Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy
Undoing the demos: Neoliberalism’s stealth destruction of liberal democracy
Like Trotskyism, neoliberalism is incompatible with democracy. It has the same totalitarian
vision of world order, and nowhere this vision includes the possibility for people to chose whant
they want. If necessary the New World Order will be brought on the tips of bayonets. In this sense
it is very close tot he spirit to the Trotskyism idea of "permanent revolution"
It also enforces a new encompassing rationalism, which should displace old, "outdated"
rationality of liberal capitalism. In this review. The main features of this type of totalitarian
thinking is so called "neoliberal rationality" which like in Marxism is heavily tilted toward
viewing the people as "homo economicus". That makes neoliberalism profoundly destructive to
the fiber and future of democracy in any form.
This new neoliberal rationality now mapping
the myriad ways in which neo-liberalism, conceived as a productive mode of reason that today saturates
ever more spheres of life, articulates crucial elements of democratic language, practice and subjectivity
‘according to a specific image of the economic’ (p. 10). In so doing neo-liberalism directly assaults
the democratic imaginary that animated so much of modernity, hollowing out liberal democratic practices
and institutions while at the same time cauterising radical democratic expressions.
Here are some quotes from Wendy Brown interview
What Exactly Is Neoliberalism
to Dissent Magazine
(Nov 03, 2015):
"... I treat neoliberalism as a governing rationality through which everything is "economized" and in a very specific way: human beings become market actors and nothing but, every field of activity is seen as a market, and every entity (whether public or private, whether person, business, or state) is governed as a firm. Importantly, this is not simply a matter of extending commodification and monetization everywhere-that's the old Marxist depiction of capital's transformation of everyday life. Neoliberalism construes even non-wealth generating spheres-such as learning, dating, or exercising-in market terms, submits them to market metrics, and governs them with market techniques and practices. Above all, it casts people as human capital who must constantly tend to their own present and future value. ..."
"... The most common criticisms of neoliberalism, regarded solely as economic policy rather than as the broader phenomenon of a governing rationality, are that it generates and legitimates extreme inequalities of wealth and life conditions; that it leads to increasingly precarious and disposable populations; that it produces an unprecedented intimacy between capital (especially finance capital) and states, and thus permits domination of political life by capital; that it generates crass and even unethical commercialization of things rightly protected from markets, for example, babies, human organs, or endangered species or wilderness; that it privatizes public goods and thus eliminates shared and egalitarian access to them; and that it subjects states, societies, and individuals to the volatility and havoc of unregulated financial markets. ..."
"... with the neoliberal revolution that homo politicus is
finally vanquished as a fundamental feature of being human and of democracy. Democracy requires that
citizens be modestly oriented toward self-rule, not simply value enhancement, and that we understand
our freedom as resting in such self-rule, not simply in market conduct. When this dimension of being
human is extinguished, it takes with it the necessary energies, practices, and culture of democracy,
as well as its very intelligibility. ..."
"... For most Marxists, neoliberalism emerges in the 1970s in response to capitalism's falling rate
of profit; the shift of global economic gravity to OPEC, Asia, and other sites outside the West;
and the dilution of class power generated by unions, redistributive welfare states, large and lazy
corporations, and the expectations generated by educated democracies. From this perspective, neoliberalism
is simply capitalism on steroids: a state and IMF-backed consolidation of class power aimed at releasing
capital from regulatory and national constraints, and defanging all forms of popular solidarities,
especially labor. ..."
"... The grains of truth in this analysis don't get at the fundamental transformation of social, cultural,
and individual life brought about by neoliberal reason. They don't get at the ways that public institutions
and services have not merely been outsourced but thoroughly recast as private goods for individual
investment or consumption. And they don't get at the wholesale remaking of workplaces, schools, social
life, and individuals. For that story, one has to track the dissemination of neoliberal economization
through neoliberalism as a governing form of reason, not just a power grab by capital. There are
many vehicles of this dissemination -- law, culture, and above all, the novel political-administrative
form we have come to call governance. It is through governance practices that business models and
metrics come to irrigate every crevice of society, circulating from investment banks to schools,
from corporations to universities, from public agencies to the individual. It is through the replacement
of democratic terms of law, participation, and justice with idioms of benchmarks, objectives, and
buy-ins that governance dismantles democratic life while appearing only to instill it with "best
practices." ..."
"... Progressives generally disparage Citizens United for having flooded
the American electoral process with corporate money on the basis of tortured First Amendment reasoning
that treats corporations as persons. However, a careful reading of the majority decision also reveals
precisely the thoroughgoing economization of the terms and practices of democracy we have been talking
about. In the majority opinion, electoral campaigns are cast as "political marketplaces," just as
ideas are cast as freely circulating in a market where the only potential interference arises from
restrictions on producers and consumers of ideas-who may speak and who may listen or judge. Thus,
Justice Kennedy's insistence on the fundamental neoliberal principle that these marketplaces should
be unregulated paves the way for overturning a century of campaign finance law aimed at modestly
restricting the power of money in politics. Moreover, in the decision, political speech itself is
rendered as a kind of capital right, functioning largely to advance the position of its bearer, whether
that bearer is human capital, corporate capital, or finance capital. This understanding of political
speech replaces the idea of democratic political speech as a vital (if potentially monopolizable
and corruptible) medium for public deliberation and persuasion. ..."
"... My point was that democracy is really reduced to a whisper
in the Euro-Atlantic nations today. Even Alan Greenspan says that elections don't much matter much
because, "thanks to globalization . . . the world is governed by market forces," not elected representatives.
..."
Neoliberalism and the end of liberal democracy by Wendy Brown
Reprinted from
http://lchc.ucsd.edu/cogn_150/Readings/brown.pdf
It is a commonplace to speak of the present regime in the United States as a neoconservative one,
and to cast as a consolidated “neocon” project present efforts to intensify U.S. military capacity,
increase U.S. global hegemony, dismantle the welfare state, retrench civil liberties, eliminate the
right to abortion and affirmative action, re-Christianize the state, deregulate corporations, gut environmental
protections, reverse progressive taxation, reduce education spending while increasing prison budgets,
and feather the nests of the rich while criminalizing the poor. I do not contest the existence of a
religious-political project known as Neoconservatism or challenge the appropriateness of understanding
many of the links between these objectives in terms of a neoconservative agenda. However, I want to
think to one side of this agenda in order to consider our current predicament in terms of a neoliberal
political rationality, a rationality that exceeds particular positions on particular issues and that
undergirds important features of the Clinton decade as well as the Reagan-Bush years. Further, I want
to consider the way that this rationality is emerging as governmentality—a mode of governance encompassing
but not limited to the state, and one that produces subjects, forms of citizenship and behavior, and
a new organization of the social.
Economic Liberalism, Political Liberalism, and What Is the Neo in Neoliberalism
In ordinary parlance, neoliberalism refers to the repudiation of Keynesian welfare state economics
and the ascendance of the Chicago School of political economy—von Hayek, Friedman, and others. In popular
usage, neoliberalism is equated with a radically free market: maximized competition and free trade achieved
through economic deregulation, elimination of tariffs, and a range of monetary and social policies favorable
to business and indifferent toward poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long-term resource
depletion, and environmental destruction. Neoliberalism is most often invoked in relation to the Third
World, referring either to NAFTA-like schemes that increase the vulnerability of poor nations to the
vicissitudes of globalization or to International Monetary Fund and World Bank policies that, through
financing packages attached to “restructuring” requirements, yank the chains of every aspect of Third
World existence, including political institutions and social formations.
For progressives, neoliberalism
is thus a pejorative not only because it conjures economic policies that sustain or deepen local poverty
and the subordination of peripheral to core nations, but also because it is compatible with, and sometimes
even productive of, authoritarian, despotic, para-militaristic, and corrupt state forms as well as agents
within civil society.
While these referents capture important effects of neoliberalism, they also reduce neoliberalism
to a bundle of economic policies with inadvertent political and social consequences: they fail to address
the political rationality that both organizes these policies and reaches beyond the market. Moreover,
these referents do not capture the neo in neoliberalism, tending instead to treat the contemporary phenomenon
as little more than a revival of classical liberal political economy.
Finally, they obscure the specifically political register of neoliberalism in the First World: that
is, its powerful erosion of liberal democratic institutions and practices in places like the United
States. My concern in this essay is with these neglected dimensions of neoliberalism.
One of the more incisive accounts of neoliberal political rationality comes from a surprising quarter:
Michel Foucault is not generally heralded as a theorist of liberalism or of political economy. Yet Foucault’s
1978 and 1979 Collège de France lectures, long unpublished,2 consisted of his critical analysis of two
groups of neoliberal economists: the Ordo-liberal school in postwar Germany (so named because its members,
originally members of the Freiburg School, published mainly in the journal Ordo) and the Chicago School
that arose midcentury in the United States. Thanks to the German sociologist Thomas Lemke, we have an
excellent summary and interpretation of Foucault’s lectureson neoliberalism; in what follows I will
draw extensively from Lemke’s work.
It may be helpful, before beginning a consideration of neoliberalism as a political rationality,
to mark the conventional difference between political and economic liberalism—a difference especially
confusing for Americans for whom “liberal” tends to signify a progressive political viewpoint and, in
particular, support for the welfare state and other New Deal institutions, along with relatively high
levels of political and legal intervention in the social sphere.4 In addition, given the contemporary
phenomena of both neoconservatism and neoliberalism, and the association of both with the political
right, ours is a time of often bewildering political nomenclature.5 Briefly, then, in economic thought,
liberalism contrasts with mercantilism on one side and Keynesianism or socialism on the other; its classical
version refers to a maximization of free trade and competition achieved by minimum interference from
political institutions. In the history of political thought, while individual liberty remains a touchstone,
liberalism signifies an order in which the state exists to secure the freedom of individuals on a formally
egalitarian basis. A liberal political order may harbor either liberal or Keynesian economic policies—it
may lean in the direction of maximizing liberty (its politically “conservative” tilt) or of maximizing
equality (its politically “liberal” tilt), but in contemporary political parlance, it is no more or
less a liberal democracy because of one leaning or the other. Indeed, the American convention of referring
to advocates of the welfare state as political liberals is especially peculiar, given that American
conservatives generally hew more closely to both the classical economic and the political doctrines
of liberalism—it turns the meaning of liberalism in the direction of liberality rather than liberty.
For our purposes, what is crucial is that the liberalism in what has come to be called neoliberalism
refers to liberalism’s economic variant, recuperating selected pre-Keynesian assumptions about the generation
of wealth and its distribution, rather than to liberalism as a political doctrine, as a set of political
institutions, or as political practices. The neo in neoliberalism, however, establishes these principles
on a significantly different analytic basis from those set forth by Adam Smith, as will become clear
below. Moreover, neoliberalism is not simply a set of economic policies; it is not only about facilitating
free trade, maximizing corporate profits, and challenging welfarism. Rather, neoliberalism carries a
social analysis that, when deployed as a form of governmentality, reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject
to education policy to practices of empire. Neoliberal rationality, while foregrounding the market,
is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; it involves extending and disseminating market
values to all institutions and social action, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player.
This essay explores the political implications of neoliberal rationality for liberal democracy—the
implications of the political rationality corresponding to, legitimating, and legitimated by the neoliberal
turn.
While Lemke, following Foucault, is careful to mark some of the differences between Ordo-liberal
thought and its successor and radicalizer, the Chicago School, I will be treating contemporary neoliberal
political rationality without attending to these differences in some of its source material. A rich
genealogy of neoliberalism as it is currently practiced—one that mapped and contextualized the contributions
of the two schools of political economy, traced the ways that rational choice theory differentially
adhered and evolved in the various social sciences and their governmental applications, and described
the interplay of all these currents with developments in capital over the past half century—would be
quite useful. But this essay is not such a genealogy. Rather, my aim is to consider our current political
predicament in terms of neoliberal political rationality, whose chief characteristics are enumerated
below.
- The political sphere, along with every other dimension of contemporary existence, is submitted
to an economic rationality; or, put the other way around, not only is the human being configured exhaustively
as homo oeconomicus, but all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality. While
this entails submitting every action and policy to considerations of profitability, equally important
is the production of all human and institutional action as rational entrepreneurial action, conducted
according to a calculus of utility, benefit, or satisfaction against a microeconomic grid of scarcity,
supply and demand, and moral value-neutrality. Neoliberalism does not simply assume that all aspects
of social, cultural, and political life can be reduced to such a calculus; rather, it develops institutional
practices and rewards for enacting this vision. That is, through discourse and policy promulgating its
criteria, neoliberalism produces rational actors and imposes a market rationale for decision making
in all spheres. Importantly, then, neoliberalism involves a normative rather than ontological claim
about the pervasiveness of economic rationality and it advocates the institution building, policies,
and discourse development appropriate to such a claim. Neoliberalism is a constructivist project: it
does not presume the ontological givenness of a thoroughgoing economic rationality for all domains of
society but rather takes as its task the development, dissemination, and institutionalization of such
a rationality. This point is further developed in (2) below.
- In contrast with the notorious laissez-faire and human propensity to “truck and barter” stressed
by classical economic liberalism, neoliberalism does not conceive of either the market itself or rational
economic behavior as purely natural. Both are constructed—organized by law and political institutions,
and requiring political intervention and orchestration. Far from flourishing when left alone, the economy
must be directed, buttressed, and protected by law and policy as well as by the dissemination of social
norms designed to facilitate competition, free trade, and rational economic action on the part of every
member and institution of society. In Lemke’s account, “In the Ordo-liberal scheme, the market does
not amount to a natural economic reality, with intrinsic laws that the art of government must bear in
mind and respect; instead, the market can be constituted and kept alive only by dint of political interventions.
. . . [C]ompetition, too, is not a natural fact. . . . [T]his fundamental economic mechanism can function
only if support is forthcoming to bolster a series of conditions, and adherence to the latter must consistently
be guaranteed by legal measures” (193).
The neoliberal formulation of the state and especially of specific legal arrangements and decisions
as the precondition and ongoing condition of the market does not mean that the market is controlled
by the state but precisely the opposite. The market is the organizing and regulative principle of the
state and society, along three different lines:
- The state openly responds to needs of the market, whether through monetary and fiscal policy,
immigration policy, the treatment of criminals, or the structure of public education. In so doing, the
state is no longer encumbered by the danger of incurring the legitimation deficits predicted by 1970s
social theorists and political economists such as Nicos Poulantzas, Jürgen Habermas, and James O’Connor.6
Rather, neoliberal rationality extended to the state itself indexes the state’s success according to
its ability to sustain and foster the market and ties state legitimacy to such success. This is a new
form of legitimation, one that “founds a state,” according to Lemke, and contrasts with the Hegelian
and French revolutionary notion of the constitutional state as the emergent universal representative
of the people. As Lemke describes Foucault’s account of Ordo-liberal thinking, “economic liberty produces
the legitimacy for a form of sovereignty limited to guaranteeing economic activity . . . a state that
was no longer defined in terms of an historical mission but legitimated itself with reference to economic
growth” (196).
- The state itself is enfolded and animated by market rationality: that is, not simply profitability
but a generalized calculation of cost and benefit becomes the measure of all state practices. Political
discourse on all matters is framed in entrepreneurial terms; the state must not simply concern itself
with the market but think and behave like a market actor across all of its functions, including law.
7
- Putting (a) and (b) together, the health and growth of the economy is the basis of state legitimacy,
both because the state is forthrightly responsible for the health of the economy and because of the
economic rationality to which state practices have been submitted. Thus, “It’s the economy, stupid”
becomes more than a campaign slogan; rather, it expresses the principle of the state’s legitimacy and
the basis for state action—from constitutional adjudication and campaign finance reform to welfare and
education policy to foreign policy, including warfare and the organization of “homeland security.”
- The extension of economic rationality to formerly noneconomic domains and institutions reaches
individual conduct, or, more precisely, prescribes the citizen-subject of a neoliberal order. Whereas
classical liberalism articulated a distinction, and at times even a tension, among the criteria for
individual moral, associational, and economic actions (hence the striking differences in tone, subject
matter, and even prescriptions between Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and his Theory of Moral Sentiments),
neoliberalism normatively constructs and interpellates individuals as entrepreneurial actors in every
sphere of life. It figures individuals as rational, calculating creatures whose moral autonomy is measured
by their capacity for “self-care”—the ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions.
In making the individual fully responsible for her- or himself, neoliberalism equates moral responsibility
with rational action; it erases the discrepancy between economic and moral behavior by configuring morality
entirely as a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences. But in so doing,
it carries responsibility for the self to new heights: the rationally calculating individual bears full
responsibility for the consequences of his or her action no matter how severe the constraints on this
action—for example, lack of skills, education, and child care in a period of high unemployment and limited
welfare benefits. Correspondingly, a “mismanaged life,” the neoliberal appellation for failure to navigate
impediments to prosperity, becomes a new mode of depoliticizing social and economic powers and at the
same time reduces political citizenship to an unprecedented degree of passivity and political complacency.
The model neoliberal citizen is one who strategizes for her- or himself among various social, political,
and economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or organize these options.
A fully realized neoliberal citizenry would be the opposite of public-minded; indeed, it would barely
exist as a public. The body politic ceases to be a body but is rather a group of individual entrepreneurs
and consumers . . . which is, of course, exactly how voters are addressed in most American campaign
discourse.8 Other evidence for progress in the development of such a citizenry is not far from hand:
consider the market rationality permeating universities today, from admissions and recruiting to the
relentless consumer mentality of students as they consider university brand names, courses, and services,
from faculty raiding and pay scales to promotion criteria.9 Or consider the way in which consequential
moral lapses (of a sexual or criminal nature) by politicians, business executives, or church and university
administrators are so often apologized for as “mistakes in judgment,” implying that it was the calculation
that was wrong, not the act, actor, or rationale.
The state is not without a project in the making of the neoliberal subject. It attempts to construct
prudent subjects through policies that organize such prudence: this is the basis of a range of welfare
reforms such as workfare and single-parent penalties, changes in the criminal code such as the “three
strikes law,” and educational voucher schemes. Because neoliberalism casts rational action as a norm
rather than an ontology, social policy is the means by which the state produces subjects whose compass
is set entirely by their rational assessment of the costs and benefits of certain acts, whether those
acts pertain to teen pregnancy, tax fraud, or retirement planning. The neoliberal citizen is calculating
rather than rule abiding, a Benthamite rather than a Hobbesian. The state is one of many sites framing
the calculations leading to social behaviors that keep costs low and productivity high. This mode of
governmentality (techniques of governing that exceed express state action and orchestrate the subject’s
conduct toward himor herself) convenes a “free” subject who rationally deliberates about alternative
courses of action, makes choices, and bears responsibility for the consequences of these choices. In
this way, Lemke argues, “the state leads and controls subjects without being responsible for them”;
as individual “entrepreneurs” in every aspect of life, subjects become wholly responsible for their
well-being and citizenship is reduced to success in this entrepreneurship (201). Neoliberal subjects
are controlled through their freedom—not simply, as thinkers from the Frankfurt School through Foucault
have argued, because freedom within an order of domination can be an instrument of that domination,
but because of neoliberalism’s moralization of the consequences of this freedom. Such control also means
that the withdrawal of the state from certain domains, followed by the privatization of certain state
functions, does not amount to a dismantling of government but rather constitutes a technique of governing;
indeed, it is the signature technique of neoliberal governance, in which rational economic action suffused
throughout society replaces express state rule or provision. Neoliberalism shifts “the regulatory competence
of the state onto ‘responsible,’ ‘rational’ individuals [with the aim of] encourag[ing] individuals
to give their lives a specific entrepreneurial form” (Lemke, 202).
- Finally, the suffusion of both the state and the subject with economic rationality has the effect
of radically transforming and narrowing the criteria for good social policy vis-à-vis classical liberal
democracy. Not only must social policy meet profitability tests, incite and unblock competition, and
produce rational subjects, it obeys the entrepreneurial principle of “equal inequality for all” as it
“multiples and expands entrepreneurial forms with the body social” (Lemke, 195). This is the principle
that links the neoliberal governmentalization of the state with that of the social and the subject.
Taken together, the extension of economic rationality to all aspects of thought and activity, the
placement of the state in forthright and direct service to the economy, the rendering of the state tout
court as an enterprise organized by market rationality, the production of the moral subject as an entrepreneurial
subject, and the construction of social policy according to these criteria might appear as a more intensive
rather than fundamentally new form of the saturation of social and political realms by capital. That
is, the political rationality of neoliberalism might be read as issuing from a stage of capitalism that
simply underscores Marx’s argument that capital penetrates and transforms every aspect of life—remaking
everything in its image and reducing every value and activity to its cold rationale. All that would
be new here is the flagrant and relentless submission of the state and the individual, the church and
the university, morality, sex, marriage, and leisure practices to this rationale. Or better, the only
novelty would be the recently achieved hegemony of rational choice theory in the human sciences, self-represented
as an independent and objective branch of knowledge rather than an expression of the dominance of capital.
Another reading that would figure neoliberalism as continuous with the past would theorize it through
Weber’s rationalization thesis rather than Marx’s argument about capital. The extension of market rationality
to every sphere, and especially the reduction of moral and political judgment to a cost-benefit calculus,
would represent precisely the evisceration of substantive values by instrumental rationality that Weber
predicted as the future of a disenchanted world. Thinking and judging are reduced to instrumental calculation
in Weber’s “polar night of icy darkness”—there is no morality, no faith, no heroism, indeed no meaning
outside the market.
Yet invaluable as Marx’s theory of capital and Weber’s theory of rationalization are in understanding
certain aspects of neoliberalism, neither brings into view the historical-institutional rupture it signifies,
the form of governmentality it replaces and the form it inaugurates, and hence the modalities of resistance
it renders outmoded and those that must be developed if it is to be effectively challenged. Neoliberalism
is not an inevitable historical development of capital and instrumental rationality; it is not the unfolding
of laws of capital or of instrumental rationality suggested by a Marxist or Weberian analysis but represents
instead a new and contingent organization and operation of both. Moreover, neither analysis articulates
the shift neoliberalism heralds from relatively differentiated moral, economic, and political rationalities
and venues in liberal democratic orders to their discursive and practical integration. Neoliberal governmentality
undermines the relative autonomy of certain institutions—law, elections, the police, the public sphere—from
one another and from the market, an independence that formerly sustained an interval and a tension between
a capitalist political economy and a liberal democratic political system. The implications of this transformation
are significant. Herbert Marcuse worried about the loss of a dialectical opposition within capitalism
when it “delivers the goods”—that is, when, by the mid–twentieth century, a relatively complacent middle
class had taken the place of the hardlaboring impoverished masses Marx depicted as the negating contradiction
to the concentrated wealth of capital—but neoliberalism entails the erosion of oppositional political,
moral, or subjective claims located outside capitalist rationality yet inside liberal democratic society,
that is, the erosion of institutions, venues, and values organized by nonmarket rationalities in democracies.
When democratic principles of governance, civil codes, and even religious morality are submitted to
economic calculation, when no value or good stands outside of this calculus, then sources of opposition
to, and mere modulation of, capitalist rationality disappear. This reminds us that however much a left
analysis has identified a liberal political order with legitimating, cloaking, and mystifying the stratifications
of society achieved by capitalism (and achieved as well by racial, sexual, and gender superordinations),
it is also the case that liberal democratic principles of governance— liberalism as a political doctrine—have
functioned as something of an antagonist to these stratifications. As Marx himself argued in “On the
Jewish Question,” formal political principles of equality and freedom (with their attendant promises
of individual autonomy and dignity) figure an alternative vision of humanity and alternative social
and moral referents to those of the capitalist order within which they are asserted. This is the Janus-face
or at least Janus-potential of liberal democracy vis-à-vis a capitalist economy: while liberal democracy
encodes, reflects, and legitimates capitalist social relations, it simultaneously resists, counters,
and tempers them.
Put simply, what liberal democracy has provided over the past two centuries is a modest ethical gap
between economy and polity. Even as liberal democracy converges with many capitalist values (property
rights, individualism, Hobbesian assumptions underneath all contracts, etc.), the formal distinction
it establishes between moral and political principles on the one hand and the economic order on the
other has also served to insulate citizens against the ghastliness of life exhaustively ordered by the
market and measured by market values. It is this gap that a neoliberal political rationality closes
as it submits every aspect of political and social life to economic calculation: asking not, for example,
what liberal constitutionalism stands for, what moral or political values it protects and preserves,
but rather what efficacy or profitability constitutionalism promotes . . . or interdicts. Liberal democracy
cannot be submitted to neoliberal political governmentality and survive.
There is nothing in liberal democracy’s basic institutions or values—from free elections, representative
democracy, and individual liberties equally distributed to modest power-sharing or even more substantive
political participation—that inherently meets the test of serving economic competitiveness or inherently
withstands a cost-benefit analysis. And it is liberal democracy that is going under in the present moment,
even as the flag of American “democracy” is being planted everywhere it can find or create soft ground.
(That “democracy” is the rubric under which so much antidemocratic imperial and domestic policy is enacted
suggests that we are in an interregnum—or, more precisely, that neoliberalism borrows extensively from
the old regime to legitimate itself even as it also develops and disseminates new codes of legitimacy.
More about this below.) Nor is liberal democracy a temporary casualty of recent events or of a neoconservative
agenda. As the foregoing account of neoliberal governmentality suggests, while post-9/11 international
and domestic policy may have both hastened and highlighted the erosion of liberal democratic institutions
and principles, this erosion is not simply the result of a national security strategy or even of the
Bush administration’s unprecedented indifference to the plight of the poor, civil liberties, law valued
as principle rather than tactic, or conventional liberal democratic criteria for legitimate foreign
policy.10
My argument here is twofold. First, neoliberal rationality has not caused but rather has facilitated
the dismantling of democracy during the current national security crisis. Democratic values and institutions
are trumped by a cost-benefit and efficiency rationale for practices ranging from government secrecy
(even government lying) to the curtailment of civil liberties. Second, the post-9/11 period has brought
the ramifications of neoliberal rationality into sharp focus, largely through practices and policies
that progressives assail as hypocrisies, lies, or contradictions but that may be better understood as
neoliberal policies and actions taking shape under the legitimating cloth of a liberal democratic discourse
increasingly void of substance.
The Bush administration’s imperial adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly borrowed extensively
from the legitimating rhetoric of democracy. Not only were both wars undertaken as battles for “our
way of life” against regimes said to harbor enemies (terrorists) or dangers (weapons of mass destruction)
to that way of life, but both violations of national sovereignty were justified by the argument that
democracy could and ought to take shape in those places—each nation is said to need liberation from
brutal and despotic rule. The standard left criticism of the first justification is that “our way of
life” is more seriously threatened by a politics of imperialism and by certain policies of homeland
security than by these small nations. But this criticism ignores the extent to which “our way of life”
is being figured not in a classically liberal democratic but in a neoliberal idiom: that is, as the
ability of the entrepreneurial subject and state to rationally plot means and ends and the ability of
the state to secure the conditions, at home and abroad, for a market rationality and subjectivity by
removing their impediments (whether Islamic fundamentalism or excessive and arbitrary state sovereignty
in the figure of Saddam Hussein). Civil liberties are perfectly expendable within this conception of
“our way of life”; unlike property rights, they are largely irrelevant to homo oeconomicus. Their attenuation
or elimination does not falsify the project of protecting democracy in its neoliberal mode.
The Left criticized the second justification, that the United States could or ought to liberate Afghanistan
from the Taliban and Iraq from Hussein, as both hypocritical (the United States had previously funded
and otherwise propped up both regimes) and disingenuous (U.S. foreign policy has never rested on the
principle of developing democracy and was not serious about the project in these settings). Again, however,
translated into neoliberal terms, “democracy,” here or there, does not signify a set of independent
political institutions and civic practices comprising equality, freedom, autonomy and the principle
of popular sovereignty but rather indicates only a state and subjects organized by market rationality.
Indeed, democracy could even be understood as a code word for availability to this rationality; removal
of the Taliban and Baath party pave the way to that availability, and democracy is simply the name of
the regime, conforming to neoliberal requirements, that must replace them. When Paul Bremer, the U.S.-appointed
interim governor of Iraq, declared on May 26, 2003 (just weeks after the sacking of Baghdad and four
days after the UN lifted economic sanctions), that Iraq was “open for business,” he made clear exactly
how democracy would take shape in post- Saddam Iraq. Duty-free imported goods poured into the country,
finishing off many local Iraqi businesses already damaged by the war. Multinationals tumbled over themselves
to get a piece of the action, and foreign direct investment to replace and privatize state industry
was described by the corporate executives advising the Bush administration as the “answer to all of
Iraq’s problems.”11 The question of democratic institutions, as Bremer made clear by scrapping early
plans to form an interim Iraqi government in favor of installing his own team of advisers, was at best
secondary to the project of privatizing large portions of the economy and outsourcing the business of
policing a society in rubble, chaos, and terror occasioned by the combination of ongoing military skirmishes
and armed local gangs.12
It is not news that replacements for the Taliban and the Baath regimes need not be rights-based,
formally egalitarian, representative, or otherwise substantively democratic in order to serve the purposes
of global capitalism or the particular geopolitical interests of the United States. Nor is it news that
the replacements of these regimes need not be administered by the Afghans or Iraqis themselves to satisfy
American and global capitalist purposes and interests, though the residues of old-fashioned democracy
inside the legitimation project of neoliberalism make even puppet or faux rule by an appointed governing
council, or by officials elected in severely compromised election conditions, ideologically preferable
to full-fledged directorship by the American occupation. What is striking, however, is the boldness
of a raw market approach to political problem solving, the extent to which radical privatization schemes
and a flourishing market economy built on foreign investment are offered not simply as the path to democracy
but as the name and the measure of democracy in these nations, a naming and measuring first appearing
in post-1989 Eastern Europe a decade earlier. Not only are democratic institutions largely irrelevant—
and at times even impediments—to neoliberal governmentality, but the success of such governmentality
does not depend on the question of whether it is locally administered or externally imposed. Market
rationality knows no culture or country, and administrators are, as the economists say, fungible. Indeed,
at this juncture in the displacement of liberal democracy by neoliberal governmentality, the question
is how much legitimacy neoliberal governance requires from a democratic vocabulary—how much does neoliberalism
have to cloak itself in liberal democratic discourse and work with liberal democratic institutions?
This is less a theoretical than a historical-empirical question about how deeply and extensively
neoliberal rationality has taken hold as ideology, that is, how much and where neoliberal governance
can legitimate itself in its own terms, without borrowing from other discourses. (Neoliberalism can
become dominant as governmentality without being dominant as ideology—the former refers to governing
practices and the latter to a popular order of belief that may or may not be fully in line with the
former, and that may even be a site of resistance to it.) Clearly, a rhetoric of democracy and the shell
of liberal democratic institutions remain more important in the imperial heartland than in recently
“liberated” or conquered societies with few if any democratic traditions of legitimacy. However, the
fact that George W. Bush retains the support of the majority of the American people, despite his open
flaunting of democratic principles amid a failing economy and despite, too, evidence that the public
justification for invading Iraq relied on cooked intelligence, suggests that neoliberalism has taken
deep hold in the homeland. Particularly striking is the number of pundits who have characterized this
willful deceit of the people as necessary rather than criminal, as a means to a rational end, thereby
reminding us that one of the more dangerous features of neoliberal evisceration of a non-market morality
lies in undercutting the basis for judging government actions by any criteria other than expedience.13
Just as neoliberal governmentality reduces the tension historically borne by the state between democratic
values and the needs of capital as it openly weds the state to capital and resignifies democracy as
ubiquitous entrepreneurialism, so neoliberalism also smooths an old wrinkle in the fabric of liberal
democratic foreign policy between domestic political values and international interests. During the
cold war, political progressives could use American sanctimony about democracy to condemn international
actions that propped up or installed authoritarian regimes and overthrew popularly elected leaders in
the Third World. The divergence between strategic international interests and democratic ideology produced
a potential legitimation problem for foreign policy, especially as applied to Southeast Asia and Central
and Latin America. Neoliberalism, by redefining democracy as thoroughgoing market rationality in state
and society, a redefinition abetted by the postcommunist “democratization” process in Eastern Europe,
largely eliminates that problem. Certainly human rights talk is ubiquitous in global democracy discourse,
but not since Jimmy Carter’s ill-fated efforts to make human rights a substantive dimension of foreign
policy have they served as more than window dressing for neoliberal adventures in democracy.
Mourning Liberal Democracy
An assault on liberal democratic values and institutions has been plainly evident in recent events:
civil liberties undermined by the USA Patriot Acts and the Total Information Awareness (later renamed
Total Terror Awareness) scheme, Oakland police shooting wood and rubber bullets at peaceful antiwar
protesters, a proposed Oregon law to punish all civil disobedience as terrorism (replete with twenty
five-year jail terms), and McCarthyite deployments of patriotism to suppress ordinary dissent and its
iconography. It is evident as well in the staging of aggressive imperial wars and ensuing occupations
along with the continued dismantling of the welfare state and the progressive taxation schemes already
diluted by the Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations. It has been more subtly apparent in
“softer” events, such as the de-funding of public education that led eighty four Oregon school districts
to sheer almost a month off the school year in spring 2003 and delivered provisional pink slips to thousands
of California teachers at the end of the 2002–03 academic year.14
Or consider the debate about whether antiwar protests constituted unacceptable costs for a financially
strapped cities—even many critics of current U.S. foreign policy expressed anger at peaceful civil disobedients
over the expense and disruption they caused, implying that the value of public opinion and protest should
be measured against its dollar cost.15 Together these phenomena suggest a transformation of American
liberal democracy into a political and social form for which we do not yet have a name, a form organized
by a combination of neoliberal governmentality and imperial world politics, shaped in the short run
by global economic and security crises. They indicate a form in which an imperial agenda is able to
take hold precisely because the domestic soil has been loosened for it by neoliberal rationality.
This form is not fascism or totalitarian as we have known them historically, nor are these labels
likely to prove helpful in identifying or criticizing it.16 Rather, this is a political condition in
which the substance of many of the significant features of constitutional and representative democracy
have been gutted, jettisoned, or end-run, even as they continue to be promulgated ideologically, serving
as a foil and shield for their undoing and for the doing of death elsewhere. These features include
civil liberties equally distributed and protected; a press and other journalistic media minimally free
from corporate ownership on one side and state control on the other; uncorrupted and unbought elections;
quality public education oriented, inter alia, to producing the literacies relevant to informed and
active citizenship; government openness, honesty, and accountability; a judiciary modestly insulated
from political and commercial influence; separation of church and state; and a foreign policy guided
at least in part by the rationale of protecting these domestic values. None of these constitutive elements
of liberal democracy was ever fully realized in its short history—they have always been compromised
by a variety of economic and social powers, from white supremacy to capitalism. And liberal democracies
in the First World have always required other peoples to pay—politically, socially, and economically—for
what these societies have enjoyed; that is, there has always been a colonially and imperially inflected
gap between what has been valued in the core and what has been required from the periphery. So it is
important to be precise here. Ours is not the first time in which elections have been bought, manipulated,
and even engineered by the courts, the first time the press has been slavish to state and corporate
power, the first time the United States has launched an aggressive assault on a sovereign nation or
threatened the entire world with its own weapons of mass destruction.
What is unprecedented about this time is the extent to which basic principles and institutions of
democracy are becoming nothing other than ideological shells concealing their opposite as well as the
extent to which these principles and institutions even as values are being abandoned by large parts
of the American population. Elements in this transformation include the development of the most secretive
government in fifty years (the gutting of the Freedom of Information Act was one of the quiet early
accomplishments of the G. W. Bush administration, the “classified” status of its more than 1,000 contracts
with Halliburton one of its more recent); the plumping of corporate wealth combined with the reduction
of social spending for limiting the economic vulnerability of the poor and middle classes; a bought,
consolidated, and muffled press that willingly cooperates in its servitude (emblematic in this regard
is the Judith Miller (non)scandal, in which the star New York Times journalist wittingly reported Pentagon
propaganda about Iraqi WMDs as journalistically discovered fact); and intensified policing in every
corner of American life— airports, university admissions offices, mosques, libraries, workplaces— a
policing undertaken both by official agents of the state and by an interpellated citizenry.
A potentially permanent “state of emergency” combined with an infinitely expandable rhetoric of patriotism
overtly legitimates undercutting the Bill of Rights and legitimates as well abrogation of conventional
democratic principles in setting foreign policy, principles that include respect for nation-state sovereignty
and reasoned justifications for war. But behind these rhetorics there is another layer of discourse
facilitating the dismantling of liberal democratic institutions and practices: a governmentality of
neoliberalism that eviscerates nonmarket morality and thus erodes the root of democracy in principle
at the same time that it raises the status of profit and expediency as the criteria for policy making.
There is much that is disturbing in the emergence of neoliberal governmentality and a great deal more
work to do in theorizing its contribution to the organization and possibilities in current and future
political life in the United States. In particular, as I suggested at the outset of this essay, filling
in the contemporary political picture would require mapping the convergences and tensions between a
(nonpartisan) neoliberal governmentality on the one hand and the specific agendas of Clintonian centrists
and Reagan-Bush neoconservatives on the other. It would require exploring the continued efficacy of
political rhetorics of morality and principle as neoliberalism voids the substance of and undercuts
the need for extramarket morality.
It would require discerning what distinguishes neoliberal governmentality from old-fashioned corporatism
and old-fashioned political realism. It would require examining the contradictory political imperatives
delivered by the market and set as well by the tensions between nationstate interests and globalized
capitalism indifferent to states and sovereignty. And it would require examining the points at which
U.S. imperial policies converge with and diverge from or even conflict with neoliberal governmentality.
By way of conclusion, however, I leave aside these questions to reflect briefly on the implications
for the Left of neoliberalism’s erosion of liberal democracy. While leftists of the past quarter century
were rarely as antagonistic to liberal democracy as the Old Left, neither did we fully embrace it; at
times we resented and railed against it, and certainly we harbored an aim to transform it into something
else—social democracy or some form of radical democracy. So the Left is losing something it never loved,
or at best was highly ambivalent about. We are also losing a site of criticism and political agitation—we
criticized liberal democracy not only for its hypocrisy and ideological trickery but also for its institutional
and rhetorical embedding of bourgeois, white, masculinist, and heterosexual superordination at the heart
of humanism. Whatever loose identity we had as a Left took shape in terms of a differentiation from
liberalism’s willful obliviousness to social stratification and injury that were glossed and hence secured
by its formal juridical categories of liberty and equality.
Still, liberalism, as Gayatri Spivak once wrote in a very different context, is also that which one
“cannot not want” (given the other historical possibilities, given the current historical meaning of
its deprivation). Even here, though, the desire is framed as roundabout and against itself, as Spivak’s
artful double negative indicates. It indicates a dependency we are not altogether happy about, an organization
of desire we wish were otherwise. What might be the psychic/social/intellectual implications for leftists
of losing this vexed object of attachment? What are the possible trajectories for a melancholic incorporation
of that toward which one is openly ambivalent; or perhaps even hostile, resentful, rebellious?\
Freud posits melancholy as occasioned by ambivalence, though the ambivalence may be more unconsciously
sustained than I am suggesting is the case for the Left’s relationship to liberal democracy. More precisely,
Freud’s focus in theorizing melancholy is love that does not know or want to avow its hostility, whereas
the task before us is to consider hostility that does not know or want to avow its love or dependency.
Still, Freud’s thinking about melancholia remains useful here as a theory of loss amid ambivalent attachment
and dependence and a theory of identity formation at the site of an ungrievable passion or attachment.
It reminds us to consider how left melancholia about liberal democracy would not just be a problematic
affect but would constitute a formation of the Left itself.
Incorporating the death of a loathed object to which one was nonetheless attached often takes the
form of acting out the loathed qualities of the object. I once had an acquaintance whose muchdespised
and abusive father died. While my friend overtly rejoiced at his passing, in the ensuing months she
engaged in extraordinary outbursts of verbal and physical abuse toward friends and colleagues, even
throwing things at them as she had described her father throwing household objects during her childhood.
Another friend buried, after years of illness, a childish, hysterical, histrionic, and demanding mother,
one who relentlessly produced herself as a victim amid her own aggressive demands. Relieved as my friend
was to have done with this parent, what should emerge over the following year but exactly such tendencies
in her own relationships? So this is one danger: that we would act out to keep alive those aspects of
the political formation we are losing, that we would take up and perform liberal democracy’s complacencies,
cruelties, or duplicities, stage them in our own work and thinking. This behavior would issue in part
from the need to preserve the left identity and project that took shape at the site of liberal democracy,
and in part from ambivalence about liberal democracy itself. In response to the loss of an object both
loved and loathed, in which only the loathing or contempt is avowed, melancholy sustains the loved object,
and continues to provide a cover for the love—a continued means of disavowing it—by incorporating and
performing the loathsomeness.
There are other ways ambivalently structured loss can take shape as melancholic, including the straightforward
possibility of idealizing a lost object as it was never idealized when alive. Straightforward, perhaps,
but not simple, for this affect also involves remorse for a past of not loving the object well enough
and self-reproach for ever having wished for its death or replacement. As idealization fueled by guilt,
this affect also entails heightened aggression toward challenges or challengers to the idealization.
In this guilt, anxiety, and defensiveness over the loss of liberal democracy, we would feel compelled
to defend basic principles of liberalism or simply defend liberalism as a whole in a liberal way, that
is, we would give up being critical of liberalism and, in doing so, give up being left. Freud identifies
this surrender of identity upon the death of an ambivalent object as the suicidal wish in melancholia,17
a wish abetted in our case by a more general disorientation about what the Left is or stands for today.
Evidence for such a surrender in the present extends from our strikingly unnuanced defenses of free
speech, privacy, and other civil liberties to the staging of antiwar protests as “patriotic” through
the iconography of the American flag. Often explained as what the Left must do when public discourse
moves rightward, such accounts presume a single political continuum, ranged from extreme left to extreme
right, in which liberals and conservatives are nothing more than the moderate versions of the extremes
(communists and fascists). Not only does the model of the continuum reduce the variety of political
possibility in modernity to matters of degree rather than kind, it erases the distinctiveness of a left
critique and vision. Just as today’s neoliberals bear little in common with traditional conservatives,
so the Left has traditionally stood for a set of values and possibilities qualitatively different from
those of welfare state liberals. Times of alliance and spheres of overlap obviously exist, but a continuum
does not capture the nature of these convergences and tactical linkages any better than it captures
the differences between, for example, a liberal commitment to rights-based equality and a left commitment
to emancipating the realm of production, or between a liberal enthusiasm for the welfare state and a
left critique of its ideological and regulatory dimensions. So the idea that leftists must automatically
defend liberal political values when they are on the ropes, while sensible from a liberal perspective,
does not facilitate a left challenge to neoliberalism if the Left still wishes to advocate in the long
run for something other than liberal democracy in a capitalist socioeconomic order.
Of course, there are aspects of liberal democracy that the Left has come to value and incorporate
into its own vision of the good society—for example, an array of individual liberties that are largely
unrelated to the freedom from domination promised by transforming the realm of production. But articulating
this renewed left vision differs from defending civil liberties in liberal terms, a defense that itself
erases a left project as it consigns it to something outside those terms. Similarly, patriotism and
flag-waving are surely at odds with a left formulation of justice, even as love of America, represented
through icons other than the flag or through narratives other than “supporting the troops,” might well
have a part in this formulation. Finally, not only does defending liberal democracy in liberal terms
sacrifice a left vision, but this sacrifice discredits the Left by tacitly reducing it to nothing more
than a permanent objection to the existing regime. It renders the Left a party of complaint rather than
a party with an alternative political, social, and economic vision.
Still, if we are slipping from liberalism to fascism, and if radical democracy or socialism is nowhere
on the political horizon, don’t we have to defend liberal democratic institutions and values? Isn’t
this the lesson of Weimar? I have labored to suggest that this is not the right diagnosis of our predicament:
it does not grasp what is at stake in neoliberal governmentality—which is not fascism—nor on what grounds
it might be challenged. Indeed, the left defense of the welfare state in the 1980s, which seemed to
stem from precisely such an analysis—“if we can’t have socialism, at least we should preserve welfare
state capitalism”—backfired from just such a misdiagnosis. On the one hand, rather than articulating
an emancipatory vision that included the eradication rather than regulation of poverty, the Left appeared
aligned with big government, big spending, and misplaced compassion for those construed as failing to
give their lives proper entrepreneurial shape. On the other hand, the welfare state was dismantled on
grounds that had almost nothing to do with the terms of liberal democracy and everything to do with
neoliberal economic and political rationality. We are not simply in the throes of a right-wing or conservative
positioning within liberal democracy but rather at the threshold of a different political formation,
one that conducts and legitimates itself on different grounds from liberal democracy even as it does
not immediately divest itself of the name. It is a formation that is developing a domestic imperium
correlative with a global one, achieved through a secretive and remarkably agentic state; through corporatized
media, schools, and prisons; and through a variety of technologies for intensified local administrative,
regulatory, and police powers. It is a formation made possible by the production of citizens as individual
entrepreneurial actors across all dimensions of their lives, by the reduction of civil society to a
domain for exercising this entrepreneurship, and by the figuration of the state as a firm whose products
are rational individual subjects, an expanding economy, national security, and global power.
This formation produces a twofold challenge for the Left. First, it compels us to consider the implications
of losing liberal democracy and especially its implications for our own work by learning what the Left
has depended on and demanded from liberal democracy, which aspects of it have formed the basis of our
critiques of it, rebellions against it, and identity based on differentiation from it. We may also need
to mourn liberal democracy, avowing our ambivalent attachment to it, our need for it, our mix of love
and hostility toward it. The aim of this work is framed by the second challenge, that of devising intelligent
left strategies for challenging the neoliberal political-economic formation now taking shape and an
intelligent left countervision to this formation. Ahalf century ago, Marcuse argued that capitalism
had eliminated a revolutionary subject (the proletariat) representing the negation of capitalism; consequently,
he insisted, the Left had to derive and cultivate anticapitalist principles, possibilities, and agency
from capitalism’s constitutive outside. That is, the Left needed to tap the desires— not for wealth
or goods but for beauty, love, mental and physical well-being, meaningful work, and peace—manifestly
unmet within a capitalist order and to appeal to those desires as the basis for rejecting and replacing
the order. No longer could economic contradictions of capitalism inherently fuel opposition to it; rather,
opposition had to be founded in an alternative table of values. Today, the problem Marcuse diagnosed
has expanded from capitalism to liberal democracy: oppositional consciousness cannot be generated from
liberal democracy’s false promises and hypocrisies. The space between liberal democratic ideals and
lived realities has ceased to be exploitable, because liberal democracy itself is no longer the most
salient discourse of political legitimacy and the good life. Put the other way around, the politically
exploitable hollowness in formal promises of freedom and equality has largely vanished to the extent
that both freedom and equality have been redefined by neoliberalism. Similarly, revealed connections
between political and economic actors—not merely bought politicians but arrangements of mutual profiteering
between corporate America and its political elite—do not incite outrage at malfeasance, corruption,
or injustice but appear instead as a potentially rational set of linkages between state and economy.
Thus, from the “scandal” of Enron to the “scandal” of Vice President Cheney delivering Iraq to Halliburton
to clean up and rebuild, there is no scandal. There is only market rationality, a rationality that can
encompass even a modest amount of criminality but also treats close state-corporate ties as a potentially
positive value—maximizing the aims of each—rather than as a conflict of interest. 18 Similarly, even
as the Bush administration fails to come up with WMDs in Iraq and fails to be able to install order
let alone democracy there, such deficiencies are irrelevant to the neoliberal criteria for success in
that military episode. Indeed, even the scandal of Bush’s installation as president by a politicized
Supreme Court in 2000 was more or less ingested by the American people as business as usual, an ingestion
that represents a shift from the expectation that the Supreme Court is independent of political influence
to one that tacitly accepts its inclusion in the governmentality of neoliberalism. Similarly, John Poindexter,
a key figure in the Iran-Contra affair and director of the proposed “Terrorism Information Awareness”
program that would have put all Americans under surveillance, continued to have power and legitimacy
at the Pentagon until the flap over the scheme to run a futures market on political violence in the
Middle East. All three of these projects are instances of neoliberalism’s indifference to democracy;
only the last forced Poindexter into retirement.
These examples suggest that not only liberal democratic principles but democratic morality has been
largely eviscerated—in neoliberal terms, each of these “scandals” is framed as a matter of miscalculation
or political maneuvering rather than by right and wrong, truth or falsehood, institutional propriety
or impropriety. Consequently, the Left cannot count on revealed deception, hypocrisies, interlocking
directorates, featherbedding, or corruption to stir opposition to the existing regime. It cannot count
on the expectation that moral principle undergirds political action or even on consistency as a value
by which to judge state practices or aims. Much of the American public appeared indifferent to the fact
that both the Afghan and Iraqi regimes targeted by Bush had previously been supported or even built
by earlier U.S. foreign policy. It also appeared indifferent to the touting of the “liberation” of Afghan
women as one of the great immediate achievements of the overthrow of the Taliban while the overthrow
of the Baath regime set into motion an immediately more oppressive regime of gender in Iraq. The inconsistency
does not matter much, because political reasons and reasoning that exceed or precede neoliberal criteria
have ceased to matter much. This is serious political nihilism, which no mere defense of free speech
and privacy, let alone securing the right to gay marriage or an increase in the minimum wage, will reverse.
What remains for the Left, then, is to challenge emerging neoliberal governmentality in Euro-Atlantic
states with an alternative vision of the good, one that rejects homo economicus as the norm of the
human and rejects this norm’s correlative formations of economy, society, state, and (non)morality.
In its barest form, this would be a vision in which justice would center not on maximizing individual
wealth or rights but on developing and enhancing the capacity of citizens to share power and hence to
collaboratively govern themselves. In such an order, rights and elections would be the background rather
than token of democracy; or better, rights would function to safeguard the individual against radical
democratic enthusiasms but would not themselves signal the presence or constitute the principle of democracy.
Instead, a left vision of justice would focus on practices and institutions of popular power; a modestly
egalitarian distribution of wealth and access to institutions; an incessant reckoning with all forms
of power—social, economic, political, and even psychic; a long view of the fragility and finitude of
nonhuman nature; and the importance of both meaningful activity and hospitable dwellings to human flourishing.
However differently others might place the accent marks, none of these values can be derived from neoliberal
rationality or meet neoliberal criteria for the good. The drive to develop and promulgate such a counterrationality—a
different figuration of human beings, citizenship, economic life, and the political—is critical both
to the long labor of fashioning a more just future and to the immediate task of challenging the deadly
policies of the imperial American state.
Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy
Wendy
Brown
From: Theory & Event
Volume 7,
Issue 1, 2003
10.1353/tae.2003.0020
In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:
For the American Left, the wake of 9/11, the War on Terrorism, practices of "homeland security,"
and the recent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq together produce a complex set of questions about
what to think, what to stand for, and what to organize. These questions are contoured both by our
diagnosis of the current orders of power and rule and by our vision of alternatives to these orders.
This essay aims to contribute to our necessarily collaborative intellectual effort -- no single analysis
can be comprehensive -- at diagnosing the present and formulating alternatives by reflecting on the
political rationality taking shape in the U.S. over the past quarter century. It is commonplace to
speak of the present regime in the United States as a neo-conservative one, and to cast as a consolidated
"neo-con" project present efforts to intensify U.S. military capacity, increase U.S. global hegemony,
dismantle the welfare state, retrench civil liberties, eliminate the right to abortion and affirmative
action, re-Christianize the state, de-regulate corporations, gut environmental protections, reverse
progressive taxation, reduce education spending while increasing prison budgets, and feather the
nests of the rich while criminalizing the poor. I do not contest the existence of a religious-political
project known as neo-conservatism nor challenge the appropriateness of understanding many of the
links between these objectives in terms of a neo-conservative agenda. However, I want to background
this agenda in order to consider our current predicament in terms of a neo-liberal political rationality,
a rationality that exceeds particular positions on particular issues, and one that undergirds important
features of the Clinton decade as well as the Reagan-Bush years. Further, I want to consider the
way that this rationality is emerging as governmentality -- a mode of governance encompassing but
not limited to the state, and one which produces subjects, forms of citizenship and behavior, and
a new organization of the social. In ordinary parlance, neo-liberalism refers to the repudiation
of Keynesian welfare state economics and the ascendance of the Chicago School of political economy
-- von Hayek, Friedman, et al. In popular usage, neo-liberalism is equated with a radically free
market: maximized competition and free trade achieved through economic de-regulation, elimination
of tariffs, and a range of monetary and social policies favorable to business and indifferent toward
poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long term resource depletion and environmental
destruction. Neo-liberalism is most often invoked in relation to the Third World, referring either
to NAFTA-like schemes that increase the vulnerability of poor nations to the vicissitudes of globalization
or to International Monetary Fund and World Bank policies which, through financing packages attached
to "restructuring" requirements, yank the chains of every aspect of Third World existence, including
political institutions and social formations. For progressives, neo-liberalism is thus a pejorative
not only because it conjures economic policies which sustain or deepen local poverty and the subordination
of peripheral to core nations, but also because it is compatible with, and sometimes even productive
of, authoritarian, despotic, paramilitaristic, and/or corrupt state forms and agents within civil
society.While these referents capture an important effect of neo-liberalism, they also reduce neo-liberalism
to a bundle of economic policies with inadvertent political and social consequences: they eschew
the political rationality that both organizes these policies and reaches beyond the market.
Moreover, these referents do not capture the neo in neo-liberalism, tending instead to treat
the contemporary phenomenon as little more than a revival of classical liberal political economy.
Finally, they obscure the specifically political register of neo-liberalism in the First World, that
is, its powerful erosion of liberal democratic institutions and practices in places like the United
States. My concern in this essay is with these neglected dimensions of neo-liberalism.One of the
more incisive accounts of neo-liberal political rationality comes from a surprising quarter:
Michel Foucault is not generally heralded as a theorist of liberalism or of political economy. Yet
Foucault's 1978 and 1979 College de France lectures, still untranscribed and unpublished,
consisted of presentations of his critical analysis of two groups of neo-liberal economists: the
Ordo-liberal school in postwar Germany (so...
Different scholars get curious about different things. It turns out that I'm curious about rather
different things to Wendy Brown. Her new book,
Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's
Stealth Revolution (Zone Books, New York 2015) is very fine. Certainly the clearest and
sharpest account of neoliberalism I have read so far. I'll try to summarize its insights into neoliberalism,
but also pose some questions regarding the things about which I am curious that get no mention in
it.Let's start with an example. Brown discusses the 2003 Bremer Orders, issued by Paul Bremer
and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq after the United States and its allies defeated Saddam
Hussein and occupied the country. The Bremer Orders appear at first blush to be a classic instance
of neoliberal 'shock doctrine'. The Bremer Orders decreed the sell-off of state enterprises, the
opening of Iraqi companies to foreign ownership, the restriction of labor rights and a capital-friendly
tax regime.
Brown concentrates on Bremer Order 81, the prohibition of re-use of crop seeds of protected varieties.
The Iraq seed bank, located in Abu Ghraib, did not survive the war. The United States government
handed out genetically modified seed in 2004. Iraqi farmers would now be permanently bound to agribusiness
companies such as Monsanto, Dow and DuPont. Agriculture has existed in Iraq since 8000BC, but never
like this before.
Through a small 'legal tweak', a domain not previously incorporated into the global market economy
became subject to the 'best practices' of agribusiness. Brown: "Thus, Order 81 epitomizes the neoliberal
mobilization of law not to repress or punish, but to structure competition and effect 'the conduct
of conduct.'" (148) Order 81 subordinates farming to a market 'reality principle'.
Brown's curiosity is about neoliberalism as a political rationality. As we shall see, it exceeds
and even reverses some classic tenets of liberalism. "Neoliberalism is the rationality through which
capitalism finally swallows humanity…." (44) Brown constructs a compelling case for the coherence
of this political rationality as a force in the world. But she does so by not being curious about
some other things along the way, and one might in turn be curious about how these other curious things
and neoliberal political rationality might interact.
She is not curious about the relation between politics and war. Politics is a separate sphere
in Brown. Quite a lot has to get bracketed off here to get down to Order 81 as a legal tweak, curious
though that tweak may be. Nor is she curious about certain kinds of agency. It would appear that
Order 81 was more or less drafted by agribusiness giant Monsanto, which had close ties to the Bush
administration. Nor is she interested in the particular kind of business Monsanto represents.
This would be where the story invokes the particular things I am most curious about. Is Monsanto
an example of 'capital' as traditionally understood, or is it some new kind of economic
rationality? It is interesting to me that what is at the core of this story is patents on the germ
lines of cereal crops. This is a kind of business based on making information a commodity,
and controlling the physical product in which that information is embodied through law and coercion
as much as through persuasion.
Hence to me it is a story about a new kind of ruling class, which elsewhere I call the
vectoral class,
whose power lies in the control not of the means of production but of information. As Peter Linebaugh
shows so graphically in
The London Hanged,
the imposition of capitalist relations of production in England in the 18th century was
as much a matter of coercion and violence as anything else.
So perhaps not surprisingly, the imposition of vectoralist relations of production are no less
coercive. The thing I am curious about, but which Brown is not, is whether neoliberalism is a symptom
of a mutation in the relations of production themselves. That might account for forms of law and
politics that are "a meshing that exceeds the interlocking directorates or quid quo pro arrangements
familiar from past iterations of capitalism." (149)
For Brown, neoliberalism is a political rationality, a "normative order of reason" (9),
the "conduct of conduct." (21) Its effect is to convert the politics of democratic liberalism to
an exclusively economic liberalism. Democracy is being hollowed out from within. Economic growth,
capital accumulation, and competitive positioning become the sole project of the state.
Political rationality is not an intention of a power, not an ideology, or "material conditions."
(115) It works through a "regime of truth." (115) "Political rationality is not an instrument of
governmental practice, but rather the condition of possibility and legitimacy of its instruments,
the field of normative reason from which governing is forged." (116) It constitutes subjects (homo
economicus) and objects (populations). It is not the same as a discourse – there can be many
and competing ones. Nor is it the same as governmentality, which means a shift away from the power
of command and punishment. Political rationality does not originate with the state but does circulate
through it. It isn't a normative form of reason so much as its implementation.
Perhaps the neoliberal renders moot a certain obsession in post-Marxist thought with the figure
of The Political and of democracy as its ideal-type of procedure. In Agamben's Homo Sacer,
there is an ambiguity as to whether the demos is the whole political body or the poor. In Rancière's
Dissensus it is neither, but is rather the uncounted, the part that has no part. In Balibar's
Equiliberty equality and freedom are imposed by the revolt of the excluded in a never-ending
struggle. It is curious to me that rare are the moments when anyone stops to question whether politics
even exists, or whether like God, the Political is a myth, one about to go the way of Zoroaster in
an era when the one true faith of the market is becoming the hegemonic faith of the world.
There's no shortage of rear-guard actions by believers in The Political, for whom neoliberalism
is a kind of heresy, an economic god masquerading as a political one. There's attention to widening
'inequality' to the vulgarity of commercialism, the endless cycle of booms and crashes in a financialized
economy. Strikingly, liberals and Marxists alike all assume this is all still covered by the concept
of 'capitalism'. There's a general consensus that capital's power has been rising, that labor suffered
defeats, if rather less attention as to why and how. What made it possible for the ruling class to
– quite literally – route around the power of labor and the social movements? It is striking how
rarely the infrastructure of twenty-first century political economy ever comes up.
In Brown what we get is a clear articulation of a kind of fault line in political rationalities,
but not much as to why it might have happened. Neoliberalism enlarges the terrain of what can be
'economized.' Contra classical liberalism, there is only homo economicus, which is then
rethought as 'human capital.' There are only kinds of capital competing with each other, and these
are imagined on the model of finance capital, as an unequal field of speculative units attempting
to accumulate and augment their value. Neoliberal 'liberty' is economic, not political. The old values
of equality, liberty fraternity are displaced by human capital, which is not even a humanism any
more. What the young Marx called the "true realm of freedom" no longer beckons.
Brown: "Whether through social media 'followers', 'likes', and 'retweets', through rankings and
ratings for every activity and domain, or through more directly monetized practices, the pursuit
of education, training, leisure, reproduction, consumption, and more are increasingly configured
as strategic decisions and practices related to enhancing the self's future value." (34) But notice
the slippage here. This is about games and strategies, not human capital. As I proposed in
Gamer Theory,
this is a model of subjectivity in which we are all gamers, of which the speculator is just one model.
Perhaps it is about the arrival of a kind of tertiary regime of information as value, where sign-value
controls exchange value controls use value. This development would not then be well captured by the
concept of neoliberalism to the extent that aspects of it are neither political nor economic.
Still, to the extent that an aspect of the present still appears political and economic, Brown
shows how the neoliberal subject is no longer that of Smith, with its trucking, bartering and exchanging,
nor a Benthemite maximizing of pleasure and minimizing of pain. The subject is now supposed to be
a wise investor, calculator and networker, or as I would put it, a gamer, for as Brown acknowledges,
"this does not always take monetary form." (37) Even if she is not curious as to what form it actually
takes. There's not much attention here to the digital infrastructure undergirding the gamer-subject,
"organizing its dating, mating, creative, and leisure practices in value-enhancing ways" (177)
Neoliberal political rationality is no longer about Kantian subjects who are ends in themselves
and a value in themselves. The human is disposable. Here I am curious as to in what sense neoliberalism
is actually a neofascism, a petit-bourgeois culture in which the ruling class buys-off the
middle class through the repression of those below it. Fascism hardly appears at all in Brown's account,
in which liberal democracy is taken to be the normal model of modern politics.
But what if we took fascism as the norm rather than an historically quarantined exception? This
would at least make sense of the casual acceptance not just of inequality but the possibility of
the extinction of those units of 'human capital' that fail to successfully compete. It would also
bring us closer to the exercise of state violence in our time and to social movements like #BlackLivesMatter,
for whom the state remains a repressive apparatus of violence above all else.
To see everything as capital is a petit-bourgeois worldview. Labor disappears as a category. It
is Marx inverted: for Marx capital was dead labor. For neoliberalism, labor is extinct and there
is only capital. Supposedly there are many capitals, all competing with each other. There's no foundation
for citizenship, for a human capital can go bankrupt and cease to exist. (Unless of course it is
'too big to fail'-a telling exception). There is no public good and no commons. Perhaps, when Donald
Trump is a leading candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, there is no politics, either.
Or as I would read it, after Benjamin, we have again our old enemy the aestheticization of the political.
For Brown, the mission of the neoliberal state is to help economic growth, competitiveness and
credit rating. Actually, I wonder of that is really the case. Perhaps 'austerity' is not about growth
at all, but maintaining the transfer of wealth upwards in the absence of growth. It might help to
be a bit more curious as to how much of neoliberalism is not a rationality at all but an ideology.
Following in the steps of Foucault, Brown is interested in how neoliberal rationality is a regime
of truth.
Certainly in its own terms it is a (semi) coherent set of norms for economic management. But perhaps
the Nietzschian flavor is too strong here. I would not want to forego the tools with which to show
its incoherence, irrationality and ideological special-pleading for an emergent ruling class, based
on truth-claims made with methods outside its orbit, and derived from the struggles against it.
Undoing the Demos is among other things a reconstructive reading of Foucault's lectures
on biopolitics as an account of how liberalism became neoliberalism in the postwar years. This is
not Foucault at his best. Here he is doing something close to old-fashioned intellectual history.
Brown: "… neoliberalism for Foucault was intellectually conceived and politically implemented." (50)
And yet both he and Brown want to make claims for this as something more than an ideological and
superstructural development.
As Brown candidly acknowledges, parts of the lectures read as an "anti-Marxist rant," even as
parts might lend themselves to a less than cautious reader to a sort of "neo-Marxist critique." (55)
But it can never be such. Nowhere does Foucault ask what transformations in the forces of production,
putting pressure on the relations of production, might generate such a break in political and ideological
forms. In that sense the lectures remain what
Poulantzas
would have called a regional study. The attempt is rather to make the political into a superstructure,
indeed the superstructure.
In Brown's account, Foucault begins with the question of limits to state power, with rights as
a constraint on sovereignty, but along side which there was a second principle of limit: the market
as not just an alternate form of organization but also of a certain truth: "market veridiction."
The neoliberal turn pushes rights aside and makes the market not just a limit to the state but its
very principle of operation.
Unlike Marxists, Foucault is not interested in property rights, the occlusion of class by nation,
or the state as ruling class in committee. Instead, the focus is on the market as truth and limit
to government. For Foucault, neoliberalism emerges out of a crisis of liberalism – and in this he
accepts its own narrative about itself. Neoliberalism does not want to be perceived as a response
to the crisis of capitalism; it wants to present itself as a response to the failure of the state.
Here Foucault does some old-style intellectual history, linking the Freiberg school and the Chicago
school with Hayek as the link between. The former contributes idea of state's role in fostering competition,
latter idea of human capital. Interestingly, Hayek is also the person who, whatever his ideological
commitments, really thought about the problem of information in economic theory. But that
would be to connect these intellectual developments to what was happening with the forces of production
at the time, whereas Foucault wants to think The Political as autonomous and primary.
Brown: "Neoliberalism is not about the state leaving the economy alone. Rather, neoliberalism
activates the state on behalf of the economy not to undertake economic functions or to intervene
in economic effects, but rather to facilitate economic competition and growth and to economize the
social, or, as Foucault puts it, to 'regulate society by the market.'" (62) The missing concept there
for me is information. It is no accident that neoliberalism has its moment in the postwar period,
when the infrastructure of command and control through information that had developed during the
war for managing complex systems was extended out of the military industrial complex into civilian
industry.
Hayek had said that only the price signal could function as a rational management of information
in a complex economy, and yet as
Ronald Coase showed, market
transactions are not free. In cases where the cost of market transaction outweighed its efficiency,
the nonmarket organizational form of the firm would prevail. The corporation emerged as a truly enormous
nonmarket form of resource allocation. The state is called upon to perform all sorts of
functions to enable these behemoths to coexist and survive. Meanwhile, the ideological fixation on
'competition' covered up the lack of it.
For neoliberalism, "the economy is at once model, object and project." (62) Precisely because
it can only be an artificial construct at this point. Civil society seems to have worked
its charms on Foucault. He could not see the other side of the picture. Looked at from the point
of view of neoliberalism, the state has to become more like the market. (And one can celebrate or
decry that proposition). But one can also see it the other way around: the market has to be propped
up and kept going by the state. Ever since
Kenneth Arrow, nobody could
much believe that the market was always an optimal allocator of resources.
The developed world became the over-developed world. Commodification ran up against the limits
of what it could claim to organize efficiently or effectively. Whole chunks of social life had to
be hacked off and fed into the flames to keep the steam up. Commodification moved on from land to
things to pure information. A whole infrastructure was put into place, of information vectors, backed
up by the extension of the old partial rights into a comprehensive set of private property rights
called 'intellectual property'. This for me would be a sketch of a story that makes sense of neoliberalism.
If 'economy' is not a static, unmoving thing in the postwar period, neither is the 'state.' Both
are transformed by the same techne. As
Sandra Braman shows, the
functions of the state start to work differently when what the state runs on is information. If there's
a connection between state and private organizational units in the postwar period, it is that they
both run on the same computational infrastructure, from the mainframe era to the PC to today's so-called
cloud computing. One might wonder, pace
Kittler, if these were
the vector more of military rationalities than of market ones. This would help make sense of an aporia
in Foucault and Brown: that the neoliberal subject is not only autonomous and self-managing, but
also obeys commands. Autonomy is constrained. Initiative is welcome but only in fulfilling a task
commanded from without. This is the essence of military organization.
One might also wonder if it is not at least in part from the generalization of military models
that inequality becomes naturalized and normalized. It is certainly the case that another component
of this, as Brown astutely observes, is a move away from the category of exchange to one of competition.
In bourgeois economics, all exchanges are equal, including that of labor and capital. Barring a few
outlier situations, the price at which an exchange takes place will tend to equilibrium. Or so it
was once believed. Competition implies not equality but inequality. Some are just better than others
and deserve more. It is as ideological and self-proving a nostrum as exchange, of course.
As already mentioned, capital replaces labor entirely as the agent of a worldview. There are only
capitals, including human capital. All subjects are supposed to be entrepreneurs of the self. One
can connect this to the observations of
Franco Beradi about the disappearance of the figure of alienation. It is as if nothing is taken
from the subject; its all about what the subject can get for itself. This entrepreneurial quality
has less and less to do with production. Its not about trucking and bartering in things – except
perhaps for Brooklyn's retro-hipsters who want not to be traders of information but to make actual
stuff again, like organic
beard-oil.
That counter-trend might be the sign that petit-bourgeois culture now knows itself to be playing
a game of trading information and attempting to compete in that game for surplus information, which
can be traded in turn for money and in turn again for things.
Success at this game becomes the only measure of success: "those who act according to other principles
are not simply irrational, but refuse 'reality.'" (67) It is a wild and unpredictable reality. The
market is now frankly acknowledged to be convulsive. "The state must support the economy, organizing
its conditions and facilitating its growth, and is thereby made responsible for the economy without
being able to predict, control, or offset its effects."
The politics that goes with this is a centrist extremism. You can be for gay marriage or for prayer
in schools, but the market is not to be questioned. The market is not there to enable the good life;
all of life is to be sacrificed to keeping the market going. Brown: "Where others saw only economic
policy, Foucault discerned a revolutionary and comprehensive political rationality , one that drew
on classical liberal language and concerns while inverting many of liberalism's purposes and channels
of accountability." (67)
Brown points to rather different limitations to Foucault's thinking than I would. For Brown, his
view is state-centric. There's only the state and its subjects. For Brown, it is the citizen who
is excluded here (rather than labor, praxis.) Foucault tends to see things from the point of view
of power. He is a little too fascinated with neoliberal 'freedom'. There's no subtending world of
exploitation. Brown questions "his acceptance of the neoliberal claim that the economy constitutes
the limit of government for liberalism and neoliberalism, that it must not be touched because it
cannot be known." (77)
For Foucault, homo economicus as a man of interest is a constant, but for Brown, self-interest
does not quite capture the latest iteration. "Homo economicus is made, not born, and operates
in a context replete with risk, contingency, and potentially violent changes, from burst bubbles
and capital or currency meltdowns to wholesale industry dissolution." (84) To me this is the subjectivity
of the gamer, or the 'Army of One.'
Homo politicus is not really a figure for Foucault, or perhaps just an episodic one. He sees things
from the pov of state power. Brown: "Still, it is strange that sovereignty for Foucault remains so
closely allied to the state and never circulates through the people – it's almost as if he forgot
to cut off the king's head in political theory." (86)
For Brown, homo politicus is the main casualty of neoliberalism. She explains this via the just-so
story of political theory, for which homo politicus is something of an ironic founding myth. "In
the beginning, there was homo politicus…." (87) Humans live together as political animals, where
politics means the capacity for association, language, law, and ethical judgment (but not, as Steigler
notes, techne).
Aristotle is quite candid about the prerequisites for political life: slavery and private property.
The household is at the same time the model of rule and site of relations of production. But Aristotle
is a bit troubled by household production, which might ground not homo politicus, but another kind
of figure. There's two different kinds of production, one natural, one unnatural. Unnatural wealth
is accumulated for its own sake. Proper acquisition concerns the household; the improper the marketplace
and money. The former has limits and grants leisure, the latter becomes an end in itself.
No mention is made here of war, which might ground the right to citizenship in the first place,
and determine the extent of those rights. Nor is any mention made of techne. How is political communication
actually and materially conducted? Are not the agora and rhetoric technologies of the polis? There
is also a bit of an elision between the classical concept of man as political and the modern one,
skipping the intervening millennia in which the leisure of the man of means was not for politics
but for God.
Even modern liberal political thought respects the foundational fiction of homo politicus. In
Smith we are not exactly political animals, but creatures of truck and barter – of exchange. But
we're not creatures of pure self interest. We might be homo economicus already in Smith, but also
creatures of deliberation, restraint and self-direction – in a word, sovereignty. The rise of homo
economicus is not incompatible with a presumed power of the political over economic. The state could
choose mercantilism or free trade, for example. Smith was intent on proving why the latter was better
state policy.
In Locke there is more strain between homo politicus and homo economicus. The danger of the latter
is made clearer in Rousseau, who is perhaps the main source of the investment in The Political that
persists in critical theory today. Rousseau is the prophet of the return of homo politicus in the
form of popular sovereignty rising up against self-interest. In Hegel this becomes the universality
of the state versus the mere particularity of civil society. The young Marx begins with the unrealized
nature of sovereign political man. Mill offers a world of little sovereigns, choosing their own means
and ends. Here the boundary between state and liberty is a political question. The state is beginning
to recede as guarantor of liberty, equality, fraternity. It becomes rather the manager of what Foucault
calls the biopolitical. But homo politicus still lingers in subjects relation to itself, even in
Freud, for whom the superego is the politician of the self.
This thumbnail account of the mythic history of homo politicus is for Brown a story which shows
the novelty of neoliberalism: "the vanquishing of homo politicus by contemporary neoliberal rationality,
the insistence that there are only rational market actors in every sphere of human existence, is
novel, indeed revolutionary, in the history of the west." (99)
Brown shows that there's a slippage in neoliberal though about the subject, between the individual
and the family. Homo economicus is still imaged as a male head of a household, or at least one with
the benefits of such a household. He may no longer have slaves, but someone tends the kids and does
the dishes. The family remains a nonmarket sphere that cannot be economized. It's a space of needs,
inter-dependence, love, loyalty, community and care – where it is women who take care of all that
'stuff.' I might venture that for all its patriarchal faults, the family is the minimal unit of communism,
not as a utopia of course, but strictly understood as a domain of shared or pooled resources outside
of both exchange and even gift –as both
Karatani and Graeber might see it.
Neoliberalism puts pressure on the family, and in particular on 'women's work'. "Either women
align their own conduct with this truth, becoming homo economicus, in which case the world becomes
uninhabitable, or women's activities and bearing as femina domestica remain the unabowed glue for
a world whose governing principle cannot hold it together…." (104) Neoliberalism intensifies gender
subordination, not least because its demolition of social services leaves women propping up more
than half the sky. Women'a domestic labor is incidentally the only time labor really appears as a
category in Brown's text.
If the point of liberalism was liberty, the point of neoliberalism is, perversely enough,
sacrifice. "This is the central paradox, perhaps even the central ruse, of neoliberal governance:
the neoliberal revolution takes place in the name of freedom – free markets, free countries, free
men – but tears up freedom's grounding in sovereignty for states and subjects alike." (108) One is
'free' only to submit to market 'discipline.'
Brown: "But when citizenship loses its distinctly political morphology and with it the mantle
of sovereignty, it loses not only its orientation toward the public and towards values enshrined
by, say, constitutions, it also ceases to carry the Kantian autonomy underpinning individual sovereignty."
(109) 'Enshrined' is a curious word-choice there. For believers in the political, neoliberalism really
does appear either as an attack on the sacred or a heretical form of it.
It is, as Foucault predicted in a rather different context, the end of Man as sacred stand-in
for the hidden God. No longer are people able to pursue the good life in their own way, as nothing
adheres to 'man' other than as human capital, as servant of the market. It is, for Brown, "an existential
disappearance of freedom from the world." (110) When Weber attacked the iron cage of rationality
and Marx the commodity as reification, both presumed a subjectivity outside of both rationality and
commodity, although I am not sure that in the case of Marx that subject was necessarily a political
one. I think for Marx that subject was labor, in its capacity to know and imagine and transform the
world. And I am not sure that this other agency of Marx is erased by neoliberalism. It is more contained
by a vectoral technology, in which all of labor's agency is siphoned off as 'creativity' and captured
as intellectual property for a new iteration of a ruling class that may not be strictly capitalist
any more.
Brown thinks that Foucault's sources for thinking the political rationality of neoliberalism are
Max Weber and Hebert
Marcuse. From Weber he takes the distinction between the rationality of means and ends, which
was developed into a whole critique of modernity in Adorno and Horkheimer. In Marcuse, the object
is more specifically a technological rationality, extending out of capitalist relations
of production and colonizing other parts of life.
Here Foucault's project is an explicitly anti-Marxist one. He restores the autonomy of the political
that is questioned in Marcuse, but in the form of a rationality thought to extend beyond mere ideology.
"For Foucault, political rationalities are world-changing, hegemonic orders of normative reason,
generative of subjects, markets, states, law, jurisprudence, and their relations." (121) Brown gives
a bit more weight to agency in her version, where the agent is 'capital', but not much is said about
its historical form, other than that it is now 'financial'. We're not told at any point how or why
it became so.
One hint at what's missing here is Brown's account of governance, which she thinks converged
with neoliberalism but is not of it. Governance is the move from hierarchy to network, from institution
to process, from command to self-organization. As I suggested earlier, this is actually not that
far removed from modern military organizational forms. And it shares with it an infrastructure of
communication technology that makes information the key to both control and autonomy. This is contemporary
logistics. The political is made technical – as indeed Marcuse had already suggested. There
is a devolution of responsibility to smaller and weaker units. "Thus, responsibilized individuals
are required to provide for themselves in the context of powers and contingencies radically limiting
their ability to do so." (134)
A particularly interesting part of Undoing the Demos is Brown's discussion of law. For
her, "… neoliberal law is the opposite of planning. It facilitates the economic game, but does not
direct or contain it." (67) her example is the 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission. This famously gives corporations the standing of people with unqualified free speech
rights, and mobilizes even the constitution for the project of a neoliberal makeover of governance.
In Brown's reading, Justice Kennedy's decision in that case, writing for the majority, is essentially
arguing that speech is like capital, and thus should be another domain of unfettered competition.
Curiously, while for Brown, Kennedy's proposition makes speech like capital, what speech
is for Kennedy is information. This once again appears as the elided concept. It is curious
that it shows up in nearly all of Browns quotations from the decision. Kennedy writes of the right
of citizens to "use information to reach consensus." (157) He in concerned with "where a person may
get his or her information." (160) Of situations where one is "deprived of information." (165)
For Kennedy, speech is innovative and productive, which is a bit like capital, but are also attributes
of information in a commodity economy in which it has become a commodity. Hence while Brown stresses
that in Kennedy's decision "There is only capital, and whether it is human, corporate, financial
or derivative…" (161) this is a metaphorical leap which steps over the key word: information. And
it is information that composes the means of control and accumulation of all the leading forms of
corporate power now.
Information is what Monsanto and Wall st have in common, and have in common too with the tech
companies, the drug companies, even Walmart, which is essentially a logistics company rather than
a retailer. Corporations compete with their brandtheir supply chain management, rather than by trucking
and bartering things, let alone making them. Of course there are still things for sale in the market,
but never without their wrappings of information, not to mention the end user agreements protecting
their proprietary code.
It is from the point of view of information that it makes perfect sense for corporations to have
untrammelled rights to speech, for corporations 'compete' with, as and for information. This is the
point of view from which it even makes perverse sense to Kennedy that corporations are a disadvantaged
minority group in that the state curtails their speech rights in elections.
That the postwar commodity economy, having run out of things to sell, has to sell information
is also a good way of making sense of the 'neoliberal' turn in education. Business now thinks it
has the tools to take on, and make money from, things that just could not even be quantified with
the old Fordist forces of production. In the neoliberal 'truth' regime, no amount of evidence will
convince anyone that the charter schools and for-profit colleges are doing a mediocre to terrible
job of this.
Brown's focus is on the decline of liberal arts in higher education. College is now about 'return
on investment' and "removing quaint concerns with developing the person or the citizen." Here Brown
strikes something of a nostalgic note. "Once about developing intelligent, thoughtful elites and
reproducing culture… higher education now produces human capital." (24) Anyone attentive to the aggressive
purging from higher education of suspected reds during the cold war could question that rosy assessment
of its recent past.
A liberal arts education was one appropriate to free men, not slaves. It lifted a student's sights
from the immediate and local to wider horizons. For Brown, the extension of such an education beyond
a narrow elite was a significant achievement of postwar America. But one might wonder here, as in
the ancient context, how citizenship is connected to war. The GI Bill could be seen as a way of recognizing
and also defusing the demands the citizen-soldier makes on the polity it has risked itself defending.
One might question how much this concern for educating citizens was a cold war project, sustained
by the Soviet 'menace'. And one might also ask if it already had an economic rationale, in turning
out labor with the broader 'skill set' for a more complex and increasingly information-driven economy.
Perhaps it is also worth recalling that the postwar university was a complex beast. In part it
delivered a broadened liberal arts education. But it was also the heart of the military-industrial
complex, from which today's military-entertainment complex was born. (Not to mention a parallel medical-industrial
one). From wartime through to the seventies, the state funded basic research, much of it on the Pentagon's
dime, contributing to a common stock of innovation. The crucial change was to allow universities
to own the intellectual property they created, which put places like Stanford and MIT into the information
business in an unprecedented way.
Perhaps it is because I am not a product of it that I am not so enamored of the myth of the great
American university. It is, after all, where one of the two branches of neoliberalism in Foucault's
account actually came from. It was not just a safe-haven for humanisms, of the homo politicus variety
and otherwise. Brown: "Even its critics cannot see the ways in which we have lost a recognition of
ourselves as held together by literatures, images, religions, histories, myths, ideas, forms of reason,
grammars, figures and languages. Instead, we are presumed to be held together by technologies and
capital flows. That presumption, of course, is at risk of becoming true, at which point humanity
will have entered its darkest chapter ever." (188) To me this sounds like that old discourse my New
School colleague Mark Grief identifies as the 'crisis
of man'.
How are the old 'figures and languages' not also technologies, or dependent on technologies? How
was the postwar university not already held together by capital flows? Here I don't think the toolbox
Brown has chosen leads to particularly sharp analysis. It may be the case that the "worldly development
of mind and character are outmoded and have been displaced by another set of metrics: income streams,
profitability, technological innovation and contribution to society construed narrowly as the development
and promulgation of marketable goods and services." (190) But Brown has rather naturalized the postwar
university and lost sight of how it too appeared as something alien and coercive in its time. On
which see for example 'On
the Poverty of Student Life.'
The disinvestment in higher education may be more explicable in terms of labor market requirements.
Today's vectoral class has no need of the mass worker. Labor is bifurcated between a small core of
highly skilled workers using or designing information technology and a vast precarious population
whose jobs have been deskilled by the same information technology.
In sum, Brown's account holds capital constant and locates a break in the regime of political
rationality. The latter has a certain primacy, as in Foucault, but is also to some extent emerging
for capital. Capital is understood somewhat metaphorically, as a category that includes
both actual corporations and forms of subjectivity. This capital is understood to be somewhat modified,
to be financial capital, even if the only example – Monsanto – does not fit that category.
What we're missing is the possibility that the mutation in political rationality has a hidden
driver – a transformation in the commodity form itself. The key ingredient in this transformation
– information – actually appears in the margins the analysis, but can't rise to the level of a concept
where there are only two regimes of subject-formation theorized: homo economicus and
homo politicus. That not only politics and economics but also war, strategy and education are
now all made of information, both as concept and real infrastructure, remains unthought.
Brown offers an excellent diagnosis of the what of neoliberalism, but not the why.
Perhaps Foucault is of less help here than one might hope, and for quite specific historical reasons.
He was among other things a late artifact of the cold war struggle around Marxism in the university.
There was a time when his heroic dissent from PCF orthodoxies had relevance. Now that the latter
has ceased to exist, it might be time to rethink the how the archive even of critical theory is no
neutral resource but is itself a product of a historical struggles. Or perhaps I am just curious
about different things.
Softpanorama Recommended
When
Firms Become Persons and Persons Become Firms outstanding lecture - Boing Boing
Neoliberalism and Global Cinema Capital, Culture, and Marxist Critique - Google Books
Unemployed Negativity The Methlab of Democracy More on the Micropolitics of Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism poisons everything How free market mania threatens education - and democracy - Salon.com
Wendy Brown on Neoliberalism
& modern Democracy - YouTube
Reclaiming Democracy: An Interview with Wendy Brown on Occupy, Sovereignty, and Secularism
5-12 Wendy Brown Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution The Majority Report with Sam Seder
The Trott Line Wendy Brown, Neoliberalism, and Why Taking Your Work Email Off Your Phone Will Not
Save Democracy
Wendy Brown
(political scientist) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
2015 Beaverbrook Annual Lecture Wendy Brown Neoliberalism Contra Democracy Ten Theses Art History &
Communication Studi
States without Nations Wendy Brown's Talk Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and the Nation-State
Wendy
Brown Homo Economicus Art & Education
Neoliberalism Is Changing Our World Without Our Even Noticing PopMatters
An Interview with Wendy Brown Prodigal
Posted on
February 22, 2013 by
stuartelden
Wendy Brown is interviewed at Critical Legal Thinking about her work and contemporary politics. Thanks
to Andrew Burridge for the link.
Edgework Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics - Wendy Brown - Google Books
The Program in Critical Theory
Neoliberalism + Biopolitics Working Group | Neoliberalism and Marxist Legacies
Wendy Brown, Professor of Political Science, UC Berkeley, Michael Burawoy, Professor of Sociology, UC
Berkeley, Colleen Lye, Associate Professor of English, UC Berkeley and Richard Walker, Professor Emeritus
of Geography, UC Berkeley
- 12 November, 2014, 5:00 pm - 7:00 pm
-
The Religion Factor No time for Despair: Neoliberalism, Democracy and (the absence of) Religion
in Wendy Brown's "Undoing the Demos"
Guest post by Roger Foster Comments
on Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution The Association fo
Foucault News
Wendy Brown-Governmentality in the Age of Neoliberalism (2014)
26 May 2014 by Clare O'Farrell
American
Nightmare Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization
La clé des langues - Anglais - Neoliberalism, De-Democratization, Sacrifice
Neoliberalism Making a Boogeyman Out of a Buzzword Foundation for Economic Education
C21 Wendy
Brown
Neoliberalism's
Defeat of Democracy – Critical Inquiry
Interview
with Wendy Brown Laney SPECTRA the Social, Political, Ethical, and Cultural Theory Archives
When
Firms Become Persons and Persons Become Firms neoliberal jurisprudence in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores
- 07 - 2015 - Eve
Wendy Brown - Sacrificial Citizenship Neoliberal Austerity Politics Committee on Globalization and Social
Change
The Meaning of David Cameron - Richard Seymour - Google Books
Biopolitical Screens Image, Power, and the Neoliberal Brain - Pasi Väliaho - Google Books
Contemporary Political Theory - Undoing the demos Neoliberalism-'s stealth revolution
Restless Subjects in Rigid Systems Risk and Speculation in Millennial ... - Susanne Wegener - Google
Books
Akrivoulis DE. Walled states at the intersection of Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism the 'march of
freedom' and the collapse
liverpool.anglican.org
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History:
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