On October 29, 2018, a Boeing 737 Max 8 belonging to Lion Air in Indonesia crashed into the Java Sea 12 minutes after take-off. All
189 passengers and crew members were killed instantly. It is extremely unusual for planes to suffer such accidents in clear weather
after having reached their cruising altitude. Flight experts concluded that the pilots were not adequately trained in the Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a robotics technology that lowers the nose of a plane to prevent a stall. Although there
is no definitive judgement on exactly what happened, it appears to be a combination of inadequate training for the pilots and a malfunctioning
MCAS.
On Sunday, another 737 Max 8 owned by Ethiopian Airlines had the same kind of accident resulting in the death of 157 passengers and
crew members. In the aftermath of the tragedy, this has led to Australia, China, Germany, France, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Singapore,
and the United Kingdom grounding the planes.
Donald Trump produced a good tweet about the airline crash.
"Airplanes are becoming far too complex to fly," Trump tweeted. "Pilots are no longer needed, but rather computer scientists from
MIT. I see it all the time in many products. Always seeking to go one unnecessary step further, when often old and simpler is far
better."
"Split second decisions are needed, and the complexity creates danger," he continued. "All of this for great cost yet very little
gain. I don’t know about you, but I don’t want Albert Einstein to be my pilot. I want great flying professionals that are allowed
to easily and quickly take control of a plane!"
The first flight from Indonesia only lasted approximately 12-13 minutes; the second flight from Ethiopia only lasted about 6 minutes.
So both occurrences were during the climb-out after departure. (Ethiopian Airlines has said its pilots had
new training for 737 MAX planes after the crash in Indonesia.)
In both cases the aircraft was up and down, up and down, not in a steady controlled fashion. And finally, in both cases the nose
dropped and both aircraft went straight into ocean( Indonesia's case, or field (Ethiopia's case). That makes those two flights
very similar. Also in previous flights pilots had reported problems of a similar nature — the inability to keep the aircraft climbing
to prescribed level.
It was like a fight of crazy computer with humans in which the computer prevailed: the software was trying to do something that led
to loss of altitude, while the pilots were trying to correct its behaviour and resume normal climb-out. They were effectively
fighting defective software system.
What is know about the crash
There are several known factor that point to criminal negligence on the part of Boeing and the corruption of regulators
The fact is the Boeing leadership like leadership of the major US technological and manufacturing companies was selected
from rabid neoliberals ("shareholder value" jerks). In this sense Boeing repeat trajectory of such companies as IBM,
who were destroyed by greed and incompetent management, who were mostly concerned with lining their own pockets via bonuses
and this operated as short-termists incapable of any strategic thinking (rabid cost cutters/outsourcers IBM
Louis V. Gerstner Jr and
Samuel J. Palmisano - Wikipedia are classic examples of this type.
Both were completely incompetent in IT bean counters. Jack Welch and Al
Dunlap is another Chainsaw The
Notorious Career of Al Dunlap in the Era of Profit-at-Any-Price John A Byrne )
The fact that the discrepancy of reading of two sensor were not reflected on instrument panel by default (which
requires a small software fix, not even extra bulb) and Boeing jerks charged $100K for that software change. That points to the
extreme, obscene level of greed and incompetence of Boeing management. Which should face the court of law. Greed, lack of
conscience and possible incompetence led Boeing to charge extra for critical safety equipment.
The computer cannot reliably determine which sensor to trust if one of just two sensors gives false readings. With three or more
sensors, the computer will instantly determine which one failed, when the remaining sensors have matching readings.
Design was deeply flawed. Here are some consideration as for ne larger engines problem. "In most planes the idea is for the center of lift and the center of mass to coincide or at least be very close. In the
case of the 737 MAX it is apparently not so. As far as I understand the reason is the engines, and the desire to use them(bigger and probably heavier and also in a more forward position) without major redesign. The result of this
arrangement is that the plane will tend to rotate in pitch without another force stabilizing it - in other words to
return the plane in a state of dynamic equilibrium. If the force isn't there you get severe pitch down, if it is small
than the required you get milder pitch down, if it is larger than required you get pitch up. It's very basic theoretical
mechanics."" Posted by: Stan | Apr 6, 2019 11:33:38 AM |
102
The fact that the MCAS system on a single sensor to make decision which could be fatal
if sensor malefaction is really strange. Neither gyroscope, not the second sensor was used in determining the action (you need all three for such vital input)
The fact that hidden MCAS system was able to override human polit action and push node down faster then pilot
tri to push it up, when the pilot pushes it up
is another case of criminal negligence. That suggest that cablitioes of MCAD system were changed after FAA review,
without additional certification to improve stability of the airplane.
The idea that you can switch off malfunctioning MCAD system is open to review. Forces at this moment can be too high to operate manually and
it looks like there is not hydraulic amplifier for pilot effort
A problem with the defective sensor made by Rosemount Aerospace. Why each sesor has only one wng, not three
mini0wings and buil-in voting system ? The "angle of attack" sensor itself was probably a "cheapo" peace of crap, designed without understanding criticality of its function.
How computers are setting us up for disaster
Two years before the Indonesian 737 crash, the Guardian published an article titled “Crash:
how computers are setting us up for disaster” that it clearly anticipated. Interestingly enough, it was not even a Boeing plane
that was discussed in the article. It was an Airbus 330 that had the same kind of systems as the Boeing NCAS.
he Air France pilots “were hideously incompetent”, wrote William Langewiesche, in his Vanity Fair article. And he thinks he knows
why. Langewiesche argued that the pilots simply were not used to flying their own aeroplane at altitude without the help of the computer.
Even the experienced Captain Dubois was rusty: of the 346 hours he had been at the controls of a plane during the past six months,
only four were in manual control, and even then he had had the help of the full fly-by-wire system. All three pilots had been
denied the ability to practise their skills, because the plane was usually the one doing the flying.
With pilots much more used to relying on automation than manual control of the plane, they failed to override the system. And this
defective system force the airplane to plunge into the Atlantic Ocean on June 1, 2009 at about 125 miles an hour. All 228 passengers
and crew, died instantly.
While pilots flying to major airports will continue to be highly paid, the wages of those working for regional airlines has fallen
drastically due to neoliberalism. In 2010, the Guardian reported on “A
pilot’s life: exhausting hours for meagre wages”. Reginal airlines pilots are overworked and underpaid
Many are forced to fly half way around the country before they even begin work. Others sleep in trailers at the back of Los Angeles
airport, in airline lounges across the country or even on the floors of their own planes. Some co-pilots, who typically take home
about $20,000 (£12,500) a year, hold down second jobs to make ends meet.
If the MCAS system malfunctions, pilots say the prescribed fix is to use manual trim to stabilize the plane, and then disconnect
the trim system. There’s a cutoff switch on the center pedestal of the 737, not far from throttles, marked “Stab Trim.” Pilots routinely
train to disconnect the automatic trim in the case of runaway trim with autopilot use.
“Boeing, in developing the 737 Max 8, obviously felt intense competitive pressure to get the new aircraft to market as quickly as
possible,” wrote Captain ‘Sully’ Sullenberger in a column in MarketWatch this week. Sullenberger is the pilot who safely landed
an Airbus A320 on the Hudson River in 2009 and a leading air safety expert.
“When flight testing revealed an issue with meeting the certification standards, the company developed a fix… but did not tell airline
pilots about it. In mitigating one risk, Boeing seems to have created another, greater risk,” he wrote.
Sullenberger added,
“After the crash of Lion Air 610 last October, it was apparent that this new risk needed to be effectively addressed.”
But instead of grounding the aircraft and immediately fixing the problem, Boeing did everything it could to conceal the deadly defect
and keep the aircraft flying.
In other words, Boeing executives evidently acted in a reckless, negligent manner, contributing to the deaths of 346 people. Sullenberger
concluded,
“It has been reported that Boeing pushed back in discussions with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] about the extent of
changes that would be required, and after the second crash, of Ethiopian 302, the Boeing CEO reached out to the US President to try
to keep the 737 Max 8 from being grounded in the US.”
Both the FAA and the Trump administration, for their part, were more than willing to run interference for the company.
The close integration between the airline industry and the agency nominally tasked with regulating it is well documented. In 2005,
the FAA introduced a new program whereby aircraft manufacturers could choose their own employees to serve as FAA “designees,” charged
with certifying the safety of their commercial planes. Since then, there has been virtually no independent oversight of the safety
of any new civilian planes, those produced at Boeing or elsewhere.
During the 737 Max 8 rollout, Boeing told its pilots that they could learn all they needed to know about flying a new type of
airplane from a 56-minute presentation on an iPad and a 13-page manual.
Both were approved by the FAA and the pilots’ union, and neither included any information about the system likely responsible
for the crashes, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmenting System, or MCAS.
US officials have deep connections to the airline industry. FAA Acting Administrator Dan Elwell was an American Airlines executive.
US President Donald Trump’s new nominee to head the administration, Stephen Dickson, is a former Delta head.
Boeing is a top defense contractor with extensive ties to the military-intelligence apparatus. Patrick Shanahan, the deputy secretary
of defense, has worked for Boeing for three decades. Moreover, the current secretary of transportation, Elaine Chao, is the wife of
Mitch McConnell, who has received hundreds of thousands of dollars in campaign financing from Boeing.
Moreover, Boeing is a key part of the US financial elite’s war for control of markets. Since the 737 Max 8 series was released
in 2017, the sales of just 350 of the 5,011 orders Boeing has received have accounted for 50 percent of the company’s profits. Boeing
itself has maintained its status as the world’s fifth-largest defense contractor and is currently the largest US exporter.
Shares of Boeing have more than tripled since the election of Donald Trump and his promises of further deregulation, making it the
highest- priced stock in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The company has accounted for more than 30 percent of the increase of the
Dow since November 2016.
The tragic and preventable deaths of nearly 350 people demonstrate certain realities of contemporary social and political life. The
capitalist system is based on the maximization of shareholder profit, not the satisfaction of the needs of society. If endangering the
lives of hundreds of people will lead to higher profits, such a risk is justified.
Governments, in their turn, serve to protect the interests of the corporations, a reality demonstrated by the Trump White House’s
efforts to protect the largest US exporter, and the repeated actions of the FAA to cover up the series of disastrous shortcuts taken
by Boeing.
These disasters highlight the need to take the airline industry out of the hands of Wall Street so that air travel can be brought
into harmony with human and social needs.
The technological advances that have been made in air travel over the past decades are indisputable. For the first time in world
history, travelers can move from any two points in the world within a single day. This technology must be freed from the restraints
of giant corporations and of the capitalist system as a whole. This requires the nationalization of the major airlines and aerospace
companies, their transformation into publicly owned and democratically controlled utilities to provide for social need, not private
profit.
On Wednesday, the FAA announced that Boeing is working on a service bulletin with instructions for airlines on how to install
new flight control computer operational program software in the Boeing 737 Max 8, Reuters reported.
"Boeing is developing a service bulletin that would specify the installation of new flight control computer operational program
software. Boeing has also developed flight crew training related to this software. The FAA's ongoing review of this software installation
and training is an agency priority, as will be the roll-out of any software, training, or other measures to operators of the 737
Max," the FAA said in a statement Wednesday.
Investigations
The US Department of Transportation (DoT) requested an audit of how the FAA and Boeing certified the 737 Max 8. In a memo
released this week, Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao requested that DoT's Inspector General Calvin Scovel conduct "an objective
and detailed factual history of the activities that resulted in the certification of the Boeing 737-MAX 8 aircraft," according to
multiple reports.
Another, separate investigation is already underway by Scovel and the US Department of Justice's Criminal Division. AP, citing a
person familiar with the matter, said a federal jury in Washington, DC, has already issued a subpoena to an individual "involved in
the plane's development seeking emails, messages and other communications."
The US Department of Transportation (DoT) requested an audit of how the FAA and Boeing certified the 737 Max 8. In a memo
released this week, Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao requested that DoT's Inspector General Calvin Scovel conduct "an objective
and detailed factual history of the activities that resulted in the certification of the Boeing 737-MAX 8 aircraft," according to
multiple reports.
Another, separate investigation is already underway by Scovel and the US Department of Justice's Criminal Division. AP, citing a
person familiar with the matter, said a federal jury in Washington, DC, has already issued a subpoena to an individual "involved in
the plane's development seeking emails, messages and other communications."
Another Boeing splatters it's enginers all over the place:
Monday, Feb 22, 2021 - 12:50
A Longtail Aviation Boeing 747-400 freighter suffered an inflight engine failure shortly
after taking off from Maastricht Airport, a regional airport in Beek in Limburg,
Netherland, on Saturday.
The plane was powered by Pratt & Whitney PW4000 engines - the same engine that just
exploded over Denver - when one of its engines suffered a failure.
A spokeswoman for Maastricht Airport, Hella Hendriks, was quoted by The Guardian as
saying, "witnesses heard one or two explosions shortly after takeoff and the pilot was
informed by air traffic control that an engine was on fire."
A spokeswoman for Maastricht Airport, Hella Hendriks, was quoted by The Guardian as saying,
"witnesses heard one or two explosions shortly after takeoff and the pilot was informed by
air traffic control that an engine was on fire."
Its reassuring to know that the pilots have excellent computers with comprehensive systems
monitoring. That 8088 chip is a doozy - no need to upgrade yet.
Another new document reveals that in a June 2016 flight test, the Boeing test pilot had
trouble completing a slow speed test needed for certification because MCAS kept kicking in.
Engineers noted how MCAS was "observed ratcheting" up the angle of the horizontal tail with
repeated activation. Another engineer in the email exchange asks "What happens when we have
faulty Angle of Attack"?
Other documents startlingly tie together two previously known events.
In a meeting on March 30, 2016, Keith Leverkuhn, the Boeing vice president who headed the
MAX program, formally approved an expansion of MCAS to allow it to activate at low speed.
This required removing what had previously been a necessary activation trigger for the
software -- a high G force. From that point on, MCAS was activated solely by a high angle of
attack and was given more authority to move the horizontal tail.
The 238-page document, written by the majority staff of the House Transportation
Committee, calls into question whether the plane maker or the Federal Aviation Administration
has fully incorporated essential safety lessons, despite a global grounding of the MAX fleet
since March 2019.
After an 18-month investigation, the report, released Wednesday, concludes that Boeing's
travails stemmed partly from a reluctance to admit mistakes and "point to a company culture
that is in serious need of a safety reset."
The report provides more specifics, in sometimes-blistering language, backing up
preliminary
findings the panel's Democrats released six months ago , which laid out a pattern of
mistakes and missed opportunities to correct them.
In one section, the Democrats' report faults Boeing for what it calls "inconceivable and
inexcusable" actions to withhold crucial information from airlines about one cockpit-warning
system, related to but not part of MCAS, that didn't operate as required on 80% of MAX jets.
Other portions highlight instances when Boeing officials, acting in their capacity as
designated FAA representatives, part of a widely used system of delegating oversight
authority to company employees,
failed to alert agency managers about various safety matters .
Boeing concealed from regulators internal test data showing that if a pilot took longer
than 10 seconds to recognise that the system had kicked in erroneously, the consequences
would be "catastrophic" .
The report also detailed how an alert, which would have warned pilots of a potential
problem with one of their anti-stall sensors, was not working on the vast majority of the Max
fleet . It found that the company deliberately concealed this fact from both pilots and
regulators as it continued to roll out the new aircraft around the world.
In Bed With the Regulators
Boeing's defense is the FAA signed off on the reviews. Lovely. Boeing coerced or bribed the FAA to sign off on the reviews now tries to hide behind
the FAA.
There is only one way to stop executive criminals like those at Boeing. Charge them with manslaughter, convict them, send them to prison for life, then take all of
their stock and options and hand the money out for restitution.
adr , 1 hour ago
Remember, Boeing spent enough on stock buybacks in the past ten years to fund the
development of at least seven new airframes.
Instead of developing a new and better plane, they strapped engines that didn't belong on
the 737 and called it safe.
SDShack , 21 minutes ago
What is really sad is they already had a perfectly functional and safe 737Max. It was the
757. Look at the specs between the 2 planes. Almost same size, capacity, range, etc. Only
difference was the 757 requires longer runways, but I would think they could have adjusted
the design to improve that and make it very similar to the 737Max without starting from
scratch. Instead Boeing bean counters killed the 757 and gave the world this flying coffin.
Now the world bean counters will kill Boeing.
Tristan Ludlow , 1 hour ago
Boeing is a critical defense contractor. They will not be held accountable and they will
be rewarded with additional bailouts and contract awards.
MFL5591 , 1 hour ago
Can you imagine a congress of Criminals Like Schiff, Pelosi and Schumer prosecuting
someone else for fraud? What a joke. Next up will be Bill Clinton testifying against a person
on trial for Pedophilia!
RagaMuffin , 1 hour ago
Mish is half right. The FAA should join Boeing in jail. If they are not held responsible
for their role, why have an FAA?
Manthong , 1 hour ago
"There is only one way to stop executive criminals like those at Boeing.
Charge them with manslaughter, convict them, send them to prison for life, then take all
of their stock and options and hand the money out for restitution."
Correction:
There is only one way to stop regulator criminals like those in government.
Charge them with manslaughter, convict them, send them to prison for life, then take all
of their pensions and ill gotten wealth a nd hand the money out for restitution.
Elliott Eldrich , 43 minutes ago
"There is only one way to stop executive criminals like those at Boeing.
Charge them with manslaughter, convict them, send them to prison for life, then take all
of their stock and options and hand the money out for restitution."
Ha ha ha HA HA HA HA HA! Silly rabbit, jail is for poors...
Birdbob , 1 hour ago
Accountability of Elite Perps ended under Oblaba's reign of "Wall Street and Technocracy
Architects" .White collar criminals were granted immunity from prosecution. This was put into
play by Attorney Genital Eric Holder. This was the beginning of having an orificial Attorney
Genital that facilitated the District of Criminals organized crime empire ending the 3 letter
agencies' interference. https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/8310187817727287761/1843903631072834621
Dash8 , 1 hour ago
You don't seem to understand the basic principle of aircraft design...it must not require
an extraordinary response for a KNOWN problem.
Think of it this way; Ford builds a car that works great most of the time, but
occasionally a wheel will fall off at highway speeds...no problem, right? ....you just guide
the car to the shoulder on the 3 remaining wheels and all good.
Now, put your wife and kids in that car, after a day at work and the kids screaming in the
back.
Still feel good about your opinion?
canaanav , 1 hour ago
I wrote software on the 787. You are right. This was not a known problem and the Trim
Runaway procedure was already established. The issue was that the MAX needed a larger
horizontal stab and MCAS would have never been needed. The FAA doesnt have the knowledge to
regulate things like this. Boeing lost talent too, and gets bailouts and tax breaks to the
extent that they dont care.
Dash8 , 1 hour ago
But it was a known problem, Boeing admits this.
Argon1 , 41 minutes ago
LGBT & Ethnicity was a more important hiring criteria than Engineering talant.
gutta percha , 1 hour ago
Why is it so difficult to design and maintain reliable Angle Of Attack sensors? The
engineers put in layers and layers of complicated tech to sense and react to AOA sensor
failures. Why not make the sensors _themselves_ more reliable? They aren't nearly as complex
as all the layers of tech BS on top of them.
Dash8 , 1 hour ago
It's not, but it costs $$....and there you have it.
Argon1 , 37 minutes ago
Its the Shuttle Rocketdyne problem, the upper management phones down to the safety
committee and complains about the cost of the delay, take off your engineer hat and put on
your management hat. All of a sudden your project launches on schedule and the board claps
and cheers at their ability to defy physics and save $ millions by just shouting at someone
for about 60 seconds..
canaanav , 1 hour ago
Each AOA sensor is already redundant internally. They have multiple channels. I believe
they were hit with a maintenance stand and jammed. That said, AOA has never been a control
system component. It just runs the low-speed cue on the EFIS and the stick shaker. It's an
advisory-level system. Boeing tied it to Flight Controls thru MCAS. The FAA likely dictated
to Boeing how they wanted the System Safety Analysis (SSA) to look, Boeing wrote it that way,
the FAA bought off on it.
Winston Churchill , 43 minutes ago
More fundamental is why an aerodynamically stable aircraft wasn't designed in the first
place,love of money.
HardlyZero , 13 minutes ago
Yes. In reality the changed CG (Center of Gravity) due to the larger fan engine really did
setup as a "new" design, so the MAX should have been treated as "new" and completely
evaluated and completely tested as a completly new design. As a new design it would probably
double the development and test cost and schedule...so be it.
DisorderlyConduct , 1 hour ago
"Lovely. Boeing coerced or bribed the FAA to sign off on the reviews now tries to hide
behind the FAA."
No - what a shoddy analysis.
The FAA conceded many of their oversight responsibilities to Boeing - who was basically
given the green light to self-monitor. The FAA is the one that is in the wrong here.
Well, how the **** else was that supposed to end up? This is like the IRS letting people
self-audit...
Astroboy , 1 hour ago
Just as the Boeing saga is unfolding, we should expect by the end of the year other
similar situations, related to drug companies, pandemia and the rest.
8. The internet was invented by the US government, not Silicon Valley
Many people think that the US is ahead in the frontier technology sectors as a result of
private sector entrepreneurship. It's not. The US federal government created all these
sectors.
The Pentagon financed the development of the computer in the early days and the Internet
came out of a Pentagon research project. The semiconductor - the foundation of the
information economy - was initially developed with the funding of the US Navy. The US
aircraft industry would not have become what it is today had the US Air Force not massively
subsidized it indirectly by paying huge prices for its military aircraft, the profit of which
was channeled into developing civilian aircraft.
People believe that corporate executives are immune from prosecution and protected by the
fact that they are within the corporation. This is false security. If true purposeful and
intended criminal activities are conducted by any corporate executive, the courts can do what
is called "Piercing The Corporate Veil" . It is looking beyond the corporation as a virtual
person and looking at the actual individuals making and conducting the criminal
activities.
FAA warns engine on Boeing 737 jets could shut down mid-flight, issues emergency order directing airlines to inspect,
replace critical part
ASSOCIATED PRESS
|
JUL 24, 2020
AT
5:42
PM
WASHINGTON -- Safety regulators issued an emergency order directing airlines to inspect and if necessary replace a
critical engine part on popular Boeing 737 jets after four reports of engines shutting down during flights.
The Boeing Company logo.
(Reed Saxon/AP)
The Federal Aviation Administration said Friday that its order affected about 2,000 twin-engine passenger jets in the
United States.
The FAA said operators must inspect any 737 that has been parked for at least seven days or been flown fewer than 11
times since being returned to service. That's because of reports that certain engine valves can become stuck in the open
position.
Corrosion of the valves on both engines could lead to a complete loss of power without the ability to restart the
engines, forcing pilots to land somewhere other than an airport, the FAA said in the order, dated Thursday.
PAID POST
What Is This?
New Jersey Launches New Policy For Cars Used Less Than 50 Miles/Day
Do not pay your next car insurance bill until you read this...
Chicago-based Boeing Co. said that with planes being stored or used less often during the coronavirus pandemic, "the
valve can be more susceptible to corrosion." The company said it is providing inspection and parts-replacement help to
airplane owners.
Major airlines typically fly their planes several times a day. However, they parked hundreds of planes when the
coronavirus pandemic triggered a collapse in air travel this spring and are bringing some of those planes back as
passenger traffic has picked up slightly.
The FAA did not provide details about the four cases of engine shutdowns.
Alaska Airlines said one occurred on a July 15 flight from Seattle to Austin, Texas, and the plane landed without
incident. Alaska said six of its planes need inspections, which have already begun.
RECOMMENDED ON CHICAGO TRIBUNE
American, United and Southwest said none of their planes had valve-related engine shutdowns. American said four of its
planes needed inspections, which were completed and found no issues. United said it is inspecting 28 planes. Southwest
was determining how many planes it needs to check.
Delta Air Lines said it would inspect 20 planes but did not say whether any of its planes suffered engine shutdowns.
The emergency order applies to versions of the 737 called the NG and Classic, the latter of which are no longer in
production but remain in some airline fleets. The directive does not apply to the newer Boeing 737 Max, which has been
grounded worldwide since March 2019 after two crashes that killed 346 people.
Passenger jets have two or more engines, and multiple engine failures of the type that FAA warned about in its order are
rare. One example was the 2009 "Miracle on the Hudson," in which US Airways pilots landed their plane on the Hudson
River in New York after bird strikes knocked out both engines. All 155 people on board survived.
More stuff on Boeing. It's actually a bit worse than I thought. In the first half of this
year, 600 737's disappeared from Boeing's backlogged orders. Last week, BOC canceled another
30 737 orders, and Norwegian Air canceled 92 737's and 5 Dreamliners. Large widebodies are
going to be in trouble for an extended period, as aviation analysts say it may take several
years for air travel to recover to 2019 levels.
Meanwhile, China's domestically-developed COMAC C-919 has received 815 orders, China says,
from 28 domestic and foreign airlines. Development of the joint Russian-Chinese-produced
CR-929 long-range widebody is in the preliminary design phase.
The Chinese company has delivered 25 of its ARJ-21 regional jets to domestic
customers.
All but 10 of the C-919 orders are domestic – but, as I have said before several
times, all China needs to do to fuck Boeing over is not buy its aircraft. 305 firm orders and
options for an additional 700 C-919's mean that at least some of those are orders which would
otherwise have been 737's, as the C-919 is the Chinese equivalent. China is the major growth
market, and it is driving hard to get its economy back on track before the west.
.On Monday, Europe's trade commissioner Phil Hogan said Washington had rejected moves
to settle the dispute.
"I want to reassure people that we are ready to act decisively and strongly on the
European Union side if we don't get the type of outcome that we expect from the United States
in relationship to finalising this 15-year-old dispute," he told the European Parliament's
trade committee
####
Sing with me, ' the wheels of the bus are coming off, coming off, coming off '
I would once again remind people that this all dates back to 1992 and the US-EU LCA (Large
Civil Aircraft) agreement and included the 1979 TLCA (Trade in Large Civil Aircraft)
agreement.* This would have allowed both Arbus & Boing to build new jumbo jet models
without a big fight but agreed subsidy limits. McDonnel Douglas (MD) threw in the towel on
its MD-12 double decker project and was taken over by Boing – or as others have pointed
out, MD Execs tookover Boing and drove the financialisation of the company since. Arbus went
ahead with the A380.
In 2004 the USA threw a tantrum on behalf of Boing and ripped up the agreement and it has
been legal ping-pong ding-dong ever since. That's the short version. The irony is that the
Arbus A380 is not a successful program and is already cancelled and young airframes now being
'parted-out.' Boing on the other hand bet on long range twins like the 777 to take passengers
from point to point rather than just hub to hub and then transferred to spokes, and has
hansomely outsold Arbus that went four engined with the A340 before dumping it for the two
engined A330 version.
A US government report finds that Boeing purposefully held back information about the
automated flight control system on its re-engineered 737 Max during the aircraft's
certification process, that led to two fatal aircraft crashes that killed 346 people.
In a scathing 52-page report published on 1 July, the Department of Transportation's
(DOT) Inspector General writes that the Chicago-based manufacturer did not share vital
information about the new aircraft's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)
during the lengthy process, thus significantly downplaying the risk that it posed.
####
More at the link.
From an engineering led company to a finance led company. Go figure.
"... Very clearly stated description of how "accidents" get engineered, baked-into, into big and complex machines and systems. Wonderful. ..."
"... Raises material questions about defects in regulation of airplane safety, and how that happens (can you spell "m-o-n-e-y"?) and why (repeat spelling). Regulatory Capture? Geewhiz...yatink? ..."
"... Feynman also tells a story about Oak Ridge in the building of the plant to separate isotopes - he knew nothing of blue-prints and they showed him reams of paper, he spotted a little rectangle with an X in side..."what happens if this opens" he said (if I recall rightly) Of course he thought it looked like a window, but in the language of blueprints it was, of course, a valve.... Turned out it was a lucky question, well, maybe not for Japan... ..."
"... Another excellent description of the Boeing profit cancer. Where are the cost/benefit analysis that were done to justify the profit over safety moves of Boeing? Some people are making big bucks by putting the public more at risk for profit. ..."
"... The failures at hand have to do with a dead-short between the ears associated with Big Bucks and "fictionalized capitalism" - they faked it, pencil whipped the job...as we used to say when I worked for the Army... ..."
The fleet of Boeing 737 MAX planes will stay out on the ground longer than anticipated.
Boeing promised a new software package to correct the
severe problems with its Maneuver Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). The delivery
was supposed to be ready in April. A month later it has still not arrived at the Federal
Aviation Agency where it will take at least a month to certify it. The FAA will not be the only
one to decide when the plane can come back into the flight line. Other country's agencies will
do their own independent review and will likely take their time.
The 737 MAX incident also revealed a problem with older generations of the 737 type of plane
that is only now coming into light. Simulator experiments (video) showed that the
recovery procedures Boeing provided for the case of a severe mistrim of the plane is not
sufficient to bring the plane back under control. The root cause of that inconvenient fact does
not lie with the 737 MAX but with its predecessor, the Boeing 737 Next Generation or NG.
This was known in pilot circles for some time but will only now receive
wider public attention :
The Boeing 737 Max's return to commercial airline service is reportedly being further delayed
by the Federal Aviation Administration.
US government officials told The Wall Street Journal's Andy Pasztor that the FAA is
evaluating the emergency procedures for not only the Max but also the older generations of
the 737 including the [once] hot-selling Boeing 737 NG.
According to the officials, the broadened evaluation will take a look at how pilots of all
737 variant are instructed to respond to emergency situations.
Here is a detailed explanation why the FAA is now looking into the pilot training for older
737 types.
The 737 NG (-600/-700/-800/-900) was the third generation derivative of the 737 and followed
the 737 Original (-100/-200) and Classic (−300/-400/-500) series. The first NG flew in
1997. Some 7,000 were build and most of them are still flying.
Two technical modifications that turned out to be a problem during the recent incidents
occurred during the redesign of the 737 Classic into the New Generation series.
In the NG series a new Flight Management Computer (FMC) was added to the plane. (The FMC helps
the pilots to plan and manage the flight. It includes data about airports and navigation
points. It differs from the two Flight Control Computers in that it has no control over
physical elements of the plane.)
The FMC on the NG version has two input/output units each with a small screen and a larger
keyboard below it. They are next to the knees of the pilot and the copilot They are located on
the central pedestal between the pilots right below the vertical instrument panel (see pic
below). The lengthy FMCs did not fit on the original central pedestal. The trim wheels on each
side, used to manually trim the airplane in its longitudinal axis or pitch, were in the way.
Boeing's 'solution' to the problem was to make the manual trim wheels smaller.
737 NG cockpit with FMC panels and with smaller trim wheels (black with a white stripe) bigger
737 Original-200 cockpit with larger trim wheels (black with a white stripe) bigger
The smaller trim wheels require more manual force to trim with the same moment of force or
torque than the larger ones did.
Another change from the 737 Classic to the 737 NG was an increase in the size of the rear
horizontal flight surface, the stabilizer.
The stabilizer at the rear of the plane can be turned around a central pivot point. The
natural nose up or nose down characteristics of an airplane change during a flight depending on
the speed at which the airplane flies. The stabilizer can be moved during a flight by
a jackscrew (vid)
which is turned by either an electric motor, or via cables from the hand-cranked trim wheels in
the cockpit. Trimming the airplane keeps it level at all flyable speeds.
At the rear end of the stabilizer is the elevator surface (blue arrow in the pic below). The
elevator is moved by the column or yoke the pilot uses to control the plane. During a flight
the pilot, or an automated stabilizer trim system (STS), will electrically trim the stabilizer
so that no additional force on the column is required for the plane to stay at its flight
level.
In case of a mistrim of the stabilizer, the plane puts its nose up or down and the pilot
will have to push or pull his column to move the elevator to counter the mistrim of the
stabilizer. Depending on the position of the stabilizer and the speed of the airplane this can
require very significant force. In some cases it might be impossible.
The size of the stabilizer increased from 31.40 square meter on the
Classic to 32.78 sqm on the NG and MAX. Meanwhile the size of the elevator, the primary control
surface the pilot can use to counter a mistrimmed stabilizer, was kept at its original size of
6.55 sqm.
It is therefore more difficult for the pilot of a 737 NG or 737 MAX plane to use the
elevator to counter a mistrimmed stabilizer than it was on the earlier 737 Classic series.
In 1961 a mistrimmed stabilizer on a Boeing 707 caused the crash of an airplane. All on board
died. The root cause was a malfunction in the electrical switch the pilot normally uses to
electrically move the stabilizer. The switch stuck in an ON position and the motor moved the
stabilizer to its most extreme position. The plane's nose went up until it aerodynamically
stalled. The pilots were unable to recover from the situation.
The type of incident where an electric malfunction drives the stabilizer into an extreme
position is since known as a 'runaway stabilizer'.
To get a type rating for Boeing planes the pilots have to learn a special procedure to
diagnose and correct a runaway stabilizer situation. The procedure is a so called 'memory
item'. The pilots must learn it by heart. The corrective action is to interrupt the electric
circle that supplies the motor which drives the jackscrew and moves the stabilizer. The pilots
then have to use the hand-cranked trim wheels to turn the jackscrew and to bring the stabilizer
back into a normal position.
[The MCAS incidents on the crashed 737 MAX were not of the classic runaway stabilizer type.
A runaway stabilizer due to an electric malfunction is expected to move the stabilizer
continuously. The computerized MCAS operated intermittently. It moved the stabilizer several
times, with pauses in between, until the mistrim became obvious. The pilots would not have
diagnosed it as a runaway stabilizer. Only in the end are the effects of both problems
similar.]
A third change from older 737s to newer types involved the manuals and the pilot training.
If due to a runaway stabilizer event the front end of the stabilizer moves up, the nose of
the airplane will move down and the plane will increase its speed. To counter that the pilot
pulls on his column to move the rear end of the elevator up and to bring the plane back towards
level flight. As the plane comes back to level the aerodynamic pressure on the mistrimmed
stabilizer increases. Attempts to manually trim in that situation puts opposing forces on the
jackscrew that holds the stabilizer in its positions. The aerodynamic forces on the stabilizer
can become so big that a manual cranking of the trim wheel can no longer move the jackscrew and
thereby the stabilizer.
Until the introduction of the newer 737 types Boeing's pilot manuals for the 737 included a
procedure that described how to overcome the situation. It was counterintuitive. If the
stabilizer put the plane in an extreme nose down position the pilot was advised to first pull
the column to decrease the speed. He then had to push the column forward to lower the
aerodynamic forces that blocked the jackscrew. Then the manual trim wheel could be turned a bit
while the plane continued to dive and again increased its speed. The procedure had to be
repeated several times: pull column to decrease speed; push column to decrease the aerodynamic
force on the stabilizer and its jackscrew; trim manually; repeat. The technic was known as the
rollercoaster maneuver.
Recently some pilots used a 737 NG flight simulator to test the procedure. They simulated
the runaway stabilizer case at a height of 10,000 feet and use the rollercoaster maneuver to
recover from the mistrim. When they finally had the stabilizer back into a correct trim
position they found themselves at 3,000 feet height. The maneuver would thus help only when the
plane is already at a significant height above ground.
Both of the recent 737 MAX crashes happened shortly after the start. The rollercoaster
maneuver would not have helped those flights. But should a runaway stabilizer incident happen
on a 737 NG at its normal flight level the maneuver would probably be the only chance to
recover from the situation.
The crashes of the two 737 MAX revealed a number of problems with the design of the MCAS
system. Several additional issues with the plane have since become known. There may be other
problems with its 737 MAX that no one yet learned of. The rather casual FAA certification of
the type was clearly not justified.
But the problems described above are 737 NG problems. The 380 or so existing 737 MAX are
currently grounded. But some 7,000 737 NG fly about every day. The record provides that it is a
relatively safe airplane. But a runaway stabilizer is a well known electrical malfunction that
could by chance happen on any of those flights.
The changes from the 737 Classic to the 737 NG make it more difficult, if not impossible,
for the pilots to recover from such a situation:
The smaller manual trim wheels on the 737 NG make it more difficult to trim a runaway
stabilizer back into a regular position.
The larger stabilizer surface makes it more difficult to counter a runaway stabilizer by
using the elevator which was kept at the same size.
737 NG pilots no longer learn the rollercoaster maneuver that is now the only way to
recover from a severe mistrim.
Simulator sessions demonstrate (video) that a runaway stabilizer
incident on a 737 NG can no longer be overcome by the procedures that current Boeing manuals
describe.
It is pure luck that no NG crash has yet been caused by a runaway stabilizer incident. It is
quite astonishing that these issues only now become evident. The 737 NG was certified by the
FAA in 1997. Why is the FAA only now looking into this?
The second 737 MAX crash revealed all these issues to a larger public. Except for MCAS the
trim systems on the NG and MAX are similar. The Ethiopian Airline flight 302 did not experience
a runaway stabilizer, but the multiple engagement of MCAS moved the stabilizer to a similar
extreme position. The pilots cut the electricity to the stabilizer motor and tried to re-trim
the plane manually by turning the trim wheels. The aerodynamic forces on the stabilizer were
impossible to overcome. The pilots had not learned of the rollercoaster maneuver. (Not that it
would have helped much. They were too low to the ground.) They switched the motor back on to
use manual electrical trim to re-trim the aircraft. Then MCAS engaged again and put them into
the ground.
All NG and MAX pilots should learn the rollercoaster maneuver, preferable during simulator
training. There are probably some 50,000 pilots who are certified to fly a Boeing NG. It will
be an enormous and costly effort to put all of them through additional training.
But it will be more costly, for all involved, if a 737 NG crashes and kills all on board due
to a runaway stabilizer incident and a lack of pilot training to overcome it. Such an incident
would probably keep the whole NG fleet on the ground.
Pilots, airlines and the public should press the FAA to mandate that additional training.
The FAA must also explain why it only now found out that the problem exists.
---
Previous Moon of Alabama posts on Boeing 737 issues:
on the one hand a thorough and impressive look at the subject. on the other hand i'm getting
on a 737 next week and this adds to my already profound anxiety about flying. good times.
Very clearly stated description of how "accidents" get engineered, baked-into, into big and
complex machines and systems. Wonderful.
Raises material questions about defects in regulation of airplane safety, and how that
happens (can you spell "m-o-n-e-y"?) and why (repeat spelling). Regulatory Capture?
Geewhiz...yatink?
Feynman's classic report on the Challenger "accident" exposes the same sort of matter.
Feynman also tells a story about Oak Ridge in the building of the plant to separate
isotopes - he knew nothing of blue-prints and they showed him reams of paper, he spotted a
little rectangle with an X in side..."what happens if this opens" he said (if I recall
rightly) Of course he thought it looked like a window, but in the language of blueprints it
was, of course, a valve.... Turned out it was a lucky question, well, maybe not for
Japan...
When you build stuff or operate it one must always ask, at every junction, what if?...
This is true of driving, of motorcycles, airplanes, boats, and probably taking a bath.
Another excellent description of the Boeing profit cancer.
Where are the cost/benefit analysis that were done to justify the profit over safety moves
of Boeing? Some people are making big bucks by putting the public more at risk for
profit.
Who are they and why are they not in jail?
If corporations are people like Mitt Romney says then why is Boeing not under arrest?
If we can't arrest Boeing then why not the leadership that made the profit over safety
decisions? Certainly there is a paper trail.
Boeing is now like Trump by putting a clear face on the sickness that is the West governed
by the elite who own global private finance and everything else.
And this sickness is having a hissy fit because it knows it can't compete against China's
mixed economy and they won't let the elite own China finance.
Public versus private finance is the war that humanity is waging even though it is
presented by the West as all these spinning plates of other things.
Boeing needs to be driven into bankruptcy, just like empire is being driven, to put
consequences to the cancer of profit over safety.
Correct me if I'm wrong but hasn't every single transport-category aircraft made since the
Boeing 707, including Airbus, Embraer and Bombardier, used a jackscrew to position the
horizontal stabilizer?
Jackscrews are, in most older cars and most trucks, and most machine tools the way the
controls and steering works. They are ordinary, simple, and nearly foolproof. The article
does not blame the jackscrew. Sometimes corrosion and maintenance issues, and rarely,
manufacturing defects, can happen...nothing like that at issue in these two failure patters.
I have seen exactly one jackscrew failure, and it still worked ok, and I have had in my
hands hundreds of jackscrews torn down for analysis.
The failures at hand have to do with a dead-short between the ears associated with Big
Bucks and "fictionalized capitalism" - they faked it, pencil whipped the job...as we used to
say when I worked for the Army...
@8 Thank you Walter. I'm not an engineer...just trying to pinpoint the stabilizer problem.
Faulty electronics? Overloaded trim wheels? Bad design or capitalist greed?
B explained it very well but is the problem unique to Boeing?
Unlike the recent MCAS issues on a new aircraft I suspect runaway trim on 737 NG is a rare
event most pilots only experience in the simulator (unlike in the 60's-70's on other models)
.In over 20 years of flying (737 NG) has their ever been a crash due to runaway trim? Just
asking as I don't know.
This does not mean the procedures should not be corrected and additional training
done.
thanks b.. that is discouraging to hear... it is interesting seeing the FAA's role in all of
this.. it reminds me of the role of the opcw and what was, or wasn't shared in the report on
douma... at some point these agencies need to be scrutinized more aggressively... the author
andersons of enron keep rearing their ugly heads..
Just curious, but has any airline ever reported a runaway stabilizer on a 737NG?
Obviously no 737NG has crashed from such an event, but if there is a runaway stabilizer
incident then the airline is (I assume) obliged to report it to the FAA. Is that data
available to the public?
To b; Thank you. to Walter also thank you for most informative comments. To dh #9. No way is
the problem unique to Boeing. Where was that walk way/over pass which collapsed the day after
it opened killing several? The Carolina's? Georgia? How about Becktel's Big Dig? The roof
tiles fell in the airport tunnel killing how many? Oops no links. Wait wait
What about the atrium walk way in???? City in the US midwest. Undersized bolts. The whole
thing fell down at the opening celebration. Deflection won. Cost cutting lost. Scores died.
Famous engineering maxims: Two is one and one is none. Keep it simple stupid.
I vote that all airline pilots get a raise and more vacation time.
Clearly then even the old 737 is unsafe below 7,000 feet and probably higher for
unprepared or unsuspecting pilots, because the recovery maneuver causes at least that
altitude loss, and the 737 NG is further unsafe in cases where the recovery maneuver does not
work.
The problem is skimping on error handling processes, the most costly, critical, and
invisible part of critical systems design. Skimping is universal where profit motive governs,
and infects regulators via bribes and regulatory capture. Where disasters will result very
rarely, the skimping remains invisible, the investors count their gains and donate to the
parties that control regulatory agencies, and managers are promoted and retire. The value of
a human life is adjusted to zero by sociopathic investors and their preferred corporate
managers.
So basically the post is stating that Boeing and the faa have a culture of overlooking safety
issues - no blood no foul (until there is blood).
Boing and faa would like to point the finger at pilots, birds, weather, God... etc. Lastly
faa and boing will be leaking blame directed at each other and then it will be that you cant
actually punish government employees and then boing is major military contractor and
strategically important - too big to fail.
Basically, they have both been shown to be unreliable. Fatal to the faa, maybe to boing,
maybe to passengers.
Unlike the recent MCAS issues on a new aircraft I suspect runaway trim on 737 NG is a rare
event most pilots only experience in the simulator (unlike in the 60's-70's on other models)
.In over 20 years of flying (737 NG) has their ever been a crash due to runaway trim? Just
asking as I don't know. This d\n mean the procedures s\n\b corrected and additional
training done. by: Pft @10 <= Re rime and clear ice builds, especially in low altitude
(take off and approaches) where icing develops along moment arm @ local positions <= trim
becomes a major frantic cockpit issue.. yeah, I know icing is never a problem in a modern
life exchanged for profit aircraft..
Psychohistorian seated the hard nail into government protected corporate lumber (weed
exterminator Monsanto , bomb makers everywhere and vision, hearing and heart -threatened
calcium channel signal corrupting 5G energies come to mind. One drop of corporation greed =
the early death for large numbers of expendable humans. but never fear the secret government
is at work, protecting the corporate lords and their Oligarch owners from those of you who
toil to earn a living.. what you governed humans don't know, those who govern you (the
governors) intend to get Assange for telling you, because the corporation lords don't want
you to know.
Never has there been a better case for independent of government, independent of corporate
influence audits..
The entire flying public should be allowed to audit all of the aircraft designs, construction
and management decisions and FAA activities and decisions from start to finish. The life of
the passenger depends on the scope and quality of the audit.
There is a safe harbor rule in securities tell the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
if you fail that requirement you must give the money investors gave you back to the
investors. ..humm!
Toyota Motor Corp. rebuked President Donald Trump's declaration that imported cars threaten
U.S. national security, signaling contentious talks are ahead for the White House and
America's key trading partners.
The United States wants to put tariffs on $11.2 billion worth of EU goods ... to offset
what it says are unfair European subsidies for plane manufacturer Airbus.
How much of Boeing is vulnerable to a European retaliation? I know that the 737 Max uses
LEAP-1B
Your post is likely to end up in some pilots' own custom-made manuals for reference if
Boeing doesn't amend its current manuals or FAA doesn't mandate appropriate pilot training on
the Boeing 737 MAX jets. Get ready to see it reprinted on other websites and blogs!
[If Trump really goes after Airbus,] How much of Boeing is vulnerable to a European
retaliation? I know that the 737 Max uses LEAP-1B engines, which are made by a joint venture
between Safran (France) and General Electric (US). Anything else?
@ Cyril with the great questions about potential implications of tariffs/sanctions to protect
Boeing market
Tariffs and sanctions could be a temporary negotiating tactic or are a slippery slope that
those in control of global private finance are willing to let Boeing and other US industry
leaders have to endure as long as global private finance stays viable in the
world....throwing America under the bus to save the scions of empire.
Is bringing the world economies to a halt via all these "bluffs" meant for some bigger
purpose?....war by other means, perhaps?
Wait until the world gets to anguish over nations debt position as part of all the fear
mongering to save private finance profit while the public takes the losses in the
shorts....it is all about getting and staying ahead of the narrative train....
During the 1989 Airline Pilot's Strike in Oz, Labor & Union acolyte, PM Bob Hawke,
solved the problem Neo-liberally by removing negotiating principles from the table and
declaring a National Emergency. This empowered the airlines to sack all the recalcitrant
pilots, thus reducing them to the status of truck drivers. I don't know if this was the
beginning of the War On Pilots but I did read that the Captain of the plane which landed an
airliner on the Hudson River, saving all on board, was on $19,000-00 p.a. and had a second
job to make ends meet.
It seemed a bit short-sighted, to me, to reduce the perceived status of a group of
highly-trained, and professional, airline pilots to well below the pay-scale status of
qualified tradesmen and even some skilled laborers - possibly to the point of (voiceless)
irrelevance?
As a former 737-300 (="Classic") and 737-700 (= "NG") pilot, I vividly remember from
during the initial simulator training how difficult it was to manually trim the 737-700.
But hey, the joke in the pilot community is that "Boeing is a law firm that also makes
aeroplanes."
Boeing needs to be driven into bankruptcy, just like empire is being driven, to put
consequences to the cancer of profit over safety.
Posted by: psychohistorian | May 25, 2019 7:13:08 PM | 4
Absolutely and utterly agree! Those at the top of both Boeing and FAA also need to be
tried for manslaughter and jailed for life.
The FAA also needs to be sanctioned by regulatory moves in EU, Russia, China and other
countries which disallow all FAA certifications until the FAA have proven that the
certifications were properly carried out, and validated by non-US agencies at FAA's cost. If
they don't fully comply, threaten mass grounding of US-certified aircraft. There also needs
to be a wide-ranging international investigation of FAA working practicies and conflicts of
interests, with mandatory full disclosure (to all non-US aviation regulators and pilots
unions) of all documentation and mandatory access to witnesses, again under threat of
grounding of all US-certified aircraft in case of non-compliance. (It won't happen of course!
There also need to similar investigations of working practices and conflicts of interest of
EU aviation authorities - also won't happen, althought there might be investigations of very
limited scope. Likewise for pharmaceuticals, pesticides and environmental hazards.)
The FMC helps the pilots to plan and manage the flight. It includes data about airports
and navigation points....The lengthy FMCs did not fit on the original central pedestal. The
trim wheels on each side, used to manually trim the airplane in its longitudinal axis or
pitch, were in the way. Boeing's 'solution' to the problem was to make the manual trim wheels
smaller.
In addition to the usual greed, we see how technocratic-engineering culture is at work
here: A basically worthless "hi-tech" toy (the FMC) is considered far more important than an
actual safety mechanism which is manual and therefore stupid from the technocratic POV.
Indeed, from this culture's POV it's an absolute value to decrease human agency and action
and increase computer agency, without regard to any kind of practicality, let alone something
so mundane and boring as the safety of human beings.
The trim wheel has a handle that folds out. A possible solution to this problem would be a
handle that is extensible, giving a large lever arm, and which functions like a ratchet
wrench.
Asking questions and making statements were 39 members of the House – 22 Democrats
and 17 Republicans – who during the 2018 election cycle took in a total of $134,749
– or an average of $3,455 each from Boeing in campaign contributions.
The structural defects in the 737 NG described so well by b are also relevant to the recent
crashes of the 737 MAX, are they not? Several reports indicated that the pilots of the
Ethiopian Airlines plane disconnected the MCAS system and tried to trim the aircraft manually
but were unable to do so, and this problem with the manual trim system caused them to turn on
the MCAS system again, with deadly results. It seems that the 737 MAX is even more dangerous
due to its 737 NG legacy. In addition to all the other necessary changes, the manual trim
wheel should be redesigned for the 737 MAX, the input from the pilot's yoke should be
increased, and a special pilot training category should be established. All of this should
have been mandated by the irresponsible FAA long ago. If the needed changes are not carried
out, nationwide boycotts of Boeing and of 737 MAX flights should be organized and carried
out.
@Dao Gen - The structural defects in the 737 NG described so well by b are also relevant
to the recent crashes of the 737 MAX, are they not?
Yes they are. The MAX crashes revealed that these issues had been 'forgotten'. That is why
the FAA is now looking into the NG. I added a paragraph near the end to clarify that.
I once ran "F&E shop, as the Army used to call them. Stands for "fuel and electronic"
[repair], sort of a forward operating base shop, these economize the logistics necessary to
support fleets. In that context machine parts, subsystems came in and we went through a
process of "triage", testing and labeling each unit as it came in. Those units which we
judged to be "BER" [beyond economical repair] got labeled as "N.G." (or NFG!) for "no good".
Even though the Boeing FUBAR'd 737 is a deadly matter I found the appellation 737-NG to be
vastly idiotic and amusing. Similarly amusing when Chevrolet named a car "no va" (doesn't
go).
Evidently Boeing ought to have named 737-MAX as 737-NFG.
Next we'll learn that the 777 is even worse than this thing & that Malaysian Air's losses
weren't Israel or the US.Gov's fault at all, just the few incompetent fools running the biz
& the FAA
snake @18 said: "Never has there been a better case for independent of government,
independent of corporate influence audits."
But what kind of organization could conduct those audits? What can exist that is
independent of business and its profit motives, which invite corruption, but also be
independent of government while having some mechanism for being answerable to the public? Any
effort to create such an organization will just recreate government.
We already have the answer: It is government regulation. We just need a deliberate
impenetrable wall between government and business interests like we in America used to have
between government and religion. We need to adjust our culture such that any
politician promising to be "business-friendly" is as shunned as one promising to
implement Sharia law. A revolution could probably accomplish this.
1) it does not extend the "lever asm" (in russia it is called "shoulder" :-) ), just makes
a better grip
2) like with piston engines, it has two "dead points (centres)". Piston engines solve it by
having multiple pistons working in different phases and by having a flywheel. Both options
can not be applied to this 737 wheel.
The video show it is exactly "dead points" that cause problems. When the handle-axis is
orthogonal to axis-man, then the wheel is more or less rotated. But those "dead points"
progressivle become more and more impassable.
> A possible solution to this problem would be a handle that is extensible, giving a
large lever arm,
Would not do.
If it extends parallel to axis - it would not increase lever no matter how long it is.
If it extends orthogonal to axis - it would just get stuck against the wall and FMS
stand.
> and which functions like a ratchet wrench.
Yep, or a removable stick, with the wheel having 8 or at least 6 wholes through the
wheel's reborde.
This all, whoever, would
1) add extra complexcitiy, increasing weight and malfanction probability.
For example, how would electro-motors act, if the wheel is locked by the said ratchet?
For example, where to store the removable lever, so it would not be a nuisance during normal
flights, but in emergency would be both easy to take and reliably fixed until being
taken?
2) would probably decrease rotating speed yet more. Force-path trade-off....
@steve Does the 777 max have any trim systems similar to the 737? Given the 777 has an
aluminum fuselage, does this mean the 787 was a mistake?
The stabilizer trim via a jackscrew on the 777 is somewhat similar to the 737 though the
jackscrew is much bigger.
It can be seen in this video at ~3:00 min: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sy-ARLZXXTA
There are many difference in the trim control. The 777 uses several independent hydraulic
circles to run the hydraulic jackscrew motor. The 777 is fly-by-wire. There ar no longer
manual trim wheels with long cables running to the stabilizer. All signals from the cockpit
are electric to three independent system which then switch the hydraulic circles on/off as
needed. There is an electric force feed back to give the pilots some 'feel' for the trim
position in their columns.
The aluminum or carbon skin decision is relevant for weight. Carbon is more expensive as
special care must be taken for flash impacts and other issues. But it is also a lot lighter
that aluminum. The higher price will easily pay off.
There is rightly a focus on the poor quality of work done by the FAA in authorising the
Boeing 737 MAX (and, it now appears, that the same could be said about the authorisation of
the NG). As stated by numerous articles the FAA were just relying on Boeing assessments and
safety checks. However, these weaknesses in the authorisation process should really have been
picked up by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and I fail to see how a
competent body would fail to do so. So, the EASA is as useless as the FAA, and aircraft
certifications are probably politically based rather than a rigorous safety and airworthiness
check.
I would imagine that Boeing still intend to have the 737 MAX re-authorised by the FAA
within a few months with the expectation that EASA approval will follow shortly after. The
political motive will be to maintain the Boeing and Airbus duopoly (for mutual self-interest
they both wish to preserve their respective market shares and not significantly challenge the
other) rather than issues of safety. As far as I can see there are no politicians in the UK
& Europe that are particularly interested or concerned about the issue
(unfortunately).
> and a special pilot training category should be established
Posted by: Dao Gen | May 26, 2019 7:53:10 AM | 36
But this is marketing disaster, too train pilots.
- Ok, mr. seller, so we need to spend N hours and M thousand USD to make our pilots
efficient at most fuel-economic flight and at pressing automatic take-=off and automatic
landing buttons. Good. Make sense.
- Oh, not just that, mr. customer, you also need to spend 10x N hours and 10xM monet to train
your pilots against emergencies.
- what emergencies
- Oh, you know, it would not ever be your problem, buyt jsut to make government happy, you
nkow, those crazy government clerks shifting responsibilities for life, they want it be
passed...
- So what exactly they need be protected from??? And why they make me pay for it?
- Well, you know, 100 years ago once in mankind history an aircraft - not Boeing our
competitor's jet it was - it got into X and then Y and wheather was Z and they crashed with
all people aboard lost. And then, 99 years ago, there was A and sun was like B and then....
and they crashed and 50% on board lost. And then there was K and if rain goes L and ....
- Okay, okay, got it. Your new Boeing is so unreliable shit, that 100 years later it still
can get into X, A and K and everyone dies and our business dies too. And you think i am such
an idiot you gonna sell me this unreliable gum-n-sticks shit? I will first buy Manhatten
bridge, before i start buying Boeings.
- No! No! our new jets are most reliable! no competitor is so reliable as Boeing! Read out
booklet! read the testimonies from our customers!
- But you say our pilots must spend ten times time and ten times money to proitext from X and
A and K fatal problems in your Boeing jets...
- NO !!! we do not have those problems! It is government, they always go overcautious and
extort!
- So you say there is no X, A and K problems in Boeing? Yes or no???
- A.. a... AH! No, there is absolutely no problems in Boeing jets.
- Good, then if there is no problem, there is nothing to overtrain our pilots at
overexpensive courses.
- But government...
- You have problems with gov't - you solve them! You better know what you must arrange with
clerks, to fix it. And sto imposing your problems with gov't over us customers. Do you want
to sell or not?
- But safety...
- You said there is NO PROBLEMS in Boeing, didn't you???
- Yes, but...
- No buts! Give me an official p[aper that there is no X, A and K problems in Boeing ever,
and that if some jet crash and burn i am not responsible, and then we pay for those jets. Or
we gonna pay those, who will give us those papers!
Outstandingly well written B; a most impressive explanation of 737 issues.
Two points I would like to add.
1. From my understanding of the design approach of the MAX, Boeing engineers where told to
forget physics and focus on FAA compliance with an eye on quick certification and insure no
additional pilot training. Example: This is why only one sensor was used. Had Boeing done the
right thing, two would have been used, but then the FAA would have needed a lot more time to
test. In addition, even now, Dennis A. Muilenburg, the CEO of Boeing is in denial. Just
listening to him makes me cringe, he needs to read this article from B and wake the F up.
2. This is terrible timing for Boeing since both the Chinese and the Russians now have
aircraft to compete with the 737 MAX. It is extremely difficult to get market share in the
commercial aircraft business, but the timing of this disaster will give the competition a
fighting chance. In fact I suspect that Airbus competition was not the only factor that made
Boeing want to move fast with the MAX aircraft.
In Silicon Valley, if you screw up a business, then you call in your crisis management
consultants to fix things. Like the Intel math error in its CPU chips. It is clear to me that
Boeing thought it best to save money and not call these crisis experts and it does show. In
this case you get what you pay for.
> The aluminum or carbon skin decision is relevant for weight..... The higher price will
easily pay off.
Posted by: b | May 26, 2019 10:06:12 AM | 45
....and then
> Carbon .... special care must be taken for flash impacts and other issues.
So, safety, right?
But, can one trust FAA and Boeing with safety now?
Also, remember recent crash of Sukhoi SSJ in Moscow.
Turn out, when going away from "just works" metallic bodies with inherent Faradey cage
properties, properly assessing all possible "what if" scenarios with full respect to possible
magnitudes and safety margins, is VERY hard, especially when marketoids demand cutting costs
at all costs are reathing over your shoulder.
There was an interesting presentation how nuclear fuel rods geometry is calculated, to
tolerate inevitable fuel curving under load. There were safety margings within safety
margins, within... Multi-level reservations. And of course there is an incentive to increase
efficiency by cutting off some margin, assigned to your unit, because there are several times
a margin in other layers.
....and then one day it becomes the anekdot about rakia barrel in a village.
While not a fan of the new Boeing management culture, I would just like to point out that one
possible reason you haven't seen any 737NG crashes due to a runaway trim stabilizer is that
fact that there is a legal 250 knot speed limit on aircraft below 10,000 feet. Additionally,
the older aircraft design was more stable at lower speeds. Therefore if a runaway trim
stabilizer did occur, you would theoretically have not reached a high enough speed to
freeze-up the the manual trim mechanisms.
In the case of the Ethiopian 737 MAX crash, the speed of aircraft was in excess of 400
knots, where manual trimming was made impossible. In that case the insidiousness and
persistence of MCAS would have led to much higher speeds than would be manageable.
> This is terrible timing for Boeing since both the Chinese and the Russians now have
aircraft to compete with the 737 MAX
Posted by: Meshpal | May 26, 2019 10:24:13 AM | 48
this WAS a terrible timing
China... it seems to have prev-gen much less efficient jet. And one only used with China,
so maybe it is equally or yet worse unreliable - there is no 3rd party experience.
Russia... MS-21 is not ready yet. Close reportedly, but just not yet.
SSJ-100 then - talk about timings - just few weeks ago crashed in Moscow after a single
lighting strike, with more than a half onboard dead.
So, no, right this vry moment there is no competition from Russia and China.
There were Brasil and Canada - but they were recently bough off by Boeing and Airbus.
There was Ukraine too, but EuroMaidan came and destroyed Antonov corporation as soon as
they could.
So, as of this very moment it still is Boeing 737 vs Airbus 320neo duopoly
Excellent work by b. Arioch at 47, That looks like an accurate scenario.
Now would be a good time for the R political party and those among the D Party to
repudiate government regulation (as it adversely affects business!) as it relates
specifically to the FAA and its "chilling effect" on Boeing. Let business flourish. Let "the
market" decide, they say.
I'm thinking that at some point the stabilizer on earlier aircraft was not movable with a
pivot point. The elevator alone was enough to move the tail up or down.
If so, what made the aircraft manufacturers feel the need for a pivot to move the entire
stabilizer?
Russia's MC-21 and
China's C919 are both
due to begin revenue flights in 2021. Both of these are significantly more affordable than
Boeing's 737 MAX family. If the 737 MAX remains grounded for a significant period, or if it
requires new type certification then Boeing could be in big trouble. Doubtless the FAA knows
this and are thus (again) rushing through the process of trying to get it in the air.
I wasn't proposing modifying the handle, I was suggesting replacing it with something
different, in this case a handle which extends radially and operates like a ratchet.
"how would electro-motors act, if the wheel is locked by the said ratchet?"
The system is designed with a clutch which allows the pilot to manually override the
motor.
Bart Hansen @53 asked: "...what made the aircraft manufacturers feel the need for a pivot
to move the entire stabilizer?"
The aerodynamics of an aircraft change with speed and also with balance... think ten
minutes after the coffee is served and a line forms at the restroom. If the balance was
always the same (no changes from burning fuel, for instance) and the plane always only flew
at one speed (reaches cruising speed before leaving the runway) then it would be easier to
design the aircraft to naturally assume neutral level flight without using trim systems. This
isn't very realistic, though. As well, while the elevators can do all of the work of
raising and lowering the nose of the aircraft, leaving all of the work to the elevators means
the pilot will have to be muscling the nose of the plane up or down 100% of the time, which
would probably get a little tiring, to say the least.
> The system is designed with a clutch which allows the pilot to manually override the
motor.
Posted by: Edward | 55
Not a clutch, but a switch. A switch that removes ("cuts off") electric power from
motor.
The wheel and the motor and the stabiliser are connected by fixed drive train, no
clutches.
It is the electric wire - outside of the train - that is connected or disconnected.
if electric power is there - then it is motor, that rotates the said wheel.
if electric power is off - then human can rotate both the wheel and the motor.
A ratchet physically blocks wheel rotation, in one direction, another, or both.
That, a properly functioning ratcher.
If a ratcher is malfunctioning - and device can break - it may become unpredictable.
Boeing clearly tried to keep this wheel-motor-stabilizer drive train "thick as a brick"
and reliable as wooden club. Because it is critical safety system.
Introducing a complex, optionally-engaging machinery, retroactivey, into "overcrowded" (no
other place for FMC was found) cabin that was designed to have nothing like that - may in
total be more dangerous than now.
Edward at 55 is right. It is you Arioch, who does not know how the 737 trim system
works.
There is an automatic clutch between the electrical drive of the jackscrew and the manual
drive. In effect the manual over rides the electrical.
There is much more to the total trim system than I wrote down in the above piece. I
provided a link at the end to the Stabilizer Trim writeup by the Satguru. It is the best that
is out there. Take a few hours to read it and a few days to understand it. Do that before you
come here to claim higher knowledge of something you don't know the basics about.
"The spinning disc is the manual trim wheel. It has a stowable handle that the pilot can
use to manually trim the stabilizer if the electric trim is not available. The system is
designed such that if that wheel does not turn, the stabilizer does not move. There is a
clutch in the system between the electric trim motor and the rest of the system, and this
clutch mechanism favors the manual trim wheel. If other methods to cutout the electric trim
failed, a pilot could simply place his foot firmly on the wheel and stop its motion, thus
stopping the stab from moving further. (The checklist actually says to grasp the wheel with
your hand, but the foot works much better)."
The effort to computer control and automate aircraft operation serves increased profit
motivations. Pilots can be certified with less training. Young pilots work for lower pay as
older pilots at higher pay levels retire or quit. As pilots depend on automated computer
control, they tend to lose the ability (or were not taught adequately) to react correctly to
emergencies.
Look at the difference between the cockpits and instrumentation of the 737 Original and
the 737 NG. The NG leans heavily on the dependability of digital LCD computer monitors
instead of clusters of independent instruments.
"So, as of this very moment it still is Boeing 737 vs Airbus 320neo duopoly"
As it was me that mentioned duopoly @46 I hope you don't mind if I point out that it is
not Boeing "versus" Airbus; it is Boeing "and" Airbus - effectively a cartel of two.
This means that the "market" is controlled (rigged) with "understood" market shares and,
most important of all, the ability to hack and flag old designs and not have to go to the
effort and expense of designing new aircraft.
The avoidance of "designing new aircraft" means that new technology is just hacked on to
less than optimum designs and software is just used like wallpaper to cover over cracks.
In my view there are 4 parties to the problem that resulted in the Boeing MAX disasters;
these are Boeing, the FAA, Airbus and the EASA.
I recall reading a few years ago about a mine accident in China. The investigators determined
that the workers had been complaining about maintenance of the ventilation system having been
lax, causing a buildup of explosive dust and gasses, and it was further determined that this
had been caused by local mine management determining they could save a few bucks by skimping
on maintenance. After the investigation, the "offices" of mine management were ordered moved
into the mine, and suddenly safety issues were all promptly addressed. I thought it was an
elegant and quintessentially Chinese solution.
Perhaps it should be mandated that all Boeing execs and FAA personnel be restricted to
flying only in 737s until these issues become important enough to be addressed.
I get the impression that it is being implied that the force required for operation of the
manual over-ride is likely to be greater than what a typical pilot might be able to provide
and maintain. This would mean that the so called back up system is itself unworkable or
unreliable. Such a claim would hsve to be logged and evaluated if there is any serious effort
to monitor and maintain design compliance - assuming it is intended to function.
Perhaps it should be mandated that all Boeing execs and FAA personnel be restricted to
flying only in 737s until these issues become important enough to be addressed.
Posted by: J Swift | May 26, 2019 1:28:11 PM | 64
OK, put the entire board an executive officers of Boeing and the Director General and
deputies of the FAA on 10 years full time toilet cleaning duty on 737-MAX. If the 737-MAX
ever flies again, that is.
The post by jared @65 brought a point to mind: Since men tend to have more upper body
strength than women, and given the hypersensitivity to identity in western cultures, this
means that the 737 NG and MAX designs are sexist and part of The Patriarchy's plot to
keep women down. I wonder why nobody in western corporate mass media has yet noted this
vulgar display of white male privilege and prejudice that Boeing has crystallized right into
the engineering of their aircraft?
@jared @65 This would mean that the so called back up system is itself unworkable or
unreliable. Such a claim would hsve to be logged and evaluated if there is any serious effort
to monitor and maintain design compliance - assuming it is intended to function.
Exactly. If the FAA (and EASA) would go by the book, all 737 NG should stay on the ground
until Boeing fixed the issue in a safe matter. Not gonna happen as both assume (too) little
risk that a runaway stabilizer could happen.
But as Capt Sullenberger says: Nothing is more expensive (to airlines and plane
manufacturers) than an accident.
About 30 years ago, an old guy retired commercial airline pilot told me that female pilots
weren't strong enough to operate certain controls manually should particular emergency
situations arise. Physical body strength was important for safety considerations.
I wonder if this trim stabilizer was what he was talking about. I don't know if these
stabilizers pivoted 30 years ago.
b, thanks for looking into Boeing and FAA's coverups. Part, or a large part of the US rise
was due to its manufacturing power and ability to manufacture good quality products.
The decadence phase or perhaps nearing the end of the decadence phase in the rise and fall of
the US empire.
This is excellent article on the 737 NG and Max. Ultimately, these aircraft were designed and
assembled in a globalized outsourced duopoly. Rosemount Aerospace Inc makes the AoA Sensor.
Rockwell Collins built the 737 Max flight-control computer and wrote the software code that
contains MCAS. Government was flushed down the toilet. Effective oversight and regulation
ended. Self-certification and "pay to play" are the rule today. Buffoons (Donald Trump and
Emmanuel Macron plus Boris Johnson soon) reign over incompetent diminished western nation
states subservient to corporate trade treaties, the Five Eyes Deep State and undemocratic
super-state institutions. If there is ever a criminal investigation of Boeing for
manslaughter, it will find that in order to increase profits, pilots and engineering safety
oversight personnel were fired or retired since the merger of Boeing and McDonnel in 1997.
Those few who are left, to keep their jobs, never pass their safety concerns on to upper
management. To reverse this, CEOs must be jailed for their crimes.
> The system is designed such that if that wheel does not turn, the stabilizer does not
move.
> this clutch mechanism favors the manual trim wheel.
> pilot could simply place his foot firmly on the wheel and stop its motion, thus
stopping the stab from moving further.
Posted by: Edward | May 26, 2019 12:55:13 PM | 61
The question remains though. You propose to augment the wheel with a comples ( =
error-prone ) mechanism, which intention is to block wheel rotation one or both directions of
the wheel. The very same "foot", but this time made of steel.
One day this ratchet - as everything - would break. In the cabin. Probably, blocking or
half-blocking wheel rotation. Without, of course, shouts and fireworks.
Pilots would trust STS or autopilot to move the wheel. So if the wheel does not move, or
moves occasinally in one directino then stops - they would consider "this is what
STS/autopilot wanted".
STS/AP would issue coimmands at the motor, the commands would be succesflly executed by
the motor, but ignored by the drive train, with accordance with Boeing philosophy "human foot
is final authority" and "human knows better can always override anything for any reason".
How this situation would develop?
How soon/late pilots would detect it?
How far this would turn stabs before pilots, realising ratchet failure, would hit "trim cut
off" and ocntinue flight now unable to turn stabs by neither motors nor wheel?
div> Typo. Boeing's merger was with McDonnell Douglas. Disciples of GE's
Jack Welch from that defense company took over. They place profit and increasing shareholder
value first. This increases their bonuses, too.
Posted by: VietnamVet , May 26 2019 21:32 utc |
74
Typo. Boeing's merger was with McDonnell Douglas. Disciples of GE's Jack Welch from that
defense company took over. They place profit and increasing shareholder value first. This
increases their bonuses, too.
Posted by: VietnamVet | May 26 2019 21:32 utc |
74
a reply to > @ Posted by: Bart Hansen | May 26, 2019 10:49:43 AM | 53 about pivoting horiz
stabilizer...look at the Wright Flyer... Yup. Pivoting stabilizer.
Videos all of on YT...
Bart wrote:"I'm thinking that at some point the stabilizer on earlier aircraft was not
movable with a pivot point. The elevator alone was enough to move the tail up or down.
If so, what made the aircraft manufacturers feel the need for a pivot to move the entire
stabilizer?"
As to why, well, it does not add more drag, as well as the several other good reasons.
Of course, the ratchet would need to be reliable and not likely to break or fail, just
like everything else on the airplane. A ratchet is a simple device and I am counting on a
mechanical engineer to design something dependable. I should add that situations where a
pilot resorts to the manual trim, such as the Ethiopian Air flight, are rare.
Those at the top of both Boeing and FAA also need to be tried for manslaughter and
jailed for life.
I would also jail Boeing's previous management (McNerney et al), as they were the ones
responsible for the shoddy development of the 737 Max. (Note: McNerney is not an engineer; he
studied English and history at Yale, and got an MBA from Harvard.)
The current honchos (Muilenberg etc.) are not innocent, as they did little after the Lion
Air crash, and after the Ethiopian Airline crash did all they could to prevent the grounding
of the Max -- in spite of hundreds of dead people. So Muilenberg should go to the slammer
too.
Of course, some people from the FAA deserve to accompany McNerney and Muilenberg in the
ball-and-chain resort.
Boeing CEO Jim McNerney apologized Friday in a companywide message for telling analysts
this week that he won't retire after turning 65 next month because "the heart will still be
beating, the employees will still be cowering."
McNerney was the CEO of Boeing when the 737 Max was designed.
I belong to a group of ex TN (Trans Australia Airlines renamed Australian in the mid
eighties) and have a couple of comments to share plus a link to the facebook page and
article
message 1
Darren White: Didn't see anything in the article about the NG's dual function balance/anti
balance elevator tabs to give the elevators more 'authority'?
message 2
Neil Tait: Was any attempt made to find the original lost engineering drawings after
Lufthansa accecpted the first b737 in 1965?
Every time it was the stablizer that cause the problem. Air China in 2001. Alaska Airline off
the cost of Southern California. Why cant they cut the Stablizer up into 5-10 pieces each
control by a separate jackscrew so the pilot can manually trim them.
You can't hack an old design (on anything, especially aircraft) without accepting that you
are trading off that which is optimum for the sake of cost. And you can't keep on hacking old
designs without introducing unnecessary complexity and unnecessary inefficiency - increasing
the level of risk. You have to accept that hacking old designs, at some point, simply will
not work. And then you have to ask yourself at what point Boeing will stop hacking the 737
design? In my view the 737 design has reached the end of the line. The best that Boeing will
come up with for the 737 MAX will be just another hack.
Elevator tabs are supposed to increase elevator control, or, said differently, make it
easier to (manually) move the elevator. They are, to my best knowledge, used on all 737 types
and thus not relevant to the discussion of NG differences.
William Gruff @57
Could you not have a similar system to "Servo assisted steering" in a car, to help the pilot
push and pull the stick? (I take it that the stick in front of the pilot(s), is what controls
the elevator?)
Additionally, I do not understand why the elevator is not pivoted at a neutral position
where the force of the wind tending to increase the angle of attack and the force tending to
decrease the angle of attack balanced.
(In case it is not clear what I mean, imagine a fin which is pivoted about its leading
edge. It will always push against any attempt to turn it out of a neutral position. Now
imagine the same fin, pivoted about its trailing edge. This will tend violently to go in
either direction, if it is turned ever so slightly out of the direction of travel of the air
going past it. Somewhere in the middle there should be a point where you can pivot it so that
the force tending to increase the angle of attack is equal and opposite to the force tending
to decrease the angle of attack. Shouldn't there? Don't large ships' rudders have an exactly
analogous system? With a small rudder that turns the main fin which is pivoted about a
neutral point?)
William Gruff @57
Another thought, could you not have a small, manually-controlled electric motor (With a
three-position switch, ON CW - OFF - ON ACW, geared to the wheels in the cockpit? It could
easily exert more force than a man and in case of power/motor failure, you could still have
your crank handle.) Or come to that, a connection to the motor driving the jack-screw that
allowed the pilot to switch off the autopilot connection to the motor and connect a switch
that allowed the pilot to control the jack-screw motor directly.
Back after the Memorial Day weekend and reading your May 25, 2018 "...Severe Problem..."
article, and comments, I was tempted to quote back to you your comment 60 words, " It
is you...who does not know how the 737 trim system works." But you do know, at least to the
extent your reading of your sources informed you, how that particular type trim system works.
What you appear to not know is how trim systems work, what they do, how and why, and how to
use a trim system in an aircraft. In this you are like the two pilots who crashed 737 MAX8
aircraft, who also did not know the basics. You are not a pilot, or responsible for the lives
of passengers who have entrusted themselves to your supposed knowledge and skills, so your
lack of understanding is not only understandable, but not in their league. For the record, if
those pilots had had basic competence they would not even have known the MCAS system was
active on their aircraft, because they would have been ahead of it: Any time you get a stall
warning the automatic first response needs to be stick (yoke) forward, add ten knots (or
more), then stabilize the aircraft in flight, and then look for the cause.
A cardinal rule of piloting is "Fly your aircraft". That is a 'first tranche' rule. Below
it, and necessary to following it is "know how to fly aircraft", and below that is, in 'third
tranche' position, the primary rule: "Know how aircraft fly." Aircraft are real-world
anti-gravity devices. In the real-world anti-gravity is accomplished by manipulating existing
components of physical reality using natural characteristics found in those and interactive
physical correlations designated 'natural laws'.
Trim tabs deflect airflow. Trim tabs differ from elevator tabs, and rudder tabs, which are
what do actual flight-surface manipulating on large commercial aircraft, whose rudders and
elevators are bigger than houses. Trim tabs are for 'trimming', not moving the surfaces. They
are not for flying the aircraft. You position a trim switch, turn a trim wheel, or crank in
trim to neutralize a control pressures in specific configuration situations. You do that so
that you do not have to hold a constant pressure against a main control device to maintain an
intended path of flight.
A "runaway trim tab" is a mechanical failure. It means something went wrong. It is not a
normal configuration for the aircraft. Correction is required for the effect of the condition
that results. Correction is a compensation procedure. Resolving a trim tab locked against a
stop is done by, as you note, but fail to notice, overpowering the fault result using primary
control.
You write: "In case of a mistrim of the stabilizer, the plane puts its nose up or
down and the pilot will have to push or pull his column to move the elevator to counter the
mistrim of the stabilizer." That is correct, and as you can see rereading, corrective input
is exerted by use of a primary control. You write also: "Depending on the position of the
stabilizer and the speed of the airplane this can require very significant force." Correct,
sometimes, again, in very unusual circumstances. The competent pilot has a number of options
in such a case. First is, of course, counter-action through a primary aircraft control. He
may also change the speed of the aircraft, and change, within limits (some of which depend on
speed), changeable flight surface configurations (flaps, snoots, raise or lower gear, etc.
Notice that, here, we have not touched trim. It is upon having corrected the condition that
trim is turned to, to relieve the amount of primary control pressure required to maintain the
desired, or required, aircraft flight situation.
Remember the rule "Fly the Airplane"? That is done with primary flight controls. And
always first. It means, in any abnormal situation, place the aircraft in a fully flying
attitude, safely within the flight-envelope the aircraft is designed to operate within. There
is an airspeed designated "maneuvering speed", sometimes "penetration speed", because it is
the speed recommended for storm and turbulence penetration. It is the safest speed in the
aircraft's flight envelope, and has a wide margin around it (in case of instrument error). It
is the speed to which a pilot should slow, or accelerate, if he is not reasonably sure what
sorting a problem will require, he should put the aircraft when dealing with an unusual
situation. Note, however, that once a pilot has returned his aircraft to normal flight in
whatever an occurrence the aircraft should be flying and flying, will be under control.
The pilot can then exercise options to make holding the established flight condition
easier. The hack pilot can put a crow-bar in the crank on his trim wheel and reef, maybe
stretching a cable, hopefully not breaking one, which would put him back at square one. The
competent pilot will have already tried the electric trim and, that not working, killed the
power to the electric trim and has started looking for the cause of the abnormality, and if
the tab is locked at a stop-block, means to return it to range, all the while holding the
aircraft in stable flight manually, with primary controls. If the cause of the trim going to
stop is the butt of the stewardess on the copilot's lap being against the copilot's trim
switch, the pilot may resolve the issue by asking her to move her butt. Note that he does not
stop flying the aircraft: He does not let go the controls to start pushing, letting the
aircraft go into a dive, or nose up to stall for the mistrim. If the cause is the.trim-switch
lever having broken and the nub having snagged against its housing, he may fly the airplane
by turning the primary control of the aircraft over to the copilot while he pries the broken
switch loose and to neutral with a tip of his pilot's wings pin, then switch power back on
and see if the electric trim is usable again. If the electric trim is out of commission, or
shorted and the motor is jacking the screw against the stop, he can take control of the
aircraft back from the copilot and go to override procedures. Note that in all cases this is
not an emergency, it is a mechanical failure. In an emergency the pilot would ignore the
troubleshooting until the emergency condition was resolved, using the primary controls.
Do you understand? A trim system is not a primary control system. It is a pilot strain
relief system. Having a trim wheel the size of a ship's wheel, with or without lashing-pins
around the rim, is not necessary, nor would be advantageous for safety. Excess leverage in
the hands of idiots is always dangerous; they try to muscle through problems and breaks
things. Break the trim wheel system trying to correct an electrical fault caused "severe
mistrim" and you have two mechanical problems (three counting the idiot). Better would be to
leave the idiots in a simulator diving seven thousand feet to relieve an aerodynamic block on
a trim tab. Never let such a one near a real airplane, especially one with passengers.
Thinking about such ones reminds me of a couple of transmission mechanics who were marveling
at an idiot in their business who had broken a shoulder rolling a transmission off a jack
trying to install it, for rocking the thing too much trying to get a bolt's thread to start.
"You only rock 'em a half-inch at most." one said. "More like a quarter at the bolt-hole."
the other said. What the hell was the guy doing rocking enough to fall off the jack, both
were wondering. It's the same thing relieving aerodynamic blocking: At ten thousand feet you
have a thousand feet vertical clearance to bobble your aircraft in, five hundred up, five
hundred down. above and below that space, at odd thousands, eleven and nine, is oncoming
traffic airspace. Going down seven thousand feet from ten thousand is equivalent to driving
across three parallel two-lane highways, coming out at three thousand feet, an odd thousand,
is into the oncoming traffic lane of a fourth two-lane highway ("Well, mu' pickup was pullin'
lef', so cousin Earl was gonna toe 'er in some, so he was on the fender reachin' down to turn
the steering knuckle, an' I was turnin' across to the pull side, to relieve the tension on
the knuckle, so he could turn it with the short wrench was all we had... Was the fender he
was on the dump-truck clipped, so I s'pose he's on the front of the dump-truck now... Dammit,
if we'd a' had a longer wrench..."). These guys could be pilots, according to your
source.
The same as you only have to rock a little to relieve friction-binding on a bolt-hole, you
only have to dip a little to relieve aerodynamic force on a flight surface. So you only get
an eighth turn in a short relief, instead of a half or three-quarter turn. You can slow to
gear speed and lower your landing gear and slow your pick up of speed to give yourself more
time. Extend flaps and get more time, maybe get slow enough you don't need to flap your tail.
And you don't have to only come back to level, point it up and take it up two hundred and
start pulling the slack on the wheel while coming to level, grab some more going down two
hundred, then go up four hundred amd do the same again. Little dips too much like some dinky
small-towns circuit truck-n-trailer carnival roller-coaster for you? Go on your radio and get
a flight-level, say, twenty, or twenty-two, those go the same direction as ten thousand feet,
and you get two thousand feet to whoop and roller-coaster in, a thousand up and a thousand
down, providing any traffic at levels nineteen and twenty-one are not roller-coastering, too,
and coming down toward you on a collision sine-wave...
Once you are back in range on the jack screw the trimming should be normally easy again.
Unless you bent something, or jammed threads on on the screw.
In the end, what is really good to know, because it is the most scary part of all that has
been brought forward by the Boeing 737 MAX8 pilot-error crashing, and aftermath of
mindless-media blabber-flapping, is that the two who crashed, and horrible to think how many
more, who are half-trained and don't know a stall when they are in one, are piloting
passenger-carrying airplanes.
At least, in their huffing and puffing and making themselves your sources they are
revealing themselves improperly trained huffer and puffer nonsense and hysteria fueled
incompetents with no idea how airplanes fly, or how to use controls correctly. In the air
ones like those are one unexpected event and resulting mentally paralyzing shock reaction,
from destroying whatever aircraft they may be flying, and killing all passengers who
entrusted themselves to their incompetences.
Blame the FAA! Blame Boeing! Don't blame the incompetents who crashed the two aircraft,
who should have been doing what the MCAS computers did before those computers did, since they
have inbuilt lag-times. Lower the nose, pick up airspeed at first warning of stall,
especially on take-off. Fly the Airplane (or re-fly it, if you have already stalled it), then
look for irregularities.
The changes from the 737 Classic to the 737 NG make it more difficult, if not impossible,
for the pilots to recover from such a situation:
The smaller manual trim wheels on the 737 NG make it more difficult to trim a runaway
stabilizer back into a regular position.
The larger stabilizer surface makes it more difficult to counter a runaway stabilizer by
using the elevator which was kept at the same size.
737 NG pilots no longer learn the rollercoaster maneuver that is now the only way to recover
from a severe mistrim.
BUT - NG HAS THE SAME RECOVERY ISSUES ! As in NO recover means to recover -
It has virtually the same size trim wheel with 1/2 the turns lock to lock = same or more
rate - the smaller wheel mitigates the tail plane differences
Boeing HAS NO DATA to simulate the trim wheel force VS MACH and never has - this is why the
stone walling on the simulator data
traditionally they have the three second rule - "dont dive for more than three seconds" or
... well we know what can happen ..
now like the MAX AOA vane, lets talk about systems integration (again) with the trim wheel -
the question is - how to crank 100+ pound trim wheel force while you are holding a stick in
your gut, in a 4 point harness and G-d forbid negative G's - or worse, pilots floating out of
their seats or stuck to the over head panel and worse case - a "diverse" 80lb female ? From
whence does though react thy force ?
@EV That is quite a long comment with lots of nonsense.
What you appear to not know is how trim systems work, what they do, how and why, and
how to use a trim system in an aircraft.
I do now the hows and whys of a trim system.
For the record, if those pilots had had basic competence they would not even have known
the MCAS system was active on their aircraft, because they would have been ahead of it: Any
time you get a stall warning the automatic first response needs to be stick (yoke) forward,
add ten knots (or more), then stabilize the aircraft in flight, and then look for the
cause.
The pilots were competent. They did not crash the plane, MCAS did that.
When the stall warning (stick shaker) went off it was obvious to the pilots that the plane
was not stalling. A view out of the window was enough to recognize that. That made the stick
shaker alarm an "Unreliable Airspeed" (UAS) event. This happen shortly after start during the
climb out in mountainous terrain. Putting the stick forward in that situation was not a good
option. The speed setting was also already high enough.
There is also no way that this could have avoided the MCAS intervention.
Trim tabs deflect airflow.
The 737 has no trim tabs. It has elevator tabs which have a different purpose than trim
tabs.
The rest of your comment is largely bollocks that has nothing to do with the flights that
crashed or the content of my piece.
Lots of words to blame the pilots who were fighting a plane that failed them.
Sorry to offend you with too much explanation. None would have worked as well. apparently.
What I was trying to say was that airplanes are flown with primary controls, not trim, which
is for easing pilot physical workload.
Where a horizontal stabilizer is adjusted for trim the whole horizontal stabilizer is a
"trim tab", with a limited range of adjustment the stabilizer is a "flying tail" of a limited
type (on a full "flying tail" the elevator control does what the 737 trim screw does).
Airplanes fly for deflection of airflow. All flight control surfaces deflect airflow.
I study "HAL Effect". My term "HAL Effect" is from the "HAL 9000" 'Logical Intelligence
Device' projection of Stanley Kubrik's "2001: A Space Oddyssey".It is product of giving too
much control to mechanical intelligence. I looked expecting to find the MCAS system to have
crashed the 737MAX8 airplanes. My initial premise was your "They [the pilots] did not crash
the plane, MCAS did that."
The physics involved did not sustain, do not sustain, that premise. The pilots stalled the
airplanes. I do not know if an MCAS system could, or, modified, will be able to, unstall an
airplane. In the 737MAX8 take-off stall events of discussion, with the pilots holding the
elevators in stall, the MCAS obviously could not and the aircraft stalled in.
Explaining this would be explaining fundamental basics of heavier than air flight, which
would take too many words. Basically, all stalls are relative, the relationship being between
aircraft and airflow Aircraft (wings) do not stall all at once, or all the same, but all will
stall in any spherical azimuth position, even going straight down with gravity aiding
acceleration to and past all limits. An aircraft cannot be pulled out of a stall-dive until
the wings are unstalled. The "view out of the window" will tell you nothing (or it may
confuse you, or give you a false sense of confidence. It is the direction of travel relative
to the plane of the wing, not to the landscape that defines a stall.
I stand by my reaction-response to stall warnings. And by my assessment of 'pilots' who
dismisses "stick shaker alarm[s] [as] an "Unreliable Airspeed" (UAS) event[s]." They need HAL
9000s to decouple their controls (so they can't hold the column back to maintain their
stalls) and fly their aircraft for them.
Even with the 737MAX8 examples arguing against me, I remain leery of shifting pilot in
command responsibilities to HAL 9000 'More Logical than Us' devices, or their latest
evolution Darwinian ancestors (which the current outcry appears to be demanding Boeing
softare engineers to supply so that 'Monkeys, Too!' will have equal right to aspire to be
pilots.
EV wrote at the end
"
Even with the 737MAX8 examples arguing against me, I remain leery of shifting pilot in
command responsibilities to HAL 9000 'More Logical than Us' devices, or their latest
evolution Darwinian ancestors (which the current outcry appears to be demanding Boeing
softare engineers to supply so that 'Monkeys, Too!' will have equal right to aspire to be
pilots.
"
Your argument made sense until the part where you put the blame back on specific humans with
your derisive 'Monkeys Too!' blaming shift. Why are you not putting the blame on the
corporate system that is challenging your "job lock" because of profit instead of the poor
dead pilots that are, at a minimum, serious victims of corporate greed along with the other
passengers. Why are you not reading the latest admittance from Boeing about
documentation/training inadequacy?
I posit that you have an agenda and are paid to come here and troll your position hoping
it sticks to the propaganda wall of obfuscation of the real problem. I think you will fail
and thanks for the opportunity to show your comment for what it is.
You are factually incorrect (what is commonly referred to as "lying").
Neither of the aircraft that the MCAS system flew into the ground stalled.
Let me repeat that as it is an important point: THE CRASHED 737MAX AIRCRAFT DIDN'T
STALL
Did you fabricate that part about the crashes yourself or is that a "mistake" that
some corporate mass media fake journalists made that you are repeating?
I will admit a bias against 'equality' agendæ that deprecate education and standards
to achieve the "equality" they define to standards set by political true-beliefs. But I do
not have any agenda, myself, nor am I paid for anything. I did not blame "corporatee greed"
because it was not involved. he current course Boeing appears to be taking looks to me to be
appeasement, to appease the media, who, as you demonstrate, have taken up "corporate greed"
as you demonstrate, as Crusaders took up the cross, to mob against and club down others. My
view in this regard is that Boeing should recover for losses and damages from the Media, who
have carelessly and willfully mobbed to lynch, without any effort to determine if it was
Boeing who raped Miz Sally, or if they's jus' riled theyselves on rumors.
The reason I blame "the poor dead pilots" is because they murdered three hundred plus
people playing "cowboy-pilot" flying between stall-warning and stall, and, for that, all
other factors aside, getting into stall situations, and not unstalling (not knowing to
unstall?).
William Gruff (94)
You need to learn about stalls and all the ways they may occur, including hitting sinks
(down-current air) at very near to stall speeds, where the sudden change of flight angle,
caused by the sinking, can change the angle of attack enough to cause stall. What is called
'wind shear' will also cause stall, but by leaving the aircraft suddenly below stall speed
relative to the entered slower-moving air.
The MCAS systems did not fly the aircraft, they only exacerbated the problems the pilots
got hemselves into.
Also, scientifically, and legally, and morally, there is a difference between being
factually incorrect and lying. Lying requires a willful component, and a maicious
component.
As an Aeronautical Engineer, trained to become a pilot in Piper Cub, T-28, and T-33 aircraft
in the Air Force, class of 57H Class....flew T-33, F-84, and F-86H in the Mass. ANG; and
finally owned and flew a Cessna182 aircraft... total of 50+ years of flying. Before I
actually flew any and ALL the aircraft I flew, I learned EVERYTHING about the aircraft BEFORE
flying it.... including 'blindfolded' cockpit checkout. Simulators are a GREAT tool for pilot
training.... HOWEVER, flying the airplane is the ONLY way to REALLY get to know the airplane.
As I understand it there is very little ACTUAL pilot training flying time given individuals
to become a pilot these days! So, I conclude the pilots flying the 737Max aircraft Did NOT
have the proper training to cover ALL the emergency situations that could cause the aircraft
to NOT be controlled safely.... REALLY need to fix that BAD situation...Amen, AMEN, and AMEN!
"... The letter to the Senate, a copy of which was obtained by The Seattle Times, was written by engineer Curtis Ewbank, a 34-year-old specialist in flight-deck systems whose job when the MAX was in early stages of development involved studying past crashes and using that information to make new planes safer. ..."
"... "I have no doubt the FAA and lawmakers are under considerable pressure to allow the 737 MAX to return to service as quickly as possible and as soon as the public MCAS flaw is fixed," Ewbank told the Senate. "However, given the numerous other known flaws in the airframe, it will be just a matter of time before another flight crew is overwhelmed by a design flaw known to Boeing and further lives are senselessly lost." ..."
"... In the letter, Ewbank revealed that he had shared these concerns with the FBI during a formal interview, which suggests his claims might be incorporated into a criminal probe into what went wrong with the 737 MAX that has been progressive in parallel to the Congressional investigations. ..."
"... Just imagine how the market would react if Boeing capped off two of the most troubled years in its history with a guilty plea to criminal negligence...maybe Boeing's bankers at Goldman can recommend some decent attorneys ..."
More than a year has passed since the second fatal crash involving a Boeing 737 MAX 8
killed hundreds of people and led to global grounding of the planes (even as the US FAA
initially insisted they were still safe), the 737 MAX 8 is still nowhere near operational.
As Congress ramps up its investigation into the failings at the FAA that led to the 737 MAX
8 being approved, an investigation that has so far revealed an atmosphere of regulatory capture
and complacency that prompted one Boeing engineer to famously quip in an internal email
obtained by Congressional investigators that the plane
was "designed by clowns who were supervised by monkeys".
Now, one day after a powerful Senate Committee
slammed the FAA for "stonewalling" the investigation , a new whistleblower has stepped into
the spotlight over letters sent to Congress warning that there are several other design flaws
with the 737 MAX 8 aside from the MCAS anti-stall software that was blamed for the deadly
crashes in Malaysia and Ethiopia.
Even more problematic for the company, not only did the engineer, Curtis Ewbank, hint at
other issues with the 737, he also claimed that certain design flaws have already been baked
into Boeing's 777X widebody, and that, if that plane is approved, it would likely only be a
matter of time before a deadly crash ensued.
Here's more from
the Seattle Times , which published a copy of Ewbank's letter.
The letter to the Senate, a copy of which was obtained by The Seattle Times, was written
by engineer Curtis Ewbank, a 34-year-old specialist in flight-deck systems whose job when the
MAX was in early stages of development involved studying past crashes and using that
information to make new planes safer.
His letter, sent earlier this month, argues that it's not enough for Boeing to fix the
flawed Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that's known to have brought
down the aircraft in two crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.
"I have no doubt the FAA and lawmakers are under considerable pressure to allow the 737
MAX to return to service as quickly as possible and as soon as the public MCAS flaw is
fixed," Ewbank told the Senate. "However, given the numerous other known flaws in the
airframe, it will be just a matter of time before another flight crew is overwhelmed by a
design flaw known to Boeing and further lives are senselessly lost."
He goes on to suggest similar shortcomings in the flight-control systems may affect the
safety of Boeing's forthcoming 777X widebody jet.
In the letter, Ewbank revealed that he had shared these concerns with the FBI during a
formal interview, which suggests his claims might be incorporated into a criminal probe into
what went wrong with the 737 MAX that has been progressive in parallel to the Congressional
investigations.
Just imagine how the market would react if Boeing capped off two of the most troubled years
in its history with a guilty plea to criminal negligence...maybe Boeing's bankers at Goldman
can recommend some decent attorneys.
As fallout from the coronavirus pandemic further pinches Boeing's cash flow –
financials already hurt by the grounding of the 737 Max – the US Air Force (USAF) has
decided to release $882 million in payments withheld from the company in order to help fix a
troublesome problem with the
####
Over only a measly $1 billion?
I should try this. Give me money or I'll go bankrupt and you'll get nothing that works
properly! What a great 'business model'.
"... "cash flows for the next two years are going to be much weaker than we had expected, due to the 737 MAX grounding, resulting in worse credit ratios than we had forecast." ..."
Just hours after S&P took the machete to Exxon's long standing AA+
credit rating , moments ago the rating agency went after the company which until just a few
weeks ago seems invincible, and whose stock price has crashed from $350 to $130 in a little
over a month after it announced it was fully drawing down its revolver: Boeing.
S&P cut Boeing's credit rating by two notches late on Monday, to BBB from A- , as its
"cash flows for the next two years are going to be much weaker than we had expected, due to
the 737 MAX grounding, resulting in worse credit ratios than we had forecast." In
addition, S&P notes, "the significant reduction in global air travel due to the coronavirus
will likely result in an increase in aircraft order deferrals, further pressuring cash
flows."
And worst of all, Boeing will likely be downgraded again, as S&P kept it on Credit Watch
negative, meaning it may be just a matter of time before Boeing is downgraded to junk, making
it the world's most iconic fallen angel.
By Gregory Tavis, a writer, a software executive, a pilot, and an aircraft owner who has
logged more than 2,000 hours of flying time, ranging from gliders to a Boeing 757 (as a
full-motion simulator).
In 2019, two brand-new Boeing 737 MAX aircraft crashed within half a year of one another,
killing all aboard both aircraft. Because of the very few numbers of flights of the new model,
those two crashes gave the 737 MAX a fatal crash rate of 3.08 fatal crashes per million
flights.
To put that number in perspective, the rest of the 737 family has a rate of 0.23 and the
737's main competitor, the A320 family, has a rate of 0.08. The A320neo, the latest version of
the A320 and the airplane against which the 737 MAX was designed to compete, has a rate of 0.0
(z (zero). (airsafe.com)
Both crashes were traced to a software system unique to the airplane, called the Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS. The 737 MAX used new and larger engines placed
further forward of the wing (for ground clearance). And those engines created an aerodynamic
instability that MCAS was intended to correct.
Soon after the crashes Boeing revealed that MCAS relied on something called an "angle of
attack" (AOA) sensor to tell the software if that instability needed to be corrected. Angle of
attack sensors are relatively unreliable devices on the outside of the airplane.
Because of this unreliability, it is common to mount several AOA sensors on the aircraft.
For example: the A320neo has three. While the 737 MAX has two AOA sensors, the MCAS software
used only one of them at a time. Subsequently, the MCAS software was triggered by bad data from
the single AOA sensor.
This then rendered the aircraft uncontrollable with the loss of 346 lives.
The Fix Is In
Boeing proposed a number of fixes to the problem. The most important: having MCAS use both
of the 737 MAX's sensors, instead of just one. If the two sensors disagreed, MCAS would not
trigger.
Using two sensors, instead of just one, is such an obvious improvement that it is difficult
to understand why they did not just do so in the first place. Nevertheless, Boeing pledged to
change the software, to use both, just over half a year ago.
It still has yet to demonstrate a viable fix.
Boeing's inability to demonstrate a fix for its troubled MCAS system is a demonstration of
just how deep the problem is. It illustrates how desperate Boeing is to keep alive a software
solution to the aircraft's instability issues.
Most chillingly, it illustrates just how inadequate such a solution is to the issue.
Most sadly, it is a symbol of the collapse of institutions in the United States. We were
once considered the world's gold standard in everything from education to manufacturing to
effective and productive public-sector regulation. That is all going down the drain, flushed by
a belief in things that just are not true.
Trying to Make Sense of It
Since I first learned of the nature of MCAS and its deficiencies, I've struggled to come up
with a theory of why? How could something as manifestly deadly, and incompetent, as MCAS
ever see the light of day within a company like Boeing?
MCAS is dumb as a bag of hammers, as incomplete as Beethoven's 10 th symphony,
and as deadly as an abattoir. Its risk to the company was total. How, then, did it ever see the
light of day?
I believe the answer lies in the nature of leadership of the Boeing organization. And the
effect on the company's culture that leadership has.
Charles Pezeshki, has a theory of empathy in the organization. When I use the term "empathy"
in this article, it is Pezeshki's term and not the more general vernacular understanding.
Specifically, my understanding of empathy in this context is a sense of trust between all
individuals in an organization that arises from transparency. That transparency, in turn,
enables an understanding of both shared success as well as shared risk.
What that means to an organization like Boeing is:
Empathy rules relationships Safety is
the foundation of empathy Empathy catalyzes synergy Empathy handles complexity well Empathy
governs tool (and process) selection Different empathy levels are tied to different values
And what it means within an organization is that if there is an erosion of empathy, costs
go up .
Empathy is important not only within an organization but also between organizations. When
empathy is destroyed between organizations, such as has happened between Boeing and its
subcontractors and suppliers, there is a quantifiable cost that can be attributed. While this
cost is similar in concept to the notion of corporate goodwill, it is not the same.
Another calculus provides us with a way to understand that cost. Let's say a subcontractor,
such as Spirit Aerosystems, supplies Boeing with finished 737 fuselages at an agreed-upon price
of $10 million dollars per fuselage. But that is the price that Boeing pays only if
there is total empathy, total trust, between the two companies.
If the empathy relationship has eroded, however, Boeing's actual price goes up. If Spirit
does not trust that Boeing will not break contracts between them in the future, Spirit will
start making contingency plans – such as making fuselages for Boeing's competitor,
Airbus.
Like a suspicious spouse, they will begin to shift resources away from Boeing. They'll start
to "look around" for another, more faithful, partner. They flirt with Airbus and begin to
retool their factories internally in the hopes of attracting that new partner. Their machinery
will start to make each 737 fuselage a little less well for Boeing as the tools become less
precise for Boeing and more precise for Airbus.
Their workers, likewise, will shift their future attention from the company that they
perceive as yesterday's news and towards the company with which they hope to form a better
relationship. And that will affect the quality of the work that Spirit does for Boeing (down)
and Airbus (up).
That also costs money . And that cost is reflected in what Boeing will need to do to
re-work defective fuselages from Spirit and in its future negotiations with Spirit.
Redundancy
In aviation, redundancy is everything. One reason is to guard against failure, such as the
second engine on a twin-engine airplane. If one fails, the other is there to bring the plane
down to an uneventful landing.
Less obvious than outright failure is the utility of redundancy in conflict resolution. A
favorite expression of mine is: "A person with one watch always knows what time it is. A person
with two watches is never sure." Meaning if there's only one source of truth, the truth is
known. If there are two sources of truth and they disagree about that truth there is only
uncertainty and chaos.
The straightforward solution to that is triple or more redundancy. With three watches it is
easy to vote the wrong watch out. With five, even more so. This engineering principle derives
from larger social truths and is embedded in institutions from jury pools to straw polls.
Physiologically, human beings cannot tell which way is up and which way is down unless they
can see the horizon. The human inner ear, our first source of such information, cannot
differentiate gravity from acceleration. The ear fails in its duty whenever the human to which
it is attached is inside a moving vehicle, such as an airplane.
Then only reliable indication of where up and down reside is the horizon. Pilots flying
planes can easily keep the plane level so long as they can see the ground outside. Once they
cannot, such as when the plane is in a cloud, they must resort to using technology to "keep the
greasy side down" (the greasy side being the underside of any airplane).
That technology is known as an "artificial horizon." In the early days, pilots synthesized
the information from multiple instruments into a mental artificial horizon. Later a device was
developed that presented the artificial horizon in a single instrument, greatly reducing a
pilot's mental workload.
But that device, as is everything in an airplane, was prone to failure. Pilots were taught
to continue to use other instruments to cross-check the validity of the artificial horizon. Or,
if the pocketbook allowed, to install multiple artificial horizons in the aircraft.
What is important is that the artificial horizon information was so critical to safety that
there was never a single point of reference nor even two. There were always multiples so that
there was always sufficient information for the pilot to discern the truth from multiple
sources -- some of which could be lying.
Information Takers and Information Givers
The machinery in an aircraft can be roughly divided into two classes: Information takers and
information givers. The first class is that machinery that manages the aircraft's energy, such
as the engines or the control surfaces.
They are the aircraft's machine working class.
The second class of machinery are the information givers. The information givers are
responsible for reporting everything from the benign (are the bathrooms in use?) to the
critical (what is our altitude? where is the horizon?).
They are the aircraft's machine eyes and ears.
Redundancy Done Right (for Its Time)
All of the ideas and technology embodied in the Boeing 737 were laid down in the 1960s. This
ran from what kind of engines, to pressurization, to the approach to the needs of
redundancy.
And the redundancy approach was simple: two of everything.
Laying that redundancy out in the cockpit became straight-forward. One set of
information-givers, such as airspeed, altitude, horizon on the pilot's side.
And another set of identical information-givers on the co-pilot's side. That way any failure
on one side could be resolved by the pilots, together, agreeing that the other side was the
side to watch.
Origin of Consciousness in the Bicameral Mind
Visualize, if you will, the cockpit of a Boeing 737 as a human brain. There is a left
(pilot) side, full of instrumentation (information givers, sensors such as airspeed and angle
of attack), a couple pilots and an autopilot.
And there is a right (co-pilot) side, with the exact same things. In the picture above items
encircled by same-colored ovals are duplicates of one another. For instance, airspeed and
vertical speed are denoted by purple ovals. The purple ovals on the left (pilot's) side get
their information from sensors mounted on the outside of the plane, on the left side. The ones
on the right, well the right side.
And, like a human brain, there is a corpus callosum connecting those two sides. That
connection, however, is limited to the verbal and other communication that the human pilots
make between themselves.
In the human brain, the right brain can process the information coming from the
left-eyeball. The left brain can process the information coming from the right-eyeball.
In the 737, however, the machinery on the co-pilot's side is not privy to the information
coming from the pilot's side (and vice-versa). The machines on one side are alienated from the
machines on the other side.
In the 737 it is up to the humans to intermediate. The human pilots are the 737's corpus
callosum.
The 737 Autopilot Origin Story
The 737 needed an autopilot, of course, and its development was straight forward.
Autopilots in those days were crude and simple electromechanical devices, full of hydraulic
lines, electric relays and rudimentary analog integration engines. They did little more than
keep the wings level, hold altitude and track a particular course.
Obtaining the necessary redundancy in the autopilot system was as simple as having two of
them. One on the pilot's side, one on the co-pilot's side. The autopilot on the pilot's side
would get its information from the same information-givers giving the pilot herself
information.
The autopilot on the co-pilot's side would get its information from the same
information-givers giving the co-pilot his information.
And only one auto-pilot would function at a time. When flying on auto-pilot, it was either
the pilot's or the co-pilots auto-pilot that was enabled. Never both.
And in those simple, straightforward, days of Camelot, it worked remarkably well.
In the picture above you can see the column labelled "A/P Engage." This selects which of the
two autopilots is in use, A or B. The A autopilot gets its information from the pilot's side.
The B from the co-pilot. If you select the B autopilot when the A is engaged, the A autopilot
will disengage (and vice-versa).
What this means is that the pilot's autopilot does not see the co-pilot's airspeed. And the
co-pilot's autopilot does not see the pilot's airspeed. Or any of the other information-givers,
such as angle of attack.
Once again, the human pilots must act as the 737s corpus callosum.
The Fossil Record
JFK was president when the 737s DNA, its mechanical, electronic and physical architecture,
were cast in amber. And that casting locked into the airplane's fossil record two immutable
objects. One, the airplane sat close, really close, to the ground (to make loading passengers
and luggage easier at unimproved airports). And, two, the divided and alienated nature of its
bicameral automation bureaucracy.
These were things that no amount of evolutionary development could change.
Rise of the Machines
Of all the -wares (hardware, software, humanware) in a modern airplane the least reliable
and thus the most liability-attracting is the humanware. Boeing, ironically, estimates that
eighty-percent of all commercial airline accidents are due to so-called "pilot error." I am
sure that if Boeing's communication department could go back in time, they'd like to revise
that to 100%.
With that in mind, it's not hard to understand why virtually every economic force at work in
the aviation industry has on its agenda at least one bullet-point addressed to getting rid of
the human element. Airplane manufacturers, airlines, everyone would like as much as possible to
get rid of the pilots up front. Not because pilots themselves cost much (their salaries are a
miniscule portion of operating an airline) but because they attract so much liability.
The best way to get rid of the liability of pilot error is to simply get rid of the
pilots.
Emergence of the Machine Bureaucracy
In aviation's early days, there was no machine bureaucracy. Pilots were responsible for
processing the information from the givers and turning that into commands for the takers. Stall
warning (information giver) activated? Push the airplane's nose down and increase power
(commands to the information takers).
Soon, however, the utility of allowing machines to perform some of the pilot's tasks became
obvious. This was originally sold as a way to ease the pilot's tactical workload, to free the
pilots' hands and minds so that they could better concentrate on strategic issues – such
as the weather ahead.
It did not take long to realize that the equation was backward. The machines worked well
when they were subservient to the pilots. But they would work even better when they were
superior to the pilots.
And now there was a third class of machinery in the plane. The machine bureaucrat.
The Airbus consortium, long a leader in advancing the technological sophistication of
aviation (they succeeded with Concorde where Boeing had utterly failed with their SST, for
example), realized this. And in the late 1970s embarked on a program to create the first "fly
by wire" aircraft, the A320.
In a "fly by wire" aircraft, software stands between man and machine. Specifically, the
flight controls that pilots hold in their hands are no longer connected directly to the
airplane's information takers, such as the control surfaces and engines. Instead the flight
controls become yet another set of information-givers.
Automation Done right
When Airbus floated the idea of a "fly-by-wire" aircraft, the A320, it knew it had to do it
right. It was a pioneer in a technology that would need to prove itself to a skeptical
industry, not to mention public. It had to build trust that it could make something that was
safe.
And that the way to do it right was with a maximum amount of empathy. Toward that end Airbus
was extremely transparent about exactly how the A320's automation would work. They told the
public (this was in the mid 1980s) that the automation system would employ an army of redundant
sensors, like the kind implicated in the MCAS crash.
They told the public that the system would employ an army of redundant computers, each able
to take over the tasks of any computer gone rogue, or down. And they told the public that the
system would use an army of disparate human groups. The system's design was laid down on paper
and disparate groups from disparate companies had to implement identical solutions to the same
designs.
Everybody worked in an atmosphere of total transparency.
That way if any of the implementing companies suffered from an inadequacy of empathy, if any
of them tried to cut a corner or didn't understand what their jobs were, it would be countered
by the results from the companies that did.
And what they produced were a set of machine bureaucrats. Taking information from the
machine eyes and ears – airspeed, angle of attack, altitude. And as well as the
pilots, both human and automatic .
And they evaluate that information – its quality, its reliability and its probity on
an equal level. Which means with an equal amount of skepticism.
The human pilots were demoted out of the bureaucracy and into the role of
information-givers. Alongside things like the airspeed sensors, the angle of attack sensors,
and all the other sensors the pilots were only there to serve as additional eyes and ears for
the machines.
Next step, bathroom monitor.
The airlines saw the writing on the wall and were delighted. Boeing, caught with its pants
around its ankles, embarked on a huge anti-automation campaign – even as it struggled to
adapt other aspects of the A320 technology, such as its huge CFM56 engines, to Boeing's
already-old 737 airframe.
Boeing's strategy worked well for quite some time. By retrofitting the A320s engines to the
737, they were able to match the A320s fuel economics. And with a vigorous anti-automation
campaign, aided by pilots' unions and a public fearful of machine control, kept the 737 sales
rolling.
It All Comes Down to Money
Wall Street loves technology that involves little or no capital investment. Think Uber. And
why it hates old-line manufacturing with its expensive factories and machinery.
And people. Which is what Boeing's managers – its board of directors –
understood when they embarked on an ambitious program to re-make the company. Re-make the
company away from its old-line industrial roots, which Wall Street abhorred, and more like
something along the lines of an Apple Computer.
The Liquidation of Capital
There were a lot of components to that transformation. Including firing all the old-line
engineers in unionized Washington State. And replacing them with a cadre of unskilled workers,
such as those putting together the 787 "Dreamliner" in antebellum South Carolina.
Putting together, not making, because another relentless part of the transformation was
liquidation of Boeing's capital plant. Like another once-giant aviation company, Curtiss
Wright, Boeing's managers had drunk the Wall Street koolaid and believed, with no empirical
evidence, that the best way of making money by making things was not to make things at all.
Think of it as aviation's version of Mel Brook's black comedy The Producers ( The
Producers was about making money, by losing money).
A key Wall Street shibboleth along those lines being something known as "Return on Net
Assets," or RONA. RONA says "Making something with something is expensive. So make something,
but make it with nothing."
Think of it as "Springtime for Hitler" ("Springtime for Hitler" was the title of a show
within The Producer s assumed to be so awful that it was guaranteed to lose money, and
thus make money).
Springtime for Hitler, in the Wall Street world, means that US manufacturing companies stop
making anything themselves. Instead everything they make, they get other people to make for
them. Using exploited labor, producing inferior product greased on the wheels of distrust, fear
and an utter lack of shared mission or shared sacrifice.
That means, for example, that the 787s being assembled in South Carolina are being put
together by people whose last job was working the fry pit at the local burger joint using parts
made by equally, and intentionally, marginalized people from half a world away.
What could go wrong? Well, Boeing itself only makes about ten percent of each 737. The rest,
ninety percent, is made by its subcontractors and suppliers. That is a situation in which
Boeing is extremely exposed to any breakdown in empathy between itself and its suppliers, yet
that risk is not factored into its stock price by Wall Street.
That's what could go wrong.
Software Is Killing Us
As a forty-year veteran of the software development industry and a person responsible for
directing teams that generated millions of lines of computer code, I will tell you something
wonderful about the industry.
Anything you can do by building hardware – by casting metal, sawing wood, tightening
fasteners or running hoses – you can do faster, cheaper, and with less organizational
heartache with software. And you can do it with far fewer prying eyes, scrutiny or
oversight.
And the icing on the cake: if you screw it up, you can pass along ("externalize," as the
economists say) the costs of your mistakes to your customers. Or in this case, the flying
public.
The Rockwell-Collins EDFCS-730
As mentioned earlier in this article, the original 737 autopilots were a collection of
electromechanical controls made out of metal, hydraulic fluid, relays, etc. And there were two
of them, each connected to either the pilot's or co-pilot's information-givers.
Over time more and more of the electromechanical functions of the autopilots were
replaced/and-or supplanted by digital components. In the most current autopilot, called the
EDFCS-730, that supplanting is total. The EDFCS-730 is "fully digital" – meaning no more
metal, hydraulic fluid, etc. Just a computer, through and through.
And, just like the original autopilots, there are only two EDFCS-730s (the A320neo has the
equivalent of five and they are far more comprehensive). And each one can only see the
information givers on their respective sides (all of the computers in the A320neo can see all
of the givers). Remember, that architecture was cast in amber.
The EDFCS-730 is "Patient Zero" of the MCAS story. It offered Boeing an enormous set of
opportunities. First, it was far cheaper on a lifecycle basis than the old units it replaced.
Second, it was trivial to re-configure the autopilot when new functionality was needed –
such as a new model of 737.
Third, its operating laws were embedded in software – not hardware. That meant that
changes could be made quickly, cheaply and with little or no oversight or scrutiny. One of the
aspects of software development in aviation is that there are far fewer standards, practices,
or requirements for making software in aviation than there are for making hardware.
A function that would draw an army of auditors, regulators and overseers in hardware gets by
with virtually no oversight if done in software.
There is a USB port in the 737 cockpit for updating the EDFCS-730 software. Want to update
it with new software? You need nothing more than a USB keystick.
It's not hard to see why software has become an unbelievably attractive "manufacturing"
option.
Longitudinal Stability
Late in the 737 MAX's development, after actual test flying began, it became apparent that
there was a problem with the airframe's longitudinal stability. We do not know how bad is that
problem nor do we know its exact nature. But we know it exists because if it didn't, Boeing
would not have felt the need to implement MCAS.
I believe that Boeing anticipated the longitudinal stability issue arising from the MAX's
larger engines and their placement. In the late 1970s Boeing had encountered something similar
when fitting the CFM56 engines to the 737 "Classic" series. There it countered the issue with a
set of aerodynamic tweaks to the airframe, including large strakes affixed to the engine cowls
which are readily visible to any passenger sitting in a window seat over or just in front of
the wing.
When the issue of longitudinal stability arising from engine size and placement arose again
with the larger-still CFM LEAP engines on the 737 MAX, Boeing had a tool at its disposal that
it had not had with previous generations of 737.
And that tool was the EDFCS-730 autopilot.
Boeing had a choice: correct the stability problems in the traditional manner (meaning
expensive changes to the airframe) or quickly shove some more software, by shoving a USB
keystick, into the EDFCS-730 to make the problem go away.
One little problem
In the olden days all of the sensors outside the plane that gathered "air data" were
connected directly to their respective cockpit instruments. The pitot tubes had plumbing
connecting them to the air speed instruments, the static ports connected directly to the
vertical speed and altimeter instruments, etc.
This turned into a bit of a plumbing nightmare as well as made it difficult to share that
data with a larger number of instruments and devices. The solution was a box called an Air Data
Inertial Reference Unit ("ADIRU" in the diagram, below), a kind of Grand Central Station of air
data. The "IRU" part of it refers to the plane's inertial reference platform, which provides
the plane's location and attitude (pointed up, down, sideways, etc.)
ADIRUs were not common on commercial airliners (I can think of none, actually) when the 737
was first certified and, indeed, the first 737s did not have any. But as newer models emerged
and the technology became commonplace, the 737 gained ADIRUs as well. However, it gained them
in a way that did not fundamentally change the bicameral nature of its information givers.
The A320 never had the same bicameral architecture. The A320 was born with ADIRUs and it has
not two but three (see the "two watches" problem, above). In the A320 all three ADIRUs are
available to all five Flight Control Computers (FCCs), all the time – making it
relatively easy for any of the FCCs to read from any of the three ADIRUs and determine if one
of the ADIRUs is not telling the truth.
One more small note, before we go on. The industry uses the term "Flight Control Computer,"
(FCC). On all aircraft that I can think of, the FCCs are the computers used to intermediate
between the pilot's controls and the airplane's control surfaces. They are where the software
that stands between man and machine "lives."
Airbus, for example, makes an express differentiation between the FCCs and the autopilot
computers. They are two separate functions.
Boeing chooses to call the autopilot computers (EDFCS-730s) "Flight Control Computers." In
the 737, which is not a fly by wire aircraft, there is no differentiation between FCC and
autopilot. They are one and the same.
I suspect this has more to do with marketing than anything but readers should take away from
it one important thing: in a real automation architecture flight control functions and
autopilot functions are distinct. In the 737 MAX Boeing has attempted to gain the marketing
advantage of having a "Flight Control Computer" architecture without having to do the real work
required of implementing a robust FCC architecture. Instead, they are cramming more and more
automation functions into boxes never designed for such: the autopilot boxes.
The result is Frankenplane.
Above is a diagram of the automation architecture of the 737 NG and 737 MAX. The two
components labelled "FCC A" (Flight Control Computer) and "FCC B" are the EDFCS-730s.
Two things stand out in the diagram:
There appears to be a link (a "corpus callosum")
between FCC A and FCC B (vertical arrows between them) The left Angle of Attack (AOA) sensor
(contained in "L ADIRU") is connected to FCC A & the right Angle of Attack (AOA) sensor
(contained in "R ADIRU") is connected to FCC B
At this point my readers may be justifiably angry with me. After all, I've been going on and
on about the bicameral nature of the 737 architecture and the lack of an electronic corpus
callosum between the two "flight control computers" (autopilots). Yet it is clearly there in
the diagram, above. I feel your pain.
In my defense, I ask that you remember one thing: we know that the initial MCAS
implementation did not use both of the 737s angle of attack sensors. Despite the link between
the FCCs that should have allowed it to do so. It should have been relatively easy for the FCC
in charge of a given flight, running MCAS, to ask the FCC not in charge to pass along the AOA
information over the link in the diagram.
Why did they not do this? Forensically, I can think of two possible reasons:
It was just
"too hard."The software in the EDFCS-730 is too brittle and crufty (these are software
technical terms, believe me), there is something about the nature of the link (it's a 150 baud
serial link, for example (note for the pedants, I am not saying it is)), you have to "wake up"
the standby FCC, etc. Boeing deliberately did not want to use both AOA sensors because, as I
said at the beginning, "a man with one AOA sensor knows what the angle of attack is, a man with
two AOA sensors is never sure."e. if Boeing used two sensors then it would have had to deal
with the problem of what to do if they disagreed. And that would have meant training which
would have violated ship the airplane.
I tend to tilt towards #1. I think it's just really, really hard to do so and I think that
the "boot up" problems (see end of this article) point to exactly that. If so, that is yet
another damning reason why the FAA and no one should ever certify as safe MCAS as a solution to
the aircraft's longitudinal stability problem.
That said, it's never "either/or." The answer could be "both #1 and #2"
Automation Done Wrong
I have spoken to individuals at all of the companies involved and have yet to find anyone at
Rockwell Collins (now Collins Aerospace) who can direct me to the individuals tasked with
implementing the MCAS software. Collins is, predictably, extremely reluctant to take ownership
of either the EDFCS-730 or its software and has predictably kept its mouth very shut for over a
year.
I have been assured repeatedly that the internal controls within Collins would never have
allowed software of such low quality to go out the door and that none of their other autopilot
products share much, if any commonality, with the EDFCS-730 (which exist for and only for the
737 NG and 737 MAX aircraft).
That, together with off the record communications, leads me to believe that Boeing itself is
responsible for the EDFCS-730 software. Most important, for the MCAS component. The
responsibility for creating MCAS appears to have been farmed out to a low-level developer with
little or no knowledge of larger issues regarding aviation software development, redundancy,
information takers, information givers, or machine bureaucracy.
And I believe this is deliberate. Because a more experienced developer, of the kind shown
the door by the thousands in the early 2000s, would have immediately raised concerns about the
appropriateness of using the EDFCS-730, a glorified autopilot, for the MCAS function – a
flight control function.
They would have immediately understood that the lack of a robust electronic corpus callosum
between the left and right autopilots made impossible the use of both angle of attack sensors
in MCAS' automatic deliberations.
They would have pointed out that the software needed to realize that an angle of attack that
goes from the low teens to over seventy degrees, in an instant, is structurally and
aerodynamically impossible.
And not to point the nose at the ground when it does. Because the data, not the airplane, is
wrong.
And if they had, the families and friends of nearly four hundred dead would be spared their
bottomless grief.
Instead, Wall Street's empathy discount sealed their fate.
Quick, Dirty and Deadly
The result is, as they say, history. Wall Street had stripped Boeing of a leadership cadre
of any intrinsic business acumen. And its leadership had no skills beyond extraordinary skills
of intimidation through a mechanism of implied and explicit threats.
Empathy has no purchase in such an environment. The collapse of trust relationships between
individuals within the company and, more important, between the company and its suppliers
fertilized the catastrophe that now engulfs the enterprise.
From high in the company came a dictat: ship the airplane . Without empathy, there
was no ability to hear cautions about the method chosen by which to ship (low-quality
software).
The Pathology of Boeing's Demise
Much has already been written about the effect of McDonnell Douglas' takeover of Boeing.
John Newhouse's Boeing vs. Airbus is the definitive text in the matter with L.J.
Hart-Smith's "Out-sourced profits- The cornerstone of successful subcontracting" being the
devastating academic adjunct.
Recently Marshall Auerback and Maureen Tkacik have covered the subject comprehensively,
leaving no doubt about our society's predilection for rewarding elite incompetence
handsomely.
Boeing's PR machine has repeatedly lied about the origin and nature of MCAS. It has tried to
imply that 737 MCAS is just a derivation of the MCAS system in the KC-46. It is not.
It has tried to blame the delays in re-certification on everything from "cosmic rays" (a
problem the rest of the industry solved when Eisenhower was president) to increased diligence
(up is the only direction from zero). Most of the press has bought this nonsense, hook line and
sinker.
More nauseatingly, it promotes what I will call the "brown pilot theory." Namely, that it is
pilot skill, not Wall Street malevolence, that is responsible for the dead. In service of that
theory it has enlisted aviation luminary (and a personal hero-no-more of mine) William
Langewiesche.
Those individuals "get it." Missing here are accurate pontifications from much of the
aviation press, the aviation consultancies or financial advisory firms. All of whom have
presented to the public a collective face of "this is interesting, and newsworthy, but soon the
status quo will be restored."
A Well, Poisoned
Boeing's oft-issued eager and anticipatory restatements of 737 MAX recertification together
with its utter failure to actually recertify the aircraft invite questions as to what is
actually going on. It is now over a year since the first crash and coming up on the anniversary
of the second.
Yet time stands still.
What was obvious, months ago, was that the software comprising MCAS was developed in a state
of corporate panic and hurry. More important, it was developed with no oversight and no
direction other than to produce it, get it out the door, and make the longitudinal problem go
away as quickly, cheaply, and silently as a software solution would allow.
What became clear to me, subsequently, was that all of the software in the EDFCS-730 was
similarly developed. And when the disinfectant of sunlight shined on the entire EDFCS-730
software, going back decades, that – as my late wife's father would say – the
entertainment value would be "zero."
The FAA was caught with its hand in the cookie jar. The FAA's loathsome Ali Bahrami,
nominally in charge of aviation safety, looked the other way as Boeing fielded change after
deadly change to the 737 with nary a twitter from the agency whose one job was to protect the
public. In the hope that a door revolving picks all for its bounty.
Collapse
Recent headlines speak in vague terms about Boeing's inability to get the two autopilots
communicating on "boot up." Forensically, what that means is that Boeing has made an attempt to
create a functional electronic corpus collosum between the two, so that the one in charge can
access the sensors of the one not in charge (see "One little problem ," above).
And it has failed in that attempt.
Which, if you understand where Boeing the company is now, is not at all surprising. Not
surprising, either, is Boeing's recent revelation that re-certification of the 737 MAX is
pushed back to "mid-year" 2020. Applying a healthy function to Boeing's public relations
prognostications that is accurately translated as "never."
For it was never realistic to believe that a blindered, incompetent, empathy-desert like
Boeing, which had killed nearly four hundred already, was able to learn from, much less fix,
its mistakes.
This was driven infuriatingly home with today's quotes from new-CEO David Calhoun. As the
Seattle Times reported, Calhoun's position is:
"I don't think culture contributed to that miss," he said. Calhoun said he has spoken
directly to the engineers who designed MCAS and that "they thought they were doing exactly the
right thing, based on the experience they've had.""
This is as impossible as it is Orwellian. It shows that Boeing's leadership is unwilling
(and probably unaware) of what the root issues are. MCAS not just bad engineering.
It was the inevitable result of the cutting of the sinews of empathy, sinews necessary for
any corporation to stand on its own two feet. Boeing is not capable of standing any more and
Calhoun's statements are the proof.
Not sure this was a technology problem, it was totally in the control of management, they
chose who was to do the work (they picked the consultant who did the work, they set the rules
for quality, they set the priorities, just ship it. Guessing they were blind to the downside,
just how they could reduce costs). Now one could say that its a political problem (aka
ideology) as the company went political leaders wanting help to control cost for the company,
saying that they would have more jobs (which was never going to happen) if the FAA was told
to 'outsource' that safety thing. Now this might be because of that Douglass purchase(they
had a history of not really considering it at all). Or it could be that wall street thing, as
they are so short sighted (that quarterly announcement, but short termism has lead to
enormous costs. Does make one wonder if any other company has noted that ah not till it costs
them billions and billions. And maybe not even then
Yes, that was the point. As a native and current denizen of the South, the sentence stood
out to me. And it is largely true in substance. Alas.
As for the loss of empathy, my working life goes back to 1971, and this has been true
everywhere I have worked. Outsource or ignore critical functions at every level of the
organization, and this will decrease quality and increase costs. Hmm, there seems to be a
leak behind that wall not my problem, I work for someone else. Um, this particular audit
function seems to miss several important measures oh, hell, just let the Third Assistant
Vice-President in charge worry about it, when s/he is not on the phone looking to move up to
Second Assistant Vice-President somewhere else. You do know, right, that these three extra
layers of learning objectives and student outcome "measurements" only take time away from our
real responsibilities and besides that, I have on occasion just let it go to see what
happens, and no one seems to notice there is one less time- and energy-consuming,
soul-deadening "report" in the "File."
But, look at the balance sheet (whatever it purports to measure)!
Yesterday evening's France 2 news, https://www.france.tv/france-2/journal-20h00/1218489-journal-20h00.html
, featured the Airbus factory in Alabama. Although it was suggested that the need to market
to American carriers, avoid Trump's tariffs and take advantage of Boeing's difficulties were
the main reasons for opening there, one did wonder if the cheap and non unionised labour was
as important.
@Colonel Smithers
February 14, 2020 at 9:05 am
-- -- -
Thanks, Colonel.
As a resident of Mobile, Alabama, where the Airbus factory is located, I can tell you that
the original reason for their choice was to set up an assembly line for the Air Force tanker
contract that Boeing now has
called the KC-46 . The major considerations were one of the longest runways in the US at
the former Brookley Air Force Base (now an industrial park) that was closed by Lyndon Johnson
in 1964, as well as the Port of Mobile. Lack of unions was most likely also a factor, but not
a main one.
When the contract was originally awarded in 2008, Airbus (EADS), with partner Northrup
Grumman, was the winner. They had proposed a new airplane designed from the bottom up. Boeing
proposed re-purposing the 767.
Boeing protested the award and won the contract after the Air Force rebid it in 2011. I
have no doubt they used whatever political influence they had to do so.
Subsequently, Airbus decided to continue construction of the plant here to build passenger
airplanes.
Also, subsequently, Boeing has had numerous problems with the KC-46, making the obvious
point that politically determined contract awards are often not the best choice.
EADS North America chairman Ralph Crosby declined to protest the award saying that
Boeing's bid was "very, very, very aggressive" and carried a high risk of losing money for
the company
It's amazing, isn't it? I don't think I've seen any site with comments which are
consistently so thoughtful and interesting.
for 180 degrees opp, see the twitter comments on the WHO daily updates on the coronavirus
– Covid-19 https://www.pscp.tv/WHO/1lPKqVQyqEbGb
I thought airbus proposed their transport/tanker, which isn't new, but had been used by a
some air forces already,not that Boeing was putting forth a new plane, it was based on
767.and tariffs didnt exist on the planes, till after 2017. Course they built that plant to
sell to carriers since some don't want to deal with a new supplier.
I was not precise. Airbus had indeed sold the tanker to others. However, it was designed
and built from the beginning as a tanker and not as a re-purposed passenger airplane.
Quite wrong.
The former USAF KC-45 was based on Airbus passenger aircraft A330-200. The point in favor of
this aircraft was it didn't need any mayor modifications except the refueling equipment. The
complete fuel load is carried in the regular tanks. The lower cargo hold of the smaller 767
tanker is fuel of fuel tanks.
Up until now all air forces bought Airbus tanker with standard passenger seating for
moving troops and cargo is carried on the lower deck.
The Boeing KC-46 is a new 767 version: 767-200 fuselage, 767-300 gear, 767-400 flaps and
is called 767-2C. It has a new computerized cockpit (787-style) but just like the 737 no real
fly-by-wire. The A330 has fly-by-wire just like A320.
Airbus was already testing the new tanker design for Australian air force while Boeing
only had a paper design.
Boeing did win the contest for cheapest tanker. USAF will use the aircraft in 90 % as
freighter. The Airbus is able to carry 90 % more pallets.
Even though Boeing offered the cheapest price no risk was associated. No USAF is paying
more for flying outdated tankers far longer. Boeing does maintenance work for the old
tankers
One other thing. The book was The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the
Bicameral Mind , by Julian Jaynes. IIRC (it was ~1976) Jaynes' primary argument dovetails
with the argument advanced here. But, if you come so close to appropriating someone else's
terminology, a reference is warranted.
I love(d) this book which I read in my most formative times (it is not new :-) . The
general – though not universal (and often contested) – opinion these days is that
it has been largely debunked. Nevertheless I would credit it with changing the way my
thinking worked – and for the better.
I still have a copy. I believe there is a legitimate non-scanned PDF available. Would
still definitely recommend.
That's exactly what I meant, perhaps not quite as directly to slavery itself but rather to
the culture of disempowerment that Boeing sought to exploit.
Well South Carolina is right next door to North Carolina, so maybe he was thinking of the
Wright Bros. fixing up the flyer in their canvas walled workshop at Kitty Hawk.
BTW: Considering the lingering fondness for Confederate monuments and flags, I think
"antebellum" is an all too accurate description of the local workforce. Jobs in a high-skill
industry at minimum wages can rightly be called slavery.
Given that (from what I have read recently) Boeing's liabilities exceed its assets and it
will require further cash infusions through bond or share issuance (quite odd, that; a public
company that sells shares) to carry on in the near term, perhaps it will become a
takeover target. Perhaps MB could ride to the rescue.
I write this in jest, but things are becoming so strange that I suppose anything is
possible.
Interesting that you mention Westinghouse. Reminds me of the nuclear industry. The reason
why we have the nuclear reactors we have today? Because they were fast in generating
electricity, though more dangerous. There is an actual design for a far safer nuclear reactor
but it takes longer to reach optimum thermal efficiencies. The nuclear industry wanted fast
reactors that quickly reached thermal efficiencies.
The nuclear industry's desires are so entrenched in regulatory bodies that thorium reactor
research has to be done overseas.
Another parallel to the Boeing saga of mismanagement, greed, and corporate degeneracy?
Goodyear RV tires that led to deaths thanks to tires that Goodyear knew were defective. Yet,
Goodyear executives hid that from the NHTSA with secret settlements.
The ultimate justice system for corporations is that cash is used to pay out for justice,
instead of people actually being convicted and sent to prison for their actions at their
company or corporation. This is the end-game for corporation for remaking our justice system.
They have been quite successful.
Boeing is simply a typical example of what is now accepted practice in America.
The US Government even manages to use official secrets laws to stifle lawsuits. Such as
the Area 51 workers who were exposed to toxic substances. Or The US military attempting to
avoid responsibility for soldiers exposed to toxic substances such as depleted uranium and
whatever toxic materials were burned in burn pits in places like Iraq. The most famous case
of exposure being Agent Orange from Vietnam. When one looks? Corporations are usually
involved in such practices under contract to The US Government.
Boeing is a fine representation of American cultural practice.
That was more a Ford thing, they did spec out the tires, they just speced then to cut
costs, nothing else.sounds familiar huh? A company putting customers lives at risks. Who knew
that was a bad thing course one might think they would have learned from the pinto, guess
not
So, where does this lead and what is the timeline? Bankruptcy? Should the company be
broken up into smaller pieces? Or is this another "too big to fail" scenario? Is a
reform/repair of the company even possible? How would that even happen?
It seems that the solutions needed at Boeing will be the same solutions needed in the rest
of the American social/economic system.
I am reminded of *quality* as a philosophical value in "Zen And The Art Of Motorcycle
Maintainance" by Robert Pirsig – a potential counterbalance to profit as a value.
Ultimately, Boeing's problems are philosophical/cultural/societal problems. And so are
America's.
The critical quote for me was: " empathy in this context is a sense of trust between all
individuals in an organization that arises from transparency "
Now there is a long forgotten book – I've often thought Persigs book should be a
'must read' for all engineers and managers. I feel like throwing that book at anyone in my
office who talks about productivity output measures without ever mentioning quality (they
never mention quality).
Well, the modern ideology of management sees quality as a cost and so it gets little
support until things go wrong ou output suffers.
I still have a Western Electric Statistical Quality Control Handbook, written at the
Chicago Hawthorne Works and which Deming contributed to. It is meant to be the shop-floor
bible of quality.
I think, consistent with the denigration of hard-nosed verifiable, quality, some who could
not pass an intro statistics course started the managerial techniques that became six-sigma,
and once again statistical control and industrial statistical design of experiments is
languishing. But then, as indicated by this article, for even six-sigma to work properly
requires a level of empathy that MBAs have destroyed.
As an older experienced employee in an engineering department I am skeptical of the
Six-Sigma process. I look forward to seeing someone do a green belt analysis on whether green
belt analysis works. So far the times I have been sucked into the green belt goat rodeos
nobody has bothered to research anything and the conclusions are obvious to anyone who has
been on the floor, such as water is wet and flows downhill.
Are there publications of Demings' "popular" works on business management? I looked him up
during his boom, and what I found was a serious textbook on sampling techniques, and then a
lot of slide decks and lecture notes published by his disciples. All worthy things, but no
guidebook to the use of statistical techniques.
ISTR a ground bass of "You'll never understand this, you fools. Hire a statistician already!"
Maybe that's why there were no publications.
But that was then. Have the times changed?
As I mentioned, a great intro to statistical process control is the Western Electric
Statistical Quality Control Handbook. I think it is now put out by AT&T. Other sources
can be found at the American Society for Quality. They used to have quite a nice intro book
that takes you from understanding variability and distributions into various run charting and
into sampling. There are several books on process optimization using statistical design of
experiments, but that is better once one has an understanding of applied stats and modeling.
However, it, and practical matters like stack-up of tolerances are covered by Western
Electric.
I hesitate to recommend some of the canned software unil one has a grasp of the
operations. I have seen some that allow illigitemate operations.
As long as his lessons live on in countries where they were accepted to begin with, such
as Japan perhaps, then no; W. Edwards Deming did not live in vein. Or in vain, either.
there's only what you do and how you do it. One must be aware of both. Associates,
strategy, and all the rest follow from process & quality (inclusive 'and')
5000 orders with deposits made and fewer than 400 delivered on the corvair of airplanes
(apologies and sorrow to ralph nader) because let's face it, if it was an easy fix it would
be done by now, which means complicated solution which means more problems added to the issue
of who's going to board one spells serious problems to this observer.
If empathy and trust are necessary for building critical complex components, capitalism is
by nature unsuited to these tasks.
Empathy and trust cannot exist in an environment where employees can be fired at the whim
of management. 49 states in the US have "at will" employment. An employer can fire for no
reason or for any reason. It's against the law to fire someone solely because they are a
member of a protected class, but any other excuse (none is needed) is valid. There are laws
on the books about whistleblowing. They're essentially never enforced. And they require
situations with actual law-breaking. Building a culture of callous disregard for human life
doesn't qualify.
Being an engineer who insists on quality is a fireable offense.
In the US, the safety net is virtually nonexistent, which means employees have an even
stronger motivation to obey. But even if the safety net were stronger, the moment the
employee is gone, management has free reign to discard safety and common sense in pursuit of
delicious bonuses. And so management fires anyone who objects and the product trundles along
until it kills hundreds of people. The market is concentrated -- capitalism again -- and so
there are no alternatives, no quality actors, no makers with empathy exist anywhere.
This happens in industry after industry -- airplanes, pharma, medicine, construction. No
matter how many lives are at stake. When management has the ability to fire employees at
will, no trust is possible. Empathy only exists until the first round of layoffs. Then the
illusion of trust shatters.
Boeing couldn't fire their union employees, but the old engineers weren't protected by a
contract. So that's what management did. That's how they succeeded in destroying a great
American instutition, arbitraging Boeing's former reputation to enrich themselves
personally.
Per Kalecki, management will always seek to preserve the ability to fire and will always
try to undermine legislative attempts to remove the whip hand. This isn't something that can
be solved by passing a law, it's a fundamental systemic problem. Capitalism is unsuited to
systems that maintain human life. The more complicated our society becomes, the more visible
the rot becomes.
"capitalism is by nature unsuited to these tasks." – No, but it all depends on
definitions and the extent (scope) they apply to. I was the coo of a just enough, just in
time steel plant. I dont know about trust, to some extent that's what standards are for, and
statistical quality control. But, I will say "goodwill" is absolutely necessary. Part of that
is doing what you signed up to do. Places were everyone hates everyone else, are terrible and
usually the result is 'awful'.
A tour de force , a precis of the festering rot in American capitalism and
business culture. Boeing is one data point in a very large set, not a unique case. Thank you
for this posting.
Be afraid people, be very afraid. My son-in-law , a neuro-surgeon was recruited to fill a
vacancy created by another surgeon leaving for a more lucrative position . Well it didn't
work out so well for him so he approached the hospital that employed him previously ( where
my son-in-law occupies his seat ) with the enticement to the hospital administrators that he
would be coming back with his patient database , Well guess what ? They rehired him. Why ?
For the money he could bring in. No other reason. The author is more than right to talk about
empathy in the specific sense in which he uses the word . My son-in-law would say that in his
hospital there is none . Just ' teams ' . I was so encouraged to see the author use this word
' teams ' in a derogatory sense because it is driving me to distraction that almost every
interaction with a corporation is with a ' team ' i.e. nobody, no personality, no personal
responsibility . It untethers us all from one another. And that's quite deliberate on the
part of the corporation . I have a mantra about this ' They want your money, but they don't
want you ' .
Isn't this the same "expert" who acquired 2000 hours flying Cessnas? This software guy
spends many many paragraphs explaining that the Max software was badly designed. No kidding,
and also not news and already thoroughly discussed. While he is undoubtedly correct that
machines are superior to people when performing routine tasks–the philosophy pursued by
Airbus–it's also true that the many variables involved in flight mean a human backup is
essential and that has traditionally been the philosophy pursued by Boeing and indeed the
airline industry in general.
In any case the Max is grounded, its reputation damaged if not destroyed and its hard to
see that an article like this one brings much to the table other than to gratify the author's
need to showoff.
This is a cheap shot. Our author is a pilot of Cessnas (which have many of the same basic
and well-proven instruments, such as artificial horizons, as the largest airliners). All
pilots now flying in the cockpits pf our airliners got their basic training flying small
airplanes like Cessnas. Basic aerodynamic principals like angle of attack are common to all
aircraft.
But more importantly, since Boeing's problems are rooted in their failed software based
MCAS system, he is a software engineer!
Basic aerodynamic principals like angle of attack are common to all aircraft.
Yes so basic that even I know about them. Surely the issue now is not the MCAS which will
be fixed or simply removed but rather the airplane itself. And I'd suggest that on that we'd
be far better served by commentary from pilots or aeronautical engineers.
Sorry and take no offense, but being a pilot and an engineer, but also a systems theorist,
I say as one, neither are particularly trained to look at the entirety of any problem. That
would be the program manager or architect. And most important some one who writes well. That
was an excellent post. NC is wonderful well at explaining why businesses fail, core
competencies here. Boeing is toast as a company. It should be broken up and sold off for
scrape. No future in commercial aviation as it now constituted. The unhinged climate and all.
The goal isn't carbon neutral it is none at all. At 7.6% reduction per year, starting now.
How we doing?
Cessna airplanes are not all small, or single engine, or even flyable with a general
aviation pilots license. See: The 303 series Crusader, the 400 series and above, especially
the Citation series (corporate jet).
(Aside: Was the "brown pilot" acknowledgement in the post a poke in the ribs at the NC
avatar "737 Pilot" ?)
It's not a cheap shot if it is true.
Many third world countries do not have healthy cockpit cultures and many
third world airlines do not invest in training their pilots.
Agreed that it is a cheap shot. Perhaps I know little and read more slowly, but it seemed
to integrate the workings of the airplane with different ideas about automation structure,
what software does within that structure and a corporate disregard of effective quality
engineering. Perhaps I'm naive, but when I see a well structured argument that also mirrors
and expands upon other objective assessments of Boeing's failings, I take notice. The attack,
a backhand use of an argument from authority, seems like hot air.
Nobody is defending Boeing here. But I don't think it's unreasonable to expect that those
who are offering up expertise on airplanes are actually experts on airplanes and especially,
in this case, on large jet liners.
Thanks Carolinian! Was wondering how long before you showed your colours on this. And you
– of all people – must know this is false: "Nobody is defending Boeing here."
By that definition, then how does anyone write about anything without being first an
'expert'. Journalists don't work that way, the follow a process of their own that yields the
truth with being an expert at anything, other then knowing how to make sense of a story, tell
the facts and speak the truth.
Different strokes for different folks perhaps, but this critique seems unusually sour
grapes for you. As to covering a subject already well covered, that seems to be all
economists and historians and, come to think of it, just about everyone, seem to do anyway,
at least for a large part of the time. And we often get pleasure and occasionally better
understanding out of it.
Agree that this comment is a cheap shot. I worked as a test pilot at Edwards and have a
good grasp on this discussion from a hardware and pilot perspective. Software killed people
and crashed jets while I was in flight test. Software production is a high skill/high risk
area that is very difficult to control. The insight here is that the hardware architecture
may not support safe software.
If true, Boeing is doomed.
Completely agree with the "empathy " discussion. Cannot develop new planes without both
risks and accountability. However, empathy is the way you navigate through the fear factor
that goes with risk.
Software also killed people in Airbus jets–something the author doesn't mention.
And that "hardware architecture" is really the crux of the issue rather than software
which can be easily fixed if properly tested (something Boeing clearly did not do). If the
Max is really such a poor hardware design it's difficult to see how it was able to fly for a
year with only two crashes which, by all accounts, were caused by the software. Indeed using
the author's own metric the failure ratio–absent the MCAS–for the Max as hardware
would also be zero.
My comment was not a cheap shot but merely a complaint that we don't need such a long
article to tell us something we already know.
Software can't necessarily be "easily fixed". It might seem on the face of it easier than
fixing hardware, but it often proves not to be the case at all. See also: banking core
platforms.
I can't imagine the amalgamated FCC/Autopilot systems on a 737 are any less complicated on an
input/output/scenario basis than a small banks transactional needs, and those have been
defeating extremely well funded and oversized teams for decades.
I suspect you're making the same mistake you're arguing against – experts talking
outside their book assume simplicity through lack of understanding. My experience has been
that everything that seems straightforward is stupidly complicated, once you learn a little
more about it.
Simple in the sense that we know and always have known why those planes crashed–the
AOA sensor malfunctioned and the MCAS only used one. Yes you can comb over the airplane and
try to find all the other things that are supposedly wrong (best done IMO by an airplane
engineer, not blog commentators), but empirically that's what we do know at this point.
This is exactly the point. Software is difficult to fix because it's so easy to make. With
a flick of a few keystrokes it is trivial to import millions of lines of code from
frameworks, libraries, etc. -- most of which the person importing does not understand. That
induces Normal Failure in software systems at a rate that would be impossible in hardware
systems.
Boeing fixing the EDFCS-730 software most likely will make the software more, not less,
prone to failures, more of which will be deadly. There is no free lunch.
Washington Post published earlier a business article; "NASA finds 'fundamental' software
problems in Boeing's Starliner spacecraft".
NASA/Boeing found a second software bug after launch failed to get the spacecraft the
correct orbit. They had to update the software to get it back to earth. More problems were
found later. NASA admits to inadequate oversight.
You cannot separate the hardware from the software. But two or more different "teams" must
work together to make it work. They didn't. The reason is deregulation. There is no
government oversight to force corrections. Also, not seeing any problems allowed corporate
managers to pocket more bonus money.
The only way this will be fixed is to use the correct term; "corruption". And, jail
corporate managers who are responsible for killing 346 people. It is manslaughter.
I really got a lot out of this article. It was written very lucidly, engaging and
illuminating. A rare combination. It tied many disparate threads together and gave an
original, insightful viewpoint.
Me too New Wafer. I appreciated the discussion of the bicameral design of the aircraft's
control systems. If it is truly baked into the 737 design as the author argues, then one
shouldn't fight it. Given that, one can see that the way to fix the MCAS properly must
include adding multiple sensors on each side.
What this makes me think of most is coronovirus. In the PRC local officials only move up
by hiding problems from their superiors or simply "not having them" they have, in the
author's terms, no empathy with those under them or even with their peers. As a consequence
the most natural reaction to a new virus is to arrest the doctors. Boeing, it seems, is not
far off.
re: "Boeing, ironically, estimates that eighty-percent of all commercial airline accidents
are due to so-called "pilot error." I am sure that if Boeing's communication department could
go back in time, they'd like to revise that to 100%."
Every pilot worth his/her E6B–I'm a dormant Commercial Pilot–accepts this
responsibility implicitly, just like the captain of a ship (who, at one time, was expected to
'go down with the ship' whether s/he was at fault or not). Even if the wings fall off in
straight-and-level flight, a conscientious pilot will tell you that he/she should have
spotted the problem in pre-flight. It just goes with the responsibility of being a pilot.
re: "The Airbus consortium, long a leader in advancing the technological sophistication of
aviation (they succeeded with Concorde where Boeing had utterly failed with their SST, for
example), realized this. And in the late 1970s embarked on a program to create the first "fly
by wire" aircraft, the A320."
Technically not true:
"The first pure electronic fly-by-wire aircraft with no mechanical or hydraulic backup was
the Apollo Lunar Landing Research Vehicle, first flown in 1964."
(although I suspect the author meant the 'first commercial airliner') The F-16–aka
'The Electric Jet'–which, I believe is the first FBW figher aircraft was flying around
the time of the A320 (if not before).
And Boeing didn't 'fail' with the SST, between environmentalists and skeptical legislators
the project was canned for lack of funding:
As I understood it, the Concorde failed because in a pique of jealousy, the States
wouldn't allow the Concord to land anywhere but in NYC and possibly one other airport, I
forget, but the restrictions made the aircraft economically impossible. France (and England)
continued to support it for years largely because of national pride, quite justified
technically, but outlandishly expensive and impossible to refine over time towards
profitability and/or environmental acceptability under the restricted circumstances.
The Concorde stopped flying because of low passenger numbers (the crash in 2000 in Paris
had something to do with that), and because it wasn't efficient flying in the subsonic range
which was what is required over US cities.
There is a difference between why the Concord failed and why it stopped; the latter being
the accumulated outcome of the former. The Concord's failure started the minute we outlawed
it from flying over US land and that was decades before 2000 and the crash. As to efficiency,
that's a hard issue to solve when you're restricted to one or two airports in the first
place. It's easy to forget that at that time the US was basically the only country in the
world with a large enough market of air ports to provide the impetus for development and
refinement of the Concord in particular and the supersonic range for passenger aircraft in
general. Tricky Dick was president and wouldn't tolerate the French and British leap frogging
us in technology simply because we were already beginning to measure things purely in
financial terms.
It may be arguable that the Concord never would have succeeded regardless, but that is
moot in that it and what ever offspring it might have spawned never got a chance.
Being supersonic the airplane created sonic booms which restricted it to flight over
oceans. It apparently was also quite noisy without the booms which led to protests by people
who lived near airports. In other words there were practical objections to SSTs in general
and they are also fuel hogs which became more of a factor after the 70s oil crisis.
There was also a high profile crash of a Concorde while taking off in Paris and this was
another blow to the plane's success. At any rate I'm not sure "pique" had much to do with
it.
I got the distinct feeling at the time of airspace restrictions on the Concord of a
sentiment, particularly held by Nixon, that if we couldn't do it with the Boeing 2707, France
sure as hell wasn't going to get a viable shot at it with the Concord.
I'll grant that Congress was the impetus behind the restrictions, ironically because of
noise and ozone pollution (imagine pollution rather than profit being a factor in our current
day congress), and that was probably what doomed the Concord, but for many of us not familiar
at the time with the issues, it did seem like pique.
As to the crash, huh? Several decades of Concord flight over the Atlantic occurred before
the crash. They stopped manufacturing parts for the Concord long before the crash and were
cannibalizing them from a standby, meaning they had no intention of continuing the
program.
I was very young when America's own "SST" was being suggested and maybe even worked on
till a successful environmental movement was able to stop work on this potential sonic
boomblaster flying around all over America.
So when Concorde was invented, it wasn't jealousy which motivated the American public to
prevent the Concorde from flying its sonic boomblasting self all over America. It was rage
and hate that we would have such a destructive technology foisted on us after we had thought
we killed it in its SST guise.
IIRC, the Americans were part of the SST race and the American manufacturers had a
consortium working on the design. They decided to attempt a "swing wing" design (where the
wings are in a "typical" airplane position during takeoff and then rotate closer to the body
line once in flight in order to increase speed).
After a couple of billion dollars (I think–which was real money at the time) and
numerous pre-orders, both domestic and international, the designers realized that the plane
as conceived could either have wings or accommodate passengers, but that it could not do
both. This led the American manufacturers to abandon SST, leaving the Concorde (And its
unstable Russian knockoff) the only option for high speed civil transport.
And yes, the American manufacturers then lobbied hard using (justified, IMO) environmental
pretexts to prevent supersonic flight over continental US. Jealousy is probably not the
correct emotion driving such lobbying–rather it was the American airline manufacturers'
very strong concern of being effectively locked
out of their own domestic market–after all, who would want to spend 10+ hours flying
from NY to LA when a supersonic plane could let you do this in under half the time?
In any case, this left trans-oceanic travel the only option for supersonic passenger
travel. This is because fuel constraints rendered supersonic trans-Pacific travel impossible,
and so the only viable routes were between Paris/London and New York/Brazil.
This is all based on my memory, so I may have gotten some of the details incorrect, but I
believe the larger story arc is pretty accurate.
"Every pilot worth his/her E6B–I'm a dormant Commercial Pilot–accepts this
responsibility implicitly, just like the captain of a ship (who, at one time, was expected to
'go down with the ship' whether s/he was at fault or not). Even if the wings fall off in
straight-and-level flight, a conscientious pilot will tell you that he/she should have
spotted the problem in pre-flight. It just goes with the responsibility of being a
pilot."
Exactly WHAT in the pre-flight checks would have identified this problem with the
MCAS?
It is soooo easy to pass on corporate responsibility to the pilot, isn't it? And it is
extremely arrogant of a pilot to criticize other pilots for not having ESP. What? Where you
special?
If it is true that Boeing claims that pilot error was responsible for 80% of plane
failures, then why didn't Boeing institute a human reliability factors program to bring that
number down? Those programs have been around for a long time. I'm aware of Rickover's studies
into human reliability engineering wrt nuclear reactors on subs and I know that although two
nuclear subs have failed, there has never been an instance of an American sub failing because
of nuclear reactor problems. If human reliability engineering worked so well in the Navy, why
didn't Boeing implement it for something equally as important as commercial flight? Because
it is cheaper just to blame the pilot?
Humans make mistakes so you design a program that makes 1) a human mistake non-fatal, and
2) you design a system that make it easy for a person to make the right choices. As a former
investigator, I know that a well built system never fails because of one mistake or fault
– well built systems take that in stride – it takes two or more mistakes/faults
to bring it down. Blaming the pilot for aircraft failures is just a way for corporations to
avoid blame for something that was definitely within their responsibility.
There are significantly less nuclear sub jaunting about the commercial airplanes. I'm not
sure the fact that there have been no failed nuclear subs (is this something the military
would even acknowledge to the public?) implies that human reliability engineering works well
enough to put a dent in the 80% failure rate
The USS Thresher, a nuclear sub, imploded during a deep diving test when it lost power and
couldn't blow its ballast tanks – plus on deep dives much of boyancy is dynamic and
loss of power can be fatal. I believe in that same year the USS scorpion was lost. Because it
was found 180 degrees from its planned course there is speculation that a torpdo started
running hot and the captain was attempting a 180 degree maneuver to disarm it.
The Thresher went down in 1963 and the Scorpion in
1968. No cause has been definitively proven in either case. Both events are described at the
Wikipedia (I know, groan) links above. Of the two, the Scorpion loss is far the more
mysterious. It was not known to be in trouble until it failed to show up at its home
port.
Ed Offley, the author of Scorpion Down which is described in the link entry,
poignantly describes families and lovers of the crew members vainly waiting in the rain and
becoming ever more agitated as the scheduled time receded into the past. Offley hypothesizes
the USSR, which was conducting exercises in the eastern Atlantic as the Scorpion was
crossing the pond from Rota, torpedoed the sub in retaliation for the the USA recovering a
sunk Soviet sub in the Pacific, in the loss of which the US may also have been involved.
" (is this something the military would even acknowledge to the public?) "
Oh, yea. Most of the military was just waiting for one of Rickover's "boys" to make a
mistake. Read about Rickover and the nuclear navy!
The point, in case you missed it, is that there are proven ways to reduce human error.
Apparently Boeing would just rather have a convenient scapegoat than fix its problems.
You entirely missed the gist of my comment (nuance is totally lost on some, it seems). Of
course, a pilot wouldn't see the small fatigue crack on the wing spar that's hidden by the
wing root sheet metal, so s/he wouldn't be held technically responsible for the resulting
accident. But any pilot worth his certificate understands that s/he is responsible for the
successful conclusion of every flight, and feels responsible if the flight doesn't end safely
and successfully (even if the NTSB, FAA and the courts exonerate him/her).
I've known several student pilots who successfully completed all the requirements for
their private pilot license, but quit flying before taking their check ride. They will
usually cite financial issues–a PP checkride is only a matter of a few hundred
dollars–or 'family issues' when the real reason is they just weren't comfortable taking
absolute responsibility, if not accountability, for flying others around (of course, the
responsibility is the same for the driver of a car but, for some reason, many drivers don't
feel that responsibility).
I'm going to guess you are not a licensed pilot?
It's no different from someone driving a car, but the fact the air is out of our
element
I'm wondering how Boeings travails will impact on airline decision making in the light of
coronavirus. We could well see a major cut back in flights worldwide this year, with all
sorts of implications for major airlines – Cathay Pacific is already in deep trouble.
If there are significant numbers of failures, I could see this cascading through
cancellations of Boeing aircraft. I suspect that if these speculations about Boeing are true,
then its final failure could be very rapid – a wave of cancellations could devastate
its balance sheets in a matter of weeks.
Cutbacks from coronavirus; quite possible, and unfortunately, providing a plausible excuse
for Boeing's demise -or significant restructuring- that obscures in the process the
underlying problems so vividly described in this article.
Of course, couronavirus, if it becomes a pandemic, is itself very much part of that
process but then who's keeping tabs.
For some reason, it appears to be difficult for many people to realize that information
needs to have the same standard of redundancy as does control. When I was designing stores
management systems (SMSs), it was difficult to make people realize that it was dangerous,
rather than beneficial, for one side of redundant control to have additional interlocks from
the other side's information; because it would vitiate the effectiveness of
built-in-test.
Software is especially vulnerable to the outsourcing problems that you mention. For
example, the F/A-18C/D SMS was delivered with software modules that containing detailed
control of each of its functions; overall control software inside the SMS was to be designed
by the customer (McDonnel-Douglas, now part of Boeing). I therefore insisted that, in
addition to normal communication between the systems and software engineers of us and the
customer, the System Safety Hazard Analysis (SSHA) contain an extra section (not specified in
the military data item description). That section listed things that the higher level
software must do, in order for the SMS potential hazards to be controlled. One of those
requirements was that the higher level software periodically verify that the two independent
indications of pickle (weapon release) button be monitored for agreement.
Naturally, as we had no control or cognizance over what the customer's engineers did after
our delivery was made, they ignored the SSHA. Eventually, after deterioration if pc boards
one of the pickle monitors was giving false positives. When the redundant one did the same,
some (fortunately unarmed) bombs were dropped during an exercise in Thailand. When
McDonnel-Douglas came back to us, I pointed to the SSHA; and they went away and ate their
liability.
Exactly – a FMEA (failure mode effects analysis) by any name is integral to any risk
assessment. It leaves me puzzled at Boeing's hand waving to minimize the criticality of what
they designed.
A remarkable article. It manages to use the nitty gritty of the MCAS issue and it's
history to delineate Boeing's soul sucking shift from a great engineering firm to corporate
cannibal to illustrate (in amazing detail) not only the specific problems Boeing faces with
the 737 MAX, and not only the reasons from the corporate level on down that resolving those
problems will be impossible, but to also illustrate by analogy how this death worship by the
forces of greed has gripped America's establishment at the macro level and how, using Boeing
as example, our shift from a functioning mfg society to one of purely extractive finance
driven outsourcing and how this has resulted in a seemingly unstoppable self destruction in
the economic and manufacturing sphere, all in the name of profit at any and all costs. The
specialized use of "empathy" as network trust made for a particularly compelling explanation
of the process and how it applied (but is not exclusive) to Boeing.
Cue the distracting wails about the evils of tort lawyers and "ridiculous" jury awards,
when that's one of the few correctives, albeit a poor and inefficient and spotty one, trying
to reverse the flight from the precautionary principle.
I'm not at all sure those comparisons are appropriate. The car makers knew the cars were
defective but made a cost/benefit analysis (cost of lawsuits, benefits to them) and did
nothing. I seriously doubt that Boeing ever thought their haphazard creation of MCAS would
crash airplanes. They seem to have assumed that the MCAS would rarely if ever be activated.
Even soulless bean counters are surely smart enough to know that air crashes are bad for the
airplane business.
We've been discussing this here for, like, forever seemingly. I may have been one of the
first to say that Boeing management was obviously the root of the problem.
But that's actually my point. It has all been said and the problems are known. The MOA
site has been beating this same drum and averred that "Boeing is America's worst company."
Seriously? Worse than Exxon or Monsanto or Goldman Sachs? If Boeing is to die for lack of
"empathy" then the end of capitalism may be at hand. Here's betting that won't happen.
Yes, it is no surprise to anyone who reads NC that, to paraphrase Putin, Wall Street
destroys anything it touches. Yet there are millions of people who love to fly or follow the
space program and so would view the demise of Boeing with great sadness. When I worked there,
Boeing was regarded as a national asset. And if this were ten years ago, I'd think the feds
would bail them out eventually and tell them to shape up. But now I don't know. But if all
the Boeing board cares about is the bottom line next month, then publishing articles that get
people reluctant to fly on their planes until they clean up their act is a plus.
The corporate issue is even more fundamental than the author outlines in this excellent
article. The reason that Boeing stretched the envelope on the 737 MAX development was because
they did not want the delay of certifying a brand-new airplane. Once a new plane is designed
and the prototype constructed and flown for the first time, it still takes nearly three years
before you can start delivering as you have to go through the new plane certification
process: https://lynceans.org/all-posts/how-long-does-it-take-to-certify-a-commercial-airliner/
The point of the 737 MAX was to portray the plane as another variant of a long-time safe
plane with changes so minor that additional training requirements would be minimal. This
would keep the certification process and the airline adoption process time to a minimum
allowing the planes to be shipped and put into service years earlier than developing a new
plane.
The Boeing culture appears to have been such that nobody of note inside ever stood up and
said "This is a bad idea." So airplane deliveries were scheduled. The marketing group doubled
down on profits by making the use of the second sensor optional that could be purchased,
which the poorer airlines did not buy, which is a reason that the two crashes occurred in
non-major airlines.
I'm starting to get the feeling a lot of finger wagers in the comments of this article
didn't really read the whole article, and certainly not carefully before posting their
assessment.
Well sure, but if you're going with "triple redundancy is required" as your starting
point, then just shut the doors at Boeing yesterday and there'd be no point to writing the
article in the first place. The author used double redundancy in the article because BOEING
uses it in their airplanes.
One point of the article is that Boeing didn't use double redundancy, but that they could
have. My point is that double redundancy wouldn't have helped with notoriously faulty AoA
sensors. They were doomed the moment they decided to take over control of the plane based
upon the input of one sensor.
And the frustrating part is that Boeing Aerospace is *full* of people that understand TMR
and how to build fault tolerant systems for harsh environments (I placed students there).
Silos.
1. Although the 737 has two AOA sensors, the legacy architecture of its sensor network
made integrating the two sensors' results difficult enough that Boeing chose to simply blow
off the attempt. They did this either because it was too hard, because they did not want to
have to deal with a situation in which the sensors disagreed, or both.
Note that of those two possibilities, one is criminally lazy and the other is criminally
criminal.
And:
2. Even if Boeing had used both sensors, two sensors is not enough.
I go into some detail in the article about the differences between the 737 architecture
and the A320 architecture. I go into even more detail about the differences here:
Thanks Gregory. Commenter rd above states that Boeing made the "second" sensor optional.
Is that one each side with a second on each side optional? Normally I'd feel crazy for asking
but this fiasco
That's not correct (that the second sensor was optional). Lots of confusion there that
stems from the same bicameral architecture. The congenital separation between the left and
the right sides of the airplane (sensors) forced certain legacy constraints on sensor
disagreement detection.
Boeing's solution was to move disagreement detection into the user (pilot) interface, not
lower where it should be. An example should help understanding here:
Pre-MAX the AOA sensors were really only used for one thing and that was activating the
stick shakers. Stick shakers are things that make the pilot's control column vibrate when the
plane gets close to a stall.
The left AOA sensor activated the left-hand column stick shaker. The right AOA sensor
activated the right-hand column stick shaker. Pilots were fairly used to situations in which
one column was shaking and the other was not -- AOA sensor failure.
SOME airlines wanted a graphical indication on the pilot's displays of what the angle of
attack was -- meaning they wanted a gauge in front of the pilots that showed what the AOA
sensors were reading. Military pilots care a lot about AOA, the rest of us do not and the
airlines that wanted the AOA display typically had a lot of ex-military pilots in their
rosters.
So Boeing made it an option to have the AOA display in front of the pilot. And they made
it a second option to have the AOA display flash a warning if the numbers coming from both
AOA sensors did not agree with each other.
But what is important is that the device that was comparing the two sensors was the
display itself and not the flight control computers. Because the signals from both sensors
were not available to the flight control computers. But they were available to the displays
in the cockpit.
You really need a minimum of three. You also need a crossbar architecture that allows
equal access to all sensors by all the computers that need access to them.
Finally, you need complexity, not complication. Complication is just quantitative
maximization whereas complexity speaks to qualitative integration. Complication is a numbers
game, complexity is a diversity game.
I'll give an example. Airbus' alpha floor (stall) protection is complicated but it is
insufficiently complex. The A320 has three angle of attack sensors, so that one bad sensor
can be detected (because it will not agree with the other two sensors)
In the XL airways crash, two of the A320's sensors froze in flight due to water in them
freezing at altitude. They froze in the same position.
The pilots were conducting stall testing of the aircraft, to make sure it could not be
stalled. As they pulled the nose up, the angle of attack readings from the two frozen sensors
did not change and they agreed with one another. The un-frozen sensor began to read
dangerously high angle of attack readings.
However, the computers rejected that sensor because it did not agree with the two frozen
sensors. So the computer chose as the "correct" data data from two identically broken sensors
and it rejected the correct sensor.
The aircraft stalled and killed the test pilots.
There are other sources of (indirect) angle of attack information, such as from the ADIRUs
-- airspeed, pitch angle, etc. A more complex system would have considered those inputs as
well and possibly made a determination that something funny was going on and that sensor data
appeared to be unreliable.
At which point the computer should have said to the pilots "I'm confused, you have the
airplane" which would have prompted them, at a minimum, to discontinue the stall tests which
were now dangerous.
So double redundancy is better than no redundancy. Triple is better than double. Quadruple
is better etc. But it's not enough to just engage in a numbers game. You want a quality game:
you want diversity of opinion.
You want the systems to have as much empathy as you can design into them.
Interesting about the XL crash and your explanation. So if Boeing somehow gets the two
flight computers to access both sensors that will be the minimum fix. After two crashes the
whole company is on the line, but they are going cheap and risky. Some future civilization is
going to use ours as a case study of what not to do, that's for sure.
And if it is a "civilization," growing up the same way ours has, nomadic herders and
hunter-gatherers to grain-storing city dwellers with priesthoods and kings and weapons and
money and wars, working off the code that's built into us, I'd give odds that the future
"civilization" would run aground on the same contradictions that we have encountered.
"We" have had plenty of opportunities to "profit" from case studies of past misfortunes,
and what have "we" learned? Or changed our collective behaviors to avoid?
Hi. My distaste for things Boeing precedes their merger with MD, but that discussion is
probably best held offline as I get worked up. I did punch through to some of your other
papers and encountered this line:
"Raise the nose, HAL." "I'm sorry, Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that."
Funny guy! Dark, but funny.
FWIW, spent a lot of time right seat in a 172 growing up. My Mom has been a 99 for 50+
years. Most forgiving aircraft I've ever flown (had to take the controls from time to time
when she had to, um, uh, you know).
That's an interesting distinction about the 172. I agree that it is quite forgiving. I
disagree (with another poster) that it is easy to fly.
A single (piston) engine aircraft that spends all of its life where the weather is (i.e.
below 10,000′) with no deicing equipment, little systems redundancy, and limited power
is a completely different animal from a large commercial airliner sailing along above
everything at 35,000′ with heated wings, radar and multiple systems (including the
pilots)
And by completely different animal, I mean it takes a whole lot more airpersonship to
operate it safely than it takes a 737, even a 737 MAX. It takes more strategy (planning), it
takes more tactics (diversions).
Everything is harder and requires a much higher level of pilot competence if for no other
reason than there aren't two pilots. There's just one.
But, forgiving, it is. I've never had my 172 rip the control column out of my hands and
head for the dirt out of control the way a 737 will.
Reminds me of what was sometime called "AI hubris." When people first started trying to
make robots, they figured they could just bolt motors onto struts and all the nasty bits
about getting the right elasticity etc. could be brute-force simulated in software. Wrong.
Sophisticated controls are indeed needed for robot arms, sure, but if the arms and legs don't
have the basic springiness and other raw mechanical properties built into the physical
design, it becomes almost impossible to control the system stably and efficiently.
I'm also reminded of my old MIT computer science professor, Joe Wiezenbaum. He used to
talk about "the uses and abuses of computing." People would say to him "but without computers
we couldn't have such a complicated tax code!" and he would reply "exactly." It's just too
easy to add in complexity without thinking.
Your title is wrong. It's not , "Ship the Airplane," which acknowledges what they were
actually making and what ight be uniequ about it, it's "Ship the Product," a n example of the
MBA mismanagement culture.
Any company that hires Nikki Haley to it's board is not interested changing it's employee
relations for the better. They are just interested in extracting money from the
taxpayers.
Before Stonecipher Boeing had a culture the worked.
As this site has stated, the poisonous culture from Douglas was imported into Boeing.
And the employees of Boeing are now remote for the Corporate office, consequently the
executives have broken the company, and compounded the issues by having no daily
communication to repair the damage.
It is a like Britain having colonies in the Americas, where the only method of
communication was a three week sailing voyage, and ruling from afar with no knowledge of
local conditions.
I was at Boeing when Condit was CEO, who preceded Stonecipher. Condit couldn't say enough
about shareholder value. So I think if the MD culture did have an affect, it merely
accelerated what was happening at Boeing already.
That's exactly right and what a lot of pundits get wrong. Boeing would still be in the
position it is in if it had not merged with McDonnell Douglas. The merger may have
turbocharged things but it did not alter the fundamental trajectory. What had happened at
Douglas had already happened to countless companies before them -- in aviation I can think of
no better example than Curtiss Wright, but there are many others.
"Most sadly, it is a symbol of the collapse of institutions in the United States. "
This is called decadence. Institutions, like people, get old and ultimately stop working
properly. It's a direct expression of entropy: disorder accumulates and ultimately takes
over. It applies at all levels, from individuals to nation-states.
This is not a very satisfying explanation, since it lacks a mechanism (other than a
fundamental law of physics). A quick scan of prior comments yields some of those; a big part
of the problem is the culture of business in general, which is highly inappropriate to
aircraft manufacture. Why has that decayed? Well, because things do.
Like Betelgeuse, the US, and most of its component institutions, is nearing the end of its
lifespan. The end can be a gentle decline, but usually isn't. It's better not to be too close
when empires or stars come to an end.
Thanks for this article, I learned a lot.
i like this explanation of how boeing went astray
but i think a large part of boeing's change was in the attempt to appeal
to politics by having stuff made in virtually every state, so that no congressman could vote
against boeing welfare
of course lockheed martin did the same, so we see bernie voted for f35
Pragmatic politics. He was in no position to kill the "program," so acted to cover his
constituents -- what politicians are I guess supposed to do, what his campaign is all about
with a much larger constituency and very different drivers.
This is a journalism/grammar/writing rant. As much as liked the article why does
Jeri-Lynne get to decide what is "devastating". To me the use of adjectives and adverbs that
attempt to make up the readers' minds are being used more and more and are becoming
increasingly hyperbolic. Why can't I decide what's "devastating" or, better yet, "whopping"?
I often wonder if this overuse of adjectives is a result of Trump or a cause of Trump.
yeah, come back next xmas (united is looking at sept as their latest in a continually
expanding time line, and are they going to put that into their xmas fleet, who's going to get
on one?) when the NFW is still grounded. 5000 orders with deposits 389 delivered, 387 still
in one piece. But no, everything is fine, nothing to see here
"I don't think culture contributed to that miss," he said. Calhoun said he has spoken
directly to the engineers who designed MCAS and that "they thought they were doing exactly
the right thing, based on the experience they've had.""
Translating corporate speak is always iffy, but here goes:
Culture, like the rotting of fish, starts at the top. By definition, culture could not
have, "contributed to that miss."
Miss means 400 dead. What's a hit?
The CEO spoke directly to the engineers . With no empathy, the engineers either said what
the CEO wanted to hear or were prepared to walk for telling the truth. About those student
loan and health care debts .
Doing the right thing . see above
Based on the experience they had. The circularity is classic corp-speak. Missing is
whether the experience is sufficient and relevant to the task, as opposed to what the new
Boeing was prepared to pay for.
The Air France Brazil-to-Paris Airbus A340 crash a few years ago profoundly effected
safety theory. The plane could have flown itself after the high-altitude stall but the
computer was adding the inputs from the left and right seats. Nobody noticed that the right
seat- fairly inexperienced- had grabbed the wrong control and pulled it back all the way
instead of, if I remember correctly, holding onto a hand rest. The adding and dividing by two
gave 3-4 minutes of bad data and the application of logic by the crew failed to solve the
problem. My 2017 Toyota Corolla has the same hidden problem- the logic takes multiple inputs
from the car and the driver and decides what "ought" to be done. But the driver (me) can
still either override or learn the quirks of the logic and adopt to them (after a couple of
close calls).
Second the 737 is a 50 year-old design. The Airbus 320 series has a wider tube which gives
each passenger an extra inch of seat width. As the engine intakes have grown to allow what I
assume are engines with a higher bypass ratio and better economy the wings on the 737, which
appear to me to be closer to the ground than the wings of the 320, are less able to handle
the larger engine casings of the newest GE engines. On the Airbus 320 the engines still fit
under the wings. Not so on the 737. Moving the engineers far forward of the wing was the
Boeing solution but that added instability, which put much greater demands on the automated
control systems. More of a decade ago Boeing had to decide "clean sheet of paper new design
or an upgrade" for the 737. There were many other Boeing projects in the design pipeline and
a limited pool of money and engineers and there was the ever-present pressure to have lower
expenses. The old Boeing was run by engineers who lived near the plant in Seattle; the new
Boeing moved the headquarters staff to Chicago. and was essentially a financial company-
remember Westinghouse and GE? Companies like Timken and Cummings still live in the midwestern
towns where they were founded. Recently Cummings decided that some of the senior people
preferred to live in exciting Chicago, not boring central Indiana. Only time will tell if
that was a good move. But my stock purchases have moved to Timken; great granddad invented
the tapered roller bearing and his descendants still get engineering degrees.
Boeing is going to have a hard time convincing people that they've fixed the problem with
the Boeing 737-MAX, especially since they seem to be going about it so poorly. If you go to
the pain relief section of your local drugstore, you will notice a number of products on the
shelf branded "Tylenol". In the early 1980s, someone, as yet unknown, opened a number of
Tylenol capsules and replaced the pain reliever inside with potassium cyanide. Seven people
died in the Chicago area. To its credit, Johnson & Johnson, the makers of Tylenol,
responded quickly and effectively. They pulled the product from the shelves and publicized
the problem. They stopped selling Tylenol in capsule form. They redid their packaging to make
any tampering obvious. It was touch and go. The name Tylenol was now associated with a rather
gruesome way to die, but the company made a point of addressing the immediate problem with
the recall, and the larger problem with changes to design of the product and the distribution
chain.
This is still a business school case study, though sometimes disguised a bit. Very few
students taking business courses these days were alive back then. My niece took such a course
a few years back, and her initial reaction was to stonewall, to argue that it was not the
company's fault, to clean up the existing supply, to insist that individuals should learn how
to recognize the problem, to treat it as a PR problem, not a systemic problem. She asked us
for our opinion and we had to laugh. Massengill still makes a vaginal douche, but they
haven't made any pharmaceuticals since the 1930s when they made a bad batch of sulfa drugs
and killed over a hundred people. Tylenol is still on sale today, and just about every OTC
drug now applies J&J's best practices, those adopted in response to the poisonings.
Boeing has been handling the 737-MAX as a problem with that particular model of the 737
and as a PR problem. They resisted grounding the planes. They have tried shifting the blame.
They are trying to do the bare minimum to get the aircraft re-certified, and they have let
everyone know that. They have not addressed any of the actual issues. Where is their
commitment to multiple redundancy? Where is the completely redesigned safety system? Where is
their commitment to safety? Are they rethinking the entire idea of charging extra for basic
safety features, as opposed to simply dropping the extra charges on this model?
Boeing has missed a number of opportunities. For example, there have been questions about
wiring issues in the aircraft. I'm not going to judge them on technical grounds, but Boeing
had a choice. They could have looked at the wiring, figured out a better scheme and started
rolling it out, damn the cost. It's safety first. Instead, they've been arguing that these
aren't particularly important issues. Maybe they're even right, but what everyone hears is
"safety second or maybe third". It's like the redesign of the Apollo capsule after the fire.
If there is any time for Boeing to be looking at safety issues, potential and proven, and
showing that they are ready and willing to make changes to mitigate them, it is now.
The Sicilian Mafia, and its "semi-clone" the US Cosa Nostra, practice the kind of
organizational empathy described early in this article (I haven't read about the practices of
the Neapolitan, Calabrian, or Pugliese organizations in Italy). Mafiosi are not allowed to
tell each other outright lies in matters of business. Tommaso Buscetta, the most important of
the turncoat Sicilians (called pentiti ) took great pains to make sure that Giovanni
Falcone and Paolo Borsellino (the 2 most important anti-Mafia prosecutors who were murdered a
few months apart) understood this principle. Although Mafiosi are by definition parasitic
predators, they've always understood that to maintain a code of silence before the law, they
needed to be transparent with each other on a daily, operational basis. It speaks worlds
about the environment at Boeing that a ruthless criminal conspiracy is a more transparent
organization.
Caveat 1: since criminals, by definition, deal in treachery, conspiracy, and murder,
Mafiosi often had very elliptical conversations, hiding their intentions without engaging in
literal falsehood. For example, "I swear that I'll never be the one to break this peace."
(But watch out for my son and heir, when I hand him the reins of power!) Employees at
productive, well-managed enterprises have never labored under this burden, not being
concerned with the parasitic accumulation of wealth and power. Communication could/can be
straightforward.
Caveat 2: It's permissible for Mafiosi to lie when setting up a member to be murdered
I guess we could also apply the empathy argument to the air travel industry as a
whole.
Its a little difficult to trust an industry and their supply chains when it treats
customers as cattle instead of people. Boeing culture is just as much a symptom as it is the
problem.
No matter how badly the air travel industry treats is customer-travellers, there's one
part of their business that requires some degree of tansparency and transactional empathy:
"You'll arrive at your destination alive and nearly as healthy as when you began your trip."
Without that, there's not much of a business. So, Boeing is too toxic for even the air
industry's ostensibly low empathy score
Great post on a belief system, some confuse for management, how that shapes reality for
everyone else – worker, consumer, bystander, and how that permeates into society at
large.
File under when Capital disinvests from reality, complexity refusing to become a line
item.
There is a much deeper question at issue here: the quiet war between openness and secrecy
in the software community. Secrecy and deception had been considered a fundamental component
of business practice for all of history until the advent of complex software. A basic tenet
of the open-source software community is that having many eyes on a software project results
in a more reliable product than a closed development environment. Closed, proprietary
software still dominates in companies like Apple, Facebook, and Amazon, but even such giants
as Microsoft and IBM are coming to terms with the value of open source. If the bad 737-MAX
design decisions had been made known to the aviation community at an early stage of
development, the crashes and the destruction of Boeing's reputation would have been
averted.
I believe that it is just a matter of time before proprietary software development results
in enough MCAS-like disasters to be abandoned as an industry norm. Once a software project
becomes essential to human safety and welfare, critical design decisions should not be
concealed by fallible managers responding to perverse incentives. Human frailty cannot be
overcome by reasoning and exhortations alone. Errors in the designs and work product of
fallible individuals can be exposed and minimized through the observation of disinterested
parties. That is why open source software is a surer path to a better future than a new set
of corporate slogans, reorganizations, and regulations.
1. Legal rights are a headache. The whole copy-left issues and lack of case law make it
difficult for companies to be able to use such code because nobody really understands the
ramifications of doing so. At least some of the big companies have decided that they can win
lawsuits (or outlast the people suing them), but this is not a universal strategy.
2. You are assuming that sufficient numbers of sufficiently competent people will examine
the code once it is openly available. That is not necessarily the case–this is why
attacks such as heartbleed (sp?) were so effective–and that was in SSL! Most pieces of
code are not used (and therefore, by proxy, examined) nearly as often.
3. Open source software is still normally vastly inferior to the proprietary software
(which is why people continue to use Windows and MacOS instead of Linux distros, which are
"free")
I doubt open source would be much help here because you are ultimately testing with actual
hardware. There is no way to get around that. You can have common standards, best practices
and best algorithms. But eventually you need to do full qualification testing with real
hardware. Even testing by simulation requires emulation of hardware elements that are
specific to the vehicle you are testing. And no open source community is going to invest in
buying and reproducing a whole airplane or even portions of it.
What you really need is better regulation with competent people doing the oversight. The
problem with the fed agencies is the restrictions on their hiring put on them by
congress.
Granted, there are many problems that need to be solved before open source becomes a
panacea, but I believe in the arrow of history, and it is clearly pointed away from
concealment and deception as standard business methods. With each passing day, the balance
between human and automated decison-making shifts toward computer systems. There is no
conceivable argument for incorporating falsehood and deception into the operation of
software, and the Boeing fiasco underlines the importance of eliminating concealed mischief
in critical high-tech projects. I believe that we are approaching an era of institutional
transparency enabled, and demanded by, an advanced digital civilization. Until that era
begins, we will continue to suffer disasters like 737-MAX.
Well, as somebody who tried very hard to make an open source product profitable, I hope
you are correct, but so far, the issues have strongly dissuaded me from doing so.
I would like to just pick on one of your points, though, because I think it is a key
bottleneck: code is not really "transparent" the way that text is, because most people are
code-illiterate (meaning they can't even write their own code, let alone try to make heads or
tails of somebody else's). Yes, in principle, people can pick over anybody else's code, but
in reality, they don't. Until this changes, it is very difficult to reach your ideal "era of
institutional transparency."
I wish it were otherwise–we could live in a very different world
Algorithms designed by people incentivised to conceal and deceive by self interested
party's will do so . The tech industry may want to act as if they bear no responsibility when
in fact they get implicated in most of it. Originally I asked whats the term for the theology
of software because some people believe in software to the point of religious dogma. For
instance level 5 self driving is forever and always just ten short years away That and the
tech industry is more than happy to "disrupt" pretty much anything for a buck which makes it
a kind of weird religion
Thanks for this article, which I finally got around to reading.
The part I can't get past is that Airbus has three state machines and five controllers,
and apparently still felt that it was a matter of life and death for them to convince
regulators of their safety. Boeing has two, of which it appears only one was working at any
given time, and seems to have felt that this was no big deal and couldn't understand why
anybody would be worried – to the point of not even considering it as a possible
explanation when hundreds of people died.
The point on empathy in business is one I've encountered before a lot of times. One
variation of it is what a friend of mine calls the "asshole premium."
I have not seen this posted here so far (though I may have just missed it) but just in
case:
This video is a whistleblower group's exposé of collusion between Boeing, a major
parts supplier to Boeing, the US Justice Department and the FAA, to cover up the fact that
major structural parts for the 737NG were supplied to Boeing way out of spec, and that the
crudest imaginable methods were used to make them "fit" at the assembly point.
Among the various occupations that I tried out during a long lifetime, I spent a few years
as an airframe modification mechanic. I understand every word of this video, and the
implications of those words. I find the video horrifying and terrifying, and I find myself
outraged by it.
Major structural parts (that hold the fuselage together) that did not fit, that had
misaligned fastener holes, etc, etc, and that were hammered into place or otherwise "made to
fit," have already failed in aircraft that were full of passengers. In the three incidents so
far in which those parts failed and the fuselage came apart, the aircraft was on the ground.
It will only be a matter of time until one of those airframes comes apart in the air.
DO NOT EVER FLY in a Boeing 737NG!
Watch the video!
p.s. The Boeing 737MAX is just a 737NG modified to make it even more dangerous to fly
Shocking Boeing Emails Reveal Contempt For Management, FAA
"Would you put your family on
a Max simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn't," one employee said to a colleague in another
exchange from 2018, before the first crash. "No," the colleague responded.
Everybody knows about the Boeing 737 MAX crashes and the type's continued grounding. I will
try to give some technical background information on the causes of the crash, technical,
sociological and organisational, covering pilot proficiency, botched maintenance, system design
and risk assessment, as well as a deeply flawed certification processes.
On the surface of it, the accidents to two aircraft of the same type (Boeing 737 MAX), which
eventually led to the suspension of airworthiness of the type, was caused by faulty data from
one of the angle-of-attack sensors. This in turn led to automatic nose-down trim movements,
which could not be countered effectively by the flight crew. Eventually, in both cases, the
aircraft became uncontrollable and entered a steep accelerated dive into terrain, killing all
people on board on impact.
In the course of the investigation, a new type of flight assistance system known as the
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) came to light. It was intended to bring
the flight characteristics of the latest (and fourth) generation of Boeing's best-selling 737
airliner, the "MAX", in line with certification criteria. The issue that the system was
designed to address was relatively mild. A little software routine was added to an existing
computer to add nose-down trim in situations of higher angles of attack, to counteract the
nose-up aerodynamic moment of the new, much larger, and forward-mounted engine nacelles.
Apparently the risk assessment for this system was not commensurate with its possible
effects on aircraft behaviour and subsequently a very odd (to a safety engineer's eyes) system
design was chosen, using a single non-redundant sensor input to initiate movement of the
horizontal stabiliser, the largest and most powerful flight control surface. At extreme
deflections, the effects of this flight control surface cannot be overcome by the primary
flight controls (elevators) or the manual actuation of the trim system. In consequence, the
aircraft enters an accelerated nose-down dive, which further increases the control forces
required to overcome its effects.
Finally I will take a look at certification processes where a large part of the work and
evaluation is not performed by an independent authority (FAA, EASA, ...) but by the
manufacturer, and in many cases is then simply signed off by the certification authority. In a
deviation from common practice in the past, EASA has announced that it may not follow the FAA
(re-) certification, but will require additional analyses and evidence. China, which was the
first country to ground the "MAX", will also not simply adopt the FAA paperwork.
This is true justice:
China Sentences Ex-Chairman of Hengfeng Bank to Death
Posted by: vk | Dec 28 2019 16:16 utc | 7
Have Boeing Board of Directors invited China to apply their best management and justice
techniques and jurisdiction to Boeing Corp (from Board of Direcotors down) to help them get
through their current difficulties? It would be the most effective way to make Boeing
profitable and effective.
No? Not yet? Well, maybe they put personal matters before shareholders' interests?
If Boeing and the FAA are still at loggerheads in six months, with still no date for the 737
Max going into service, it isn't just that pressure on Boeing's suppliers and customers will
become acute, perhaps catastrophic for some. Boeing's practice of booking future, yet to be
earned, profits as current income means persistent negative cash flow could lead to an
unraveling. The last time we saw similar accounting was how supposedly risk free future income
from CDOs was discounted and included in the current earnings of banks. Remember how that movie
ended? 1
Now hopefully we are just being unduly worried, since the downside of the 737 Max remaining
grounded with no date as to when it will go into service is more considerable than the press
seems to appreciate.
But a big red flag is the lack of any specifics about where the FAA and Boeing are, and I
don't mean just dates. For instance, if the FAA and Boeing were not all that far apart on a
remedy and the FAA just needed Boeing to satisfy the agency on a few more issues, you'd expect
both sides to be making cautiously positive noises. The absence of anything like that is a bad
sign.
Muilenburg Ouster: Too Little, Too Late
Muilenburg left under duress. It appears that the shock of Boeing needing to suspend 737 Max
production to conserve cash flow roused the board out of its complacency.
Even though Boeing issued a tart statement showing an intent to chart a better course, and
Mr. Market obligingly gave the stock a 3% pop, there's every reason to regard the shift as too
little, too late. 2 We were hardly alone in saying early on that Boeing was totally
botching how it was handling the grounding.
From a March post :
Boeing is breaking the rules of crisis management and making what may well prove to be a
bad "bet the company" wager .
It is important to recognize that the global grounding of the 737 Max is the result of
trying to compensate for questionable, profit-driven engineering choices by adding a safety
feature (the MCAS software system) and then going cheap on that, in terms of selling planes
not kitted out fully and acting as if it was perfectly fine to install software that could
take control of the plane and barely tell pilots about it. Two paragraphs more than 700 pages
into a manual does not qualify as anything approaching adequate disclosure.
Boeing is taking steps that look designed to appear adequate, when given the damage done
to the 737 Max and its brand generally, this isn't adequate. No one has any reason to give
Boeing the benefit of the doubt. The scale of this failure is so large that it's called the
adequacy of FAA certifications into question. Until this fiasco, aviation regulators deferred
to the judgment of regulator in the country where the manufacturer was headquartered. But
with China embarrassing the FAA by (correctly) being the first to ground the 737 Max, foreign
regulators will make their own checks of Boeing's 737 Max fixes .and that practice may
continue with other US-origin planes unless Boeing and the FAA both look to have learned a
big lesson. So far, Boeing's behavior says not.
Some other posts explained the need for a Muilenburg defenestration, starting in March:
The fact that Muilenburg remained long past his sell by date is a sign of how deeply
disconnected the Boeing board is. It seemed reminiscent of the way Wells Fargo chairman and CEO
John Stumpf held on, trying to maintain the pretense that institutionalized unrealistic sales
goals that virtually required employees to cheat customers were the doing of 'a few bad
apples". The Wells directors may have rationalized their head-in-the-sand posture by the fact
that Stumpf had long been a key driver of Norwest Bank and later Wells' acquisition and growth
strategies, which then became his downfall. After Stumpf left, the bank was caught out in even
more abuses, such as unwarranted car repossessions and force placing home insurance.
Even the complacent Boeing board should have been jolted out of its stupor in November.
Then, FAA director Steve Dickson pushed back on Boeing pressure to recertify the 737 Max by
year end via his weekly video to the troops, which was guaranteed to be picked up by the press.
The bit about the 737 Max starts at 0:59:
https://www.youtube.com/embed/N71s4_Q3Fe4
This message should have alarmed the Boeing board, since Dickson made clear he was not
committing to any timetable. But apparently Boeing continued to pressure the FAA privately,
leading Dickson to make an even more pointed statement earlier this month. Even so, the Boeing
top brass seemed incapable of recognizing that it wasn't anywhere near having the plane back in
business until Muilenburg initiated the production halt, sending shock waves through Boeing's
supply chain.
Boeing Still Not Taking the Crisis Seriously Enough
There isn't much reason to be optimistic about the installation of the Boeing chairman David
Calhoun as CEO effective January 13. On paper, he looks credible: former executive from GE's
jet engine operation; a seasoned "corporate fixer,"
according to the Wall Street Journal , with a turnaround at Nielsen to his credit; and a
Blackstone executive.
But being an executive at a top parts maker isn't the same as leading a regulated business
and one in deep trouble. And the depiction of Calhoun as a fixer suggests that his strong suit
is behind-the-scenes cleanups and talking customers and money people out of trees.
Mr. Calhoun and Boeing finance chief Greg Smith, who will serve as interim CEO, face the
same challenges as Mr. Muilenburg: winning back the confidence of government officials,
suppliers, airlines and the traveling public. Mr. Calhoun spent much of Monday phoning some
of those constituents, including lawmakers, a Boeing spokesman said.
This is completely and utterly backwards. Yes, as a matter of ritual, a new CEO calls key
constituents ASAP and he needs to call more people and do more listening if he's inheriting a
big mess.
But Boeing has a massive immediate and longer-term problem and they are reality problems,
not perception, aka "confidence" problems.
The 737 Max needs to be fixed . The fact that the FAA hasn't accepted the software patches
that Boeing has attempted and that the FAA is having to tell Boeing to drop its pressure is a
strong tell that whatever Boeing-submitted remedies the agency is looking at now may not do
either, or at best, they will require simulator training, something Boeing has fiercely
resisted.
If our reading of the tea leaves is correct, and Boeing is still not close to satisfying the
FAA and foreign regulators, who have no reason to cut the US manufacturer any slack, all of
this confidence building is besides the point.
In fact, as a gander through the Wall Street Journal's comment section shows, even more
readers are saying they won't get on the plane until it has been in the air for quite a while.
Now those sentiments may not translate into action. If you are coming home and you find to your
surprise that your plane is a 737 Max, will you really refuse to board and go on a later
flight? The flip side is serious refusniks can make a point of booking as often as possible on
737 Max-free Delta. And the longer the plane's grounding continues, the more the bad press will
feed passenger fears.
Boeing needs a fundamental turnaround . Quite a few journalists have described how Boeing's
once vaunted engineering prowess went out the window as a result of the reverse takeover by
McDonnell Douglas. The decision to go cheap and expedient with a 737 product extension in the
form of the Max, as opposed to biting the bullet and building a new fuel-efficient narrow-body
that would presumably be the first in a new long-lived model family, typifies the short-termism
that has brought Boeing to this sorry juncture. Its bean-counters-masquerading-as-leaders have
bizarrely shed what even MBAs ought to recognize as its core competence, namely its engineering
prowess. The production problems with the 787 Dreamliner and the embarrassment of an aborted
"Starliner" space capsule demo are further evidence of institutional rot.
Troublingly, Calhoun has been a Boeing director since 2009, so he participated in the board
approval of the 737 Max in August 2011. In other words, he's never had a problem with the
long-term gutting of Boeing's engineering chops; there's no reason to think he has adequate
perspective on how bad things have gotten.
A former Boeing senior leader, who asked for anonymity to speak freely, admitted doubts
about whether Calhoun is the one to revive the company's historic culture of engineering
prowess that's been eclipsed for years by a focus on financial performance.
"If it's just more cost cutting, that's not what we need," he said. "We have to restore
the culture of engineering excellence that has served us so well for over a century."
In an interview, Richard Aboulafia, vice president of analysis at aviation consulting firm
Teal Group, offered similar concern that Calhoun may have "the wrong skill-set to change
Boeing."
"He's been on Boeing's board for 10 years, coming from the private equity industry and
from GE in the Jack Welch era," Aboulafia said. "This is the kind of résumé
that Boeing has not been lacking and it's not as if he's bringing a fresh perspective."
He said Boeing needs a leader now with not only a firm grip of the jetliner market but
also with "a strong understanding and appreciation for engineering."
"That's what's been lacking at Boeing, and that's what this company really needs," he
said.
Analyst Rob Stallard at Vertical Research Partners argued that Calhoun won't be at the helm
all that long, that his job will be to get the 737 Max flying and choose a successor. But as we
suggested, our sense remains that Boeing is not all that close to having the 737 Max approved
as safe. It's not clear what happens if the crisis were to drag on, say, for another six
months, and still have no timetable for resolution. And given how much of an overhaul Boeing
needs, a more engineering-minded CEO, even in the unlikely event Calhoun would recommend one to
the board, would only be a first step on the airplane maker's road to recovery. The company
needs an executive-level housecleaning, but Calhoun and this board are unlikely to back a
radical course change.
We thought our take on Boeing's managerial rot was grim, but a fresh edition of the highly
regarded industry newsletter Leeham News if anything says we haven't been caustic enough.
From yesterday's release :
Boeing needs to take bold steps -- and I mean, really bold steps -- to recover from the
worst crisis in its 103 year history.
I outlined in an Oct. 7 column why the top executives and half the Board of Directors need
to go. This was limited to the MAX crisis.
Things only got worse since then
As noted in the Oct. 7 column, the Boeing board is entrenched.
It also fails to include a pilot of high stature -- someone like a Chesley Sullenburger or
the late Al Haynes. Given what's happened, a former investigator from the National
Transportation Safety Board or a former member of the EASA regulatory agency might be a good
addition.
The GE cost-cutting culture in the executive ranks and the Board that's been prevalent for
20 years needs to go.
Crucial is a Board that has fresh perspective and is not married to "shareholder value" as
the No. 1, 2 and 3 priorities.
Shareholder value is important, of course. But not at the expense of safety and investing
in new airplanes rather than derivatives of a 50-year old design (the 737) or a band aid (the
777X).
While I agree wholeheartedly that Boeing needs to get rid of most of its C-Suite and a lot
of its board, I don't see how this happens any time soon. Board directors have staggered terms.
It is hard to see what deus ex machina could force half of the board out in short order. And
only a new board would be sufficiently ruthless about the current executives.
As with Wells Fargo, the most likely source for root and branch reform at Boeing will be
outside pressure, but absent a bona fide crisis, again it is hard to see big enough changes
soon. Even so, Boeing's suppliers and its 737 Max customers are already at their wits' end.
Many of them are powerful companies in their own right, either nationally or in Congressional
districts. If Boeing does not get its act together on the 737 Max in relatively short order,
the knock-on effects will only get worse.
Boeing is one of the few companies that uses a technique called program accounting. Rather
than booking the huge costs of building the advanced 787 or other aircraft as it pays the
bills, Boeing -- with the blessing of its auditors and regulators and in line with accounting
rules -- defers those costs, spreading them out over the number of planes it expects to sell
years into the future . That allows the company to include anticipated future profits in its
current earnings. The idea is to give investors a read on the health of the company's
long-term investments.
As we indicated above, the last time we saw anything remotely like this booking
not-yet-earned future profits on a current basis was with CDOs, and that very abuse was a major
driver of the financial crisis. The idea that Boeing could unravel seems far fetched. But the
idea that AIG could fail would have been dismissed as fantastical in 2006.
Again, it's easy to dismiss these concerns as a tail risk. But those tails are fatter than
you think.
___
1 We have way more detail on how this scheme worked in ECONNED and past posts,
but here is the short version: The links between the demand for CDOs and the "negative basis
trade" that was arguably a widespread form of bonus fraud. When a AAA instrument, in this case
the AAA tranche of CDOs, was insured by an AAA guarantor (think AIG or the monolines), internal
reports typically treated it as if all the expected income in future years was discounted to
the present. As we know now, in the overwhelming majority of cases, bonuses were paid on income
that was never earned. This mechanism was THE reason many banks would up holding so much AAA
CDO inventory – it was more lucrative for the traders to retain and "hedge" it than sell
it.
2 We see
via Leeham News that this appears to be a widely-shared take; for instance, Lion Air used
the same expression in a letter commemorating the Muilenburg exit.
Re: Boeing's fierce resistance to simulator training:
This has been portrayed, no doubt correctly, as a cost-containment agenda to make the
Max-8 more appealing to customers.
The thought occurs that avoiding simulator training might also have a "conceal the
behavior" agenda, in that if the simulator were to actually train pilots on the new
"features", they would have the privilege of memorable experiences of trying to override MCAS
and correct the stabilizer trim (with the 'too-small' manual trim wheel) while plummeting
toward earth.
Simulator training for MCAS would IMO have been "anti-marketing" for this aircraft.
Which suggests a marketing chicken-and-egg catastrophe, in that MCAS was supposed to avoid
the need for retraining, but having implemented MCAS, retraining remains undesirable as it
might disincentivize customers whose pilots, having experienced simulated MCAS emergencies,
might be, quite reasonably, chary of flying this craft.
Boeing was selling the MAX as requiring almost no retraining to save airlines expense and
lost pilot time. Southwest in particular insisted on it.
Canada has called for removing MCAS, the trigger of this whole problem, from the MAX. Am I
correct that modifications required to get the MAX back in the air at some point void
common-type recertification and lead to the need for a ground up certification like a clean
sheet design? It seems in that case Boeing would be truly screwed.
The comment from the Canadian source was the view of someone at the regulator, and not a
formal position. So it isn't clear how widely his opinion is shared.
No MCAS = permanent grounding of the plane. The hardware would have to be redesigned,
which would take the better part of a decade.
Have no idea about the issue of re- versus de novo certification.
I have the impression that without MCAS, the 737 Max-8 cannot safely ascend steeply on
takeoff; the AoA is too high and the tendency is to pitch up, risking a stall. I think that
means a significantly shallower and slower ascent to cruising altitude.
The cynic in me wonders if the retirement fund should be short the parent company, rather
than long.
I posited previously that the MCAS solution, with dual AoA sensors was the best design
Boeing could find for the bad flight characteristics, a hardware problem, for the 727
Max.
And that now Boeing is trying to invent a better than best solution.
Software cannot compensate for bad hardware. Or one cannot fix a hardware problem with
software.
One did wonder about the wisdom, the risk, of continuing to build a flawed plane for
inventory when it could not fly safely.
It appears to be throwing good money after bad with a plan based on "then a miracle
occurs."
Nowhere have I read how much money Boeing saved by using single AOA sensors rather than
dual sensors. Not sure that the polling would have corrected the MCAS software, but supposing
it did:
If x = cost savings / plane, y = # of planes, and -$7bn equals return on the investment,
then wouldn't ROI = -$7bn / (x*y) * 100%.
Which whatever figures x and y represent, this decision would seem to me to result in one
of the most astonishing ROIs in history. Operation Barbarossa probably doesn't even come
close.
An aside, interesting how many people are treating the 737 Max crashes as Black Swans when
in fact they are the inevitable result of allowing MBAs to make engineering (and many other)
decisions.
From a number of sources (my first notice of this was at the Moon of Alabama 'blog), the
737 flight control computer, which is based on a 286-class CPU, is at the thresh-hold of
overburdened with the current software.
It's conceivable to me that the single-AoA data input was related to limitations on how
much additional number crunching the FCC could deal with.
It seems likely that improvements to the software or the cockpit user interfaces, if
possible, would add to the computing burden, and if the FCCs are already near their limit,
the fix may be very difficult to realize.
Those tens of billions of dollars spent on share buy-backs are looking very poorly
spent.
I've spent (wasted?) years of my early IT career developing real-time software in
286-based environments. These things are not really processing powerhouses, but there is
more. When you design hardware around them, the options for channeling interrupts, I/O,
accessing memory etcetera are limited. In short, the whole hardware package puts severe
constraints on what you can do.
If the developers effectively did run into FCC capacity problems forcing them to
oversimplify MCAS implementation, the only ways out that I can see are either leaving out
MCAS completely (the "Canadian option") or replacing the 286-based FCC with something
significantly more powerful, with the latter option probably required in the future
anyway.
If the FCC indeed needs to be redone and replaced on all 737max planes, don't expect them
to fly anytime soon. I would wager a rough guess of a few years at least not to speak of
what's needed to re-certify the thing, or the plane.
From what I have seen elsewhere, mainly Moon of Alabama, replacing the FCC would be such a
major change as to require re-certifying the entire aircraft. There are also issues of the
existing software being written within the limitations of 286-based CPU's as another
commentator has mentioned. Boeing really has boxed themselves in.
Fired? No way. He and the rest of the directors officers C-suiters current and former and
their family members should be in the jump seats on every flight.
Same goes for GM's coverup delay on Cobalt ignition switches and Ford Focus locking
transmission in drive.
As a software engineer with many decades experience I can say that (a) this is generally
true, but (b) it doesn't stop people from trying it on every project!
"We'll fix it in software" is a punch line at almost every tech company.
From my experience in embedded software controlling hardware, fixing hardware "problems"
depends on what the hardware issues (problems) are.
For example stable and predictable non-linear behavior in a sensor may appear to be a
problem, but may it be easily compensated for by software that compensates for the sensor's
behavior.
If the hardware "problem" does not have stable and predictable behavior, then one can't
fix it in software. For example, one can't compensate for a completely failed or unstable
sensor.
One can view data corrupting noise in information channels as a "hardware problem" that
has been extremely well compensated for by software for many years in computer networks and
hardware.
The success of the computer hard drive depends on recorded cyclic redundancy codes that
are used to verify that data read back is indeed "good", otherwise a re-reading of the drive
is launched.
Effectively this software compensation for noise in communications channels traces back to
Claude Shannon's 1948 work on information theory.
The masters of fixing hardware problems with software have to be in NASA, the people who
care for space probes that develop glitches over the years. It's amazing how they can work
around one device after another breaking down, using computers with the processor power of a
microwave oven.
Not that those fixes would pass FAA, but when you don't have a choice you can do a lot
with software.
I'm still unclear about why the MAX hardware is "bad", other than it doesn't respond to
pilot input the same way the earlier 737 hardware did. They therefore added MCAS as a type of
compatibility layer. That seems like a reasonable idea to me except that 1) the pilots should
know that it is there, and 2) there has to be a way to turn it off if things get weird! And
of course 3) Both 1 and 2 require additional pilot training which was a no-go the way the MAX
program was sold.
Now that everyone knows about MCAS though, the above all seem fixable. The MAX has other
problems as well that might further delay re-certification. I see mention of the FAA pushing
back at Boeing, so I guess we will see whether the FAA is really out of Boeing's pocket this
time.
MCAS was not well documented and past flight envelope protection systems had less
authority and could be physically overidden as the flight crew went through the process to
turn off the system. In the past main trim and autopilot stabilizer trim had cutout
switches.
Airbus uses three sensors, each feeding a different make computer. The three results are
compared, consensus among at least two determine the truth. So to equal this, Boeing needs
two more sensors, not one more. But as noted, their ancient computer chip might be maxed out.
IMO they need to emulate airbus, but maybe that costs too much takes too long? How costly to
retrofit the existing fleet?
At least it would avoid activating the Frankenstein Mcas unnecessarily.
Almost. For an A320 series aircraft there are three Angle Of Attack (AOA) sensors and
three Air Data Inertial Reference Units (ADIRU). The sensors and the ADIRUs come from the
same vendor and no intermix is allowed between vendors or often even mod level. Each ADIRU
gets AOA information from channels in two AOA sensors and information is compared internally
between the two channels in the ADIRU and then also cross checked with the other two ADIRUs
calculations. With three units each flight crew display has two sources to choose from as
well as a standby fourth system with limited functions. Also, all systems using ADIRU data,
such as the two Flight Augmentation Computers (FAC), will fault mismatched inputs. All of
these systems have been refined over the thirty years of service of this type of
aircraft.
One of the features of the 1980/90s Airbus A320 avionics architecture is that trend
monitoring of air data systems (Pitot, Static, AOA) and inertial systems is on the horizon.
This will speed up the refinement process of the systems. In the past flight test aircraft
and operator's aircraft equipped with special add on data logging equipment was needed to
refine the systems.
I wouldn't be surprised if Boeing either went back to a SMYD type computer with two AOA
channels to remove the MCAS function from the FCC or added a boat-load of aerodynamic add-ons
to correct the pitch fault.
(See the Beechcraft 1900 airliner or a McDonnell Douglas MD-90 as an example of
aerodynamic patches.)
I understand that Airbus even had independent teams program the software for each AOA
sensor so as to make it impossible for a software bug to be replicated across sensors.
I don't believe that is true. An airframe manufacturer (Airbus) will often offer several
vendor supplied units that meet specifications. So there may be two or three AOA sensor
suppliers to choose from and two or three ADIRU suppliers. The AOA vane only supplies
position information, the ADIRU then takes the input and determines how to use the position
information while also comparing the calculations the other two ADIRUs come up with. Some
tolerance between inputs is allowable and wild information such as when airspeed is too low
it make the AOA track correctly (Take off and landing roll) is a function located inside the
ADIRU. A few years ago an A320 operator reported problems from the three AOA sensors freezing
due to water in the bearing area which led to the ADIRUs not being able to discriminate
between bad inputs so a Service Bulletin was issued to replace that model/mod level units.
(It's a very dynamic environment and depending on what regulating authority an operator is
under controls how the operator updates their aircraft. FAA and EASA are usually very
strict.)
The independent team approach is usually used in flight control and flight guidance, where
you would want one team to determine flight command and the other team to determine
monitoring due to the same input. The two systems have different architecture and if a
disagree occurs the computer drops out and the next in the chain of control takes over. Early
on control would be Intel architecture and monitoring would be Motorola, which led to a lot
of "I'm a PC/I'm a MAC" jokes when troubleshooting in service faults.
>added a boat-load of aerodynamic add-ons to correct the pitch fault.
Thanks *very much* for this full comment. From this lookie-loo's seat the above really
seems to be the least-bad option, but it'll be interesting to see what shakes out from the
OEM, the FAA, and other regulators.
Quite a climb-down involved with that proposed solution, though.
Adding: aerodynamic fixes for the MAX's issues would almost certainly
reduce fuel efficiency, and airlines would not be happy with that.
That could be partly why that approach (which the MAX's first
chief test pilot recommended, IIRC) was not approved by
management.
This reminds me of the apocryphal quote attributed to a Spanish admiral before the Armada
sailed "we have the confident hope of a miracle (to beat the English)."
What I'm wondering about is the current administration is (correctly) letting the FAA put
safety first in this instance at the expense of business and growth.
They cannot do otherwise since the EU and China, especially China, keeps them honest.
If it were a purely inside-US problem, the plane would already be in the air again is my
guess. However, they cannot sign off on Boeing when China has legitimate reasons not to.
As for the article's outlook of a possible AIG-type disaster, I sort of agree this is
likely. Tho it will more be a GM like disaster and rescue plan since Boeing is in
manufacturing. There is no way in gehenna (family blog) Boeing will fail. Boeing is certainly
much more too big to fail than any other manufacturing business in the US. The US government
must and certainly will step in when, probably not if, Boeing's C-suite is incapable. This
kind of rescue is also the only realistic way imho, how this totally incapable board can be
fired for incompetence and a back to engineering roots leadership installed. If the US
government has the will to do this of course. In the name of national security even, which
this is, for once, actually sort of, is. Boeing has a military business side as well, which
needs the civilian one and vice versa.
So I see a "it has to get a lot worse before it can better" scenario for Boeing, since
there have obvious problems at the whole Boeing board-level, not just with Muilenburg. The
govenment on the other side will only be allowed to step in if actual bankruptcy looms, which
is still quite a bit away.
Having worked for the gov and seen many directors come and go, I ask that too! He doesn't
fit in any of the categories that the pols usually pick for those positions, i.e.,
politically well connected, good looking, yes men with MBA's and with little knowledge of the
agency they are supposed to direct.
And how is he keeping that job – the pressures on him must be enormous. He must have
a backbone of steel.
Isn't it obvious? The FAA is well and truly screwed if they don't improve their
credibility with their foreign counterparts as quickly as possible. That credibility will not
come from being acquiescent–it will come from visibly demonstrating that they are
willing to cause severe pain to the industry they regulate when it is necessary to act in
such a manner.
I would be absolutely astonished if it turns out that the FAA was not significantly
responsible for Muilenburg's very justified firing. And whatever Calhoun's shortfalls, I
suspect that he has learned the lesson and will not be stupid enough to pressure the FAA
going forward (at least not publically).
He was appointed in August. Someone in the Trump Administration must have been
uncharacteristically alert enough to realize that getting the FAA seen to be credible again
with other regulators was a necessary if not sufficient condition for saving Boeing's hide.
The US losing its ability to have its certifications accepted by other regulations is deadly
to US aviation.
We said in our November post we thought Dickson was the real deal. Glad you agree.
You could easily be right, but I didn't see it similarly.
"Straight talk from Steve" sounds like more PR-concocted spin to me, from the title on
down. Telling staff to take their time (privately) is good, for sure, but publicly pointing
it up feels like "Reassure Investors™ 101", to me.
Dickson came from Delta Airlines where he had experienced the transition to good
management, leadership and the development of a strong safety culture. He also has experience
with flying Airbus and Boeing aircraft.
I think they're pretty well hosed. My understanding is they tried to fix a physics (or
physical) problem with software. The engine is simply too big for the plane. Until they
replace the engine or resize the plane, the Max is a no-fly for me. It's hard enough to
accept fly by wire when the plane is engineered correctly. To make it so the plane doesn't
want to stay aloft by design and then patch with a single, non-redundant sensor/system is
lunacy.
I could see Boeing splitting into three parts: defense, commercial air, and parts/service.
Much like when the financial services guys were caught, they will attempt to "bad bank" the
commercial air division.
This will be a case study one day. Hopefully the MBA/managerial class will learn the right
lesson from this. Absolute tragedy.
Seems like an opportunity for an Airbus only Southwest knock-off
If they were capable of learning this wouldn't have happened in the first place. The
reason they are not capable is pride and arrogance. It isn't the first time in history that a
company was endangered or destroyed by short-sightedness and hubris. Examples abound:
GM
LTV
GE
HP
Bethlehem Steel
Sears Roebuck
The list goes on and on and on .
In each case, the downfall happens after the "financialization" of the makeup of the board
of directors. Simply put, when they make [money] instead of [product], they whole thing
eventually tanks. The best years at Bethlehem was when it was run by steel men. The best
years at GM was when it was ran by car people. The best years at HP was when it was run by
engineers.
Failure is an easily observable and repeatable, historic pattern of activity.
I am wondering if this fiasco along with the others exposes some psychological fault of
humans. It's like taking a moderately intelligent person -> modern business school
education -> functional idiot that couldn't find his way out of a paper bag -> company
is destroyed.
Boeing seems to be merely collateral damage of the particular path the American Empire has
chosen to take to die. Is there anything that can arrest this trajectory? Anyone, anyone?
Making stock buybacks illegal would certainly help – if done ten years ago. But now?
And I found out recently that in 2017 Boeing had its own employee pension plan invest in its
own stock. No one could possibly think that was anything than a stock buyback. A board that
does that might as well be in private equity. But then they are. Jesus.
> If they were capable of learning this wouldn't have happened in the first place. The
reason they are not capable is pride and arrogance.
I am not sympathetic to Boeing's plight (and in fact very much hope that criminal charges
will be laid in this instance, which in fact may be required for credibility reasons), but if
you want to understand the situation rather than polemize, you need to understand the
double-bind that "they" are in. Arrogance (especially to pre-conceived political views) was
likely a factor, but the point is that if they did not choose to prioritize short-term
earnings, they would have likely lost their jobs in favour of someone who pursued more or
less the same strategies that was eventually followed.
The system-wide incentives/penalties cannot be emphasised enough–this is not limited
to Boeing.
"The system-wide incentives/penalties cannot be emphasised enough–this is not
limited to Boeing."
Indeed, as I said, there is a long list of failure..
However, I do not buy the argument of "The competition made me do it". Dong something
provably wrong and risking everything because of what competition * might * do is
flawed logic at best.
The game is dirty because the payers are dirty, and that is an individual choice that they
make. These are the same class of people who have been lecturing us all for decades about
"personal responsibility" while concurrently doing everything possible to evade said
responsibility. See: regulatory capture, FAA.
"Waah waahh mommy the market made me do it!!" is BS, and those who disclaim responsibility
should not have any, nor should they have the rewards when things go right.
That is not true. Costco has for two decades stared down analyst pressure to pay their
store employees less. Costco understands that having well paid employees (by retail
standards) is important and in the end helps insure better margins by:
1. Making affluent people feel better about shopping at Costco, since they get cheap
prices without abusing the help. The guilt reduction factor is apparently non-trivial in
where they choose to shop
2. Reducing shrinkage. Way less employee theft at Costco
3. More motivated and cheerful employees, which pays off per #1 (making Costco less
unpleasant as a big box crowded store) and probably other ways.
Boeing is vastly more powerful than Costco. It is in a much better position to sell a "we
need to focus on engineering to compete with Airbus" story than Costco to make an analogous
pitch in retail.
Former proud HP employee here. I left the company before the fiasco that was Carly
Fiorina–why do the 'business' TV shows still trot her out?–but my BFF was there
and saw how the reverse takeover by Compaq she engineered nearly destroyed the company. The
collegial HP employees were no match for the hardened Compaq infighters.
> Failure is an easily observable and repeatable, historic pattern of activity.
Oops–this comment was actually what originally had me wanting to reply.
Failure in *any* system is actually the norm, which is why it is so "easily observabel and
repeatable" and so historic. Competitive advantages are difficult to come by and tend to be
very fleeting, and complex systems (e.g. current sociological, business, economic, political,
etc. environment and the interactions between them) are inherently hazardous and failure
prone **by their very nature**.
There is no way to remove thie failure-prone aspect of the system indefinitely–it is
endemic to the nature of the system itself. Any organization (or human, for that matter)
almost always has to ride the line between profits (revenues and costs) and other factors
such as safety. Inevitably, they eventually make the wrong decisions, but it is statistically
inevitable that they eventually do so.
The trick is to structure things such that failure on a single decision or two does not
threaten survival of the individual or entity. That requires truly understanding the key
aspects of the system and the impacts of any decision, which is probably impossible
Happy Holidays to every one! And especially to Jules for rescuing so many of my comments
from spam. This new laptop has the world's worst mousepad – I never know if I am
left-clicking or right clicking or double clicking – so it's no surprise that Skynet
thinks I'm spamming.
'Boeing's practice of booking future, yet to be earned, profits as current income means
persistent negative cash flow could lead to an unraveling.'
Is it to late to re-adopt that old maxim again that it is not a profit until it goes into
the bank? After reading this excellent article, I am betting for sure that there will be not
return to the skies for this bird in 2020 and it is Boeing's fault. Will Trump be persuaded
to bail out Boeing down the track? Hard to say.
Came across an article a long time ago which talked about Boeing having so much of the
plane built under contract. I think that Japan got a lot of these contradicts. But Boeing was
even willing to have the wings built by foreign countries which was a good as giving their
technology away which would be a long-term disaster for Boeing but excellent for short -term
executive bonuses.
Bonus points too for PK in pointing out that for Ryanair, that this plane is as good as a
petard.
The problem is that aviation is long term affair. So if Boeing starts new plane now and
even if everything goes more or less accordig to plan, it will be more than decade before
they will be selling the pieces for more than it costs them to manufacture. And if the plane
is success, it will become reliable cash cow somewhere in its second decade.
You can count profit only after the money is in your bank, but that means it's like first
ten years you are digging multibilion hole, next ten years you are trying to get out of it
and after that you start to show profit.
I don't think it's possible to make any sense of such programs without guessing into far
future.
What if the process of building a new plane would reveal yet another deep problem within
the company? What if that is a bigger part of their reluctance, even bigger than the brain
dead greed?
Interesting point. Do they even have the capabilities in designing, testing, and
certifying an entirely new plane anymore? Looking at the other botches in engineering, not
just the MAX. one wonders.
A small but still important issue may be that, even though Boeing seems to have 'captured'
the regulators, consider the pressure on any regulator that recertifies the 737 max. There
has been so much publicity, that if ANYTHING happens to a 737 max in the year after it
restarts flying, the government employee that signed off on it will be toast there is likely
a very powerful administrative conservatism at this point that may be very hard to overcome.
These are planes, remember, and flying at 560 mph at 35,000 feet is a very difficult regime
and things can go wrong even on 'perfect' planes Who wants to bet their career and reputation
that NOTHING will happen to any 737 MAX?
As regards the comment by "Summer," yes, another thing to consider. What if Boeing is no
longer capable of competently designing a modern cutting-edge airliner? What if it has
outsourced and downsized its core engineering capacity so much that it just can't do it any
more? That's the sort of ability you can't rebuild by just hiring another 100,000 foreign
nationals on H1B visas – talented though they may be as individuals, they don't have
the collective experience needed. Look at how hard it has been for other countries to make
competitive jetliners, not even Japan has succeeded yet.
Boeing has captured the FAA but not necessarily Canadian and European regulators. The
Canadians are still pissed about the forced sale of Bombardier to Airbus while the Europeans
have Airbus. Then there are the Asian regulators .
I think Boeing has pushed the 737 one plane model too far. They should have bit the bullet
several years ago and designed a new plane. By now they would probably be getting it
certified by the FAA with glowing comments from the airlines.
With regards to revamping an existing plane vs. designing a new plane from scratch, from
my experience as a design engineer retrofitting something is almost always header to get
right than something purpose built from the start, as long as the specifications and wish
list are rational (the F-35 had too many competing wishes to be an efficient program and
would have been better as 2-3 separate planes) . Retrofits sound good at the beginning
(especially to accountants), but you are always end up trying to shoehorn something into
somewhere where it doesn't fit, which is what happened to the 737 MAX.
You missed that the FAA under new director Steve Dickson is standing up to Boeing. He and
they realize the worst thing for the FAA (and US aviation) would be for other regulators to
reject its certification if and when it approves the 737 Max. The Chinese may do so out of
cussedness. but they need the Europeans and the Canadians to agree pretty pronto for
credibility's sake and to reassure passengers.
All of our regulators–FAA, FTC, SEC, etc.–have to feel under siege after more
than 50 years of the GOP convincing everybody that 'government is the problem' and
regulations, ALL OF THEM, are bad*. The loyal civil servants who hang in there and do their
level best in spite of declining funding and morale have my gratitude and respect.
* Unless, of course, a 'conservative' is harmed, then it's "Why didn't the government DO
SOMETHING?!"
Clinton appointee Arthur Levitt had only modest regulatory goals, that of protecting
retail investors. He was nevertheless under almost constant attack from the Senator from
Hedgistan, Joe Lieberman, who threatened to and if memory serves correct, actually did cut
the SEC's budget to hamstring the agency.
Just to add that the fact that some regional airlines are heavily into the 737 is likely
one reason Boeing didn't make an all new airplane. With a largely similar plane parts can be
shared, mechanic retraining less necessary etc.
Boeing and Airbus have systematically improved flight safety significantly over the last
40 years. The industry is facing a serious challenge with degrading pilot skills,
globalization and the demand for more automation to further improve safety. These are the
most complex vehicles made by mortals. The best engineers use to go into aerospace, now they
go into other industries. So, increased demands as we take safety from 5 sigma to 6 sigma,
and increased competition for the best engineers.
People are simply wrong to attribute this to MBAs, McDonnell Douglas, accounting and the
like. It is frankly laughable to call McDonnell an MBA culture. The challenge is to engineer
better in a tougher competitive market. Boeing has the capacity to continue doing great
things. People in the cheap seats maybe need to change their view on how they value these
markets.
A fair question to ask is why did Boeing use its free cash flow to buy back stock, rather
than invest in 737 replacement? The answer to that question is important to the Boeing story
and US innovation generally. Answer that question, and we can fashion a better strategy for
US technology competitiveness.
Isn't that decision to use free cash flow for stock buybacks rather than investing in
product or processes itself evidence of financialization and "an MBA culture?"
If there are degrading pilot skills, why did Boeing skimp on pilot training, obscure the
MCAS system in the pilot manual, and focus more on "shareholder value" than passenger safety?
Talented engineers (like most talent) are attracted to pay and working conditions and a
challenge: Boeing offered none of that. It seems an MBA culture pushed the talented engineers
aside.
Boeing chose not to challenge its engineers to build a truly modern aircraft to drive
profits into the future. It chose to jury-rig an old air-frame to maximize current profits;
at the expense of 346 living souls.
In large part the degrading of pilot skills is in the developing countries. There is a
vast difference between a trained-by-rote pilot and an airman. The earlier flight of the Lion
air MAX had a pilot that brought it in with a defective angle of attack sensor. Subsequently
the airline installed a junky rebuilt angle of attack sensor, then a much less capable pilot
took off and crashed the same plane.
The developed countries have their own concerns with adequate pilot training and a
generation of experienced pilots nearing retirement age as the industry grows.
"It is laughable to call McDonnell an MBA culture." Make shit up much?
What planet are you from? Numerous press accounts based on insider views say the reverse.
Start with Moe Tkacik's widely lauded report at the New Republic:
This New Yorker account similarly provided specific incidents from after the reverse
takeover of how Boeing prioritized its financials over engineering, and how its executives
abandoned practices like process improvement that were both pro-safety and pro-long term
profits:
Very good article, IMO. The board is still invested in the beast that might turn the giant
company to its knees. I foresee the application of MMT ideas to the rescue of both shale oil
drillers and Boeing. B-bonds and Oily-bonds combined make Boiled Bonds.
One aspect of this fiasco is that it is a systemic problem rather then an isolated one;
the bad practices that led to this situation are supposed to be due to importing the business
practices of the military side of the company to the civilian side. This means that the same
practices that led to the 737 MAX are operating elsewhere– in the military side, and
likely causing problems there as well. Of course, the existence of bad practices in the MIC
isn't exactly news, which may be why little is said about it, because everyone already knows
this.
The same can be said about the FAA role in this mess.
Yah, let's see if "we" can parse what went wrong with the 737MAX as supposedly being the
next dependable (safe and profit-generating -- discounting externalities) Boeing aircraft
wafting millions of people off on vacations or junkets or to those terribly important
business meetings. Got to be a fix in there somewhere, right? Some combination of change of
leadership and re-institution of some set of corporate values, maybe undoing some of the
outsourcing (though there you have another set of claimants for bailouts,) whatever.
I see only one bit of notice given to a really much bigger failure here: It takes a huge
amount of petroleum extraction and combustion, with those "knock-on effects" like what is
happening in Australia. Looks to me that people are so wedded to their own immediate
gratification that a big swath of the planet will eventually be stripped of most species,
including our own, as ambient conditions become "untenable."
Of course the French and Chinese and even the evil Russians are going to keep building
their jet fleets to use or sell on to lesser places, all aiming at "growth" and profit. Fun
to project and speculate what might or will be happening to the seeming juggernaut known as
Boeing. Also perversely fun to project and speculate on the fate of the biosphere, which
suffers because of MCAS-class and MBA thinking. But the PR tells us that Boeing is
indispensable to life as we know it, having settled parasitically into its niches in commerce
and war.
"Fix" Boeing? That's like nursing back to health the sociopathic guy who has sworn to rob
and kill you.
Is there any analysis, or perhaps it was included in Congress questioning that never made
it on air, that shows whether the performance of the MAX in the conditions that MCAS was
designed to counteract (i.e. increased likelihood of stalls while turning during a steep
climb vs. other 737-rated designs) was objectively not allowed (meaning the flight envelope
can't pass even under a new type certification) or just relatively not allowed in order to
keep the 737 type cert?
This to me is the key to understanding how the FAA is proceeding. If it's just an issue
relative to keeping the 737 certification, then seems like there are more paths forward here
to get the plane back in the air, albeit still painful for Boeing. Just take out MCAS and
call the plane a Boeing 740 or something under a certification different than the 737. That
seems to be what that Canadian engineer is implying can be done when he asked about whether
it makes sense to just remove MCAS.
But if the FAA would never approve the performance of any plane, even under a new type
cert, that operates like the MAX would without MCAS, then this is a more severe problem. It
really seems like the hardware and cockpit design issues raised as Boeing iterates their
"software solution" overwhelm the baseline design, and there is no way to certify this
airframe.
This blog, by an engineer who has worked for Boeing in the past is the best source I have
found on the matter. As yet I have not found any source definitively stating the extent of
the handling characteristics of the MAX without the MCAS active. Without the MCAS the
documents I have been able to find say only that the sick force/g does not progressively
increase in two flight regimes (the higher speed range wind up turn and at lower speed with
the flaps retracted) but I haven't seen any statement about whether it meets the
certification requirements for handling characteristics of a transport category aircraft if
the MCAS is not installed. We do know that without the MCAS it couldn't be sold as requiring
very little in the way of type specific training for pilots of earlier versions of the 737
and this was the main driving force behind the design. I have also read that implementing
input from multiple AOA sources and giving a disagree warning when they don't say the same
thing would have required enough type specific training that this would have resulted in the
aircraft failing to meet the guarantees Boeing had made to customers about transition
training needs and associated costs.
We have posted repeatedly that the 737 Max is dynamically unstable to a degree that is
unprecedented in a passenger airplane. MCAS was intended to compensate for that. No MCAS or
fix that accomplishes the same end, no recertification.
And a recertification of the 737 Max a new model would take even longer even if that were
possible.
We are saying this looks like a serious problem. If Boeing were able to fix MCAS
sufficiently to satisfy the FAA and other regulators, it probably would have happened by now.
At least the FAA and Boeing would be making more positive noises about making progress.
Boeing could well be the next AIG. If the 737 Max is not certified to carry passengers in
four or five months, the negative cash flow will hit the fan. The only way it can fly safely
in the near term without a new flight control system is to require extensive training and
washing out pilots who can't stay out of high angle of attack stall conditions and resolution
of the confusing cockpit warnings. It will cost lots of money.
Everything is coming together. Neoliberalism and neutering government do not work. Worse
the media propaganda avoids mentioning that the world has changed and has gone multi-polar.
Russia has cut itself off of the internet. Donald Trump has wandered off into impeachment
anger and know nothingness. Professionals are required to design, build, maintain and fly the
737 Max safely. Boeing profited from short changing them. If this is finally the start of the
"haute" middle-class revolt against the profit driven exploitative aristocracy, not just
Boeing will be restructured.
"..A senior Boeing executive, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the new Forkner
documents contain the same kind of "trash talking" about the FAA as in the October
messages.
He said he doesn't think they will be explosive but that they will generate headlines and
continue to be a problem for Boeing. He added that there might be additional documents he is
unaware of.
Forkner poses a continuing problem for the company, because he hired his own high-powered
criminal defense attorney instead of lawyers retained by Boeing, and the company doesn't know
what he's doing, the executive said.
While Forkner invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to avoid
turning over records to DOJ, Boeing doesn't know if he might cut a deal with prosecutors in
exchange for his cooperation, he said.."
Interesting phrasing in this Seattle Times piece on this Christmas Eve docu-dump.
Placing financials over engineering at Boeing has put one of the crown jewels of US
capitalism at risk. This affects the entire economy. A functional ruling class would not have
let this happen or at least would be moving fast to correct it if it had happened.
"Still, Muilenburg, 55, is in line to receive $26.5m in cash and stock as part of his exit
package.
His payout could reach as high as $58.5m, depending on how it is structured, according to an
SEC filing, including a pension of $807,000 annually and Boeing stock worth another $13.3m"
– Reported in The Guardian
Cult of The CEO – a strange cult to me. As a regular schnook reading about this
mess, I can't fathom these friggin contracts given to corporate executives. This guy signed
off on what was a fatal disaster. The bucks evidently don't stop here
Why is there no sward to impale himself on? Instead, this crazily opulent goodbye gift,
pre-arranged, in a no-skin-in-the-game world $58.5 million. Something to do with
Capitalism?
This comment on Muilenburg's departure from Boeing found at Leeham News, seems about right
to me:
"Old Tart
December 23, 2019
Muilenburg's departure is WAY overdue, but Calhoun is not the answer. He will be a
continuation of the GE/McDonnell Douglas cancer that has metastasized through Boeing since
1997. He was part of the decision making process that approved a $20 billion stock buyback
almost exactly a year ago (after the first MAX crash), following his approval of more than
$40 billion in buybacks the 5 years prior to that. Boeing could have launched at least two
new airplane programs with that cash. And as long as all Boeing managers are cycled through
the Harry Stonecipher charm school in St. Louis, that culture will continue to trickle down
throughout the company."
Adding: As I see it the 737 MAX situation is a bellwether event, and the corporatists
really
don't, so far, get it.. "labor force" issues will be coming to the fore, and soon, IMO.
I agree; it's not Muilenberg's fault, or not entirely. But firing the CEO is about as far
from American corporate tradition as you can get – it is much more customary to
identify 'a few bad apples' from the lower echelons, fire them and announce the company has
undergone a purge and is now 'all better'. And they had to have had it in for the engineers
who shot off their mouths. 'They' being the investors and the board of Boeing. Letting
Muilenberg take the fall might have something to do with his very early admission of company
responsibility. Mind you, he was also the CEO when Boeing fought so hard against grounding
the type, and only did it when pretty much everyone else had already done so for aircraft
under their own control.
The CEO takes the fall for the board. Replacing him with David Calhoun is the exact
opposite of what they need. Like PG&E stocking their board with wall st types as a way to
get out of bankruptcy. Doubling down on their mistakes as Yves or Lambert would say.
Hopefully, Calhoun and the whole board will be gone to Hell within a year.
Re Boeing–that's kind of a non story as the whole point of a stress test is to test
to destruction or near destruction in order to find areas that need structural improvement.
In other words testing is a good thing. Perhaps they should have done more of it before
releasing the Max.
Re-Democracy Now and Syria-Juan Cole probably told Amy not to talk about the new
revelations. Cole and Goodman have been Syria regime change boosters.
The point is not that the fuselage failed – its that it failed short (marginally so,
but it still failed) before it reached its stress level. You would expect almost all
engineering structures to survive significantly beyond the target stress level, especially in
such controlled circumstances, which do not allow for structural decay over time or slight
manufacturing flaws.
The story did say that Boeing will now add reinforcements to strengthen as a result of the
test. But it also said that the FAA will now hand the process over to Boeing so perhaps that
is the "hook."
I've been one of the first around here to criticize Boeing, but I do think the
villain-ization of the Seattle company is a bit over the top. Obviously if planes continue
falling out of the sky they are over. It's not like they can be quite as sneaky as, say, auto
companies in order to save a few dollars or even a lot of dollars.
Didn't the semi-"new" Leadership of Boeing move the Corporate Headquarters from Seattle to
Chicago some years ago? And didn't that same leadership open a no-unions-allowed factory area
in South Carolina in the long term hope of attriting the Legacy Seattle facility to a size
small enough to exterminate? Thereby exterminating the Legacy Union presence?
In what sense is Boeing a "Seattle" company anymore?
"The story did say that Boeing will now add reinforcements to strengthen as a result of
the test. But it also said that the FAA will now hand the process over to Boeing . . ."
Here is the problem: It is easy to add reinforcements, but how will you know that they
will work? In practice–as opposed to theory–they often don't. Occasionally they
even make things worse (oops!) The only way to know is to test–which is precisely what
Boeing says it will not do, and will not have to do.
A failure at 99% load is a failure. Changing your criteria and standards after the fact is
not engineering, it is MBA-style creative accounting.
If killing people for money is not evil, then certainly Boeing is not evil. This should be
clear to everyone,
A fairly recent update on the Boeing situation. This is a lengthy and very comprehensive
article which delves into the cultural shift at Boeing from an engineer-centric agency to an
executive-dominated moneymaker, just before the production of the Dreamliner.
"In December, 1996, Boeing announced that it was buying a struggling rival, McDonnell
Douglas, for thirteen billion dollars. Sorscher is one of many Boeing employees who have
identified the merger as the moment when Boeing went from being led by engineers to being
led by business executives driven by stock performance.
Sorscher recalled a labor-management breakfast, shortly before the merger, at which a
top Boeing executive said that the company would reduce spending on a program that employed
engineers to find improvements in the process of making planes. Sorscher, a member of the
union's bargaining unit at the time, pointed out how much money process improvement was
saving the company."
" The executive tipped his head back, as if thinking how best to explain basic
economics to a clueless scientist. Finally, as Sorscher recalled, the executive said, "The
decisions I make have more influence over outcomes than all the decisions you make."
Sorscher told me, "It was: 'I can't help but make a billion dollars every time I pick up
the phone. You people do things that save four hundred thousand dollars, that take one
shift out of flow time -- who gives a crap?' "
Three years later, the engineers' union went on strike over bonus pay and cuts in
health coverage. James Dagnon, another Boeing executive, said that engineers had to accept
that they were no longer the center of the universe. "We laughed," Sorscher recalled. "This
is an engineering company -- these are complex, heavily engineered products. Of course
we're the center of the universe. But he wasn't kidding. We didn't get it. Who is the
center of the universe? It's the executives."
A fascinating read. The Dreamliner, the first project built under the new culture, was
rolled out three years late and tens of billions over budget. The following year, persistent
battery fires grounded the model for three months.
And that's not even making a dent in the arrogance of the company aristocracy – the
previous CEO made $80 million in salary and bonuses in his final three years in the post
– and the determination to stick with the corporate-economic model despite clear
warnings that it was on a sled bound for hell. If you read the whole thing, you'll have a
much better understanding why we have not yet seen the triumphant return of the Max 8 to the
air.
Another well focused take down of the NYT about their propaganda and obfuscation in support of profit over public safety.....thanks
b
I suggest you send the NYT a link to your posting and ask them to respond.
The MSM is a tool being used by TPTB to keep the public ignorant and brainwashed...and it keeps working unfortunately.
Suppressing alternatives POV by web sites like MoA is on TPTB agenda and rising fast. MoA is a .org web site and read below
what just happened to non-profit .org domain management
One of the major reasons it was termed The Gilded Age was the ownership of Congress, particularly the semi-appointed Senate, by
Big Business beginning in the early 1870s, which was brought to a semblance of public control only for the brief Depression Decade
1930-1940, and was then lost again and is now worse than ever. More than ever I'm convinced this entire fiasco is a massive indicator
of the USA's decline in almost every aspect.
Corruption is rampant. Government is bought. The new Western Empire is a club of multinational corporations that operate via international
trade institutions, free to accumulate money without restraint. Millions of dollars were passed on to the Biden and Heinz finance
group after Ukraine's takeover. Syria's oil is being stolen now. Corporate media ignores it.
Boeing and Airbus are the two businesses that manufacture all of the global commercial airliners. When there was government
regulation and CEOs jailed, competitors would squeal on companies who weren't following the rules. No more.
As the Canadian regulator indicated, MCAS was only required to make the 737 Max fly like the 737 NG. It is not needed. It can
be deleted. Pilots can be trained to recover with the new flight characteristics. But that costs money. Boeing will pull every
string to avoid it. Profiting from death is the Empire's new normal. If the 737 Max cannot be flown safely, a few more crashes
and last major industrial manufacturer in America will fail.
b: Thanks for continuing to publish previous Moon of Alabama posts on Boeing 737 MAX issues at the end of each new post on the
subject. It has become a precious archive worth keeping together.
Resume of the article linked above by Michael Roberts:
Every year, the US Inland Revenue Service (IRS) fails to collect over $500bn in taxes. These taxes are mainly owed by high-income
earners who avoid or evade taxes they should pay. The IRS just fails to collect what is owed, mainly because it does not check
personal submissions, has few inspectors for fraud and insufficient technology to check.
"The sources of the individual income tax gap are primarily high-income individuals because more of their income accrues
in opaque categories like dividend income, capital gains, and proprietorship income. In some of those categories, taxes are
paid on only 55 percent of income earned."
"he magnitude of the gap is a function of the resources at the IRS's disposal to detect and punish individuals, corporations,
estates, and tax avoiders across other filing categories. These resources have decreased over time: The IRS budget has decreased
(in real terms) by nearly 15 percent since 2011. Its enforcement budget has dropped by 25 percent during this period."
It is now estimated that between 2020–29, the IRS will fail to collect nearly $7.5 trillion in taxes. A new study suggests
that increasing audit rates (especially for high-income earners), more information reporting, and IT investment can shrink
the gap by around 15% or $1trn. Not as much as it should be but something.
But rich tax evaders need not worry - the required investment will not be made.
The MSM is a tool being used by TPTB to keep the public ignorant and brainwashed...and it keeps working unfortunately.
How very cedulous of you to say, but that ain't the who story, is it?
MSM pushes most sensible people to Alt media, which tells them somewhat more sophisticated lies, but they are lies nonetheless,
with a generous sprinkling of things we can agree upon, because all important media is controlled by Intelligence. It has never
been otherwise, since the invention of a hammer and chisel.
You ain't gonna walk this one back, trolls. Not with your sycophantics. Censor all you like. We understand the dialectic. Your
headlines now arrive with same force as those of your MSM partners. We know you are lying with every exhalation of your breath.
The purpose of media is thought control. Period. Anyone who tells you otherwise is lying.
I fear you're spouting nonsense here, but let's try nonetheless:
"MSM pushes most sensible people to Alt media, which tells them somewhat more sophisticated lies, but they are lies nonetheless,
with a generous sprinkling of things we can agree upon, because all important media is controlled by Intelligence."
There's some circular reasoning going on in the background here, I sense, but let's stay away from that. What bothers me a
bit -- capital-i-Intelligence, what is your usage of that word here?
Clear up this nonsense.
I am not surprised at the revolving door corruption. This is the country that can only get 2 out of 20 elevators functional
on a new aircraft carrier. They need much more than a new Navy Commander. I am astounded that the recent sacking was over arrogance
rather than incompetence.
If Boeing gets away with this (and I expect they will), it will represent the total rf'ing of USA product reliability.
@ Posted by: bjd | Nov 25 2019 22:11 utc | 10 with the response to AlfaAlfalfa (9)
Thanks for that. Other questions are
Who are the "we" that know us sycophantics....(had to look it up) are lying?
If us "pond scum" (others excepted, me only) can't use the technology, how are we suppose to communicate with each other in
this world.....in person only?
And kinda part of the one above, MoA is a one man show who works for contributions and so how is his web site "media"?
@flankerbandit, who in
6 stated that MCAS is not so much a stall handling system but rather meant to provide
stick control to the pilot via offering a certain feedback. I have experienced the onset of a
stall, as vibration, myself, once in a small plane, so I agree that it is a somewhat generic
situation in which an intuitive sensing of the airplane can be experienced. However, if this
rings true, I'd like to ask if this sort of acute awareness is really dependend on a specific
reaction in the stick. I could imagine that a diverse handling experience of a certain type,
like the MAX, can be learned in a simulator, so much so that pilots can get acquainted with
the unusual behaviour; possibly aided by instruments. - The answer on this question allows to
infer if Boeing malignantly forced a sales feature (no pilot re-training required because
MCAS), or if exquisite hubris led the design process when the larger engines threw the whole
airframe off balance.
I remind my fellow barflies of the electric elevators that are setting back USS Ford. The
case is somewhat reminiscent, in that an unstable layout is countered with a brute
engineering approach which relies on control technology, i.e. computing power.
Often I expect these stories in the media to get important technical details wrong...but
here we see that this writer did his homework...
I have said this many times before, but the MCAS system is NOT an anti-stall system...it
is there solely for the purpose of providing the right kind of stick feel to the pilot...
"On most airplanes, as you approach stall you can feel it," a veteran pilot for a U.S.
commercial carrier told me.
Instead of the steadily increasing force on the control column that pilots were used
to feeling -- and that F.A.A. guidelines required -- the new engines caused a loosening
sensation.
This is exactly it...and this is why I have to wonder how exactly is MCAS going to be
cleared to fly again...since the original, much less authoritative version was found
inadequate in providing the stick force required...and the rejigged production version proved
to be a surefire killer if it kicked in at low altitudes such as takeoff...
We recall that Captain Sullenberger called the MAX a 'death trap'...
So clearly the system's authority has to be dialed back...in which case the airplane
handling qualities do not meet established requirements...
The story here tells of the struggle that the family of Ralph Nader's grand-niece, who
perished in the Ethiopian flight, is waging to 'axe the max'...
Hopefully they will succeed, but I doubt it..the MAX can never be a good airplane...full
stop...
Here's an
interesting article on the entire 737 line - to wit: the 737 is a 1960s era commuter
plane that has been pushed and extended into ever larger/longer roles - ones it is simply not
designed for.
I've said it before, I'll say it again: the 737s convey the single worst experience I have
ever had on airplanes in my 1.5 million miles in the air - with the single exception of a 3+
decade old Chinese 727 I was unlucky enough to be on (and lucky enough to land safely in), in
1984.
The latest detailed summary on 737 MAX certification shortcuts.
It is no wonder, after reading this, why Southwest is publicly reconsidering its
standardization on the 737.
"There are certain men in the world who rather see everybody hung before they'll take
blame." ― Arthur Miller's "All My Sons"
When American playwright Arthur Miller wrote those words in 1947, he was penning a work
based on the conspiracy between the Wright Aeronautical Corporation and military and civilian
inspectors to approve defective airplane engines for use in World War II. The collusion
occurred between 1941 and 1943 and was brought before then-Senator Harry Truman's investigative
committee after workers exposed the scheme. A number of executives went to prison.
In Miller's play, the chief culprit, Joe Keller, offloads the blame onto a subordinate and
later finds out that 21 pilots died as a result of his actions, including one of his sons.
Keller commits suicide out of shame and regret.
Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg showed no such human emotions when he sat before the Senate
Commerce Committee on Tuesday and the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on
Wednesday. Knowing he had nothing to fear from the Democratic and Republican politicians
deferentially lobbing questions at him, he stonewalled and evaded, defending his decision to
ignore and conceal multiple warnings from engineers and pilots and rush the deadly Boeing 737
Max 8 into service in 2017.
He even defended the "delegation" of oversight by federal regulators to Boeing itself and
called for a further "updating," i.e., gutting, of regulations.
Within two years of the launch of the new plane, two 737 Max 8 planes had crashed as a
result of the malfunction of an automatic anti-stall mechanism called the Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), whose very existence had been concealed from
pilots. A total of 346 men, women and children were killed.
At this week's hearings, Muilenburg acknowledged that he knew of the red flags, yet not a
single congressman or senator suggested that he, or his coconspirators in the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), should be criminally prosecuted. Nor did the corporate media.
The first disaster occurred just over a year ago when Lion Air Flight 610 plunged into the
sea outside of Jakarta, Indonesia, killing 189 people. The second came five months later, when
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 nosedived into the ground near Addis Ababa, extinguishing the
lives of another 157 human beings.
At Wednesday's hearing, Muilenburg did not even acknowledge the presence of family members
of the deceased who stood behind him holding up photos of their lost spouses, children, parents
and siblings. He turned around to face them only after a member of the group demanded that he
"look at people when you say you're sorry."
The Max 8 crashes were not simply accidents, they were crimes. They were the outcome of the
criminalization of the American corporate ruling class.
Investigations by both Indonesian and Ethiopian flight safety officials have concluded that
both Boeing and the FAA were culpable in the crashes.
By now, facts have emerged, some of which were raised at the hearings, which demonstrate
incontrovertibly that Boeing knowingly put into service an aircraft that was not safe. These
include:
Emails from pilots and engineers warning of the dangers, including one from Mark
Forkner, Boeing's chief technical pilot, noting that MCAS was out of control, "egregious" and
"running rampant" during a test run on a flight simulator. An email to Muilenburg from a senior
manager recommending that the entire Max 8 program be shut down because standard safety
protocols were being ignored in the race to launch the plane before Boeing's European-based
rival Airbus captured a slice of its market share. He wrote, "All my internal warning bells are
going off and for the first time in my life I am hesitant about putting my family on a Boeing
airplane." A 2016 warning to Congress from the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists union,
which represents workers at the FAA, that deregulation had reached a point where regulators
would be able to intervene in problems with an airplane only "after an accident has happened
and people are killed." The removal of any mention of MCAS from flight training manuals and the
reduction of pilot training on the new aircraft to a one-hour video on an iPad. Boeing's
expansion of the power and scope of MCAS shortly before the Max 8's launch without any
notification to the FAA, other regulatory agencies, pilots or airlines. Boeing's decision to
attach a new and bigger engine to a five-decade old airframe, rather than redesign the
airplane, in order to cut costs, reduce labor, rush production and speed up certification. The
resulting tendency of the Max 8 to stall, which MCAS was intended to correct, rendered the new
plane "fatally flawed," according to former pilot and aviation safety expert Chesley "Sully"
Sullenberger. The failure of Boeing and the FAA to ground the 737 Max 8 after the October 2018
Lion Air crash, even though Boeing had been aware of problems with MCAS before the disaster.
Even after the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 five months later, Boeing and the FAA
refused to ground the plane until every other authority in the world had done so.
All of these crimes of commission or omission flow from Boeing's subordination of all
considerations, including safety, to profit. This is not unique to the aerospace manufacturer,
but the basis of the entire capitalist system. The lives lost along the way are just the cost
of doing business.
While the grounding of the Max 8 and lawsuits by pilots and relatives of victims are
expected to cost Boeing $8 billion, the company increased in value by nearly $200 billion from
the time that the deathtrap was announced in 2011 to when the planes were grounded.
The anarchy and irrationality of the capitalist market have been given unbridled rein by the
deregulation of the airline industry -- and every other sector of the capitalist economy --
which began under Democrat Jimmy Carter in 1978 and has continued under both Democrats and
Republicans for the past four decades. It is of a piece with the financialization and
deindustrialization of the economy and the destruction of jobs, wages and social services.
For his part, Muilenburg laid off 16,000 workers in 2016 and 2017, his first two full years
as CEO. As a reward, he draws a salary of $30 million a year. This year, nearly a third of his
compensation has come from selling off a sizeable chunk of his Boeing stock a month before the
Ethiopian Airlines crash.
Like many mega corporations, Boeing occupies a strategic position in the global operations
of American imperialism and is tightly integrated into the state military/intelligence
apparatus. It is the largest US exporter and second largest defense contractor. It is on the
front lines of the mounting trade conflict with Europe, in which Boeing faces off against
Europe's Airbus. Since Trump's election, it has more than tripled its stock price, spearheading
the massive run-up on the Dow that has bolstered the fortunes of the American ruling elite.
Boeing is only one example of the lawlessness of the operations of big business. The recent
past has seen the BP oil spill, the lead poisoning of Flint, the opioid epidemic, the wildfires
and power outages linked to PG&E and the Wall Street crash of 2008. Not a single CEO has
gone to jail as a result of these disasters driven by corporate greed and criminality. As
Obama's attorney general Eric Holder told Congress in 2013, America's corporate barons and
their business empires are "too big to jail."
These are not aberrations or the products, at root, of subjective avarice -- although blind
greed exists in abundance. The criminalization of the American ruling class is the product of
the degeneration and crisis of the entire social and economic system of capitalism.
The Boeing disasters underscore the need to put an end to capitalism and replace it with
socialism, which is based on the satisfaction of social need, not private profit. This means
mobilizing the working class to expropriate the private owners of the banks and major
corporations and transform corporate giants such as Boeing into publicly owned and
democratically controlled utilities. It means ending the dictatorship of the corporations over
the workers and placing the control of economic life in the hands of the producers.
The entire political system and both bribed parties of big business, including their left
talkers like Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, will oppose this to the bitter end. To
establish safe, efficient, comfortable and affordable air travel requires the independent and
revolutionary mobilization of the working class in the US and internationally in the fight for
socialism.
A Boeing pilot working on the 737 Max said in messages from 2016 that A Boeing pilot working on the 737 Max said in messages from
2016 that a new automated
system was making the plane difficult to control in flight simulators , more than two years before it was
grounded following two deadly crashes . From a report: The pilot, Mark Forkner, complained that the system, known as MCAS,
was causing him trouble. "It's running rampant in the sim," he said in a message to a colleague, referring to the simulator. "Granted,
I suck at flying, but even this was egregious," he went on to say, according to a transcript of the exchange reviewed by The New
York Times . The 737 Max was grounded earlier this year after crashing twice in five months, killing 346 people. In both cases, MCAS
malfunctioned based on erroneous data, sending the planes into unrecoverable nose dives. Mr. Forkner, the chief technical pilot for
the plane, went on to say that he had lied to the Federal Aviation Administration. "I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly),"
Mr. Forkner says in the messages. The messages are from November 2016. Eight months earlier, Mr. Forkner had asked the F.A.A. if
it would be O.K. to remove mention of MCAS from the pilot's manual. The F.A.A., which at the time believed the system would only
activate in rare cases and wasn't particularly dangerous, approved Mr. Forkner's request.Re:Not just omit, but remove? (
Score: 3 )
TLDR; Penny pinching Boeing management, more interested in short-term stock price than customers, who didn't listen to actual
engineers, lied to the FAA, which because of budget cuts are unable to independently verify anything manufacturers say.
by cusco ( 717999 ) < [email protected]
> on Saturday October 19, 2019 @01:43PM (
#59325222 ) If you graph the Pentagon
budget and the Deficit in the years since Ronnie Raygun you'll notice that they parallel each other very closely most years. The
reason was explicitly laid out by Grover Norquist, leader of the conservative brain trust, who openly declared that they intended
to run the deficit up so high that the only funds available would be for the military and debt repayment. He said, on his web page,
that they intended to shrink the US government down to the size where, "I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the tub."
It seems to be working.
There is no reason why the US needs to spend more than the next 8 countries combined, 6 of whom are supposedly "allies". That's
not "Defense" spending.
by Ed Tice ( 3732157 ) on Friday October 18, 2019 @05:11PM (
#59323582 ) Is this just the /. editors being sloppy? Or was that really his job title? If so, I think that Boeing might have a much bigger problem. Like
their chief technical pilots sucks at flying!
Flag as Inappropriate
by dgatwood ( 11270 ) on Friday October 18, 2019 @05:21PM (
#59323612 )
Homepage Journal I would argue that this is actually a good
thing. You probably don't want a crackerjack pilot doing that job, because that person is likely to do the right things to fix any
failures, and it will look like things are going fine even in situations where a more average pilot would exhibit CFIT. You're better
off if you have a tester whose skills are only one step above those of a garden slug, because if anything goes wrong, that tester
will be befuddled, and the testing session will be a failure. :-)
Flag as Inappropriate
But isn't that the opposite of what Boeing was doing? I thought the complaint was Boeing had crack test pilots checking out these
planes, and pilots were bitching the average pilot couldn't fly half as well as the typical 737 test pilot.
If I read the summary correctly, their "chief technical pilot" commented that he sucked at flying, which if true, implies that
it wasn't crack test pilots. Whether the person actually does suck at flying or was just being ironic, I couldn't say. :-)
by mlyle ( 148697 ) on Friday October 18, 2019 @08:28PM (
#59324012 ) Their chief technical pilot
is probably both a pretty damn good pilot *and* surrounded by people who are even more awesome test pilots. Compared to his peers
he may "suck at flying" and he may be half-ironically mentioning that ;).
by gweihir ( 88907 ) on Saturday October 19, 2019 @12:29AM (
#59324322 ) If they knew this and did
nothing to fix it, then they seem to exceed criminally negligent manslaughter now. It may be time to look into who needs to go to
prison here for a long, long time. You keep using that word and for once I think it means exactly what you think it means.
by alaskana98 ( 1509139 ) on Friday October 18, 2019 @09:51PM (
#59324162 ) You raise some really interesting
points. I would imagine that (at least within the last 20 years or so) the development of a new Aircraft platform (for lack of a
better term) is very much akin to developing a new software platform. I say this because really, aside from the actual physical parts
that keep an aircraft afloat a modern plane is just a software package with wings. And as such, it should be relatively trivial to
port the software side of things on a functioning plane to a sandboxed simulator runni.ng the exact same software but being fed false
sensory input data as opposed to data derived from a real-world usage scenario. (In other words, the software driving the plane could
give two f's where the data is coming from, as long as the data fits the parameters it is looking for.) That being said, I would
imagine Boeing's own simulators for the 737 Max should have been running the exact same software as the actual planes themselves
and as such should be able to design failure scenarios within the simulator that should produce outcomes very similar to eventually
(and tragically) happened in real life. But enough of the arm-chairing, I would love to hear from the folks who actually write the
code for these sims (fat chance, I know.. they are probably heavily bound by NDAs).
"... "Investors pressured Boeing to quickly build its fuel-efficient 737 Max planes to top European rival Airbus, a key lawmaker said before the manufacturer's CEO appears before Congress on two fatal crashes of the beleaguered planes. 'This all starts on Wall Street,' Rep. Peter DeFazio, an Oregon Democrat and chair of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure." ..."
"... A Federal Aviation Administration analysis showed a good chance the same malfunction would crop up again, according to agency officials and people briefed on the results. Even under the most optimistic scenario, the agency's statistical models projected a high likelihood of a similar emergency within roughly a year. ..."
"... Year after year after year, Congress does not properly fund the FAA in order for it to do its work. It doesn't give the FAA the money or the human resources or expertise to do its work. ..."
" Lawmaker blames investors for Boeing's race to sell troubled 737 Max : 'This all
starts on Wall Street'" [ CNBC
]. "Investors pressured Boeing to quickly build its fuel-efficient 737 Max planes to top
European rival Airbus, a key lawmaker said before the manufacturer's CEO appears before
Congress on two fatal crashes of the beleaguered planes. 'This all starts on Wall Street,' Rep.
Peter DeFazio, an Oregon Democrat and chair of the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure."
"' Why Is This Airplane Still Flying?' The FAA Missteps That Kept Boeing's MAX Aloft"
[
Wall Street Journal ]. "Just after a Boeing Co. 737 MAX jet crashed in Indonesia a year
ago, FAA officials asked themselves: Should they warn the world the entire fleet could have a
design flaw? A Federal Aviation Administration analysis showed a good chance the same
malfunction would crop up again, according to agency officials and people briefed on the
results. Even under the most optimistic scenario, the agency's statistical models projected a
high likelihood of a similar emergency within roughly a year. " • Very good reporting
from the WSJ, well worth a read.
" FAA admin. on Boeing 737 Max: We're still deciding 'when, whether' plane will fly
again" [Steve Dickson,
USA Today ]. "The FAA is fully committed to address all of the recommendations raised by
investigators, including those that pertain to when, whether or how the 737 Max will return to
service. As we have said repeatedly, the aircraft will fly only after we determine it is safe."
• Dickson is the administrator of the FAA.
" Congress is accountable in Boeing MAX crisis, too " [ Leeham
News & Analysis ]. " Year after year after year, Congress does not properly fund
the FAA in order for it to do its work. It doesn't give the FAA the money or the human
resources or expertise to do its work. " • Correct!
"I'm not Boeing anywhere near that: Coder whizz heads off jumbo-sized maintenance snafu" [
The Register
].
Really a tech doc war story about the 747: "After about 30 pages I reached a page where my
Windows app showed more data than the RS6000 app. I had two extra diagrams and an extra
paragraph of text.
Clicking through the thousands of pages I found more places where my app showed extra
diagrams and text."
Hoo boy. The culprit: "'After a few days of debugging,' Pete told us, 'it turned out [to be]
an optimisation bug in the IBM C compiler used on the RS6000.
It was overwriting registers that were being used to store local C variables when the call
stack got too deep.' Thus not all the text and diagrams were being displayed." •
Just after a Boeing Co. 737 MAX jet crashed in Indonesia a year ago, FAA officials asked
themselves: Should they warn the world the entire fleet could have a design flaw?
A Federal Aviation Administration analysis showed a good chance the same malfunction would
crop up again, according to agency officials and people briefed on the results. Even under the
most optimistic scenario, the agency's statistical models projected a high likelihood of a
similar emergency within roughly a year.
Yet in the end, the FAA didn't formally consider grounding the MAX or taking other drastic
steps, based on the sketchy early information from the October 2018 accident. It simply
reminded pilots how to respond to such emergencies.
That decision set the stage for a second fatal MAX crash, of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302,
less than five months later.
In a critical misstep, FAA officials relied extensively on Boeing's initial flight-simulator
test results, some of the people said. Boeing largely used its cadre of highly experienced test
pilots, an industry practice the FAA and accident investigators later acknowledged wasn't
appropriate to gauge how the other pilots would react in a real emergency.
On Monday, an FAA spokesman said the reminder to pilots "followed a rigorous and
well-defined process," adding that the agency's overall response met regulatory requirements,
was approved by multiple agency officials and reflected widely accepted industrywide
standards.
Earl Lawrence, head of the FAA's aircraft-certification office, which approves and monitors
new airplane models, was fresh in his post and lacked details about the MAX's original approval
to delve deeply into the situation, said people briefed on the deliberations. He and his team
followed Boeing's lead on diagnosing and resolving the crisis, including Boeing's predictions
that a fix could be developed in time to avert another tragedy.
From front-line FAA engineers and midlevel managers to high-ranking officials at agency
headquarters, the consensus was that it wasn't necessary to take drastic action such as
grounding the fleet. FAA officials vouched for the safety of the MAX, even though it included
the MCAS feature that eventually was implicated in both crashes.
How the FAA decided against a more-aggressive response to the crash hasn't been reported
before in detail.
That stance has prompted a barrage of criticism on Capitol Hill and elsewhere. The FAA's
decisions are expected to feature in Senate and House committee hearings this week. Lawmakers
are expected to ask Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg about the company's interactions
with the FAA, including whether it urged the regulator to avoid taking more-forceful action
between the crashes.
As the MAX edges toward service again, probably early next year, European safety authorities
have formally shelved the idea of ungrounding the MAX simultaneously with the FAA. They want to
perform their own simulator tests and analyze additional safeguards. Other foreign regulators,
too, are poised to conduct separate evaluations -- something once unthinkable among overseas
regulators, who typically followed the FAA in vetting the safety of U.S.-certified planes.
Boeing agreed with the FAA that it was appropriate to reiterate existing pilot procedures
before rolling out software changes, a company spokesman said. "The safety of everyone flying
on our airplanes was paramount as the analysis was done and the mitigating actions were taken,"
he said, adding: "Boeing began work on a potential software update shortly after the Lion Air
accident, when MCAS was identified as a potential factor. Boeing agreed to the FAA's timeline
for implementing the software update."
The FAA spokesman said "There was no regulatory requirement in this instance to use average
pilots," adding that current testing procedures require them. He said Mr. Lawrence "is
well-versed in certification standards" even though he wasn't involved early on with the MAX,
and "all meetings and conversations in the immediate aftermath of the Lion Air accident were
based on the best information available at the time."
From the moment that Lion Air Flight 610 nosedived into the Java Sea with 189 people
onboard, FAA officials were playing catch-up. The first shock, said people familiar with the
details, came when FAA engineers in the Seattle region discovered Boeing hadn't submitted
revised safety assessments detailing the latest changes to MCAS, the automated flight-control
system at the heart of the problem.
Agency engineers struggled to understand MCAS's intricacies. As government and Boeing
experts met to discuss responses, Boeing engineers seemed to realize they had underestimated
MCAS's ability to push the plane's nose down forcefully and repeatedly, and overestimated how
pilots would respond, said a person familiar with the FAA's response.
Days after the Lion Air crash, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D., Ore.), chairman of the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, met Ali Bahrami, the FAA's top safety official,
for a closed-door briefing. The FAA contingent sought to persuade the lawmaker, an FAA critic,
that the crash exposed operational rather than design problems, Mr. DeFazio said in an
interview. "We were assured this was one-off" as an event, he said.
The FAA prepared its standard postcrash risk analysis, called Transport Airplane Risk
Assessment Methodology, which calculated the potential extent of the problem.
It received a flood of information about pilot and maintenance missteps, and other data from
the scene that suggested there were systemic repair and inspection shortcomings at Lion Air. As
neither FAA engineers nor most of their bosses fully grasped the intricacies of MCAS, they felt
comfortable delving into issues many of them understood better, including how pilots reacted to
emergencies with the system, said some of the people briefed on the deliberations. FAA managers
worked with U.S. airlines to scour MAX flight records over the more than two years. They didn't
find any event revealing an MCAS malfunction similar to the one in the Lion Air dive.
Early on, regulators emphasized the results of Boeing's flight-simulator sessions. Boeing,
which conducted tests in an advanced flight simulator near Seattle, told regulators its
analysis showed pilots generally starting to respond within several seconds, an acceptable
result, despite a cacophony of blaring cockpit alerts and warning lights, said some of the
people briefed on the results.
The crews in those simulated emergencies primarily were Boeing pilots far more experienced
than typical airline pilots, said the people. In the crush of fast-moving developments, the FAA
seemingly didn't focus on the makeup of the simulator crews, said the people briefed on the
results.
With initial information at hand, the FAA focused on an emergency directive. In the dry
technical language used for routine maintenance inspections, the FAA reminded pilots to adhere
to longstanding procedures when encountering similar emergencies. The directive didn't fully
spell out the harrowing details of an MCAS malfunction, specifically how the system pushed down
the plane's nose over pilot attempts to override it.
The issue of whether to mention MCAS was debated at lower levels of the FAA, making its way
to the agency's acting head, Daniel Elwell, who endorsed the decision not to identify the
system, said a person with knowledge of the deliberations. Boeing later spelled out MCAS
details in a Nov. 10 bulletin to airlines.
The FAA spokesman said MCAS wasn't mentioned due to concerns that it could have interfered
with Indonesian investigators by implying a probable cause of the accident.
FAA officials embraced Boeing's reassuring message portraying the aircraft's design as
essentially sound and indicating that a relatively swift fix would alleviate concerns. Boeing
and agency leaders continued to reiterate the notion the Lion Air crash was primarily due to
pilot errors and maintenance lapses, said current and former industry officials, federal
regulators and outside safety experts. After accident investigators issued a preliminary
report, Boeing issued a statement pointing to potential pilot and maintenance lapses in the
document.
Mr. Lawrence, the agency's new certification chief, relied on recommendations from
lower-level staffers who tended to support many of Boeing's positions, agency officials and
safety experts said. He spent minimal time reviewing the directive, one of them said, before
the FAA released it about a week after the Lion Air crash.
Around the same time, more than 20 officials in the FAA's Seattle-area certification office
gathered to hash out responses. They discussed accident assessments, the pilots' apparent
failure to disable MCAS and signs of maintenance lapses. The participants agreed the directive
was a good step while officials learned more about the MCAS.
Before the gathering's conclusion, FAA experts realized the emergency reminder to pilots
"isn't going to be enough" and they needed to prod Boeing to devise a long-term software
solution, the person close to the deliberations said. Boeing, which had independently come to
the same conclusion, got to work.
At FAA headquarters, Mr. Lawrence and his lieutenants felt comfortable they had alleviated
the short-term danger. Agency personnel understood the emergency directive wouldn't eliminate
the risk of another accident, according to an FAA official involved in the deliberations, but
they believed that it would reduce the danger enough that the planes could safely keep flying
while Boeing came up with a permanent fix.
One European pilot-union leader recalls getting into a shouting match with a Boeing official
about the extensive use of test pilots in simulators after the Lion Air crash. During a break
in a meeting to update the region's aviators and MAX operators about the status of the software
fix, the union official maintained that test pilots in simulators couldn't be viewed as
reliable stand-ins for airline pilots flying planes. The Boeing technical expert, he said,
maintained just as strongly that the industry had followed that course for decades, leading to
recent record low accident rates.
Boeing encouraged FAA personnel to call the planned software fix an "enhancement." Senior
agency officials publicly and privately echoed the same line, and dissected crew errors rather
than Boeing's design shortcomings.
At the FAA's working levels, though, there was some frustration at Boeing's stance. At one
meeting between FAA officials and Boeing personnel not long after the Lion Air crash, the
person familiar with the agency's response said, officials were surprised at Boeing's emphasis
on language.
"Don't call it a fix," this person recalls a Boeing official saying. "These are
enhancements."
"Call it whatever you want," an FAA official snapped, saying the most pressing issue was
shoring up MCAS, not quibbling over how to describe it.
By mid-February, the FAA's decision to forego a more forceful response appeared to be paying
off. Agency officials were weeks from approving a new version of the MAX software, said the FAA
official close to the deliberations.
Then Ethiopian Flight 302 plowed into a field near Addis Ababa, killing all 157 on board.
The FAA began conducting a fresh risk analysis, seeking to quantify the likelihood of a third
such emergency.
Amid signs the MCAS system was central to the second crash, governments around the world
ordered fleets grounded. The FAA maintained publicly that the specifics were too unclear to
merit such decisive action. Two days after the crash, FAA engineers and managers in the Seattle
area concluded immediate grounding was the only option, said people familiar with the
details.
"Why is this airplane still flying?" one FAA engineer asked at a meeting, said a person
familiar with the gathering. The recommendation was waiting for Mr. Lawrence when he walked
into the office March 13, three days after the crash.
Canadian regulators handed over refined satellite-tracking charts that revealed similarities
between the two MAX crashes. On March 13, the FAA pulled the trigger on a grounding order.
The FAA's decision came after every major aviation country already had deemed the MAX
unsafe. "We have said all along that we are a data-driven organization," the FAA's Mr. Elwell
told reporters. "The data coalesced today and we made the call."
I don't know if this was mentioned in the 737Max threads: The NYTimes Magazine of Oct. 13
carried a letter, in response to the Langewiesche article, which appeared earlier in the
Times Magazine and was discussed at MOA. The letter was by Capt. Chesley (Sully) Sullenberger
who captured everyone's imagination landing safely in the Hudson River. He cuts Langewiesche
to pieces.
Langewiesche minimizes the design flaws and certification failures that precipitated
those tragedies, and still pose a threat to the flying public.
Inadequate pilot training and experience do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the
[MCAS] that was a death trap. The MCAS design should never have been approved -- not
by Boeing, and not by the FAA.
We need to fix all the flaws in the current system -- corporate governance, regulatory
oversight, aircraft maintenance and, yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we
ensure the safety of everyone who flies.
"... A newly found structural defect on older 737 NG planes, the predecessor of the 737 MAX, will ground a significant number of those planes. ..."
"... There are new damning revelations about the 737 MAX development process that have led to two deadly accidents. The Southwest pilot associated is suing Boeing for making false statements. A whistleblower asserts that Boeing left out safety features because of their costs. A Joint Authorities Technical Review will make it more difficult for Boeing to 'upgrade' older airplane types. ..."
"... The FAA has issued an Air Worthiness Directive (AD) for high time Boeing 737 NGs, requiring immediate inspections for cracks in their wing attachments called pickle forks. ..."
"... The results of the first week of inspections are 5% of the inspected aircraft have cracks with the lowest flight cycle aircraft with cracks at 23,600 flights. ..."
"... "Boeing made a calculated decision to rush a re-engined aircraft to market to secure its single-aisle market share and prioritize its bottom line," the introduction to the suit states. "In doing so, Boeing abandoned sound design and engineering practices, withheld safety critical information from regulators and deliberately mislead its customers, pilots and the public. ..."
"... 7. Boeing's false representations, made directly to SWAPA, caused SWAPA to agree, despite its initial reluctance, to include the 737 MAX as a term in its collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with Southwest. The aircraft's grounding is now causing SWAPA pilots to lose millions of dollars each month because the 737 MAX was removed from Southwest's flight schedule, and from SWAPA pilots' paychecks as well. ..."
"... The ethics charge, filed by 33-year-old engineer Curtis Ewbank, whose job involved studying past crashes and using that information to make new planes safer, describes how around 2014 his group presented to managers and senior executives a proposal to add various safety upgrades to the MAX. ..."
"... The proposed but rejected changes would have prevented false cockpit alarms. The point is crucial because the Angle-of-Attack sensor failures that caused both 737 MAX accidents led to a number of confusing alarms which made it difficult for the pilots to diagnose the problem. It has since been revealed that Boeing had received exceptions from current regulatory rules that demand a better alarming system: ..."
"... The precipitous fall of manufacturing in the USA is simply apalling. If it isn't lead in the water then it must be Chicago School economic criminals. I was astounded at manufacturing in Finland and they appear to have sustained their impetus for constant improvement. ..."
"... I wonder just how much % of US GDP is comprised of parasitic financial engineering. Going by healthcare costs versus other countries: At least half. ..."
"... The big problem here is that the Ethiopian crash happened after the existence of MCAS was revealed, and the FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive about how to deal with it, which was to make sure to use those trim-cutout switches...as stated in the checklist for ordinary runaway trim. ..."
"... Well that turned out to be insane...because the Ethiopian crew did just that, and crashed anyway. It was simply impossible to recover that airplane at that low a height when the MCAS nosed it over. It was a death sentence. ..."
Two weeks ago the National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) released a 13 pages long recommendation
(pdf) resulting from its investigation into the 737 MAX incidents. Since we
dicussed that damning report more bad news for Boeing has come out.
Boeing's general business is not doing well.
A newly found structural defect on older 737 NG planes, the predecessor of the 737 MAX,
will ground a significant number of those planes.
There are new damning revelations about the 737 MAX development process that have led to
two deadly accidents. The Southwest pilot associated is suing Boeing for making false
statements. A whistleblower asserts that Boeing left out safety features because of their
costs. A Joint Authorities Technical Review will make it more difficult for Boeing to
'upgrade' older airplane types.
There are further delays in the MAX return into the air.
The MAX is grounded, the 787 is being investigated for quality issues and has major engine
problems, the 777-X is even further delayed with engine problems, and the KC-46 is failing to
meet needs and currently restricted from carrying passengers and cargo. Now, the prior
generation 737NG is developing serious premature failure of structural components that should
last the lifetime of the aircraft, and could result in an additional financial drain. We've
been looking for good news about Boeing, but simply can't find any.
An order for 22 of Boeing's 787 Dreamliner
was canceled . Without new orders the two production lines for the 787 will need only 40
more months to finish the outstanding orders. That is a relative short backlog for a large
passenger jet production line. Boeing needs a new mid-range product but has little time to work
on it.
Boeing's net order tally, including cancellations, was a negative 84 for the first nine
months of 2019, also hit by the bankruptcy of India's Jet Airways, which resulted in Boeing
removing 210 aircraft from its order backlog.
During the conversion of a 737 NG passenger jet into a freighter plane Boeing found serious
defects on a structural component that was supposed to have a longer lifetime than the
plane. Boeing notified the FAA:
The FAA has issued an Air Worthiness Directive (AD) for high time Boeing 737 NGs, requiring
immediate inspections for cracks in their wing attachments called pickle forks.
The cracks were discovered on high time aircraft which were torn down for conversion to
freighters. The affected 737 types are NG only; the MAX and Classic have a different wing
attachment design.
...
The issued AD affects Boeing 737 NG aircraft with over 22,600 flight cycles (flights). These
shall be inspected within one year. For aircraft with more than 30,000 flight cycles, the
inspection shall be completed within one week from the effective date of the AD.
The central wingbox is the structure where the wings are attached to the planes body.
The planes are supposed to make up to 90,000 flights throughout their life without such
structural damages. The first inspection round showed that the
problem is systematic and serious:
The results of the first week of inspections are 5% of the inspected aircraft have cracks
with the lowest flight cycle aircraft with cracks at 23,600 flights.
Each plane will take three weeks to repair. But the supply of replacement parts for the
cracked component is limited and it may take longer to produce new ones.
It is not clear yet what causes the cracks in the forged aluminum part. Many older NG were
retrofitted with winglets on the tips of their wings. These may have led to unforeseen loads or
vibrations. It is possible that some of the younger 737 NG airplanes have a similar
problem.
This is bad news for those airlines that exclusively fly Boeing 737 planes. Not only are
their new 737 MAX planes grounded but a significant share of their older 737 NG fleets will
also come off the flight line and will require lengthy repairs.
Southwest Airlines Pilots Association has
sued Boeing over its 737 MAX design:
"Boeing made a calculated decision to rush a re-engined aircraft to market to secure its
single-aisle market share and prioritize its bottom line," the introduction to the suit
states. "In doing so, Boeing abandoned sound design and engineering practices, withheld
safety critical information from regulators and deliberately mislead its customers, pilots
and the public.
"Boeing's misrepresentations caused SWAPA to believe that the 737 MAX aircraft was safe,"
the suit goes on, then adds starkly: "Those representations proved to be false."
120. The risk profile and required risk assessment of the second iteration of MCAS was
completely different from the first, and yet Boeing neither assessed that increased risk nor
even attempted to mitigate it. Instead, Boeing used its ODA authority to hide this
information.
This is a point we made several times in our writings about the MAX. Boeing has claimed that
an MCAS failure was a 'runaway stabilizer' incident for which no extra training was needed. The
Southwest pilots disagree:
229. An MCAS failure is not like a runaway stabilizer. A runaway stabilizer has continuous
un-commanded movement of the tail, whereas MCAS is not continuous and pilots (theoretically)
can counter the nose-down movement, after which MCAS would move the aircraft tail down again.
SWAPA is suing Boeing because the assertions it made about the 737 MAX were directly
relevant for the union's negotiations with Southwest:
7. Boeing's false representations, made directly to SWAPA, caused SWAPA to agree, despite its
initial reluctance, to include the 737 MAX as a term in its collective bargaining agreement
("CBA") with Southwest. The aircraft's grounding is now causing SWAPA pilots to lose millions
of dollars each month because the 737 MAX was removed from Southwest's flight schedule, and
from SWAPA pilots' paychecks as well.
It will cost Boeing some $100 million to settle the suit. That will only be a small part of
the total damage the 737 MAX problems caused the company. But the additional public relation
damage will be significant.
A Boeing engineer has come forward to say that Boeing
rejected safety upgrades because of their costs:
The ethics charge, filed by 33-year-old engineer Curtis Ewbank, whose job involved studying
past crashes and using that information to make new planes safer, describes how around 2014
his group presented to managers and senior executives a proposal to add various safety
upgrades to the MAX.
The complaint, a copy of which was reviewed by The Seattle Times, suggests that one of the
proposed systems could have potentially prevented the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia that
killed 346 people. Three of Ewbank's former colleagues interviewed for this story
concurred.
The proposed but rejected changes would have prevented false cockpit alarms. The point is
crucial because the Angle-of-Attack sensor failures that caused both 737 MAX accidents led to a
number of confusing alarms which made it difficult for the pilots to diagnose the problem. It
has since been revealed that Boeing had
received exceptions from current regulatory rules that demand a better alarming system:
In 2014, Boeing convinced the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to relax the safety
standards for the new 737 MAX related to cockpit alerts that would warn pilots if something
went wrong during flight, according to documents reviewed by the Seattle Times.
Seeking an exception, Boeing relied on a special FAA rule to successfully argue that full
compliance with the latest federal requirements would be "impractical" for the MAX and would
cost too much.
...
The Seattle Times reviewed the relevant parts of the document that Boeing submitted to the
FAA to win its exception. They show the federal regulator struck out four separate clauses
that would be requirements for any new jet being produced today. This meant Boeing avoided
having to design a complete upgrade of the 737's aging flight-crew-alerting system.
...
On the Ethiopian Airlines flight that crashed in March, the pilots faced a barrage of alerts
throughout the six-minute flight. Besides the stick-shaker, they heard repeated loud "DON'T
SINK" warnings that the jet was too close to the ground; a "clacker" making a very loud
clicking sound to signal the jet was going too fast; and multiple warning lights telling the
crew the speed, altitude and other readings on their instruments were unreliable.
The use of old certification standards when updating a plane is a major point of criticism
raised by a new report :
The Federal Aviation Administration, which approved the design of the jet in 2017, dropped
the ball on many fronts, the Joint Authorities Technical Review found. A 69-page summary of
the findings also said the panel found evidence that Boeing exerted "undue pressures" on some
of its own employees who had FAA authority to approve design changes.
The JATR
report is damning for both, Boeing and the FAA. It describes all the known failures and
makes 12 recommendations that will change the way how old plane types can be 'upgraded' into a
new version. FAA exceptions like the ones above will no longer be possible:
Changed Product Rules (..) and associated guidance (..) should be revised to require a
top-down approach whereby every change is evaluated from an integrated whole aircraft system
perspective. These revisions should include criteria for determining when core attributes of
an existing transport category aircraft design make it incapable of supporting the safety
advancements introduced by the latest regulations and should drive a design change or a need
for a new type certificate. The aircraft system includes the aircraft itself with all its
subsystems, the flight crew, and the maintenance crew.
If implemented the recommendation will make another 737 MAX impossible. A future upgrade of
an old plane type will have to conform with the current regulation to a much larger extent and
can no longer rely on the old rules to which it was originally designed. If this gets applied
to the currently grounded 737 MAX, which may be possible, the plane will never fly again.
Current Boeing plans to upgrade its 777 with new wings and engines might also be in trouble.
Thoughts about upgrading the 767 will have to be put aside.
Other JATR recommendations criticize the FAA's delegation system that allowed Boeing
engineers to self-certify some design changes. Other points are the general lack of human
factor analysis and problems with evaluating pilot training necessities.
A few observations in the JATR report will have some engineers shake their heads. This lack
of functionality in Boeing's engineering simulator is, for example, inexcusable:
Observation O3.13-A: During evaluation in the Boeing engineering simulator (E-Cab), the JATR
team observed that the device does not incorporate control loading on the manual stabilizer
trim wheel. As a result, control forces on the manual stabilizer trim wheel are not
representative of the aircraft.
The manual trim is required to bring the plane back into normal flight after the electric
trim or MCAS failed. That is currently not always possible because the aerodynamic forces in
certain situations
are too great to be overcome with the manual wheel. The European regulator noted that as a
major problem that Boeing has to rectify. That Boeing was not even able to simulate this is
mind boggling.
It is also damning for Boeing and the FAA that the report's authors had to include this
eternal engineering truth:
[I]n the hierarchy of safety solutions, mitigation by design should be prioritized over
warnings and training/procedures.
This
comment from a pilot forum is also very relevant:
Finding F3.5-C The JATR team considers that the STS/MCAS and EFS functions could be
considered as stall identification systems or stall protection systems, depending on the
natural (unaugmented) stall characteristics of the aircraft. From its data review, the JATR
team was unable to completely rule out the possibility that these augmentation systems
function as a stall protection system.
(my emphasis)
In my words, it seems unclear to this day, whether the MAX is sufficiently aerodynamically
stable in pitch or not. Whether the MAX requires a full blown stall envelope protection
including all the mandatory redundancy, or not, may decide the fate of her certification.
As a consequence of all the above some industry analysts have called
for
the firing of the CEO and of long term board members of Boeing.
Yesterday the Boeing board took the first step and
demoted its chairman and CEO:
With pressure mounting on the Boeing board and increased public concern about a need to
revamp the company's safety culture, the board on Friday took away Dennis Muilenburg's role
as company chairman, separating that position from his chief executive role.
Muilenburg will remain CEO and president, and will stay on the board of directors, while
lead director David Calhoun was elected to replace him as chairman.
It is generally assumed that Muilenburg will be fired as CEO as soon as the MAX disaster is
over.
This will still take several months.
While the new MCAS software is
allegedly ready to be cerified there are still many open points that international
certification authorities have asked Boeing to rectify. The European regulator wants
more testing to be done to the changes to the Flight Control Computers:
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency recently told senior U.S. regulators it wasn't
satisfied that FAA and Boeing officials had adequately demonstrated the safety of
reconfigured MAX flight-control computers, according to people briefed on the discussions.
The aim is to add redundancy by having both computers work simultaneously to eliminate
hazards stemming from possible chip malfunctions identified months ago; over decades, and on
previous versions of the 737, only one computer at a time has fed data to automated systems,
alternating between flights. The concerns were passed on by EASA chief Patrick Ky to Ali
Bahrami, the FAA's top safety official, one of the people said.
...
Boeing and the FAA are finishing testing the dual-computer system, and the final results
haven't been presented to EASA or other regulators. EASA has signaled, though, that it wants
additional risk scenarios examined beyond those in the current testing plan, this person
said.
...
Boeing engineers are frustrated EASA hasn't specified what additional measures might allay
its objections, according to people close to the discussions.
The last paragraph is astonishing. It is not the task of a regulator to tell Boeing
engineers how to solve their problems. The regulators set the rules and check if a
manufacturer's engineering solutions comply with those.
That Boeing still does not get that and is looking for easy ways out of its problems shows
that the company has yet to learn its lesson.
---
Previous Moon of Alabama posts on Boeing 737 MAX issues:
Thanks for the ongoing coverage of the human life lost because profit b
I read on Reuters this past week that Boeing is in negotiation to purchase Embraer from
Brazil who makes smaller airplanes. I con only conjecture that Boeing's ongoing
financialization intentions would be to drive that company into the ground like they are
doing with Boeing.
How come none of the leadership of Boeing is in jail facing murder charges?
As soon as Boeing's top management understood what they were looking at they didn't like
it.
Another company had produced a paragon of an airplane and they had nothing to match it.
And so Boeing decided they had to do as much harm to that airplane's chances as they could
-- most of all, to stop any American airline from buying it.
The company was Bombardier, based in Canada. The airplane was the Bombardier C Series, a
single-aisle jet that, in several versions, could seat between 100 and 150 passengers.
...
Boeing's formidable Washington lobbying machine swung into action. Dennis Muilenburg, the
Boeing CEO, had already cozied-up to Trump by agreeing to cut the costs of the future Air
Force One jets. In September 2017, the Commerce Department announced a killing blow to
Bombardier, imposing a 300 percent duty on every C Series sold in the US.
...
But on Oct. 16, 2017, to the amazement of the whole aerospace industry, Airbus announced it
was taking a 51 percent stake -- not in Bombardier itself but in the C Series program.
Without any down payment.
In one stroke Airbus had changed the future of the airline industry. And out-gamed
Boeing.
...
To ram home just how much Airbus was now able to out-game Boeing, they said they would
build a final assembly line for the C Series in Alabama for those sold to American
airlines, thereby removing the vulnerability to tariffs. (Many components of the jet were,
in any case, made in America, in addition to the engines.)
Thanks for the follow up b. Since I send you a check yearly you know that Bombardier is my
last name but along with that I am 7 generations removed from the linage that started the
Bombardier company.
I like to think I have inherited some of the creativity of the founder and met his son and
daughter in the mid 1980's. As an occasional sailor and cross country skier I detest the
noise of the Seadoo and Skidoo but they have a fairly good reputation still from what I hear
and read. Due to their international popularity they have conditioned me and others in my
family to change the pronunciation of our last name to the French manner.....grin
As the Clive Irving / The Daily Beast article that B linked to @ 3 illustrates, a culture
that prizes short-term profits and cost-cutting, and which denigrates innovation, risk-taking
and pride in providing a consistent standard of engineering excellence and safety, is
dominant at Boeing. Sacking Dennis Muilenberg and a few other Board Directors will do very
little to change that culture. The entire organisational structure needs examining and
change. Even the shareholder ownership and how that is structured should be investigated and
reformed.
Moving Boeing's headquarters back to Seattle to be close to where most engineers and
technical support work, and where most of the manufacture of the planes is located, away from
the influence of neoliberal ideology emanating from hired brainwashed University of Chicago
graduates, would be a start.
b. you mention Southwest, which has been Boeing's most loyal customer for almost five
decades. It was the first airline to use one make and model of aircraft exclusively –
the Boeing 737. Boeing used Southwest to carry out tests on new aircraft and the Southwest
fleet was always serviced by Boeing. In some respects its history mirrors that of Boeing, in
other ways it doesn't.
From its origins in the early 1970s Southwest seemed to defy business logic. It was the
only airline that constantly produced expected returns for Wall Street and at one point its
market capitalization was higher than those of its far larger competitors, such as Delta. But
it has a strong union and was always one of the companies in the US people most wanted to
work for. It's founder and CEO, Herb Kelleher, is a most remarkable fellow. He brought in a
completely new ethic of employees first just when in the late 1970s neoliberalism began to do
the exact opposite and Jack Welch began to slash jobs at GE, bringing in a top down,
management consultant-run, macho culture. At Southwest decision-making was devolved down to
the customer-facing employee and assigning blame was strictly forbidden. A sense of fun at
work was explicitly encouraged including dressing up and acting plain daft. For a few days a
year roles would be switched around, so pilots worked as cabin crew, cabin crew as gate
staff, etc. Even Herb himself pitched in when a plane was late. So news began to spread about
how this airline went out of its way for both its staff and passengers. And, of course, staff
would reciprocate by going out of their way for the airline. And tickets were really cheap
due to fast turnarounds.
Other companies came to study Southwest. Even the dreaded Irish company Ryanair went to
Texas. But none of them could replicate what Herb called "the emotional intelligence." And
lets not forget the remarkable COO Coleen Brennan. When a cabin crew member was failing to
perform to his usual standards she discovered he had just had a very costly divorce and owed
$18,000 in lawyer's fees. Coleen wrote him a check for that sum from her own bank
account.
Then Herb retired in 2005 and Southwest appears to have followed all the rest, including
Boeing. Just one small example but highly indicative. A few years after Herb left they forced
a young woman off a plane because her skirt was too short. In Herb's day this would have been
inconceivable. Far more likely would have been someone announcing in a joking tone: "We have
to warn you all. There's a passenger with a very short skirt so whatever you do don't
look!"
@Lochearn #10
I do wonder how the 737 MAX's troubles impact Southwest Airlines.
SWA pretty much is fully 737.
This article from 2016 talks about SWA and Lion Air being the 2 largest customers for the
737 MAX, and that SWA was postponing some of its previous committed order even back then.
Note that Lion Air was one of the 737 MAX crashes...
The slow-motion collapse of Boeing is due to the extraction of wealth from businesses and the
middle class to financiers in the West. Boeing was the last American major manufacturing
industry. No more. What is astonishing is the avoidance of looking at the reasons why except
here at MofA. The collapse is visible from PG&E shutting off electricity to 2 million
people in California to Boris Johnson's Halloween. As far as I can tell, the desert
approaches to Aramco's oil facilities are still defenseless. If the Saudis don't make peace
with the Houthis, a global economic crash will result from the resumptions of missile attacks
and the cutoff of oil from Saudi Arabia. But there has been no movement towards peace,
re-instituting the rule of law, and jailing corporate criminals for manslaughter. Instead a
Coup is underway to remove an elected President
"That Boeing was not even able to simulate this is mind boggling."
This is "mind-boggling" only to a mind that is missing vital data. To wit: It was known
that any use of the simulator to mimic physical demands required by a pilot to handle the
trim-wheel to correct a situation would, of necessity, demonstrate pilot failure to handle
situation. Such a demonstration would preclude issue FAA "air worthiness" certification.
Therefore, the simulator must not be upgraded to use the known factors of physical
demands. If the physical demands were demonstrated, there would be actual records of pilot
failures that could not be suppressed from regulatory exposure and resulting Boeing liability
and exposure of the fraud. [Likewise, simulation tests were not conducted including full
interaction of MCAS program with single or multiple false AOA signals.]
As it was, there was no record of actual failures prior to the crashes, that could not be
handled by Public Relations confusion, intimidation, bribery, etc. [with emphasis on the
"etc".]
The takeover of America by corporations has been accomplished, and their legal enforcer is
the American government whose decision makers are real persons under control by said
corporations [including trusts and foundations and other ersatz, fake, legal
constructions].
That is what Mussolini meant by defining Fascism as merger of gov and corporations [which
is only a handy English translation of his actual language]. And that is why he chose the
symbol of the fasces. The fasces symbolized the power to judge, punish and kill that was
vested in the Roman magistrate displaying the symbol.
Corporations [etc.] rule. Government is their legal enforcer.
[Why corporations, etc.? Because corporations are immortal; persons die.]
Aren't the Iranians lucky that US embargoed the sale of these US aircrafts to Iran. Who new
Trump was a Divine Intervention. By trumpeting sanctions against Iran, US saved the lives of
Iranian passengers and undermined the Boeing's bottom line. Strange how the Rota Fortunae
turns.
So Boeing finally ends Chair of the Board-CEO duality by demoting Muilenburg to CEO only.
This comes 17 years after the Sarbanes-Oxley act that, although it failed to mandate an
independent Chair (even though that's considered obvious best practice in much of the world,
including the UK), at least led many well-governed firms to give up on duality a decade or
more ago.
But then Boeing hands the Board Chair role to... Dave Calhoun, who (a) is on the board to
represent Blackstone, the squeeze-for-cash private equity fund that has played quite a role
in putting Boeing into its investment tailspin, and (b) has been on the board since before
the MAX debacle started (whereas Muilenburg can at least claim he was selling inflated weapon
systems while the MAX was being designed).
If you own Boeing shares, the writing is on the wall: Sell before Blackstone itself, or
some of the other PE vultures, either debt-load Boeing while stripping the cash or outright
start to short the stock and take the whole company down on the back of employees, clients
and ordinary shareholders.
The silver lining is that a Boeing collapse may be all the better, as far as aviation
safety and progress are concerned.
Your point about the coup against Trump brings us back to last night's quite heated
discussion which some of us I think want to avoid – it's a bit like the late Roman
emperors. It's what happens when as in the legend of Ouroborus the serpent that begins to eat
its own tail ie. eat up all its companies through private equity. Is Trump this or that
hardly matters except maybe to postpone the Iran thing.
And in another mind-boggling feat of glossing over incompetence and conflicts of interest:
'SWAPA's lawsuit mentions that in July 2016, Boeing's 737 chief technical pilot, Mark
Forkner, invited Southwest pilots to participate in training for the differences between the
737 MAX and the previous 737 model already in the airline's fleet.
"Boeing's differences training did not include instructions on MCAS and at no point during
Boeing's presentation did Boeing disclose the existence of MCAS or its associated risks," the
complaint states. During the certification of the MAX, it was Forkner who suggested to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) in an email that MCAS not be included in the pilot manual.
Forkner left Boeing in 2018 and is now a first officer with Southwest Airlines. Last
month, The Seattle Times reported that Forkner has refused to provide documents sought by
federal prosecutors investigating the crashes, citing his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.'
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/in-scathing-lawsuit-southwest-pilots-union-says-boeing-737-max-was-unsafe/
That should make an interesting atmosphere in that Southwest cockpit...
From b's article - "EASA has signaled, though, that it wants additional risk scenarios
examined beyond those in the current testing plan, this person said.
...
Boeing engineers are frustrated EASA hasn't specified what additional measures might allay
its objections, according to people close to the discussions."
I cannot access the full WSJ article without subscribing, but going on the section quoted,
unless EASA has stated the risk scenarios that need examining, the section quoted reads like
the Europeans are squeezing Boeing out.
Once denial no longer works, the predictable, and false, refrain will be 'we' can't compete.
My wish is that there is a pushback that drives home the real reason for the decline - the
Financial Industrial Complex and Private Equity pirates, who have busted out once great
companies like Boeing, with bad money driving out good people.
..."Seeking an exception, Boeing relied on a special FAA rule to successfully argue that full
compliance with the latest federal requirements would be "impractical" for the MAX and would
cost too much."...
Financialized criminals in action. All criminals seek exception to the rule, and bend,
twist, contort reality to suit themselves. How any one in authority, and knowledge that are
still working for this zombie company, sleep at night! Well I guess when your monetary bed is
feathered by crooked individuals you tend not to notice your involvement. Why is no one in
jail? Ya, that's right, capitalism in action. Nothing is criminal except smoking a joint!
As for "corporations [including trusts and foundations and other ersatz, fake, legal
constructions]"...
Note the relevance of National Security.There are some 3-letter .gov agencies that operate
globally and utterly covertly.
Now understand that MCAS is a software program that spreads beyond America; in fact, it is
precisely as global as the sale of 737MAX. And the 737MAX was deliberately marketed as a
global best-seller
MCAS is uniquely accessible and controlled by American entities.
Who or what could resist using such for their own quiet purposes? Including a one-off
tweak, now and then, on another player on the grand chessboard? It would be so easy; and
evidence-free like a disappearing ice-bullet.
Any corporate managers standing in the way could be easily brought under control by just
smooth, patriotic-talk with only a hint of consequence for not being reasonable... or if that
was too vague, more cooperative.
Anyone can understand the merger of corporations and .gov is a 2-way communication or deal
or enterprise or path to riches or, in the most resistive case, an existential event?
Boeing is just another Corporate America criminal company, not first and not the last one, it
places profits above all other possible values, as human lives, ethics, moral and safety.
This is a corruption that is deep inside Corporate America, I know from inside one large
Corporation, I opted out for not agreeing with their MO.
In a normal and fair world, which we do not have, Boeing's leadership should be in jail now
for intentional murder against hundreds of civilians in two 737MAX accidents, it only
happened due to Boeing short cuts and bribery to FAA, this is intentional murder.
On top of that 737MAX was just one of many failed projects with short cuts, and the world is
now only realizing the big issue it has on its hands, with possibly thousands of planes
risking millions of people's lives every day.
Still, I do not think nothing will happen to Boeing, may a huge financial loss for few years,
but nothing will change, it runs deep in Corporate America and it is linked to US MIC famous
corruption.
Americans are taking too long to take their lives back on track, maybe too much fluorine in
the water is removing the will to fight back these freaks in power.
Not only Boing but also the FAA has been found to be lacking (negligent and
incompitent).
I would say this is an prime example of us oligarchy- a result of neoliberal policy where
private industry is expected to assume role of government (regulation and oversight) but then
cuts corners to save money and then is indifferent to the impact on the public because after
all who is there to appeal to.
Anyway fortunately US is out of commercial aircraft business for near future. Well except
arms will be twisted.
All the evidence points that Marx's theory is correct: capitalism is a historically specific
system with an expiring date. This "expiring date" is determined, mainly, by the system's
tendency of the profit rate to fall. I've already called it here the moment the first post
about this Boeing debacle begun.
That means the "financialisation" -- as is being preached by the keynesians and their
admirers (e.g. MMTers) -- is false: capitalism can never be predominantly financial. The
proletarian class has never been
bigger as a proportion to the world's population . The difference is that, nowadays, it
is the middle classes of the First World countries who dominate the production of opinion on
the internet, so, from their point of view, the world is indeed "dematerialised" or
"financialised". That's empirically false.
The capitalists seek to go financial when the profits from their industry has been
depressed to the point they either can't keep up with competition or straight up loss or
stagnation. They then begin to gamble on future gains in order to prop up, at least on their
books, their profit rates. That's exactly the case with Boeing.
They go financial -- and not expand or modernize their manufacturing -- because profit is
the exploitation over investment differential: if you invest more, you exploit more, but you
spend more. Marx's law demonstrates the proportion of the rise in investment over rise of
exploitation is secularly crescent, hence, sooner or later, capital resorts to absolute
exploitation (i.e. freeze/lower wages, firing workers, longer daily workdays) to try to slow
down its own decline. Finance doesn't need huge investments because the profit is fictitious,
so it also intensifies.
Therefore, Boeing is not doing all this because it is greedy, but because they are
desperate.
And it looks like they are not alone: Apple -- whose financial department is already so
huge it would be the third largest hedge fund if independent -- has launched a worst version
of its smartphone for an exorbitant price (luxury markets also slow down the downfall of
profit rate) and is launching its own monetary system (Apple card); Facebook is launching its
own cryptocurrency.
@Lochearn
Your celebration of the positive aspects of Southwest is well said. However, it also needs to
be said: Herb Kelleher has blood on his hands. Lots of blood... here is the story...
In the 1980's, Southwest was just getting started with flights between Dallas, San Antonio,
and Houston. At that time, the Texas government conducted a study to determine if high-speed
rail between the three cities was a good idea. Before the final positive recommendation was
released, Kelleher the killer stepped in and bought off the participants, as high-speed rail
would deliver service at half of Southwest's price. This would destroy Southwest and leave
Kelleher in millions of dollars of debt. After Kelleher bribed the government, the final
report effectively killed the high-speed rail option. As a result, people who don't fly
between these cities are forced to drive. Guess what the carnage has been on the Interstates
connecting these cities...
Kelleher is personally responsible for at least half of it: thousands of human deaths, tens
of thousands of human injuries, tens of thousands of animals, enormous amounts of pollution,
huge property damage, enormous road maintenance costs, catastrophic inability to escape
Houston floods, many hundreds-of-millions of dollars in vehicle damage - shit, I can't go on.
Suffice to say, may Kelleher enjoy his frying in Hell. Good riddance, cunt.
Oh, and about that great Southwest customer service... at some point,
Kelleher-the-dollar-whore must have taken a flight on Piedmont Airlines in the Carolinas
before launching Southwest. He was no genius. He just saw how good an airline could be when
he travelled Piedmont. After Piedmont was bought by USAirways (a catastrophe for frequent
fliers), I suspect all the best Piedmont people went to Southwest - and gave Southwest such a
good reputation. In those days, it was quite obvious who was former Piedmont and who was
USAirways.
Kelleher is one of the most overrated executives in history. He was a drag on the economy of
the entire United States, given what was possible had Texas gone with rail (and given the
damages along the Interstates). Again, I hope he enjoys his sojourn in Hell.
Even with huge resistance by the US, Airbus must be smiling currently.
Boeing was taken over by the greedy capitalists, and they, as usual, put it in the trash for
a few extra bucks.
Microsoft, Boeing, Starbucks. There's a theme here. by: bjd @ 7 <= you can get MBS. out of
this. ?
The collapse is visible from PG&E shutting off electricity to 2 million people in
California to Boris Johnson's Halloween. As far as I can tell, the desert approaches to
Aramco's oil facilities are still defenseless. If the Saudis don't make peace with the
Houthis, a global economic crash will result from the resumptions of missile attacks and the
cutoff of oil from Saudi Arabia. But there has been no movement towards peace, re-instituting
the rule of law, and jailing corporate criminals for manslaughter. Instead a Coup is underway
to remove an elected President by: VietnamVet @ 12
I worked in the fibers industry during the 60s and I watched as money was taken from every
place possible,
technical people were replaced by technicians. (just as is being done today with Nurse
Practitioners and technical school
debt ridden 3 months of schooling grads now man the front lines of Medicine). Its a culture
of don't bother me with safety or making the product work or delivery quality service, and
its a policy endemic to the top brass (the elites as is probably the case at Boeing ).. No
one can be Top Brass in a production environment in the USA culture today unless they fit
into what I call the scum culture (the elite).. The can of worms that brought this about is
wall street and its big daddy corrupt don't care about nobody but me firms. for years I have
said they were intentionally collapsing the manufacturing and technical know how [Americas
were so proud of] during the 50 -70s. It took 800 technical people to start that 1 mile long
316 Stainless steel yarn making plant up.. and to get it running smoothly, when I left 8
years later there were 12 professionals, 400 non-professional technicians running the joint.
The process was sold to the Koreans and the fat cat stockholders live off the royalty.. But
the Koreans got our technology for nothing.
I venture to say, no group of professionals trained in America could today start that process
up.. it involves just about every technical expertise known to mankind. I guess Americans
could hire the Koreans to come show us how to make it work?
So Boeing finally ends Chair of the Board-CEO duality by demoting Muilenburg to CEO only.
This comes 17 years after the Sarbanes-Oxley act that, although it failed to mandate an
independent Chair (even though that's considered obvious best practice in much of the world,
including the UK), at least led many well-governed firms to give up on duality a decade or
more ago. be fx @ 15.. <- no member of the culture can be blamed or punished..
Financialized criminals in action. by Taffyboy @ 22. I think i would opt for the label
organized crime.
Jared at 29 points out that joe @ 8 said Not only Boeing but also the FAA has been found
to be lacking (negligent and incompetent). jared @29 responds a prime example of US oligarchy
<==They scream at every manufacturers meeting to deregulate .. eliminate product liability
law suits . lie under oath at lawsuits layer and defendant alike hide from justice behind
defense its for defense you cannot ask me those questions. nor can you or any court make me
answer them.
Marx's theory is correct vk @30 <= maybe but what's happened to Americans since the USA
became a hot bead of supporters of corporate criminals is not capitalism. its economic
zionism.. take no prisoners, allow no one to compete, destroy everything that cannot be owned
or controlled.. no one but no one is entitled to anything .. except the few. The difference
between capitalism and economic zionism is free for all competition.. supervised by
government and kept free of any thing approaching a monopoly.. vs the government creates the
monopoly powers and gives them to the few so the few can deny all would be competition
copyright, patent, and privatisation, financialization use war, sanctions and whatever to
eliminate all competition.
Therefore, Boeing is not doing all this because it is greedy, but because they are desperate.
Posted by: vk | Oct 12 2019 23:17 utc | 30
I disagree. Boeing spent 40 billions on share buybacks rather than spending part of the
stash on developing new flying platforms. 737 was modified for more than 50 years, and it
seems that in the last decade it exceeded the limitations of the original frame and some
components. I understand that the computer/processor system was incapable of handling MACS as
MACS should be designed, e.g. with proper sensor redundancies and proper user interface --
that requires many input streams, integrating warning into actionable summaries etc. Then
there was a major logical contradiction of the approach: when pilots could not handle the
plane, automatic MACS could take over, but in MACS itself was compromised, say, by faulty
sensors, then the baton would be passed back to the pilot -- so was MACS needed or not? If
needed, passing the control to the pilot would just confuse the blame, if not needed, why it
was introduced? This setup makes some sense on a fighter plane, if the situation is too
confusing, alerted crew can eject, but on a civilian plane...
Another story was that once MACS set the tail flaps wrongly while the plane was on
cruising speed or close to it, reseting would require more force than the wheels rotated by
hand could deliver. This is why the plane (and cars) need hydraulic systems, but something
was wrong with the control of that system.
All of that can be traced to the method of making new planes by cobbling additions to an
old one. For example, a new plane could be designed to be stable, and/or to have sufficiently
powerful computers, hydraulics etc.
From the estimates I have read, developing plane by cobbling additions was something like
2-3 billion and perhaps 2-3 times more if a new platform was developed, so Boeing cut
development costs by about 6 billion. As a result, the stock buy back would be 15% lower and
the stock prices would fly a little less high than they did. To me, it looks like poor
greed.
[I]n the hierarchy of safety solutions, mitigation by design should be prioritized over
warnings and training/procedures.
Actually the design rule is more like:
1) Identity all hazards and degree of risk associated with those
2) Revise the design to eliminate hazards presenting high risk of injury etc.
3) ... [what you said]
So ideally they would design a plane that is fairly easy to fly maybe even self correcting
(by aerodynamic performance not by banks of computers).
If there are good reasons why the plane cannot be made easy to fly even self correcting then
the next step would be train the pilots - simply something like this think has a tendency to
want to nose up when you are heavy on the throttle, if you experience this you should monitor
for approach stall conditions and consider less throttle or counter with elevator (sorry know
nothing about flying other than avoid ground contact).
But they didn't want to train instead they fabricated a mousetrap that was in itself a
hazrd.
b's continuing story of Boeing is a morality tale. Beautifully written and very simple.
It is a story that shows how utopian is the belief that capitalism can be regulated.
It cannot be.
You can try: legislatures may huff and puff, reformers may reform but inevitably capitalism
shakes off regulation like a retriever jumping out of a lake.
The entire system is rotten. The only regulatory mechanisms that capitalists will accept are
those imposed by the marketplace-the only legislature that they respect. But as Boeing so
graphically demonstrates the marketplace leads to monopoly, which brooks no regulation,
except those which it imposes.
If the marketplace were working, according to the fairy tales economists tell, there would
not be a Boeing left in the sky. The company would be out of business and half of Congress,
the Federal Regulators, the owners of the media and every economist of the Chicago school
would be in jail awaiting execution.
It is one of the bitter ironies of the story that among those killed in the Ethiopian crash
was one of Ralph Nader's close relatives.
Another story worth following is the GM strike and the whole story of current UAW
negotiations the immediate context of which includes the massive transfer of money from the
car companies to Union officials. The entire system is corrupt.
There are only two alternatives: living with the barbarism or replacing it with socialism.
All the rest is gossip.
Does anybody think that these manifestations are typical of inherent systemic flaws in the
corporate governmental structures coupled with behavioral abnormalities of individuals and
groups of individuals involved in their operation and administration? Does anybody think that
similar examples could be found in and throughout other industries that are governed and
operated in the same way? Service industries? Medical? Pharmaceutical? Food production?
Transportation? Automotive? Governmental? Military? Is this a tip of the iceberg sort of
thing?
@ Josh who wrote
"
Does anybody think that similar examples could be found in and throughout other industries
that are governed and operated in the same way? Service industries? Medical? Pharmaceutical?
Food production? Transportation? Automotive? Governmental? Military? Is this a tip of the
iceberg sort of thing?
"
Yes, the financialization meme permeates all services and industries, IMO
Examples from my own life are my healing of a Traumatic Brain Injury by
neurofeedback/neuromodulation techniques that operate under a totally different paradigm than
the current talk/drug based mental health system
Also I am now using for pain management a photobiomodulation unit (made in America) called
a Medlight 630 PRO which represents disintermediation of the existing Big Pharma drug system
and so is not supported by insurance in spite of being used successfully by NASA and the
military speciality fighting units.....instead we have the opioid crisis.
Advances are not allowed because they would make some folks lose their lock on the money
machine temporarily if not permanently.
I will just add here that it's incredible that Boeing tried to pass of the MCAS as the
same thing as 'runaway trim'...
Now just by way of explanation for those who may be unfamiliar with basic airmanship, the
'trim' of the horizontal stabilizer [its physical angle] on any airplane is what is used to
cancel out any pressure on the control stick, either forward or back...
Flying at different speeds the airplane requires differing amounts of downforce from the
tailplane...the purpose of which downforce is to balance the lift created by the wing, which
tends to want to pitch the airplane nose down...therefore a downforce on the tail is require
to teeter the nose back up and keep the airplane in balance...
In an airplane capable of flying at speeds from about 100 mph to 500 mph, this is not an
easy problem and requires a quite elaborate mechanical or electronic control system, or some
kind of hybrid...the point being to adjust the tailplane [aka horizontal stabilizer] for a
neutral feel in the control stick at any speed in the flight envelope...that's called the
trimmed condition.
In any case, problems with the trim can happen which will cause the tailplane to 'run
away' from its desired neutral position...this could be due to an electrical fault in the
system, since the tailplane trim [the angle at which it is set] is driven by an electric
motor...
Or, importantly, it can be caused by aerodynamic forces, in which case it's an aerodynamic
runaway...[the trim system has dual friction brakes, but those can fail]
Now here is why pilots are so gobsmacked by Boeing's chicanery...before MCAS there were
two contact-type switches in the bottom of the control stick...when pulling back on the
stick, that switch would open and cut electrical power to the trim...
So if it was an electrical runaway simply holding the stick stationary [as per the
checklist] would bring that contact switch into play as the trim noses the airplane
down...
With MCAS that switch at the base of the stick was disabled...
Now the pilot thinks it's an aerodynamic runaway...at which point you don't want to pull
back on the stick because it will only aggravate the situation...the force caused by the
elevator 'flap' moving up [stick back] causes the nose of the tailplane to go up even more
[it acts as a trim tab]... forcing the airplane into a steeper dive...
Now here is the key...if you have an aerodynamic runaway, you want to use the TRIM
SWITCHES on the stick to trim opposite to the runaway...
If you cut the power, you may not be able to stop the aerodynamic runaway with your bare
hands on those trim wheels...and if the plane gets all the way nose down, you're never going
to budge those wheels...
The Ethiopian flight data recorder shows the pilots had exactly this situation...in
desperation they turned the electrical cutout switches back on to trim with the stick
switches... BUT, that only turned the MCAS back on again and nosed the plane down even
more...
So it is incredible that Boeing was allowed by the FAA to at first even hide the existence
of MCAS...and then later, after the first crash, to say just handle it like any runaway
trim...
That's at the heart of the southwest pilots lawsuit...this is complete bullshit...
Another aspect of this is why isn't Trump firing the Transportation Secretary...and why
hasn't the secretary fired his FAA chief...?
My prediction...nothing will be fixed properly...because it can't... THERE IS NO
FIX
The MAX is a flying coffin due to the instability caused by those big new engines, which
needs some kind of bandaid fix...and as crazy as it may sound, I expect Boeing will push
through and get that deathtrap into the air again...
Folks, take your chances with this airplane at your own risk...
PS...and now we have the structural problems which is due to metal fatigue...this happened
because the 737 is now twice its original weight and it is again practically impossible to
just continue patching things up...and this applies to the NG as well...
Anyone venture to guess how many hundreds of millions the CEO would get when hes fired? He
should be in jail but in the US, people such as this gets a huge severance package just like
the military getting medals for bombing weddings.
@B
You have updated the article it seems, it would be good to put a small annotation to that
effect.
Posted by: Igor Bundy | Oct 13 2019 7:08 utc | 40
Muilenburg is - just in my humble opinion - legally acting in gross neglect, and it should be
possible to fire him on that basis with no severance pay. However I agree with you that it
probably won't happen that way. In the event that Boeing gives him a large severance payout,
it would be interesting if some small-time shareholder could initiate a class-action lawsuit
against the Board (or against Boeing, or whatever) for damages resulting from the misuse of
finances against the interests of shareholders.
From the very first article in March I clearly stated my position that: (a) the 737MAX would
never fly again, and (b) Boeing was finished, it would go bankrupt, it could not be saved.
Why was I so sure of this, when many others were saying otherwise? Because it was clear
from the outset - from the article and from the comments including several from personal
experience - that there very serious and fatal flaws including gross criminality in the
entire top-level management of the corporation, combined with linked fatal problems and gross
corruption and criminality in the FAA.
When you have that sort of situation, criminal negligence, criminal coverup, and criminal
prioritisation of profits over the most basic safety never occurs in single incidents! When
one such incident comes out, you can always be sure that there were plenty more where that
came from. Especially so, when the top management acts with such gross dishonesty and opacity
as was the case with Boeing from the outset of this incident.
Furthermore, it is a huge corporation with huge numbers of employees and former employees.
When a company systematically treats its workforce badly, that is a lot of potential people
with grudges who have damaging inside information - therefore it is certain there will be
whistleblowers - both from hurt people bearing grudges against this or that, and from purely
morally-acting people who want to do what they feel is their duty. Stuff comes out. A small
trickle slowly grows. Some is not very important, but some is clear evidence of legal
culpability in serious issues.
Thus, with every single development we have seen Boeing edge ever closer - slowly, step by
step, but compellingly and inevitably - ever closer and closer to the endgame I declared
above: (a) the 737MAX would never fly again, and (b) Boeing was finished, it would go
bankrupt, it could not be saved.
Even though Boeing at this point is still relatively far from it's final desting, it
cannot avoid that destiny. The problems are not limited to the passenger aircraft side but
also the MIC side.
The cockups and criminality in sum total are so colossal, that salvation of Boeing through
massive government intervention would be both political and economic suicide for the United
States - apart from the colossal costs involved and the colossal legal liabilities, when
coupled with the public image of such gross abuse of public safety, the impenetrable and
unsurmountable technical problems of the 737MAX ghost, and the emerging range of problems of
other aircraft in the 7x7 series, would make it impossible to retain the 7x7 series (and
especially the 737 series) in the product line. Developing completely new aircraft would take
too long, and in the intervening period the market position would be lost irretrievably to
stronger competitors. (It is also questionable whether there are enough sufficiently
competent engineers in the USA today).
If the US government were to force the bailout of Boeing and force the dangerous and
improperly certified aircraft back in the air - even domestically (internationally would be
impossible anyway), the gross criminality of that action in plain sight and the
extreme disregard for public safety also in plain sight would so disrepute the
US government that the complete collapse of the USA would be vastly accelerated.
After all, the flow of evidence of criminal culpability and the ever widening of the
scandal will certainly not stop, and international regulators will certainly not allow these
death traps to fly. Even US arms-twisting and blackmail of foreign especially EU regulators
will not work, because too many liabilities are networked across different industries -
insurance, pilots unions, passenger interest groups, airlines, manufacturers unions, victim
litigation, etc - it will be impossible to reconcile, it will explode.
The USA/FAA/Boeing cannot escape from this vortex. It is like a black hole.
"There are only two alternatives: living with the barbarism or replacing it with
socialism. All the rest is gossip."
This at least is one perfectly-cut gem of pure truth, in this whole discussion. Yet there
are still millions of propaganda-bamboozled semi-literates in the Anglozionist empire who
hear 'socialism' as a snarl-noise, devoid of any other meaning. Cheers bevin!
Odd as your suggestion might sound to many barflies, it is actually spot on.
Across most industries, in many corporations you can find similar mindsets in the most
senior managerial hierarchies. Let's face it, everyone uses the same accounting principles
and methods, the same financial models, and these are all permeated by an outlook that
considers short-term profit, measured in time periods of three months, to be more important
than the medium-term or the long-term periods (themselves often measured in periods of
eighteen months and three years respectively).
Indeed, there was a time in the 1980s and 1990s when everyone who was anyone in the
corporate world had to get a Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree. The knowledge
and outlook you acquired in doing such a degree (the best universities to get such a degree
were supposed to be Stanford University in California, Harvard or Massachusetts Institute of
Technology) was supposed to be "transferable" across a range of industries, meaning that you
could work in a company in one industry at the top or near-top level (where you are making
major decisions determining the company's direction and shaping its culture) and then work in
another company in another industry at the top level or near-top level, doing much the
same.
So it's very likely what you suggest is at once a combination of systemic flaws in
management hierarchies and the measuring tools used to determine whether a firm is doing well
or not, in money terms, and a general cultural trend in which people were encouraged not to
work from the bottom of the firm up to the top but rather to flit from one firm and one
industry to another, spreading either their successes or, more likely, their blunders.
.."The cracks were discovered on high time aircraft which were torn down for conversion to
freighters. The affected 737 types are NG only; the MAX and Classic have a different wing
attachment design."...
Just out of morbid curiosity, does that mean that Boeing went with a new wing design for
the NG only to revert back to the "old" design for the MAX?
Or does it mean that all three have different wing attachment designs: a "classic"
wingbox, a "pickle fork" design for the NG, and Something Newer Again for the MAX?
The implications for Boeing if it is the former might be rather profound, if not downright
sinister.
Does anybody think that these manifestations are typical of inherent systemic flaws in the
corporate governmental structures coupled with behavioral abnormalities of individuals and
groups of individuals involved in their operation and administration? Does anybody think that
similar examples could be found in and throughout other industries that are governed and
operated in the same way? Service industries? Medical? Pharmaceutical? Food production?
Transportation? Automotive? Governmental? Military? Is this a tip of the iceberg sort of
thing? by: Josh @ 34
< ==I am nobody but my answer is yes, see snake at 30 .. also..
There is a giant difference in the corporate culture of the 50s and 60s vs today.. and its
not just in America its in every intelligence interconnected, MSM news coordinated, armed
human container ( nation state ) in the modern world. Its endemic and systemic.. which means
it has both been planned and is somewhere centrally coordinated.. I suspect the intelligence
services.. interconnect with the book publishers and the university:government:corporate
interconnect system.. Some clues have already come out of the sex scandal investigations. The
importance of those sex investigations is that they seem to be leading to the connection
points which allow to link the scoundrels with the money that produces, uses and engineers
into our societies amoral philosophies and controlled behavioral-isms.
This lowest level of morality coupled to the highest level of corruption environment<=
produces often non functional product engineering and delivers unacceptable levels of service
seems to have been (is) designed into our societies by someone and that someone needs to be
identified if ever we humans are going to find peace among the nations of the world. There is
so much that can be done to improve the human lot, if ever humanity could yank itself free of
the nation state system. The minds of the educated working together interactively on the same
problems all at once is something to strive for, but today the few educated minds are rthe
private property of the corporate world. Denying people education and killing them in wars
seem to be one way they deny competition. Today's technology created by educated minds are or
have been encapsulated into the criminal, corrupt corporate we own it all culture..and the
corporations are using it to deny competition.
Its the driving support for that culture which needs to be identified and dealt with.
I studied books like "in search of excellence" and "design for the real world". Lucky to
attend a three day workshop with Victor Papaneck and researched aspects of manufacturing and
IT innovation. The precipitous fall of manufacturing in the USA is simply apalling. If it
isn't lead in the water then it must be Chicago School economic criminals. I was astounded at
manufacturing in Finland and they appear to have sustained their impetus for constant
improvement.
As for Boeing and it's directors and shareholders, they should be surcharged for human and
corporate neglect. Indeed all elected officials should be subject to surcharge in to pay for
their failures that lead to personal or financial injury whether in a socialist or capitalist
system. They must have real skin in the game.
Oh, poor Boeing! How will this military industrial complex component and imperialist
capitalist tool ever survive?!? Surely the Amerikastani government will never stoop do low as
to order the whistleblowers and naysayers silenced, and will not armtwist vassal governments
to compel their airlines to begin flying and buying its planes, no matter how unsafe, right?
You make some very good points, but I don't see it happening.
I had thought initially that this would have to be the end of the MAX...two crashes in
quick succession caused by a gross airplane design defect would, in another era, spell
exactly that...the end [as with the de Havilland Comet in the '50s].
The first sign that the MAX would be taken out of service would have been the firing of
the FAA chief...this has not happened, despite the incredible corruption of this vital
regulatory agency.
This tells me that Boeing will be allowed to get this thing back in the air. It's a
political life and death situation that goes way beyond Boeing...this company is the
flag-bearer of the mighty US Empire...it will not be permitted to go down...
To be fair, there is no need for Boeing to disappear [and that's not realistic
anyway].
For instance the triple seven is a GREAT AIRPLANE...the queen of the skies, with an
amazing safety record. Out of more than 1,600 flying for nearly 25 years there have only been
seven hull losses...and two of those were ground incidents while the plane was not
flying...
Two were the mysterious MH370 crash, and the infamous MH17 shootdown by almost certainly
Ukrainian Nazis...[but blamed on Donbass 'rebels' and Russia by a corrupt western power
establishment].
The only case where passengers died in an in-flight mishap of the conventional kind was
during an Asiana landing in San Fran in 2013 where the crew undershot the runway [pilot error
no question].
Only three passengers died because they weren't wearing their seat belts as they were
instructed to do before any landing, and were thrown clear of the aircraft...everyone else
was evacuated...
Those were the first fatalities in the triple seven, after 18 years in service...you can't
ask for much more than that.
But let's look for a moment at MH17...this complete fake 'investigation' should give us
all a clue about the ruling elite's disregard for ordinary folks and the flying
public...they're not interested in the truth or in any kind of moral principles...
The goal has been a political campaign against Russia, using a civil aviation tragedy as a
weapon...this is the level of cynicism we have in the west today.
I will also not that the triple seven was designed more than a quarter century ago,
starting in fact while the Soviet Union was still around...which served to keep a check on
the worst instincts of the capitalist class...and before the west descended into its moral
morass.
Now we have the JATR [Joint Authorities Technical Review] which is an ad-hoc body without
any legal authority anywhere...it is comprised of aviation experts and their report is
calling for 'better' regulatory oversight...
The preliminary NTSB report is milquetoast...and the NTSB has a long record of blaming
pilots and shielding manufacturers...this state of affairs didn't just happen
overnight...it's been a long time in the making.
So this squawking from this JATR amounts to verbiage and nothing more...like I said,
nothing is going to change because there is too much at stake for the entire imperialist
system...
In the bigger context, the passenger jet business has been deeply politicized for
decades...airline travel is a key global industry and the US [and Europe too] are now doing
everything possible to put a stick in the spokes of a resurgent Russian civil aircraft
industry because they don't want the competition.
Which competition incidentally is exactly what the flying public needs in order to keep
the aviation oligarchs honest.
It is not clear yet what causes the cracks in the forged aluminum part. Many older NG were
retrofitted with winglets on the tips of their wings
my take: Cyclical loads need to surpass a certain threshold before they cause crack
propagation. Typically dynamic loads caused by slightly altered aerodynamics (such as
winglets) are not so significant, and the energy is dissipated along the wingspan. I think
its more a strutural issue emanating from take off or landing loads, which are large impact
forces on the structure. The crack is in the transition from the rigid forged pickle to the
more elastic strap. Such transitions from stiff to elastic members cause local stress peaks,
and become problematic when the material is unable to redistribute local excess stresses
through plastification.
You know what really is a pain in the ass for Boeing? It's the civilian airliner branch.
Boeing should get rid of it. Simply not profitable enough. Consider Boeing's war department,
which is doing SO good! In fact, US companies should restrict themselves to war activities,
there's far more profit to be made and they're doing it SO good. Plus there is much less
(no?) red-tape in those "national security" activities. The real matter is: as far as war is
NOT concerned, US civilian companies should close shop. Or at the very least work with one or
the other of the 17 US intelligence agencies. US civilians should emigrate to countries where
civilian product know-how is still valued. The US would then be free to be a full-fledged
military state.
My modest contribution...
What!? You tell me US war products are much overrated as well?!
Then I don't know what they got to do... A regime change in the US maybe?...
"Therefore, Boeing is not doing all this because it is greedy, but because they are
desperate."
The rest of the post by vk @27 explains it concisely, but this is the key
point.
Is it key because it absolves the capitalist elites of the moral defect of greed? No, this
point is crucial because it demonstrates that the problem with late stage capitalism is not
one of moral decline but rather is endemic; systemic. The problem is a structural component
of capitalism.
Is Dennis Muilenburg stupid or evil? Of course not. Well, maybe he is sorta evil, but that
is not the problem with Boeing. It's not like Muilenburg would be a serial murderer lurking
in dark places waiting for victims to pass by if he were just a Walmart door greeter by trade
rather than Boeing's CEO. He's just trying to do his job, which is to quarter-by-quarter
improve Boeing's profitability. Sadly for all whose livelihoods depend upon capitalism that
is getting harder, if not downright impossible, to do at this stage of the game.
Costs/corners must be cut and income streams refined and streamlined. The Market (hallowed be
Its name) will not be satisfied with piddling 1% to 2% returns, but the aircraft marketplace
is saturated, and is poised to get even more saturated as UAC and COMAC start trying to
muscle in with their MC-21 and C919. Sure, Boeing should be designing new planes, but
that takes many years of investment before showing any returns and The Market (hallowed be
Its name) demand satisfaction now . There can be no delaying of gratification for The
Market (hallowed be Its name).
It is The Market (hallowed be Its name) that has a need for greed. Business leaders just
try to satisfy it. This is important because focusing upon the greediness of any individuals
cannot solve the problems exemplified by Boeing. Trying to tame the greediness built right
into the most sacred component of the capitalist economy, on the other hand, leaves you with
something that is not capitalism. You cannot make The Market (hallowed be Its name) function
without greed, and your best attempts to reorganize The Market (hallowed be Its name) to
operate around humanistic imperatives will result in something that looks a lot like
socialism.
@30 Snake no group of professionals trained in America could today start that process
up. many of us are still around. I recently came back to the US in 2014. Spent years
working in China. The technology transfer was amazing. Chinese are good people to work with
too. I asked an older(than me... i'm old now) engineer if he thought this was a good idea. He
told me to read Antony Sutton. So I did. It is amazing. It seems like they wanted to destroy
the US on purpose. In China the government pays large manufacturing industry costs for
utilities infrastructure and hook up. Free... all on the government. No taxes for 7 years.
Half taxes for 7 years. They want it. The people want it. In the US it is "lean
manufacturing". The old plants are maintained on a shoe string budget. Capital spending is
sparse. The top positions are dominated by finance people where in China it is mostly
engineers. The difference is obvious. I think the plan was to have China build everything
with the US finance scum skimming a large share of the profits. The Chinese had other
plans/ambitions and now the conflict. I think the US is much weaker than during the cold war.
I think the US loses the battle this time around. The USA will be the one to collapse. It is
much deserved. Hopefully the sociopaths and psycopaths who run the country don't throw a
tantrum and blow us all up.
I wonder what role Boeing's past chairman Jim McNerney has played in destroying a once great
company like Boeing. He comes from GE, another once great US company that has been ruined by
a type of management that has deemphasized a company's fundamental technical strength in
favor of marketing, and short term money making. The scary question is, to how many other
great, technically oriented US companies has GE "exported" its brand of management? It is
especially scary because the effect will become visible provably a decade or so after the
damage starts.
For some 30 years after WW2, capitalism was successfully regulated, and people in the West
led decent lives. Capitalists allowed this because of the Communist threat.
Today, there is once again a threat, a Chinese threat, a threat of contagion from a system
whose success is increasingly apparent. Don't capitalists now have the same reasons their
ancestors had to allow a regulation of capitalism?
@ Posted by: Goldhoarder | Oct 13 2019 13:06 utc | 51
That is not a theory, that's exactly what happened and designed.
Mao correctly diagnosed that, in late stage of capitalism, it was the role of socialism to
do the basic historic role of early stage capitalism in the Third World. Marx stated that a
system doesn't fall before all of its possibilities are depleted. It is only when capitalism
is completely developed that socialism can be built. This is public knowledge, Mao didn't
hide his theory from anybody (on the contrary, he publicized it in China the most he could).
That was also the general consensus of the CCP and still is today.
After the fall of Bretton Woods (1971), Nixon created the petrodollar and, after the
Sino-Soviet schism (1969), he drew a hedge in the socialist world by dealing a preferred
nation deal with China in 1972. That helped China break the capitalist siege at the height of
the Cold War and use capitalist resources to industrialize itself. At the time, the Americans
thought China's high growth rates were only due to its immense population; the USA was also
prospering, so they didn't bother to continue to outsource its manufacturing to the Chinese.
The end of the 70s was also the beginning of an era were it was widely believed in the First
World that the future of the working classes would be one of "smart jobs", i.e. highly paid,
low intensity, low stress, with excellent workplace conditions; they would walk in green,
polution-free cities, while the Third World would to the dirty, but necessary, jobs like
manufacturing and agriculture.
That's the difference beteween China and India. China had a socialist revolution, and had
a long-term plan of development of the nation while India didn't. India fell for the siren
song of liberalism and let the capitalists loose to exploit their people, land and
infrastructure at will. End result is that, today, India's GDP is only USD 2.8 trillion;
while China's is USD 14 trillion; India today must be compared to Brazil (GDP: USD 1.8
trillion) instead of China. In 1975, Brazil and China had roughly the same GDP (with Brazil,
obviously, having a much higher GDP per capita); they followed polar opposite strategies of
development: nowadays, the Chinese GDP is almost 10x bigger and its average wage per hour is
double. That means the Brazilians cannot even play the sweatshop card anymore.
flakerbandit @36 Flying at different speeds the airplane requires differing amounts of
downforce from the tailplane...the purpose of which downforce is to balance the lift created
by the wing, which tends to want to pitch the airplane nose down...therefore a downforce on
the tail is require to teeter the nose back up and keep the airplane in balance...
I may be wrong but this sounds backwards to me. The nose is always pitched slightly
upwards in order to generate sufficient lift to counteract gravitation. The higher the speed,
the less pitch required. In fact a min. pitch is even integrated into the design. This
constant pitch constitutes the form drag. It also leads to the nose wanting to perpetually
move upwards, eventually leading to stall. This must be aerodynamically countered using the
joystick by moving the wing flaps down, or causing the tail force upwards, also by moving the
tail flaps down. The trim obviates this perpetual counteraction with the joystick by
resetting the tail flaps in a constant position to offset the downward force, freeing the
joystick. It needs to be readjusted for changed speeds
"how many other great, technically oriented US companies has GE "exported" its brand of
management? It is especially scary because the effect will become visible provably a decade
or so after the damage starts.
@ Nathan Mulcahy | Oct 13 2019 14:24 utc | 52
Before Boeing, McNerney raped and pillaged 3M. Thankfully, 3M is a broader-based company
and the sane people of Minneapolis (not the coasts crowd) righted the ship.
The good news is that with GE trading below 1/6 of its high - which came in 2000! - and
"Neutron Jack" Welsh's former deputies as dis-reputed as he has become, GE won't be such an
incubator of slash-and-burners that spread like wees through industrial America.
The bad news is that they have been replaced by private equity scroundels like Dave
Calhoun, who use the board to do their raping and pillaging.
Excellent point and summary.
But it's not that U.S. government are trying to destroy country it is rather that they were
effectively influenced to look the other way.
Some people are becoming very wealth at the expense of the nation - zombie nation.
I am in manufacturing plants around the country on regular basis - US is non competitive
in infrastructure and talent. And I will refrain from discussing experiences on military
projects - working for vendor (not classified stuff).
Only US has going for it is lots of room for improvement.
Oh brother...sorry to sound dismissive but you are possibly confusing readers
here...everything you said is total nonsense.
I say that as an aeronautical engineer and professional pilot who has spent most of my
career in flight testing of military and commercial aircraft...
The wing has a NEGATIVE pitching moment which increases with lift...that means that as
more lift is produced the more the airplane wants to nose down.
This translates as increasing force on the stick [aka 'yoke'] as the pilot pulls back to
nose the airplane up.
He is fighting against the increasing pitching moment...if he lets go of the stick the
airplane will nose back down and settle into its trimmed condition.
Pulling the nose up like this is how you slow the aircraft down...the extra lift produces
more lift-induced drag...and also more parasitic drag, by exposing a greater section area of
the wing and fuselage to the airstream...think of holding your hand outside the window of
your car on the highway...if you hold it flat [palm down] there is much less air resistance
than if you hold your palm perpendicular to your direction of travel.
If you want the aircraft to fly slow, you then set the pitch attitude to such a more
nose-up configuration...and then you use trim to trim out the control pressure...ie the
pressure it takes to hold the stick back and keep the nose up like that...
That's what trim is for, like I said earlier, so you can take your hands off the stick at
any flying speed you have set...and that's also why a different trim angle is needed at
different speeds.
In straight and level unaccelerated flight, the forces and moments acting on the flight
vehicle must be in equilibruim...that means that lift must equal weight and thrust must equal
drag.
The moments must also be in equilibrium. That means the nose-down moment that is created
by the wing lift must be balanced by a downforce on the tail, which like I said teeters the
nose up about the center of gravity...
Think of a fulcrum point like a teeter totter...the CG is the fulcrum point...and one side
of the totter is very short but has a big person sitting on it...while the other is very long
and has a small person sitting on it...they are both in equilibrium and the totter is exactly
horizontal.
The tail is much smaller but is a long distance from the CG...which gives it a long lever
arm...the wing lift [technically called the neutral point, which is the spot where all lift
forces act, just as CG is the spot where the total weight acts] is generally about half way
back along the wing chord...and is a very short way ahead of the CG...
So just like the tetter totter, we have a very big wing lift and nose down pitching
moment...balanced by a quite small tail force on a long lever arm.
For longitudinal stability the neutral point is placed ahead of the CG by a small
amount...this is called the stability margin. [In fighter aircraft that have fly by wire, the
NP is actually behind the CG, making for an unstable but very responsive aircraft...the
computer provides the stability by constant corrections, unnoticed by the pilot]
It's disappointing to see that when I try to elucidate a technical point that some people
who obviously know absolutely nothing about the subject will want to speak up without even
taking the time to try to learn some basics.
Have to correct myself there on the relationship between the neutral point and the CG...the
CG must be AHEAD of the neutral point, for positive static stability...not the other way
around...
What homegrown talent can there be in US manufacturing, when the average American couldn't be
bothered to grasp basic STEM skills, while the intellectuals who do would rather join
finance, healthcare and law etc where there's a lot more money to be made for them in these
sectors with massive rent seeking activity?
@ Posted by: flankerbandit | Oct 13 2019 17:10 utc | 58
> It's disappointing to see that when I try to elucidate a technical point
> that some people who obviously know absolutely nothing about the subject
> will want to speak up without even taking the time to try to learn some
> basics.
As a scientist, get used to it... it never ends. Even in the anti-intellectual USA where
people have little interest in science, everyone thinks they're the expert.
You are wrong about one thing. There is probably good reason for the engineer's frustration.
It sounds like the Europeans are pulling a stock government stunt - vague demanding more
testing. The Boeing engineers aren't asking the EASA to solve their problems. They think they
have solved their problems. The role of the government in this case to say yes, they are
solved or no, they are not [AND HERE's why].
At issue here will be the definition of when
you've demonstrated compliance with the regulation. Sometimes it's easy - MIL-H-5440 has a
requirement that all hydraulic lines less than a 1/2" from fixed structure shall be secured
with stand offs (this is in there to prevent another aircraft accident like the one that
killed Knute Rockne). Verifying that requirement is easy. Look at the drawings/inspect the
aircraft. If, on the other hand, the requirement is that the pilot shall always be able to
trim the aircraft to neutral flight throughout all portions of the aircraft's normal flight
envelope without excessive force, how do you test for that requirement? I know how it's done
- by picking some number of points in the envelope where the loading is expected to be the
worst. You can't test every point. And it's always possible for an overseer to say, well, I
think you need to look at more points. (Which ones?)
"It is not clear yet what causes the cracks in the forged aluminum part. Many older NG were
retrofitted with winglets on the tips of their wings. These may have led to unforeseen loads
or vibrations. It is possible that some of the younger 737 NG airplanes have a similar
problem."
Have older 737 series been retrofitted with winglets? I have seen pictures of the 500
series with winglets.
These have to do with crew alerts that are REQUIRED and on the books, but Boeing got a
free pass.
It's clear to me you have no idea what you are talking about...the European regulators
have asked specific questions about how this MCAS is supposed to be fixed.
Boeing has not given any answers.
As someone who has many hours as a flight test engineer and test pilot working on aircraft
certification I know how the process works...your comments about trimming and testing for
trimming are ridiculous.
As I have already explained here, this has nothing to do with conventional trim...
it has to do with the fact that MCAS uses the trim system to patch over an AERODYNAMIC
INSTABILITY at high angles of attack.
I have already explained this before. One requirement for handling qualities that test
pilots test for is a linear increase of stick force needed to nose the plane up.
With the MAX, that does not happen at high alpha because the engine nacelles mounted far
forward start making lift at high alpha, thus lessening the control stick force required by
the pilot.
This is a VERY BIG PROBLEM...
Thus MCAS was slapped on to nose the plane down in order to provide the missing stick
force...it's like trimming nose down, which will increase the force the pilot needs to apply
to hold stick back.
In flight test, it was found that the original MCAS authority was NOT ENOUGH to fix this
handling quality issue...thus the authority was increased four-fold and also made to
repeat every few seconds.
This tells me as a professional that the rating the MAX got from the test pilots was quite
low on the Cooper-Harper scale for handling qualities.
Now the fix is supposed to be to decrease the MCAS authority to something presumably
resembling the original 'lite' version...
Which brings us right back to the problem of the airplane not meeting the handling
qualities criteria...
IT CAN'T BE FIXED LIKE THAT
The Europeans know it and every professional test pilot and engineer knows it.
After Boeing commits suicide through incompetence and negligence, we can get to work on
Lockheed.
With a bit of patience, the entire American military industrial congressional complex may
fail, enhancing the world's security.
Thanks for putting in your comments here. My own experience compared to working up and
testing a large commercial aircraft is very small time. I have watched media and commentators
always quick to blame the pilots when there is a crash. I ended up designing, building, test
flying, and then clocking up a lot of hours in my own ultralight whirlybird, so if anything
went wrong, there was only myself to blame. Commercial pilot I feel is a different game not
only to what I did but also the test pilots that are involved in the building and testing of
aircraft.
For pilots that did not know mcas existed or the full extent of how it functioned, the
boeing max was a death trap. But other aircraft crashes in the past, aways the media kicks
off with pilot error or pilot suicide ect when in nearly all cases it turns out there was
some type of aircraft malfunction.
I always flew with the wind in my face and visual reference. For a pilot flying on
instruments, whos job and experience is to fly from point A to point B in straight and level
flight, always well within the aircrafts limitations, quickly making the correct decision
when something goes wrong and the instruments are not functioning correctly would be a
difficult thing.
@flankerbandit 66
"In flight test, it was found that the original MCAS authority was NOT ENOUGH to fix this
handling quality issue...thus the authority was increased four-fold and also made to repeat
every few seconds.
Now the fix is supposed to be to decrease the MCAS authority to something presumably
resembling the original 'lite' version."
I was one of the people who suggested originally that what is happening now is what must
happen, but only as an absolute minimum. This is because if I have to take chances, I would
rather take chances that my pilot wants to preserve his own life then trust someone who is
not on the plane and who decided to take control away from the pilot through jumbled code and
faulty sensors (and then hidden this from the pilot).
This rot in Boeing comes from an interplay between the greedy management, now incompetent
engineers and deeply corrupt regulators and the US Government superstructure (no-one getting
even fired for causing hundreds of deaths).
The real, proper, reliable solution, of course, is to redesign the plane completely to
ensure full dynamic stability with specific motors. This means that 737MAX should never fly
again in any normal society. Whichever government (through its regulator) allows this
plane to fly again is clearly and deliberately breaching the social contract with its
citizens.
Thanks for your input Peter...it sounds like you designed and built a gyroplane or perhaps
a light helo...well done!
I have a few friends that have built their own aircraft projects over the years, mostly
from kits.
I've been fiddling with a design of my own that I would like to eventually build, and now
that I am semi-retired [LOL] I may just actually get around to it.
The cost of a store-bought small airplane is out of reach for most regular folks...and
what you get for your money is a terrible value proposition...that's why so many people are
building their own...I think in the US more homebuilts are registered [by far] than newly
built light aircraft.
I agree with you about the 'blame the pilot' game...I have become quite cynical about the
NTSB over the years because I see them protecting the manufacturers. This is a shame because
it used to be a great organization that didn't pull punches. Hopefully they will get back on
track.
Although the NTSB's work in this area is ongoing, based on preliminary information, we are
concerned that the accident pilot responses to the unintended MCAS operation were not
consistent with the underlying assumptions about pilot recognition and response that
Boeing used, based on FAA guidance, for flight control system functional hazard
assessments, including for MCAS, as part of the 737 MAX design.
That's a good start, but it's not the major problem, in my view.
The big problem here is that the Ethiopian crash happened after the existence of MCAS was
revealed, and the FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive about how to deal with it, which was
to make sure to use those trim-cutout switches...as stated in the checklist for ordinary
runaway trim.
Well that turned out to be insane...because the Ethiopian crew did just that, and crashed
anyway. It was simply impossible to recover that airplane at that low a height when the MCAS
nosed it over. It was a death sentence.
I and others had stated that in these situations that the checklist is not adequate at
all. A proper emergency procedure needs to be put in place that is going to actually give
pilots a chance at low altitudes.
This would also entail a switch to shut off MCAS, while leaving the electric trim on. This
is the only way you are going to have a chance save an airplane that has a malfunctioning
MCAS down low.
If you have enough height there is what used to be called a yo-yo maneuver, or what Boeing
calls a 'roller-coaster'...where you first need to unload the tailplane by pointing the plane
even more nose down, so that you can free up the trim wheels and manually trim back.
Only problem is that this takes several thousand feet of altitude. This was proved in the
sim after the flight data from Ethiopian was retrieved...
I really don't see how they are going to solve this problem if it occurs at low height
where you just don't have room to do these kinds of maneuvers...and there is no procedure to
quickly identify a malfunctioning MCAS and shut it off.
There actually exists a so-called 'trim override' switch on the back of the center
console...this allows you to override the cutout switches in the base of the control stick
that I mentioned previously.
The use of this allows the pilot to use both the elevator by pulling the stick back and
the electric trim at the same time.
But I see nothing happening in terms of a new emergency procedure. Even that would entail
enough changes to cost both Boeing and the airlines money.
And that's what it's all about, money. The airlines are just as bad in this regard. After
all Boeing sold them the MAX on the basis of not having to spend any money on retraining
existing 737 pilots.
Like I said those existing procedures are worth diddly and were a death sentence to the
Ethiopian flight.
At Kiza...everybody agrees that the MAX should never fly again, but I just don't see it.
Like anybody in our ruling elite gives a flying hoot about 'social contracts'...
Gyro. I preferred the rotary wing for what I was doing which was mustering cattle sheep
and goats.Rotary wing is much better in turbulence, plus it can come down in vertical decent whereas a
fixed wing stalls. I originally bought a homebuilt machine which I began modifying after
about 200 hours.
At 3000 hrs I built a new airframe to my design and incorporated my previous mods. did 2000
hours with that setup until health issues prevented me from flying. Most of those hours were
just above tree tops or down amongst the trees and scrub.
I had lightened trim pressure until it was virtually non existant so it couldn't be trimmed
to fly hands free in straight and level flight, but when working feral stock, I could through
it around for several hours without my arm feeling like it was about to fall off.
When I look at commercial aircraft through, there job is to transport passengers or cargo
safely from point A to point B.
These aircraft should be stable in all parts of the flight envelope. Mcas as software patch
for an aerodynamic or engineering design problem ... the angle of attack allowed in the
flight envelope for the aircraft should have been decreased, and if limiting AoA made the
aircraft unsafe to fly then design needed to be changed.
Boeing, FAA, NTSB .. complacency and rot throughout the system.
I guess the reason I think about some of this is that back when I was flying, a few people
suggested I build aircraft to sell. I would have liked building them, but I did not want the
responsibility that accompanies this.
Five thousand hours in a gyro...and herding livestock no less...now that is not only
impressive but sounds like a lot of fun.
I love low and slow flying...but it comes with its own dangers and is a demanding skill
set in its own right.
You're right about the gyro and its ability to handle turbulence...also very safe because
that rotary wing cannot actually stall, and you can autorotate straight down like you
said.
I know a few gyro pilots, but haven't been up in one...would love to give it a go...
As I said I am very skeptical of Boeing's supposed 'fix'...if another MAX goes down then I
think that would be the end of it...but that's a heck of a price to pay.
I remember from a number of years ago reading about the early airlines that kicked off after
the WWI and more so after WWII. Many of the airforce or fighter pilots, although they could
react very well to an emergency situation, it was found were not considered suitable - or of
the right mindset for flying passenger aircraft. Perhaps because they were willing to take
risks.. a long time since I read about it but I think that was the issue.
With this in mind, a commercial aircraft needs to be designed around the capabilities and
weak points of the character types best suited to that style of aviation. I guess this is
what has always bugged me when putting an aircraft crash down to pilot error or saying in
hindsight this or that pilot could have made the right decision in the given situation and
saved the aircraft.
@flankerbandit
I did not mean to say that the "elite" do give a hoot to social contract. Printing money like
crazy is a much worse example. I only mean that there is a breaking point somewhere in this
progression due to accumulation. It may not be the forcing of the 737Max death trap on the
naive population, but eventually there will be a straw that breaks the camel's back.
In "What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?" William Langewiesche draws the conclusion
that the pilots are primarily to blame for the fatal crashes of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian
302. In resurrecting this age-old aviation canard, Langewiesche minimizes the fatal design
flaws and certification failures that precipitated those tragedies, and still pose a threat
to the flying public.
...
I am also one of the few who have flown a Boeing 737 MAX Level D full motion simulator,
replicating both accident flights multiple times. I know firsthand the challenges the
pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not
being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design.
These emergencies did
not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable
airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS.
The MCAS design should never have been
approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The National
Transportation Safety Board has found that Boeing made faulty assumptions both about the
capability of the aircraft design to withstand damage or failure, and the level of human
performance possible once the failures began to cascade. Where Boeing failed, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) should have stepped in to regulate but it failed to do so.
Lessons from accidents are bought in blood and we must seek all the answers to prevent the
next one. We need to fix all the flaws in the current system -- corporate governance,
regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only
then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies.
Good letter from Sullenburger. I suppose the NYT wouldn't have printed it if he'd included
the fact that another thing that needs to be fixed is "journalism" which is nothing but
laundered corporate lies, like that of the NYT.
'Sully' Sullenberger's lette to NYT Magazine in response to the William Langewiesche 737 MAX
piece:
"In "What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?" William Langewiesche draws the
conclusion that the pilots are primarily to blame for the fatal crashes of Lion Air 610 and
Ethiopian 302. In resurrecting this age-old aviation canard, Langewiesche minimizes the fatal
design flaws and certification failures that precipitated those tragedies, and still pose a
threat to the flying public.."
Off memory, it was "Sully" Sullenburger safely put an aircraft down in a river. I doubt the
average commercial pilot could have pulled that off (not to denigrate the average pilot). It
is good pilots like this are putting in their voices.
b, thanks for keeping onto this. Boeing has brought things to a point that cannot be ignored.
I could never stand the boredom of flying an aircraft from point A to point B, but the
tendency of media and pundits (I'm guessing pushed by the manufacturers) to blame the pilots
in any commercial aviation crash has annoyed me for a long time.
flankerbandit @ 83 "Great to see Sullenberger call out the idiot Langewiesche".
Indeed! I can't seem to post a link right now, but for another example of corporatist toadie
Langewiesche's "work", for anyone who hasn't seen it, search for 'The Lessons of ValuJet
592', at the Atlantic magazine.
...
Boeing engineers are frustrated EASA hasn't specified what additional measures might allay
its objections, according to people close to the discussions.
The last paragraph is astonishing. It is not the task of a regulator to tell Boeing
engineers how to solve their problems. The regulators set the rules and check if a
manufacturer's engineering solutions comply with those.
That Boeing still does not get that and is looking for easy ways out of its problems
shows that the company has yet to learn its lesson.
To which one could add...
The fact that Boeing's Board removed Muilenburg as Chairman but retained his services as CEO
is virtual endorsement of his management style.
i.e. Having bullied Boeing into trouble, they're confident that he'll be able to blame
someone else and bully his way out again. It'd be interesting to read the minutes of the
meeting during which he bullied the Board into keeping him on as CEO...
"... The lawsuit also aggressively contests Boeing's spin that competent pilots could have prevented the Lion Air and Ethiopian Air crashes: ..."
"... When asked why Boeing did not alert pilots to the existence of the MCAS, Boeing responded that the company decided against disclosing more details due to concerns about "inundate[ing] average pilots with too much information -- and significantly more technical data -- than [they] needed or could realistically digest." ..."
"... The filing has a detailed explanation of why the addition of heavier, bigger LEAP1-B engines to the 737 airframe made the plane less stable, changed how it handled, and increased the risk of catastrophic stall. It also describes at length how Boeing ignored warning signs during the design and development process, and misrepresented the 737 Max as essentially the same as older 737s to the FAA, potential buyers, and pilots. It also has juicy bits presented in earlier media accounts but bear repeating, like: ..."
"... Then, on November 7, 2018, the FAA issued an "Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2018-23-51," warning that an unsafe condition likely could exist or develop on 737 MAX aircraft. ..."
"... Moreover, unlike runaway stabilizer, MCAS disables the control column response that 737 pilots have grown accustomed to and relied upon in earlier generations of 737 aircraft. ..."
"... And making the point that to turn off MCAS all you had to do was flip two switches behind everything else on the center condole. Not exactly true, normally those switches were there to shut off power to electrically assisted trim. Ah, it one thing to shut off MCAS it's a whole other thing to shut off power to the planes trim, especially in high speed ✓ and the plane noise up ✓, and not much altitude ✓. ..."
"... Classic addiction behavior. Boeing has a major behavioral problem, the repetitive need for and irrational insistence on profit above safety all else , that is glaringly obvious to everyone except Boeing. ..."
"... In fact, Boeing 737 Chief Technical Pilot, Mark Forkner asked the FAA to delete any mention of MCAS from the pilot manual so as to further hide its existence from the public and pilots " ..."
"... This "MCAS" was always hidden from pilots? The military implemented checks on MCAS to maintain a level of pilot control. The commercial airlines did not. Commercial airlines were in thrall of every little feature that they felt would eliminate the need for pilots at all. Fell right into the automation crapification of everything. ..."
At first blush, the suit filed in Dallas by the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association (SwAPA) against Boeing may seem like a family
feud. SWAPA is seeking an estimated $115 million for lost pilots' pay as a result of the grounding of the 34 Boeing 737 Max planes
that Southwest owns and the additional 20 that Southwest had planned to add to its fleet by year end 2019. Recall that Southwest
was the largest buyer of the 737 Max, followed by American Airlines. However, the damning accusations made by the pilots' union,
meaning, erm, pilots, is likely to cause Boeing not just more public relations headaches, but will also give grist to suits by crash
victims.
However, one reason that the Max is a sore point with the union was that it was a key leverage point in 2016 contract negotiations:
And Boeing's assurances that the 737 Max was for all practical purposes just a newer 737 factored into the pilots' bargaining
stance. Accordingly, one of the causes of action is tortious interference, that Boeing interfered in the contract negotiations to
the benefit of Southwest. The filing describes at length how Boeing and Southwest were highly motivated not to have the contract
dispute drag on and set back the launch of the 737 Max at Southwest, its showcase buyer. The big point that the suit makes is the
plane was unsafe and the pilots never would have agreed to fly it had they known what they know now.
We've embedded the compliant at the end of the post. It's colorful and does a fine job of recapping the sorry history of the development
of the airplane. It has damning passages like:
Boeing concealed the fact that the 737 MAX aircraft was not airworthy because, inter alia, it incorporated a single-point failure
condition -- a software/flight control logic called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System ("MCAS") -- that,if fed
erroneous data from a single angle-of-attack sensor, would command the aircraft nose-down and into an unrecoverable dive without
pilot input or knowledge.
The lawsuit also aggressively contests Boeing's spin that competent pilots could have prevented the Lion Air and Ethiopian Air
crashes:
Had SWAPA known the truth about the 737 MAX aircraft in 2016, it never would have approved the inclusion of the 737 MAX aircraft
as a term in its CBA [collective bargaining agreement], and agreed to operate the aircraft for Southwest. Worse still, had SWAPA
known the truth about the 737 MAX aircraft, it would have demanded that Boeing rectify the aircraft's fatal flaws before agreeing
to include the aircraft in its CBA, and to provide its pilots, and all pilots, with the necessary information and training needed
to respond to the circumstances that the Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 pilots encountered nearly three
years later.
And (boldface original):
Boeing Set SWAPA Pilots Up to Fail
As SWAPA President Jon Weaks, publicly stated, SWAPA pilots "were kept in the dark" by Boeing.
Boeing did not tell SWAPA pilots that MCAS existed and there was no description or mention of MCAS in the Boeing Flight Crew
Operations Manual.
There was therefore no way for commercial airline pilots, including SWAPA pilots, to know that MCAS would work in the background
to override pilot inputs.
There was no way for them to know that MCAS drew on only one of two angle of attack sensors on the aircraft.
And there was no way for them to know of the terrifying consequences that would follow from a malfunction.
When asked why Boeing did not alert pilots to the existence of the MCAS, Boeing responded that the company decided against
disclosing more details due to concerns about "inundate[ing] average pilots with too much information -- and significantly more
technical data -- than [they] needed or could realistically digest."
SWAPA's pilots, like their counterparts all over the world, were set up for failure
The filing has a detailed explanation of why the addition of heavier, bigger LEAP1-B engines to the 737 airframe made the plane
less stable, changed how it handled, and increased the risk of catastrophic stall. It also describes at length how Boeing ignored
warning signs during the design and development process, and misrepresented the 737 Max as essentially the same as older 737s to
the FAA, potential buyers, and pilots. It also has juicy bits presented in earlier media accounts but bear repeating, like:
By March 2016, Boeing settled on a revision of the MCAS flight control logic.
However, Boeing chose to omit key safeguards that had previously been included in earlier iterations of MCAS used on the Boeing
KC-46A Pegasus, a military tanker derivative of the Boeing 767 aircraft.
The engineers who created MCAS for the military tanker designed the system to rely on inputs from multiple sensors and with
limited power to move the tanker's nose. These deliberate checks sought to ensure that the system could not act erroneously or
cause a pilot to lose control. Those familiar with the tanker's design explained that these checks were incorporated because "[y]ou
don't want the solution to be worse than the initial problem."
The 737 MAX version of MCAS abandoned the safeguards previously relied upon. As discussed below, the 737 MAX MCAS had greater
control authority than its predecessor, activated repeatedly upon activation, and relied on input from just one of the plane's
two sensors that measure the angle of the plane's nose.
In other words, Boeing can't credibly say that it didn't know better.
Here is one of the sections describing Boeing's cover-ups:
Yet Boeing's website, press releases, annual reports, public statements and statements to operators and customers, submissions
to the FAA and other civil aviation authorities, and 737 MAX flight manuals made no mention of the increased stall hazard or MCAS
itself.
In fact, Boeing 737 Chief Technical Pilot, Mark Forkner asked the FAA to delete any mention of MCAS from the pilot manual so
as to further hide its existence from the public and pilots.
We urge you to read the complaint in full, since it contains juicy insider details, like the significance of Southwest being Boeing's
737 Max "launch partner" and what that entailed in practice, plus recounting dates and names of Boeing personnel who met with SWAPA
pilots and made misrepresentations about the aircraft.
Even though Southwest Airlines is negotiating a settlement with Boeing over losses resulting from the grounding of the 737 Max
and the airline has promised to compensate the pilots, the pilots' union at a minimum apparently feels the need to put the heat on
Boeing directly. After all, the union could withdraw the complaint if Southwest were to offer satisfactory compensation for the pilots'
lost income. And pilots have incentives not to raise safety concerns about the planes they fly. Don't want to spook the horses, after
all.
But Southwest pilots are not only the ones most harmed by Boeing's debacle but they are arguably less exposed to the downside
of bad press about the 737 Max. It's business fliers who are most sensitive to the risks of the 737 Max, due to seeing the story
regularly covered in the business press plus due to often being road warriors. Even though corporate customers account for only 12%
of airline customers, they represent an estimated 75% of profits.
Southwest customers don't pay up for front of the bus seats. And many of them presumably value the combination of cheap travel,
point to point routes between cities underserved by the majors, and close-in airports, which cut travel times. In other words, that
combination of features will make it hard for business travelers who use Southwest regularly to give the airline up, even if the
737 Max gives them the willies. By contrast, premium seat passengers on American or United might find it not all that costly, in
terms of convenience and ticket cost (if they are budget sensitive), to fly 737-Max-free Delta until those passengers regain confidence
in the grounded plane.
Note that American Airlines' pilot union, when asked about the Southwest claim, said that it also believes its pilots deserve
to be compensated for lost flying time, but they plan to obtain it through American Airlines.
If Boeing were smart, it would settle this suit quickly, but so far, Boeing has relied on bluster and denial. So your guess is
as good as mine as to how long the legal arm-wrestling goes on.
Update 5:30 AM EDT : One important point that I neglected to include is that the filing also recounts, in gory detail, how Boeing
went into "Blame the pilots" mode after the Lion Air crash, insisting the cause was pilot error and would therefore not happen again.
Boeing made that claim on a call to all operators, including SWAPA, and then three days later in a meeting with SWAPA.
However, Boeing's actions were inconsistent with this claim. From the filing:
Then, on November 7, 2018, the FAA issued an "Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2018-23-51," warning that an unsafe condition
likely could exist or develop on 737 MAX aircraft.
Relying on Boeing's description of the problem, the AD directed that in the event of un-commanded nose-down stabilizer trim
such as what happened during the Lion Air crash, the flight crew should comply with the Runaway Stabilizer procedure in the Operating
Procedures of the 737 MAX manual.
But the AD did not provide a complete description of MCAS or the problem in 737 MAX aircraft that led to the Lion Air crash,
and would lead to another crash and the 737 MAX's grounding just months later.
An MCAS failure is not like a runaway stabilizer. A runaway stabilizer has continuous un-commanded movement of the tail, whereas
MCAS is not continuous and pilots (theoretically) can counter the nose-down movement, after which MCAS would move the aircraft
tail down again.
Moreover, unlike runaway stabilizer, MCAS disables the control column response that 737 pilots have grown accustomed to and
relied upon in earlier generations of 737 aircraft.
Even after the Lion Air crash, Boeing's description of MCAS was still insufficient to put correct its lack of disclosure as
demonstrated by a second MCAS-caused crash.
We hoisted this detail because insiders were spouting in our comments section, presumably based on Boeing's patter, that the Lion
Air pilots were clearly incompetent, had they only executed the well-known "runaway stabilizer," all would have been fine. Needless
to say, this assertion has been shown to be incorrect.
Excellent, by any standard. Which does remind of of the NYT zine story (William Langewiesche
Published Sept. 18, 2019) making the claim that basically the pilots who crashed their planes weren't real "Airman".
And making
the point that to turn off MCAS all you had to do was flip two switches behind everything else on the center condole. Not exactly
true, normally those switches were there to shut off power to electrically assisted trim. Ah, it one thing to shut off MCAS it's
a whole other thing to shut off power to the planes trim, especially in high speed ✓ and the plane noise up ✓, and not much altitude
✓.
And especially if you as a pilot didn't know MCAS was there in the first place. This sort of engineering by Boeing is criminal.
And the lying. To everyone. Oh, least we all forget the processing power of the in flight computer is that of a intel 286. There
are times I just want to be beamed back to the home planet. Where we care for each other.
One should also point out that Langewiesche said that Boeing made disastrous mistakes with the MCAS and that the very future
of the Max is cloudy. His article was useful both for greater detail about what happened and for offering some pushback to the
idea that the pilots had nothing to do with the accidents.
As for the above, it was obvious from the first Seattle Times stories that these two events and the grounding were going to
be a lawsuit magnet. But some of us think Boeing deserves at least a little bit of a defense because their side has been totally
silent–either for legal reasons or CYA reasons on the part of their board and bad management.
Classic addiction behavior. Boeing has a major behavioral problem, the repetitive need for and irrational insistence on profit
above safety all else , that is glaringly obvious to everyone except Boeing.
"The engineers who created MCAS for the military tanker designed the system to rely on inputs from multiple sensors and with
limited power to move the tanker's nose. These deliberate checks sought to ensure that the system could not act erroneously or
cause a pilot to lose control "
"Yet Boeing's website, press releases, annual reports, public statements and statements to operators and customers, submissions
to the FAA and other civil aviation authorities, and 737 MAX flight manuals made no mention of the increased stall hazard or MCAS
itself.
In fact, Boeing 737 Chief Technical Pilot, Mark Forkner asked the FAA to delete any mention of MCAS from the pilot manual
so as to further hide its existence from the public and pilots "
This "MCAS" was always hidden from pilots? The military implemented checks on MCAS to maintain a level of pilot control. The commercial airlines did not. Commercial
airlines were in thrall of every little feature that they felt would eliminate the need for pilots at all. Fell right into the
automation crapification of everything.
"... Erm, I think China was the first country to ground Boeing 737 MAX jets over the Angle of Attack sensor issue that caused the Indonesian and Ethiopian Boeing 737 MAX planes to crash after take-off, killing a combined total of 346 people. ..."
"... the company has a lot of work to do: either swallow its pride, redesign the jets to balance properly and work properly and retrain the pilots appropriately; or be prepared for any consequences if one of its airliners fails a third time because of the same problem. ..."
Boeing forecasts that China will need 8,090 new commercial aircraft over the next 20 years
in addition to $1.6 billion in services related to passenger air transport.
Its 2019 China Commercial Market Outlook for the next two decades sees the entire
aircraft and services market through 2038 reaching $2.9 trillion, a 7% increase over its
forecast last year.
####
What a tough one for Boeing. On the one hand it sells airliners to China, on the other it
makes and sells weapons to fire at China! Like Russia, be in no doubt that China will work
hard to minimize any dependence on the West (sic the USA) for any critical equipment like
aero engines. The West seems to have learned nothing that threats and sanctions against
strong countries will ultimately cost them much more in the long run, good will and more
importantly trust , burnt to a cinder.
Erm, I think China was the first country to ground Boeing 737 MAX jets over the Angle of
Attack sensor issue that caused the Indonesian and Ethiopian Boeing 737 MAX planes to crash
after take-off, killing a combined total of 346 people.
f Boeing is keen to sell airliners
to China, and especially its 737 MAX jets (because they're expected to be the workhorses of
Boeing's range of passenger aircraft), the company has a lot of work to do: either swallow
its pride, redesign the jets to balance properly and work properly and retrain the pilots
appropriately; or be prepared for any consequences if one of its airliners fails a third time
because of the same problem.
The Chinese would need their heads examined if they bought Boeing after the graphic example
they are even now observing, that the United States will leverage any advantage in order to
demand concessions. Other countries – like Iran – who have bought American
aircraft have seen the USA cut them off from spare parts and withdraw all the American
technicians they insist do the maintenance routines. Justin Trudeau might fly around in a 737
just to demonstrate how confident he feels in American know-how and technology, but there's
no reason for anyone else to act like such a retard.
Boeing does make a good aircraft. But Airbus is just as good, and more importantly, it's
not American. It's bad enough that it's French, considering how the French under Hollande
bent over for Washington, and canceled the warship contract they had signed with Russia when
the first ship was already built and ready for delivery. Hopefully they learned a lesson,
considering how bitter the French builders were at Hollande's spinelessness. But there's no
reason China can't build its own airliners in cooperation with Russia. The USA will make a
big noise about not certifying it, but the threat by China to junk its remaining Boeings
would strike fear into Boeing's heart, and it has many lobbyists at court.
I hope everyone can see that this is only fairness in action. Americans proclaim
themselves the champions of fairness – well, then, surely they will understand how,
after the US government bullying everyone and American steelworkers smirking over the
advantages Trump's tariffs on its neighbours bestowed upon them, other countries suddenly
were not eager to buy American products. Trump's technique is to gain market share by
prohibiting competition. Nobody should be surprised when American products in foreign markets
are shunned.
It's interesting that Boeing has a 737 fitting and completion center in Zhoushan, China
whereas Airbus builds entire A320s at Tianjin (50 p/y starting 2009) as it also does in
Mobile, Alabama. And let us not forget that a VIP 767 ordered for Chairman Jiang Zemin was
found to be bugged back in 2003
"... The aim of the panel, called the Joint Authorities Technical Review, was to expedite getting the 737 Max into the air by creating a vehicle for achieve consensus among foreign regulators who had grounded the 737 Max before the FAA had. But these very regulators had also made clear they needed to be satisfied before they'd let it fly in their airspace. ..."
"... The FAA hopes to give the 737 Max the green light in November, while the other regulators all have said they have issues that are unlikely to be resolved by then. The agency is now in the awkward position of having a body it set up to be authoritative turn on the agency's own procedures. ..."
"... the FAA had moved further and further down the path of relying on aircraft manufactures for critical elements of certification. Not all of this was the result of capture; with the evolution of technology, even the sharpest and best intended engineer in government employ would become stale on the state of the art in a few years. ..."
"... Although all stories paint a broadly similar picture, .the most damning is a detailed piece at the Seattle Times, Engineers say Boeing pushed to limit safety testing in race to certify planes, including 737 MAX ..The article gives an incriminating account of how Boeing got the FAA to delegate more and more certification authority to the airline, and then pressured and abused employees who refused to back down on safety issues . ..."
"... In 2004, the FAA changed its system for front-line supervision of airline certification from having the FAA select airline certification employees who reported directly to the FAA to having airline employees responsible for FAA certification report to airline management and have their reports filtered through them (the FAA attempted to maintain that the certification employees could provide their recommendations directly to the agency, but the Seattle Times obtained policy manuals that stated otherwise). ..."
"... On Monday, the Post and Courier reported about the South Carolina plant that produced 787s found with tools rattling inside that Boeing SC lets mechanics inspect their own work, leading to repeated mistakes, workers say. These mechanic certifications would never have been kosher if the FAA were vigilant. Similarly, Reuters described how Boeing weakened another safety check, that of pilot input. ..."
"... As part of roughly a dozen findings, these government and industry officials said, the task force is poised to call out the Federal Aviation Administration for what it describes as a lack of clarity and transparency in the way the FAA delegated authority to the plane maker to assess the safety of certain flight-control features. The upshot, according to some of these people, is that essential design changes didn't receive adequate FAA attention. ..."
"... But the report could influence changes to traditional engineering principles determining the safety of new aircraft models. Certification of software controlling increasingly interconnected and automated onboard systems "is a whole new ballgame requiring new approaches," according to a senior industry safety expert who has discussed the report with regulators on both sides of the Atlantic. ..."
"... For instance, the Journal reports that Canadian authorities expect to require additional simulator training for 737 Max pilots. Recall that Boeing's biggest 737 Max customer, Southwest Airlines, was so resistant to the cost of additional simulator training that it put a penalty clause into its contract if wound up being necessary. ..."
"... Patrick Ky, head of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, told the European Parliament earlier this month, "It's very likely that international authorities will want a second opinion" on any FAA decision to lift the grounding. ..."
"... Most prominently, EASA has proposed to eventually add to the MAX a third fully functional angle-of-attack sensor -- which effectively measures how far the plane's nose is pointed up or down -- underscoring the controversy expected to swirl around the plane for the foreseeable future. ..."
"... It's hard to see how Boeing hasn't gotten itself in the position of being at a major competitive disadvantage by virtue of having compromised the FAA so severely as to have undercut safety. ..."
"... has Boeing developed a plan to correct the trim wheel issue on the 787max? i haven't seen a single statement from them on how they plan to fix this problem. is it possible they think they can get the faa to re-certify without addressing it? ..."
"... Don't forget that the smaller trim wheels are in the NG as well. any change to fix the wheels ripples across more planes than just the Max ..."
"... The self-inflicted wound caused by systematic greed and arrogance – corruption, in other words. Boeing is reaping the wages of taking 100% of their profits to support the stock price through stock buybacks and deliberately under-investing in their business. Their brains have been taken over by a parasitic financial system that profits by wrecking healthy businesses. ..."
"... Shareholder Value is indeed the worst idea in the world. That Boeing's biggest stockholder, Vanguard, is unable to cleanup Boeing's operations makes perfect sense. I mean vanguards expertise is making money, not building anything. Those skills are completely different. ..."
"... One maxim we see illustrated here and elsewhere is this: Trust takes years to earn, but can be lost overnight. ..."
The FAA evidently lacked
perspective on how much trouble it was in after the two international headline-grabbing crashes
of the Boeing 737 Max. It established a "multiagency panel" meaning one that included
representatives from foreign aviation regulators, last April. A new Wall Street Journal article
reports that the findings of this panel, to be released in a few weeks, are expected to
lambaste the FAA 737 Max approval process and urge a major redo of how automated aircraft
systems get certified .
The aim of the panel, called the Joint Authorities Technical Review, was to expedite getting
the 737 Max into the air by creating a vehicle for achieve consensus among foreign regulators
who had grounded the 737 Max before the FAA had. But these very regulators had also made clear
they needed to be satisfied before they'd let it fly in their airspace.
The JATR gave them a venue for reaching a consensus, but it wasn't the consensus the FAA
sought. The foreign regulators, despite being given a forum in which to hash things out with
the FAA, are not following the FAA's timetable. The FAA hopes to give the 737 Max the green
light in November, while the other regulators all have said they have issues that are unlikely
to be resolved by then. The agency is now in the awkward position of having a body it set up to
be authoritative turn on the agency's own procedures.
The Seattle Times, which has broken many important on the Boeing debacle, reported on how
the FAA had moved further and further down the path of relying on aircraft manufactures for
critical elements of certification. Not all of this was the result of capture; with the
evolution of technology, even the sharpest and best intended engineer in government employ
would become stale on the state of the art in a few years.
However, one of the critical decisions the FAA took was to change the reporting lines of the
manufacturer employees who were assigned to FAA certification.
From a May post :
Although all stories paint a broadly similar picture, .the most damning is a detailed
piece at the Seattle Times,
Engineers say Boeing pushed to limit safety testing in race to certify planes, including 737
MAX ..The article gives an incriminating account of how Boeing got the FAA to delegate
more and more certification authority to the airline, and then pressured and abused employees
who refused to back down on safety issues .
As the Seattle Times described, the problems extended beyond the 737 Max MCAS software
shortcomings; indeed, none of the incidents in the story relate to it.
In 2004, the FAA changed its system for front-line supervision of airline certification
from having the FAA select airline certification employees who reported directly to the FAA
to having airline employees responsible for FAA certification report to airline management
and have their reports filtered through them (the FAA attempted to maintain that the
certification employees could provide their recommendations directly to the agency, but the
Seattle Times obtained policy manuals that stated otherwise).
Mind you, the Seattle Times was not alone in depicting the FAA as captured by Boeing. On
Monday, the Post and Courier reported about the South Carolina plant that produced 787s found
with tools rattling inside that
Boeing SC lets mechanics inspect their own work, leading to repeated mistakes, workers say.
These mechanic certifications would never have been kosher if the FAA were vigilant. Similarly,
Reuters described how Boeing weakened another safety check, that of pilot input.
One of the objectives for creating this panel was to restore confidence in Boeing and the
FAA, but that was always going to be a tall order, particularly after more bad news about
various 737 Max systems and Boeing being less than forthcoming with its customers and
regulators emerged.
From the Wall Street Journal :
As part of roughly a dozen findings, these government and industry officials said, the
task force is poised to call out the Federal Aviation Administration for what it describes as
a lack of clarity and transparency in the way the FAA delegated authority to the plane maker
to assess the safety of certain flight-control features. The upshot, according to some of
these people, is that essential design changes didn't receive adequate FAA attention.
The report, these officials said, also is expected to fault the agency for what it
describes as inadequate data sharing with foreign authorities during its original
certification of the MAX two years ago, along with relying on mistaken industrywide
assumptions about how average pilots would react to certain flight-control emergencies .
The FAA has stressed that the advisory group doesn't have veto power over modifications to
MCAS.
But the report could influence changes to traditional engineering principles determining
the safety of new aircraft models. Certification of software controlling increasingly
interconnected and automated onboard systems "is a whole new ballgame requiring new
approaches," according to a senior industry safety expert who has discussed the report with
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic.
If the FAA thinks it can keep this genie the bottle, it is naive. The foreign regulators
represented on the task force, including from China and the EU, have ready access to the
international business press. And there will also be an embarrassing fact on the ground, that
the FAA, which was last to ground the 737 Max, will be the first to let it fly again, and
potentially by not requiring safety protections that other regulators will insist on. For
instance, the Journal reports that Canadian authorities expect to require additional simulator
training for 737 Max pilots. Recall that Boeing's biggest 737 Max customer, Southwest Airlines,
was so resistant to the cost of additional simulator training that it put a penalty clause into
its contract if wound up being necessary.
It's a given that the FAA will be unable to regain its former stature and that all of its
certifications of major aircraft will now be second guessed subject to further
review by major foreign regulators. That in turn will impose costs on Boeing, of changing its
certification process from needing to placate only the FAA to having to appease potentially
multiple parties. For instance, the EU regulator is poised to raise the bar on the 737 Max:
Patrick Ky, head of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, told the European
Parliament earlier this month, "It's very likely that international authorities will want a
second opinion" on any FAA decision to lift the grounding.
Even after EASA gives the green light, agency officials are expected to push for
significant additional safety enhancements to the fleet. Most prominently, EASA has proposed
to eventually add to the MAX a third fully functional angle-of-attack sensor -- which
effectively measures how far the plane's nose is pointed up or down -- underscoring the
controversy expected to swirl around the plane for the foreseeable future.
A monopoly is a precious thing to have. Too bad Boeing failed to appreciate that in its zeal
for profits. If the manufacturer winds up facing different demands in different regulatory
markets, it will have created more complexity for itself. Can it afford not to manufacture to
the highest common denominator, say by making an FAA-only approved bird for Southwest and
trying to talk American into buying FAA-only approved versions for domestic use only? It's hard
to see how Boeing hasn't gotten itself in the position of being at a major competitive
disadvantage by virtue of having compromised the FAA so severely as to have undercut
safety.
Even if Boeing finds solutions that international regulators can finally accept, their
implementation will take additional months. The AoA sensor and trim wheel issues will
likely require hardware changes to the 600 or so existing MAX airplanes. The demand for
simulator training will further delay the ungrounding of the plane. There are only some two
dozen 737 MAX simulators in this world and thousands of pilots who will need to pass
through them.
has Boeing developed a plan to correct the trim wheel issue on the 787max? i haven't seen
a single statement from them on how they plan to fix this problem. is it possible they think
they can get the faa to re-certify without addressing it?
The self-inflicted wound caused by systematic greed and arrogance – corruption, in
other words. Boeing is reaping the wages of taking 100% of their profits to support the stock
price through stock buybacks and deliberately under-investing in their business. Their brains
have been taken over by a parasitic financial system that profits by wrecking healthy
businesses.
It's not only Boeing – the rot is general and it is terrible to see the destruction
of American productive capacity by a parasitic finance sector.
Shareholder Value is indeed the worst idea in the world. That Boeing's biggest
stockholder, Vanguard, is unable to cleanup Boeing's operations makes perfect sense. I mean
vanguards expertise is making money, not building anything. Those skills are
completely different.
Shareholder value does what it intended to do, which is to maximise stock value in the
short term, even if it significantly cuts value in the long term.
By that measure allowing Boeing to take over the FAA and self-certify the 737-MAX was a
big success, because of short term maximization of stock value that resulted. It is now
someone else's problem regarding any long term harm.
Having worked at Boeing and the FAA, this report is very welcome. One thing: federal
hiring practices in a way lock out good people from working there. Very often the fed
managing some project has only a tenuous grasp is what is going on.
But has the job bc they
were hired in young and cheap, which is what agencies do with reduced budgets. That and job
postings very often stating that they are open only to current feds says it all.
So deferring
to the airline to "self-certify" would be a welcome relief to feds in many cases. At this
point, I doubt the number of their "sharpest and best intended" engineers is very high.
If
you want better oversight, then increase the number and quality of feds by making it easier
to hire, and decrease the number of contractors.
I deal with federal and state regulators (not airplane) all the time. Very well meaning
people, but in many cases are utterly unqualified to do the technical work. So it works well
when they stick to the policy issues and stay out of the technical details.
However, we have
Professional Engineers and other licensed professionals signing off on the engineering
documents per state law. You can look at the design documents and the construction
certification and there is a name and stamp of the responsible individual.
The licensing laws clearly state that the purpose of licensing is to hold public health
and safety paramount. This is completely missing in the American industrial sector due to the
industrial exemptions in the professional engineering licensing laws. Ultimately, there is
nobody technically responsible for a plane or a car who has to certify that they are making
the public safe and healthy.
Instead, the FAA and others do that. Federal agencies and the
insurance institute test cars and give safety ratings. Lawyers sue companies for defects
which also helps enforce safety.
One maxim we see illustrated here and elsewhere is this: Trust takes years to earn, but
can be lost overnight.
Boeing management and the FAA, having lost the trust of most people in the world through
their actions lately, seem to nevertheless think it will be a simple matter to return to the
former status quo. It seems as likely, or perhaps more likely, that they will never be
able to return to the former status quo. They have been revealed as poseurs and imposters,
cheerfully risking (and sometimes losing) their customers' lives so they can buy back more
stock.
This image will be (rightfully) hard for them to shake.
So people are going to quit their jobs rather than fly on Boeing planes? Joe and Marge
Six-Pack are going to choose flights not based on what they can afford but based on what make
of plane they are flying on? As if the airlines will even tell them in advance?
There are close to zero consequences to Boeing and FAA management. Click on the link to
the Purdue Sacklers debacle. The biggest inconvenience will be paying the lawyers.
From 1992 to 1999 I worked for the FAA running one of their labs in OKC. My role, among
other things, was to provide data to the Administrator on employee attitudes, business
practice changes, and policy impact on morale and safety. Back then, likely as now, it was a
common complaint heard from FAA execs about the conflict of interest of having to be both an
aviation safety regulatory agency and having to promote aviation. Congress seemed fine with
that – apparently still is. There is FAA pork in nearly every Congressional district
(think airports for example). Boeing is the latest example of how mission conflict is not
serving the aviation industry or public safety. With its headquarters within walking distance
of Capitol Hill, aviation lobbyists do not even get much exercise shuttling.
The 1996 Valuejet crash into the Florida swamps shows how far back the mission conflict
problem has persisted. Valuejet was a startup airline that was touted as more profitable than
all the others. It achieved that notoriety by flying through every FAA maintenance loophole
they could find to cut maintenance costs. When FAA started clamping down, Senate Majority
Leader Daschle scolded FAA for not being on the cutting edge of industry innovation. The
message was clear – leave Valuejet alone. That was a hard message to ignore given that
Daschle's wife Linda was serving as Deputy FAA Administrator (the #2 position) – a
clear conflict of interest with the role of her spouse – a fact not lost on
Administrator Hinson (the #1 position). Rather than use the disaster as an opportunity to
revisit FAA mission conflict, Clinton tossed Administrator Hinson into the volcano of public
outcry and put Daschle in charge. Nothing happened then, and it looks like Boeing might
follow Valuejet into the aviation graveyard.
Nothin' like regulatory capture. Along with financialized manufacturing, the cheap &
profitable will outdo the costly careful every time. Few businesses are run today with the
moral outlook of some early industrialists (not enough of them, but still present) who,
through zany Protestant guilt, cared for their reputations enough to not make murderous
product, knowing how the results would play both here and in Heaven. Today we have PR and
government propaganda to smear the doubters, free the toxic, and let loose toxins.
From food to clothing, drugs to hospitals, self-propelled skateboards to aircraft,
pesticides to pollution, even services as day care & education, it is time to call the
minions of manufactured madness to account. Dare we say "Free government from Murder
Inc."?
This is an excellent summary of the untenable situation that Boeing and the Federal
Government have gotten themselves into. In their rush to get richer the Elite ignored the
fact that monopolies and regulatory capture are always dangerously corrupt. This is not an
isolated case. FDA allows importation of uninspected stock pharmaceutical chemicals from
China. Insulin is unaffordable for the lower classes. Diseases are spreading through homeless
encampments. EPA approved new uses of environmentally toxic nicotinoid insecticide,
sulfoxaflor. DOD sold hundreds of billions of dollars of armaments to Saudi Arabia that were
useless to protect the oil supply.
The Powers-that-be thought that they would be a hegemon forever. But, Joe Biden's green
light for the Ukraine Army's attack against breakaway Donbass region on Russia's border
restarted the Cold War allying Russia with China and Iran. This is a multi-polar world again.
Brexit and Donald Trump's Presidency are the Empire's death throes.
NC readers know what the problem is as two comments above indicate clearly. Isn't the FAA
ashamed to keep conniving with the money and permitting dangerous planes to fly?
Boeing just got a WTO ruling against Airbus. It seems that one rogue produces others. Time
to clean the stable and remove the money addiction from safety regulation
I think that I can see an interesting situation developing next year. So people will be
boarding a plane, say with Southwest Airlines, when they will hear the following announcement
over the speakers-
"Ladies and gentlemen, this is your Captain speaking. On behalf of myself and the
entire crew, welcome aboard Southwest Airlines flight WN 861, non-stop service from Houston
to New York. Our flight time will be of 4 hours and 30 minutes. We will be flying at an
altitude of 35,000 feet at a ground speed of approximately 590 miles per hour.
We are pleased to announce that you have now boarded the first Boeing 737 MAX that has
been cleared to once again fly by the FAA as being completely safe. For those passengers
flying on to any other country, we regret to announce that you will have to change planes at
New York as no other country in the world has cleared this plane as being safe to fly in
their airspace and insurance companies there are unwilling to issue insurance cover for them
in any case.
So please sit back and enjoy your trip with us. Cabin Crew, please bolt the cabin doors
and prepare for gate departure."
"... Boeing screwed up by designing and installing a faulty systems that was unsafe. It did not even tell the pilots that MCAS existed. It still insists that the system's failure should not be trained in simulator type training. Boeing's failure and the FAA's negligence, not the pilots, caused two major accidents. ..."
"... Moon of Alabama ..."
"... Does the author of the NYT Magazine 'hit' piece have a conscience? He reminds me of every politician that voted to go to war in Iraq. Casualties? Oh! You mean collateral damage? Millions! That's acceptable. No problem. ..."
"... engineering used to be a discipline with ethics and responsibilities... But now anybody who could write two lines of code can call themselves a software engineer.... ..."
"... My opinion: EASA will fold and the 737 MAX will be ungrounded in Europe by January 2020. ..."
"... The NYT is the newspaper for the Democratic side of the Wall Street elite ..."
"... For any foreign certification authority, it is quite risky to recertify the 737MAX. It is politically doable only if it can claim that the European authority did it also. Therefore, if Europe does not fold but counter-attacks, on one hand Airbus may lose the American market, but on the other hand it may gain kind of a monopoly for most of the remaining global market. ..."
"... The US's ability to financially sustain this business on a global scale is faltering and will likely collapse along with US$ fiat. Others in Europe and China might pick up some of the slack but the era of $700 all inclusive vacations is slowly coming to an end. All things 'middle' are now deemed unsustainable. ..."
"... Ironically Boeing has put itself in this position. By aggressively accusing pilot error they have made pilot behaviour a headline factor in these crashes. But if pilot behaviour was due to a faulty Flight Control Computer then Boeing is doubly at fault here ..."
"... The 737 Max pilots didn't have a chance. Four experienced pilots with knowledge of MACS system in the simulators had four seconds to do the right thing. ..."
"... The question is: Given more time, with no misleading warnings, knowledge, and simulator training to acquire muscle memory, can regular airline pilots recover control in case of sensor failure and/or with the changed flight characteristics of the Max. ..."
Langewiesche describes an earlier Lion Air flight that also experienced an MCAS failure but
was by chance saved:
Immediately after liftoff, the captain's airspeed indication failed,
airspeed-disagreement and altitude-disagreement warnings appeared on his flight display
and his stick shaker began to rattle the controls in warning of an imminent stall.
The Bali captain was enough of an airman to realize that he was dealing with an
information failure only -- not an actual stall. No direct mention has been made of this,
but he must have immediately identified the replacement angle-of-attack vane on his side
as the likely culprit.
Wrong. How would the pilot know that? The pilot noticed intermitted automatic down trim.
That failure mode was not in the flight manuals and pilot had no way to attribute it to an
AoA sensor. The claim is also contradicted by the pilot's maintenance log entry:
After pulling up to the gate in Jakarta, the Bali captain informed a company mechanic
about "the aircraft problem" and in the maintenance log noted only three anomalies -- the
captain's airspeed and altitude indication errors and the illumination of a warning light
related to a system known as Feel Differential Pressure. That was it. Apparently the
captain noted nothing about the failure of the newly installed angle-of-attack sensor ,
or the activation of the stick shaker, or the runaway trim, or the current position of
the trim cutout switches. If true, it was hard to conclude anything other than that this
was severe and grotesque negligence.
The captain noted nothing about the AoA sensor because he did not know that it
failed.
The captian did mention a trim problem but he had not experienced a runaway trim. A
classic runaway trim is continuously. An MCAS intervention like the captain experienced
discontinues after 9 seconds. But the pilots on that flight did not even know that MCAS
existed. The captain reported all the basic symptoms he experienced during that flight. A
runaway was not one of them.
Langewiesche fails to mention, probably intentionally, the captain's additional entry in
the maintenance log. The captain
wrote :
"Airspeed unreliable and ALT disagree shown after takeoff, STS also running to the wrong
direction ...".
STS, the Speed Trim System, moves the stabilizer trim. It does that all the time but
discontinuously during every normal flight. The pilot correctly described the symptoms of
the incident as he perceived them. Those were not the symptoms of a continuously runaway
stabilizer. But the pilot knew, and documented, that he experienced an intermitted trim
problem. It was the mechanics responsibility to analyze the underlying error and to correct
the system which is exactly what he did.
The author's "blame the pilots" attitude is well expressed in this paragraph:
Critics have since loudly blamed it for the difficulty in countering the MCAS when the
system receives false indications of a stall. But the truth is that the MCAS is easy to
counter -- just flip the famous switches to kill it. Furthermore, when you have a
maintenance log that shows the replacement of an angle-of-attack sensor two days before
and then you have an associated stick shaker rattling away while the other stick shaker
remains quiet, you do not need an idiot light to tell you what is going on. At any rate,
the recognition of an angle-of-attack disagreement -- however pilots do or do not come to
it -- has no bearing on this accident, so we will move on.
An AoA sensor failure and a following MCAS incident will cause all of the following: an
unexpected autopilot shutdown, an airspeed warning, an attitude disagree warning, a stall
warning and, after MCAS intervenes, also an over-speed warning. The control column rattles,
a loud clacker goes off, several lights blink or go red, several flight instruments
suddenly show crazy values. All this in a critical flight phase immediately after the start
when the workload is already high.
It is this multitude of warnings, which each can have multiple causes, that startle a
pilot and make it impossible to diagnose and correct within the 10 seconds that MCAS runs.
To claim that "MCAS is easy to counter" is a gross misjudgment of a pilot's workload in
such a critical situation.
After blaming the pilots Langewiesche bashes the foreign air safety regulators which are
now investigating the MAX accidents:
According to sources familiar with both investigations, Boeing and the N.T.S.B. have been
largely excluded and denied access to such basic evidence as the complete flight-data
recordings and the audio from the cockpit.
...
It is a forlorn hope, but you might wish that investigators like those in Indonesia and
Ethiopia would someday have the self-confidence to pursue full and transparent
investigations and release all the raw data associated with the accidents.
I am not aware of an accident in the U.S. where the FAA investigators released "complete
flight-data recordings and the audio from the cockpit" to foreign entities that were
suspected to have caused the incident. Nor will the FAA "release all the raw data"
associated with an accident. Certainly not before an investigation is finished.
Boeing screwed up by designing and installing a faulty systems that was unsafe. It did
not even tell the pilots that MCAS existed. It still insists that the system's failure
should not be trained in simulator type training. Boeing's failure and the FAA's
negligence, not the pilots, caused two major accidents.
Nearly a year after the first incident Boeing has still not presented a solution that
the FAA would accept. Meanwhile more safety critical issues on the 737 MAX were found for
which Boeing has still not provided any acceptable solution.
But to Langewiesche this anyway all irrelevant. He closes his piece out with more "blame
the pilots" whitewash of "poor Boeing":
The 737 Max remains grounded under impossibly close scrutiny, and any suggestion that
this might be an overreaction, or that ulterior motives might be at play, or that the
Indonesian and Ethiopian investigations might be inadequate, is dismissed summarily. To
top it off, while the technical fixes to the MCAS have been accomplished, other barely
related imperfections have been discovered and added to the airplane's woes. All signs
are that the reintroduction of the 737 Max will be exceedingly difficult because of
political and bureaucratic obstacles that are formidable and widespread. Who in a
position of authority will say to the public that the airplane is safe?
I would if I were in such a position. What we had in the two downed airplanes was a
textbook failure of airmanship . In broad daylight, these pilots couldn't decipher a
variant of a simple runaway trim, and they ended up flying too fast at low altitude,
neglecting to throttle back and leading their passengers over an aerodynamic edge into
oblivion. They were the deciding factor here -- not the MCAS, not the Max.
One wonders how much Boeing paid the author to assemble his screed.
--- ---
Previous Moon of Alabama posts on Boeing 737 MAX issues:
Does the author of the NYT Magazine 'hit' piece have a conscience? He reminds me of
every politician that voted to go to war in Iraq. Casualties? Oh! You mean collateral
damage? Millions! That's acceptable. No problem.
14,000 Words Of "Blame The Pilots" That Whitewash Boeing Of 737 MAX Failure
The New York Times
No doubt, this WAS intended as a whitewash of Boeing, but having read the 14,000 words,
I don't think it qualifies as more than a somewhat greywash. It is true he blames the
pilots for mishandling a situation that could, perhaps, have been better handled, but
Boeing still comes out of it pretty badly and so does the NTSB. The other thing I took away
from the article is that Airbus planes are, in principle, & by design, more
failsafe/idiot-proof.
Key words: New York Times Magazine. I think when your body is for sale you are called a
whore. Trump's almost hysterical bashing of the NYT is enough to make anyone like the
paper, but at its core it is a mouthpiece for the military industrial complex. Cf. Judith
Miller.
The New York Times Magazine just published a 14,000 words piece
An ill-disguised attempt to prepare the ground for premature approval for the 737max. It
won't succeed - impossible. Opposition will come from too many directions. The blowback
from this article will make Boeing regret it very soon, I am quite sure.
Come to think about it: (apart from the MCAS) what sort of crap design is it, if an
absolutely vital control, which the elevator is, can become impossibly stiff under just
those conditions where you absolutely have to be able to move it quickly?
It will only highlight the hubris of "my sh1t doesn't stink" mentality of the American
elite and increase the resolve of other civil aviation authorities with a backbone (or in
ascendancy) to put Boeing through the wringer.
For the longest time FAA was the gold standard and years of "Air Crash Investigation" TV
shows solidified its place but has been taken for granted. Unitl now if it's good enough
for the FAA it's good enough for all.
That reputation has now been irreparably damaged over this sh1tshow. I can't help but
think this NYT article is only meant for domestic sheeple or stock brokers' consumption as
anyone who is going to have anything technical to do with this investigation is going to
see right through this load literal diarroeh.
I wouldn't be surprised if some insider wants to offload some stock and planted this
story ahead of some 737MAX return-to-service timetable announcement to get an uplift.
Someone needs to track the SEC forms 3 4 and 5. But there are also many ways to skirt
insider reporting requirements. As usual, rules are only meant for the rest of us.
Thanks for the ongoing reporting of this debacle b....you are saving peoples lives
@ A.L who wrote
"
I wouldn't be surprised if some insider wants to offload some stock and planted this story
ahead of some 737MAX return-to-service timetable announcement to get an uplift. Someone
needs to track the SEC forms 3 4 and 5. But there are also many ways to skirt insider
reporting requirements. As usual, rules are only meant for the rest of us.
"
I agree but would pluralize your "insider" to "insiders". This SOP gut and run
financialization strategy is just like we are seeing with Purdue Pharma that just filed
bankruptcy because their opioids have killed so many....the owners will never see jail time
and their profits are protected by the God of Mammon legal system.
Hopefully the WWIII we are engaged in about public/private finance will put an end to
this perfidy by the God of Mammon/private finance cult of the Western form of social
organization.
Peter Lemme, the satcom guru , was
once an engineer at Boeing. He testified over technical MAX issue before Congress and wrote
lot of technical details about it. He retweeted the NYT Mag piece with this comment :
Peter Lemme @Satcom_Guru
Blame the pilots.
Blame the training.
Blame the airline standards.
Imply rampant corruption at all levels.
Claim Airbus flight envelope protection is superior to Boeing.
Fumble the technical details.
Stack the quotes with lots of hearsay to drive the theme.
Ignore everything else
Indeed, I was put in mind of the Ford Pinto affair where internal documents highlighted
the risk of filling the passenger space with burning petrol in the event of a rear end
crash involving that car and recommended repositioning the fuel tank. It was decided on the
basis of cost which was an additional $11 per car and the remote likelihood of there being
any survivors to sue not to do anything. Unfortunately for them a thirteen year old Richard
Grimshaw did survive such an event. The jury was outraged enough to add $125,000,000 in
punitive damages to the settlement, not unexpectedly later reduced to $3.5,000,000.
A former Boeing official who was subpoeaned to testify about his role in the development of
the 737 Max has refused to provide documents sought by federal prosecutors, according to
the Seattle Times, citing his Fifth Amendment right against forcible self-incrimination.
Mark Forkner who was Boeing's chief technical pilot on the 737 Max project during the
development of the plane, was responding to a grand jury subpoena. The US Justice
Department is investigating two fatal crashes of the Boeing jet, and is looking into the
design and certification of the plane, according to a person familiar with the matter cited
by the Seattle Times.
The Fifth Amendment provides a legal right that can be invoked by a person in order to
avoid testifying under oath. Because the amendment is used to avoid being put in a
situation where one would have to testify about something that would be self-incriminating,
it can sometimes be seen by outsiders as an implicit admission of guilt, although that is
not always the case.
It is less common to invoke the Fifth to resist a subpoena for documents or evidence.
According to legal experts, its use by Forkner could simply suggest a legal manuever
between Boeing's attorneys and prosecutors.
Langewiesche wrote an article for Vanity Fair magazine back in 2014 about the loss of Air
France 447 that also was themed on whether today's lousy pilots just aren't good enough for
today's magnificent airliners.
I thought, and still think, it was an excellent (and disturbing) article, but possibly
Langewiesche is so enamored of that theme, it is blinding him to Boeing's numerous screwups
in designing the Max.
perhaps, just like proponents of AI and self driving cars. They just love the
technology, financially and emotionally invested in it so much they can't see the forest
from the trees.
I like technology, I studied engineering. But the myopic drive to profitability and
naivety to unintended consequences are pushing these tech out into the world before they
are ready.
engineering used to be a discipline with ethics and responsibilities... But now anybody
who could write two lines of code can call themselves a software engineer....
My opinion: EASA will fold and the 737 MAX will be ungrounded in Europe by January 2020.
China, however, is a completely different beast: it is socialist and have created, in 2015,
its first
domestically produced passenger jet .
Consider the "reporter's" CV: Vanity Fair is largely navel gazing by the upper middle class
and the very well off. And the Atlantic hasn't published anything challenging in more than
30 years--and it's worsened over the last 20.
Of course this guy was the goto airplane "reporter" for the NYT Mag.
And yes, it's laughable that the NY Times Mag published this. As if an error reading in
one sensor sending an automobile off a cliff, or under a truck in the case of Tesla, would
be acceptable in any instance.
What does it really matter?" Boeing is just a symptom of the Terminal Illness of the US of
A. There are dozens and dozens maybe hundreds and hundreds more. The last 30 years of my
life and I am going to be 67 soon I have personally witnessed the destruction of science
and technology in the US. What was a great accomplishment for the Nation as a whole and
despite the fact that most people had no involvement in or knowledge of what was
accomplished and what a great system had been created, has been destroyed by the same sick
Fucks that have destroyed the American Middle Class and American Economy and American
Culture. Just the land of the greedy pig and the ass licking dumb ass inbred CEO and CEO
wannabees... Its not easy to destroy an entire culture but they have done it and are proud
of it too...
Yes, the tariff against Airbus is likely a tool for pressuring the European
certification authority. Nevertheless my prediction is opposite to yours:
For any foreign certification authority, it is quite risky to recertify the 737MAX.
It is politically doable only if it can claim that the European authority did it also.
Therefore, if Europe does not fold but counter-attacks, on one hand Airbus may lose the
American market, but on the other hand it may gain kind of a monopoly for most of the
remaining global market.
There's a pattern to this blame game. In this 2014 Vanity Fair article The
Human Factor Langewiesche devotes hundreds of words, more than I ever wanted to know
(scroll down), about pilots and how they have evolved, as automation (artificial
intelligence) has taken over the cockpits. The 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447 killed
228 people and the pilots "were hideously incompetent" Langewiesche wrote in this article,
which also includes some sociological factors.
@41 jay... that is true, but this is one of the main fronts that the private banks used to
secure there own position - thru gse's... everyone knew it was happening and the
authorities never cracked down on any of it... thus the resultant stock price... they
didn't come shooting back like citicorp and etc. etc.. there is a reason for that.. the
public was on the hook for these gse's.. the taxpayer gets all the downside and none of the
upside.. they will circle the wagons over boeing as well... guaranteed...
Air travel and the essentially indistinguishable Military Industrial Complex are the
most heavily subsidized 'industries' in existence. They would not and could not function
without government largesse.
The US's ability to financially sustain this business on a global scale is faltering
and will likely collapse along with US$ fiat. Others in Europe and China might pick up some
of the slack but the era of $700 all inclusive vacations is slowly coming to an end. All
things 'middle' are now deemed unsustainable.
Others have their eyes on the money pie, including for pensions and basic social
services. Google for example, which wants to keep extending it's massively expensive
infrastructure for spying plus build a centrally controlled system of self driving sardine
tins, for which Boeing is an important competitor, moneywise and especially in terms of the
technical talent required to both build and sustain it.
The mass transport of people via large aircraft is coming to an end. So too is mass
movement in privately owned cars. Globalists have private jets for themselves and could
care less about how peons get around, except insofar as everyone can be perfectly
controlled. Toll roads and possibly even digitally controlled sidewalks/ gates will soon
price convenient mobility, and also freedom of movement, completely out of reach for a
rapidly dissapearing middle class.
All is by design. The Globularchs are making a prison planet and feudal technocracy for
all those who lack sufficient social status. The takedown of Boeing is part of a process by
which the rest of us are irrevocably enslaved. First they build a problem in the public
mind via media then later they offer their solutions. A thousand year feudal Reich is what
they have planned for us and unless we learn to distinguish between the easily fixable
problems faced by Boeing or GM and the phoney plotlines fostered by Globalists we will have
no one to blame when those below the Ubermenchen class can't travel more than 5 kilometers
from their domiciles for the entirety of their lives.
@ Posted by: Parisian Guy | Sep 18 2019 22:13 utc | 47
You assume 1) the European people is enlightened and 2) Europe is not a capitalist
economy.
Of course that, if a trade war involving Airbus and Boeing begin, the whole European MSM
will quickly mold the European public opinion so that the European people begin to defend
Airbus as if it was defending its own existence.
However, there's the capitalist flank the USA can exploit over Europe. That is, it can
unground the 737 MAX in the American market and slap tariffs and fines on Airbus in order
to (try to) cripple its market share. Europe is not China, and, as the USA, depends on
infinite and indefinite economic growth to survive: even four years is enough to bend
European morale in this case, because there would be upper middle class jobs lost in the
Peninsula.
Europe is also not the USA: it built a capitalist model that essentially depends on its
image and glamour to survive. Its legitimacy essentially rests on the higher life quality
of its peoples vis-a-vis the rest of the world (e.g. the propagandization of Scandinavia).
If those middle/upper middle class jobs begin to be axed, there will be structural trouble
for the European social contract.
I guess it would be fair to say that William Langewiesche's life experience and background
as a pilot and then a writer specialising in aviation stories about the interface of
aviation technology and human limitations (physical and psychological) blinds him to the
fact that it's not so much human frailty in the two related cases of the Lion Air and the
Ethiopian Airlines crashes, as it is the current culture of Boeing itself which prioritises
profit over engineering, intentional redundancy built into technology (two Angle of Attack
sensors linked to the MCAS would be better than just one, Boeing 737 MAX jets have two AoA
sensors but Airbus jets have three AoA sensors, the third in the tail of the jet) and
maintaining consistency in quality and standards.
Langewiesche can waffle all he likes about the minutiae of what the Lion Air and
Ethiopian Airlines flight crews should have done or not done but all that wordiness counts
for nothing if he had been given information so incomplete and biased in favour in Boeing,
that it is nothing more than a pack of lies and he ends up writing propaganda.
The official air crash investigation reports might be coming out soon.
In the immediate aftermath of the crashes it looked like the pilots in both crashes had
not responded ideally. Some of their actions, even in teh Eithiopian's flight did not make
sense.
It was assumed this was due to pilot error,lack of training, foriegn pilots etc.
I have seen later reports that the reason for the pilots seeming mistakes is going to be
put entirely down to malfunctioning sensors and incorrect information and warnings from the
flight control computer.
It seems likely the pilots in both crashes will be completely exonerated of any
blame . Their actions will be attributed to the malfunctioning sensors and warnings
they were receiving.
In both crashes the pilots were overloaded with warnings, and nome of them were
erroneous.
In other words, blame in both crashes is going to end up 1000% on Boeing itself. Even in
the Lion Air flight.
Due to the MCAS
And their crappy 30 year old Flight Control Computer that could not produce correct
information in an emergency due to a highly predictable, even inevitable fault it had no
ability to error correct for.
This latter point is what I believe Boeing is trying to hide with its muddying the
waters exercise here.
This is absolutely crucial to the 737's future. The MCAS fix is relatively straight
forward. Have the ability to turn it off and hand complete control back to the pilots. And
prove the 737 is safe to fly with MCAS switched off (which I believe is the case).
As far as most people are concerned if MCAS is safe then the plane is safe. (and the
manual trim wheels are usuablez
But I belive the EASA, and the accident investigators have concluded the 737's Flight
Control Computer can't be trusted. This is a giant can of worms. Much bigger than even
MCAS itself. Re-writing Flight Control Computers will take years.
And remember there are two previous 737 crashes, prior to the MAX, that had somewhat
similar profiles to their crashes, that were controversially attributed to pilot error.
What if they were also due to faulty information from the 737 Flight Control Computers.
Ironically Boeing has put itself in this position. By aggressively accusing pilot
error they have made pilot behaviour a headline factor in these crashes. But if pilot
behaviour was due to a faulty Flight Control Computer then Boeing is doubly at fault
here
div> @ 33 FAA regulations prohibit flying with a device that has had a
battery recall from the manufactuer, which appliesto a limited set of 15" MacBook Pros. In a
CYA move some airlines limit all MacBooks.
@ 33 FAA regulations prohibit flying with a device that has had a battery recall from the
manufactuer, which appliesto a limited set of 15" MacBook Pros. In a CYA move some airlines
limit all MacBooks.
Pyrrho , Sep 18 2019 23:30 utc |
57David G , Sep 18 2019 23:43 utc |
58
@49 Don Bacon:
But was Langewiesche wrong about AF447?
All that happened on that plane mechanically was a brief loss of valid airspeed
indication, which corrected itself after a few seconds. That was it: nothing else wrong
with that aircraft, cruising safely at its full altitude.
From that insignificant glitch, the pilots (primarily the copilot, with the captain
failing to right the situation) managed to fly their airliner into the ocean, through pure
panic, incompetence, and confusion.
Langewiesche may have let his confirmation bias lead him to back a loser in the Max, and
it's possible he isn't up to mastering the myriad technical details here (the AF447 story
is technically straightforward), but the AF447 story makes a disturbingly strong case that
a well designed modern airliner can be a lot more trustworthy than the crew flying
it.
Like life, the AF447 crash was more complicated. One of the three pilots imputed the
wrong data into the flight radar system. So the plane flew into an Atlantic equatorial
thunderstorm which it normally would have avoided. The chief pilot was resting in the back.
The rookie co-pilot was flying. The speed indicator iced over in the storm, the auto-pilot
disengaged dumping control to the rookie. Airbus flight control sidesticks are not
interconnected. The 2nd officer did not know that the rookie had panicked in the storm and
was pulling back on his stick. The senior pilot had time to make it back to the cockpit but
only at the last seconds did he and the second officer realize that the plane at stalled
and would not recover.
The 737 Max pilots didn't have a chance. Four experienced pilots with knowledge of
MACS system in the simulators had four seconds to do the right thing. One failed. In
both crashes the pilots were fighting to save their lives.
The question is: Given more time, with no misleading warnings, knowledge, and
simulator training to acquire muscle memory, can regular airline pilots recover control in
case of sensor failure and/or with the changed flight characteristics of the Max.
Monopolies ignore designing human computer interfaces that work and that actually
increase safety. That costs big bucks.
Very easy solution, tell FAA to unground all the 737MAX and let them fly in the US. You
could lease the other 737MAX from all around the world, for probably very interesting
conditions. So Boeing also can deliver new planes and anything will be fine again.
I wish GOOD LUCK , the US-Passengers may will need it.
PS: Cancel the code-sharing to avoid problems with other airlines. Let them fly!
and enjoy your Popcorn.
Right, banks like Deutche Bank and Citi sure used the fact that Fannie and Freddie were
buying this crap, the securities, to say "see the sort of US government backed entities are
okay with it".
However the other insurance big banks used was credit default swaps, AKA fake insurance.
Buy that fake "policy" on a "bond" made up of ill defined garbage, and you then can turn
around and sell more of that ill defined garbage.
(Of course, in the real world liability insurance doesn't work that way, buy real
insurance, then burn down your neighbor's house, never get liability insurance again.)
And it's largely AIG (backed by Goldman Sachs) that sold those fake "bond" insurance
bets.
Unlike ibanks, which can hide crap, definitely still are, it's a bit hard to hide the
fact that a major product line is spectacularly crashing to the ground and killing
people.
Microsoft tried to pretend that its major product line, Windows, didn't have disastrous
crashes for at least 10 years. These lies have a great deal to do with the revival of Apple
and the emergence of Google and Android.
There was even a major flaw in the Sept 2019 Patch Tuesday release for Windows 7--the OS
became unusable. However I don't think Microsoft is going anywhere.
Boeing's travails show what's wrong with modern capitalism. Deregulation means a
company once run by engineers is now in the thrall of financiers and its stock remains high
even as its planes fall from the sky
Notable quotes:
"... The Muilenburg statement followed a September 3 presentation (pdf) by the chief of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Patrick Ky for the European parliament. It documents how EASA early on told the FAA and Boeing what it would do before allowing the plane back into the air. ..."
"... The most important statement in the above is that EASA will not rely on the FAA's judgment of the 737 MAX flight safety but make its own one. This is the consequence of the FAA's delegation of certification authority to Boeing and its very late grounding of the plane. ..."
"... EASA tasked 20 of its experts, test pilots and engineers with the review of the 737 MAX. They evaluated 70 test points and in June and July performed simulator test flights. Significant technical issues were found and communicated to Boeing in early July . Solving these issues is a condition for the plane's re-certification ..."
"... Friction between Boeing Co. and international air-safety authorities threatens a new delay in bringing the grounded 737 MAX fleet back into service, according to government and pilot union officials briefed on the matter. ..."
"... EASA will have its own pilots doing the certification flights on the revamped 737 MAX. They will test it with the modified MCAS as well as without it. They will also test the other points EASA listed. ..."
Boeing chairman and chief executive Dennis Muilenburg on Wednesday reiterated his
projection that, despite concerns publicly expressed by Europe's air safety regulator, the
737 MAX should begin to return to service around November.
This is unlikely to be the last change of the date. Muilenburg had additional bad
news:
However, he conceded that lack of alignment among international regulatory bodies could
mean that the grounded jet may first resume flying in the United States, with other major
countries following later.
"We're making good, solid progress on a return to service," Muilenburg said, speaking at
a Morgan Stanley investor conference in Laguna Beach, Calif. He later added that " a phased
ungrounding of the airplane among regulators around the world is a possibility."
The "phased ungrounding" means that the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration would certify
the plane as being safe while other regulators would still not do so. U.S. passengers would
be asked to fly on a plane that the rest of the world would still consider too unsafe to fly.
737 MAX flights from the U.S. to other countries would still be grounded as would the by far
largest part of the total fleet in Europe and China.
It is doubtful that insurance providers, U.S. airlines, their passengers and their pilots
would welcome such a "phased" move. It is an extremely risky behavior. Any accident during
that time, no matter for what reason, would bring the affected airline, Boeing and the FAA
into even deeper trouble.
It is likely that Boeing and the FAA would like to blame the foreign regulators for making
late or unreasonable demands. But the history of the two deadly 737 MAX accidents and the
development since prove that only Boeing and the FAA are to blame for this.
The Muilenburg statement followed a September 3 presentation
(pdf) by the chief of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Patrick Ky for the European
parliament. It documents how EASA early on told the FAA and Boeing what it would do before
allowing the plane back into the air.
Design changes proposed by Boeing are EASA approved ( no delegation to FAA )
Additional and broader independent design review has been satisfactorily completed by
EASA
Accidents of JT610 and ET302 are deemed sufficiently understood
B737 MAX flight crews have been adequately trained
The most important statement in the above is that EASA will not rely on the FAA's judgment
of the 737 MAX flight safety but make its own one. This is the consequence of the FAA's
delegation of certification authority to Boeing and its very late grounding of the plane.
Ky openly
blamed the FAA for giving too much authority to Boeing:
"Yes, there was a problem in this notion of delegation by the FAA of the MCAS safety
assessment to Boeing," Ky told the EU Parliament committee.
"This would not happen in our system," he insisted. "Everything which is
safety-critical, everything which is innovative has to be seen by us and not
delegated."
EASA tasked 20 of its experts, test pilots and engineers with the review of the 737 MAX.
They evaluated 70 test points and in June and July performed simulator test flights.
Significant technical issues were found and
communicated to Boeing in early July . Solving these issues is a condition for the
plane's re-certification:
Lack of exhaustive monitoring of the system failures resulting in a stabiliser
runaway
Too high forces needed to move the manual trim wheel in case of a stabiliser
runaway
Too late disconnection of autopilot near stall speed (in specific conditions)
Too high crew workload and risk of crew confusion in some failure cases, especially
Angle of Attack single failure at take-off
Boeing was expected to provide solutions for each of these issues.
But in a August 2019 meeting of international regulators Boeing
failed to
present them:
Friction between Boeing Co. and international air-safety authorities threatens a new delay
in bringing the grounded 737 MAX fleet back into service, according to government and pilot
union officials briefed on the matter.
The latest complication in the long-running saga, these officials said, stems from a
Boeing briefing in August that was cut short by regulators from the U.S., Europe, Brazil
and elsewhere, who complained that the plane maker had failed to provide technical details
and answer specific questions about modifications in the operation of MAX flight-control
computers.
As a consequence of Boeing's unwillingness EASA went public with its demands by putting
them into the above presentation. Even under political pressure there is no way EASA can now
go back on them.
EASA will have its own pilots doing the certification flights on the revamped 737 MAX.
They will test it with the modified MCAS as well as without it. They will also test the other
points EASA listed.
The flight safety regulators do not provide technical solutions for the problems they
find. They only tell Boeing to provide and implement designs that satisfies a regulator's
demands. If any of the points above is not satisfactory solved EASA will not allow the 737
MAX to fly in Europe. Other regulators like the Chinese CAAC will likely follow EASA on the
issue but may also add additional points. Some 80% of Boeing's single aisle planes are sold
into foreign markets. These will not be allowed to fly until the EASA's and others' demands
are satisfied.
Boeing has so far provided a solution for the Flight Control Computer problems. It has yet
to improve the confusing alarms, crew procedures and the associated training. Boeing does not
want mandatory simulator training for new 737 MAX pilots and the FAA seems to agree with it
on that point. But Canada already said that it will
demand such training and EASA and others are likely to do the same. Boeing has given no
appropriate response for the Angle of Attack integrity issues. EASA wants a third AoA sensor
or an equivalent technical solution. The
manual trim wheel problem , which also applies to the older 737 NG type, is also still an
open issue.
Muilenberg does not seem to
understand (pdf) that Boeing has to do more about these issues than 'answer
questions':
Rajeev Lalwani Analyst, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLCQ
... we've all seen the added sensor chatter. So we'd love for you to clarify what is and
isn't accurate.
Dennis A. Muilenburg Chairman, President & Chief Executive Officer, The Boeing
Co
[...] we're going to respect individual questions from different regulators and EASA has
brought up some questions and that we're working our way through. I wouldn't see those as
divisive. I just think those are questions that we need to answer as part of the process.
And questions around things like angle of attack, system design. Recognize that our
architecture on Boeing airplanes is different than Airbus airplanes. And that's always been
a topic of discussion; that doesn't necessarily mean hardware changes. In some cases, those
questions can be answered with simulation work or software updates or process updates. So
there's no specificity on answers. They're just question areas that we work our way through
as part of the normal certification process. So I would describe it that way. I think we've
got to pay attention to it, lot of work to do to answer questions. But everyone's motivated
to work together here and it creates timeline uncertainty.
The lack of AoA sensor redundancy and the blocked manual trim wheel need technical
solutions. "Answering questions" will not provide those. I for one can not see that EASA or
CAAC will let Boeing get away with this.
Muilenburg's admission that the plane is not ready for international certification is
devastating news for the company even as he tried to sell its as progress. The FAA might lift
the grounding of the plane under political pressure but other regulators will not follow
through. The public uproar that will be caused by that will make it nearly impossible to sell
tickets for 737 MAX flights.
Even if Boeing finds solutions that international regulators can finally accept, their
implementation will take additional months. The AoA sensor and trim wheel issues will likely
require hardware changes to the 600 or so existing MAX airplanes. The demand for simulator
training will further delay the ungrounding of the plane. There are only some two dozen 737
MAX simulators in this world and thousands of pilots who will need to pass through them.
These technical and organizational problems have all been known for several months. EASA
and others pointed them out early and often. But Boeing is still dragging its feet instead of
solving them. The delays caused by this unreasonable behavior risk the company's sales,
reputation and maybe even its existence.
---
Previous Moon of Alabama posts on Boeing 737 MAX issues:
Muilenburg lives in cloud cockoo land! This is definitive proof that he urgently needs to
be sacked. To say he is incompetent would be a gross understatement - he is off the scale.
If investors are satisfied with answers like this, they fully deserve to lose their
investment.
The foreign regulators walked out because Boeing wasn't willing to provide answers to
questions - and yet Muilenburg thinks Boeing is ready to fly?
Basically what he is saying is that Boeing can solve all the 737MAX problems by
bullshitting. Nothing else required. Is anybody going to agree with that? Anybody? Anybody?
Well, anybody's cat then?
If Boeing makes no serious effort to satify the EASA requirements, there is absolutely
zero chance it will fly even in the US, and even with absolute maximum pressure from
the US government to restart flying - because other parties like pilots union etc will
block it.
This situation is an absolutely brilliant comment on the problems of the financialisation
of Boeing. Nobody could have asked for a clearer statement than this.
Boeing is a classic example of what happens when you let the bean counters (a.k.a.
"financiers") who know nothing about the engineering and manufacturing processes within a
company take over that company. Workers get laid off, engineering and manufacturing is
outsourced, regulations are disregarded, but hey, PROFITS GO UP, stock price goes up, share
buybacks, multi-million dollar bonuses for the bean counters running the company!! It's all
good, right? Well, er no... Safety goes out the window and planes fly themselves into the
ground.
They say that if you were to go back in time with an elephant gun, and shoot a dinosaur
right thru the heart, It would take some time for the head to get the messages it was
dead....
Same with Boeing.... It's dead.... It just has not fallen down dead yet...
Boeing HAD a very small window to avoid self inflicted death... That window closed.
Smart money is on a big fall for them.
div> Americans will be proud to give their lives in order to protect
corporate bonuses at Boeing.
Thanks again b for your ongoing coverage of the financialization death of Boeing
@ Masher1 # 5 who wrote
"
Smart money is on a big fall for them.
"
The current role for Muilenburg is to stall long enough so that the Smart Money folks
can offload their ownership before the crash comes. The gut and run strategy is SOP for the
financialization folk, ask Mitt Romney.
Boeing's failures go beyond the 737MAX and include a recently cancelled $6+Billion contract
to supply vital components to the USAF's hypersonic missile program, which set it back a
few more years. This report's about the
KC-46 continuing problems:
"Boeing's troubled KC-46 Pegasus refueler and transport plane may have yet another
design flaw. The Pentagon barred it from flying passengers and cargo after locks on one
aircraft opened on their own."
The plane wasn't grounded but is prohibited from being used as a transport. The article
also reviews more of its problems.
Boeing's 777 also has issues and here
we see early signs of Boeing management's ineptness--perhaps the fine should have had 3
additional zeros added to it to get the proper response? There are many more problems with
Boeing products when one searches for them. It ought to be clear that the entire management
team at Boeing needs replacing.
Also interesting that Boeing has more trouble (again) with the Boeing KC46 .
"Boeing's troubled KC-46 Pegasus refueler and transport plane may have yet another design
flaw. The Pentagon barred it from flying passengers and cargo after locks on one aircraft
opened on their own.
Numerous cargo locks on the floor of one KC-46 unlocked several times during a recent
test flight."
@dh - If the FAA certifies the planes American Airlines and United will be the first to
put them back in service.
I doubt it. United will wait for EASA. There is a simple reason for that. United is
codesharing with Lufthansa and other international Star Alliance airlines.
If one books a flight from Germany to some smaller city in the U.S. the first leg is
usually on LH and the second a codeshare flight with UA.
Can LH sell tickets for such flights when the second leg is on an uncertified (for Europe)
MAX?
How will its insurances and reinsurance cover that?
All such co-operations and agreements are only possible when regulators agree.
"Lack of alignment of regulatory agencies" translates to ..... we at Boeing whine that our
ability to bribe the FAA doesn't apply worldwide, and we repeat our calls for
One-Stop-Shopping for buying regulatory approvals. This would lead to higher efficiencies
in our ability to bribe officials.
@12 Thanks b. I didn't know about the LH connection. I assume all the updated 737 Max
planes will only be used on domestic flights by American, United and Southwest (which owns
more Maxs than anyone).
We need a new term for this sort of thing - 4th World? If these things get back in the sky
there will be protests. This is exactly the sort of thing that will have Americans
cancelling their trips to DisneyWorld and writing to their congressmen. Maybe it's what we
need. Unfortunately it probably won't happen. Next month there'll be another press release
pushing it to December and so on, until the mess is ironed out I mean bailed out.
Boeing is Too-Big-To-Fail. Should such a prospect occur, we'd see their pet Congresspeople
and Senators demanding that the taxpayers bail out the company. National Security would be
given as the reason. Now that the industry has consolidated to the point where there are
only a couple of airplane manufacturers for military contracts, the taxpayers will be told
that it is impossible to allow one of them to fail. If you are an American taxpayer, expect
to be grabbed by the ankles, held upside down and shook until even the last penny has been
removed from your pockets.
Boeing Co.'s troubled 737 Max jets are unlikely to return to service until early 2020 as
regulatory authorities in the U.S. and Europe remain divided and the planemaker has yet to
submit its finalized software fix planned for this month, according to Barclays.
Europe's aviation safety watchdog will not accept a US verdict on whether Boeing's
troubled 737 Max is safe. Instead, the European Aviation Safety Agency (Easa) will run its
own tests on the plane before approving a return to commercial flights.
The European Aviation Safety Agency plans to send its own pilots to the U.S. to conduct
flight tests of Boeing Co.'s grounded 737 Max jet before it is returned to service, it said
Tuesday.
Boeing's travails show what's wrong with modern capitalism. Deregulation means a company
once run by engineers is now in the thrall of financiers and its stock remains high even as
its planes fall from the sky
The 737 Max's return risks accidentally breaking the aviation industry. The industry is
beginning to game out the potential unintended long-term consequences the events of 2019
will have on the business of commercial aviation.
The only reason the 737 MAX is not dead yet is because Boeing is an American company. Any
other country (specially Russia and China), they would've already been banned and slapped
with insurmountable fines.
The 737 MAX's problems comes from its design and are unsolvable. The only way to
unground it is through a cultural revolution in the West, where deaths by airplane become
morally acceptable again. But that in itself would require billions of dollars spent in
propaganda for decades, so the Law of the Tendency of the Profit Rate to Fall stands.
Boeing has struggled since two crashes of its 737 Max aircraft led to the plane being
grounded indefinitely. Still, analysts at Morgan Stanley think the company can recover and
rally to $500 per share over the next 12 months. Morgan Stanley expects Boeing to post
solid earnings growth, especially after the 737 Max is returned to service, which could be
as soon as October.
Not to imply that the Boeing "errors" and the very early jet airliner "Comet" are even
remotely similar... However the outcome may be similar?
Let me sketch the deal>
Comet was a very good airplane. However the holes for the rivets holding it together
(particularly 'round the windows) were punched, not drilled. The result was crack fatigue
failure of a generally catastrophic character. Bang. they crashed. there's a wiki
" windows had been engineered to be glued and riveted, but had been punch riveted only.
Unlike drill riveting, the imperfect nature of the hole created by punch riveting could
cause fatigue cracks to start developing around the rivet. "
The Comet got fixed. The RAF flew them until recently, Excellent airplane. But...
"Mark Forkner, Boeing's chief technical pilot on the MAX project......
"Forkner suggested to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that MCAS not be
included in the pilot manual...The FAA, after internal deliberations, agreed to keep MCAS
out of the manual...
"Boeing won the FAA's approval to give pilots just an hour of training through an iPad
about the differences between the MAX and the previous 737 generation. MCAS was not
mentioned."
The notion that Boeing is going to "fail" in any form of short term timeframe is
ridiculous.
Even if the 737 never flies again, Boeing still has its other defense and existing
commercial planes to sell parts, services and updates for.
Equally, there is very much a duopoly in commercial aircraft. There is literally no one
else that has the capacity to replace Boeing's 737 - and I'm sure Boeing is counting on
that. Even Airbus doesn't have the capacity to replace Boeing 737s.
@ 27 "The notion that Boeing is going to "fail" in any form of short term timeframe is
ridiculous."
Very recently Keiser Report evaluated the company has having a net value of less than zero,
and that they were one new loan from failing to make payroll.
Maybe he has another opinion... That the MIC will keep a moribund corpse animated, for a
time... Maybe!
I would rather walk than fly 737 Max. The plane is a death trap.
China and Russia both have new airliners that can fill the niche of the 737 Max and
probably much much safer too. Western airlines may not buy them but BRICs countries
will.
Presumably not all Congressmen fly Lear Jets. They will be paying attention to Boeing's
response and their constituent's emails.
I don't understand the air force response to the cargo plane issues. Only put pilots at
risk?
Do military planes also have to pass FAA certification? (Such as it is?) If so, how did the
KC pass inspection?
If not, who insures their planes are air worthy?
Re the De Havilland Comet.
You are right, it was a brilliant airplane. Unfortunately at the time metal fatigue was a
problem which was not understood in the context of pressurised aircraft.
What is interesting is how the British responded to the Comet's fatigue related
explosive depressurisation troubles. Everything (and I mean everything) was grounded.
Everything included many other aircraft types as well. The government ordered all
development projects for new aircraft types at the time halted and then that they be
reviewed. Even after that those projects could not proceed until the problems of the Comet
were understood and could be solved [to demonstrate how severe the government's reaction
was, consider that within the Bristol group of companies was a car building division and
its forward model programmes were stopped and could not be restarted until the government
rescinded its blanket bans- Bristol cars were affected since they were a part of an
aviation organisation and the government's orders did not make distinction between cars and
planes unfortunately].
The trouble was that even though the fatigue problem was subsequently understood and
design amendments were arrived at to make Comet safe, that took time. In that time the
British aero industry lost the lead it had built up across all commercial passenger
aircraft sectors, not only for pressurised-cabin jet-propelled passenger aircraft but for
everything else as well. Every project and new type launch was delayed, even including
non-pressurised aircraft! Time passed quickly.
Boeing 707 arrived and took the market which could have already been partially populated
by Comet aircraft. The mighty turbo-prop Bristols and others that were delayed similarly
found themselves being launched into crowded markets where competitors already had a firm
toe-hold. It was too late to get the sales they were intended to achieve. This set back was
never able to be recovered. The take home is that the British government fatally wounded
the British commercial aviation industry.
The Comet went on to a long life in civil and military aviation with the last passenger
variant retired from regular timetabled commercial service in 1980 and the very last of the
Comets flying retired in 1997 (there may have been a few historic and commemorative demo
flights since but if there were they were not commercial service). The public certainly did
buy tickets to fly Comet. It was a great aircraft and passengers had confidence in it. The
trouble was that not that many got sold, since by the time they did re-enter the market the
airlines were already running (and buying) 707s. It was too late!
So here we are watching Boeing burning. This time it is a problem which should never
have occurred in the first place as the technical knowledge to avoid it existed (Comet was
exactly the opposite situation). Boeing ought to review the 757 and 767 and do a modern
version of one (or both) of those.
..[A]n absolutely brilliant comment on the problems of the financialisation of Boeing.
Nobody could have asked for a clearer statement than this. Boeing has gone into
self-destruct mode. by: BM @ 2 <= did you mean self-denial mode..
Boeing is a classic example ... by: Greg @ 3 <=of what happens when the local
national government imposes on those it governs sufficient market exclusivity, and near
exclusive access to the purse of the local national government, so that one and one
company, can produce anything. Without competition, there is no incentive for its products
to be safe..no incentive for its products to be efficient, because the government in
partnership with its private monopoly company will bail out the private market partner
using tax payer money.
The notion that Boeing is going to "fail" in any form of short term timeframe is
ridiculous.
Even if the 737 never flies again, Boeing...there is literally no one else that has the
capacity to replace Boeing's 737 - and I'm sure Boeing is counting on that. Even Airbus
doesn't have the capacity to replace Boeing 737s. by: c1ue @ 27
EZ allows no competition, takes no prisoners, takes or destroys all that might some day
be competition..
B's journalism it a world class performance.
The 767 has morphed into the KC-46 so they have done a lot of that work already, but it
is a bit big. More puzzling is why the didn't take the 757 design forward.
Ah siotu, so quick to blame the British Government for acting in the interest of public
safety, but no condemnation of boeing for ignoring public safety. I get the picture but I
prefer to read Goebbels.
>>>> dh | Sep 12 2019 16:43 utc | 8
Did you read the updates/dates?
An Update on the Boeing 737 MAX
Updated Sept. 1, 2019 at 9 a.m. CT.
Cancellations extended through Dec. 3
Updated July 14, 2019 at 9 a.m. CT.
Cancellations extended through Nov. 2.
Updated June 9, 2019 at 9 a.m. CT.
Cancellations extended through Sept. 3.
Updated April 14, 2019 at 9 a.m. CT.
As we prepare for summer, our focus is around planning for the busiest travel period of
the year. Families everywhere are counting on American Airlines for their summer
vacations, family reunions, trips to visit friends and adventures overseas. Our
commitment to each other and to our customers is to operate the safest and most reliable
operation in our history.
Updated April 7, 2019 at 9 a.m. CT.
American continues to await information from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
Department of Transportation (DOT), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), other
regulatory authorities and Boeing that would permit the 24 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in our
fleet to resume flying.
Updated March 14, 2019 at 4 p.m. CT.
On March 13, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded all U.S.-registered
Boeing 737 MAX aircraft, including the 8 and 9 variants, as a precautionary measure. This
includes the 24 MAX 8 aircraft in the American Airlines fleet. We are complying with the
FAA directive.
Somehow I don't think American are going to be the first to fly their 737Max.
With that level of comfort for himself and his family, Muilenburg sure can afford to
live in Tierra de los Cuckoos de la Nube.
One really has to wonder who Boeing Corporation's shareholders and investors are, that
they tolerate such huge salary and compensation packages for senior people like Muilenburg
while engineers, designers, technicians and factory-floor workers maybe don't get the pay
or the working conditions they deserve. But I would not be surprised if most of Boeing's
shareholders turn out to be the very senior corporate execs who borrow money from Wall St
banks to buy shares in the company and expect workers to sacrifice parts of their own
compensation packages to pay back the interest on those loans.
You may know the movie, vaguely derivative of Comet>
"No Highway" Jimmy Stewart and Marlene Dietrich and other stars - on YT
I am ashamed I was too brief. And it is worth considering that the long term effect was
to really hurt the UK airplane industry. Perhaps 40 years ago I was working with GE on a
"go fix your screw-up" job on a cogen extraction turbine at a sawmill in Oregon. My
engineer and I spent several happy hours drinking and chatting - after I found the sabotage
(woodruff keys deliberately left out dust control rotary valves)---anyway "H.C." told me
several things from his old days with GE, and jobbing around with several employers - right
after the Korean war and through to our time together.
One was about repowering the Constellation airliners with GT's - and what went wrong
with that > "alloys not suitable" ie metallurgic incompatibility. However it may be that
the motivation was fear that there might be a Comet-type failure scenario...so it wasn't
worth the risk. I don't know if there really was an issue with the Connie getting repowered
- but they thought there was or might be. I understand that super DC 3's are, some, GT, but
they're nonpresurized, and tough.
Another was an isotope separation method that I have never again heard of - but he said
it worked, simply not economic (though what's "economic" about making "poot"?) I looked
into it as theory. It's slow, but probably could be improved. Other than that it is not
good to say.
Yet another about the hypersonic (?) re-entry shape that they dropped on near zero at
Kwaj. (in the 1960's). I think it was pretty heavy...see Boeing X 20 @ wiki - what he spoke
of was a 1/4 size (?) test vehicle shape, ie preliminary work, shooting from Vandenberg. I
wonder if Boeing kept the data they had when X20 was cancelled.
Do read the X20 wiki...nazi boffins to us boffins to intercontinental
rocketbomber...what a career to brag about in Hell!
I suspect that Trump has the political chops to avoid pushing this with the FAA and foreign
safety agencies. I'm not so sure about the #resistance. I can well see the Democrats
complaining that Trump hasn't applied pressure.
We'll need a new description for the shade of deep blue that will have appeared on the
faces of the PR spin doctors of AA and United Airlines by the time the FAA gives the Boeing
737MAX aircraft the all-clear to fly again.
I suggest that with your monicker being Ghost Ship, you go first to say what that colour
should be called.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>Text</BLOCKQUOTE>
< A HREF="http://www.aclu.org/">Headline (not the URL)</A> → Headline (not the URL)
"... During the certification process, Forkner suggested to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that MCAS not be included in the pilot manual, according to previous Seattle Times reporting. ..."
Chief Test Pilot on 737MAX involved in cover-up:
[snippet from Sept 8 Seattle Times ]
"...During the certification process, Forkner suggested to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) that MCAS not be included in the pilot manual, according to previous
Seattle Times reporting.
The FAA, after internal deliberations, agreed to keep MCAS out of the manual, reasoning
that MCAS was software that operates in the background as part of the flight-control system,
according to an official familiar with the discussions.
In addition, Boeing won the FAA's approval to give pilots just an hour of training through
an iPad about the differences between the MAX and the previous 737 generation. MCAS was not
mentioned. ..."
The 80286 Intel processors: The Intel 80286[3] (also marketed as the iAPX 286[4] and often called Intel 286) is a 16-bit
microprocessor that was introduced on February 1, 1982. The 80286 was employed for the IBM PC/AT, introduced in 1984, and then
widely used in most PC/AT compatible computers until the early 1990s.
Notable quotes:
"... The fate of Boeing's civil aircraft business hangs on the re-certification of the 737 MAX. The regulators convened an international meeting to get their questions answered and Boeing arrogantly showed up without having done its homework. The regulators saw that as an insult. Boeing was sent back to do what it was supposed to do in the first place: provide details and analysis that prove the safety of its planes. ..."
"... In recent weeks, Boeing and the FAA identified another potential flight-control computer risk requiring additional software changes and testing, according to two of the government and pilot officials. ..."
"... Any additional software changes will make the issue even more complicated. The 80286 Intel processors the FCC software is running on is limited in its capacity. All the extras procedures Boeing now will add to them may well exceed the system's capabilities. ..."
"... The old architecture was possible because the plane could still be flown without any computer. It was expected that the pilots would detect a computer error and would be able to intervene. The FAA did not require a high design assurance level (DAL) for the system. The MCAS accidents showed that a software or hardware problem can now indeed crash a 737 MAX plane. That changes the level of scrutiny the system will have to undergo. ..."
"... Flight safety regulators know of these complexities. That is why they need to take a deep look into such systems. That Boeing's management was not prepared to answer their questions shows that the company has not learned from its failure. Its culture is still one of finance orientated arrogance. ..."
"... I also want to add that Boeing's focus on profit over safety is not restricted to the 737 Max but undoubtedly permeates the manufacture of spare parts for the rest of the their plane line and all else they make.....I have no intention of ever flying in another Boeing airplane, given the attitude shown by Boeing leadership. ..."
"... So again, Boeing mgmt. mirrors its Neoliberal government officials when it comes to arrogance and impudence. ..."
"... Arrogance? When the money keeps flowing in anyway, it comes naturally. ..."
"... In the neoliberal world order governments, regulators and the public are secondary to corporate profits. ..."
"... I am surprised that none of the coverage has mentioned the fact that, if China's CAAC does not sign off on the mods, it will cripple, if not doom the MAX. ..."
"... I am equally surprised that we continue to sabotage China's export leader, as the WSJ reports today: "China's Huawei Technologies Co. accused the U.S. of "using every tool at its disposal" to disrupt its business, including launching cyberattacks on its networks and instructing law enforcement to "menace" its employees. ..."
"... Boeing is backstopped by the Murkan MIC, which is to say the US taxpayer. ..."
"... Military Industrial Complex welfare programs, including wars in Syria and Yemen, are slowly winding down. We are about to get a massive bill from the financiers who already own everything in this sector, because what they have left now is completely unsustainable, with or without a Third World War. ..."
"... In my mind, the fact that Boeing transferred its head office from Seattle (where the main manufacturing and presumable the main design and engineering functions are based) to Chicago (centre of the neoliberal economic universe with the University of Chicago being its central shrine of worship, not to mention supply of future managers and administrators) in 1997 says much about the change in corporate culture and values from a culture that emphasised technical and design excellence, deliberate redundancies in essential functions (in case of emergencies or failures of core functions), consistently high standards and care for the people who adhered to these principles, to a predatory culture in which profits prevail over people and performance. ..."
"... For many amerikans, a good "offensive" is far preferable than a good defense even if that only involves an apology. Remember what ALL US presidents say.. We will never apologize.. ..."
"... Actually can you show me a single place in the US where ethics are considered a bastion of governorship? ..."
"... You got to be daft or bribed to use intel cpu's in embedded systems. Going from a motorolla cpu, the intel chips were dinosaurs in every way. ..."
"... Initially I thought it was just the new over-sized engines they retro-fitted. A situation that would surely have been easier to get around by just going back to the original engines -- any inefficiencies being less $costly than the time the planes have been grounded. But this post makes the whole rabbit warren 10 miles deeper. ..."
"... That is because the price is propped up by $9 billion share buyback per year . Share buyback is an effective scheme to airlift all the cash out of a company towards the major shareholders. I mean, who wants to develop reliable airplanes if you can funnel the cash into your pockets? ..."
"... If Boeing had invested some of this money that it blew on share buybacks to design a new modern plane from ground up to replace the ancient 737 airframe, these tragedies could have been prevented, and Boeing wouldn't have this nightmare on its hands. But the corporate cost-cutters and financial engineers, rather than real engineers, had the final word. ..."
"... Markets don't care about any of this. They don't care about real engineers either. They love corporate cost-cutters and financial engineers. They want share buybacks, and if something bad happens, they'll overlook the $5 billion to pay for the fallout because it's just a "one-time item." ..."
"... Overall, Boeing buy-backs exceeded 40 billion dollars, one could guess that half or quarter of that would suffice to build a plane that logically combines the latest technologies. E.g. the entire frame design to fit together with engines, processors proper for the information processing load, hydraulics for steering that satisfy force requirements in almost all circumstances etc. New technologies also fail because they are not completely understood, but when the overall design is logical with margins of safety, the faults can be eliminated. ..."
"... Once the buyback ends the dive begins and just before it hits ground zero, they buy the company for pennies on the dollar, possibly with government bailout as a bonus. Then the company flies towards the next climb and subsequent dive. MCAS economics. ..."
"... The problem is not new, and it is well understood. What computer modelling is is cheap, and easy to fudge, and that is why it is popular with people who care about money a lot. Much of what is called "AI" is very similar in its limitations, a complicated way to fudge up the results you want, or something close enough for casual examination. ..."
United Airline and American Airlines furtherprolonged the
grounding of their Boeing 737 MAX airplanes. They now schedule the plane's return to the flight
line in December. But it is likely that the grounding will continue well into the next
year.
After Boeing's
shabby design and lack of safety analysis of its Maneuver Characteristics Augmentation
System (MCAS) led to the death of 347 people, the grounding of the type and billions of losses,
one would expect the company to show some decency and humility. Unfortunately Boeing behavior
demonstrates none.
There is still little detailed information on how Boeing will fix MCAS. Nothing was said by
Boeing about the manual trim system of the 737 MAX that
does not work when it is needed . The unprotected rudder cables of the plane
do not meet safety guidelines but were still certified. The planes flight control computers
can be
overwhelmed by bad data and a fix will be difficult to implement. Boeing continues to say
nothing about these issues.
International flight safety regulators no longer trust the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) which failed to uncover those problems when it originally certified the new type. The FAA
was also the last regulator to ground the plane after two 737 MAX had crashed. The European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) asked Boeing to explain and correct
five major issues it identified. Other regulators asked additional questions.
Boeing needs to regain the trust of the airlines, pilots and passengers to be able to again
sell those planes. Only full and detailed information can achieve that. But the company does
not provide any.
As Boeing sells some 80% of its airplanes abroad it needs the good will of the international
regulators to get the 737 MAX back into the air. This makes the arrogance
it displayed in a meeting with those regulators inexplicable:
Friction between Boeing Co. and international air-safety authorities threatens a new delay in
bringing the grounded 737 MAX fleet back into service, according to government and pilot
union officials briefed on the matter.
The latest complication in the long-running saga, these officials said, stems from a
Boeing briefing in August that was cut short by regulators from the U.S., Europe, Brazil and
elsewhere, who complained that the plane maker had failed to provide technical details and
answer specific questions about modifications in the operation of MAX flight-control
computers.
The fate of Boeing's civil aircraft business hangs on the re-certification of the 737 MAX.
The regulators convened an international meeting to get their questions answered and Boeing
arrogantly showed up without having done its homework. The regulators saw that as an insult.
Boeing was sent back to do what it was supposed to do in the first place: provide details and
analysis that prove the safety of its planes.
What did the Boeing managers think those regulatory agencies are? Hapless lapdogs like the
FAA managers`who
signed off on Boeing 'features' even after their engineers told them that these were not
safe?
Buried in the Wall Street Journal
piece quoted above is another little shocker:
In recent weeks, Boeing and the FAA identified another potential flight-control computer risk
requiring additional software changes and testing, according to two of the government and
pilot officials.
The new issue must be going beyond the flight control computer (FCC) issues the FAA
identified in June .
Boeing's original plan to fix the uncontrolled activation of MCAS was to have both FCCs
active at the same time and to switch MCAS off when the two computers disagree. That was
already a huge change in the general architecture which so far consisted of one active and one
passive FCC system that could be switched over when a failure occurred.
Any additional software changes will make the issue even more complicated. The 80286 Intel
processors the FCC software is running on is limited in its capacity. All the extras procedures
Boeing now will add to them may well exceed the system's capabilities.
Changing software in a delicate environment like a flight control computer is extremely
difficult. There will always be surprising side effects or regressions where already corrected
errors unexpectedly reappear.
The old architecture was possible because the plane could still be flown without any
computer. It was expected that the pilots would detect a computer error and would be able to
intervene. The FAA did not require a high design assurance level (DAL) for the system. The MCAS
accidents showed that a software or hardware problem can now indeed crash a 737 MAX plane. That
changes the level of scrutiny the system will have to undergo.
All procedures and functions of the software will have to be tested in all thinkable
combinations to ensure that they will not block or otherwise influence each other. This will
take months and there is a high chance that new issues will appear during these tests. They
will require more software changes and more testing.
Flight safety regulators know of these complexities. That is why they need to take a deep
look into such systems. That Boeing's management was not prepared to answer their questions
shows that the company has not learned from its failure. Its culture is still one of finance
orientated arrogance.
Building safe airplanes requires engineers who know that they may make mistakes and who have
the humility to allow others to check and correct their work. It requires open communication
about such issues. Boeing's say-nothing strategy will prolong the grounding of its planes. It
will increases the damage to Boeing's financial situation and reputation.
---
Previous Moon of Alabama posts on Boeing 737 MAX issues:
"The 80286 Intel processors the FCC software is running on is limited in its capacity."
You must be joking, right?
If this is the case, the problem is unfixable: you can't find two competent software
engineers who can program these dinosaur 16-bit processors.
You must be joking, right?
If this is the case, the problem is unfixable: you can't find two competent software
engineers who can program these dinosaur 16-bit processors.
One of the two is writing this.
Half-joking aside. The 737 MAX FCC runs on 80286 processors. There are ten thousands of
programmers available who can program them though not all are qualified to write real-time
systems. That resource is not a problem. The processors inherent limits are one.
Thanks b for the fine 737 max update. Others news sources seem to have dropped coverage. It
is a very big deal that this grounding has lasted this long. Things are going to get real bad
for Boeing if this bird does not get back in the air soon. In any case their credibility is
tarnished if not down right trashed.
What ever software language these are programmed in (my guess is C) the compilers still
exist for it and do the translation from the human readable code to the machine code for you.
Of course the code could be assembler but writing assembly code for a 286 is far easier than
writing it for say an i9 becuase the CPU is so much simpler and has a far smaller set of
instructions to work with.
@b:
It was a hyperbole.
I might be another one, but left them behind as fast as I could. The last time I had to deal
with it was an embedded system in 1998-ish. But I am also retiring, and so are thousands of
others. The problems with support of a legacy system are a legend.
I commented when you first started writing about this that it would take Boeing down and
still believe that to be true. To the extent that Boeing is stonewalling the international
safety regulators says to me that upper management and big stock holders are being given time
to minimize their exposure before the axe falls.
I also want to add that Boeing's focus on profit over safety is not restricted to the 737
Max but undoubtedly permeates the manufacture of spare parts for the rest of the their plane
line and all else they make.....I have no intention of ever flying in another Boeing
airplane, given the attitude shown by Boeing leadership.
This is how private financialization works in the Western world. Their bottom line is
profit, not service to the flying public. It is in line with the recent public statement by
the CEO's from the Business Roundtable that said that they were going to focus more on
customer satisfaction over profit but their actions continue to say profit is their primary
motive.
The God of Mammon private finance religion can not end soon enough for humanity's sake. It
is not like we all have to become China but their core public finance example is well worth
following.
So again, Boeing mgmt. mirrors its Neoliberal government officials when it comes to arrogance
and impudence. IMO, Boeing shareholders's hair ought to be on fire given their BoD's behavior
and getting ready to litigate.
As b notes, Boeing's international credibility's hanging by a
very thin thread. A year from now, Boeing could very well see its share price deeply dive
into the Penny Stock category--its current P/E is 41.5:1 which is massively overpriced.
Boeing Bombs might come to mean something vastly different from its initial meaning.
Such seemingly archaic processors are the norm in aerospace. If the planes flight
characteristics had been properly engineered from the start the processor wouldn't be an
issue. You can't just spray perfume on a garbage pile and call it a rose.
In the neoliberal world order governments, regulators and the public are secondary to
corporate profits. This is the same belief system that is suspending the British Parliament
to guarantee the chaos of a no deal Brexit. The irony is that globalist, Joe Biden's restart
the Cold War and nationalist Donald Trump's Trade Wars both assure that foreign regulators
will closely scrutinize the safety of the 737 Max. Even if ignored by corporate media and
cleared by the FAA to fly in the USA, Boeing and Wall Street's Dow Jones average are cooked
gooses with only 20% of the market. Taking the risk of flying the 737 Max on their family
vacation or to their next business trip might even get the credentialed class to realize that
their subservient service to corrupt Plutocrats is deadly in the long term.
"The latest complication in the long-running saga, these officials said, stems from a Boeing
BA, -2.66% briefing in August that was cut short by regulators from the U.S., Europe, Brazil
and elsewhere, who complained that the plane maker had failed to provide technical details
and answer specific questions about modifications in the operation of MAX flight-control
computers."
It seems to me that Boeing had no intention to insult anybody, but it has an impossible
task. After decades of applying duct tape and baling wire with much success, they finally
designed an unfixable plane, and they can either abandon this line of business (narrow bodied
airliners) or start working on a new design grounded in 21st century technologies.
Boeing's military sales are so much more significant and important to them, they are just
ignoring/down-playing their commercial problem with the 737 MAX. Follow the real money.
That is unblievable FLight Control comptuer is based on 80286!
A control system needs Real Time operation, at least some pre-emptive task operation, in
terms of milisecond or microsecond.
What ever way you program 80286 you can not achieve RT operation on 80286.
I do not think that is the case.
My be 80286 is doing some pripherial work, other than control.
It is quite likely (IMHO) that they are no longer able to provide the requested
information, but of course they cannot say that.
I once wrote a keyboard driver for an 80286, part of an editor, in assembler, on my first
PC type computer, I still have it around here somewhere I think, the keyboard driver, but I
would be rusty like the Titanic when it comes to writing code. I wrote some things in DEC
assembler too, on VAXen.
arata @16: 80286 does interrupts just fine, but you have to grok asynchronous operation, and
most coders don't really, I see that every day in Linux and my browser. I wish I could get
that box back, it had DOS, you could program on the bare wires, but God it was slow.
Boeing recently lost a $6+Billion weapons contract thanks to its similar Q&A in that
realm of its business. Its annual earnings are due out in October. Plan to short-sell
soon!
I am surprised that none of the coverage has mentioned the fact that, if China's CAAC does
not sign off on the mods, it will cripple, if not doom the MAX.
I am equally surprised that we continue to sabotage China's export leader, as the WSJ
reports today: "China's Huawei Technologies Co. accused the U.S. of "using every tool at its
disposal" to disrupt its business, including launching cyberattacks on its networks and
instructing law enforcement to "menace" its employees.
The telecommunications giant also said
law enforcement in the U.S. have searched, detained and arrested Huawei employees and its
business partners, and have sent FBI agents to the homes of its workers to pressure them to
collect information on behalf of the U.S."
I wonder how much blind trust in Boeing is intertwined into the fabric of civic aviation all
around the world.
I mean something like this: Boeing publishes some research into failure statistics, solid
materials aging or something. One that is really hard and expensive to proceed with.
Everything take the results for granted without trying to independently reproduce and verify,
because The Boeing!
Some later "derived" researches being made, upon the foundation of some
prior works *including* that old Boeing research. Then FAA and similar company institutions
around the world make some official regulations and guidelines deriving from the research
which was in part derived form original Boeing work. Then insurance companies calculate their
tarifs and rate plans, basing their estimation upon those "government standards", and when
governments determine taxation levels they use that data too. Then airline companies and
airliner leasing companies make their business plans, take huge loans in the banks (and banks
do make their own plans expecting those loans to finally be paid back), and so on and so
forth, building the cards-deck house, layer after layer.
And among the very many of the cornerstones - there would be dust covered and
god-forgotten research made by Boeing 10 or maybe 20 years ago when no one even in drunk
delirium could ever imagine questioning Boeing's verdicts upon engineering and scientific
matters.
Now, the longevity of that trust is slowly unraveled. Like, the so universally trusted
737NG generation turned out to be inherently unsafe, and while only pilots knew it before,
and even of them - only most curious and pedantic pilots, today it becomes public knowledge
that 737NG are tainted.
Now, when did this corruption started? Wheat should be some deadline cast into the past,
that since the day every other technical data coming from Boeing should be considered
unreliable unless passing full-fledged independent verification? Should that day be somewhere
in 2000-s? 1990-s? Maybe even 1970-s?
And ALL THE BODY of civic aviation industry knowledge that was accumulated since that date
can NO MORE BE TRUSTED and should be almost scrapped and re-researched new! ALL THE tacit
INPUT that can be traced back to Boeing and ALL THE DERIVED KNOWLEDGE now has to be verified
in its entirety.
Boeing is backstopped by the Murkan MIC, which is to say the US taxpayer. Until the lawsuits
become too enormous.
I wonder how much that will cost. And speaking of rigged markets - why do ya suppose that
Trumpilator et al have been
so keen to make huge sales to the Saudis, etc. etc. ? Ya don't suppose they had an inkling of
trouble in the wind do ya? Speaking of insiders, how many million billions do ya suppose is
being made in the Wall Street "trade war" roller coaster by peeps, munchkins not muppets, who
have access to the Tweeter-in-Chief?
I commented when you first started writing about this that it would take Boeing down and
still believe that to be true. To the extent that Boeing is stonewalling the international
safety regulators says to me that upper management and big stock holders are being given
time to minimize their exposure before the axe falls.
Have you considered the costs of restructuring versus breaking apart Boeing and selling it
into little pieces; to the owners specifically?
The MIC is restructuring itself - by first creating the political conditions to make the
transformation highly profitable. It can only be made highly profitable by forcing the public
to pay the associated costs of Rape and Pillage Incorporated.
Military Industrial Complex welfare programs, including wars in Syria and Yemen, are
slowly winding down. We are about to get a massive bill from the financiers who already own
everything in this sector, because what they have left now is completely unsustainable, with
or without a Third World War.
It is fine that you won't fly Boeing but that is not the point. You may not ever fly again
since air transit is subsidized at every level and the US dollar will no longer be available
to fund the world's air travel infrastructure.
You will instead be paying for the replacement of Boeing and seeing what google is
planning it may not be for the renewal of the airline business but rather for dedicated
ground transportation, self driving cars and perhaps 'aerospace' defense forces, thank you
Russia for setting the trend.
As readers may remember I made a case study of Boeing for a fairly recent PHD. The examiners
insisted that this case study be taken out because it was "speculative." I had forecast
serious problems with the 787 and the 737 MAX back in 2012. I still believe the 787 is
seriously flawed and will go the way of the MAX. I came to admire this once brilliant company
whose work culminated in the superb 777.
America really did make some excellent products in the 20th century - with the exception
of cars. Big money piled into GM from the early 1920s, especially the ultra greedy, quasi
fascist Du Pont brothers, with the result that GM failed to innovate. It produced beautiful
cars but technically they were almost identical to previous models.
The only real innovation
over 40 years was automatic transmission. Does this sound reminiscent of the 737 MAX? What
glued together GM for more than thirty years was the brilliance of CEO Alfred Sloan who
managed to keep the Du Ponts (and J P Morgan) more or less happy while delegating total
responsibility for production to divisional managers responsible for the different GM brands.
When Sloan went the company started falling apart and the memoirs of bad boy John DeLorean
testify to the complete disfunctionality of senior management.
At Ford the situation was perhaps even worse in the 1960s and 1970s. Management was at war
with the workers, faulty transmissions were knowingly installed. All this is documented in an
excellent book by ex-Ford supervisor Robert Dewar in his book "A Savage Factory."
Well, the first thing that came to mind upon reading about Boeing's apparent arrogance
overseas - silly, I know - was that Boeing may be counting on some weird Trump sanctions
for anyone not cooperating with the big important USian corporation! The U.S. has influence
on European and many other countries, but it can only be stretched so far, and I would guess
messing with Euro/internation airline regulators, especially in view of the very real fatal
accidents with the 737MAX, would be too far.
Please read the following article to get further info about how the 5 big Funds that hold 67%
of Boeing stocks are working hard with the big banks to keep the stock high. Meanwhile Boeing
is also trying its best to blackmail US taxpayers through Pentagon, for example, by
pretending to walk away from a competitive bidding contract because it wants the Air Force to
provide better cost formula.
So basically, Boeing is being kept afloat by US taxpayers because it is "too big to fail"
and an important component of Dow. Please tell. Who is the biggest suckers here?
re Piotr Berman | Sep 3 2019 21:11 utc
[I have a tiny bit of standing in this matter based on experience with an amazingly similar
situation that has not heretofore been mentioned. More at end. Thus I offer my opinion.]
Indeed, an impossible task to design a workable answer and still maintain the fiction that
737MAX is a hi-profit-margin upgrade requiring minimal training of already-trained 737-series
pilots , either male or female.
Turning-off autopilot to bypass runaway stabilizer necessitates :
[1]
the earlier 737-series "rollercoaster" procedure to overcome too-high aerodynamic forces
must be taught and demonstrated as a memory item to all pilots.
The procedure was designed
for early Model 737-series, not the 737MAX which has uniquely different center-of-gravity and
pitch-up problem requiring MCAS to auto-correct, especially on take-off.
[2] but the "rollercoaster" procedure does not work at all altitudes.
It causes aircraft to
lose some altitude and, therefore, requires at least [about] 7,000-feet above-ground
clearance to avoid ground contact. [This altitude loss consumed by the procedure is based on
alleged reports of simulator demonstrations. There seems to be no known agreement on the
actual amount of loss].
[3] The physical requirements to perform the "rollercoaster" procedure were established at a
time when female pilots were rare.
Any 737MAX pilots, male or female, will have to pass new
physical requirements demonstrating actual conditions on newly-designed flight simulators
that mimic the higher load requirements of the 737MAX . Such new standards will also have to
compensate for left vs right-handed pilots because the manual-trim wheel is located between
the .pilot/copilot seats.
================
Now where/when has a similar situation occurred? I.e., wherein a Federal regulator agency
[FAA] allowed a vendor [Boeing] to claim that a modified product did not need full
inspection/review to get agency certification of performance [airworthiness].
As you may know, 2 working, nuclear, power plants were forced to shut down and be
decommissioned when, in 2011, 2 newly-installed, critical components in each plant were
discovered to be defective, beyond repair and not replaceable. These power plants were each
producing over 1,000 megawatts of power for over 20 years. In short, the failed components
were modifications of the original, successful design that claimed to need only a low-level
of Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversight and approval. The mods were, in fact, new
and untried and yet only tested by computer modeling and theoretical estimations based on
experience with smaller/different designs.
<<< The NRC had not given full inspection/oversight to the new units because of
manufacturer/operator claims that the changes were not significant. The NRC did not verify
the veracity of those claims. >>>
All 4 components [2 required in each plant] were essentially heat-exchangers weighing 640
tons each, having 10,000 tubes carrying radioactive water surrounded by [transferring their
heat to] a separate flow of "clean" water. The tubes were progressively damaged and began
leaking. The new design failed. It can not be fixed. Thus, both plants of the San Onofre
Nuclear Generating Station are now a complete loss and await dismantling [as the courts will
decide who pays for the fiasco].
In my mind, the fact that Boeing transferred its head office from Seattle (where the main
manufacturing and presumable the main design and engineering functions are based) to Chicago
(centre of the neoliberal economic universe with the University of Chicago being its central
shrine of worship, not to mention supply of future managers and administrators) in 1997 says
much about the change in corporate culture and values from a culture that emphasised
technical and design excellence, deliberate redundancies in essential functions (in case of
emergencies or failures of core functions), consistently high standards and care for the
people who adhered to these principles, to a predatory culture in which profits prevail over
people and performance.
Good article. Boeing is, or used to be, America's biggest manufacturing export. So you are
right it cannot be allowed to fail. Boeing is also a manufacturer of military aircraft. The
fact that it is now in such a pitiful state is symptomatic of America's decline and decadence
and its takeover by financial predators.
They did the same with Nortel, whose share value exceeded 300 billion not long before it was
scrapped. Insiders took everything while pension funds were wiped out of existence.
It is so very helpful to understand everything you read is corporate/intel propaganda, and
you are always being setup to pay for the next great scam. The murder of 300+ people by
boeing was yet another tragedy our sadistic elites could not let go to waste.
For many amerikans, a good "offensive" is far preferable than a good defense even if that
only involves an apology. Remember what ALL US presidents say.. We will never apologize.. For
the extermination of natives, for shooting down civilian airliners, for blowing up mosques
full of worshipers, for bombing hospitals.. for reducing many countries to the stone age and
using biological
and chemical and nuclear weapons against the planet.. For supporting terrorists who plague
the planet now. For basically being able to be unaccountable to anyone including themselves
as a peculiar race of feces. So it is not the least surprising that amerikan corporations
also follow the same bad manners as those they put into and pre-elect to rule them.
People talk about Seattle as if its a bastion of integrity.. Its the same place Microsoft
screwed up countless companies to become the largest OS maker? The same place where Amazon
fashions how to screw its own employees to work longer and cheaper? There are enough examples
that Seattle is not Toronto.. and will never be a bastion of ethics..
Actually can you show
me a single place in the US where ethics are considered a bastion of governorship? Other than
the libraries of content written about ethics, rarely do amerikans ever follow it. Yet expect
others to do so.. This is getting so perverse that other cultures are now beginning to
emulate it. Because its everywhere..
Remember Dallas? I watched people who saw in fascination
how business can function like that. Well they cant in the long run but throw enough money
and resources and it works wonders in the short term because it destroys the competition. But
yea around 1998 when they got rid of the laws on making money by magic, most every thing has
gone to hell.. because now there are no constraints but making money.. anywhich way.. Thats
all that matters..
You got to be daft or bribed to use intel cpu's in embedded systems. Going from a motorolla
cpu, the intel chips were dinosaurs in every way. Requiring the cpu to be almost twice as
fast to get the same thing done.. Also its interrupt control was not upto par. A simple
example was how the commodore amiga could read from the disk and not stutter or slow down
anything else you were doing. I never seen this fixed.. In fact going from 8Mhz to 4GHz seems
to have fixed it by brute force. Yes the 8Mhz motorolla cpu worked wonders when you had
music, video, IO all going at the same time. Its not just the CPU but the support chips which
don't lock up the bus. Why would anyone use Intel? When there are so many specific embedded
controllers designed for such specific things.
Initially I thought it was just the new over-sized engines they retro-fitted. A situation
that would surely have been easier to get around by just going back to the original engines
-- any inefficiencies being less $costly than the time the planes have been grounded. But
this post makes the whole rabbit warren 10 miles deeper.
I do not travel much these days and
find the cattle-class seating on these planes a major disincentive. Becoming aware of all
these added technical issues I will now positively select for alternatives to 737 and bear
the cost.
I'm surprised Boeing stock still haven't taken nose dive
Posted by: Bob burger | Sep 3 2019 19:27 utc | 9
That is because the price is propped up by
$9 billion share buyback per year . Share buyback is an effective scheme to airlift all
the cash out of a company towards the major shareholders. I mean, who wants to develop
reliable airplanes if you can funnel the cash into your pockets?
Once the buyback ends the dive begins and just before it hits ground zero, they buy the
company for pennies on the dollar, possibly with government bailout as a bonus. Then the
company flies towards the next climb and subsequent dive. MCAS economics.
Hi , I am new here in writing but not in reading..
About the 80286 , where is the coprocessor the 80287?
How can the 80286 make IEEE math calculations?
So how can it fly a controlled flight when it can not calculate its accuracy......
How is it possible that this system is certified?
It should have at least a 80386 DX not SX!!!!
moved to Chicago in 1997 says much about the change in corporate culture and values from a
culture that emphasised technical and design excellence, deliberate redundancies in essential
functions (in case of emergencies or failures of core functions), consistently high standards
and care for the people who adhered to these principles, to a predatory culture in which
profits prevail over people and performance.
Jen @ 35
< ==
yes, the morally of the companies and their exclusive hold on a complicit or
controlled government always defaults the government to support, enforce and encourage the
principles of economic Zionism.
But it is more than just the corporate culture => the corporate fat cats
1. use the rule-making powers of the government to make law for them. Such laws create high
valued assets from the pockets of the masses. The most well know of those corporate uses of
government is involved with the intangible property laws (copyright, patent, and government
franchise). The government generated copyright, franchise and Patent laws are monopolies. So
when government subsidizes a successful outcome R&D project its findings are packaged up
into a set of monopolies [copyrights, privatized government franchises which means instead of
50 companies or more competing for the next increment in technology, one gains the full
advantage of that government research only one can use or abuse it. and the patented and
copyrighted technology is used to extract untold billions, in small increments from the
pockets of the public.
2. use of the judicial power of governments and their courts in both domestic and
international settings, to police the use and to impose fake values in intangible property
monopolies. Government-rule made privately owned monopoly rights (intangible property rights)
generated from the pockets of the masses, do two things: they exclude, deny and prevent would
be competition and their make value in a hidden revenue tax that passes to the privately held
monopolist with each sale of a copyrighted, government franchised, or patented service or
product. .
Please note the one two nature of the "use of government law making powers to generate
intangible private monopoly property rights"
There is no doubt Boeing has committed crimes on the 737MAX, its arrogance & greedy
should be severely punished by the international commitment as an example to other global
Corporations. It represents what is the worst of Corporate America that places profits in
front of lives.
How the U.S. is keeping Russia out of the international market?
Iran and other sanctioned countries are a potential captive market and they have growth
opportunities in what we sometimes call the non-aligned, emerging markets countries (Turkey,
Africa, SE Asia, India, ...).
One thing I have learned is that the U.S. always games the system, we never play fair. So
what did we do. Do their manufacturers use 1% U.S. made parts and they need that for
international certification?
Ultimately all of the issues in the news these days are the same one and the
same issue - as the US gets closer and closer to the brink of catastrophic collapse they get
ever more desperate. As they get more and more desperate they descend into what comes most
naturally to the US - throughout its entire history - frenzied violence, total absence of
morality, war, murder, genocide, and everything else that the US is so well known for (by
those who are not blinded by exceptionalist propaganda).
The Hong Kong violence is a perfect example - it is impossible that a self-respecting
nation state could allow itself to be seen to degenerate into such idiotic degeneracy, and so
grossly flaunt the most basic human decency. Ergo , the US is not a self-respecting
nation state. It is a failed state.
I am certain the arrogance of Boeing reflects two things: (a) an assurance from the US
government that the government will back them to the hilt, come what may, to make sure that
the 737Max flies again; and (b) a threat that if Boeing fails to get the 737Max in the air
despite that support, the entire top level management and board of directors will be jailed.
Boeing know very well they cannot deliver. But just as the US government is desperate
to avoid the inevitable collapse of the US, the Boeing top management are desperate to avoid
jail. It is a charade.
It is time for international regulators to withdraw certification totally - after the
problems are all fixed (I don't believe they ever will be), the plane needs complete new
certification of every detail from the bottom up, at Boeing's expense, and with total
openness from Boeing. The current Boeing management are not going to cooperate with that,
therefore the international regulators need to demand a complete replacement of the
management and board of directors as a condition for working with them.
If Boeing had invested some of this money that it blew on share buybacks to design a new
modern plane from ground up to replace the ancient 737 airframe, these tragedies could have
been prevented, and Boeing wouldn't have this nightmare on its hands. But the corporate
cost-cutters and financial engineers, rather than real engineers, had the final word.
Markets don't care about any of this. They don't care about real engineers either. They
love corporate cost-cutters and financial engineers. They want share buybacks, and if
something bad happens, they'll overlook the $5 billion to pay for the fallout because it's
just a "one-time item."
And now Boeing still has this plane, instead of a modern plane, and the history of this
plane is now tainted, as is its brand, and by extension, that of Boeing. But markets blow
that off too. Nothing matters.
Companies are getting away each with their own thing. There are companies that are losing
a ton of money and are burning tons of cash, with no indications that they will ever make
money. And market valuations are just ludicrous.
======
Thus Boeing issue is part of a much larger picture. Something systemic had to make
"markets" less rational. And who is this "market"? In large part, fund managers wracking
their brains how to create "decent return" while the cost of borrowing and returns on lending
are super low. What remains are forms of real estate and stocks.
Overall, Boeing buy-backs exceeded 40 billion dollars, one could guess that half or
quarter of that would suffice to build a plane that logically combines the latest
technologies. E.g. the entire frame design to fit together with engines, processors proper
for the information processing load, hydraulics for steering that satisfy force requirements
in almost all circumstances etc. New technologies also fail because they are not completely
understood, but when the overall design is logical with margins of safety, the faults can be
eliminated.
Instead, 737 was slowly modified toward failure, eliminating safety margins one by
one.
Boeing has apparently either never heard of, or ignores a procedure that is mandatory in
satellite design and design reviews. This is FMEA or Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. This
requires design engineers to document the impact of every potential failure and combination
of failures thereby highlighting everthing from catastrophic effects to just annoyances.
Clearly BOEING has done none of these and their troubles are a direct result. It can be
assumed that their arrogant and incompetent management has not yet understood just how
serious their behavior is to the future of the company.
Once the buyback ends the dive begins and just before it hits ground zero, they buy the
company for pennies on the dollar, possibly with government bailout as a bonus. Then the
company flies towards the next climb and subsequent dive. MCAS economics.
Computer modelling is what they are talking about in the cliche "Garbage in, garbage out".
The problem is not new, and it is well understood. What computer modelling is is cheap,
and easy to fudge, and that is why it is popular with people who care about money a lot. Much
of what is called "AI" is very similar in its limitations, a complicated way to fudge up the
results you want, or something close enough for casual examination.
In particular cases where you have a well-defined and well-mathematized theory, then you
can get some useful results with models. Like in Physics, Chemistry.
And they can be useful for "realistic" training situations, like aircraft simulators. The
old story about wargame failures against Iran is another such situation. A lot of video games
are big simulations in essence. But that is not reality, it's fake reality.
@ SteveK9 71 "By the way, the problem was caused by Mitsubishi, who designed the heat
exchangers."
Ahh. The furriners...
I once made the "mistake" of pointing out (in a comment under an article in Salon) that the
reactors that exploded at Fukushima was made by GE and that GE people was still in charge of
the reactors of American quality when they exploded. (The amerikans got out on one of the
first planes out of the country).
I have never seen so many angry replies to one of my comments. I even got e-mails for several weeks from angry Americans.
@Henkie #53
You need floating point for scientific calculations, but I really doubt the 737 is doing any
scientific research.
Also, a regular CPU can do mathematical calculations. It just isn't as fast nor has the same
capacity as a dedicated FPU.
Another common use for FPUs is in live action shooter games - the neo-physics portions
utilize scientific-like calculations to create lifelike actions. I sold computer systems in
the 1990s while in school - Doom was a significant driver for newer systems (as well as hedge
fund types).
Again, don't see why an airplane needs this.
"... DER SPIEGEL learned a great deal about the bizarre process of regulatory approval in the U.S. We also learned of a complaint by a whistleblower at Boeing, who approached the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in June with serious accusations against the airplane manufacturer. ..."
"... But if it is revealed that 346 people died because both a corporation and the regulators tasked with overseeing it were grossly negligent, or even deliberately lax, then it would have far-reaching consequences for the aviation industry, the credibility of supervisory bodies and for normal people's everyday lives. ..."
"... "Even before the Lion Air and ET 302 flight data recorder information was available, it was clear to us that the two events shared remarkable similarity," Moller recalls. The two lawyers had no doubt: "There was something seriously flawed and wrong with the 737 Max." ..."
"... The flight paths of both planes were inexplicably wild, characterized by sharp and sudden gains and losses of altitude, as if the pilots were struggling to maintain control of their aircraft. By the end, the planes had gained so much speed and were descending so steeply that the pilots would have had to possess superhuman strength to counter the pressure on the horizontal stabilizer trim. Moller and Green from the law firm Kreindler & Kreindler, specialists in catastrophes, had a case. And what a case it was. ..."
"... "We believe that the facts that emerge through litigation will demonstrate that commercial pressure, the Boeing/Airbus competition and the drive to make money and save money resulted in the 737 Max, as initially designed and sold, being an unreasonably dangerous airplane," says Moller. ..."
"... The competition between Boeing and Airbus does, in fact, appear to be a key element in these two crashes. The profitability of both companies depends on but a few products, and when it comes to the most important aircraft of all, the short- and medium-haul planes, Boeing has fallen behind Airbus, Moller says, and suddenly, once-loyal Boeing customers were buying jets from Airbus, preferring the new A320 to the outdated 737. Boeing had to act quickly. But instead of designing an altogether new aircraft, Moller says, engineers continued to make changes to the old 737 design and, in the end, came up with an aircraft that was dangerously designed. ..."
"... In the coming proceedings and investigations, particular attention will be paid to the time between the crash in Indonesia and the one in Ethiopia. This will be the most dangerous window for Boeing. If the prosecution can prove or find witnesses to say that people at Boeing or aviation regulators had cautioned against the further operation of the 737 Max after the Lion Air crash, it could make the company look extremely culpable. If anyone at Boeing had even the slightest inkling of the new system's inherent risks, things could get tricky. ..."
"... The Kreindler attorneys have already filed their first complaints with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Chicago. They chose Chicago because that's where Boeing's board of directors and corporate management is located, far from the company's production facilities in Seattle. "It was Boeing's board that approved the Boeing 737 Max project," Green says. The lawyers in New York already know who the judge will be. His name is Alonso, a youthful-looking man who was appointed under Barack Obama. "This is his first major aviation case," Green says. ..."
Pushing It to the Max Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings
The crash of two Boeing 737 Max jets in the course of just months has created an existential crisis for the company. Were the
346 who died in Indonesia and Ethiopia the victims of shortcuts and cutthroat competition in the aviation industry?
... ... ...
From here, there's a direct connection to Indonesia, where only five months earlier, on Oct. 29, Lion Air Flight 610 likewise
entered a steep dive, slamming into the Java Sea minutes after takeoff. Together, these two crashes plunged the aviation world into
turmoil. And all eyes were suddenly trained on an airplane that had only just gone on the market: the Boeing 737 Max.
Within hours of the second crash, China ordered all planes of that model to be grounded. The United States needed three days to
follow suit. Since then, 550 of the new planes around the world, with a sticker price of around $135 million, have been paralyzed.
If it were up to Boeing, the aircraft would have been back in service long ago, patched up with a software update. But following
the failure of the update in question in tests conducted in late June, the crisis has been ongoing. The 737 Max remains grounded
and all eyes are still fixed on Boeing.
In recent weeks, DER SPIEGEL dispatched a reporting team to Seattle, New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Addis Ababa, Jakarta
and Paris to shed light on the events leading up to and including the crashes. They conducted interviews with Boeing executives and
airline managers, visited Boeing factories and spoke to experts who explained the technical side of what went wrong. They even stepped
into a flight simulator to get a better understanding. In Ethiopia and Indonesia, they tracked down eyewitnesses of the crashes and
spoke to the victims' surviving family members around the world along with lawyers and experts.
DER SPIEGEL learned a great deal about the bizarre process of regulatory approval in the U.S. We also learned of a complaint
by a whistleblower at Boeing, who approached the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in June with serious accusations against
the airplane manufacturer.
A best-case scenario is hard to imagine given the dire straits in which Boeing currently finds itself. The only way our standard
approach to the risks of flying can possibly remain unchanged is if, at the end of the investigations in Ethiopia and Indonesia,
it is determined that both were truly accidents in the conventional sense and their similarities.
But if it is revealed that 346 people died because both a corporation and the regulators tasked with overseeing it were grossly
negligent, or even deliberately lax, then it would have far-reaching consequences for the aviation industry, the credibility of supervisory
bodies and for normal people's everyday lives.
A Feared Lawyer
It was nighttime in New York when the Boeing 737 fell out of the sky in Ethiopia. Marc Moller heard about it on Sunday morning
right after he woke up. An Ethiopian Airlines plane, he learned, had crashed on the way to Nairobi with 157 people on board. His
first thought was: Lion Air.
Soon, the first TV stations began calling him. CNN and NBC always need experts when the words "Breaking News" scroll across the
screen. Producers at the news channels have Moller's number saved for whenever a plane goes down and the 80-year-old lawyer is a
legend among his colleagues. When it comes to representing the bereaved, no one can fool him. Airlines, airplane manufacturers, even
car rental companies have come to fear him. Should the situation call for it, Moller has no problem disparaging the other side as
"mass murderers." When he represented relatives of the victims of the Germanwings crash in 2015, he accused the instructors of the
co-pilot, who ultimately killed himself and 149 others in a brutal murder-suicide, of not having noticed how volatile the pilot was.
A day after the crash in Ethiopia, Moller met with a senior partner from the law firm Kreindler & Kreindler on Third Avenue in
Manhattan. The man's name is Justin Green, who had flown fighter jets for the Marines before becoming an attorney. By the time Moller
showed up, Green had already begun analyzing the radar data from Flight 302. Now they compared it with the data from Lion Air 610.
"Even before the Lion Air and ET 302 flight data recorder information was available, it was clear to us that the two events shared
remarkable similarity," Moller recalls. The two lawyers had no doubt: "There was something seriously flawed and wrong with the 737
Max."
The flight paths of both planes were inexplicably wild, characterized by sharp and sudden gains and losses of altitude, as
if the pilots were struggling to maintain control of their aircraft. By the end, the planes had gained so much speed and were descending
so steeply that the pilots would have had to possess superhuman strength to counter the pressure on the horizontal stabilizer trim.
Moller and Green from the law firm Kreindler & Kreindler, specialists in catastrophes, had a case. And what a case it was.
... ... ...
Colorful, Jagged Lines
Half a world away, New York attorneys Moller and Green spread out documents showing the plane's flight path, angle of attack and
speed at various points in time. The data has been entered into a coordinate system and are represented as colorful, jagged lines
that only experts can interpret. For this, Moller relies on his colleague Green, though he has his own opinion of what went wrong:
"We believe that the facts that emerge through litigation will demonstrate that commercial pressure, the Boeing/Airbus competition
and the drive to make money and save money resulted in the 737 Max, as initially designed and sold, being an unreasonably dangerous
airplane," says Moller.
The competition between Boeing and Airbus does, in fact, appear to be a key element in these two crashes. The profitability
of both companies depends on but a few products, and when it comes to the most important aircraft of all, the short- and medium-haul
planes, Boeing has fallen behind Airbus, Moller says, and suddenly, once-loyal Boeing customers were buying jets from Airbus, preferring
the new A320 to the outdated 737. Boeing had to act quickly. But instead of designing an altogether new aircraft, Moller says, engineers
continued to make changes to the old 737 design and, in the end, came up with an aircraft that was dangerously designed.
When he talks, Moller sounds like he already has the jury in front of him. He asks rhetorical questions, which he immediately
answers himself, and develops an image for his audience of a plane, wobbling and shaking from faulty software run amok, with an overwhelmed
crew, at far too low an altitude, much too close to the ground -- all because the aircraft was designed and built in such great haste.
"We believe that the facts that will emerge through the litigation will demonstrate that commercial pressure, the Boeing/Airbus
competition and the drive to make money and save money resulted in the 737 MAX as initially designed and sold was an unreasonably
dangerous airplane," says Moller.
Of course, the engineers never meant to kill anyone, Moller hastens to add. But he says they were driven by confirmation bias
as they worked toward their goal. And that goal was to deliver an aircraft as quickly as possible -- one that looked new, was more
fuel efficient, that airlines would want to have and that pilots could fly immediately without requiring further training.
DER
SPIEGEL
In the coming proceedings and investigations, particular attention will be paid to the time between the crash in Indonesia
and the one in Ethiopia. This will be the most dangerous window for Boeing. If the prosecution can prove or find witnesses to say
that people at Boeing or aviation regulators had cautioned against the further operation of the 737 Max after the Lion Air crash,
it could make the company look extremely culpable. If anyone at Boeing had even the slightest inkling of the new system's inherent
risks, things could get tricky.
Moller is confident the case can be won. In court, he plans to talk about trust, which he can already do very convincingly. "You
board an airplane, sit down in seat 10C or 14F and you have no idea who the pilot is," Moller says. "You have no idea who was the
last one to have messed around with the maintenance of the plane. You sit down, buckle up and you even worry about sitting upright
and putting your feet in the right position. You are locked into this tube. Some are nervous, some are not. But all have to have
absolute trust that everything is in order, the equipment and the people operating it. Absolutely safe. And if there is the slightest
doubt about the safety of the plane by the airline: Don't fly. The plane must be grounded."
The Kreindler attorneys have already filed their first complaints with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in Chicago. They chose Chicago because that's where Boeing's board of directors and corporate management is located, far
from the company's production facilities in Seattle. "It was Boeing's board that approved the Boeing 737 Max project," Green says.
The lawyers in New York already know who the judge will be. His name is Alonso, a youthful-looking man who was appointed under Barack
Obama. "This is his first major aviation case," Green says.
Expectations that the Boeing 737 MAX 8 will return to the skies any time in the near future
have largely faded, and now, after dedicating billions of dollars to compensating customers,
Boeing is finally facing their wrath in the courtroom. The FT reports that a Russian
aircraft-leasing company has filed a lawsuit against the aerospace company seeking not only the
return of the deposit it paid for the 35 MAX 8s that it ordered, but also punitive damages in
the hundreds of millions.
Avia Capital Services, a subsidiary of Russian state conglomerate Rostec, accused Boeing of
"negligent actions and decisions" that led to two deadly accidents and roughly 350 deaths.
Regulators around the world grounded the 737 MAX 8 in response to the accidents, and
investigations have pointed toward issues with the plane's software as the culprit.
In its lawsuit, Avia also claimed that the design of the MAX 8 was "defective", and -
embracing a more conspiratorial tone - that Boeing knew about these defects bu withheld this
"critical information" from US regulators and Boeing's customers. The lawsuit was filed in Cook
County circuit court in Chicago, where Boeing is based.
Avia ordered 35 MAX 8s, and paid a cash deposit of $35 million to secure its order. In its
lawsuit, the company is seeking the return of this deposit, along with another $75 million of
lost profits plus additional punitive damages.
The company's lawyer, Steven Marks of the Miami aviation law firm Podhurst Orseck, said
Boeing had offered the company compensation for the MAX 8's problems, but that this
compensation was "inadequate." Marks is also representing the families of some of the
victims.
Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg has said it's possible that the MAX 8 could be re-approved for
passenger service by October. But it's entirely possible that the CEO could be jawboning to
convince customers to hold off from moving ahead with lawsuits. Of course, the families of the
victims who died in the two plane crashes attributed to flaws in the 737 MAX 8's anti-stall
system are moving ahead with their lawsuits, even after Boeing set aside $100 million for
payoffs. In the meantime, orders for new 737 MAX 8s have dried up, and if the plane isn't given
the OK to return to the skies before the end of the year, it's possible that Boeing could halt
production of its most popular aircraft, according to
CBS News.
American firms like Southwest (the 737 MAX 8s' largest customer) have been far more
understanding and willing to work with Boeing. But how much longer until their patience runs
out, and they start filing lawsuits?
Though this hasn't been reflected in Boeing shares, it's still entirely possible that a
flood of legal judgments could bankrupt Boeing.
There goes ZH again with their propaganda puff pieces. Using the term conspiratorial like
most of ZH readers don't already know it was a term invented by the CIA to attack people who
questioned government narratives. How pathetic. How much lower can you go? I'm guessing as
long as NBC pays the bills, much lower
Social engineering, set asides, afearmotive ackshun, rainbow workers, etc, etc, all come
at a price, less quality, inferior production, higher costs, and less safety. It's about
votes from the less or not qualified, lazy, and low aptitude. America is sinking under the
dead weight.
... and to that, the "Wall Street" types respond? So what? The bottom line is all that
matters. When it become apparent that the value of the company is going to wane, the insiders
will bailout -- well ahead of the exodus insuring their profits and/or minimizing their
risks. We've been in the "investor economy" officially since 2009 and TARP. It was announced
in public that some things in the planned economy are simply "too big to fail". That
statement implies that all the others are simply "too small to matter". I am sure the "Wall
Street" types are finding creative ways to turn this problem into just another profit center.
When it comes to investing? There is no morality. The penalties for crimes by corporations
are fundamentally different than for real persons.
There is what is KNOWN by observation and data, observation. And then there is the
knowledge of METHOD, meaning a culture of neglect, sloth, deception, amorality, greed, and
just not giving a ****. THAT means that the possibility or even probability of more defects
and omissions are not yet known. I believe there are more structural and mechanical defects
that have not seen the light of day. There are several extended interviews with fired
Boinging employees who objected to violating procedures or whistle blowers who describe
horrendous mistakes and improper workmanship that is actually criminal.
I believe that a certain number-provided by Boeing-should be forensically torn down to the
last riot and Quality checked.
Replacing American Engineers with Cheap H-1 workers.
I could really care less if Boeing dies after what they did to all their great engineers
just because they were white, they are trying to shift the blame for the failure of the SJW
MAX over to Whitey but the effort is largely failing because it is too obviously patently
false.
Adios Gillette, Boeing, (hopefully Nike) and whoever else takes a crap on their roots
including Dicks Sporting Goods, which has now posted enormous losses - I'd rather see them
gone and if others stood their ground well enough, we'll see LOTS MORE get tossed in the ash
bin of history.
I'll be disappointed if anyone who tries to damage our civilization further than it has
already been damaged survives in business after trying.
It's interesting how the world seems to be getting along mostly OK without 737Max.
Relatively few disruptions, at least from the point of view of this specimen of flying
public. I'm sure the airlines have had to jump through a few hoops, but the longer the
work-arounds keep working, the less need for 737MAX.
Kra-Z-Eyes, say anything for the apartheid state of israel, Nimrata Haley is on Boeing's
Board of Directors with an annual salary of $315,000.00 per year 'cause she has an
undergraduate degree in accounting.
Nikki Haley slams 'manipulative' Macron for inviting Zarif to G7 ... https://www.jpost.com › American-Politics ›
Nikki-Haley-slams-manipulati... 1 day ago - The Jerusalem Post - Israel News ... Nikki Haley
slams 'manipulative' Macron for inviting Zarif to G7 ... United States Ambassador to the
United Nations Nikki Haley listens to a speaker during a U.N. Security Council meeting
...
Nikki Haley, who fought union effort at Boeing S.C. plant, nominated to ... https://www.seattletimes.com ›
business › nikki-haley-nominated-for-board-s... Feb 26, 2019 - Haley, former governor
of South Carolina, fought attempts by unions to represent ... Nikki Haley, who fought union
effort at Boeing S.C. plant, nominated to jet ... The New York Times, The Washington Post or
Bloomberg News.
In a turbulent world, some things remain stable, even to an irrational degree. One example
is the price of Boeing stock, which, at $329 a share as of midday August 16, has barely moved
-- down just 1.6 percent -- from a year ago.
Nevertheless, neither the slaughter of passengers nor the subsequent deluge of shocking
revelations have had any long-term impact on the stock price. There have indeed been short-term
fluctuations in the interim, notably a sharp climb in the months following the first MAX
disaster in Indonesia last October, when management's disgraceful PR spin ascribing blame to
incompetent foreign pilots achieved some traction in the press.
The second crash, in March this year, and consequent worldwide grounding of the plane, led
to a sharp downward move, which nonetheless leveled off at around current prices even as bad
news of corporate culpability continued to seep out of the ongoing investigations. On the other
hand, for anyone who cares to look, the bad news is clearly reflected in the balance sheet. The
hallowed planemaker recently announced the largest quarterly loss in its
history -- $2.9 billion -- thanks to a $5 billion charge relating to lost revenue on MAX
sales. Overall, Boeing now owns a total equity of
negative $5 billion, meaning that its liabilities exceed assets by that amount. That $5
billion charge was most certainly a drop in the bucket compared to the lawsuit settlements yet
to come. Even so, Wall Street appears unworried. Analysts still rate the stock a "strong buy" by a wide
margin , with a consensus estimate that it will climb some 90 points from its currently
stable position in the high $320s over the next 12 months. The $2.3 billion Boeing spent
buying its own stock in the first three months of this year no doubt encouraged such
bullish sentiment, part of the $43 billion splurged on price-propping buybacks since 2013.
In addition, other powerful forces are hard at work to save the corporate behemoth from
going into a terminal stall. Boeing, for example, is a component of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average, the 30-stock index generally if misleadingly cited as a bellwether of the market as a
whole, and even the entire U.S. economy. Because the Dow is weighted by price, an upward or
downward move in Boeing has a significant effect on the index, which makes it a particular
object of interest for the trading desks at major Wall Street players. Hence the stock is
traded very actively in the "dark pools," otherwise known as "alternative trading systems,"
with opaque names such as JP Morgan's JPMX, operated by the big banks and major institutions as
unregulated stock exchanges, courtesy of a toothless SEC.
These are ideal instruments for manipulating the market, since they don't have to show their
bids and offers to the general market place as is required on regulated exchanges. As analogy,
think of carpet dealers in a bazaar negotiating prices privately among themselves behind the
backs of ordinary customers.
The tender regard being exhibited by big players on Wall Street is not, of course, solely
for the sake of propping up the Dow. There is a lot of money directly at stake , not least in
the 67 percent of the Boeing stock owned by just five giant funds,
including Vanguard ($5.3 trillion in total assets) and Blackstone ($6.8 trillion). It's a sign
that Boeing must keep borrowing money to stay afloat. Fortunately, thanks to low interest rates
and the river of cash generated by the Federal Reserve since 2008, supplies are ready to hand.
Thus on July 31, for example, Boeing
borrowed a total of $5.5 billion via notes of varying maturities and interest rates taken
up by major banks, including JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs -- and
that was on top of $3.5 billion borrowed in late April.
Given that it may be quite a while before money starts to flow again from airlines shopping
for 737s, there is undoubtedly a lot of Wall Street interest in the alternative source for
emergency Boeing cash flow: a giant taxpayer bailout in the form of a Pentagon contract of
suitable proportions. Fortunately, there is a vehicle for delivering the cash:
the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, the Minuteman-replacement ICBM authorized by
President Obama as part of his $1
trillion nuclear modernization program . It carries a price tag, gratifying to investors,
of up to $100 billion -- a sum that will quite certainly be exceeded down the road.
Until very recently, the competition for this lucrative (and totally unneeded) contract was
between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. Given that Northrop is already enjoying a
pot of modernization gold in the shape of the B-21 bomber contract, Boeing seemed a sure
bet to land the deal, especially as the Air Force's detailed requirements appeared tailored to
favor Boeing rather than Northrop.
But in late July, Boeing abruptly announced that
it was walking away from the bidding. This was not due to a sudden reluctance to service
the nuclear arms race, but rather a high-stakes effort to prod the Air Force into rewriting the
cost of the competition rules, officially termed "request for proposal," so as to obviate the
cost advantage enjoyed by Northrop thanks to its artful purchase last year of Orbital ATK, the
only viable supplier of the solid fuel rocket engines required by the new missile. We cannot
doubt that the Air Force will see the light before too long, the stakes for the system being
what they are. "Too big to fail" is a term customarily applied to the colossi of Wall Street,
who thus escaped the consequences of their greed and incompetence following their shredding of
the global economy in the 2008 crash. As the Boeing saga outlined above illustrates, the
TBTFers stick together, secure in the knowledge that the taxpayers will always be there to pick
up the tab.
Andrew Cockburn is the Washington editor of Harper's Magazine and the author of
five nonfiction books, including Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins (2016)
. He has written for The New York Times, The New Yorker, Playboy, Vanity Fair,
and National Geographic, among other publications.
This article was
supported by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation.
Where Boeing is at fault (as well as the FAA for letting Boeing get away with it) is for
claiming that airlines didn't need to train pilots to fly the 737-MAX (as long as the
pilots knew how to fly other 737 variants).
In reality, the 737-MAX, unlike other 737 variants, was programmed to plunge nose-first
into the ground if a single angle of attack sensor failed. That's a really nasty
feature--in fact Boeing has conceded that the airplane shouldn't have been designed that
way in the first place--and needs to be covered in training.
You point to inadequate training in undeveloped countries, which may be true as a
general matter, but in this case, the training was inadequate everywhere. No pilot should
have been piloting a 737-MAX until they demonstrated that they could handle the sensor
failure scenario in a flight simulator. Airlines in the United States didn't provide this
training because Boeing assured them they didn't have to.
I have no quarrel with the Boeing in general, but in this case the company really blew
it. When Boeing came up with the concept of the 737-MAX (basically a plane that could act
as a drop-in replacement for other 737 variants while carrying more passengers), it may
have been reasonable to believe that this was doable. Later on in the development process,
it should have been obvious that this goal wasn't completely achievable, but their may have
been some "group think" effect that prevented people at Boeing from recognizing this.
This is what Ike was talking about. He wasn't just bashing the closeness of military and
industry and academic research, he was specifically discussing the security and laziness of
cost-plus contracts.
Like the Banks, Boeing has to remain viable. Boeing will find a fall guy, and move on from
there.Lehman Bros took the hit for the Banks creation of the great recession.
"It's a sign that Boeing must keep borrowing money to stay afloat."
- Right, a company that is building on house of cards...
"But in late July, Boeing abruptly announced that it was walking away from the bidding.
This was not due to a sudden reluctance to service the nuclear arms race, but rather a
high-stakes effort to prod the Air Force into rewriting the cost of the competition rules,"
-
- ....and is still able to blackmail Air Force and taxpayers for more money.
"... Meanwhile, just about everybody in the airline industry, the Department of Transportation, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Justice Department (with its criminal probe), the transport unions, the consumer groups such as Flyers Rights, and the flying public are anxious to see top Boeing officials in the witness chair under oath answering important questions. ..."
"... It is not as if Boeing lobbyists are absent. The giant company has been everywhere in Washington, D.C. getting its way for years in Congress, with NASA, the Department of Defense, and of course, the hapless, understaffed FAA. Boeing gives campaign donations to about some 330 members of Congress. ..."
"... The Boeing case involves a more imminent danger. The company and its "captured" FAA want to unground the MAX as fast as possible and to get more new MAXs, under order, to the airlines. ..."
"... This haste is all the more reason why Congress has to pick up the pace, regardless of "MAX Mitch" McConnell, the Kentucky dictator of the Senate who is a ward of the Boeing complex and its campaign cash. If the 737 MAX is ever allowed to fly again, with its shaky software fixes, glitches, and stitches, the pressure will build on members of Congress to go soft on the company. They will be told not to alarm millions of passengers and unsettle the airline industry with persistent doubts about the plane's prone-to-stall and other serious safety hazards from overautomation and sloppy construction, already documented in The New York Times, the Seattle Times, and other solid media reporting. ..."
"... Moreover, retired airline Captain Chesley Sullenberger, in his brilliant testimony before DeFazio on June 19th, called for full simulator training for pilots before they fly the MAX on scheduled routes (read Captain Sullenberger's full statement here ). ..."
"... How long before the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Department of Transportation or the Congress and the betrayed airlines themselves call for the resignation of both officers and the Board and, end the career conflict of interest these failed incumbents have with the future well-being of the Boeing Corporation itself? ..."
Two Boeing 737 MAX crashes, one in Indonesia last October and one in Ethiopia this past
March, took a combined 346 lives. Steady scrutiny by the media reported internal company leaks
and gave voice to sidelined ex-Boeing engineers and aerospace safety specialists. These experts
have revealed that Boeing's executives are responsible because they chose to use an unstable
structural design and faulty software. These decisions left the flying public, the pilots, the
airlines, and the FAA in the dark, to varying degrees.
Yet Congressional Committees, which announced investigations months ago, still have not
called on Dennis Muilenburg, the CEO of Boeing, or any member of Boeing's Board of Directors to
testify.
Given the worldwide emergency grounding of all 400 or so MAX aircraft and the peril to crews
and airline passengers, why are the Senate and House Committees holding back? House Committee
Chairman, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-OR) wants to carefully prepare for such action after the staff
goes through the much delayed transmission of documents from Boeing. Meanwhile, Senate
Committee Chair Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) deferred to Boeing's request to put off their
testimony before Congress until the Indonesian government puts out its report on the Lion Air
disaster, presumably sometime in October.
Meanwhile, just about everybody in the airline industry, the Department of Transportation,
the National Transportation Safety Board, the Justice Department (with its criminal probe), the
transport unions, the consumer groups such as Flyers Rights, and the flying public are anxious
to see top Boeing officials in the witness chair under oath answering important questions.
It is not as if Boeing lobbyists are absent. The giant company has been everywhere in
Washington, D.C. getting its way for years in Congress, with NASA, the Department of Defense,
and of course, the hapless, understaffed FAA. Boeing gives campaign donations to about some 330
members of Congress.
Corporate CEOs hate to testify before Congress under oath when they are in hot water. CEOs
from the tobacco, drug, auto, banking, insurance, and Silicon Valley industries have all
dragged their feet to avoid testifying. Eventually they all had to show up in public on Capitol
Hill.
The Boeing case involves a more imminent danger. The company and its "captured" FAA want to unground the MAX as fast as possible and to get more new MAXs, under order, to the
airlines.
This haste is all the more reason why Congress has to pick up the pace, regardless of "MAX
Mitch" McConnell, the Kentucky dictator of the Senate who is a ward of the Boeing complex and
its campaign cash. If the 737 MAX is ever allowed to fly again, with its shaky software fixes,
glitches, and stitches, the pressure will build on members of Congress to go soft on the
company. They will be told not to alarm millions of passengers and unsettle the airline
industry with persistent doubts about the plane's prone-to-stall and other serious safety
hazards from overautomation and sloppy construction, already documented in The New York Times,
the Seattle Times, and other solid media reporting.
With investigations underway at civil aviation agencies all over the world, and a grand jury
operating in the U.S. looking into criminal negligence, this is no time for Congress to take
its time in laying open the fullest truths and facts in public. Bear in mind, apart from the
civil tort law suits, all other investigations are not being conducted in public.
There is a growing consensus by impartial specialists that after many iterations of the
Boeing 737 series, beginning with the 737-100 in 1967, the much larger, more elaborate Boeing
737 MAX must be seen as a new aircraft requiring full certification. Certainly that is the view
of some members of Chairman DeFazio's committee and Chairman David Price's House Subcommittee
on Appropriations which holds the keys to funding a much larger FAA budget to do its job as a
regulator, not as a deregulator that abdicates to Boeing.
Moreover, retired airline Captain Chesley Sullenberger, in his brilliant testimony before
DeFazio on June 19th, called for full simulator training for pilots before they fly the MAX on
scheduled routes (read Captain
Sullenberger's full statement here ).
In a precise letter to the Secretary of Transportation, Elaine Chao and the acting and
incoming heads of the FAA (Daniel Elwell and Stephen Dickson respectively), dozens of families
and friends of the victims from many countries asked for full recertification and mandatory
simulator training before any decision is made about the 737 MAX. Currently 737 MAX pilots are
only given an hour of iPad training -- a clearly insufficient measure and an affront to safety
( see more
here ). The letter, which was sent on August 7, 2019, also called for the resignation of
Ali Bahrami, the abdicator in charge of safety at the FAA.
Many decisions are coming up for the FAA and Boeing. The FAA would be very foolish to
unground the 737 MAX just for U.S. airspace without the counterparts in North America, Europe,
Asia, South America, and Africa concurring.
As for Boeing, the company cannot afford another one or two crashes attributed to continued
indifference to longstanding aerodynamic standards of stability. The issue for Boeing's
celebrity, minimally experienced Board of Directors is how long it will tolerate Boeing's
management that, over the judgement of its best engineers, has brought the company to its
present predicament.
How long before the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Department of Transportation
or the Congress and the betrayed airlines themselves call for the resignation of both officers
and the Board and, end the career conflict of interest these failed incumbents have with the
future well-being of the Boeing Corporation itself?
Manufacturing: "With the Boeing 737 MAX Grounded, Top Boeing Bosses Must Testify Before
Congress Now" [
Ralph Nader ]. "As for Boeing, the company cannot afford another one or two crashes
attributed to continued indifference to longstanding aerodynamic standards of stability.
The issue for Boeing's celebrity, minimally experienced Board of Directors is how long it
will tolerate Boeing's management that, over the judgement of its best engineers, has
brought the company to its present predicament. How long before the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Department of Transportation or the Congress and the betrayed airlines
themselves call for the resignation of both officers and the Board and, end the career conflict
of interest these failed incumbents have with the future well-being of the Boeing Corporation
itself?"
Everything is like CalPERS. Ergo, Boeing is like CalPERS.
When they said that "The company and its "captured" FAA want to unground the MAX as fast
as possible" I was thinking for a brief moment that they said that they want to "underground"
the MAX as fast as possible which gave another spin on that story.
Earlier in the 737 program, long before MCAS software addition, there were instructions
for using "roller coaster " procedure to recover from stuck-stabilizer failure when excessive
forces had to be overcome to use the manual correction wheel [next to each pilot's inboard
knee] . At some early point, that procedure was no longer taught as there were only very rare
causes of stuck/failed stabilizer that were easily handled [no MCAS software program that
repeatedly forces the stabilizer to pitch-down, which counters each crew correction toward
level flight].
With MCAS added to 737MAX, that "rollercoaster" procedure was neither taught nor even
available in the existing simulators used for training. WHY?
Q--Well, what if it was taught? And in the manual? Then either the procedure must be added to
all the existing simulators, worldwide, or new simulators designed and sold before any pilots
could qualify.
Now you ask "So what?"
Kaboom! Then the real debacle would be discovered and quickly exposed to all training
pilots and obxervers.
Namely, in simulator training, some male pilots would fail by not have the strength to
manually turn the correcting wheel. Even more female pilots would almost certainly fail.
Recall that the wheel is next to the inboard knee of each pilot. Thus, except for
ambidextrous pilots, the week arm would often be next to the wheel! [To wit: Right-handed
left-seat pilot has strong arm next to wheel; but right-handed right-seat co-pilot would have
weak arm next to wheel.
The 737 series was introduced in operation in late 1960s, when female commercial pilots
were a rarity.
Now it is 2018, with MCAS added, how were the huge numbers of female pilots, worldwide,
going to be accomodated? De-selected? A marketing nightmare!
Furthermore, without hugely expensive re-design/engineering/certification and re-training
of all pilots and maintenance in brand new simulators? Well, that gives the lie to 737MAX
being a routine upgrade needing just quickie updates for any 737-series pilots. And thus no
sales advantages vis-a-vis Airbus ! Or Bombardier or Embraer. In fact, there would clearly be
sales disadvantages including unworkable profit margins.
Besides, existing management will get rich and retire long before the problems ever
appear! We can just gum it to death and let the lawyers howl and feast on billable hours. Our
personal success is certain. [The hired,chief execs viewpoint, as opposed to the long-dead
founder's intent.]
"... Boeing's 737 Max was built with "effectively neutered" oversight, writes the New York Times, citing interviews with over a dozen current and former employees at America's Federal Aviation Agency. ..."
"... regulator had been passing off routine tasks to manufacturers for years, with the goal of freeing up specialists to focus on the most important safety concerns. But on the Max, the regulator handed nearly complete control to Boeing , leaving some key agency officials in the dark about important systems like MCAS, according to the current and former employees...The company performed its own assessments of the system, which were not stress-tested by the regulator. ..."
"... Turnover at the agency left two relatively inexperienced engineers overseeing Boeing's early work on the system. The F.A.A. eventually handed over responsibility for approval of MCAS to the manufacturer. After that, Boeing didn't have to share the details of the system with the two agency engineers... ..."
"... Late in the development of the Max, Boeing decided to expand the use of MCAS, to ensure the plane flew smoothly. The new, riskier version relied on a single sensor and could push down the nose of the plane by a much larger amount. Boeing did not submit a formal review of MCAS after the overhaul. It wasn't required by F.A.A. rules... The agency ultimately certified the jet as safe, required little training for pilots and allowed the plane to keep flying until a second deadly Max crash, less than five months after the first.... By 2018, the F.A.A. was letting the company certify 96 percent of its own work, according to an agency official. ..."
Boeing's 737 Max was built with "effectively neutered" oversight,
writes the New York Times, citing interviews with over a dozen current and former employees at
America's Federal Aviation Agency.
Their damning conclusion? The agency "had never independently assessed the risks of
the dangerous software known as MCAS when they approved the plane in 2017." regulator had been passing off routine tasks to manufacturers for years, with the goal of
freeing up specialists to focus on the most important safety concerns. But on the Max,
the regulator handed nearly complete control to Boeing , leaving some key agency officials
in the dark about important systems like MCAS, according to the current and former
employees...The company performed its own assessments of the system, which were not
stress-tested by the regulator.
Turnover at the agency left two relatively inexperienced engineers overseeing Boeing's
early work on the system. The F.A.A. eventually handed over responsibility for approval of MCAS
to the manufacturer. After that, Boeing didn't have to share the details of the system with the
two agency engineers...
Late in the development of the Max, Boeing decided to expand the use of MCAS, to ensure
the plane flew smoothly. The new, riskier version relied on a single sensor and could push down
the nose of the plane by a much larger amount. Boeing did not submit a formal review of MCAS
after the overhaul. It wasn't required by F.A.A. rules... The agency ultimately certified the
jet as safe, required little training for pilots and allowed the plane to keep flying until a
second deadly Max crash, less than five months after the first.... By 2018, the F.A.A. was
letting the company certify 96 percent of its own work, according to an agency
official.
The article ends by describing the days after the first 737 Max crash, when Boeing executives
visited the regulatory agency's headquarters in Seattle.
"The officials sat incredulous as Boeing executives explained details about the system that
they didn't know."
Overall, it seems that the F.A.A. was far too differential to Boeing, reportedly treating
them like "a client" and acquiescing to decisions the company made based on their budget and
deadlines, instead of overseeing them more strictly.
Most damningly, Boeing never submitted the autopilot software MCAS for formal F.A.A. review,
after the company began using it to fly the 737 Max, so the F.A.A. was unaware about its
flaws.
Boeing has stopped producing the popular 737 Max model, which is hurting not only Boeing's
bottom line but airlines as well, many of whom have been pushing for compensation for lost
earnings.
Michael O'Leary, CEO of the budget airline Ryanair, is worried that if Boeing doesn't get
the model working again, he might have to cut jobs, as he is not getting the amount of planes
he was expecting and it's hurting his bottom line. "It may well move to 20, it could move to
10, and it could well move to zero if Boeing don't get their s--- together pretty quickly with
the regulator," O'Leary reportedly said on an earnings call.
Turn out that Boeing is not the only company with worrisome autopilot software, as airlines
using certain models of Airbus's A350 software have been told that they have to power down the
software every 149 hours or risk "...partial or total loss of some avionics systems or
functions.
We
already knew that there was little oversight
over Boeing with regards to the failed Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
(MCAS):
The company performed its own assessments of the system, which were not stress-tested by
the regulator. Turnover at the agency left two relatively inexperienced engineers
overseeing Boeing's early work on the system.
The F.A.A. eventually handed over responsibility for approval of MCAS to the
manufacturer. After that, Boeing didn't have to share the details of the system with the
two agency engineers. They weren't aware of its intricacies, according to two people with
knowledge of the matter.
Late in the development of the Max, Boeing decided to expand the use of MCAS, to ensure
the plane flew smoothly. The new, riskier version relied on a single sensor and could push
down the nose of the plane by a much larger amount.
Boeing did not submit a formal review of MCAS after the overhaul. It wasn't required by
F.A.A. rules.
The results are well know. The single sensor failed and MCAS activated during a critical
flight phase. 346 people on two flights were killed.
But MCAS is not the only system that the FAA allowed to be certified even when it could
cause significant problems. The European regulator EASA identified
five additional major issues that need to be fixed before the 737 MAX can again fly.
Early on, engineers at the F.A.A. discovered a problem with one of the most important new
features of the Max: its engines. The Max, the latest version of the 50-year-old 737,
featured more fuel-efficient engines, with a larger fan and a high-pressure turbine. But
the bigger, more complex engines could do more damage if they broke apart midair.
The F.A.A. engineers were particularly concerned about pieces hitting the cables that
control the rudder, according to five people with knowledge of the matter and internal
agency documents. A cable severed during takeoff would make it difficult for pilots to
regain control, potentially bringing down the jet.
The 737 MAX has newly developed LEAP-1B
engines which have a larger fan at the front than the previous ones.
The fans are 69.4 inch (1.76m) in diameter compared to 61 inch (1.55m) on the 737 NG
engines. The fan turns with 5,000 rotations per minute and the turbine with
20,000 rotations per minute (pdf). If a fan or turbine blade or disk breaks it becomes a
high speed projectile that can not be contained by the engine housing.
The engines on the MAX are further forward than on previous 737 models. The debris of an
uncontained engine failure would hit the plane's body in places that were previously safe.
Uncontained
engine failures are relatively rare but they can and do
happen on all modern jet types.
Posted by b at
14:47 UTC |
Comments (50) No surprises here, the corruption that runs throughout the MIC breeds a
lack concern for quality control, after all why bother putting all that effort into creating
a superior product when you can just bribe the regulators to approve it as it and then bribe
the government to promote and buy your crappy product as is. I doubt Boeing will go under
because of this though (even thought they deserve to go down in flames), the US government
would remove all budget caps, super change the printing presses, threaten their allies,
absolutely anything and everything to save Boeing if it came down to it.
Amazing what private parties can do in revealing faults when the data is public and everyone
is given access to it.
Thanks B for a great job .
What I like about the Boeing problem is that it reveals the deep corrupt nature of current
corporate armies and brings into full view the result of privatization and economic Zionism .
Other privatizations include the Internet, the energy providers like the power companies (the
are franchised monopolies), now 5G < more dangerous than Nicotine and so on.. The private
party providers have little concern for the welfare of the masses of people, unless they are
maybe liable for something, that they sell to. Moreover these private parties are corrupt
enough to corrupt the government oversight agencies and the members of the elected government
(they call it lobbying) in order to accomplish their profits to the satisfaction of wall
street. The aircraft industries responds to Wall Street, not to masses they sell to. . Yeah I
know the FAA regulates but its regulations do not apply to the big guys. Big bucks can be had
in contracting $100,000 per nail government contacts and flying airplanes for hire.
All airlines, and all power companies, and all communications companies from research to
end user should be owned and operated by the government IMO. .
Taxpayers paid ~$1.5T for the F-35, and yet the IP rights and maintenance lies solely in
the hands of Lockheed Martin instead of the government. And that's not even discussing about
the design shortcomings or testing fraud...
Yup, totally no corruption happening right there. The MIC is so utterly corrupt that is
has hollowed out the US military so much that even the neocons feel skittish at taking on
Venezuela face-on, let alone Iran.
Amazing what private parties can do in revealing faults when the data is public and
everyone is given access to it.
Excellent point, Snake!!
What I like about the Boeing problem is that it reveals the deep corrupt nature of
current corporate armies and brings into full view the result of privatization and economic
Zionism ... The private party providers have little concern for the welfare of the
masses of people, unless they are maybe liable for something, that they sell to.
Private Party Providers ... very apt term for the political parties! (All of the Hegemon
Inc (TM) private group, not just the US)
Had this been a free market capitalist system likely Boing would have already been put out of
business or would have been opperated different because of competition and risk.
If they are going to release this death trap to the public, in a just world it should be a
requirement that all Boeing top executives and board members be required to fly on them
exclusively.
Is the target label shifting to the faa?
"By 2018, the F.A.A. was letting the company certify 96 percent of its own work, according to
an agency official."
Many issues here. Certificators delegate to the company who delegates to money god.
Better Faa boys to look back to recently closed works.
...
There are several ways to solve the problem. Redundant steel cables could mitigate the risk.
The cables could be protected by titanium tubes as they are on some military planes.
Redundant electric wires that control a servo to move the hydraulic valves could be
added.
The main problem is the de facto acceptance of the risk of a "liberated" turbine blade
penetrating the passenger compartment. It would be better to eliminate the risk altogether by
installing shields adjacent to, or within, the engine cowling to deflect loose blades. The
shields wouldn't need to be more than 1/4 of the circumference of the engine and wouldn't
need to be the full length of the engine - just near the turbine banks. On the other hand
if/when a blade gets loose it's probably best to let it get away from the engine to prevent
it from rattling around and causing more damage.
If it's more sensible to let a loose blade escape the engine ASAP then consideration
should be given to beefing up the control cables to enable them to survive the impact from a
flying turbine blade. And seats opposite a turbine bank could be discounted...
It's sad to see all that boeing is talking about is getting the plane back in the air soonest
possible.Why is boeing so reluctant on letting go of the 737.
The failures cited in the links were on the intake fans, not the compressors. When one
blade is off, the engine is functionally done as much as it would be with more blades damaged
by a contained failure. If the larger radius blades of the LEAP-1B increase the risk of
failure, that is an issue with the engine that goes far beyond its use on the 737 MAX.
I thought jet engines were supposed to be armoured to prevent blades flying out of the engine
when they fail. But armour = more weight = less profit and greed will always win out.
these planes sound scary... i don't know why anyone would fly in one here forward...
@ 5 jonathan... capitalism at its finest.. get the taxpayer to pay for all the future
private profit... why not just call it socialism instead?? because all the profit only goes
to a few...
It's sad to see all that boeing is talking about is getting the plane back in the air
soonest possible.
Posted by: Edward | Jul 28 2019 16:20 utc | 13
In a normal world with such a gross litany of Boeing failures and the multilevel
scandal of FAA negligence/improper handover of regulation to the regulated/cover up of known
defects/ignorance of failures known to Boeing, the Chief Executive of Boeing with his tail
between his legs would not even dare speak of getting the plane back in the air
quickly, the massive loss of profits notwithstanding, because of the implied lack of interest
in safety.
Why is the haste to get the plane airborne not itself a scandal of massive proportions?
Why are there no urgent congressional hearings about why Boeing is so neglectful of basic
safety?
In my view the certification of the 737MAX - and also the 737NG - needs urgently to be
irrevocably REVOKED IN ITS ENTIRETY, with an absolute prohibition on all flights until/unless
the certification is started afresh absolutely from scratch und under scrupulous scrutiny.
Anything less is an unaccountable neglect of safety, and puts in doubt the seriousness and
validity of ALL FAA certifications.
When is there going to be a lawsuit questioning whether any FAA certification
whatsoever has any legal validity, given the extreme negligence, unaccountability, fraud and
incompetence?
From an insurance perspective, it would surely be possible to argue that the FAA as
currently constituted is not competent to certify aircraft safety - in general - and that
therefore no FAA certification carried out by the FAA on any aircraft in recent years
(or for as long as the certification system and competence was broadly similar to the way it
is now) is valid, and that therfore all purported insurance coverage for the aircraft is null
and void.
As soon as one insurance company publicly states that its coverage of the 737MAX is null
and void, the scandal is in a new ballpark.
I believe one factual error was made, the fan speed of the new engines is not 20,000 rpm but
rather around 5,000. the core does spin that fast but the fan, which is powered by the low
pressure turbine is much slower. the fan also comes up to max speed more slowly than the core
which has an almost instantaneous reaction to throttle position.
all aircraft with jet engines have an area marked by vertical red lines that show the
plane of the compressor blades. The chance of a fan blade coming off and severing a cable
would be miniscule. I have heard stories of jet engines self destructing but in 24 years of
working on fighter aircraft I never saw it nor read about it happening on any of the aircraft
in the US Air Force inventory. Engines are regularly inspected and bad things very rarely
happen.
The government will just borrow enough money to save Boeing and make the share holders whole.
The air lines that are losing money because of Boeing will be made whole as well. That is the
job of the US govt these days. No executive bonus left behind.
I am pretty sure we haven't seen the end of the scandals - on the contrary, I think things
are just beginning to come out. Boing (let's just stick to Boing, it seems more apt
than Boeing) is a huge company with a huge number of employees, many of whom have causes for
dissatisfaction. We have already seen what sort of a company it is and the attitude of its
top-level management. More and more scandals are going to come out, right across the board
not just 737 and not just civil aircraft, and the thus-far steady trickle will turn step by
step into a heavy flow and eventually a huge gush.
We aint seen nothing yet! It's going to go "***BOING***"
You are right with the fan speed. I have now corrected that.
The chance of a fan blade coming off and severing a cable would be miniscule.
There are lots of civilian planes in the air each and every day. Even rare events happen
regularly. If one searches for pictures
of plane engine failure one finds plenty.
Engine failures happen too often. They are inside the chance limit of 10^9 which means
that they require redundancy. No single engine failure can be allowed to bring down an
airliner.
Hull or wing penetrations happen in some of the engine failure cases. United Airlines
Flight 232 crashed because of that. That is why the FAA demands redundancies in control and
hydraulic lines that are in danger of being hit.
yeah - socialism or something like that, in spite of all the ranting by americans of how
they hate socialism..
Yes, something like that. The reasons why it is so incomprehensible to the majority of
people lies in the fact that its origin was never really debated.
Ask anybody what 'National Socialism' is and note the answers. In a society where profits
are privatized and losses are socialized, one is looking at exactly that.
The owner class is shielded from what would spell bankruptcy
to the little people's ventures. Practically none of the
industrialists cashing in during National Socialism in
Germany was ever sent to prison.
As corporations are now writing the laws, Boeing will
receive compensation for loss of future profits. Added
to the taxpayer tab. You just wait for that announcement.
The solution to this will drive rage into the faces of those
who profit from the status quo:
Nationalize Boeing. Profits won't go to shareholders any longer, but back into public
coffers and into R&D.
Alternatively, make it mandatory for legislators to exclusively use the 737 MAX for their
air travels.
Just a minor correction about the rotational speed of the fan. It's a maximum of 4,586 rpm,
not 20,000. The higher figure is the rotating speed of the high pressure spool, known as N2.
The low pressure spool, N1, includes the fan and the low pressure turbines that drive
it.
The tip speed of the fan is still enormous at this maximum speed, In excess of 420 meters
per second, which is about Mach 1.2. In kmh it is over 1,500 km/hr.
Still an engine fan coming loose is a very rare occurence, but it certainly has happened
on several occasions.
Critical flight control lines like rudder cables MUST be protected in any eventuality. The
air regulations are quite clear on that. So yes, the bottom line is that Boeing took another
shortcut and rolled the dice.
And the US regulator, the FAA, let them. It's a nightmare situation. Boeing needs to just
pull the plug on the MAX and take its lumps. A clean sheet single aisle aircraft is required.
There is no more room for this 50 year old design to evolve.
Single engine military jet flights were banned over residential areas in ny city after an
engine failure caused one to go down on a citt street and incinerate a couple of people.
Mechanical things always break, maintenance checks are never perfect. "Acceptable risk" is
the standard, as it must be, but the determination of what is acceptable needs to be
carefully considered. In this case it was "expedient risk" as determined a party with an
obvious conflict of interest inappropriately making the determination.
All airlines, and all power companies, and all communications companies from research to
end user should be owned and operated by the government IMO. .
Posted by: snake | Jul 28 2019 15:21 utc | 4
I agree entirely but I would go further. All pharmaceutical companies, Major hospitals,
water supplies, roads, railways, prisons should be owned by the government too. Private
pharma and hospitals NEED sick people to turn a profit. Nationalised pharma and hospitals
need cures to reduce running costs. Private prisons NEED prisoners to turn a profit.
Nationalised prisons can concentrate on rehabilitation and prevention of recidivism.
At this point, Boeing should just let the MAX die, stop producing it, and focus on other
planes. Bad situation, but in the long run, not as bad as the alternative - risking
bankruptcy.
@20 bnw... yeah - socialism or something like that, in spite of all the ranting by
americans of how they hate socialism..
The old definitions of Communism and Socialism were something like :
Communism is : from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.
Socialism is : from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.
So this is a new definition of Socialism as far as I can see. It goes something like this:
"From each according to his ......? (Oh forget it!), to each according to his greed"
The Boeing 737 MAX fiasco is a perfect example of why you need strong government regulation
of business. Hundreds of people have died in 737 Max crashes, that could have been and should
have been prevented by prompt and strong government intervention. Turning the 737 MAX
aircraft's quality control over the company was so stupid that it defies all logic. Boeing's
major concern however was to cut costs and increase the company's bottom line. Because of
their profits-at-all-costs decision, will now cost that firm far more financially and by
reputation than it would have if they had done it right the first time. Those who claim
business, if left alone and unregulated will things better and faster, need only to look at
the 737 MAX fiasco to see the fallacy of that belief.
I believe that it has been standard practice in many countries to say that if the FAA
certified a plane that was sufficient reason to accept it as being airworthy. Clearly this is
no longer a tenable position.
Presumably European, Russian, Chinese, etc., (Probably not the British!) governments will
demand that US airplanes undergo certification procedures by their own inspectors. Won't
they? If not, why not?
indeed the DC10 had a very serious design defect wherein all three hydraulic systems in the
tail of the aircraft were vulnerable in the disk area around the tail mounted engine. that is
unforgivable. what is also unforgivable is that crack in the disk assembly should have been
seen during regular maintenance. wiki speaks of investigators finding penetrant dye in the
crack of the failed blade. It failed after almost 18 years of service and should have been
discovered much earlier.
that brings up another point which is not going to set well with everyone and that is
aircraft maintenance. not all airlines have the same level of seriousness when it comes to
doing regular and scheduled maintenance. some don't have skilled workers, some can't afford
downtime, and some just don't care. this is a known problem which can be readily verified by
checking on which airlines are allowed to operate in Europe and or the US. there are so many
that are not allowed you have to really ask yourself if you want to fly on some minor African
or South American carriers. Already the US and European carriers are doing the minimum
required...
at any rate, Boeing made a mistake with the 737 Max, the company has existed due to
military contracts for so long that they have become rotten from the top down. I believe I
saw a story not long ago that Boeing was buying back stock. as with any corporation their
responsibility is to the shareholder. that is a damn shame but it is reality. I do not see
that changing any time soon in the US of A
Where is the accountability? In our new world order, the rich, powerful, famous and well
connected get a free ride. In China, the CEO would be stood against a wall and shot ... here
he keeps his job and will probably get a bonus.
Thanks for the ongoing coverage of the demise of Boeing b
I wrote initially that this problem would take Boeing down and I still think that will be
true....maybe some parts left to do MIC stuff but the rest bankrupt so they don't have to pay
all they should have to for the victims of their perfidy.
@ flankerbandit who wrote
"
There is no more room for this 50 year old design to evolve.
"
I agree but want to use your age reference to add that FIAT money brought to you by the
global private finance folk has been around since 1971, almost as long.
I would argue that the damage fiat money is doing to the world far surpasses the damage by
Boeing which is a victim of the former
China is saying that it doesn't want to play the fiat money game of the West anymore and
is forcing the West to back to money connected to things of value and associated
controls.
I continue to posit that the global airplane of current Western finance is like
flankerbuilt wrote
"
There is no more room for this 50 year old design to evolve.
"
div> I truly believe Boeing is going down, the lack of cash flow to impact
its operations in the next 12 months is simply huge its share value has not collapse most
likely due to key stakeholders agreement until now, the 1st one that dump large quantities of
Boeing's shares, the share price will collapse, as of now share price is higher than one year
ago which is absolutely unacceptable for the current crisis and the future lack of cash flow,
the only reason it sustain at this level is a backstage agreement with key stakeholders, in
other words, Wall Street corruption.
It is important to notice the level of new order cancelations for 737MAX but also other Boeing
planes, as soon as airlines start sensing the blood on the pool they will cancel hundreds of
planes in order.
I truly believe Boeing is going down, the lack of cash flow to impact its operations in the
next 12 months is simply huge its share value has not collapse most likely due to key
stakeholders agreement until now, the 1st one that dump large quantities of Boeing's shares,
the share price will collapse, as of now share price is higher than one year ago which is
absolutely unacceptable for the current crisis and the future lack of cash flow, the only
reason it sustain at this level is a backstage agreement with key stakeholders, in other
words, Wall Street corruption.
It is important to notice the level of new order cancelations for 737MAX but also other
Boeing planes, as soon as airlines start sensing the blood on the pool they will cancel
hundreds of planes in order.
But the USA is a free market capitalist country: the government is for sale, at a precise
price (just because the price is undisclosed, doesn't mean there isn't one).
Just a little more info about aircraft engines 'exploding' in flight.
In April, 2018 Southwest Airlines Flight 1380, a Boeing 737-700 had a fan blade come off
and one passenger was killed by flying debris, which also damaged the airplane wing. The
airplane was emergency landed on the one remaining engine, the previous generation CFM56.
The NTSB preliminary report says a fan blade [titanium] failed and heard off at the root
where it attaches. The suspected cause is metal fatigue and the engine manufacturer issued a
service directive for ultrasonic inspections after 20,000 landing-takeoff cycles.
Here the fan and compressor blade shapes were distorted, which caused compressor surge,
where the engine is not able to invest enough air for the rpm it is turning. The result can
be backfiring through the front of the engine, as on this flight, which tore both engines
apart.
The crew miraculously landed the plane dead stick.
So yes, as the incident from last year shows, that fan blade letting go was totally
unexpected by the manufacturer, hence the tightened maintenance schedule.
Of course this won't help if the airline skimps on maintenance, as some certainly do.
Thanks for pointing out facts that corporate media ignores. Boeing and the Federal Government
are at a cross roads. The transfer of wealth to the rich from the forever wars, piracy, and
asset stripping is ending. The system has taken all of the surplus. Only thing left is
shortening people's lifespans. Off subject or not; the Trump tweetstorm about Baltimore
highlights America's basic problem. A major port on USA's East Coast but there are no working
jobs left in Baltimore that can support a family. Education and healthcare collapsing. This
is the future of the West if predatory capitalism isn't tamed. Boeing needs to be saved but
must be regulated to serve the public good.
I wouldn't at all be surprised, indeed I take it as given, that Boeing's share price is
being propped up by the US Govt directly or indirectly - via the FED for example. When it
goes the stampede for the exits will be on an historic scale.
@24 notheonly1.. i agree with your suggestions, but i just don't see that happening until
after the empire falls..
@31 foolisholdman.. "So this is a new definition of Socialism as far as I can see. It goes
something like this: "From each according to his greed.." that is what it looks like to me as
well... except they don't call it that! the world is upside down and i find it is a lot
easier to understand it when i flip everything upside down... i think i need to do what alice
in wonderland did to make it all make sense..
@43 symen d... i think that has been the plan of the usa's for the longest time -screw
europe one way or the other...
@10 - y,
With regards to Boeing and 2020 elections, I figure not very much. Because as a beacon of
liberty and free market, we abhor socialism... Chump's Maga base of neo-confederates won't be
driven to the polls by serious strategic industrial issues. It's a certainty, the nativists
will be fed a heavy dose of demagogic missile tweets about n*ggers, spics and socialist SJW's
impeding their exceptional project. Ted Cruz and other GOP reactionaries wanted to destroy
the US Export-Import Bank, one of the few remaining instruments (dating from new deal era)
indispensable to fight a trade war... When linear cretinism rules the day, deplorables will
perceive zugzwang as winning multi-dimensional chess. Derp.
Don't even think that the US of A administration will let Boeing go down without
reacting.
What they can do ? Accuse Airbus of corruption, put 2nd level EU directors in jail, negociate
with manager a bargain sale to Boeing and profit.
They've already done such a think with many companies in the past.
@37 Canthama makes an important point. In any "sensible" market Boeing stock would already be
taking a hammering. But it isn't, which suggests some very underhanded collusion is taking
place.
Some people here are suggesting that it is the US government that is the hidden hand
propping up Boeing as a "too big to fail" part of the MIC, and they will simply print
whatever it takes to stop Boeing from collapsing.
I am cynical enough to suspect that this isn't the case.
I suspect those who are exposed to the tune of $billions are propping up Boeing until they
can quietly unwind their expose. After which the company will collapse in a day - or even
less - precisely because at that point they won't give a s**t about the company, or its
workforce, or anyone else who relies on its products for their livelihood.
@ Posted by: Yeah, Right | Jul 29 2019 11:31 utc | 47
Stock is what Marx called "fictitious capital". It appears as a paper that gives you money
ex nihilo .
This is achieved in two ways: rising prices of the stock itself and/or dividends. Which
way (or both) is taken is all up to the company itself: e.g. Amazon doesn't pay dividends,
relying exclusively on its confidence its stock prices will always go up while Apple does a
combination of rising dividends and rising stock prices (buybacks).
Stock prices are unrelated to the productive health of the individual capital in question.
After the coup of 2016, the usurper Brazilian government begun to liquidate extremely
productive infrastructure in order to register higher profits in its annual reports to the
shareholders: its stock prices almost doubled in a quesiton of days.
After another bad night with little sleep (6ºC in my house) I thought about the
Boeing affair.
I call it an affair now, as is obviously that the status quo of this corporation is in
jeopardy and the peddlers are trying to stop Boeing from sinking.
That would otherwise be called 'insider trading', correct? But the result of a sleepless
night over the failing corporation brought another aspect to light.
Empires have been failing for much less than the main income source Boeing has been for
the empire for a very long time. Before the advent of Airbus, who would airlines have to buy
from? Ilyushin? McDonnell? Boeing had cornered the market after WWII - there was no other
civilian aircraft manufacturer in the West that could produce its numbers.
With this income source now definitely gone - and without TPP that would force treaty
members to buy Boeing, or else - the US Titanic is listing faster than a turning iceberg.
Especially in the light of the now old news, that China has started to 3D print main
components for its own domestic aircraft. And on top of it, the Russians are joining the
program for the rapid manufacturing of Boeing replacements.
Iran won't buy any either. Nor Venezuela, or Syria. Only the US dependents in the West
will still buy Boeing. Therefore I am convinced that the implications of this reckless public
transportation manufacturer's utter failure will shake the foundations of the empire towards
rubble.
Another important aspect is - looking at the Chinese High Speed rail network, created in
no time at all - NOW would be the time to lay the tracks from New York to L.A. From Chicago
to Dallas. Another commenter linked the RT article about the continuous high speed rail track
layer. A simple calculation will reveal that they are doing upwards of ten kilometer per day
- seven days a week.
Plus, it is not that airplanes are flying for free either, so the energy calculation for
high speed is not as bad as defenders of the stinking status quo will make anybody believe. A
train is the most efficient transportation modus possible. Even when it goes really, really
fast.
I saw this piece which I think explained what happened at Boeing.
For what little my opinion is worth, many of the problems in the West have originated in
our business schools. They are a curse. Its not too late to shut them all down, and
redistribute the curricula to other departments.
"According to Boeing's annual reports, in the last five years Boeing diverted 92% of
operating cash flow to dividends and share buybacks to benefit investors. Since 1998, share
buybacks have consumed $70 billion, adjusted for inflation. That could have financed several
entire new airplane models, with money left over for handsome executive bonuses..."
to be a devil's advocate, would doing that have made business sense? Would demand have
supported the new models? Was there a technological reason to bring in new models that would
create their own demand?
It goes far beyond the schools. It's the overarching Western business philosophy. I had to
take one business course for ROTC. The central message from day one was that the business of
business is to make money. A lot of us found this sleazy and disconcerting, but we never
harbored dreams of being massively rich. This is in line with what semiconscious said below
about Boeing maximizing dividends and share buybacks. They may talk about building fantastic
aircraft, but that's just talk. They'll build the cheapest product they can in order to
maximize profits. It wasn't always this way. The idea of offering a quality product for a
fair price was once far more than a marketing slogan. It was a time when craftsmen,
manufacturers and service providers stood behind their work as a matter of honor and pride.
It is a philosophy of "being a man for others" for the business world.
"There is one rule for the industrialist and that is: make the best quality goods possible at
the lowest cost possible, paying the highest wages possible." Henry Ford.
"There is one rule for the industrialist and that is: make goods at the lowest cost
possible, paying the lowest wages possible." Ver. 2.0 (current)
Eric, government safety and fuel efficiency regulations have something to do with that but
that's clearly not the only reason. These companies are improving engineering, designing and
manufacturing all the time. Getting the reputation of producing nothing but cheap crap is not
good for the bottom line. However, this isn't always for the best. VW made a decision about a
decade ago to "cheap out" on its cars in the US market. The difference was noticeable, but it
was a marketing success. Most US buyers preferred the cheaper price over better features and
materials.
Probably. Boeing's engineering standards were once extremely high. It was the foundation of
their long running success. For the last 20 years the management have been extracting value
by under-investing. Not building a new aircraft and going with the software solution for the
737 Max saved a huge amount of money, or at least would have if the process hadn't been
mismanaged/misconceived. However, making the the product subservient to the business is not a
path to longterm success. Its a path to increasingly bad planes.
In many industries, CEOs can can make +USD100mn. When these kinds of sums are involved we
shouldnt be surprised if decisions are made which prioritizes the short term over the long
term.
My Dad and Brother-in-Law worked at Boeing. I am not disinterested. My Brother-in-law who
is also Vietnam Veteran and retired told me that the 737 Max catastrophes are directly due to
the takeover of Boeing by McDonnell Douglas executives in 1997. Boeing, just like Intel, U.S.
Steel or Toys R Us, was seized by financiers who could care less about the business and
milked it of all its value. Money that should have been used designed a new single aisle
passenger airliner instead was used to pay executive bonuses and increase shareholder value
by stock buybacks. Due to this de-industrialization policy the USA is now an empty shell of
the nation that I grew up in. The only thing rising is the number of billionaires up to 680
led by Jeff Bezos.
If Congress had not deregulated aviation and let Boeing employees certify the safety of
the aircraft, FAA inspectors, who once were paid by taxpayers, more likely than not would
have pointed out that the 737 Max flight control system which could nose dive the airplane
into the ground by regulation requires three or more sensors not one.
Boeing in order to survive as North America's aircraft manufacturer must be able to sell
single aisle passenger aircraft in East Asia. Dennis Muilenburg should know this. Clearly the
Trump Administration doesn't. Boeing's future depends on getting the 737 Max re-certified by
the Civil Aviation Administration of China. This will take time and could cost billions of
dollars. If not, the US aviation industry will wither away. The new Cold War, unless ended,
will force the formation of two global economic blocks, once again, except this time China
will have all the manufacturing expertise and industry.
FAA inspectors would have required a different airplane, one in which flight stability was
inherent in the airframe and not faked by means of software.
"Boeing, just like Intel, U.S. Steel or Toys R Us, was seized by financiers who
could care less about the business and milked it of all its value. Money that should have
been used designed a new single aisle passenger airliner instead was used to pay executive
bonuses and increase shareholder value by stock buybacks. Due to this de-industrialization
policy the USA is now an empty shell of the nation that I grew up in."
VV,
Yes, this financialization of our economy over the past 40 years under both Republican and
Democratic administrations and Congresses has hollowed out our economy and financed the
technology transfer to China strengthening the totalitarian CCP.
With the focus on financial asset inflation that primarily benefits the top 1% we now have
the worst wealth inequality in a century. Even worse the degree of systemic debt and unfunded
liabilities are gargantuan. The middle classes and working classes will be further shredded
as the debt load continues to depress productivity growth and monetary & fiscal policies
become even more extreme. If we thought the political conflict we have seen so far is bad, we
ain't seen nothing yet!
Ray Dalio, the Chief Investment Officer of Bridgewater, one of the largest hedge funds
recently penned a note on "paradigm shifts", which is well worth a read.
"There's a saying in the markets that "he who lives by the crystal ball is destined to eat
ground glass." While I'm not sure exactly when or how the paradigm shift will occur, I will
share my thoughts about it. I think that it is highly likely that sometime in the next few
years, 1) central banks will run out of stimulant to boost the markets and the economy when
the economy is weak, and 2) there will be an enormous amount of debt and non-debt
liabilities (e.g., pension and healthcare) that will increasingly be coming due and won't
be able to be funded with assets. Said differently, I think that the paradigm that we are
in will most likely end when a) real interest rate returns are pushed so low that investors
holding the debt won't want to hold it and will start to move to something they think is
better and b) simultaneously, the large need for money to fund liabilities will
contribute to the "big squeeze." At that point, there won't be enough money to meet the
needs for it, so there will have to be some combination of large deficits that are
monetized, currency depreciations, and large tax increases, and these circumstances will
likely increase the conflicts between the capitalist haves and the socialist have-nots
.
The opioid crisis, Trumpism are all symptoms of the deleterious effects of
financialization. Demagogues from both the left & right are in our political future as
large segments of our population experience significant stress as their standard of living
comes under increasing pressure. Note that the bottom 50% only have 1% of the financial
assets.
Ray Dalio is also looking at some aspects of MMT and if it works, that is wonderful. If it
does not, it can make things even worse. Where many agree with Mr. Dalio, is that the current
financial system is working less and less. Boeing and others are a symptom of that.
My wife was not sure why I insisted over the last decade that we use paper profits from
Wall Street to buy diamonds, gold, silver and such. She does like wearing it now and
then.
We've been living MMT for the past decade. Just look at the scale of monetization in
Europe, Japan, Switzerland and the US in that period. Now in the "greatest economy in
history" with the stock market at all time highs, see how the yield curve looks with the Fed
readying rate cuts and $13 trillion of sovereign debt with negative yields and swap spreads
negative. Isn't it incredulous that Italian 10yrs yield less than 10yr Treasuries and
Argentina can issue 100yr bonds?
If MMT works, why after trillions in monetization does semiconductor and auto sales on a
YoY basis decline and why does Singapore print negative economy and German industrial
production decline?
Boeing buying Embraer regional airliner division and merging with its commercial airliner
sector recently looked like as a desperate move, Embraer is world leader in the regional
airliner market and is famous for being efficient, Boeing is hoping of being saved by
Brazilian engineers.
Thanks for your very informative post. I am not all that surprised that Boeing is in their
deserved trouble. Most big US companies have a senior management well removed from reality.
Many years ago, when I was in the trucking business, we suddenly got a lot of trips hauling
refrigerators back to various GE factories, due to a faulty compressor they had installed.
The repair guys in the field soon found them to be faulty. It took one and a half years for
that information to reach senior management, resulting in a lot of units made with a problem.
Since airplanes are a lot more complicated, what happened should be expected.
The 737MAX will probably never fly passengers again. It's Kludge and they knew it. So does
the rest of the aviation world. Maybe the earlier 737s will live on, but this Turducken has
been thoroughly exposed and other aircraft will fill the niche Boeing tried wedging this
into.
In many ways Boeing is a metaphor for modern America. Started out with such promise, reached
a peak, and since then steadily downhill while others (competitors) thrive. Part of the
tragedy is that the majority fail to see the reality and will continue down the same
destructive path.
Yes, executives have a duty of loyalty to the company (and, by extension, to its owners,
the shareholders).
More to the point, Boards have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a company, which
much predates Milton Friedman's 1970 article in the New York Times Magazine. Corporate law
is, by and large, state law in the state of incorporation, now mostly Delaware and New York
for publicly traded corporations.
Precedents from Michigan from about 100 years ago began to establish that a Board's
fiduciary duty involves maximizing corporate profits. Based on this, it became part of the
broader legal theory of the corporation that this was a key duty of boards in the 1920s and
1930s. By the 1940s and early 1950s, beginning with closely-held corporations and later OTC
traded corporations, lawyers like Joseph Flom and Martin Lipton contended mightily over
shareholder derivative suits in the New York courts.
One of the things that came out of these suits is the business judgement rule that
presumes that HOW the board maximizes shareholder value is left to the business judgement of
the board, who are (ideally) chosen for business acumen and savvy.
With a publicly traded corporation, a shareholder can fairly freely sell their shares if
the return is insufficient (portfolio theory). However, most people do not monitor a
corporation in which they own stock like they owned the business (even though, legally, they
do, or at least a small part of it). Boards have a fiduciary duty to shareholder to protect
their interests (largely, but not exclusively, by maximizing return), which makes sense
especially because stocks are often held by the endowments of charities, pension funds and
other vulnerable parties.
Put in extreme terms, a Board, which concentrates on corporate grand strategy, could put a
lot of money into R&D to reap future profits by disrupting the market at cost of current
returns. But that COULD be challenged. The more common approach today would be to acquire new
technology to disrupt the market by acquiring a smaller company with promising tech but not
risking current returns by doing expensive in-house R&D which might not show any
return.
Actually, under Delaware corporate law, directors are required to "maximize shareholder
value." That doesn't mean increase profits. It gives directors a lot of discretion under the
business judgment rule.
That being said, directors are elected by the shareholders. Shareholders will vote for the
directors who will raise the stock price so that those who already own stock will profit.
Thus, we have corporations taking out billion dollar loans to purchase stock, which increases
the current stock price for current shareholders, but puts future shareholders in debt. In
sum, the drive to increase shareholder value leads to the cannibalization of the
corporation.
Executives act in their self-interest. Their compensation packages are tied to stock price
which is how they make the real big bucks. Not salary. Hence, why financial engineering is
what they do. GE is the poster child and Jack Welch the epitome of the "great" CEO. It
doesn't matter if the business survives and if long-term shareholders (the pension funds,
401K plans and mutual funds) lose value. After all it is OPM.
Peter Drucker, the management gaon, used to say that Reg Jones was the greatest CEO he
worked with in his long career because Jones could pick someone very different from himself
as CEO who better fit the times.
However, those traits were apparently conspicuously absent in Welch, who picked a
successor not obviously suited to the times while Welch himself hung on too long even as the
world changed around him (he didn't notice, for example, that GE Capital, a major source of
GE's profits in the 1980s and 1990s, became a potential liability by the early 2000s).
Not everyone has the self-awareness that Jones had. Not everyone can read the tea leaves
well enough to know, " now it's time for something completely different."
Welch was tough, unsentimental and perfectly suited to the demanding business environment
of the 1980s and 1990s. He made the changes that had to be made early and voluntarily and GE
did far better than other companies like IBM and GM that didn't.
But it seems that Welch didn't realize that being right for one period isn't enough.
GE became a finance company that had a manufacturing side business under Welsh. He also moved
that manufacturing to China and forced GE's subcontractors to move manufacturing there too.
That financial business that Welsh created has ruined GE and it currently is close to
bankruptcy.
If executives can spend shareholder's money of furnishings and charitable contributions,
rather than maximizing shareholder's returns, they will. Keep them from doing so.
The big question is: "How?"
As lord Keynes said, "In the long term, we are all dead." The US, with its short term
orientation has generally out performed Japan with its long term orientation. It is possible,
but not yet determined, that the same is true of the PRC.
I think modern approaches to corporate governance are an improvement on what went before. I
also think a less intrusive regulatory structure abets growth and innovations.
However, laws (and things like the business judgement rule) have tended to restrict things
like shareholder derivative suits, which I think limits a more effective check on the
system.
If anything, it might make sense to take things that boards tend to get wrong (e.g.,
capitalization decisions by boards of financial institutions, as with the Great Recession and
the S&L Crisis) out of the ambit of the business judgement rule and put the burden on the
board to prove there decisions were reasonable. It does not tell the Board what decision to
make, but pointedly tells them that they bear the liability if they did not consider it
carefully.
The root cause of all this is the out-of-control financial sectors of the western
industrialized societies, and most especially that of the USA. The go-to source for
understanding this is the life work of economist and economic historian Michael Hudson who,
in his 80th year, is still very much at the top of his game. Hudson has studied economic
history from ancient Mesopotamia 5,000 years ago to the present, and he asserts that in
societies that use money the financial sectors that emerge to do basic, necessary functions
such as processing transactions and lending money for short term needs inevitability become
ever more parasitic, thus weakening societies from within, unless they develop active
measures for preventing this. Many Mesopotamian societies of the 3rd and 2nd millennia BCE
accomplished this for extended periods with periodic debt relief programs. This is the topic
of Hudson's most recent book . . and forgive them their debts: Lending, Foreclosure and
Redemption from Bronze Age Finance to the Jubilee Year.
Two of Hudson's many books are crucial to understanding how this has played out since
early in the 20th century. The first is Super Imperialism: The Origin and Fundamentals of
U.S. World Dominance, 2003 Edition , which describes the financial aspects of US foreign
policy which since the First World War enabled the US to supplant the overt colonialism of
the Western European with a more stealthy financial colonialism centered on the USA. The book
was originally published in 1972 and substantially updated in 2003. One thing that becomes
apparent from this history even though it's not directly brought out by Hudson, is that the
refugees who have been so effectively used by Trump to distract his base from the fact he,
like all 20th century presidents except Franklin Roosevelt, shy away from confronting the
titans and minions of Wall Street. And even FDR limited the scope of his New Deal programs to
those that affected the financial sector's domestic predation; he was fully on board with
what it did abroad.
The other book at the top of the Hudson must-read list is Killing the Host: How
Financial Parasites and Debt Destroy the Global Economy , published in 2015. In it he
discusses how many of the causal factors cited in other comments that have hollowed out
Boeing and many other companies can be traced back to the malign imperatives of the financial
sectors of the western industrialized countries.
For a convenient introduction to Hudson's thought, below are links to transcripts of two
recent interviews of him by Bonnie Faulkner of the Guns And Butter podcast which provide a
pretty good overview of his body of work.
Well, given its Halachic roots hardly a radical or socialist solution, but does it
undermine people's willingness to loan money to strangers (which was not the case in Ancient
Israel, Ancient Mesopotamia or modern Islamic nations with a Hawiya/Islamic lending
system)?
Most of what Hudson writes about in and forgive them their debts - the late 4th
through the mid 2nd millennia - predates the coalescence of the Jewish identity and religion.
He is said to be working on a sequel to that book that will address attitudes toward periodic
debt relief from the late 2nd millennium up through Greek, Roman & early Christian times.
Not all types of debt were relieved in ancient Mesopotamia, only those which if unforgiven
posed a threat to the establishment, which in that era was usually the political and
religious authority combined in the person of the monarch/high priest. These were typically
debts owed by free holders who were available to be called upon to put aside their plows when
necessary to defend the city or state. Often the debts were owed directly to the
temple/government and were forgiven every 25 or 50 years, or upon the ascent of a new
occupant of the throne.
I neglected to mention that the full text of the 2003 edition of Super Imperialism is
available as a PDF download from Hudson's personal website. Here's the link:
A few things I learned in my ten years in international business. 1. The business of
business is making money, not the products. They are just the means for making money.. 2.
Resources are not free as they are in government. Someone has to pay for them. 3.
Transactions are where you make money if you do. Infrastructure; factories, people, company
towns or country clubs, etc. should be taken down as soon as the transactions that they
support are no longer making money. 4. There are profit centers and there are cost centers.
Remember that. I hated business just like the banker Claude Devereux hated it in my books but
like him I was good at it. TTG, you should have been a priest or a crusader warrior monk.
For over six years I felt I had a calling to become a Maryknoll missionary priest. I even
went to a future priest summer camp at Stockbridge, MA run by the Marionists. Then the
hormones kicked in. I became a Special Forces officer instead.
COL (R) Lang, well said. As my Corporate Finance Prof put it: "(1) Cash is good; (2) the
balance sheet is crap: and (3) their ain't no such thing as a free lunch."
As for your item (4), never forget you can always sell the PPE and mitigate losses to meet
new (and, often, reduced) needs, Mitt Romney mastered this in East Coast M&A.
Talking of warrior priests, here is a story of unofficial action taken by priests and
Catholics in The Philippines to stop the ruinous drug wars between Dutarte and the drug
barons:
I considered being a priest for a about a week when I was ten. Sadly, my long search for
universal meaning in the Church came to the end when I realized that the senior clergy that I
had long dealt with as an invested member of a papal order of chivalry had always been lying
to me about their state of grace with regard to sex.
I was lucky to Father James F. O'Dea as the pastor of our Church for as long as I lived
there. He grew up in nearby Waterbury and was a Navy chaplain in the Pacific during the war.
He was of that rare breed of men of high honor, morals, courage and compassion. We had an
abnormally high concentration of that breed in my hometown. Father O'Dea told us the story of
how some young seminarians asked him how they could stifle normal sexual urges. Father O'Dea
told them he had no idea and that he would love to know if they ever found out how to do so.
I didn't become jaded until I saw what caliber of men infest most of the world. Oh well.
FIDO.
We own Boeing stock. Even though the price hasn't dipped as much as I expected in the wake of
the 2 crashes, I've soured on the company and have wanted to sell to cut our losses. But
while I'm a worrier, my eternally-optimistic husband wants to hold on especially now that
Boeing has announced a $5 billion earnings hit, thereby finally putting a number to its
[presumed] liability and thus ending some degree of fear and speculation. He may be
right. We shall see.
Besides this, one of his brothers was a Navy pilot and blames poor training for the
crashes. He thinks African and Asian pilots (except for Singapore) generally aren't as well
trained as American pilots.
That is true of you want to sell or liquidate the business. I suppose you know that you
can sell the business entity with its book, etc. Or, you can sell the assets.
"... Prosecutors are likely concerned with whether " broad cultural problems " pervade the entire company, including pressure to OK shoddy work in order to deliver planes on time, one source told the Seattle Times. The South Carolina plant manufactured 45 percent of Boeing's 787s last year, but its supersize -10 model is built exclusively there. ..."
"... Prosecutors are on the hunt for " hallmarks of classic fraud ," the source said, such as lying or misrepresentation to customers and regulators. Whistleblowers in the Charleston factory who pointed to debris and even tools left in the engine, near wiring, and in other sensitive locations likely to cause operating issues told the New York Times they were punished by management, and managers reported they had been pushed to churn planes out faster and cover up delays. ..."
"... A critical fire-fighting system on the Dreamliner was discovered to be dysfunctional earlier this month, leading Boeing to issue a warning that the switch designed to extinguish engine fires had failed in " some cases ." While the FAA warned that " the potential exists for an airline fire to be uncontrollable ," they opted not to ground the 787s, instead ordering airlines to check that the switch was functional every 30 days. ..."
Federal prosecutors are expanding their Boeing probe, investigating charges the 787
Dreamliner's manufacture was plagued with the same incompetence that dogged the doomed 737 MAX
and resulted in hundreds of deaths. The US Department of Justice has requested records related
to 787 Dreamliner production at Boeing's South Carolina plant, where two sources who spoke to
the Seattle Times said there have been allegations of " shoddy work ." A third source
confirmed individual employees at the Charleston plant had received subpoenas earlier this
month from the " same group " of prosecutors conducting the ongoing probe into the 737
MAX. Boeing is in the hot seat over alleged poor quality workmanship and cutting corners at the
South Carolina plant.
Prosecutors are likely concerned with whether " broad cultural
problems " pervade the entire company, including pressure to OK shoddy work in order to
deliver planes on time, one source told the Seattle Times. The South Carolina plant
manufactured 45 percent of Boeing's 787s last year, but its supersize -10 model is built
exclusively there.
Prosecutors are on the hunt for " hallmarks of classic fraud ," the source said, such
as lying or misrepresentation to customers and regulators. Whistleblowers in the Charleston
factory who pointed to debris and even tools left in the engine, near wiring, and in other
sensitive locations likely to cause operating issues told the New York Times they were punished
by management, and managers reported they had been pushed to churn planes out faster and cover
up delays.
The 737 MAX, too, was reportedly rushed to market amid much corner-cutting in order to beat
competitor Airbus' hot new model. Worse, the Federal Aviation Administration allegedly let
Boeing conduct many of the critical safety checks itself, and other countries' regulators took
the US safety certification as proof they did not need to conduct their own checks, culminating
in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines tragedies in October and March.
A critical fire-fighting system on the Dreamliner was discovered to be dysfunctional earlier
this month, leading Boeing to issue a warning that the switch designed to extinguish engine
fires had failed in " some cases ." While the FAA warned that " the potential exists
for an airline fire to be uncontrollable ," they opted not to ground the 787s, instead
ordering airlines to check that the switch was functional every 30 days.
The software at the heart of the Boeing 737 MAX crisis was developed at a time when the company was laying off experienced engineers
and replacing them with temporary workers making as little as $9 per hour, according to
Bloomberg .
In an effort to cut costs, Boeing was relying on subcontractors making paltry wages to develop and test its software. Often times,
these subcontractors would be from countries lacking a deep background in aerospace, like India.
Boeing had recent college graduates working for Indian software developer HCL Technologies Ltd. in a building across from Seattle's
Boeing Field, in flight test groups supporting the MAX. The coders from HCL designed to specifications set by Boeing but, according
to Mark Rabin, a former Boeing software engineer, "it was controversial because it was far less efficient than Boeing engineers just
writing the code."
Rabin said: "...it took many rounds going back and forth because the code was not done correctly."
In addition to cutting costs, the hiring of Indian companies may have landed Boeing orders for the Indian military and commercial
aircraft, like a $22 billion order received in January 2017 . That order included 100 737 MAX 8 jets and was Boeing's largest order
ever from an Indian airline. India traditionally orders from Airbus.
HCL engineers helped develop and test the 737 MAX's flight display software while employees from another Indian company, Cyient
Ltd, handled the software for flight test equipment. In 2011, Boeing named Cyient, then known as Infotech, to a list of its "suppliers
of the year".
One HCL employee posted online: "Provided quick workaround to resolve production issue which resulted in not delaying flight test
of 737-Max (delay in each flight test will cost very big amount for Boeing) ."
But Boeing says the company didn't rely on engineers from HCL for the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, which was
linked to both last October's crash and March's crash. The company also says it didn't rely on Indian companies for the cockpit warning
light issue that was disclosed after the crashes.
A Boeing spokesperson said: "Boeing has many decades of experience working with supplier/partners around the world. Our primary
focus is on always ensuring that our products and services are safe, of the highest quality and comply with all applicable regulations."
HCL, on the other hand, said: "HCL has a strong and long-standing business relationship with The Boeing Company, and we take pride
in the work we do for all our customers. However, HCL does not comment on specific work we do for our customers. HCL is not associated
with any ongoing issues with 737 Max."
Recent simulator tests run by the FAA indicate that software issues on the 737 MAX run deeper than first thought. Engineers who
worked on the plane, which Boeing started developing eight years ago, complained of pressure from managers to limit changes that
might introduce extra time or cost.
Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing flight controls engineer laid off in 2017, said: "Boeing was doing all kinds of things, everything
you can imagine, to reduce cost , including moving work from Puget Sound, because we'd become very expensive here. All that's very
understandable if you think of it from a business perspective. Slowly over time it appears that's eroded the ability for Puget Sound
designers to design."
Rabin even recalled an incident where senior software engineers were told they weren't needed because Boeing's productions were
mature. Rabin said: "I was shocked that in a room full of a couple hundred mostly senior engineers we were being told that we weren't
needed."
Any given jetliner is made up of millions of parts and millions of lines of code. Boeing has often turned over large portions
of the work to suppliers and subcontractors that follow its blueprints. But beginning in 2004 with the 787 Dreamliner, Boeing sought
to increase profits by providing high-level specs and then asking suppliers to design more parts themselves.
Boeing also promised to invest $1.7 billion in Indian companies as a result of an $11 billion order in 2005 from Air India. This
investment helped HCL and other software developers.
For the 787, HCL offered a price to Boeing that they couldn't refuse, either: free. HCL "took no up-front payments on the 787
and only started collecting payments based on sales years later".
Rockwell Collins won the MAX contract for cockpit displays and relied in part on HCL engineers and contract engineers from Cyient
to test flight test equipment.
Charles LoveJoy, a former flight-test instrumentation design engineer at the company, said: "We did have our challenges with the
India team. They met the requirements, per se, but you could do it better."
I love it. A company which fell in love so much with their extraordinary profits that they sabatoged their design and will
now suffer enormous financial consequences. They're lucky to have all their defense/military contracts.
Oftentimes, it's the cut-and-paste code that's the problem. If you don't have a good appreciation for what every line does,
you're never going to know what the sub or entire program does.
By 2002 i could not sit down with any developers without hearing at least one story about how they had been in a code review
meeting and seen absolute garbage turned out by H-1B workers.
Lots of people have known about this problem for many years now.
May the gods damn all financial managers! One of the two professions, along with bankers, which have absolutely no social value
whatsoever. There should be open hunting season on both!
Shifting to high-level specs puts more power in the hands of management/accounting types, since it doesn't require engineering
knowledge to track a deadline. Indeed, this whole story is the wet dream of business school, the idea of being able to accomplish
technical tasks purely by demand. A lot of public schools teach kids science is magic so when they grow up, the think they can
just give directions and technology appears.
In this country, one must have a license from the FAA to work on commercial aircraft. That means training and certification
that usually results in higher pay for those qualified to perform the repairs to the aircraft your family will fly on.
In case you're not aware, much of the heavy stuff like D checks (overhaul) have been outsourced by the airlines to foreign
countries where the FAA has nothing to say about it. Those contractors can hire whoever they wish for whatever they'll accept.
I have worked with some of those "mechanics" who cannot even read.
Keep that in mind next time the TSA perv is fondling your junk. That might be your last sexual encounter.
"... A series of simulator flights to test new software developed by Boeing revealed the flaw, a source told CNN . In simulator tests, government pilots discovered that a microprocessor failure could push the nose of the plane toward the ground. It is not known whether the microprocessor played a role in either crash. ..."
With Boeing's fleet of 737 MAX planes indefinitely grounded after unexpected problems with the MCAS
system costs hundreds of people their lives in two fatal crashes, tests on the grounded planes
revealed a new, and unrelated safety risk in the computer system for the Boeing 737 Max that could
push the plane downward the FAA announced; the discovery could lead to further lengthy delays
before the aircraft is allowed return to service.
A series of simulator flights to test new
software developed by Boeing revealed the flaw, a
source told CNN
.
In simulator tests, government pilots discovered that a microprocessor failure could push the nose
of the plane toward the ground. It is not known whether the microprocessor played a role in either
crash.
While the original crashes remain under investigation, preliminary reports showed that "a new
stabilization system pushed both planes into steep nosedives from which the pilots could not
recover." The issue is known in aviation circles as runaway stabilizer trim.
"The FAA recently found a potential risk that Boeing must mitigate," the agency said in an
emailed statement on Wednesday, without providing any specifics.
While the latest glitch is separate from, and did not involve the Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System linked to the two fatal accidents since October that killed 346 people,
it could produce an uncommanded dive similar to what occurred in the crashes,
Bloomberg
confirmed, also citing an unnamed source..
Meanwhile, piling damage control upon damage control, Boeing announced it could break the chain
of events that led to both crashes by developing a software fix that would limit the potency of
that stabilization system. In other words, for every uncontrolled dive there is a software
upgrade... allegedly. The problem is that the broader public is becoming increasingly disgusted by
what is a clear culture of cutting corners and rolling out flying coffins that crash to earth the
moment there is a BSOD.
... the "nosedives" are the cost accountants cutting what little
value remains in any American produced good or service! Once
again the end-user is the LAST consideration in Corporate America!
One of these is not like
the others..
,
11 minutes ago
link
O.K. Boeing, here's your fix.
Given that the screw jack is a
bi-directional system: If it's electric you rewire it, if
hydraulic replumb it, but essentially you fit an "auto" and a
"manual" switch (or valve).
In the "manual" position the pilots have a toggle to set the
damn trim wherever they ******* like. In the "auto" position the
software can have a go. Clear demarcation of responsibilty.
They are pilots after all, not computer programmers.
You are hereby granted an open licence to use this idea free of
Royalties of any kind, but I would like it referred to in the
manual as the "Professor Dave" fix..
I argue 'Not a glitch - an unintended feature that Boeing knew
about'. The new engine design needed an entirely different
fuselage and that didn't happen. Why? Likely money. ../
At this point, they will be redesigning the plane which is what
should have been done from the start. It will never be
re-certified. All the immense profits and cost savings went down
the drain, and now it's actually costing them money. The CEO will
be terminated in the near future.
"... The lawsuit focuses on the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) anti-stall system , which Pilot X claims gave the aircraft "inherently dangerous aerodynamic handling defects." ..."
"... On the older 737 NG, the right switch was labeled "AUTO PILOT" - and allowed pilots to deactivate the plane's automated stabilizer controls, such as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), suspected to be the culprit in both crashes. The left toggle switch on the NG would deactivate the buttons on the yoke which pilots regularly use to control the horizontal stabilizer. ..."
"... On the 737 MAX, however, the two switches were altered to perform the same function ..."
"... In a rush to bring the plane to customers, Boeing did not alert pilots to the software in a bid to prevent " any new training that required a simulator " -- a decision that was also designed to save MAX customers money. ..."
"... Pilot X, alleges that Boeing "decided not to tell MAX pilots about the MCAS or to require MAX pilots to undergo any MCAS training" so that its customers could deploy pilots on "revenue-generating routes as quickly as possible". ..."
"... The pilots who have joined the lawsuit hope to "deter Boeing and other airplane manufacturers from placing corporate profits ahead of the lives of the pilots, crews, and general public they service." ..."
"... A true classic of cutting corners. Boeing was so much in hurry to introduce a stretched version of 737 that while an airplane frame and an engine were incompatible they organized a shotgun wedding between the two compromising sound aero dynamical characteristics. To override these inconveniences MCAS software was created, but pilots were not informed of this extra feature and most likely why this had to be added. It obviously would have raised uncomfortable questions. (Yes you can also fix hanging panels with ducted tape) ..."
"... Now the bill for this criminal negligence is huge, because the planes are grounded, pilots joining to a class action and 300+ deaths will be settled in court. The situation also exposed corruption in the certification process. It was previously unheard of that a manufacturer was allowed themselves unilaterally decide, what parameters were appropriate, when this MCAS fix was approved. Would be nice to see the both parties´ bank records from that time period. ..."
"... No name changing of the fleet will fix the destroyed reputation of the US corporation. Trying to stay competitive is understandable, but to cut corners on safety is unforgivable. ..."
Over 400 pilots have joined a class-action lawsuit against Boeing, accusing the company of an "unprecedented cover-up" of "known
design flaws" on the company's top-selling 737 MAX, according to the
Australian Broadcasting Company.
The MAX, first put into service in 2017, was involved in two fatal crashes over the course of a year; the first off the coast
of Indonesia in October 2018, killing 189 - and the second in Ethiopia, killing 157. The lawsuit, filed by a plaintiff who goes by
"Pilot X" in court documents out of "fear of reprisal from Boeing and discrimination from Boeing customers," accuses the Chicago-based
aviation giant of "an unprecedented cover-up of the known design flaws of the MAX, which predictably resulted in the crashes of two
MAX aircraft and subsequent grounding of all MAX aircraft worldwide."
The pilots argue that they " suffer and continue to suffer significant lost wages, among other economic and non-economic damages
" since the fleet was grounded across the globe.
The lawsuit focuses on the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) anti-stall system , which Pilot X claims gave
the aircraft "inherently dangerous aerodynamic handling defects."
The reason for this handling quirk was by design, as Boeing made the decision to retrofit newer, large fuel-efficient engines
onto an existing 737 model's fuselage, in order to create the MAX.
The larger engines caused a change in aerodynamics which made the plane prone to pitching up during flight, so much so, that
it risked a crash as a result of an aerodynamic stall.
To stop this from happening, Boeing introduced MCAS software to the MAX, which automatically tilted the plane down if the software
detected that the plane's nose was pointing at too steep of an angle , known as a high
Angle of Attack (AOA). -
ABC
In May, we reported that Boeing designers also altered a MCAS toggle switch panel that could have prevented both of the deadly crashes.
On the older 737 NG, the right switch was labeled "AUTO PILOT" - and allowed pilots to deactivate the plane's automated stabilizer
controls, such as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), suspected to be the culprit in both crashes. The left
toggle switch on the NG would deactivate the buttons on the yoke which pilots regularly use to control the horizontal stabilizer.
On the 737 MAX, however, the two switches were altered to perform the same function , according to internal documents reviewed
by the Times, so that they would disable all electronic stabilizer controls - including the MCAS and the thumb buttons on the yoke
used to control the stabilizer. During the October Lion Air flight, pilots were reportedly unaware of how to troubleshoot the MCAS
system - while
the day before , an off-duty pilot with knowledge of the stabilizer controls helped pilots disable the system on the same plane.
Data from the flight revealed that the repeated commands from the MCAS system sent the flight from Bali to Jakarta plummeting into
the sea.
In a rush to bring the plane to customers, Boeing did not alert pilots to the software in a bid to prevent "
any new
training that required a simulator " -- a decision that was also designed to save MAX customers money.
Pilot X, alleges that Boeing "decided not to tell MAX pilots about the MCAS or to require MAX pilots to undergo any MCAS training"
so that its customers could deploy pilots on "revenue-generating routes as quickly as possible".
In March, a report from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) found that the system was
only mentioned
once in the aircraft manual, which was in the glossary, explaining the MCAS acronym -- an omission Boeing did not deny in
response to the CBC. -
ABC
The pilots who have joined the lawsuit hope to "deter Boeing and other airplane manufacturers from placing corporate profits
ahead of the lives of the pilots, crews, and general public they service."
A true classic of cutting corners. Boeing was so much in hurry to introduce a stretched version of 737 that while an airplane
frame and an engine were incompatible they organized a shotgun wedding between the two compromising sound aero dynamical characteristics.
To override these inconveniences MCAS software was created, but pilots were not informed of this extra feature and most likely
why this had to be added. It obviously would have raised uncomfortable questions. (Yes you can also fix hanging panels with ducted
tape)
Now the bill for this criminal negligence is huge, because the planes are grounded, pilots joining to a class action and
300+ deaths will be settled in court. The situation also exposed corruption in the certification process. It was previously unheard
of that a manufacturer was allowed themselves unilaterally decide, what parameters were appropriate, when this MCAS fix was approved.
Would be nice to see the both parties´ bank records from that time period.
This is the beginning of the end for Boeing. Take a look at what's going on in their 787 assembly plant in N. Chas S. Carolina.
Of 15 workers polled, 9 said they would not step aboard the plane they're building!
They are going to win because everything they allege is true.
Like I said a few days back, Boeing either:
1. Takes a 30 billion dollar charge and halts the production line, installs a HW retrofit that allows full disconnection of
the MCAS to allow the pilots to fly the plane, offers this retrofit FREE and immediately to all existing customers,
2. Close up shop.
The FAA, who have already fucked up enough on this, must insist on item 1.
As a corollary, the the MBA ***** running the 737Max project team need to be terminated without prejudice with all options,
stock, pensions and bonuses forfeited. Sorry you slimy turds, you killed 600 people for your ******* careers.....**** you.
Edit: you MBA pukes, you had a Bsc or MSc in areo-space engineering but went over to the dark side to learn how to commit fraud
and feel good about it. You are a disgrace to the engineering profession, again, from the bottom of my heart, **** you.
"On the 737 MAX, however, the two switches were altered to perform the same function, according to internal documents reviewed
by the Times, so that they would disable all electronic stabilizer controls - including the MCAS and the thumb buttons on the
yoke used to control the stabilizer. "
On the B737 NG if a "Runaway Stabilizer" situation occurs the procedure is to turn off both Stabilizer trim switches.
This is in effect exactly what the 737Max does as described above in the quotation marks. Therefore the result is the same on
both aircraft leading to the pilot having to use manual trim to alleviate aerodynamic forces on the control column.
The question that has yet to be answered is, did the pilots of the two crashed aircraft follow these procedures?
On the Lion air crash I read somewhere the pilots were confused as to why the aircraft was not following their commands. This
would suggest the AP was still engaged but as you know, real facts about these two crashes are hard to come bye.
This is what happens when the ******* bean counters (McDonald Douglas financial pukes) take over from the engineers (Boeing
prior to the merger with MD).
No name changing of the fleet will fix the destroyed reputation of the US corporation. Trying to stay competitive is understandable,
but to cut corners on safety is unforgivable.
Reliance on Three independent Computers is no-way to Fly, the shortcutting was Not WindTunnel testing after increasing wing
size, increasing engine size that required repositioning forward and attempting to expect Third Computer to reach altitude quicker
so that Autopilot could fly !
Speaking on the eve of the Paris airshow, Boeing CEO, Dennis Muilenburg, admitted to reporters that
the company made a "mistake" in handling a problematic cockpit warning system in its 737
Max jets
before
two crashes
of the top-selling plane killed 346 people, and he
promised transparency as the U.S. aircraft maker tries to get the grounded model back in flight.
In response to FAA faulting Boeing for not telling regulators for more than year that a safety
indicator in the Max cockpit didn't work,
AP reports
that Muilenberg has
now admitted that Boeing's communication with regulators, customers and the public "was not
consistent. And that's unacceptable."
"We clearly had a mistake in the implementation of the alert,"
Muilenburg
said.
"When I make comments about the previous design and how we followed those processes, that's
something we put a lot of thought and depth of analysis into. That doesn't mean that it can't be
improved."
Muilenburg went on to call
the crashes of the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines jets a
"defining moment" for Boeing,
but said he thinks the result will be a "better and
stronger company."
He expressed confidence that the Boeing 737 Max would be cleared to fly again later this year.
Additionally, the embattled CEO confirmed
the company is undergoing a multi-faceted
review of 737 Max design
, noting that regulators are examining the 737 Max software,
angle-of-attack disagree alert, and are also studying "every element of training syllabus."
Speech the Boeing CEO should make: "At Boeing, we put engineering
and safety first. Therefore, I am immediately offering my
services, as CEO, at the same all-in pay as an average Boeing
engineer. All executives and Board members who want to remain
with the company will be required to do the same. Our
headquarters is moving to where it belongs, Seattle, Paine Field,
so we can focus acutely on our business of building the finest
aircraft we can."
Muilenberg has implemented in percentage terms the largest stock
buyback program in history. This is why he never apologizes for
murdering innocent passengers. His job is to borrow money on
behalf of the shareholders, use it to buy out the shares of the
insiders, then, when repayment time comes around, scream for the
taxpayers to give them a bogus defense contract to cover the
loans.
Boeing CEO Admits "Mistakes" Were Made Before 2 Crashes
Killed 346 People
Understatement of the century Dennis. You shouldn't be able to
sleep comfortably at night you son of a bitch. Yet, you probably
see yourself far removed from the process and you'll let your
underlings hang. Choke on your next executive bonus! **** you!
Incredible that the guy is still CEO. He still can't properly
apologise for what happened on his watch and I am not at all
convinced by Boeing's response to this double tragedy. I won't be
setting foot in this lousy aircraft even after the software update
and pilot retraining it remains a death trap in my view, even if
it is flown by steely eyed American airline pilots as opposed to
pilots from some "second rate" country.
If the Boeing Board was doing its job, Muilenburg would be fired
for cause. It really is that simple. That he still has a job shows
how impotent the Board of Directors truly is. Either impotent
or.... maybe, also culpable??
A new Board has to be seated and
everyone involved with this fiasco must be terminated. Boeing is
responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people. That's also a
fact. Don't waste years pointing fingers at whose to blame- there
is plenty of blame to go around.
1) Fire Boeing leadership.
2) Replace everyone on the BOD who knew anything about the
angle of attack indicators and software problems.
3) Replace everyone fired with Boeing people who sounded
warnings.
4) Pay every family of the victims 15 million dollars
immediately.
5) Put the FAA on the shop floor and make the FAA do all
testing and inspections. No self-certifying.
I have been reading everything I can find on the 737Max. I kept
coming to similar conclusions to those of the pilots who have
flown it, and I was particularly interested in one of the comments
"The airframe with the engines mounted differently did not have
adequately stable handling at high AoA to be certifiable".
The things that I have read both from Boeing and others, some of
which precede both accidents, seem to point towards the above
comment.
So - Boeing literature states that the engine pylons were a new
item to handle the extra engine weight, and were forward and
higher than the previous ones. I have flown in many 737's over my
years of travel and I have noticed how the engines flex on the
pylons during take off and climb, power changes, and especially on
landing.
If, and you would have to think that it is a big IF, the pylons
flexed more than their design limit in the climb, could this cause
an unexpected incipient stall situation - enough to get the
software to kick in?
"... Boeing is playing with fire. In a "normal" airliner crash the manufacturer is seldom as obviously guilty as Boeing is in both crashes. Paying huge awards to the families of the victims ought to be part of the punishment for such outrageous corporate misbehavior. ..."
Boeing is playing with fire. In a "normal" airliner crash the manufacturer is seldom as
obviously guilty as Boeing is in both crashes. Paying huge awards to the families of the
victims ought to be part of the punishment for such outrageous corporate
misbehavior.
"... The FAA has a clearly established pro-Boeing bias and will likely allow Boeing to unground the 737 MAX. We must demand that the two top FAA officials resign or recuse themselves from taking any more steps that might endanger the flying public. The two Boeing-indentured men are Acting FAA Administrator Daniel Elwell and Associate FAA Administrator for Aviation Safety Ali Bahrami. ..."
"... The FAA has long been known for its non-regulatory, waiver-driven, de-regulatory traditions. It has a hard time saying NO to the aircraft manufacturers and the airlines. After the aircraft hijackings directing flights to Cuba in the 1960s and 1970s, the FAA let the airlines say NO to installing hardened cockpit doors and stronger latches in their planes. These security measures would have prevented the hijackers from invading the cockpits of the aircrafts on September 11, 2001. The airlines did not want to spend the $3000 per plane. Absent the 9/11 hijackings, George W. Bush and Dick Cheney might not have gone to war in Afghanistan. ..."
"... Boeing has about 5,000 orders for the 737 MAX. It has delivered less than 400 to the world's airlines. From its CEO, Dennis Muilenburg to its swarms of Washington lobbyists, law firms, and public relations outfits, Boeing is used to getting its way. ..."
"... Right now, the Boeing/FAA strategy is to make sure Elwell and his FAA quickly decide that the MAX is safe for takeoff by delaying or stonewalling Congressional and other investigations. ..."
"... Time is not on the side of the 737 MAX 8. A comprehensive review of the 737 MAX's problems is a non-starter for Boeing. Boeing's flawed software and instructions that have kept pilots and airlines in the dark have already been exposed. New whistleblowers and more revelations will emerge. More time may also result in the Justice Department's operating grand jury issuing some indictments. More time would let the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, led by Chairman Peter DeFazio (D-OR) dig into the failure of accountability and serial criminal negligence of Boeing and its FAA accomplices. Chairman DeFazio knows the history of the FAA's regulatory capture. ..."
"... The FAA and its Boeing pals are using the "trade secret" claims to censor records sought by the House Committee. When it comes to investigating life or death airline hazards and crashes, Congress is capable of handling so-called trade secrets. This is all the more reason why the terminally prejudiced Elwell and Bahrami should step aside and let their successors take a fresh look at the Boeing investigations. That effort would include opening up the certification process for the entire Boeing MAX as a "new plane." ..."
The Boeing-driven FAA is rushing to unground the notorious prone-to-stall Boeing 737
MAX (that killed 346 innocents in two crashes) before several official investigations are
completed. Troubling revelations might keep these planes grounded worldwide.
The FAA has a clearly established pro-Boeing bias and will likely allow Boeing to unground
the 737 MAX. We must demand that the two top FAA officials resign or recuse themselves from
taking any more steps that might endanger the flying public. The two Boeing-indentured men are
Acting FAA Administrator Daniel Elwell and Associate FAA Administrator for Aviation Safety Ali
Bahrami.
Immediately after the crashes, Elwell resisted grounding and echoed Boeing claims that the
Boeing 737 MAX was a safe plane despite the deadly crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.
Ali Bahrami is known for aggressively pushing the FAA through 2018 to further abdicate its
regulatory duties by delegating more safety inspections to Boeing. Bahrami's actions benefit
Boeing and are supported by the company's toadies in the Congress. Elwell and Bahrami have both
acquired much experience by going through the well-known revolving door between the industry
and the FAA. They are likely to leave the FAA once again for lucrative positions in the
aerospace lobbying or business world. With such prospects, they do not have much 'skin in the
game' for their pending decision.
The FAA has long been known for its non-regulatory, waiver-driven, de-regulatory traditions.
It has a hard time saying NO to the aircraft manufacturers and the airlines. After the aircraft
hijackings directing flights to Cuba in the 1960s and 1970s, the FAA let the airlines say NO to
installing hardened cockpit doors and stronger latches in their planes. These security measures
would have prevented the hijackers from invading the cockpits of the aircrafts on September 11,
2001. The airlines did not want to spend the $3000 per plane. Absent the 9/11 hijackings,
George W. Bush and Dick Cheney might not have gone to war in Afghanistan.
The FAA's historic "tombstone" mentality (slowly reacting after the crashes) is well known.
For example, in the 1990s the FAA had a delayed reaction to numerous fatal crashes caused by
antiquated de-icing rules. The FAA was also slow to act on ground-proximity warning
requirements for commuter airlines and flammability reduction rules for aircraft cabin
materials.
That's the tradition that Elwell and Bahrami inherited and have worsened. They did not even
wait for Boeing to deliver its reworked software before announcing in April that simulator
training would not be necessary for the pilots. This judgment was contrary to the experience of
seasoned pilots such as Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger. Simulator training would delay
ungrounding and cost the profitable airlines money.
Boeing has about 5,000 orders for the 737 MAX. It has delivered less than 400 to the world's
airlines. From its CEO, Dennis Muilenburg to its swarms of Washington lobbyists, law firms, and
public relations outfits, Boeing is used to getting its way. Its grip on Congress – where
300 members take campaign cash from Boeing – is legendary. Boeing pays little in federal
and Washington state taxes. It fumbles contracts with NASA and the Department of Defense but
remains the federal government's big vendor for lack of competitive alternatives in a highly
concentrated industry.
Right now, the Boeing/FAA strategy is to make sure Elwell and his FAA quickly decide that
the MAX is safe for takeoff by delaying or stonewalling Congressional and other
investigations.
The compliant Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, under Senator Roger
Wicker (R-MS), strangely has not scheduled anymore hearings. The Senate confirmation of Stephen
Dickson to replace acting chief Elwell is also on a slow track. A new boss at the FAA might
wish to take some time to review the whole process.
Time is not on the side of the 737 MAX 8. A comprehensive review of the 737 MAX's problems
is a non-starter for Boeing. Boeing's flawed software and instructions that have kept pilots
and airlines in the dark have already been exposed. New whistleblowers and more revelations
will emerge. More time may also result in the Justice Department's operating grand jury issuing
some indictments. More time would let the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
led by Chairman Peter DeFazio (D-OR) dig into the failure of accountability and serial criminal
negligence of Boeing and its FAA accomplices. Chairman DeFazio knows the history of the FAA's
regulatory capture.
Not surprising on June 4, 2019, DeFazio sent a stinging letter to FAA's Elwell and his
corporatist superior, Secretary of Transportation Elaine L. Chao, about the FAA's intolerable
delays in sending requested documents to the Committee. DeFazio's letter says: "To say we are
disappointed and a bit bewildered at the ongoing delays to appropriately respond to our records
requests would be an understatement."
The FAA and its Boeing pals are using the "trade secret" claims to censor records sought by
the House Committee. When it comes to investigating life or death airline hazards and crashes,
Congress is capable of handling so-called trade secrets. This is all the more reason why the
terminally prejudiced Elwell and Bahrami should step aside and let their successors take a
fresh look at the Boeing investigations. That effort would include opening up the certification
process for the entire Boeing MAX as a "new plane."
The Boeing-biased Elwell and Bahrami have refused to even raise in public proceedings the
question: "After eight or more Boeing 737 iterations, at what point does the Boeing MAX 8
become a new plane?" Many, including Cong. David Price (D-NC), chair of the House
Appropriations Subcommittee, which oversees the FAA's budget, have already questioned the
limited certification process.
Heavier engines on the old 737 fuselage changed the MAX's aerodynamics and made it
prone-to-stall. It is time for the FAA's leadership to change before the 737 MAX flies with
vulnerable, glitch-prone software "fixes".
Notwithstanding the previous Boeing 737 series' record of safety in the U.S. during the past
decade – (one fatality), Boeing's bosses, have now disregarded warnings by its own
engineers. Boeing executives do not get one, two, three or anymore crashes attributed to their
ignoring long-known aerodynamic engineering practices.
The Boeing 737 MAX must never be allowed to fly again, given the structural design defects
built deeply into its system.
The majority of Boeing 737 MAX aircraft had a non-working alert for faulty sensor data. The
company scheduled the problem to be fixed three years after discovering it and didn't inform
the FAA until one of the planes crashed. Two Boeing 737 MAX airliners operated by Lion Air and
Ethiopian Airlines crashed five months apart, killing a total of 346 people, and leading to a
worldwide grounding of the new model. Both accidents were apparently caused by faulty data from
Angle of Attack (AoA) sensors, which made the aircraft software falsely detect impending
stalling and pushed the aircraft's nose down.
Pilots were supposed to be alerted about possible problems with the sensors by an AoA
Disagree alert, which should light up when data coming from two AoA sensors does not match. But
the alert required an optional set of indicators to be installed to actually work, and only 20
percent of the aircraft sold had them. Boeing learned about the situation in November 2017, but
considered it a low-risk issue and scheduled a fix for 2020, the company
reported to a House committee.
After Lion Air flight 610 crashed in October 2018, the company decided to accelerate its
timeline, Boeing said in response to a letter sent by Representatives Peter DeFazio and Rick
Larsen, who head a House committee that is investigating the crashes and possible mismanagement
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regarding the rollout of the 737 MAX. Boeing first
informed the FAA about the faulty alert after one of the planes crashed.
The aviation giant reported
the issue earlier in May. Neither the Lion Air aircraft nor Ethiopian Airlines flight 302,
which crashed in March, had the optional feature that allows the alert to work, although it was
not immediately clear if the pilots could have averted the disasters if they had known that the
AoA sensors were failing.
The Lion Air aircraft, however, narrowly avoided a similar incident a day before its final
demise thanks to an off-duty pilot who was in the cockpit and instructed the crew to turn
off the anti-stalling system.
"... I suspect the MCAS was presented as an evolution of the earlier SMYD system on the 737NG, which also uses a single AOA sensor input. The SMYD system had less authority to drive the horizontal stabilizer trim system than the MCAS eventually needed. ..."
"... This is an excellent article. Since I was born and raised in a Boeing family; I've been following this the best I can. To get EU and China's recertification the Max's fix will have to be comprehensive and make the plane safe to fly. Sometime next year? ..."
"... This all started when Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas in 1997 and GE's Jack Welch followers made increasing shareholder value and corporate suite bonuses the priority at Boeing. What killed 346 people was deregulation and the politicians who cut FAA funding and allowed Boeing to self-certify the safety of their aircraft. ..."
"... "To get EU and China's recertification the Max's fix will have to be comprehensive and make the plane safe to fly." ..."
"... So EU and China certifications that previously existing had no inherent value as they simply went along with the US FAA? ..."
"... The Seattle Times has had a good series of articles on the 737 Max. Funds to oversee flight safety were cut by both political parties. The FAA plant representatives who oversee aircraft safety are now paid by Boeing not public servants. ..."
"... My impression is that the political appointees who rotate through government and corporate jobs believe that the greater their income the better it is for them and everyone else. ..."
"... Another example of the toxic work environment at Boeing since the merger was reporting that the staff didn't dare tell the Boeing CEO when they rolled out the 787 it wouldn't be another year before they could fly it. ..."
"... Boeing and Congress shot the American aircraft industry in the foot just to make a little more money for themselves. ..."
"... I would recommend reading Richard Feyman's "What do you care what other people think?" section on his experiences on the Roger's Commission report not so much for the O-ring investigation but on the absurdity of NASA's bizarre risk assessment methodology. ..."
"... It is also an interesting insight into the workings of such commissions - with the other members happily taking the NASA guided tour while he found the techies and grilled them on how risk assessments were calculated. He refused to sign the final report unless he was allowed to add a critical appendix. ..."
"... A few basic questions come to mind. What was the cost of this generation of Max-8s? What was the actual installed cost of the second AOA sensor (not the price they wanted to charge.) That marginal cost just sunk a few billion off the company revenue stream. Who in executive leadership thought that option, only one AOA sensor, was a reasonable design to take to market? In addition who in the pilots union was willing to accept a single hour of training time as valid in transfering to a new airframe? ..."
"... what about the mechanisms to alert Boeing and the airlines that something was seriously amiss? Even before the Lion Air crash pilots were reporting unacceptable incidents with MCAS. As I said, corporate cultures are lethal to anyone who is perceived as messing with the gravy train ..."
"... Fred, this is not a simple engineering failure with a single cause. It is not linear. The failure involves aspects of marketing, pilot training, design, manufacture, operational practice, procedures, documentation regulations and oversight and of course money. There is never one single cause. This truism is encapsulated in Prof. James Reasons "swiss cheese model" of accident causation. ..."
A serious development factor with the Max was to get pilots to be able to transfer from the
prior generations of 737 to the Max with as minimal a training program as possible. A very big
selling point. The competitor jet is more comfortable (IMO), a more modern design so you need a
competitive edge. The MCAS system was the key. It allegedly made the Max fly like the older
generations, preventing the higher thrust from causing a uncontrollable pitch up. One pilot
stated that his transition training was 60 minutes on an IPad. Pilots stated they were not
aware it was even there, running the whole time. There is no way to "turn it off".
Things get real technical at this point but the basic system relies on a correct read from a
single pitch sensor or AOA (angle of attack) sensor. The jet has two, looking like small vanes
on either side of the fuselage, just below the cockpit. Focus on the fact that the safest
version of MCAS, using both sensors rather than one, cost more money. And so many airlines did
not order it.
Now the story starts going very badly. If the one sensor the basic system is looking at goes
bad, MCAS does not know the actual nose pitch of the jet and starts to take over trying to fix
a problem that isn't there. The pilots can not turn it off. As stated, most didn't even know it
was there. Without the sensor working properly it is going to do the wrong things. In Lion Air,
the sensor and system was repeatedly found faulty on prior flights. In the Ethiopian crash,
there is evidence that a bird strike knocked it off the aircraft. The only thing the pilots can
do is turn off the electric motor that controls the horizontal stabilizer (sets pitch or nose
angle) and crank the stabilizer by hand. Again, watch the Mentour Pilot video on this.
There is evidence that pilots were reporting issues prior to the Lion Air crash and they
absolutely confronted Boeing after it. I have to tell you that this reminds me of the moment
after the Challenger accident when we were informed of the outcome of the Rodgers Report and
there was undeniable evidence that appropriately placed people knew the infamous O-Rings were
leaking all along and were worse as the temperature got colder. We were gutted.
With the Shuttle, IMO, people were allowed to redefine their jobs as "making it fly", not
making it fly safely. The word safely got crushed out. I believe Boeing had all the evidence
needed to stop this as early as a year ago, if not further back. Corporate cultures, NASA
included, create lethal environments for people who scream STOP! See the Columbia accident for
a repeat at NASA. It was bad enough that action wasn't taken before the Lion Air accident. I
fully believe it's absolutely inexcusable after.
It is not a silly question to ask if Boeing Commercial Aircraft will survive this event. No
Lockheed, Douglas or Convair airliners are being manufactured these days. One thing money can't
buy is trust. Airlines are cancelling 737 orders. Airbus is selling large numbers of the A320
family and has the financial backing of European countries. The A380 failure (enormous
investment and far too few sales) could have taken out a company but not a group of nations.
China has a need for some 7,000 regional planes. They are working hard to develop and make
their own competent aircraft and to compete internationally. They are a nation, not a private
company that has to make a profit.
I (layperson that I am), do not think Boeing Commercial Aircraft will disappear but it may
lose its peer status with Airbus. They will fix the Max. That being said, there are serious
issues in resolving the correct training to give to pilots. The sales edge of very little
training is gone. There are reports that 737 Max simulators, a very big deal in training
pilots, need faults corrected in their software. Getting this model back to flying was thought
to be a matter of a month or two. Now August may be the earliest qnd the Paris Air Show, where
many new sales are usually announced, is nearly at hand.
Boeing has been trying to make a decision on the all new 797, which would replace 757s and
767s now ageing out of usefulness. The market is estimated at 4,000 aircraft on a global basis.
Airbus is pitching an A321 variant as the right answer. Their more modern aircraft, the A321,
still has room for development. Boeing has to fund, develop, and launch the 797 aircraft. At
that point they will be still left with no replacement for the 737.
There is a saying that a commercial aircraft firm bets the company when developing a new
airliner. Did Boeing bet the company on not developing a 737 replacement? It looks like we may
find out in the next few years.
How does Embraer factor into the mix? I flew a brand new one on United from Houston to
central Mexico, probably an E-175-s. As a passenger, I was impressed. It struck me that
Embraer was now getting into Boeing's cash cow business.
After the ban on technology to China there is zero chance that China will buy Boeing and
become the next Iran. They might buy Airbus short term if the US doesn't stop them but China
and Russia have already reached an agreement to joint produce airliners.
Not thinking the Airbus purchase would ever happen. Airbus has significant national
ownership. Fiat was trying to merge with Renault and the French government just stopped that.
I've not followed this closely, but ever since I discovered that MCAS relied on a
single sensor (in the cheaper version) I have wondered about the FAA's role in this.
How in God's name did an aircraft with such an obviously dangerous lack of redundancy in a
critical system get certified?
Yes. Another post all by itself. Still digging at that but it appears the FAA agreed with
Boeing that MCAS would not have to be published in the pilot manuals, or actions were just
about to that effect.
I made the comment that this would all become a great business class in how not to do
something and how exactly not to respond to a disaster that it caused.
I suspect the MCAS was presented as an evolution of the earlier SMYD system on the 737NG,
which also uses a single AOA sensor input. The SMYD system had less authority to drive the
horizontal stabilizer trim system than the MCAS eventually needed.
This is an excellent article. Since I was born and raised in a Boeing family; I've been
following this the best I can. To get EU and China's recertification the Max's fix will have
to be comprehensive and make the plane safe to fly. Sometime next year?
This all started when
Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas in 1997 and GE's Jack Welch followers made increasing
shareholder value and corporate suite bonuses the priority at Boeing. What killed 346 people
was deregulation and the politicians who cut FAA funding and allowed Boeing to self-certify
the safety of their aircraft.
Like what already happened to the Rust Belt, taxes will
continue to be cut and money transferred to the global rich until the aircraft industry in
North America withers away. The next generation single aisle airliner will be assembled in
China. Tariffs and war drums will only speed up this process. Both political parties are
complicit in the hallowing out of America. They deny their failures or any future risks; let
alone, how to address them.
The Seattle Times has had a good series of articles on the 737 Max. Funds to oversee
flight safety were cut by both political parties. The FAA plant representatives who oversee
aircraft safety are now paid by Boeing not public servants.
My impression is that the
political appointees who rotate through government and corporate jobs believe that the
greater their income the better it is for them and everyone else.
The FAA assumed that Boeing
wouldn't design a flight critical system dependent on one sensor that if it went bad would
dive the airplane into the ground. But, Boeing did. Boeing did not ground the fleet after the
Lion Air crash when the horizontal stabilizer jackscrew was found in the full nose down
position making flying impossible. This was all due to pressure to keep pilot training costs
down. Another example of the toxic work environment at Boeing since the merger was reporting
that the staff didn't dare tell the Boeing CEO when they rolled out the 787 it wouldn't be
another year before they could fly it.
Before I retired I sat in on telephone conversations with Canadian and Australian
regulators. I assume the foreign aviation authorities had similar sharing agreements with the
FAA. After this how can Canada, EU or China trust American aviation oversight? Boeing and
Congress shot the American aircraft industry in the foot just to make a little more money for
themselves.
I would recommend reading Richard Feyman's "What do you care what other people think?"
section on his experiences on the Roger's Commission report not so much for the O-ring
investigation but on the absurdity of NASA's bizarre risk assessment methodology.
It is also
an interesting insight into the workings of such commissions - with the other members happily
taking the NASA guided tour while he found the techies and grilled them on how risk
assessments were calculated. He refused to sign the final report unless he was allowed to add
a critical appendix.
As I understand it the design issues revolve around engine size and placement used to
avoid redesign, retooling and testing associated with an entire new airframe. To compensate a
software system controlled flap position during takeoff/landing and was active during all
operations. Added to this was utilization of a single " single pitch sensor or AOA (angle of
attack) sensor. The jet has two,..." Thus a single point of failure causes a catastrophic
failure of the flap positioning. In addition training for certification was set at as little
as one hour?
A few basic questions come to mind. What was the cost of this generation of Max-8s? What
was the actual installed cost of the second AOA sensor (not the price they wanted to charge.)
That marginal cost just sunk a few billion off the company revenue stream. Who in executive
leadership thought that option, only one AOA sensor, was a reasonable design to take to
market? In addition who in the pilots union was willing to accept a single hour of training
time as valid in transfering to a new airframe?
Fred, it reminds me so much of Challenger. Who in the Astronaut Office was OK with the O-Ring
reports? Just collective numbness to the possibility that this was introducing a huge risk
factor.
More than that, what about the mechanisms to alert Boeing and the airlines that something
was seriously amiss? Even before the Lion Air crash pilots were reporting unacceptable
incidents with MCAS. As I said, corporate cultures are lethal to anyone who is perceived as
messing with the gravy train.
Thank you so much for your clear description of the Boeing problem. I worked in airline
engineering for six years and visited Seattle, Renton and Everett a lot. I watched the 767
prototype being built - large lumps of black painted pine bolted to the airframe representing
stuff yet to be delivered.
Vietnam Vets comments regarding the mcdonnell douglas merge are to the point. The Boeing I
dealt with was run by engineers with humility. Whenever I dealt with McDonnell Douglas it was
always "what would you know? you're just a user. We designed the DC3'. They $5@#ed Boeing
management.
Fred, this is not a simple engineering failure with a single cause. It is not linear. The
failure involves aspects of marketing, pilot training, design, manufacture, operational
practice, procedures, documentation regulations and oversight and of course money. There is
never one single cause. This truism is encapsulated in Prof. James Reasons "swiss cheese
model" of accident causation.
A characteristic I do not care for with the 737 was that with the 737NG series Boeing,
probably due to their larger customers' requests, did not upgrade the avionics package from
the earlier architecture. They stayed with two air data systems and no central maintenance
system.
Airbus with the A320 family in the 1980s used three air data systems and a maintenance
computer. This architecture, seen in all Airbus aircraft since and Boeing 747-400s, 777s and
787s allows the addition of another layer of safety by allowing trend monitoring of aircraft
system health from telemetry. The industry is at a point where data storage is large and cost
effective, and now analysis tools are being developed to alert accidences. This allows
alerting of trends before the flight crews see in-service problems.
Deregulation is the real reason. Neoliberalism and "greed is good" mentality is a contributing factor
Notable quotes:
"... There was no person who didn't risk losing their job and livelihood if they pointed out that MCAS violated the federal commercial flight regulations which prohibits a single sensor on flight critical systems. ..."
"... This is the same as the restart of the Cold War due to "Russian Aggression" or the use of proxy radical forces to instigate regime change. ..."
"... If corporate media does not report factual news but regurgitates propaganda endlessly then nothing will ever be fixed. Out of control systems kill people. ..."
"... Airlines urged regulators on Sunday to coordinate on software changes to the Boeing 737 MAX in a bid to avoid damaging splits over safety seen when the aircraft was grounded in March. ..."
"... I won't be surprised if the EU and China aren't VERY late with their approvals of the 737 'fixes'. They're probably getting tired of being kicked around by the Trumpies and this is a no-brainer way of getting some revenge. ..."
"... Whistleblower tales describe how this sort of thing has been going on for a long time. For now though, the FAA has to pretend to be a real regulatory agency. ..."
"... I took the NYT's article as being the first step by Boeing to set up their chief test pilot as the fall-guy for the entire 737Max fiasco. ..."
"... It certainly reads that way: the feature was initially intended only for high-speed, high-end. Then the test pilot found low-speed handling was iffy, so he decided that it should always be active. ..."
"... Good post! Boeing has already tried to crucify the ignorant/untrained "third world" pilots of the airplanes which went down. Why not try again with another pilot patsy? It might work. If it doesn't, wonder what plan "C" will be? ..."
The NY Times article misses the whole point of why two 737 Max(s) crashed: 1) Boeing's
self-certification of the safety of their airplanes and 2) the corporate drive to increase
shareholder value and C-Suite Bonuses.
Both assured that there was no oversight.
There was no person who didn't risk losing their job and livelihood if they pointed out
that MCAS violated the federal commercial flight regulations which prohibits a single sensor
on flight critical systems.
This is the same as the restart of the Cold War due to "Russian Aggression" or the use of
proxy radical forces to instigate regime change.
If corporate media does not report factual news but regurgitates propaganda endlessly then
nothing will ever be fixed. Out of control systems kill people.
Regarding the 737 MAX, today's news stories are filled with stuff like this:
SEOUL, June 2 (Reuters) - Airlines urged regulators on Sunday to coordinate on software changes to the Boeing 737 MAX in
a bid to avoid damaging splits over safety seen when the aircraft was grounded in March.
The International Air
Transport Association (IATA), whose 290 carriers account for 80 percent of world flying, said trust in the certification
system had been damaged by a wave of separate decisions to ground the jet, with the U.S. last to act.
Airlines are worried further differences between regulators over safety could confuse passengers and cause
disruption.
Lot of double-talk there. "Confuse passengers" is another way of saying that if the US lets the airplane fly before anybody
else does, hardly anyone will believe the thing is safe. Crazy Trumpies + wet-noodle FAA + indifferent Boeing -- that's not
a comforting situation at all.
I won't be surprised if the EU and China aren't VERY late with their approvals of the 737 'fixes'. They're probably
getting tired of being kicked around by the Trumpies and this is a no-brainer way of getting some revenge. Who can
quarrel with wanting to keep airplane passengers as safe as possible?
Yet another reason to turn off that damned 737 spotlight:
Some Boeing 737 MAX planes may have faulty parts: FAA June 2, 2019 / 3:20 PM
Whistleblower tales describe how this sort of thing has been going on for a long time. For now though, the FAA has to pretend to
be a real regulatory agency.
I took the NYT's article as being the first step by Boeing to set up their chief test pilot as the fall-guy for the entire
737Max fiasco.
It certainly reads that way: the feature was initially intended only for high-speed, high-end. Then the test pilot found
low-speed handling was iffy, so he decided that it should always be active.
And everyone at Boeing just.... agreed.... without really understanding what they were agreeing to.
Because, you know, nobody dares to argue with a test pilot...
Good post! Boeing has already tried to crucify the ignorant/untrained "third world" pilots of the airplanes which went down. Why
not try again with another pilot patsy? It might work. If it doesn't, wonder what plan "C" will be?
Introduction complex software systems in aviation creates a new set of problems. Some of the can be solved by duplication of
the equipment like Airbus was doing. Boeing failed to do this in this case there was not the second computer working with the
second sensor. Paradoxically it also increates the demand to the relibility of manual operation procedure in case
computers malfunction. the issue with trip week -- not sufficient size -- proved to be deadly as pilots were not able
to move it in the conditions such need need arise -- it needs to big force to move: clearly blunder in designing this mechanical
part of the system.
Notable quotes:
"... The 737 MAX incident also revealed a problem with older generations of the 737 type of plane that is only now coming into light. Simulator experiments (video) showed that the recovery procedures Boeing provided for the case of a severe mistrim of the plane is not sufficient to bring the plane back under control. ..."
The fleet of Boeing 737 MAX planes will stay out on the ground longer than anticipated.
Boeing promised a new software package to correct the
severe
problems with its Maneuver Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). The delivery was
supposed to be ready in April. A month later it has still not arrived at the Federal Aviation
Agency where it will take at least a month to certify it. The FAA will not be the only one to
decide when the plane can come back into the flight line. Other country's agencies will do
their own independent review and will likely take their time.
The 737 MAX incident also revealed a problem with older generations of the 737 type of plane
that is only now coming into light. Simulator experiments (video) showed that the
recovery procedures Boeing provided for the case of a severe mistrim of the plane is not
sufficient to bring the plane back under control. The root cause of that inconvenient fact does
not lie with the 737 MAX but with its predecessor, the Boeing 737 Next Generation or NG.
This was known in pilot circles for some time but will only now receive
wider public attention :
The Boeing 737 Max's return to commercial airline service is reportedly being further delayed
by the Federal Aviation Administration.
US government officials told The Wall Street Journal's Andy Pasztor that the FAA is
evaluating the emergency procedures for not only the Max but also the older generations of
the 737 including the [once] hot-selling Boeing 737 NG.
According to the officials, the broadened evaluation will take a look at how pilots of all
737 variant are instructed to respond to emergency situations.
Here is a detailed explanation why the FAA is now looking into the pilot training for older
737 types.
The 737 NG (-600/-700/-800/-900) was the third generation derivative of the 737 and followed
the 737 Original (-100/-200) and Classic (−300/-400/-500) series. The first NG flew in
1997. Some 7,000 were build and most of them are still flying.
Two technical modifications that turned out to be a problem during the recent incidents
occurred during the redesign of the 737 Classic into the New Generation series.
In the NG series a new Flight Management Computer (FMC) was added to the plane. (The FMC helps
the pilots to plan and manage the flight. It includes data about airports and navigation
points. It differs from the two Flight Control Computers in that it has no control over
physical elements of the plane.)
The FMC on the NG version has two input/output units each with a small screen and a larger
keyboard below it. They are next to the knees of the pilot and the copilot They are located on
the central pedestal between the pilots right below the vertical instrument panel (see pic
below). The lengthy FMCs did not fit on the original central pedestal. The trim wheels on each
side, used to manually trim the airplane in its longitudinal axis or pitch, were in the way.
Boeing's 'solution' to the problem was to make the manual trim wheels smaller.
737 NG cockpit with FMC panels and with smaller trim wheels (black with a white stripe) bigger
737 Original-200 cockpit with larger trim wheels (black with a white stripe) bigger
The smaller trim wheels require more manual force to trim with the same moment of force or
torque than the larger ones did.
Another change from the 737 Classic to the 737 NG was an increase in the size of the rear
horizontal flight surface, the stabilizer.
The stabilizer at the rear of the plane can be turned around a central pivot point. The
natural nose up or nose down characteristics of an airplane change during a flight depending on
the speed at which the airplane flies. The stabilizer can be moved during a flight by
a jackscrew (vid)
which is turned by either an electric motor, or via cables from the manually hand-cranked trim
wheels in the cockpit. Trimming the airplane keeps it level at all flyable speeds.
At the rear end of the stabilizer is the elevator surface (blue arrow in the pic below). The
elevator is moved by the column or yoke the pilot uses to control the plane. During a flight
the pilot, or an automated stabilizer trim system (STS), will electrically trim the stabilizer
so that no additional force on the column is required for the plane to stay at its flight
level.
In case of a mistrim of the stabilizer, the plane puts its nose up or down and the pilot
will have to push or pull his column to move the elevator to counter the mistrim of the
stabilizer. Depending on the position of the stabilizer and the speed of the airplane this can
require very significant force. In some cases it might be impossible.
The size of the stabilizer increased from 31.40 square meter on the
Classic to 32.78 sqm on the NG and MAX. Meanwhile the size of the elevator, the primary control
surface the pilot can use to counter a mistrimmed stabilizer, was kept at its original size of
6.55 sqm.
It is therefore more difficult for the pilot of a 737 NG or 737 MAX plane to use the
elevator to counter a mistrimmed stabilizer than it was on the earlier 737 Classic series.
In 1961 a mistrimmed stabilizer on a Boeing 707 caused the crash of an airplane. All on board
died. The root cause was a malfunction in the electrical switch the pilot normally uses to
electrically move the stabilizer. The switch stuck in an ON position and the motor moved the
stabilizer to its most extreme position. The plane's nose went up until it aerodynamically
stalled. The pilots were unable to recover from the situation.
The type of incident where an electric malfunction drives the stabilizer into an extreme
position is since known as a 'runaway stabilizer'.
To get a type rating for Boeing planes the pilots have to learn a special procedure to
diagnose and correct a runaway stabilizer situation. The procedure is a so called 'memory
item'. The pilots must learn it by heart. The corrective action is to interrupt the electric
circle that supplies the motor which drives the jackscrew and moves the stabilizer. The pilots
then have to use the hand-cranked trim wheels to turn the jackscrew and to bring the stabilizer
back into a normal position.
[The MCAS incidents on the crashed 737 MAX were not of the classic runaway stabilizer type.
A runaway stabilizer due to an electric malfunction is expected to move the stabilizer
continuously. The computerized MCAS operated intermittently. It moved the stabilizer several
times, with pauses in between, until the mistrim became obvious. The pilots would not have
diagnosed it as a runaway stabilizer. Only in the end are the effects of both problems
similar.]
A third change from older 737s to newer types involved the manuals and the pilot training.
If due to a runaway stabilizer event the front end of the stabilizer moves up, the nose of
the airplane will move down and the plane will increase its speed. To counter that the pilot
pulls on his column to move the rear end of the elevator up and to bring the plane back towards
level flight. As the plane comes back to level the aerodynamic pressure on the mistrimmed
stabilizer increases. Attempts to manually trim in that situation puts opposing forces on the
jackscrew that holds the stabilizer in its positions. The aerodynamic forces on the stabilizer
can become so big that a manual cranking of the trim wheel can no longer move the jackscrew and
thereby the stabilizer.
Until the introduction of the newer 737 types Boeing's pilot manuals for the 737 included a
procedure that described how to overcome the situation. It was counterintuitive. If the
stabilizer put the plane in an extreme nose down position the pilot was advised to first pull
the column to decrease the speed. He then had to push the column forward to lower the
aerodynamic forces that blocked the jackscrew. Then the manual trim wheel could be turned a bit
while the plane continued to dive and again increased its speed. The procedure had to be
repeated several times: pull column to decrease speed; push column to decrease the aerodynamic
force on the stabilizer and its jackscrew; trim manually; repeat. The technic was known as the
rollercoaster maneuver.
Recently some pilots used a 737 NG flight simulator to test the procedure. They simulated
the runaway stabilizer case at a height of 10,000 feet and use the rollercoaster maneuver to
recover from the mistrim. When they finally had the stabilizer back into a correct trim
position they found themselves at 3,000 feet height. The maneuver would thus help only when the
plane is already at a significant height above ground.
Both of the recent 737 MAX crashes happened shortly after the start. The rollercoaster
maneuver would not have helped those flights. But should a runaway stabilizer incident happen
on a 737 NG at its normal flight level the maneuver would probably be the only chance to
recover from the situation.
The crashes of the two 737 MAX revealed a number of problems with the design of the MCAS
system. Several additional issues with the plane have since become known. There may be other
problems with its 737 MAX that no one yet learned of. The rather casual FAA certification of
the type was clearly not justified.
But the problems described above are 737 NG problems. The 380 or so existing 737 MAX are
currently grounded. But some 7,000 737 NG fly about every day. The record provides that it is a
relatively safe airplane. But a runaway stabilizer is a well known electrical malfunction that
could by chance happen on any of those flights.
The changes from the 737 Classic to the 737 NG make it more difficult, if not impossible,
for the pilots to recover from such a situation:
The smaller manual trim wheels on the 737 NG make it more difficult to trim a runaway
stabilizer back into a regular position.
The larger stabilizer surface makes it more difficult to counter a runaway stabilizer by
using the elevator which was kept at the same size.
737 NG pilots no longer learn the rollercoaster maneuver that is now the only way to
recover from a severe mistrim.
Simulator sessions demonstrate (video) that a runaway stabilizer
incident on a 737 NG can no longer be overcome by the procedures that current Boeing manuals
describe.
It is pure luck that no NG crash has yet been caused by a runaway stabilizer incident. It is
quite astonishing that these issues only now become evident. The 737 NG was certified by the
FAA in 1997. Why is the FAA only now looking into this?
The second 737 MAX crash revealed all these issues to a larger public. Except for MCAS the
trim systems on the NG and MAX are similar. The Ethiopian Airline flight 302 did not experience
a runaway stabilizer, but the multiple engagement of MCAS moved the stabilizer to a similar
extreme position. The pilots cut the electricity to the stabilizer motor and tried to re-trim
the plane manually by turning the trim wheels. The aerodynamic forces on the stabilizer were
impossible to overcome. The pilots had not learned of the rollercoaster maneuver. (Not that it
would have helped much. They were too low to the ground.) They switched the motor back on to
use manual electrical trim to re-trim the aircraft. Then MCAS engaged again and put them into
the ground.
All NG and MAX pilots should learn the rollercoaster maneuver, preferable during simulator
training. There are probably some 50,000 pilots who are certified to fly a Boeing NG. It will
be an enormous and costly effort to put all of them through additional training.
But it will be more costly, for all involved, if a 737 NG crashes and kills all on board due
to a runaway stabilizer incident and a lack of pilot training to overcome it. Such an incident
would probably keep the whole NG fleet on the ground.
Pilots, airlines and the public should press the FAA to mandate that additional training.
The FAA must also explain why it only now found out that the problem exists.
---
Previous Moon of Alabama posts on Boeing 737 issues:
on the one hand a thorough and impressive look at the subject. on the other hand i'm getting
on a 737 next week and this adds to my already profound anxiety about flying. good times.
Very clearly stated description of how "accidents" get engineered, baked-into, into big and
complex machines and systems. Wonderful.
Raises material questions about defects in regulation of airplane safety, and how that
happens (can you spell "m-o-n-e-y"?) and why (repeat spelling). Regulatory Capture?
Geewhiz...yatink?
Feynman's classic report on the Challenger "accident" exposes the same sort of matter.
Feynman also tells a story about Oak Ridge in the building of the plant to separate
isotopes - he knew nothing of blue-prints and they showed him reams of paper, he spotted a
little rectangle with an X in side..."what happens if this opens" he said (if I recall
rightly) Of course he thought it looked like a window, but in the language of blueprints it
was, of course, a valve.... Turned out it was a lucky question, well, maybe not for
Japan...
When you build stuff or operate it one must always ask, at every junction, what if?...
This is true of driving, of motorcycles, airplanes, boats, and probably taking a bath.
Another excellent description of the Boeing profit cancer.
Where are the cost/benefit analysis that were done to justify the profit over safety moves
of Boeing? Some people are making big bucks by putting the public more at risk for
profit.
Who are they and why are they not in jail?
If corporations are people like Mitt Romney says then why is Boeing not under arrest?
If we can't arrest Boeing then why not the leadership that made the profit over safety
decisions? Certainly there is a paper trail.
Boeing is now like Trump by putting a clear face on the sickness that is the West governed
by the elite who own global private finance and everything else.
And this sickness is having a hissy fit because it knows it can't compete against China's
mixed economy and they won't let the elite own China finance.
Public versus private finance is the war that humanity is waging even though it is
presented by the West as all these spinning plates of other things.
Boeing needs to be driven into bankruptcy, just like empire is being driven, to put
consequences to the cancer of profit over safety.
Correct me if I'm wrong but hasn't every single transport-category aircraft made since the
Boeing 707, including Airbus, Embraer and Bombardier, used a jackscrew to position the
horizontal stabilizer?
Jackscrews are, in most older cars and most trucks,and most machine tools the way the
controls and steering works. They are ordinary, simple, and nearly foolproof. The article
does not blame the jackscrew. Sometimes corrosion and maintenance issues, and rarely,
manufacturing defects, can happen...nothing like that at issue in these two failure patters.
I have seen exactly one jackscrew failure, and it still worked ok, and I have had in my
hands hundreds of jackscrews torn down for analysis.
The failures at hand have to do with a dead-short between the ears associated with Big
Bucks and "fictionalized capitalism" - they faked it, pencil whipped the job...as we used to
say when I worked for the Army...
@8 Thank you Walter. I'm not an engineer...just trying to pinpoint the stabilizer problem.
Faulty electronics? Overloaded trim wheels? Bad design or capitalist greed?
B explained it very well but is the problem unique to Boeing?
Unlike the recent MCAS issues on a new aircraft I suspect runaway trim on 737 NG is a rare
event most pilots only experience in the simulator (unlike in the 60's-70's on other models)
.In over 20 years of flying (737 NG) has their ever been a crash due to runaway trim? Just
asking as I don't know.
This does not mean the procedures should not be corrected and additional training
done.
thanks b.. that is discouraging to hear... it is interesting seeing the faa's role in all of
this.. it reminds me of the role of the opcw and what was, or wasn't shared in the report on
douma... at some point these agencies need to be scrutinized more aggressively... the author
andersons of enron keep rearing their ugly heads..
Just curious, but has any airline ever reported a runaway stabilizer on a 737NG?
Obviously no 737NG has crashed from such an event, but if there is a runaway stabilizer
incident then the airline is (I assume) obliged to report it to the FAA. Is that data
available to the public?
To b; Thank you. to Walter also thank you for most informative comments. To dh #9. No way is
the problem unique to Boeing. Where was that walk way/over pass which collapsed the day after
it opened killing several? The Carolina's? Georgia? How about Becktel's Big Dig? The roof
tiles fell in the airport tunnel killing how many? Oops no links. Wait wait
What about the atrium walk way in???? City in the US midwest. Undersized bolts. The whole
thing fell down at the opening celebration. Deflection won. Cost cutting lost. Scores died.
Famous engineering maxims: Two is one and one is none. Keep it simple stupid.
I vote that all airline pilots get a raise and more vacation time.
Clearly then even the old 737 is unsafe below 7,000 feet and probably higher for
unprepared or unsuspecting pilots, because the recovery maneuver causes at least that
altitude loss, and the 737 NG is further unsafe in cases where the recovery maneuver does not
work.
The problem is skimping on error handling processes, the most costly, critical, and
invisible part of critical systems design. Skimping is universal where profit motive governs,
and infects regulators via bribes and regulatory capture. Where disasters will result very
rarely, the skimping remains invisible, the investors count their gains and donate to the
parties that control regulatory agencies, and managers are promoted and retire. The value of
a human life is adjusted to zero by sociopathic investors and their preferred corporate
managers.
So basically the post is stating that boing and the faa have a culture of overlooking safety
issues - no blood no foul (until there is blood).
Boing and faa would like to point the finger at pilots, birds, weather, God... etc. Lastly
faa and boing will be leaking blame directed at each other and then it will be that you cant
actually punish government employees and then boing is major military contractor and
strategically important - too big to fail.
Basically, they have both been shown to be unreliable. Fatal to the faa, maybe to boing,
maybe to passengers.
Unlike the recent MCAS issues on a new aircraft I suspect runaway trim on 737 NG is a rare
event most pilots only experience in the simulator (unlike in the 60's-70's on other models)
.In over 20 years of flying (737 NG) has their ever been a crash due to runaway trim? Just
asking as I don't know. This d\n mean the procedures s\n\b corrected and additional
training done. by: Pft @10 <= Re rime and clear ice builds, especially in low altitude
(take off and approaches) where icing develops along moment arm @ local positions <= trim
becomes a major frantic cockpit issue.. yeah, I know icing is never a problem in a modern
life exchanged for profit aircraft..
Psychohistorian seated the hard nail into government protected corporate lumber (weed
exterminator Monsanto , bomb makers everywhere and vision, hearing and heart -threatened
calcium channel signal corrupting 5G energies come to mind. One drop of corporation greed =
the early death for large numbers of expendable humans. but never fear the secret government
is at work, protecting the corporate lords and their Oligarch owners from those of you who
toil to earn a living.. what you governed humans don't know, those who govern you (the
governors) intend to get Assange for telling you, because the corporation lords don't want
you to know.
Never has there been a better case for independent of government, independent of corporate
influence audits..
The entire flying public should be allowed to audit all of the aircraft designs, construction
and management decisions and FAA activities and decisions from start to finish. The life of
the passenger depends on the scope and quality of the audit.
There is a safe harbor rule in securities tell the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
if you fail that requirement you must give the money investors gave you back to the
investors. ..humm!
Toyota Motor Corp. rebuked President Donald Trump's declaration that imported cars threaten
U.S. national security, signaling contentious talks are ahead for the White House and
America's key trading partners.
I don't know much about commercial aircraft but even I can see that b has way ahead of other
media in reporting about the Boeing/FAA clusterf*ck. Both in terms of timely info and depth
of info.
The United States wants to put tariffs on $11.2 billion worth of EU goods ... to offset
what it says are unfair European subsidies for plane manufacturer Airbus.
How much of Boeing is vulnerable to a European retaliation? I know that the 737 Max uses
LEAP-1B
Your post is likely to end up in some pilots' own custom-made manuals for reference if
Boeing doesn't amend its current manuals or FAA doesn't mandate appropriate pilot training on
the Boeing 737 MAX jets. Get ready to see it reprinted on other websites and blogs!
[If Trump really goes after Airbus,] How much of Boeing is vulnerable to a European
retaliation? I know that the 737 Max uses LEAP-1B engines, which are made by a joint venture
between Safran (France) and General Electric (US). Anything else?
@ Cyril with the great questions about potential implications of tariffs/sanctions to protect
Boeing market
Tariffs and sanctions could be a temporary negotiating tactic or are a slippery slope that
those in control of global private finance are willing to let Boeing and other US industry
leaders have to endure as long as global private finance stays viable in the
world....throwing America under the bus to save the scions of empire.
Is bringing the world economies to a halt via all these "bluffs" meant for some bigger
purpose?....war by other means, perhaps?
Wait until the world gets to anguish over nations debt position as part of all the fear
mongering to save private finance profit while the public takes the losses in the
shorts....it is all about getting and staying ahead of the narrative train....
During the 1989 Airline Pilot's Strike in Oz, Labor & Union acolyte, PM Bob Hawke,
solved the problem Neo-liberally by removing negotiating principles from the table and
declaring a National Emergency. This empowered the airlines to sack all the recalcitrant
pilots, thus reducing them to the status of truck drivers. I don't know if this was the
beginning of the War On Pilots but I did read that the Captain of the plane which landed an
airliner on the Hudson River, saving all on board, was on $19,000-00 p.a. and had a second
job to make ends meet.
It seemed a bit short-sighted, to me, to reduce the perceived status of a group of
highly-trained, and professional, airline pilots to well below the pay-scale status of
qualified tradesmen and even some skilled laborers - possibly to the point of (voiceless)
irrelevance?
As a former 737-300 (="Classic") and 737-700 (= "NG") pilot, I vividly remember from
during the initial simulator training how difficult it was to manually trim the 737-700.
But hey, the joke in the pilot community is that "Boeing is a law firm that also makes
aeroplanes."
Boeing needs to be driven into bankruptcy, just like empire is being driven, to put
consequences to the cancer of profit over safety.
Posted by: psychohistorian | May 25, 2019 7:13:08 PM | 4
Absolutely and utterly agree! Those at the top of both Boeing and FAA also need to be
tried for manslaughter and jailed for life.
The FAA also needs to be sanctioned by regulatory moves in EU, Russia, China and other
countries which disallow all FAA certifications until the FAA have proven that the
certifications were properly carried out, and validated by non-US agencies at FAA's cost. If
they don't fully comply, threaten mass grounding of US-certified aircraft. There also needs
to be a wide-ranging international investigation of FAA working practicies and conflicts of
interests, with mandatory full disclosure (to all non-US aviation regulators and pilots
unions) of all documentation and mandatory access to witnesses, again under threat of
grounding of all US-certified aircraft in case of non-compliance. (It won't happen of course!
There also need to similar investigations of working practices and conflicts of interest of
EU aviation authorities - also won't happen, althought there might be investigations of very
limited scope. Likewise for pharmaceuticals, pesticides and environmental hazards.)
The FMC helps the pilots to plan and manage the flight. It includes data about airports
and navigation points....The lengthy FMCs did not fit on the original central pedestal. The
trim wheels on each side, used to manually trim the airplane in its longitudinal axis or
pitch, were in the way. Boeing's 'solution' to the problem was to make the manual trim wheels
smaller.
In addition to the usual greed, we see how technocratic-engineering culture is at work
here: A basically worthless "hi-tech" toy (the FMC) is considered far more important than an
actual safety mechanism which is manual and therefore stupid from the technocratic POV.
Indeed, from this culture's POV it's an absolute value to decrease human agency and action
and increase computer agency, without regard to any kind of practicality, let alone something
so mundane and boring as the safety of human beings.
The trim wheel has a handle that folds out. A possible solution to this problem would be a
handle that is extensible, giving a large lever arm, and which functions like a ratchet
wrench.
Asking questions and making statements were 39 members of the House – 22 Democrats
and 17 Republicans – who during the 2018 election cycle took in a total of $134,749
– or an average of $3,455 each from Boeing in campaign contributions.
The structural defects in the 737 NG described so well by b are also relevant to the recent
crashes of the 737 MAX, are they not? Several reports indicated that the pilots of the
Ethiopian Airlines plane disconnected the MCAS system and tried to trim the aircraft manually
but were unable to do so, and this problem with the manual trim system caused them to turn on
the MCAS system again, with deadly results. It seems that the 737 MAX is even more dangerous
due to its 737 NG legacy. In addition to all the other necessary changes, the manual trim
wheel should be redesigned for the 737 MAX, the input from the pilot's yoke should be
increased, and a special pilot training category should be established. All of this should
have been mandated by the irresponsible FAA long ago. If the needed changes are not carried
out, nationwide boycotts of Boeing and of 737 MAX flights should be organized and carried
out.
@Dao Gen - The structural defects in the 737 NG described so well by b are also relevant
to the recent crashes of the 737 MAX, are they not?
Yes they are. The MAX crashes revealed that these issues had been 'forgotten'. That is why
the FAA is now looking into the NG. I added a paragraph near the end to clarify that.
I once ran "F&E shop, as the Army used to call them. Stands for "fuel and electronic"
[repair], sort of a forward operating base shop, these economize the logistics necessary to
support fleets. In that context machine parts, subsystems came in and we went through a
process of "triage", testing and labeling each unit as it came in. Those units which we
judged to be "BER" [beyond economical repair] got labeled as "N.G." (or NFG!) for "no good".
Even though the Boeing FUBAR'd 737 is a deadly matter I found the appellation 737-NG to be
vastly idiotic and amusing. Similarly amusing when Chevrolet named a car "no va" (doesn't
go).
Evidently Boeing ought to have named 737-MAX as 737-NFG.
Next we'll learn that the 777 is even worse than this thing & that Malaysian Air's losses
weren't Israel or the US.Gov's fault at all, just the few incompetent fools running the biz
& the FAA
snake @18 said: "Never has there been a better case for independent of government,
independent of corporate influence audits."
But what kind of organization could conduct those audits? What can exist that is
independent of business and its profit motives, which invite corruption, but also be
independent of government while having some mechanism for being answerable to the public? Any
effort to create such an organization will just recreate government.
We already have the answer: It is government regulation. We just need a deliberate
impenetrable wall between government and business interests like we in America used to have
between government and religion. We need to adjust our culture such that any
politician promising to be "business-friendly" is as shunned as one promising to
implement Sharia law. A revolution could probably accomplish this.
1) it does not extend the "lever asm" (in russia it is called "shoulder" :-) ), just makes
a better grip
2) like with piston engines, it has two "dead points (centres)". Piston engines solve it by
having multiple pistons working in different phases and by having a flywheel. Both options
can not be applied to this 737 wheel.
The video show it is exactly "dead points" that cause problems. When the handle-axis is
orthogonal to axis-man, then the wheel is more or less rotated. But those "dead points"
progressivle become more and more impassable.
> A possible solution to this problem would be a handle that is extensible, giving a
large lever arm,
Would not do.
If it extends parallel to axis - it would not increase lever no matter how long it is.
If it extends orthogonal to axis - it would just get stuck against the wall and FMS
stand.
> and which functions like a ratchet wrench.
Yep, or a removable stick, with the wheel having 8 or at least 6 wholes through the
wheel's reborde.
This all, whoever, would
1) add extra complexcitiy, increasing weight and malfanction probability.
For example, how would electro-motors act, if the wheel is locked by the said ratchet?
For example, where to store the removable lever, so it would not be a nuisance during normal
flights, but in emergency would be both easy to take and reliably fixed until being
taken?
2) would probably decrease rotating speed yet more. Force-path trade-off....
@steve Does the 777 max have any trim systems similar to the 737? Given the 777 has an
aluminum fuselage, does this mean the 787 was a mistake?
The stabilizer trim via a jackscrew on the 777 is somewhat similar to the 737 though the
jackscrew is much bigger.
It can be seen in this video at ~3:00 min: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sy-ARLZXXTA
There are many difference in the trim control. The 777 uses several independent hydraulic
circles to run the hydraulic jackscrew motor. The 777 is fly-by-wire. There ar no longer
manual trim wheels with long cables running to the stabilizer. All signals from the cockpit
are electric to three independent system which then switch the hydraulic circles on/off as
needed. There is an electric force feed back to give the pilots some 'feel' for the trim
position in their columns.
The aluminum or carbon skin decision is relevant for weight. Carbon is more expensive as
special care must be taken for flash impacts and other issues. But it is also a lot lighter
that aluminum. The higher price will easily pay off.
There is rightly a focus on the poor quality of work done by the FAA in authorising the
Boeing 737 MAX (and, it now appears, that the same could be said about the authorisation of
the NG). As stated by numerous articles the FAA were just relying on Boeing assessments and
safety checks. However, these weaknesses in the authorisation process should really have been
picked up by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and I fail to see how a
competent body would fail to do so. So, the EASA is as useless as the FAA, and aircraft
certifications are probably politically based rather than a rigorous safety and airworthiness
check.
I would imagine that Boeing still intend to have the 737 MAX re-authorised by the FAA
within a few months with the expectation that EASA approval will follow shortly after. The
political motive will be to maintain the Boeing and Airbus duopoly (for mutual self-interest
they both wish to preserve their respective market shares and not significantly challenge the
other) rather than issues of safety. As far as I can see there are no politicians in the UK
& Europe that are particularly interested or concerned about the issue
(unfortunately).
> and a special pilot training category should be established
Posted by: Dao Gen | May 26, 2019 7:53:10 AM | 36
But this is marketing disaster, too train pilots.
- Ok, mr. seller, so we need to spend N hours and M thousand USD to make our pilots
efficient at most fuel-economic flight and at pressing automatic take-=off and automatic
landing buttons. Good. Make sense.
- Oh, not just that, mr. customer, you also need to spend 10x N hours and 10xM monet to train
your pilots against emergencies.
- what emergencies
- Oh, you know, it would not ever be your problem, buyt jsut to make government happy, you
nkow, those crazy government clerks shifting responsibilities for life, they want it be
passed...
- So what exactly they need be protected from??? And why they make me pay for it?
- Well, you know, 100 years ago once in mankind history an aircraft - not Boeing our
competitor's jet it was - it got into X and then Y and wheather was Z and they crashed with
all people aboard lost. And then, 99 years ago, there was A and sun was like B and then....
and they crashed and 50% on board lost. And then there was K and if rain goes L and ....
- Okay, okay, got it. Your new Boeing is so unreliable shit, that 100 years later it still
can get into X, A and K and everyone dies and our business dies too. And you think i am such
an idiot you gonna sell me this unreliable gum-n-sticks shit? I will first buy Manhatten
bridge, before i start buying Boeings.
- No! No! our new jets are most reliable! no competitor is so reliable as Boeing! Read out
booklet! read the testimonies from our customers!
- But you say our pilots must spend ten times time and ten times money to proitext from X and
A and K fatal problems in your Boeing jets...
- NO !!! we do not have those problems! It is government, they always go overcautious and
extort!
- So you say there is no X, A and K problems in Boeing? Yes or no???
- A.. a... AH! No, there is absolutely no problems in Boeing jets.
- Good, then if there is no problem, there is nothing to overtrain our pilots at
overexpensive courses.
- But government...
- You have problems with gov't - you solve them! You better know what you must arrange with
clerks, to fix it. And sto imposing your problems with gov't over us customers. Do you want
to sell or not?
- But safety...
- You said there is NO PROBLEMS in Boeing, didn't you???
- Yes, but...
- No buts! Give me an official p[aper that there is no X, A and K problems in Boeing ever,
and that if some jet crash and burn i am not responsible, and then we pay for those jets. Or
we gonna pay those, who will give us those papers!
Outstandingly well written B; a most impressive explanation of 737 issues.
Two points I would like to add.
1. From my understanding of the design approach of the MAX, Boeing engineers where told to
forget physics and focus on FAA compliance with an eye on quick certification and insure no
additional pilot training. Example: This is why only one sensor was used. Had Boeing done the
right thing, two would have been used, but then the FAA would have needed a lot more time to
test. In addition, even now, Dennis A. Muilenburg, the CEO of Boeing is in denial. Just
listening to him makes me cringe, he needs to read this article from B and wake the F up.
2. This is terrible timing for Boeing since both the Chinese and the Russians now have
aircraft to compete with the 737 MAX. It is extremely difficult to get market share in the
commercial aircraft business, but the timing of this disaster will give the competition a
fighting chance. In fact I suspect that Airbus competition was not the only factor that made
Boeing want to move fast with the MAX aircraft.
In Silicon Valley, if you screw up a business, then you call in your crisis management
consultants to fix things. Like the Intel math error in its CPU chips. It is clear to me that
Boeing thought it best to save money and not call these crisis experts and it does show. In
this case you get what you pay for.
> The aluminum or carbon skin decision is relevant for weight..... The higher price will
easily pay off.
Posted by: b | May 26, 2019 10:06:12 AM | 45
....and then
> Carbon .... special care must be taken for flash impacts and other issues.
So, safety, right?
But, can one trust FAA and Boeing with safety now?
Also, remember recent crash of Sukhoi SSJ in Moscow.
Turn out, when going away from "just works" metallic bodies with inherent Faradey cage
properties, properly assessing all possible "what if" scenarios with full respect to possible
magnitudes and safety margins, is VERY hard, especially when marketoids demand cutting costs
at all costs are reathing over your shoulder.
There was an interesting presentation how nuclear fuel rods geometry is calculated, to
tolerate inevitable fuel curving under load. There were safety margings within safety
margins, within... Multi-level reservations. And of course there is an incentive to increase
efficiency by cutting off some margin, assigned to your unit, because there are several times
a margin in other layers.
....and then one day it becomes the anekdot about rakia barrel in a village.
While not a fan of the new Boeing management culture, I would just like to point out that one
possible reason you haven't seen any 737NG crashes due to a runaway trim stabilizer is that
fact that there is a legal 250 knot speed limit on aircraft below 10,000 feet. Additionally,
the older aircraft design was more stable at lower speeds. Therefore if a runaway trim
stabilizer did occur, you would theoretically have not reached a high enough speed to
freeze-up the the manual trim mechanisms.
In the case of the Ethiopian 737 MAX crash, the speed of aircraft was in excess of 400
knots, where manual trimming was made impossible. In that case the insidiousness and
persistence of MCAS would have led to much higher speeds than would be manageable.
> This is terrible timing for Boeing since both the Chinese and the Russians now have
aircraft to compete with the 737 MAX
Posted by: Meshpal | May 26, 2019 10:24:13 AM | 48
this WAS a terrible timing
China... it seems to have prev-gen much less efficient jet. And one only used with China,
so maybe it is equally or yet worse unreliable - there is no 3rd party experience.
Russia... MS-21 is not ready yet. Close reportedly, but just not yet.
SSJ-100 then - talk about timings - just few weeks ago crashed in Moscow after a single
lighting strike, with more than a half onboard dead.
So, no, right this vry moment there is no competition from Russia and China.
There were Brasil and Canada - but they were recently bough off by Boeing and Airbus.
There was Ukraine too, but EuroMaidan came and destroyed Antonov corporation as soon as
they could.
So, as of this very moment it still is Boeing 737 vs Airbus 320neo duopoly
Excellent work by b. Arioch at 47, That looks like an accurate scenario.
Now would be a good time for the R political party and those among the D Party to
repudiate government regulation (as it adversely affects business!) as it relates
specifically to the FAA and its "chilling effect" on Boeing. Let business flourish. Let "the
market" decide, they say.
I'm thinking that at some point the stabilizer on earlier aircraft was not movable with a
pivot point. The elevator alone was enough to move the tail up or down.
If so, what made the aircraft manufacturers feel the need for a pivot to move the entire
stabilizer?
Russia's MC-21 and
China's C919 are both
due to begin revenue flights in 2021. Both of these are significantly more affordable than
Boeing's 737 MAX family. If the 737 MAX remains grounded for a significant period, or if it
requires new type certification then Boeing could be in big trouble. Doubtless the FAA knows
this and are thus (again) rushing through the process of trying to get it in the air.
I wasn't proposing modifying the handle, I was suggesting replacing it with something
different, in this case a handle which extends radially and operates like a ratchet.
"how would electro-motors act, if the wheel is locked by the said ratchet?"
The system is designed with a clutch which allows the pilot to manually override the
motor.
Bart Hansen @53 asked: "...what made the aircraft manufacturers feel the need for a pivot
to move the entire stabilizer?"
The aerodynamics of an aircraft change with speed and also with balance... think ten
minutes after the coffee is served and a line forms at the restroom. If the balance was
always the same (no changes from burning fuel, for instance) and the plane always only flew
at one speed (reaches cruising speed before leaving the runway) then it would be easier to
design the aircraft to naturally assume neutral level flight without using trim systems. This
isn't very realistic, though. As well, while the elevators can do all of the work of
raising and lowering the nose of the aircraft, leaving all of the work to the elevators means
the pilot will have to be muscling the nose of the plane up or down 100% of the time, which
would probably get a little tiring, to say the least.
> The system is designed with a clutch which allows the pilot to manually override the
motor.
Posted by: Edward | 55
Not a clutch, but a switch. A switch that removes ("cuts off") electric power from
motor.
The wheel and the motor and the stabiliser are connected by fixed drive train, no
clutches.
It is the electric wire - outside of the train - that is connected or disconnected.
if electric power is there - then it is motor, that rotates the said wheel.
if electric power is off - then human can rotate both the wheel and the motor.
A ratchet physically blocks wheel rotation, in one direction, another, or both.
That, a properly functioning ratcher.
If a ratcher is malfunctioning - and device can break - it may become unpredictable.
Boeing clearly tried to keep this wheel-motor-stabilizer drive train "thick as a brick"
and reliable as wooden club. Because it is critical safety system.
Introducing a complex, optionally-engaging machinery, retroactivey, into "overcrowded" (no
other place for FMC was found) cabin that was designed to have nothing like that - may in
total be more dangerous than now.
Edward at 55 is right. It is you Arioch, who does not know how the 737 trim system
works.
There is an automatic clutch between the electrical drive of the jackscrew and the manual
drive. In effect the manual over rides the electrical.
There is much more to the total trim system than I wrote down in the above piece. I
provided a link at the end to the Stabilizer Trim writeup by the Satguru. It is the best that
is out there. Take a few hours to read it and a few days to understand it. Do that before you
come here to claim higher knowledge of something you don't know the basics about.
"The spinning disc is the manual trim wheel. It has a stowable handle that the pilot can
use to manually trim the stabilizer if the electric trim is not available. The system is
designed such that if that wheel does not turn, the stabilizer does not move. There is a
clutch in the system between the electric trim motor and the rest of the system, and this
clutch mechanism favors the manual trim wheel. If other methods to cutout the electric trim
failed, a pilot could simply place his foot firmly on the wheel and stop its motion, thus
stopping the stab from moving further. (The checklist actually says to grasp the wheel with
your hand, but the foot works much better)."
The effort to computer control and automate aircraft operation serves increased profit
motivations. Pilots can be certified with less training. Young pilots work for lower pay as
older pilots at higher pay levels retire or quit. As pilots depend on automated computer
control, they tend to lose the ability (or were not taught adequately) to react correctly to
emergencies.
Look at the difference between the cockpits and instrumentation of the 737 Original and
the 737 NG. The NG leans heavily on the dependability of digital LCD computer monitors
instead of clusters of independent instruments.
"So, as of this very moment it still is Boeing 737 vs Airbus 320neo duopoly"
As it was me that mentioned duopoly @46 I hope you don't mind if I point out that it is
not Boeing "versus" Airbus; it is Boeing "and" Airbus - effectively a cartel of two.
This means that the "market" is controlled (rigged) with "understood" market shares and,
most important of all, the ability to hack and flag old designs and not have to go to the
effort and expense of designing new aircraft.
The avoidance of "designing new aircraft" means that new technology is just hacked on to
less than optimum designs and software is just used like wallpaper to cover over cracks.
In my view there are 4 parties to the problem that resulted in the Boeing MAX disasters;
these are Boeing, the FAA, Airbus and the EASA.
I recall reading a few years ago about a mine accident in China. The investigators determined
that the workers had been complaining about maintenance of the ventilation system having been
lax, causing a buildup of explosive dust and gasses, and it was further determined that this
had been caused by local mine management determining they could save a few bucks by skimping
on maintenance. After the investigation, the "offices" of mine management were ordered moved
into the mine, and suddenly safety issues were all promptly addressed. I thought it was an
elegant and quintessentially Chinese solution.
Perhaps it should be mandated that all Boeing execs and FAA personnel be restricted to
flying only in 737s until these issues become important enough to be addressed.
I get the impression that it is being implied that the force required for operation of the
manual over-ride is likely to be greater than what a typical pilot might be able to provide
and maintain. This would mean that the so called back up system is itself unworkable or
unreliable. Such a claim would hsve to be logged and evaluated if there is any serious effort
to monitor and maintain design compliance - assuming it is intended to function.
Perhaps it should be mandated that all Boeing execs and FAA personnel be restricted to
flying only in 737s until these issues become important enough to be addressed.
Posted by: J Swift | May 26, 2019 1:28:11 PM | 64
OK, put the entire board an executive officers of Boeing and the Director General and
deputies of the FAA on 10 years full time toilet cleaning duty on 737-MAX. If the 737-MAX
ever flies again, that is.
The post by jared @65 brought a point to mind: Since men tend to have more upper body
strength than women, and given the hypersensitivity to identity in western cultures, this
means that the 737 NG and MAX designs are sexist and part of The Patriarchy's plot to
keep women down. I wonder why nobody in western corporate mass media has yet noted this
vulgar display of white male privilege and prejudice that Boeing has crystallized right into
the engineering of their aircraft?
@jared @65 This would mean that the so called back up system is itself unworkable or
unreliable. Such a claim would hsve to be logged and evaluated if there is any serious effort
to monitor and maintain design compliance - assuming it is intended to function.
Exactly. If the FAA (and EASA) would go by the book, all 737 NG should stay on the ground
until Boeing fixed the issue in a safe matter. Not gonna happen as both assume (too) little
risk that a runaway stabilizer could happen.
But as Capt Sullenberger says: Nothing is more expensive (to airlines and plane
manufacturers) than an accident.
About 30 years ago, an old guy retired commercial airline pilot told me that female pilots
weren't strong enough to operate certain controls manually should particular emergency
situations arise. Physical body strength was important for safety considerations.
I wonder if this trim stabilizer was what he was talking about. I don't know if these
stabilizers pivoted 30 years ago.
b, thanks for looking into Boeing and FAA's coverups. Part, or a large part of the US rise
was due to its manufacturing power and ability to manufacture good quality products.
The decadence phase or perhaps nearing the end of the decadence phase in the rise and fall of
the US empire.
This is excellent article on the 737 NG and Max. Ultimately, these aircraft were designed and
assembled in a globalized outsourced duopoly. Rosemount Aerospace Inc makes the AoA Sensor.
Rockwell Collins built the 737 Max flight-control computer and wrote the software code that
contains MCAS. Government was flushed down the toilet. Effective oversight and regulation
ended. Self-certification and "pay to play" are the rule today. Buffoons (Donald Trump and
Emmanuel Macron plus Boris Johnson soon) reign over incompetent diminished western nation
states subservient to corporate trade treaties, the Five Eyes Deep State and undemocratic
super-state institutions. If there is ever a criminal investigation of Boeing for
manslaughter, it will find that in order to increase profits, pilots and engineering safety
oversight personnel were fired or retired since the merger of Boeing and McDonnel in 1997.
Those few who are left, to keep their jobs, never pass their safety concerns on to upper
management. To reverse this, CEOs must be jailed for their crimes.
> The system is designed such that if that wheel does not turn, the stabilizer does not
move.
> this clutch mechanism favors the manual trim wheel.
> pilot could simply place his foot firmly on the wheel and stop its motion, thus
stopping the stab from moving further.
Posted by: Edward | May 26, 2019 12:55:13 PM | 61
The question remains though. You propose to augment the wheel with a comples ( =
error-prone ) mechanism, which intention is to block wheel rotation one or both directions of
the wheel. The very same "foot", but this time made of steel.
One day this ratchet - as everything - would break. In the cabin. Probably, blocking or
half-blocking wheel rotation. Without, of course, shouts and fireworks.
Pilots would trust STS or autopilot to move the wheel. So if the wheel does not move, or
moves occasinally in one directino then stops - they would consider "this is what
STS/autopilot wanted".
STS/AP would issue coimmands at the motor, the commands would be succesflly executed by
the motor, but ignored by the drive train, with accordance with Boeing philosophy "human foot
is final authority" and "human knows better can always override anything for any reason".
How this situation would develop?
How soon/late pilots would detect it?
How far this would turn stabs before pilots, realising ratchet failure, would hit "trim cut
off" and ocntinue flight now unable to turn stabs by neither motors nor wheel?
div> Typo. Boeing's merger was with McDonnell Douglas. Disciples of GE's
Jack Welch from that defense company took over. They place profit and increasing shareholder
value first. This increases their bonuses, too.
Typo. Boeing's merger was with McDonnell Douglas. Disciples of GE's Jack Welch from that
defense company took over. They place profit and increasing shareholder value first. This
increases their bonuses, too.
a reply to > @ Posted by: Bart Hansen | May 26, 2019 10:49:43 AM | 53 about pivoting horiz
stabilizer...look at the Wright Flyer... Yup. Pivoting stabilizer.
Videos all of on YT...
Bart wrote:"I'm thinking that at some point the stabilizer on earlier aircraft was not
movable with a pivot point. The elevator alone was enough to move the tail up or down.
If so, what made the aircraft manufacturers feel the need for a pivot to move the entire
stabilizer?"
As to why, well, it does not add more drag, as well as the several other good reasons.
Of course, the ratchet would need to be reliable and not likely to break or fail, just
like everything else on the airplane. A ratchet is a simple device and I am counting on a
mechanical engineer to design something dependable. I should add that situations where a
pilot resorts to the manual trim, such as the Ethiopian Air flight, are rare.
Those at the top of both Boeing and FAA also need to be tried for manslaughter and
jailed for life.
I would also jail Boeing's previous management (McNerney et al), as they were the ones
responsible for the shoddy development of the 737 Max. (Note: McNerney is not an engineer; he
studied English and history at Yale, and got an MBA from Harvard.)
The current honchos (Muilenberg etc.) are not innocent, as they did little after the Lion
Air crash, and after the Ethiopian Airline crash did all they could to prevent the grounding
of the Max -- in spite of hundreds of dead people. So Muilenberg should go to the slammer
too.
Of course, some people from the FAA deserve to accompany McNerney and Muilenberg in the
ball-and-chain resort.
Boeing CEO Jim McNerney apologized Friday in a companywide message for telling analysts
this week that he won't retire after turning 65 next month because "the heart will still be
beating, the employees will still be cowering."
McNerney was the CEO of Boeing when the 737 Max was designed.
p>
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"... So Boeing's 737 Max crashes, and the FAA's complacency about them, have cost the regulator dearly. And there's no way for the agency to regain its authority. The US can't throw its weight around the way it once did. ..."
"... Because they think financial "engineering" is more important than actual engineering. ..."
"... As I pointed out to management, "Any safety device powerful enough to be useful is also going to be dangerous." The device was worse than the problem it was supposed to solve and was removed. ..."
"... Boeing does have a strong incentive to make sure there's not another crash because if there is they are finished. ..."
"... There's no denying that MCAS is a workaround for engines that don't fit the airplane. You don't need an engineering degree to see that's unacceptable. ..."
"... I don't understand how Boeing can avoid at least using a second Angle of Attack sensor with MCAS. Will the MCAS at least be re-classified as a critical system? If so, doesn't that make a second sensor mandatory? ..."
"... Using both sensors has been announced as part of the fix. ..."
"... So there was a second sensor available and MCAS just wasn't using it? I think Boeing wanted a configuration for MCAS that didn't require new training for 737 pilots. Do you know if critical systems are required to have 2 or 3 sensors? ..."
"... Any part of the plane that can cause a crash is supposed to use redundant sensors but the MCAS wasn't so designated which surprised even some Boeing engineers. ..."
"... "For the first time, Boeing admits MCAS is an extension of Speed Trim, which I have long suspected, and why it was designed with a single input. Speed Trim is constantly applying stabilizer trim commands in manual flight. ..."
"... Boeing used to have a rule that managers from the military part of the company were never transferred to the civilian side. Before becoming Boeing CEO, Muilenburg oversaw a pentagon program that wasted $20 billion before being cancelled. ..."
"... "I think I read somewhere that Boeing was resisting altering MCAS to use two sensors because then 737 pilots would need new training." – me too. Two sensors would imply it was a critical piece of hardware, requiring pilot training, so they went with one. ..."
"... A second sensor may not be enough. This system is of the highest criticality. Then there is the question of whether the sensor – which was never intended for direct control is good enough. ..."
"... Aircraft have had artificial horizons port to starboard for decades. Why no artificial horizon device rotated through 90 degrees for front to back? ..."
"... Any future orders would have to be cancelled. Fire the board and CEO and put in new one that will have a safety-first mandate. If the loss of revenue while re-engineering a future version of the 737 is severe enough to threaten Chapter 11, then do a GM-style bankruptcy or break up the company into "good co/bad co" and put all the rotten assets in the bad company and wind it down. ..."
"... My guess is that the Chinese are waiting in the long grass – this is far too juicy a chance for them to strike at the US in retaliation for the tariffs for them to pass up. ..."
"... They will wait until the FAA gives the green light before they say anything. If they refuse to certify it without a complete redesign, then it kills the MAX stone dead – not just in Asia, but everywhere as no leasing agent will touch it, and European budget airlines like Ryanair will also have to give it a pass as they look to Asia for 'resales' for their used aircraft. It would become too risky a purchase for anyone but exclusively US based airlines. ..."
"... China wants rather than needs the planes. It has its own Comac brand and Airbus has a manufacturing plant in China. Its airline industry would survive a shortfall, it just means they'd be running older aircraft longer that they'd want. The damage to China would be minimal compared to what would be inflicted on the US. ..."
A FAA news conference which presumably had restoring faith in the plane and the agency as a
major goal didn't appear to make much progress on either front. And it also appears that the
FAA placing way too much trust in Boeing had led to the regulator losing its hegemony in
certifications. Nicely played!
Boeing's two largest US customers, Southwest and American Airlines, had made statements that
they anticipated returning the 737 Max to service in August. That timetable was almost
certainly the result of expectations set by Boeing.
That plan has gone up in smoke. The FAA said it wouldn't give an idea as to when the 737 Max
would be deemed airworthy again, and a year was not out of the picture, although commentators
seemed to regard that long as highly unlikely.
On top of that, the FAA mentioned that Boeing had missed several deadlines for submitting a
software fix for the FAA to evaluate, and was set to get it in this week. Not a good look as
far as the airlines with mothballed planes are concerned.
Moreover, while the US press for the most part was putting a positive spin, given the
givens, on the FAA's press conference, the Financial Times reported that foreign regulators,
who are set to meet with the FAA today (Thursday) are taking a tough line on the 737 Max
recertification, including insisting on simulator training as a requirement. This confirms a
risk we and others had raised before: that the FAA, by doggedly defending the 737 Max when
other regulators were proven correct in grounding it, is no longer fully in charge of the
certification process. At best, it is having to negotiate terms with key foreign
regulators.
cting Federal Aviation Administration chief Daniel Elwell appeared to undermine industry
expectations that Boeing Co.'s grounded 737 MAX jets would be heading toward a smooth and
predictable return to the skies.
Mr. Elwell repeatedly told reporters at a news conference Wednesday that he couldn't predict
when the fleet would be back in the air, suggesting instead that the process of approving a
proposed software fix for the aircraft remains open-ended and subject to various factors --
many outside his control.
Some of his comments seemed to signal potentially months of additional delay, as Mr. Elwell
appeared to distance himself from plans by some U.S. airlines to put the jets back into
operation in August
The Journal did mention, but downplayed, the further impediment of winning over foreign
regulators. Stunningly, it included but failed to flag the significance of the notion that
foreign regulators might not accept the FAA's clean bill of health:
In addition to verifying the revised software, the FAA has to establish new training
requirements, create enhanced maintenance standards and -- most important -- persuade foreign
regulators to endorse the bulk of the eventual U.S. plan
At Thursday's session, FAA officials will detail progress so far and seek suggestions from
foreign participants. Weeks ago, air-safety regulators for Canada and the EU said they
planned to conduct separate reviews of changes to the automated flight-control feature,
called MCAS, along with a safety assessment of the entire aircraft.
"Other countries and other authorities may take longer" to put the planes back into
service, Mr. Elwell said, "and they undoubtedly will." Meanwhile, the FAA is asking foreign
regulators "what else they would like to see from us," Ali Bahrami, the FAA's top safety
official, told reporters.
Canada, Europe and Indonesia made clear ahead of the meeting that they would set their own
conditions for determining when the plane is safe to fly again, threatening the FAA's goal of
building consensus for a co-ordinated plan to put the 737 Max back into action.
At least with the pink paper, the Canadians were mum on their requirements, but per earlier
remarks, training is on the list. Undermining the US role in certifying planes overseas,
Indonesia said it is considering having Transport Canada or the European regulator EASA give a
second opinion.
EASA must approve and mandate any design changes by Boeing
EASA must complete an additional independent design review
737 Max flight crews must be "adequately trained"
And China will be even more stringent. Again from the Financial Times:
China, which was the first big regulator to ground the Max and a crucial market for
Boeing, could be one of the last countries to lift its ban, aviation sources said.
Chinese regulators are likely to insist on additional checks before they clear the plane
to fly. That could erode the existing convention by which nations recognise safety
certifications from the manufacturer nation, and someday provide an opening for Beijing to
push for easier recognition of the planes it is developing. Chinese airlines and leasing
companies account for at least 10 per cent of Boeing's unfilled order book for the Max.
And the list of countries officially not deferring to the FAA includes Brazil:
Brazil, one of the few global regulators that mandated pilot training on the MCAS before
allowing the Max to fly, said it continues to conduct "our own evaluations about the
aircraft".
So Boeing's 737 Max crashes, and the FAA's complacency about them, have cost the regulator
dearly. And there's no way for the agency to regain its authority. The US can't throw its
weight around the way it once did.
The problem is not the MCAS software which can certainly be reprogrammed, it is the
aircraft itself that is unbalanced and unsafe. Boeing tried to be too clever, hoping that
with covering software no aircrew would notice, and their criminal negligence has caught up
with them.
Keep making 737 800NGs, and develop a replacement aircraft, otherwise you're stuffed.
Why don't they get the message?
Exactly! Software can do a lot of things for you, it can even temporarily mask a
mechanical defect, but a workaround isn't a fix and in something as critical as an airplane,
workarounds are unacceptable. I suspect even the MBAs are beginning to realize this.
I once worked on a HW/SW add on for an inkjet printer that was supposed to identify and
correct missing nozzles that would cause a print defect. Occasionally the device would
misfire (usually due to a hair or spec of dust on the sensor.)
It would then delete entire rows of nozzles causing horrible print defects.
As I pointed out to management, "Any safety device powerful enough to be useful is also
going to be dangerous." The device was worse than the problem it was supposed to solve and
was removed.
It's clear that without MCAS, these 2 planes would not have crashed.
And yet it has been flying for two years now with the only crashes quite likely tied to
broken AOA sensors rather than the balance. To be sure we have every reason to distrust
Boeing management at this point–particularly as they won't even admit that they made a
mistake. On that basis perhaps all Boeing planes should be grounded. But Boeing does have a
strong incentive to make sure there's not another crash because if there is they are
finished.
You need to read the serious reports including the Seattle Times investigation. And my
reading of that series says that MCAS was a marketing workaround so Boeing could sell
the Max as the same plane. The MCAS only kicks in when the airplane is in a near stall and
for professional pilots that's supposed to almost never happen -- even if the plane
pitches up more than previously on takeoff. If the Max was constantly stalling then we'd be
hearing a lot more about it as all sorts of buzzers and verbal warnings and "stick shakers"
happen during a stall.
In other words "common sense" also needs accurate information and if any of the above is
incorrect then happy to be corrected.
" MCAS was a marketing workaround so Boeing could sell the Max as the same plane."
That is exactly the problem. MCAS was NOT a marketing workaround for occasional aircraft
instability. It was a a mild engineering workaround that they marketed to buyers of the 737
Max, so Boeing could make MORE MONEY.
I don't understand how Boeing can avoid at least using a second Angle of Attack sensor
with MCAS. Will the MCAS at least be re-classified as a critical system? If so, doesn't that
make a second sensor mandatory?
I tried making this comment yesterday in the Links but it never went through. I sometimes
have problems making comments on NC. I used to be able to edit comments.
So there was a second sensor available and MCAS just wasn't using it? I think Boeing
wanted a configuration for MCAS that didn't require new training for 737 pilots. Do you know
if critical systems are required to have 2 or 3 sensors?
It was all talked about in the Seattle Times series which can be googled up or was linked
here. Any part of the plane that can cause a crash is supposed to use redundant sensors but
the MCAS wasn't so designated which surprised even some Boeing engineers. It could be this decision was simply a mistake
due to management inattention rather than trying to save money by only using one of the two sensors.
The fact that Boeing won't come clean is their biggest mistake and violates the Tylenol
precedent where you try to restore confidence above all else. From what I've read the current
Boeing CEO did rise up through the engineering side of the company but came over from their
Defense Dept business where mistakes are par for the course and the customer–the
Pentagon–doesn't seem to care very much. See the Andrew Cockburn Harper's article that
Jerri-lynn linked yesterday.
"For the first time, Boeing admits MCAS is an extension of Speed Trim, which I have long
suspected, and why it was designed with a single input. Speed Trim is constantly applying
stabilizer trim commands in manual flight. This masks MCAS trim commands. Further, MCAS trim
commands are effectively a slowover and in the case of the Lion Air flights, intermittent.
These factors, combined with the flight deck effects from the high AoA value causing high
workload, interfere with the expected human response. There has yet to be any acknowledgement
of this, rather the opposite by ignoring it. The FAA repeatedly made the same assertion, the
MCAS malfunction is easy to detect."
I think I read somewhere that Boeing was resisting altering MCAS to use two sensors
because then 737 pilots would need new training.
Boeing used to have a rule that managers from the military part of the company were never
transferred to the civilian side. Before becoming Boeing CEO, Muilenburg oversaw a pentagon
program that wasted $20 billion before being cancelled.
"I think I read somewhere that Boeing was resisting altering MCAS to use two sensors
because then 737 pilots would need new training." – me too. Two sensors would imply it
was a critical piece of hardware, requiring pilot training, so they went with one.
You'll have to say where you read that because I've not seen it. I don't think the Seattle
Times stories said why two were not used–maybe just a mistake?
MCAS was considered non-critical because e.g. if it goes out all of a sudden, the pilot
can fly the plane manually, they just have to control the pitch themselves. But for that,
they need proper training and a way to turn the MCAS off.
A second sensor may not be enough. This system is of the highest criticality. Then there
is the question of whether the sensor – which was never intended for direct control is
good enough. Then there is the question of whether the sensor is mounted in a protected
enough manner. Just think of bird strikes which tend to occur at a time when the sensor is
most critical and proximity to ground is a given.
Then there is the question of using trim to
do flight control. The several hundred RPMs of the trim wheel when active is imho. alone a
safety no-go. And then think about sitting in a plane, not much distance to the ground and
the pilots having to rewind under pressure what the automated system just added to their
trim. The plane is rapidly gaining speed and after a not so high speed threshold the trim
wheel becomes very hard or impossible to move.
And how do these scenarios interact with engine failure during take-off considering the
forward mounted engines?
Simple financial equation : $70k max per passenger.
I believe those were the limits provided by the Warsaw convention agreed just after WW II.
When flying, for a very small number of people was quite risky.
I can remember a Shower of Tomato Juice dropping from the ceiling of a plane over the
Sahara Desert, me clapping and asking for a repeat performance!
Why are they mechanical sensors in this day and age, subject to bird shit, and bird
strike, and ladder dings?
A spirit level glued (in three places, and with three level tubes) to the aircraft ceiling
would work well. Aircraft have had artificial horizons port to starboard for decades. Why no
artificial horizon device rotated through 90 degrees for front to back?
I think the best thing for all here would be for the US to just cut to the chase and
bailout Boeing now.
Have the Fed buy up all the Max planes currently sitting in hangars, and have the FAA
direct Boeing to turn them into scrap.
Any future orders would have to be cancelled. Fire the board and CEO and put in new one
that will have a safety-first mandate. If the loss of revenue while re-engineering a future
version of the 737 is severe enough to threaten Chapter 11, then do a GM-style bankruptcy or
break up the company into "good co/bad co" and put all the rotten assets in the bad company
and wind it down.
In civilian aircraft here is only Boeing and Airbus, I can't see the US letting Boeing go
out out of business for just this reason. Boeing's military side is safe obviously. If the
USA was genuinely a capitalist Boeing would go under.
It's funny how the Commie chinks are better at developing industry the the US running
dogs.
My guess is that the Chinese are waiting in the long grass – this is far too juicy a
chance for them to strike at the US in retaliation for the tariffs for them to pass up.
They will wait until the FAA gives the green light before they say anything. If they
refuse to certify it without a complete redesign, then it kills the MAX stone dead –
not just in Asia, but everywhere as no leasing agent will touch it, and European budget
airlines like Ryanair will also have to give it a pass as they look to Asia for 'resales' for
their used aircraft. It would become too risky a purchase for anyone but exclusively US based
airlines.
But wasn't there some discussion here that the Chinese need the planes and Airbus
production is booked up into the future while Max planes are piling up on storage runways?
Also such a move for trade war purposes and not provable safety purposes would kick off the
trade war in earnest
China wants rather than needs the planes. It has its own Comac brand and Airbus has a
manufacturing plant in China. Its airline industry would survive a shortfall, it just means
they'd be running older aircraft longer that they'd want. The damage to China would be
minimal compared to what would be inflicted on the US.
The Chinese have lots of fast trains, which are much more convenient, and provide shorter
end-t-end times for trips < 800km.
Airline trip:
Leave House: 3.5 hours before take off, fight time, Final destination: 3 hours after
landing
Overhead 6.5 hours.
Flying at 300 mph (average), Car vs Plane vs High Speed Train
Effective speed door to door
1 hour flight:300/(6.5) = 61 mph.
2 hour flight:600/(7.5) = 80 mph.
3 hour flight:900/(8.5) = 106 mph (Limit of Car's effective speed).
4 hour flight:1200/(9.5) = 125 mph
5 hour flight:1500/(10.5) = 142 mph (Limit of Fast Train's effective speed)
That's why high speed trans are so popular in Europe and Japan and could be in the US.
Given the nature of MCAS, there should be at least 3 AoA sensors (Airbus uses 4) and at
least two separate and independent processors running different processors.
I was going to say much the same thing. The best a software fix can do is use data from
the two existing sensors. Will foreign airlines and regulators be satisfied with that?
'The 737 Max situation has developed not necessarily to Boeing's advantage.' Hah! I like
that. It's like the time that the Challenger Shuttle blew up on takeoff and a controller said
'Obviously a major malfunction'
This is all good information this. I was thinking about all the money that will have to be
use to store those 737s, modify & upgrade them, re-certify them and then compensate the
airlines for lost revenue. Hoo boy. At the very least it must be in the hundreds of millions.
If the Europeans have three "prerequisite conditions" before certifying that plane,
namely
EASA must approve and mandate any design changes by Boeing
EASA must complete an additional independent design review
737 Max flight crews must be "adequately trained"
Then that totally blows away the whole justification of the 737 MAX program. The idea of
that program was to modify the 737 and tell airlines that it worked same as the old one and
needed no training for the pilots and, by accepting the word of the FAA about its
certification, the plane was ready to fly upon delivery. Now it is to be treated for what it
is – a whole new plane redesign.
The biggest loser from this mess, apart from the dead that is, is the FAA. Instead of nailing
their colours to the mast over the airworthiness of the 737 MAX , the FAA nailed their
trousers to the mast instead which meant that they can no longer climb down. Their
international status is now shot and there may be even more mistrust about sending black
boxes to the US for decoding. You only have that in a no-trust situation. And you don't get
trust back on this level except after years of hard work.
What? You think the FAA is going out of business? Distrust of the FAA may hurt the US
airplane business but the US has ways to retaliate when it comes to Airbus and others.
"The biggest loser from this mess, apart from the dead that is, is the FAA."
What does it take to put the brakes on deregulation? Apparently, more then the 2008
financial crash. It seems like the U.S. will only relent on this when it is forced to with a
gun to its head.
'The 737 Max situation has developed not necessarily to Boeing's advantage.' I believe
that is how Emperor Hirohito described the situation when he announced Japan's unconditional
surrender to the Allied coalition.
As an aside, when these Boeing articles first started making their appearance in this blog
(which was a very good thing), there was pushback from some readers in regard to the
prevailing narrative. The implication was that the plane was fine and that this was a case of
"pilot error". How odd that virtually none of the aviation authorities around the world view
it in those simple terms.
Yes, that was the Emperor's description of the situation.
I'll offer this Milton Friedman quote for good measure of just how wrong Mr. Friedman
was:
"Many people want the government to protect the consumer. A much more urgent problem is to
protect the consumer from the government." – Milton Friedman
No need for regulations to protect public safety. That just gets in the way of the great
market god, which is infallible /s
All this deregulation has degraded the "made in the USA" label to the point other
governments now question its implied guaranty of safety and soundness. Hard to complain about
"cheap Chinese imitations" when Boeing itself is only an imitation of its former self.
According to Satcom Guru, "Boeing has released a description of the MCAS related changes
they are proposing.
1) Flight control system will now compare inputs from both AOA sensors. If the sensors
disagree by 5.5 degrees or more with the flaps retracted, MCAS will not activate."
Since MCAS is there because of the Max's tendency to go nose up and stall, won't this mean
that if one of the two sensors fails, MCAS won't kick in and the plane may try to go nose up
and stall?
Any pilots out there to clarify? https://www.satcom.guru/2019/03/aoa-vane-must-have-failed-boeing-fix.html
"As a general rule, commercial pilots try not to get anywhere near a stall.
There are circumstances that either from inattention or some environmental effect like
windshear, the aircraft may get dangerously close to a stall, but these are decidedly rare
events. Assuming that MCAS was designed right in the first place, it is entirely possible
that the entire MAX fleet could operate for years before MCAS was ever needed.
There are numerous systems on any commercial aircraft that can malfunction. When that
happens, we execute the appropriate procedures and either continue the flight to destination
or land short at a suitable airport. In either case, the procedure will provide guidance on
any additional precautions that should be taken. When the MAX is returned to service, I
suspect that we will have a new non-normal procedure that will provide this guidance.
Offhand, it will probably just advise pilots to exercise greater diligence and/or restrict
the flight envelope."
MCAS may not be needed at all. Boeing's main motivation for installing this system may
been to avoid a training requirement for 737 pilots.
Pilots may "try not to get anywhere near a stall", but Max pilots were given 2 hours on an
iPad and told it behaved like previous 737s. Thus, might they have found themselves
unexpectedly going nose up and stalling without MCAS?
Apparently the stall tendency is only when the engines are at full power. As anyone who's
ever taken a flight knows, that's when you hear those engines start to roar as the plane
moves down the runway on takeoff. One of the pilots is always at the controls and manually
flying the plane as it lifts off. Also the flaps are down so the MCAS was not even able to
come on until fully airborne (as designed it only works when the flaps are up and above 1000
ft). Meanwhile at cruising altitude the autopilot is robotically flying the plane unless
there is turbulence or some such and therefore MCAS is irrelevant. When the plane lands the
pilot(s) are once again manually flying the plane in case there's an emergency or the
airplane has to go around to avoid an obstruction on the runway. And when descending it is
slowing down, not speeding up so presumably MCAS is once again irrelevant.
Note in the Edward comment above the result should the now two AOA sensors disagree is to
simply turn off the MCAS. You wonder why they didn't simply remove MCAS as the "fix."
Note in the Edward comment above the result should the now two AOA sensors disagree is
to simply turn off the MCAS. You wonder why they didn't simply remove MCAS as the
"fix."
The death of common sense? Boeing playbook seems to consist of only delay, evade, deny,
lie, and if all else fails spew endless amount of bovine excrement over everything with the
goal being to make as much money as possible right now .
Stopping, stepping back, and re-evaluating what they were doing would have required some
self-awareness, at least a shred of responsibility and a conscience, plus a something beside
the next quarter's pay and bonus amounts. It is as they were addicted to money, and like most
addicts, could only think on how to get their next ever increasing fix. That is how most
addicts destroy themselves by losing any sense of how their actions are affecting others, or
worse, actively denying it to others. It is one think to mess up, and be destructive, for we
are all human, but it is quite another to almost mindlessly destroy others for that damn fix.
Boeing is not making mistakes. It is betraying everyone else.
"... Like many of its Wall Street counterparts, Boeing also used complexity as a mechanism to obfuscate and conceal activity that is incompetent, nefarious and/or harmful to not only the corporation itself but to society as a whole (instead of complexity being a benign byproduct of a move up the technology curve). ..."
"... The economists who built on Friedman's work, along with increasingly aggressive institutional investors, devised solutions to ensure the primacy of enhancing shareholder value, via the advocacy of hostile takeovers, the promotion of massive stock buybacks or repurchases (which increased the stock value), higher dividend payouts and, most importantly, the introduction of stock-based pay for top executives in order to align their interests to those of the shareholders. These ideas were influenced by the idea that corporate efficiency and profitability were impinged upon by archaic regulation and unionization, which, according to the theory, precluded the ability to compete globally. ..."
"... "Return on Net Assets" (RONA) forms a key part of the shareholder capitalism doctrine. ..."
"... If the choice is between putting a million bucks into new factory machinery or returning it to shareholders, say, via dividend payments, the latter is the optimal way to go because in theory it means higher net returns accruing to the shareholders (as the "owners" of the company), implicitly assuming that they can make better use of that money than the company itself can. ..."
"... It is an absurd conceit to believe that a dilettante portfolio manager is in a better position than an aviation engineer to gauge whether corporate investment in fixed assets will generate productivity gains well north of the expected return for the cash distributed to the shareholders. But such is the perverse fantasy embedded in the myth of shareholder capitalism ..."
"... When real engineering clashes with financial engineering, the damage takes the form of a geographically disparate and demoralized workforce: The factory-floor denominator goes down. Workers' wages are depressed, testing and quality assurance are curtailed. ..."
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the corresponding end of the Soviet Empire gave the fullest impetus imaginable to the forces of
globalized capitalism, and correspondingly unfettered access to the world's cheapest labor. What was not to like about that? It afforded
multinational corporations vastly expanded opportunities to fatten their profit margins and increase the bottom line with seemingly
no risk posed to their business model.
Or so it appeared. In 2000, aerospace engineer L.J. Hart-Smith's remarkable paper, sardonically titled
"Out-Sourced Profits – The Cornerstone of Successful Subcontracting," laid
out the case against several business practices of Hart-Smith's previous employer, McDonnell Douglas, which had incautiously ridden
the wave of outsourcing when it merged with the author's new employer, Boeing. Hart-Smith's intention in telling his story was a
cautionary one for the newly combined Boeing, lest it follow its then recent acquisition down the same disastrous path.
Of the manifold points and issues identified by Hart-Smith, there is one that stands out as the most compelling in terms of understanding
the current crisis enveloping Boeing: The embrace of the metric "Return on Net Assets" (RONA). When combined with the relentless
pursuit of cost reduction (via offshoring), RONA taken to the extreme can undermine overall safety standards.
Related to this problem is the intentional and unnecessary use of complexity as an instrument of propaganda. Like many of its
Wall Street counterparts, Boeing also used complexity as a mechanism to obfuscate and conceal activity that is incompetent, nefarious
and/or harmful to not only the corporation itself but to society as a whole (instead of complexity being a benign byproduct of a
move up the technology curve).
All of these pernicious concepts are branches of the same poisoned tree: "
shareholder capitalism ":
[A] notion best epitomized by Milton Friedman that the only social
responsibility of a corporation is to increase its profits, laying the groundwork for the idea that shareholders, being the owners
and the main risk-bearing participants, ought therefore to receive the biggest rewards. Profits therefore should be generated
first and foremost with a view toward maximizing the interests of shareholders, not the executives or managers who (according
to the theory) were spending too much of their time, and the shareholders' money, worrying about employees, customers, and the
community at large. The economists who built on Friedman's work, along with increasingly aggressive institutional investors, devised
solutions to ensure the primacy of enhancing shareholder value, via the advocacy of hostile takeovers, the promotion of massive
stock buybacks or repurchases (which increased the stock value), higher dividend payouts and, most importantly, the introduction
of stock-based pay for top executives in order to align their interests to those of the shareholders. These ideas were influenced
by the idea that corporate efficiency and profitability were impinged upon by archaic regulation and unionization, which, according
to the theory, precluded the ability to compete globally.
"Return on Net Assets" (RONA) forms a key part of the shareholder capitalism doctrine. In essence, it means maximizing the returns
of those dollars deployed in the operation of the business. Applied to a corporation, it comes down to this: If the choice is between
putting a million bucks into new factory machinery or returning it to shareholders, say, via dividend payments, the latter is the
optimal way to go because in theory it means higher net returns accruing to the shareholders (as the "owners" of the company), implicitly
assuming that they can make better use of that money than the company itself can.
It is an absurd conceit to believe that a dilettante
portfolio manager is in a better position than an aviation engineer to gauge whether corporate investment in fixed assets will generate
productivity gains well north of the expected return for the cash distributed to the shareholders. But such is the perverse fantasy
embedded in the myth of shareholder capitalism.
Engineering reality, however, is far more complicated than what is outlined in university MBA textbooks. For corporations like
McDonnell Douglas, for example, RONA was used not as a way to prioritize new investment in the corporation but rather to justify
disinvestment in the corporation. This disinvestment ultimately degraded the company's underlying profitability and the quality
of its planes (which is one of the reasons the Pentagon helped to broker the merger with Boeing; in another perverse echo of the
2008 financial disaster, it was a politically engineered bailout).
RONA in Practice
When real engineering clashes with financial engineering, the damage takes the form of a geographically disparate and demoralized
workforce: The factory-floor denominator goes down. Workers' wages are depressed, testing and quality assurance are curtailed. Productivity
is diminished, even as labor-saving technologies are introduced. Precision machinery is sold off and replaced by inferior, but cheaper,
machines. Engineering quality deteriorates. And the upshot is that a reliable plane like Boeing's 737, which had been a tried and
true money-spinner with an impressive safety record since 1967, becomes a high-tech death trap.
The drive toward efficiency is translated into a drive to do more with less. Get more out of workers while paying them less. Make
more parts with fewer machines. Outsourcing is viewed as a way to release capital by transferring investment from skilled domestic
human capital to offshore entities not imbued with the same talents, corporate culture and dedication to quality. The benefits to
the bottom line are temporary; the long-term pathologies become embedded as the company's market share begins to shrink, as the airlines
search for less shoddy alternatives.
You must do one more thing if you are a Boeing director: you must erect barriers to bad news, because there is nothing that bursts
a magic bubble faster than reality, particularly if it's bad reality.
The illusion that Boeing sought to perpetuate was that it continued to produce the same thing it had produced for decades: namely,
a safe, reliable, quality airplane. But it was doing so with a production apparatus that was stripped, for cost reasons, of many
of the means necessary to make good aircraft. So while the wine still came in a bottle signifying Premier Cru quality, and still
carried the same price, someone had poured out the contents and replaced them with cheap plonk.
And that has become remarkably easy to do in aviation. Because Boeing is no longer subject to proper independent regulatory scrutiny.
This is what happens when you're allowed to "
self-certify" your own airplane , as the Washington Post described: "One Boeing engineer would conduct a test of a particular
system on the Max 8, while another Boeing engineer would act as the FAA's representative, signing on behalf of the U.S. government
that the technology complied with federal safety regulations."
This is a recipe for disaster. Boeing relentlessly cut costs, it outsourced across the globe to workforces that knew nothing about
aviation or aviation's safety culture. It sent things everywhere on one criteria and one criteria only: lower the denominator. Make
it the same, but cheaper. And then self-certify the plane, so that nobody, including the FAA, was ever the wiser.
Boeing also greased the wheels in Washington to ensure the continuation of this convenient state of regulatory affairs for the
company. According to OpenSecrets.org ,
Boeing and its affiliates spent $15,120,000 in lobbying expenses in 2018, after spending, $16,740,000 in 2017 (along with a further
$4,551,078 in 2018 political contributions, which placed the company 82nd out of a total of 19,087 contributors). Looking back at
these figures over the past four elections (congressional and presidential) since 2012, these numbers represent fairly typical spending
sums for the company.
But clever financial engineering, extensive political lobbying and self-certification can't perpetually hold back the effects
of shoddy engineering. One of the sad byproducts of the FAA's acquiescence to "self-certification" is how many things fall through
the cracks so easily.
Yves here. Even thought this critique of Boeing might seem a bit .bloodthirsty Boeing does have blood on its
hands and has been astonishingly unrepentant about it.
Given the fact that Boeing is part of a duopoly of
makers of large planes, and there is no plausible way that Airbus could take up the new orders slack,
predictions of its demise would seem to be premature. But AIG was widely viewed as indomitable until it started
its nosedive.
Another way to return Boeing to the community of adequately-behaved major corporations would be a
housecleaning of its executive ranks, starting the the CEO, and the board, along with board reforms such as the
creation of a safety subcommittee with clout. But the odds of anything like that happening look remote.
Why might Boeing be at much greater risk of serious trouble than it now appears? Huawei. China likely
perceives that the US is engaging in hostage-taking, both close to literally with the extradition request for
the CEO's daughter, Meng Wanzhou, and the Trump Administration moving towards a blacklisting yesterday.
From
the Financial Times
:
The White House and US Department of Commerce took steps on Wednesday night that would in effect ban
Huawei from selling technology into the American market, and could also prevent it from buying
semiconductors from suppliers including Qualcomm in the US that are crucial for its production .
The US Department of Commerce said it would put Huawei on its so-called Entity List, meaning that the
American companies will have to obtain a licence from the US government to sell technology to Huawei. At the
same time, US president Donald Trump signed an executive order declaring the US telecoms sector faced a
"national emergency" -- giving the commerce department the power to "prohibit transactions posing an
unacceptable risk" to national security .
Paul Triolo, a technology policy expert at Eurasia Group, a risk consultancy, said it was a "huge
development" that would not only hurt the Chinese company but also have an impact on global supply chains
involving US companies such as Intel, Microsoft and Oracle.
"The US has basically openly declared it is willing to engage in a full-fledged technology war with
China," he said.
Huawei has few alternatives for critical semiconductors to Qualcomm, which would likely be denied an export
license if the US follows through on its threat of putting Huawei on the "Entity List" (the second most
stringent category, but still sufficient for the US to bar licensing). One is Murata, but Japan has joined the
US ban on Huawei 5G products, and would presumably fall in line if the US were to ask Japan to tell Murata not
to sell semiconductors to Huawei.
The advantages of China going after Boeing, as opposed to making life miserable for US technology companies,
would be considerable. Targeting, say, Microsoft would be an obvious tit for tat. By contrast, China was the
first country to ground the 737 Max, and its judgement was confirmed by other airline regulators and eventually
the FAA. China does not have a credible competitor to Boeing, so it could wrap continued denial of
certification of the 737 Max in the mantle of being pro-safety, even if independent parties suspected this was
a secondary motive.
On top of that, Ethiopian Air's forceful criticism of the 737 Max gives China air cover. Unlike Lion Air,
which is widely seen as a questionable operator, readers who fly emerging economy carriers give Ethiopian Air
high marks for competence and safety. One even wrote, "I have flown Ethiopian Air. It's certainly far better
than Irish-owned and operated Ryan Airlines (even though the latter has white pilots with nice Irish accents)."
Chinese interests have made large investments many countries in Africa, so it's conceivable it could get
other countries on the continent to follow its lead. Admittedly, China plus those countries collectively may
not be large enough to do considerable damage to Boeing. But this action would break the hegemony of the FAA as
certifier for US manufacturers, and that could prove crippling in the long run.
Another issue that hasn't gotten the attention it warrants is that Boeing appears to lack the stringent
software development protocols necessary for "fly by wire" operations. Boeing historically has relied on pilots
being able to reassert control over automated functions'; Airbus has "fly by wire" systems as far more
prominent and accordingly the expectation and ability of pilots to override these systems is lower.
However, many articles noted that MCAS took the 737 further into a fly-by-wire philosophy than it had been
before. Yet Boeing was astonishingly lax, having only two angle of attack sensors, of which only one would be
providing input to MCAS, and then on an arbitrary-seeming basis.
By contrast, the Airbus philosophy stresses redundancy, not only in hardware -- they use not three but four
angle of attack sensors -- but in software, and even software development. "Two or more independent flight
control computing systems are installed using different types of microprocessors and software written in
different languages by different development teams" and verified using formal methods ("
Approaches
to Assure Safety in Fly-By-Wire Systems: Airbus Vs. Boeing
").
By Gregory Travis, a writer, a software executive, a pilot, and an aircraft owner who has logged
more than 2,000 hours of flying time, ranging from gliders to a Boeing 757 (as a full-motion simulator) and
Marshall Auerback, a market analyst and commentator. Produced by
Economy for All
,
a project of the Independent Media Institute
"If we fly [the Boeing 737] again, we'll be the last airline to fly them again,"
said
Tewolde Gebremariam, CEO of Ethiopian Airlines.
Almost immediately after the takeoff of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10, the
first
signs of trouble appeared
. The Boeing 737's two angle of attack indicators, one on either side of the
aircraft, gave inconsistent readings. The left indicator suddenly recorded a dangerous angle of attack of 36
degrees, while the right one showed a benign 11 degrees.
In response to the angle of attack from the left side, the stick shaker on the captain's side (left)
activated. The stick shaker vibrated the pilot's control column to warn of an impending stall. The co-pilot's
column, however, did not vibrate as it was activated from the right-side angle of attack sensor. This was the
first indication to the pilots that the angle of attack sensors disagreed with one another.
In less than a second, after going from 36 degrees, the pilot's left-hand angle of attack (AOA) sensor
suddenly jumped to 75 degrees of angle of attack. If it were actually true that the aircraft pitched up that
rapidly, the airframe would have broken apart.
It was not true, however. The sensor was faulty. Yet the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
(MCAS) computer software did not disregard this obviously incorrect reading.
Six seconds later, the heater on the left-hand side AOA sensor changed state. Angle of attack sensors are
particularly susceptible to malfunction when water from rain or a recent airplane washing gets into their guts.
To prevent this, they are fitted with ice-melting heaters.
Two minutes after takeoff, the captain called for the airplane's flaps to be retracted. Because the 737's
MCAS function does not activate until the flaps are retracted, the captain has unconsciously summoned his, and
his passengers', executioner.
Two minutes and 15 seconds after takeoff had passed. Because it was only reading the faulty left-hand AOA
sensor and because that sensor was indicating a dangerous stall, the MCAS software activated for 10
seconds -- spinning the trim wheels 46 revolutions -- and pushed the 737's nose toward the ground.
Ten seconds later, the pilots disabled MCAS by throwing the cutout switches. Next, they attempted to "roll
back" those 46 revolutions manually but found that the aerodynamic forces were so great that the trim wheels
could not be moved back by hand. Meanwhile, the captain asked his first officer to help him hold the control
column back as the nose-down force commanded by MCAS was overwhelming his strength.
In desperation, they turned the trim cutoff switch back "on" so that they could use the electric motor to
turn the trim wheel, which they could not move by hand. They were successful for a moment at un-winding it, but
MCAS rapidly reactivated and drove the trim back nose-down. The trim wheels were rotating nearly 300 RPM, in
the wrong direction, under MCAS command.
The pilots were helpless. The trim reached its nose-down stop, and the control column force necessary to
keep the plane level overwhelmed the pilots. The plane eventually plunged into the ground at a 40-degree angle
while traveling
nearly 600 miles per hour
, killing everybody on board.
This mishap is one of the most tragic illustrations of Boeing's decline. It boggles the mind to consider how
these issues escaped regulatory review and how the aircraft were deemed airworthy. This could only happen in an
industry afflicted by a wholesale collapse of regulation and oversight.
Is the Boeing company even capable of building safe commercial airliners any longer? And should we expect to
see the fatally flawed 737 MAX 8 return to service? In regard to the latter, no less than the
CEO of Ethiopian Airlines has just said no.
The evidence seems to indicate that public-sector regulatory
oversight is incapable of reviewing manufacturers' designs and ascertaining their airworthiness.
In short, it looks like the system has collapsed.
Shareholder Capitalism, the Military, and the Beginning of the End for Boeing
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the corresponding end of the Soviet Empire gave the fullest impetus
imaginable to the forces of globalized capitalism, and correspondingly unfettered access to the world's
cheapest labor. What was not to like about that? It afforded multinational corporations vastly expanded
opportunities to fatten their profit margins and increase the bottom line with seemingly no risk posed to their
business model.
Or so it appeared. In 2000, aerospace engineer L.J. Hart-Smith's remarkable paper, sardonically titled
"Out-Sourced Profits – The Cornerstone of
Successful Subcontracting,"
laid out the case against several business practices of Hart-Smith's previous
employer, McDonnell Douglas, which had incautiously ridden the wave of outsourcing when it merged with the
author's new employer, Boeing. Hart-Smith's intention in telling his story was a cautionary one for the newly
combined Boeing, lest it follow its then recent acquisition down the same disastrous path.
Of the manifold points and issues identified by Hart-Smith, there is one that stands out as the most
compelling in terms of understanding the current crisis enveloping Boeing: The embrace of the metric "Return on
Net Assets" (RONA). When combined with the relentless pursuit of cost reduction (via offshoring), RONA taken to
the extreme can undermine overall safety standards.
Related to this problem is the intentional and unnecessary use of complexity as an instrument of propaganda.
Like many of its Wall Street counterparts, Boeing also used complexity as a mechanism to obfuscate and conceal
activity that is incompetent, nefarious and/or harmful to not only the corporation itself but to society as a
whole (instead of complexity being a benign byproduct of a move up the technology curve).
All of these pernicious concepts are branches of the same poisoned tree: "
shareholder
capitalism
":
[A] notion best epitomized by
Milton Friedman
that the only social responsibility of a corporation is to increase its profits, laying
the groundwork for the idea that shareholders, being the owners and the main risk-bearing participants,
ought therefore to receive the biggest rewards. Profits therefore should be generated first and foremost
with a view toward maximizing the interests of shareholders, not the executives or managers who (according
to the theory) were spending too much of their time, and the shareholders' money, worrying about employees,
customers, and the community at large. The economists who built on Friedman's work, along with increasingly
aggressive institutional investors, devised solutions to ensure the primacy of enhancing shareholder value,
via the advocacy of hostile takeovers, the promotion of massive stock buybacks or repurchases (which
increased the stock value), higher dividend payouts and, most importantly, the introduction of stock-based
pay for top executives in order to align their interests to those of the shareholders. These ideas were
influenced by the idea that corporate efficiency and profitability were impinged upon by archaic regulation
and unionization, which, according to the theory, precluded the ability to compete globally.
"Return on Net Assets" (RONA) forms a key part of the shareholder capitalism doctrine. In essence, it means
maximizing the returns of those dollars deployed in the operation of the business. Applied to a corporation, it
comes down to this: If the choice is between putting a million bucks into new factory machinery or returning it
to shareholders, say, via dividend payments, the latter is the optimal way to go because in theory it means
higher net returns accruing to the shareholders (as the "owners" of the company), implicitly assuming that they
can make better use of that money than the company itself can. It is an absurd conceit to believe that a
dilettante portfolio manager is in a better position than an aviation engineer to gauge whether corporate
investment in fixed assets will generate productivity gains well north of the expected return for the cash
distributed to the shareholders. But such is the perverse fantasy embedded in the myth of shareholder
capitalism.
Engineering reality, however, is far more complicated than what is outlined in university MBA textbooks. For
corporations like McDonnell Douglas, for example, RONA was used not as a way to prioritize new investment in
the corporation but rather to justify
disinvestment
in the corporation. This disinvestment ultimately
degraded the company's underlying profitability and the quality of its planes (which is one of the reasons the
Pentagon helped to broker the merger with Boeing; in another perverse echo of the 2008 financial disaster, it
was a politically engineered bailout).
RONA in Practice
When real engineering clashes with financial engineering, the damage takes the form of a geographically
disparate and demoralized workforce: The factory-floor denominator goes down. Workers' wages are depressed,
testing and quality assurance are curtailed. Productivity is diminished, even as labor-saving technologies are
introduced. Precision machinery is sold off and replaced by inferior, but cheaper, machines. Engineering
quality deteriorates. And the upshot is that a reliable plane like Boeing's 737, which had been a tried and
true money-spinner with an impressive safety record since 1967, becomes a high-tech death trap.
The drive toward efficiency is translated into a drive to do more with less. Get more out of workers while
paying them less. Make more parts with fewer machines. Outsourcing is viewed as a way to release capital by
transferring investment from skilled domestic human capital to offshore entities not imbued with the same
talents, corporate culture and dedication to quality. The benefits to the bottom line are temporary; the
long-term pathologies become embedded as the company's market share begins to shrink, as the airlines search
for less shoddy alternatives.
You must do one more thing if you are a Boeing director: you must erect barriers to bad news, because there
is nothing that bursts a magic bubble faster than reality, particularly if it's bad reality.
The illusion that Boeing sought to perpetuate was that it continued to produce the same thing it had
produced for decades: namely, a safe, reliable, quality airplane. But it was doing so with a production
apparatus that was stripped, for cost reasons, of many of the means necessary to make good aircraft. So while
the wine still came in a bottle signifying Premier Cru quality, and still carried the same price, someone had
poured out the contents and replaced them with cheap plonk.
And that has become remarkably easy to do in aviation. Because Boeing is no longer subject to proper
independent regulatory scrutiny. This is what happens when you're allowed to "
self-certify"
your own airplane
, as the Washington Post described: "One Boeing engineer would conduct a test of a
particular system on the Max 8, while another Boeing engineer would act as the FAA's representative, signing on
behalf of the U.S. government that the technology complied with federal safety regulations."
This is a recipe for disaster. Boeing relentlessly cut costs, it outsourced across the globe to workforces
that knew nothing about aviation or aviation's safety culture. It sent things everywhere on one criteria and
one criteria only: lower the denominator. Make it the same, but cheaper. And then self-certify the plane, so
that nobody, including the FAA, was ever the wiser.
Boeing also greased the wheels in Washington to ensure the continuation of this convenient state of
regulatory affairs for the company. According to
OpenSecrets.org
, Boeing and its affiliates spent $15,120,000 in lobbying expenses in 2018, after spending,
$16,740,000 in 2017 (along with a further $4,551,078 in 2018 political contributions, which placed the company
82nd out of a total of 19,087 contributors). Looking back at these figures over the past four elections
(congressional and presidential) since 2012, these numbers represent fairly typical spending sums for the
company.
But clever financial engineering, extensive political lobbying and self-certification can't perpetually hold
back the effects of shoddy engineering. One of the sad byproducts of the FAA's acquiescence to
"self-certification" is how many things fall through the cracks so easily.
AOA: A Recipe for Disaster
You can see this problem in regard to the AOA sensors in the Boeing 737 aircraft. Historically, these
sensors have not been a particularly important metric in regard to commercial flying done by human pilots.
Boeing neither put much effort into the AOA system, nor was it regarded as a particularly crucial safety
consideration. This is why taking off with inoperative AOA heaters on a Boeing airplane like the 737 was never
a big deal -- the worst consequence would be an annoying activation of the stick shaker when it was clear the
activation was erroneous.
However, AOA sensors become
very
important in computer-controlled ("fly by wire") aircraft, which is
why the A320 has three AOA sensors and why having heaters working on two of the three is an airworthiness
requirement.
When Boeing put MCAS on the new Max 8 737, it did make the AOA sensor a first-line flight-critical item. But
it never went back and revised the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) to reflect the AOA system's new
importance. And this didn't get caught by the FAA because, as noted earlier, they were allowing Boeing to
self-certify under the new rules. There wasn't an independent set of eyes to catch the oversight.
The Cost of Building a Safe Airplane
Since these decisions were largely governed by
bottom line considerations
, what would it take to quantify the financial implications to Boeing of fielding
a "good" 737 MAX? "Good" here means a version of the 737 plane that actually addressed the problems of the
current MAX 8 model, whose aerodynamic instability led Boeing to the MCAS software Band-Aid "fix" (a software
"solution" that supposedly addressed the problems thrown up by the engine's modifications, but which in reality
led to the tragic crashes in Indonesia and Africa).
Making a good 737 MAX would have involved three things:
Fundamental changes to the 737 airframe to raise its height to fit the larger engines.
A new aircraft type certificate, reflecting and acknowledging the changes.
Costs of training pilots for what is, essentially, a new aircraft.
Let's estimate the total cost of a-c, above, as $5 billion. That's $5 billion more to make a "good" 737 MAX
vs. the current "bad" 737 MAX.
These calculations reveal that, deploying the shortcuts that Boeing actually adopted, the "bad" 737 design
yielded Boeing a profit margin of 21 percent per aircraft sold. By contrast, a "good" design, which properly
incorporated better safety features, yielded a profit of 19 percent per aircraft. (At least according to our
calculations.)
That doesn't sound like that much of a decrease. In fact, a 19 percent profit margin, per airplane, sounds
pretty good -- especially for an aircraft that no longer has a greater-than-average propensity to dive for the
dirt.
But it represents a 2 percent reduction in profit margins. When you evaluate that against the fact that the
737 program accounts for nearly half of all of Boeing's profits and that the wizards astride the corporation
have told Wall Street that they can conjure 1 percent to 1.5 percent annual profit increases, company-wide, the
actions undertaken by Boeing's senior management begin to make sense.
Boeing's MCAS wizardry, to cast a spell upon the 737 MAX's aerodynamic instability, then, bears all the
forensic fingerprints of a panic. It was a cheap financial fix designed to safeguard a 21 percent profit
margin. This despite the fact that designing the 737 properly would still have yielded substantial profits.
True, Boeing wouldn't have met its profit forecasts, which may have affected the stock price. But we would have
avoided a situation whereby Boeing played the equivalent of Russian roulette with the airlines and, by
extension, the passengers on those planes.
And here's the likely fallout from this putrid exercise in greed: Boeing is probably done as a credible
manufacturing concern. Its credibility has been shattered as the company has repeatedly failed to get out in
front of the problem and even today keeps finding itself reacting to yet more damaging disclosures.
It's somewhat difficult to impute motives, but Boeing's upper management arrogantly seems to be making an
implicit assumption that it can overcome this problem, on the basis that the flying public has very few
alternatives to its increasingly flawed products. That may be true in the immediate short term, but surely
Airbus and
future competitors out of Asia
are licking their proverbial chops thanks to the magnitude of the
incompetence displayed here by Boeing.
Ironically, Boeing's increasing resort to offshoring is foaming the runway (pun intended) for its future
competitors. For some time now, the company has been engaged in instructing its future competition on how to
build commercial airliners. The Chinese have been gobbling up U.S. aviation capacity, everything from Teledyne
Continental Motors to Cirrus aircraft, at a breakneck pace. And, like a play out of Hart-Smith's paper on what
not
to do, Boeing has been teaching the Chinese, in China, how to build commercial airliners.
For students of history, the irony of the capitalists having
actually sold
the communists the rope
with which to hang themselves is, frankly, too much to bear. But the Chinese, like the Airbus consortium, can
afford to take a long-term strategic view that a company captured by the disease of shareholder capitalism like
Boeing clearly cannot. In China, the planes will be built domestically, and will not be subject to the
arbitrary dictates of private portfolio managers; they will not be constrained by strategies that seem largely
to be focused on meeting (or beating) an arbitrary quarterly earnings per share figure.
Boeing has no inherent capacity to plan for the future nor is the company's leadership compensated for their
strategic vision. Their executives are tactically compensated on the basis of the annual gyrations of the stock
price, which constrains the ability to take the long-term risks and investment, much less evince concerns about
engineering and safety that are a unique requirement of airliner building. They should be worried more about
facing manslaughter charges. The negligence has become even worse since the 2005 regulatory reform that handed
all inspection and certification of Boeing's airplanes over to Boeing itself. It was not hard to predict the
sad outcome of that denouement: a failed 787 Dreamliner program and, now, a 737 MAX 8 plane with nothing to
show but bodies strewn across the desert and beneath the sea.
Just a point on alternatives to Boeing – there is one alternative 'type' that airlines can choose, and can
make sense when oil prices are low – that's to keep older aircraft in the air longer. Most airliners are still
fully airworthy and have plenty of air miles in them when they are retired – the reason for retiring and
replacing them is that the annualised costs of a new aircraft are usually lower. Even independently of this
crash, a number of airlines over the past few years, notably, Ryanair, have slowed down their replacement rate
– I'm not sure the reason, although I would guess its that low fuel prices mean the most efficient new models
don't pay for themselves on short haul routes.
So the supply bottleneck may not be as severe as everyone thinks, airlines may be willing to hold off for a
few years until Airbus can step up or Sukhoi/Tupolev/Mitsubishi/Embraer or Comac start producing competitive
products (although I must admit I'd be very worried about flying any of those aircraft if political pressure is
on the manufacturers to rush into production, this is precisely what seems to have screwed the Sukhoi
Superjet).
I think Yves is quite right that Boeing is a nice fat target for the Chinese. Airbus has long links in
China, much longer than Boeing, so could well be working behind the scenes to encourage this. And for the
Chinese, the fact that hitting Boeing would also be a blow to the Japanese (who are major subcontractors to
Boeing) would be the cherry on top of the cake. And it can't hurt the prospects of
Comac
either.
Just one point on this:
On top of that, Ethiopian Air's forceful criticism of the 737 Max gives China air cover. Unlike Lion Air,
which is widely seen as a questionable operator, readers who fly emerging economy carriers give Ethiopian
Air high marks for competence and safety. One even wrote, "I have flown Ethiopian Air. It's certainly far
better than Irish-owned and operated Ryan Airlines (even though the latter has white pilots with nice Irish
accents)."
Much as I loath Ryanair and everything they stand for (I refuse to use their flights, even when
cheaper/faster than alternatives), they do have an impeccable safety record. In terms of service, you can't
really compare a national carrier like Ethiopian Air to a budget short haul operator like Ryanair.
One pilot accused the airline of employing flight simulator trainers that are not knowledgeable about
"aircraft systems, Boeing procedures, or company procedures," and failing to follow a syllabus for a
pilot training course.
"Across the board, 737, 767 [and] 777 [flight simulator] instructors not knowledgeable about the
aircraft's systems, Boeing procedures, or company procedures," the pilot alleged in the complaint.
"Overall, [Ethiopian Airlines] offers substandard training compared to industry norms," the pilot wrote.
The pilot also criticized Ethiopian Airlines' coordination on specific flights, calling its dispatch
office "a disgrace" and taking the airline to task for apparent safety oversights.
"Crews never get accurate flight plans, fuel loads, latest weather or up to date information," the
pilot alleged.
The pilot also noted that "non-normal checklists in the cockpit are not kept current, including
complete omission of certain checklists," referring to documents that instruct pilots on how to respond
to "non-normal" equipment behaviors that can become dangerous.
The pilot also harshly criticized the airline's management style, alleging that a pressure to meet
deadlines sometimes led flight crews to overlook maintenance requirements.
"If a scheduled flight pushes back due to maintenance, mechanics are punished with a reduction in
salary," the pilot wrote. "Leadership style of the company is fear based. This permeates all aspects of
the operation and all departments. Nobody wants to be held accountable. Misunderstandings, conflicts, or
errors are handled through punishment."
The pilot said the FAA should intervene. The agency regularly evaluates whether foreign countries meet
U.S. standards for airline oversight, and has the authority to revoke authorizations given to specific
countries.
"It's the duty and moral responsibility of ICAO, the FAA and JCAB to assure this airline is fully
competent and compliant before allowing them to expand and continue their international operations," the
pilot wrote. "The traveling public deserves much safer air transport. Essentially, [Ethiopian Airlines]
doesn't have the infrastructure to support the giant influx of 787′s, A350′s, and 737Max's on order.
Safety is being sacrificed for expansion and profit margin."
Also found this one, plane crashed, 90 dead. Bit dated, but similarities are striking .
Ethiopian 302
Accident Summary. A Boeing 737-8AS(WL) passenger jet, registered ET-ANB, was destroyed in an accident 6 km southwest off
Beirut International Airport (BEY), Lebanon. All 82 passengers and eight crew members were killed.
PROBABLE CAUSES:
1-
The flight crew's mismanagement of the aircraft's speed, altitude, headings and attitude
through inconsistent flight control inputs resulting in a loss of control.
2- The flight crew failure to abide by CRM principles of mutual support and calling deviations hindered
any timely intervention and correction.
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:
1- The manipulation of the flight controls by the flight crew in an ineffective manner resulted in the
aircraft undesired behavior and increased the level of stress of the pilots.
2-
The aircraft being out of trim for most of the flight directly increased the workload on the
pilot and made his control of the aircraft more demanding.
3- The prevailing weather conditions at night most probably resulted in spatial disorientation to the
flight crew and lead to loss of situational awareness.
4- The relative
inexperience of the Flight Crew
on type combined with their
unfamiliarity with the airport contributed, most likely, to increase the Flight Crew workload and stress.
5- The consecutive flying (188 hours in 51 days) on a new type with the absolute minimum rest could have
likely resulted in a chronic fatigue affecting the captain's performance.
6- The heavy meal discussed by the crew prior to take-off has affected their quality of sleep prior to
that flight.
7- The aircraft 11 bank angle aural warnings, 2 stalls and final spiral dive contributed in the increase
of the crew workload and stress level.
8- Symptoms similar to those of a subtle incapacitation have been identified and could have resulted from
and/or explain most of the causes mentioned above. However, there is no factual evidence to confirm
without any doubt such a cause.
9- The
F/O reluctance to intervene
did not help in confirming a case of captain's subtle
incapacitation and/or to take over control of the aircraft as stipulated in the operator's SOP.
You could keep older aircraft longer, paying more for fuel, and maintenance. Both of which would be much
higher. Now the question is will 737 survive this fiasco? And Boeing
American retired its 747 quite a while back. Maybe you're thinking Delta/Northwest? They had them
until recently. Don't think any U.S. airlines are using 747's anymore.
Qantas is and they code share long haul flights with American. So yes, technically not American.
That may be how my colleague saw an "American" flight with a 747.
Cathay Pacific, Lufthansa and Virgin Air are still using 747s.
If China Boeing certifications (not just Max), and it manages to get a few more states to do so (Iran,
Russia, anyone?), it affects, I believe, not just landing and takeoffs, but also using its airspace. That would
severely curtail a lof of Asia/Europe flights.
That said, I'd be very very careful saying that politically driven aircraft company in China would be better
able to compete with Boeing because the quarterly reports were missing. Political pressure can create the same
if not worse outcomes.
Look at Sukhoi SJ-100, the supposed showcase for Russian civilian aviation. And that with Russian having a
long history of actually having built commercial planes (Tupolev, Ilyushin, Yakovlev).
Yes, in all the fuss over the 737, its largely overlooked that the SJ-100 is having very similar problems
with possibly similar roots. Sukhoi is of course a primarily military company and I've seen it reported that
there was huge political pressure on Sukhoi to get the SJ-100 in production faster than they were
comfortable with. While the SJ-100 may be TBTF from the point of view of the Russian government, it is hard
to see foreign buyers expressing much enthusiasm for what seems to be such a flawed design.
My point is really that political pressure is no better than financial pressure. Both can lead to
massive screw up. So betting that China (or whoever) would have a better aircraft just because the party
can order it so is naive. I think it's not just about production, but design too. The Moscow incident was
after a lightning strike. Somethign has to be badly wrong for a lightning strike to take all electronics
on a plane (airframe on its own should do a Faraday's cage, unless it's of course all carbon composite).
As an aside, it is interestign they decided to name it Sukhoi, when Tupolev/Ilyushin names were
arguably much more established commercially. I'd not be surprised if some of those were still operating
somewhere.
I agree with that – building airliners is very difficult indeed, as the Chinese and Japanese have
shown with their struggles to build viable aircraft.
I don't know how the Russian aircraft industry is organised now, I assume there is a lot of
integration between the various historic names (but even in Soviet days, the old bureaus were very
competitive against each other). Perhaps 'Sukhoi' was simply considered a sexier name. But certainly
there are airliners under development under the Tupolev name.
I cannot think of any reason save financial motivations why Chinese engineering and design should
not be the equal of the West.
The research papers I have seen have Chinese names on them, just as often as not, and we are training
their engineers and scientists, as we have done for decades.
The Chinese saw an opportunity to be the low cost manufacturer to the world, and turned it into a
powerhouse. Now they only need to start competing on quality instead of price.
If the "CCP" decides to make salaries competitive with the (falling) West, for the necessary talent,
in conjuction with a lower cost of living in China, will many return home?
The mode of thought that says the Chinese can only appropriate tech, is a dangerous illusion. Just
because they CHOSE to compete on those terms in the past, does not mean they must in future.
When they decide to be the best, instead of the cheapest, and have the political will to fund that
choice, how you gonna stop them?
Goldman Sachs?
If Boeing had implemented MCAS correctly from the beginning and there were no accidents to mar its
rollout, would you still consider the MAX to be a flawed design?
The Comet may not be the best example given its history, and of course De Havilland is no
longer making aircraft and what was left of them was acquired by BAE.
Also should not that pretty much every large commercial airliner built today has pod mounted
engines.
The MAX is a bridge too far. They used an engine too large for the airframe then papered it over
with MCAS. Boeing should have planned for a clean sheet design 15 years ago rather than get jammed
up in the competitive situation that produced the MAX.
This is a common misconception. The MCAS was added to avoid having to recertify the Max as
having different flight characteristics, not to keep it from falling out of the sky. Simulator
training that imitated the new tendency to nose up could familiarize pilots with the new
handling but Boeing didn't want to do that because it would hurt sales. The reason the MCAS
should have been called a critical part that required sensor redundancy–Boeing didn't want to do
that either apparently–was because the MCAS itself could cause the plane to fall out of the sky,
as we've seen.
At least this is my read of the Seattle Times investigation and they seem to be the ones most
plugged in to company insiders.
And this is a critical distinction as a belief that the plane is inherently not airworthy
would require Boeing to recall and presumably scrap billions of dollars worth of airplanes.
It's part of China's model. With its Made in China 2025 initiative, the Chinese government has announced
a push for Chinese leadership in ten key industries, including advanced information technology, aviation,
rail, pharmaceuticals, and others.This preceded the Boeing 737 fiasco. It's a longstanding part of their
economic development model.
Yes, but it still doesn't mean the resulting design will be any good. There was a lot of "made in SU"
drives (for items that they could not import from the west, like semiconducters), including a lot of
design stealing (like intel's 8080 chip), but most of them failed miserably.
I
never
once suggested a Chinese manufacturer would be the beneficiary of this
strategy. You are straw manning me. I was explicit that large commercial aircraft manufacture is a duopoly.
In fact, China would have clean-looking hands in going after Boeing because it didn't have a credible
national manufacturer as an alternative, unlike the US targeting Huawei.
Ten years out is a different matter. The Chinese think in those terms, the US doesn't.
"In China, the planes will be built domestically, and
will not be subject to the arbitrary
dictates of private portfolio managers;they will not be constrained
by strategies that seem
largely to be focused on meeting (or beating) an arbitrary quarterly earnings per share figure."
Emphasis mine.
This is not yours, but it is in the post. It says that the CCP (because stuff like this will be run by
CCP, directly or not) will run it better than private ownership, because it will not have the constraints
the private ownership has.
In context, you were linking the idea of the 737 Max losing a lot of appeal immediately if the
Chinese and others refused to recertify the plane, with a point made by Marshall about China's
long-term ability to compete with Boeing when these were independent arguments. You were creating the
impression that I had argued that China could pick up sales from Boeing now, when I had said no such
thing and Travis and Marshall took pains to stress that China had long-term, not immediate, potential
to be a serious competitor.
To more directly address the article, this confirms very much the arguments in yesterdays article about
industrial policy. The US has an industrial policy for aerospace – basically 'put billions into military and
hope some of it benefits civil aviation by way of overspill'. If the US had a real civil aerospace strategy, it
would never have allowed McDonald Douglas to be merged into Boeing and the MD series to die. The US is more
than big enough for two competing civil airline companies.
There is also I think an increasing problem in that military aircraft are now almost entirely diverged from
civil aviation in terms of engineering. Government money to design and build B-52's led directly to the
development of 7-series civil aircraft – they are basically the same thing, just different shaped bodies. But
in terms of materials construction, electronics, even basic aerodynamics, there is no relationship whatever
between a B-2 bomber and a modern airliner. So the 'trickle down' of defence investment is no longer benefiting
civil aviation.
A sensible strategy would first of all split Boeing up between defence and civil as the very first item on
the agenda.
Unfortunately from a financial perspective, if Boeing's cash cow, the 737, just turned into a dog, the
"Good Boeing" would be the military side, and the "Bad Boeing" the civilian side. What then?
I'm sure some Chinese businessmen would be more than happy to buy up the designs and plant for the
existing aircraft. There might be a little question though as to where they'll be built .
More seriously though, I would see the future of a civil Boeing as a hook up between it and
Mitsubishi
and
Embraer
. Between the
three of them they could maintain an impressive array of aircraft. There would be quite a cultural
clash though.
Mitsubishi?? In the wake of the Ghosn imbroglio, which western companies and executives in their
right mind would want to get deep in bed with a Japanese company? Japan is only slightly less
dangerous for foreigners than China.
But when real engineering clashes with financial engineering, the damage takes the form of a
geographically disparate and demoralized workforce
The United States has had a delusional view about education and the workforce, which is evidence in a
graphic on p. 6 of this 2007 report; "Tough Choices Tough Times: The Report of the new Commission on the
Skills of the American Workforce."
http://www.ncee.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Executive-Summary.pdf
The Prototypical U.S. Industry in 10 years if all goes well?
Obviously, with manufacturing outsourced to "less developed countries," the jobs in these countries
would amount to routine work done by both people and machines. American workers would then enjoy creative
jobs in research, development, design, marketing and sales and global supply chain management.
http://www.ncee.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Executive-Summary.pdf
On p. 5, the report also points out:
In this environment, it makes sense to ask how American workers can possibly maintain, to say
nothing of improve, their current standard of living. Today, Indian engineers make $7,500 a year
against $45,000 for an American engineer with the same qualifications. If we succeed in matching the
very high levels of mastery of mathematics and science of these Indian engineers -- an enormous
challenge for this country -- why would the world's employers pay us more than they have to pay the
Indians to do their work? They would be willing to do that only if we could offer something that the
Chinese and Indians, and others, cannot.
Even Marco Rubio is beginning to smell the rot of corporate greed and the "shareholder primacy theory"
As Rubio says:
At its core, the problem is that, beginning in the 1970s, the primary objective for companies
became maximizing return to shareholders, and that came at the expense of investing in new capacities
and in innovation. In essence, it's coming at the expense of the things that lead to growth. In key
industries that are critical to our national security and our national interests, that's even more
problematic.
My thought exactly. Couldn't read the rest after seeing this.
From Investopedia: Example of How to Use RONA
"Assume a company has revenue of $1 billion and total expenses including taxes of $800 million, giving it
a net income of $200 million. The company has current assets of $400 million and current liabilities of $200
million, giving it net working capital of $200 million.
Further, the company's fixed assets amount to $800 million. Adding fixed assets to net working capital
yields $1 billion in the denominator when calculating RONA. Dividing the net income of $200 million by $1
billion yields a return on net assets of 20% for the company."
To me one of the most damning things about Boeing's implementation of MCAS on the 737-MAX is that it
actually knew how to do this properly, but no longer seems to be capable of leveraging what should be
institutional memory. I've only seen it mentioned once, but on a Montour Pilot video the guy describes Boeing's
deployment of an MCAS system on a military fuel tanker jet it built in the 1980's. They added the MCAS system
on that plane to assist the pilots should its cargo fuel suddenly shift unexpectedly changing the plane
position. The system had all of the design features that are missing in the 737-MAX MCAS system that brought
about the 2 crashes. At the very least one would have expected that they'd just pull the specs off that MCAS
system and say here write us a new one using these requirements. The fact that this obviously didn't happen
shows how bad things are at Boeing.
Good grief! Calls for Boeing to be dismantled plays right into the hands of the Europeans (Airbus) and China
(Comac) plus Brazil (Embraer). E.g. our competitors. Wide dissemination hurts American interests. Especially
because they don't have a realistic basis in fact.
– Or have people forgotten Boeing is America's national champion?
– Do folks have a clue how many jobs we're talking about? (+150K before ancillary industries and partners, just
direct empl0yment)
– Have you the slightest clue what this would mean for import/export ratios?
– When you look at an Airbus, haven't you realized it looks an awful lot like a Boeing?
– Ditto Embraer.
– Ditto Comac.
– Who in hell do you think invented almost all the technologies we have in large scale aircraft?
– Have you forgotten about Air France 447, an Airbus A330-203 and the crash in the Atlantic?
The last point is especially important to folks pointing at the putative design flaw of the Boeing (Me? I'm
awaiting the final report because depending on newsies is downright stupid). Anyway, the A330 crash involved a
genuine design flaw.
Finally, t4o all the nervous Nellies fretting about stuff they know jack about . . . chill. And Susan,
reprinting this is a disgrace if not outright treasonous to US national interests. Never have I been so glad
for the limited reach of an entity like NC because this is akin to shouting fire in a theater. You are raising
concerns and fanning flames about which you know squat! For shame.
I feel sorry for you, to have lost your moral compass (if you ever had one). Your jingoistic ravings are
sickening in light of the reality that hundreds of innocent people were murdered by corporate scum. It is
only right and proper that countries such as France, Brazil and China take Boeing's place. Or have you lost
your faith in the "Market"?
The over the top jingoism and defense of a company that failed to ensure proper functioning of safety
equipment led me to believe that this idiotic response can only be meant cynically directed against an
industry on the wrong path
Thanks for your comment. Airbus has indeed had crashes related to their heavy use of automation and fly
by wire technology. One should also point out that air crashes used to be far more common than they are
today. The truth is that air travel is extraordinarily safe despite the two Boeing crashes and part of that
is because computers and automation make planes and air traffic control safer (along with better training
and procedures) , but only assuming the same care is taken with the software as the hardware. Clearly that
was not the case with Boeing re the Max and their CEO definitely should resign or be forced out to help
restore confidence.
Finally if one wants to fret about airline safety then you might be more concerned about scheduled
maintenance that is farmed out to low cost Central American companies or other airline cost cutting measures
such as hiring poorly paid and relatively inexperienced pilots for the short hop subsidiaries that are now a
staple.
Apropos your comment from today's Sydney Morning Herald:
A former Qantas captain who saved a passenger jet after a computer failure twice sent it diving
towards the Indian Ocean has warned that pilot training needs to be bolstered to help deal with rogue
systems in an era of greater aircraft automation.
Mr Sullivan was captaining a Qantas A330 on a flight from Singapore to Perth in 2008 when an
air-data unit sent incorrect information to other systems, leading to a flight-control computer twice
commanding the aircraft carrying 303 passengers to nosedive.
And this from the pilot:
"We practise engine failures in the simulator – now we need to practise automation failures," he
said.
"These automated failures are more exotic and you can't just read about them in a manual or on an
online course. You have to do it; you have to see it; you have to practise it."
It was just a matter of luck that these two plane crashes happened overseas you know. This could easily
have happened in a commercial flight in the US. Would you be saying the same if a 737 MAX came down trying
to fly out of Dallas or LAX or O'Hare? Decades ago Ralph Nader came out with his ground breaking book
"Unsafe at Any Speed" which led to massive improvements in car safety in American cars. Would you have
opposed those safety measures because they would have given foreign car makers a bit of an edge? Think how
many tens of thousands of American were never killed because of this change in safety with American built
cars. It is the same deal here. And in a bit of irony, Ralph Nader's grandniece was killed in the last 737
crash so you can expect to hear a lot from him before long.
The Seattle Times story in today's Links gives a good overview of the pilot question. The gist is that
foreign pilots often do have less experience than their American counterparts (because of less private
aviation availability) but that Boeing knows that too and should not produce planes that real life pilots
can't fly.
Emotional reactions to comments like the above from John Beech are missing the point IMO. Saying that
the pilots in these crashes may have done better doesn't let Boeing off the hook even if Boeing is trying
to wriggle free in a mistaken attempt to evade responsibility. If nothing else the CEO's ostrich like
behavior is reason for him to get the boot.
Fine. But I owe zero allegiance to any corporation, indeed imo it's the other way around. The
bailout of the worst people who were most responsible for 2008 could have led nowhere else but here,
and that said it's likely this is just the tip of the iceberg, If you crapify enough you wind up with
crap, no matter how un-crappy things were when you started.
"the pilots in these crashes may have done better doesn't let Boeing off the hook"
This. In fact, I'd argue it makes it WORSE, if it's true what is in a link in a
comment above
is correct.
In such a case Boeing
knowingly
sold aircraft with a known significant difference
to an airline with bad training practices. Their (the airline) pilots are even asking FAA to intervene
– but I guess if it means fewer sales to Boeing, why would they, given how they outsourced the plane
safety to B already?
How's that different from selling a gun to a known psychopath? Uh, I guess that's actually ok in
the US, so why not.
What is damning to Boeing is that they made a dangerous alteration to the plane–the MCAS–for
marketing purposes and didn't even bother to make sure it worked right. There's no way they or
their insurance don't pay through the nose in lawsuits.
I admit. I know nothing. I've flown over 3 million miles, caused planes in flight to return brcause I
noteced defects in the plane, and am an engineer with both a life long curiosotuy about engineering and
systems.
I'm a typical engineer. Yes I know swuat. But I can analyze machines, ask questions, and make deductions.
Here is an Engineering question: Why did Boeing management pay for MCAS to be developesd?
Because of the new engines for the plane, which are much bigger than the old ones,causing the plane's
center of gravity to change, which lead to concerns about stalls. And the reason for the new engines, was
because they are much more efficient than the previous engines
"Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel." -- Samuel Johnson
I might be labeled an American nationalist, but really I have
no
problem accepting that
other countries might not want to buy Boeing's American made flying suicide machines for which the company
is wholly at fault for. It is not loyalty, patriotism or even jingoism, but fanaticism to blame others for
what the company has done to itself, to them and to us as well.
I agree the remarks about NC are inappropriate and even offensive but the stuff about Airbus etc is
correct and little noted here. Crusading against Boeing management is one thing, but surely it's not in
the US economy's interest for Boeing to go under. Not that I'm an economist, but I believe I've read that
elsewhere in NC.
Boeing is doing a perfectly fine job of self-destructing, NC is merely reporting on and analyzing the
flames. Even if we don the patriotic blindfold you suggest and shut up about the mass homicide Boeing's
planes have caused, do you really think everyone else in the world is going to do the same?
Besides, Boeing has ginormous defense contracts. Even if their civilian line craters their billions in
military subsidies will keep them alive no matter how crappy their planes are.
Wow! "Putative design flaw"? Putative?? Really? I put that in the same category as "putative harm from
tobacco". And I love this little gem of jingoism: "And Susan, reprinting this is a disgrace if not outright
treasonous to US national interests." So 300+deaths are ok as long as we can still chant "USA, USA!".
Articles like this are why I read NC. I can get jingoistic nonsense elsewhere. "Treasonous to US national
interests." What transparent nonsense! And don't talk about jobs because the executives at Boeing are doing
their best to eliminate those American jobs. In the US these days there are no national interests only the
interests of the real owners of this country. Hint: that ain't me and probably not you either so cling to
the vain hope that our economic system still serves the many.
I read this post this morning and I am still trying to deal with the monstrosity of it. So upsetting. A
group of rich people practically committed mass murder and destroyed the livelihoods of thousands in order to
become even richer. I am sickened to my stomach to think of all the people I love putting their lives in the
hands of these psychopaths who will get away with (Mass) Murder most foul. Vicious, evil, criminals in suits.
Recently flew Southwest, probably on a 737, so yeah.
As a practical matter, a number of reports detail obviously criminal behavior, like failing to report
hazards they knew about. At this point, it's a test of the criminal "justice" system whether Boeing
executives are prosecuted.
Tell that to the American financial wizards who off-shored our jobs and with them the technologies they are
based on, all in furtherance of the narrow interests of the investor class.
Or have people forgotten Boeing is America's national champion?
Like GM was america's national champion until it decided to dump manufacturing, and all those pesky
employees, to go into finance?
Have you the slightest clue what this would mean for import/export ratios?
Where were you when China invaded the USA via Walmart to destroy our nations retail capacity?
Who in hell do you think invented almost all the technologies we have in large scale aircraft?
And who might I ask moved aircraft manufacturing to China and taught the Chinese to build American planes?
Slam the barn door all you want, the cows are not only gone, they've been re-branded and all this was
pro-actively enabled by America's ownership class, the folks supposedly responsible for protecting American
interests.
John Beech May 17, 2019 at 8:02 am comment confirms my fears: we do live in a fascist state. How else can
one portray corporate management criticism as tantamount to treason? Does Mr Beech place Ralph Nader in the
same category on account of composing "Unsafe at any Speed"? At the time of publication the automobile industry
was easily twenty percent of domestic economic output.
What might drive Mr Beech's strong emotion is the concern of unemployment for himself, family or friends. I
think we, as in this country need to think seriously about providing a real safety net for those afflicted by
corporate mismanagement. Like unemployment insurance, Boeing and other large entities can fund a pool for these
disasters. Better managed companies will pay a lower rate. (Insert plug for uninversal health care here!) I
propose this tax as a means to encourage "do the right thing" corporate mentality. MMT does not apply here as
in single payer health.
I close by stating that both we as a nation and Boeing as a corporation can do better. The improvements lie
on differing tangents, but are both critically necessary.
It has been said that medicare for all – national health insurance – will, in fact, make our corporations
more competitive by eliminating the expense they carry of subsidizing the sleazy medical insurance industry.
So that would be a step in the right direction for our corporations. Costcut the sleaze and keep the
quality-maintenance expenditures. To that end another good cost cutting measure would be to eliminate the
"services" of all the "dilettante portfolio managers" as they are easily as sleazy as health insurance
companies.
I'm betting that if you looked at the qualifications of those in the executive suite and the board of
directors, you'd find more people whose experience is in financial engineering than aviation engineering. THAT
needs to change and quickly.
That'll no doubt be the reason Nikki Haley's on their board. She has a background in finance and
accounting, in addition to her prowess in bullshitting, browbeating and belittling the UN.
Not sure why you didn't add a discussion of Boeing's KC-46. This is the modified version of the 767 to be
used as the latest and greatest version of the Air Force air re-fueling fleet. From what I understand, this
adds an interesting dimension to your position that the problems at Boeing are from relentless cost cutting to
maximize shareholder profits because the KC-46 is a cost-plus adventure where the taxpayer picks up the cost of
Boeing's failures. My information is that the delay in delivery of the KC-46 is quietly causing many
unanticipated problems for the Air Force in their efforts to transition to the new aircraft. For example, I
understand that there is a regular AF wing somewhere in the midwest where their former aircraft, KC-135s, were
transferred to other units in anticipation of the delivery of the KC-46s. But presently the pilots have no
planes to fly because the new anticipated delivery date has been pushed back to November. This article briefly
describes the problem.
Related to this is the fact that Boeing also does considerable other work for the military on a cost plus
basis. I am informed that the AF is now taking delivery of modified KC-135s which have been re-fitted with
"glass" cockpits virtually identical to the latest 737 cockpits. To my mind, this information begs the
question: Can Boeing properly manufacture aircraft regardless of the profits involved?
A minor quibble with the article: While reducing the profit margin from 21% to 19% is just a 2 percentage
point drop in that headline figure, it represents a bit over 9% cut in the actual margin (19 is @90.476% of
21). I believe that's how it would be seen from the exec. POV.
I am not sure the Murata reference is the correct one as you don't really think of them as a big semi
player.
There are a number of internal chinese players that could edge out Qualcomm such as MediaTek, Rockchip, and
Allwinner. MediaTek is the most advance, but in reality all 3 are mainly using technology from ARM. Another
wild card is Samsung. It may license it chipsets to China, and they are very capable.
What the US can do (and does do) is require you to buy chips from certain vendors to join certain networks.
So if you want to be on the AT&T network you often have to source your chips from a very limited selection of
suppliers.
However, as the US market is relatively small in comparison to Europe and Asia, and because of the
difficulty of working in the US market, you may see major vendors do fine by just ignoring the market entirely.
About ten years ago the English economist John Kay produced a wonderful book he called ' Obliquity ' . His
thesis, with extensive evidence from all manner of human activity throughout the ages , was that almost any
goal pursued directly was unlikely to succeed . The main subject of the book was however the pursuit of profit,
which he showed with numerous examples, was most successfully achieved when it wasn't pursued directly, but
rather by pursuing first and foremost other objectives ; for example and perhaps most obviously quality with
profit flowing from the achievement of that objective. Hence the title of the book . Again with examples he
shows how corporations that reject the notion that they have responsibilities to employees and the wider
society in favour of ' shareholder value ' simply wither on the vine. The fate of Boeing if it pursues its
present stance is unlikely to be anything other than oblivion . Come on Boeing try some obliquity.
Has anyone mentioned Andrew Cockburn's Harper's article "The Military-Industrial Virus"? I'm late to this
discussion but he talks about Boeing merging with McDonnell Douglas and how everything changed after that.
That began to change in 1997, when Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas, a defense company. In
management terms, the merger was in effect a McDonnell takeover, with its executives -- most importantly CEO
Harry Stonecipher -- assuming command of the combined company, bringing their cultural heritage with them. The
effects were readily apparent in the first major Boeing airliner initiative under the merged regime, the 787
Dreamliner. Among other features familiar to any student of the defense industry, the program relied heavily
on outsourcing subcontracts to foreign countries as a means of locking in foreign buyers. Shipping parts
around the world obviously costs time and money. So does the use of novel and potentially risky
technologies: in this case, it involved a plastic airframe and all-electronic controls powered by an
extremely large and dangerously flammable battery.
Cockburn goes on to talk about the 737 Max 8 and the Boeing V-22 Osprey which has had multiple crashes.
Seems disturbing that the new Defense Secretary Shanahan headed up Boeing's Missile Defense Systems and the
Dreamliner program.
In the same article, he mentions the book "Shattered Minds" about the faulty helmets worn by soldiers and
Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan. They amplified the effects of the explosions on the brain and "were found to
be dangerously vulnerable to bullets and shrapnel, thanks to a corrupt contractor skimping on the necessary
bulletproof material."
I just saw the Broadway revival of the 1947 play "All My Sons" by Arthur Miller. The lead guy let faulty
cracked engine parts go into airplanes with 21 WW II pilots crashing and dying.
What's good for business is not necessarily good for you and me.
Yes yes, Boeing did a bad thing. But never build another airliner? You would prefer Airbus to have a
monopoly? You would prefer to ride some nice Russian airliner? Yes this a tragedy, and it would be nice if some
executives would go to jail, but Boeing nevertheless makes airplanes that let millions of people fly all over
the world with risk levels that, while not zero, are very nearly superhumanly good (though to be admitted: this
is largely because the public remains intolerant of errors in this area).
Consider the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx, apparently marketed on misleading claims, that some estimates put
at causing "between 88,000 and 139,000 heart attacks, 30 to 40 percent of which were probably fatal, in the
five years the drug was on the market" (wikipedia). Of course nobody went to jail and the company is still in
business and printing money No it doesn't excuse Boeing in this case. But it should put Boeing's misdeeds in
perspective.
Just because Merck got away with even a worse crime doesn't mean Boeing should also get off.
And Boeing has been dishonest (the deliberate effort to avoid recertification, the now-many instances of
Boeing's failure to inform or deliberately under-inform key parties like the regulators and customers about
not just MCAS but other important changes in the plane) as well as exceptionally unrepentant. They acted in
bad faith and show no intention of cleaning up their act.
Well Boeing was sure doing the right thing by returning "shareholder value". Since January its stock shot up
50% until the crashes started. Good job CEO.
"... Trump appointed a bunch of lackeys to DOT, FAA, and various other agencies. He appointed people like Dan Elwell, E. Chao, etc. because he knew they would undermine the agencies' oversight. ..."
Now, ahead of a hearing before a House Transportation subcommittee on Wednesday,
WSJ
is
reporting that senior FAA officials weren't involved in the agency's review of MCAS, despite the unprecedented power delegated to
the system in the new generation of 737s, because the agency viewed the system as a "non-critical safety risk."
Ask how it arrived at this conclusion, the agency told WSJ that Boeing hadn't designated MCAS as a critical system, and the
agency simply took the aerospace company at its word.
The results, these officials said, also indicate that during the certification process, Boeing didn't flag the automated
stall-prevention feature as a system whose malfunction or failure could cause a catastrophic event. Such a designation would
have led to more intense scrutiny.
FAA engineers and midlevel managers deferred to Boeing's early safety
classification, the inquiry determined, allowing company experts to conduct subsequent analyses of potential hazards with
limited agency oversight.
Boeing employees who served as designated agency representatives signed off on the final
design, according to people familiar with the findings.
The people who described the report didn't specify what information and safety data Boeing shared with t
he FAA
during the approval process, a topic that is a major focus of various ongoing investigations.
Also at issue is
whether agency officials performed any assessment on their own about the system's initial safety classification, according to
aviation industry officials, pilot unions and others tracking the investigations.
According to the report details leaked to WSJ, it's not clear why Boeing didn't designate MCAS as a 'critical system', though
the FAA doesn't believe the company intentionally violated any certification rules. It's also unclear what kind of oversight
process, if any, the FAA exercised over Boeing's decision. Boeing, in turn, said that it didn't feel the system was 'critical' -
and that relying on a single sensor for flight data was appropriate - because pilots could simply switch MCAS off. Though that
didn't pan out in practice, as the pilots of the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines flights both tried, and failed, to disable MCAS
before the system forced their planes into a deadly downward dive.
The FAA's administrative review, launched in March in the wake of the second fatal crash, didn't uncover efforts by Boeing
to flout certification rules or intentionally provide faulty data to the FAA, according to people familiar with the findings.
But it remains unclear what formal processes the FAA had in place to conduct an assessment independent of the initial
determination by Boeing -- that MCAS wasn't critical to safety and therefore didn't warrant close FAA scrutiny.
https://www.dianomi.com/smartads.epl?id=4855
Still,
the FAA doesn't really have an explanation for why it delegated so much authority to Boeing.
In testimony to the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee two months ago, Mr. Elwell said detailed safety
assessment and approval of the suspect system was "delegated," or handed over, to Boeing relatively early in the approval
process under standard procedures.
But he didn't tell senators how that initial decision was reached or exactly what
role FAA officials played in subsequent safety assessments.
The revelations come as Congress has subpoenaed representatives from pilots unions and the major airlines to testify. The DOT
is also ramping up its own investigation. One thing is becoming increasingly clear: Before the grounding of the 737 MAX 8 is
lifted, lawmakers are going to want answers to why these lapses in oversight occurred.
Trump appointed a bunch of lackeys to DOT, FAA, and various other
agencies. He appointed people like Dan Elwell, E. Chao, etc. because
he knew they would undermine the agencies' oversight.
But somehow this is the fault of everyone but Trump and his
apointees in the eyes of Trumptards.
ALL three letter agencies are full of IMMORAL life long government
bureaucrats whose main purpose in life is to profit from their
government job and get power wherever they can.
So, your thesis is that low level bureaucrats forced the FAA
not to conduct safety assessments of Boeing because...why
exactly?
I have another less absurdly-moronic theory: our corrupt,
revolving door system between private companies and agencies
has resulted in high-level agency appointees (Trump's in this
case) turning a blind eye to regulatory oversight.
You're a special kind of stupid if you have to seriously ask that
question. FAA officials and Boeing executives conspired to help
Boeing bring a new airplane to market as an established model to save
money. Corruption is the norm in big business and government because
it is so profitable with little accountability.
All bureaucrats are immoral regardless of party BUT non are
as immoral as the deprived marxist Democrats whose virtues
are openly deception and violence. The most immoral and
power-hungry people in our population are drawn to the
government.
ALL government bureaucrats are immoral by nature. The
most IMMORAL are drawn to government where they can
get away with their criminal activities. You're just
in denial at how immoral government workers are.
Democrats are the worst. Democrats don't even try to
pretend to have morals anymore they openly say they
want the money and the power. True psychopaths.
Try finding a three letter US Federal agency that ISN'T corrupt!
All the immoral power-hungry psychopaths obsessed with money and
power are drawn to government like a fly is drawn to ****.
I used to work for GE in their NDT department, (non-destructive
testing) that manufactured Eddy Current and Ultrasound machines
that inspect bolt holes on the fuselage and cracks on wheels of
heavy machinery like planes and the wing joints and railroad
wheels.
Guess who the private airlines who bought equipment from us,
hated the most? 1) TSA and 2) FAA.
Fifty-years of social engineering hiring results in mediocrity
at best.
I grew-up in aviation and was around a lot of FAA
types who are guys now in their 80's (and dead). Many of them
were around during the boom years for aviation and worked
through some tough problems in conjunction with the commercial
carriers. These were bad *** dudes, deeply steeped in the
faith of 'safety first' and the reputation of the FAA as a
ball-busting agency that couldn't be bought, coddled or fucked
with.
Again, those guys are either dead or in their 80's. The FAA
today has some of these folks but not enough. There are too
many bureaucrats, pension hustlers and socially engineered
nobody's. And they've outsourced to mercenaries and a
mercenary will never be committed to the mission like a soldier
of Rome.
End social engineering in government hiring. End social
engineering in government contracts (end the 8A program). Quit
reducing the standards and quit outsourcing to 3rd parties.
**** the lawmakers. They are useless.
Boeing should tell the
airlines to put up the money, make the dual sensors standard and
certify the pilots on the MAX.
Fire the free marketing assholes who decided they could keep the costs down...
Let's hope the victims' families will sue the FAA approving personnel
individually into bankruptcy....if that's even possible. But most
likely, the taxpayers will have to cover for it.
Sure would have been nice if the FAA had been allowed to provide that
knowledgable "second set of eyes" to vet the design and
implementation.
Of course anyone checking their own product will OK
it - because (again, of course) they've done the best they could, so
of course it's OK - designed and built to be that way. That's the
fatal flaw in self-certifying a product - can't see the flaws because
you've done your best and you're too close to it.
Boeing short circuited this "second set of eyes" process out of
un-enlightened self interest - to save money - ha!
I'm sure they "Covered All the Bases" by using "Best Practices" to
ensure a "Safe Harbor" design using an "Agile Development Process"
which is "ISO 900x Compliant".
Yes. That is why on gov contracts you have a preliminary design
review, critical design review, and testing. Just try to get a
govie to sit through a design review. Their eyes glaze over and
then they go to lunch and don't come back. So whoever is left
signs off.
Testing is the first thing to get cut when it goes
over budget. How's that for logic. Buy something but don't worry
if it works.
WRONG! This is what the REGULATORS brought us. Corruption for
sale. No morals. Just statists who are hungry for bureaucratic
money and power. Virtually EVERY U.S. three letter Federal agency
is corrupt and devoid of morals.
Yes, the regulators, in this case, appointed by TRUMP and
appointed for the sole purpose of facilitating the shady
practices of corporations like Boeing. He did with the FAA,
DOT, EPA, etc....he appoints people who don't believe in the
agency's mandate to begin with.
I mean, who the **** are you blaming for the work of Trump's
appointees if not Trump? Pelosi?
These are LIFELONG bureaucrats who ONLY serve their masters
in the bureaucratic cult class. Their main purpose in life
is to profit from their government job and gain power over
people wherever they can.
"The FAA doesn't really have an explanation for why it delegated so
much authority to Boeing."
Why don't we let the FAA build the
planes. See how well that works. The ignorance of people that believe
the brute authority of government makes good things happen.
FAA dropped the ball by waiting for hours after the crash to publicly
declare them airworthy. They should not have waited hours, an
immediate response would have been much better for Boeing stock.
There are bonuses at stake here people!
MCAS never would have been altered had the airframe been stable after
the engine move.
MCAS appears to have done a fine job until it was
asked to do something new.
The real question is how they got the engine move certified, and
how flight test did not turn up the tendency towards stall. A pilot,
without MCAS, would have been applying trim.
I thought MCAS was only added AFTER engine move altered flight
characteristics. MCAS was supposed to make MAX 8 fly just like older 737,
reducing pilot training costs. So pilots thought the plane would fly just like 737. Except for the crashing part. That was new.
Reminds me of that time the SEC was suppose to be watch dogging the
players back in the runup to the last global financial crisis. Other
than captured regulators, revolving doors, rubber stamps, and midget
****, things might have worked out differently ..
"But it remains unclear what formal processes the FAA had in place to
conduct an assessment independent of the initial determination by
Boeing -- that MCAS wasn't critical to safety and therefore didn't
warrant close FAA scrutiny." Answer: None. The revolving door goes
round and round, and so does Trump's former United Nations Ambassador
Nikki Haley, for example, who
is
joining Boeing's board of directors
after leaving the
Administration more than two months ago.
What I can't understand is how this wasn't tested. In simulating MCAS
operation certainly somebody somewhere doing fault analysis would
naturally have simulated the case of a bad AOA sensor. That it wasn't
tested leaves me wondering what else important was never tested.
Crash 737-Max did not happen as a result of some software bug that can be corrected with one
patch, and not because of the lack of duplication of sensors. The problem seems to be much
deeper and speaks to a crisis in engineering culture at least in Boeing, but more broadly in
large us companies in General.
The logic of the Boeing 737-Max was something like this. Let's not design a new narrow-body
aircraft from scratch, but take a 50-year-old trash (737) with all its mechanics, hydraulics,
electronics, etc. almost unchanged and put on it more economical (and larger) engines. And in
order to compensate for the somewhat changed aerodynamics, we will introduce a new system for
controlling the angle of attack, not really tested, which will be turned on unexpectedly for
pilots, at the signal of one sensor, and we will not tell the pilots about it and train them.
The main design criterion was not "what should be done to at least not lower the safety of the
new model?", and "how to make all the changes so that it was not necessary to undergo a new
certification and additional training for pilots?".
Most publications draw attention to two angle-of-attack sensors (relative to airflow), and
that the MCAS system was activated by a signal from either of them:
Boeing also designed the system to trust on a single sensor -- a rarity in aviation, where
redundancy is common. Several former Boeing engineers who were not directly involved in the
system's design said their colleages most likely opted for such an approach since relying on
two sensors could still create issues. If one of two sensors malfunctioned, the system could
struggle to know which was right.
Airbus addressed this potential problem on some of its planes by installing three or more
such sensors. Former Max engineers, including one who worked on the sensors, said adding a
third sensor to the Max was a nonstarter. Previous 737s, they said, had used two and managers
wanted to limit changes. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/business/boeing-737-max-.html
It's not really about three sensors instead of two. Failure of one sensor, or even two if
the system has many sensors for different parameters - this is a normal situation and the whole
control system as a whole must cope with this. Surprisingly primitive logic MCAS - if two
sensors show different data, then believe the one that shows the anomaly. With this logic,
adding a third sensor, on the contrary, will only increase the likelihood of misbehavior. In
fact, the system should not respond to the sensor that shows the greatest anomaly, but to a set
of sensors that do not contradict each other in the description of the state of the object. If
a sensor contradicts the totality of the others, it is considered defective, and if it does not
completely contradict, but differs from the totality more than others - its readings are taken
into account with a reduced weight. These are the main ideas of data fusion, combining data
that has long been widely used in engineering Sciences, starting with Kalman filters, etc.
Fairly simple algorithms combine the data in full, even use of cheap drones, not in passenger
aviation.
The movement of the body of the aircraft as a solid body is not an insanely complicated
task, and is described by quite simple equations. In addition to the two sensors of the angle
of attack in the aircraft uses many others - thrust, speed, altitude, position and orientation
in space, linear and angular acceleration at three coordinates, etc. If one sensor shows an
abnormally large angle of attack, if it is a real signal, it must be compatible with changes in
other data - height, acceleration and others, otherwise the sensor is defective. To include a
key for the safety of the aircraft automatic system in terms of one abnormal sensor is a stupid
and vicious logic, but it was followed by Boeing in the design of the 737-Max. That's what he's
paying for now.
zigzagzug April 9 2019, 19:38:51 UTC 1 month ago
"The logic of MCAS is surprisingly primitive - if two sensors show different data,
then believe the one that shows the anomaly. "
In modern society, more attention is paid to minorities than to ordinary members, so there
is nothing unexpected here. On the contrary, the designers were clearly guided by everyday
logic ))
dark_beer, April 10 2019, 00:09:49 UTC 1 month ago
On a politically correct Boeing, one sensor should be gay and the other black.
lazy_flyer, April 9 2019, 19:46:09 UTC 1 month ago Edited: April 9 2019, 19:46:21 UTC
Quite simple data matching algorithms
Hardware "OR" nothing more complex there is simply no need to put.
talking about the crisis in engineering culture at least in Boeing
All around us. Every step of the way. The main thing is to release the product to the
market as soon as possible. And all the clamps and errors will be corrected as the appearance
of indignant reviews from disgruntled consumers. That's only in aviation this leads to
disasters.
vdkrav, April 26 2019, 00:01:47 UTC 2 weeks ago
"Everywhere around us. Every step of the way."
But young intellectuals believe that we are on the p[orog unprecedented 3rd NTR. Read, there every third comment about it.
In defense of Boeing, we can say that it was not necessary to retrain the requirement of
the starting customer. But the lack of a quorum on the sensors it is a complete shame for
such a reputable company
alextr98, April 9 2019, 22:56:35 UTC 1 month ago
In a large European company Airbus similar problems. In 2009, crashed flight 447 air
France - frozen speed sensors, autopilot disconnected and turned off all protection against
jambs, and the pilots were not slow to mess up. Like to determine the speed can also be
different ways, but Airbus somehow relied on a single, which is out of order. But no one is
talking about the crisis in Airbus ' engineering culture.
zevaka_derevnia, April 9 2019, 22:58:19 UTC 1 month ago
Yeah, to be honest, at the end there was a sense that the system did "fuck off". And it's
not that there was a requirement not to be retrained and a desire not to re-certify... Just
scored on the software and the interface, deciding, it seems, that "we'll release, and debug
and send the patch later." It ended badly. IMHO
prison sentences would be fair.
robustov, April 10 2019, 09:52:20 UTC 1 month ago
Add to that and the fact that using the impact on state agencies, Boeing all this stuff
still do self-certification - that's even beyond good and evil.
neznaika_nalune, April 10 2019, 14:04:18 UTC 1 month ago
The FAA is likely Packed full of former employees of the Boeing where they have yet to
take experts.
occuserpens,
April 14 2019, 18:03:07 UTC 4 weeks ago Edited: April 16 2019, 10:38:14 UTC
This software was needed because the Boeing weighed down the engines and instead of making
another car for them, put it on the 737, which is not designed for them. This changed all the
aerodynamics that had to be compensated by the software.
But such software should not depend on the serviceability of the sensors, not enough of
them, etc. It should either solve the problem automatically, or turn off and transfer control
to the pilots. Instead, he did not disconnect and began to interfere with the pilots to control
the aircraft.
To talk about any something stupid mistakes here IMO is thus meaningless.. In aviation, almost always work it's not enough, so there
should be still a logical
branch when the system crashes. The solution, of course, will eventually be found, but
alas it's too late.
When Boeing transitioned from the 737 NG model to the 737 MAX, designers
altered a toggle
switch panel that could have prevented both of the deadly crashes
over the last year in
Ethiopia and Indonesia, killing a combined 346 people, according to an investigation by the
Seattle
Times
.
On the 737 NG, the right switch was labeled "AUTO PILOT" - and allowed pilots to deactivate the
plane's automated stabilizer controls, such as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
(MCAS), suspected to be the culprit in both crashes. The left toggle switch on the NG would
deactivate the buttons on the yoke which pilots regularly use to control the horizontal
stabilizer.
On the 737 MAX, however,
the two switches were altered to perform the same function
,
according to internal documents reviewed by the
Times,
so that they would disable
all electronic stabilizer controls
- including the MCAS and the thumb buttons on the yoke
used to control the stabilizer.
Former Boeing flight-controls engineer Peter Lemme, a harsh critic of the MAX design, first
raised questions over the switch alteration
on his blog
, and
says he doesn't understand why Boeing made the change.
He said if the company had maintained the switch design from the 737 NG,
Boeing could
have instructed pilots after the Lion Air crash last year to simply flip the "AUTO PILOT" switch
to deactivate MCAS
and continue flying with the normal trim buttons on the control
wheel. He said
that would have saved the Ethiopian Airlines plane and the 157 people on
board
.
"There's no doubt in my mind that they would have been fine," Lemme said. -
Seattle
Times
Boeing told the
Times
that they had historically called for pilots to flip both
switches to disable a problematic or "runaway" stabilizer, so the button change matched that
procedure, adding that the two switches "were retained for commonality of the crew interface."
https://www.dianomi.com/smartads.epl?id=4855
"Boeing strongly disagrees with any speculation or suggestion that pilots should deviate from
these long-established and trained safety procedures," the company added.
During the October Lion Air flight, pilots were reportedly unaware of the MCAS system - while
the
day before
, an off-duty pilot with knowledge of the stabilizer controls helped pilots disable
the system on the same plane.
Data from the flight revealed that the repeated commands
from the MCAS system sent the flight from Bali to Jakarta plummeting into the sea.
After that crash, Boeing issued a directive calling for pilots to use the typical runaway
stabilizer procedure to deal with MCAS in the event of a problem. Then pilots would be able to
swivel the tail down manually by physically turning a control wheel that connects to the tail
via cables.
After they were able to manually control the stabilizer, the Ethiopian Airlines pilots appear to
have flipped the cutoff switches back on, reactivating the MCAS system. Shortly after, it entered a
fatal nosedive which killed all 157 people aboard.
"When you're pulling on the column with 80-100 pounds of force trying to save your life, your
troubleshooting techniques are very weak," said aviation consultant Doug Moss. "You need some
gut-level instinctive things to do to solve the problem."
A veteran Boeing 737 test pilot said that all Boeing planes have two such cutoff switches,
not just the 737. And both he and American Airlines Captain Dennis Tajer, a spokesman for the
Allied Pilots Association who flies 737s, said they could think of no existing procedure that
called for flipping only one of the switches.
The procedure appears to be designed to prepare for a situation in which the plane's
stabilizer motor is for some reason jammed and moving uncommanded in one direction
– a
classic "runaway stabilizer" situation. That would require shutting off all power to the
motor. -
Seattle
Times
Notably, the FAA did not notify pilots that the functionality of the switches had been altered,
simply noting in its documentation the labeling change "Stab Trim cutout switches panel
nomenclature."
If I read this correctly, the MCAS stabilizer drive had a higher
priority than the pilots, and without flipping those magic
switches the pilots simply couldn't win. I thought Airbus was the
only one with the philosophy that machine is supreme and humans
were just along for the ride? At least thats been the Boeing line
of propaganda for many many years.
What else hasn't Boeing told
us? This can't be the only example of their lies.....
"He said if the company had maintained the switch design from the
737 NG,
Boeing could have instructed pilots after the Lion Air
crash last year to simply flip the "AUTO PILOT" switch to
deactivate"
If Boeing had been responsible (money vs
lives) there would never had been a Lion air crash.
Pathetic. There needs to be jail time for those responsable.
If you haven't read some of the in depth articles, here is my
summation:
The new Max engines are so large they had to be
moved forward on the wing.
The new engine nacelles THEMSELVES generate lift in addition
to the normal wing lift.
The new engine nacelle lift is forward of the wings
which produces a large torque and jacks the front of the plane
up. Once the plane pitches up, the engine nacelles lift gets
STRONGER and leads to a runaway pitch up scenario until a stall
occurs.
Since this behavior is illegal in a commercial jet, Boeing
hid the issue with poor software and did not tell anyone about
it.
Essentially , putting in an MCAS system to correct a
previous design alteration which had now made the aircraft
more dynamically unstable was the second mistake.
It is a
critical error in the basics of flight itself , which even I
as a former low time private pilot could understand. At take
off and landing when there angle of attack changes going on
all the time, you don't install a system that requires time
to deactivate or correct or research in a manual to the
correct an error that been introduced into the flight
control system. You've only got seconds to act and anything
that requires more than a second to allow full unimpeded
manual control back to the pilot is a timebomb. In this
case, assuming a pilot would have immediately deactivated
the angle of attack sensors, the computer program that
directed the screw motor to adjust the horizontal stabilizer
trim tab, or the power to the screw drive motor itself,
it appears that it would have taken a lot of precious time
for the pilot to manually undo the motorized screw driven
input by the manual trim control wheel by hus seat, which
was not enough time when you are that close to the ground.
Boeing Co. knew months
before a deadly 737 Max crash that a cockpit alert wasn't working the way the company had
represented to buyers of the jetliner.
But the planemaker didn't tell airlines or the Federal Aviation Administration of the
problem with the warning light until after a Lion Air plane went down off the coast of
Indonesia in October, according to a Boeing statement Sunday. The accident
occurred after an erroneous reading by a single angle-of-attack sensor triggered software that
pushed the jet's nose down until pilots lost control.
The faulty cockpit indicator was supposed to flash when the plane's angle-of-attack vanes,
which measure the position of the plane's nose against the oncoming air stream, send
conflicting signals. Boeing had told airlines that the so-called AOA disagree alert was
standard across the Max fleet, as it had been on a previous generation of 737 aircraft.
But the alert was only working on planes that had a separate angle-of-attack indicator on
the cockpit display, the manufacturer said. The additional feature cost extra.
A culture of close collaboration between test pilots, engineering staff deteriorated
in later stages of aircraft's development
Boeing Co. BA 0.18% limited the role of its own pilots in the final stages of developing the
737 MAX flight-control system implicated in two fatal crashes, departing from a longstanding
practice of seeking their detailed input, people familiar with the matter said.
As a result, Boeing test pilots and senior pilots involved in the MAX's development didn't
receive detailed briefings about how fast or steeply the automated system known as MCAS could
push down a plane's nose, these people said. Nor were they informed that the system relied on a
single sensor -- rather than two -- to verify the accuracy of incoming data about the angle of
a plane's nose, they added.
In a clarification that only created more confusion, Boeing said Monday that an alert
intended to notify pilots when the plane might be receiving erroneous data from one of the 737
MAX 8's 'angle of attack' sensors wasn't disabled intentionally, as
WSJ reported on Sunday, but that the feature had been disabled because of a previously
undisclosed software glitch.
What's confusing is that Boeing had confirmed WSJ's story that the aerospace company had
neglected to tell the FAA and Southwest, the biggest customer for the 737 MAX 8, that the alert
feature had been disabled because it had been made a new
'optional' safety feature . The alerts would have warned pilots that the plane's MCAS
system might be about to misfire.
... ... ...
The company said that it didn't intentionally deactivate the alerts, and that
they had only been disabled because of the software issue.
Boeing is now saying that its engineers, as well as safety regulators at the FAA, either
missed or overlooked the software glitch that rendered these alerts inoperable, presumably even
on planes where the extra safety features had been paid for. The alerts had been standard on
earlier models.
The Monday statement suggests Boeing engineers and management, as well as U.S. air-safety
regulators, either missed or overlooked one more software design problem when the model was
certified two years ago. Before Monday, neither Boeing nor the Federal Aviation
Administration had disclosed that an additional software glitch -- rather than an intentional
plan by the plane maker -- rendered so-called angle of attack alerts inoperable on most MAX
aircraft. The alerts warn pilots when there is a disagreement between two separate sensors
measuring the angle of a plane's nose.
Boeing's disclosure comes as the plane maker scrambles to win FAA and international
approval of a software fix for MCAS, making it less potent and less likely to misfire. In
addition to the challenges already facing the MAX fleet, revelations of the additional
software difficulties are likely to be scrutinized by airlines, passengers and regulators
world-wide as Boeing strives to restore their trust and return the MAX fleet to service.
The alerts, intended to tell cockpit crews if sensors are transmitting errant data, had
been standard on earlier 737 models. Officials at airlines around the globe, including
Southwest Airlines Co., the largest 737 MAX customer, assumed the alerts remained standard
until details emerged in the wake of the Lion Air crash. At that point, the industry and FAA
inspectors monitoring Southwest realized the alerts hadn't operated on most MAX aircraft,
including Southwest jets.
Ultimately, Boeing's admission of this glitch could make winning FAA approval to allow the
planes to return to the skies even more difficult, and it's also bound to make international
regulators more wary of Boeing's updated flight software, which the company has said is being
designed to make MCAS less powerful, and more quickly identify when a plane's sensors are
feeding it erroneous data.
Despite the bad news, which could further weigh on new 737 orders by prolonging the
grounding, Boeing shares traded slightly higher on Tuesday, and remained up on the year.
The "glitch": we lined the executives pockets in lieu of reasonable development timelines
and adequate testing. Probably outsourced s/w development to some **** hole country where
they are "really gonna care" about quality.
Unpossible. Last month there were dozens of "pilots" in here telling us that brown
skin caused these accidents. Perhaps those goons were on (((someone's))) payroll all
along?
The thing is, they've now admitted it's a safety system, which invalidates the
certification and shows the deliberate misnaming as a stability augmentation system.
Do these guys have stocks in Caterpillar?, 'cos they are digging themselves a pretty big
hole here.
And besides, 'software glitch' doesn't wash - they designed it. It's a design error, one
of quite a few just in this one system.
Let's have a listing of the names of the designers, and their H1B status.
They will always "admit" it was a software problem.
ANYTHING to avoid admitting that it's an "engines are too big" and "wings are too far
forward to be stable" (cancel existing orders and recall existing units) - engineering and
manufacturing problem.
The problem is this is a "737" in name only. Aerodynamics are different, critical avionics
are different. The question for both Boeing and the FAA is, who decided additional training
is not necessary, as this is still a "737"?
The airlines benefit from the competition between Airbus and Boeing so I don't expect the
737 max 8 debacle to lead to the demise of Boeing. That said, it will definitely hurt
Boeing's bottom line for awhile while Boeing makes the changes necessary to repair its
damaged reputation for safety.
This
basic fact pattern has been revealed to be worse than it first appeared by virtue of Boeing not
having been explicit that the angle of attack sensor alerts had been disabled on the 737 Max.
Why should Boeing have cleared its throat and said something? Recall that the sales pitch for
the 737 Max was that it was so much like existing 737s that it didn't require FAA
recertification or pilot simulator training. But the angle of attack sensor alert had been a
standard feature in all previous 737s, meaning buyers would assume it was part of the plane
unless they were told otherwise. And on top of that, the non-upgraded 737 Max did have lights
in the pilots' controls for this alert. But they didn't work unless the buyer had purchased the
package of safety extras.
And the proof that Boeing was playing way too cute with its pointed silence about its
deactivation of what had been a standard feature? The biggest customer for the 737 Max,
Southwest Airlines, had inaccurate information in its pilots' manual because the airline had
mistakenly assumed the angle of attack sensor alerts worked as they had on earlier 737s.
From the Wall Street Journal:
Boeing Co. didn't tell Southwest Airlines Co. and other carriers when they began flying
its 737 MAX jets that a safety feature found on earlier models that warns pilots about
malfunctioning sensors had been deactivated, according to government and industry
officials.
Federal Aviation Administration safety inspectors and supervisors responsible for
monitoring Southwest, the largest 737 MAX customer, also were unaware of the change, the
officials said.
The alerts inform pilots whether a sensor known as an "angle-of-attack vane" is
transmitting errant data about the pitch of a plane's nose .
Southwest's management and cockpit crews didn't know about the lack of the warning system
for more than a year after the planes went into service in 2017, industry and government
officials said. They and most other airlines operating the MAX learned about it only after
the Lion Air crash in October led to scrutiny of the plane's revised design.
"Southwest's own manuals were wrong" about the availability of the alerts, said the
Southwest pilots union president, Jon Weaks.
Boeing reduced the production rate on the 737 line in mid-April from 52/mo to 42/mo in
response to the grounding of the airplane by regulators worldwide.
The company and others said they didn't know how long the airplane would be
grounded.
But Boeing told suppliers to keep producing parts, components and the fuselage at rate
52.
Boeing already had a ramp-up plan in place;
According to the information LNA learned at the, this is the schedule for ramping back
up:
• Rate 42/mo, April and May;
• Rate 47, June;
• Rate 51.5, July and August; and
• Rate 57, September.
Boeing originally planned to go to 57/mo in June or July.
Good luck with that. The upside is that this corporate controlled flight into terrain
will someday make a great B-school case study.
Edit: If you Captcha-train an autonomous vehicle not to run into bicycles, and it gets
into an accident,
are you legally liable? Asking for a friend.
Oh man, this is bad. Really bad. This story just gets worse and worse over time. It's like
one of those Russian Matryoshka dolls – just when you think that you have a handle on
what happened, you find that there is a whole new layer of ugliness underneath. When the hell
did safety become an optional extra on Boeing aircraft? After reading this, I think that it
was a minor miracle that there were no 737 MAX crashes in the continental United States. By
the sounds of this article, it would have likely been a Southwest airliner if it had
happened. I am wondering what else will come out of this saga that we don't know about
yet.
I would say that Boeing easily falls into the 'Too big to fail.' category.
So no matter what happened they will be either made whole (more defense contracts,
taxpayer bailout if necessary, whatever is needed) or protected in some way tbd. They are a
100 billion a year company with 150,000+ employees and untold numbers of other contractors
and jobs depending on their existence. Going away is just not going to happen.
Okay, Boeing screwed the pooch again, and they should have been more clear in their
communications to the airlines. However, let me add some perspective as a 737 operator.
Given the AOA malfunction in either the Lion Air or Ethiopian accidents, an "AOA Disagree"
warning annunciation would have possibly been helpful, but not really crucial to the safe
recovery of the aircraft. There were plenty of other indications that the AOA's were
disagreeing – namely that only one of the stick shakers was activated. Once you get
over the initial surprise, it shouldn't have been that hard to determine this fact. The lack
of the AOA display and disagree annunciator is not what doomed these crews.
I've never had a flight emergency as a pilot, but had a few as a diver. I suspect that for
both of those, when they hit, you need to resolve things quickly and efficiently, with panic
being the worst enemy.
Panic in my experience stems from a number of things here, but two crucial ones are:
– input overload
– not knowing what to do, or learned actions not having any effect
Both of them can be, to a very large extent, overcome with training, training, and more
training (of actually practising the emergency situation, not just reading about it and
filling questionairres).
So, if the crews were expecting to see AoA disagree but it wasn't there, they could have
easily be misled and confused. The crews weren't (from what I've seen) hugely experienced. So
any confusion would have made a bad situation even worse. How big an impact it made is hard
to judge w/o any other materials.
Well it is rarely just one thing that causes an "accident". There are multiple
contributors here. But the one basic overarching cause was Boeing's insistence that
there-will-not-be-any-additional-training.
Without that management decree, the Max could be flown without the hack of MCAS, just that
the pilots be trained on the new pitchup characteristics.
And releasing MCAS into the wild without even alerting pilots to its existence, well, that
is manslaughter, if not outright murder.
My takeaway from the IEEE article was that the AOA sensor is almost a red herring. The dog
that didn't bark was a pitch sensor, and the cardinal sin (from a software perspective) was
that the MCAS algo did not consider pitch sensor values when deciding whether or not to angle
the plane towards ground.
I suggest reading some of the other pieces on the 737 debacle on NC. There's been
extensive discussion of the details, and yes the pilots may be partially to blame, but are
the least culpable out of all parties involved.
Given that story states that Boeing was more or less silent on the disabling of the sensor
alerts, it's is reasonable to posit that any 737 pilot stepping into a 737 MAX would expect
the sensor to be active.
I can understand the position that a pilot still needs to be skilled enough to not be 100%
reliant on sensors, warning lights etc. to fly the plane. However, if I already assume that a
sensor is active and it's not providing a signal that I would be potentially anticipating,
it's going to seed doubt in my mind in a scenario where you don't have much time at all to
think things through.
On the other hand: a safety light that is deactivated without telling the airlines and
pilots gives false negatives to pilots at a critical juncture. They assume it's active, check
it, and see a false negative they don't realize is false.
Imagine having a 'check engine' or 'oil' light on your car's dashboard that's been
deactivated. They never come on. But they're still there. The driver assumes they'll light if
there's engine trouble that needs attention.
Boeing's actions don't pass the 'reasonable man' test.
Yeah, normally if a mechanical gauge "knows" that it isn't working there will be a little
flag that pops up across the display. Leaving the light there but inoperative instead of
either removing the light or covering it up with an "inoperative" cover is a really bad idea.
It is EVEN WORSE than making safety features optional, and that is bad enough.
Let's see
First, they didn't know MCAS existed, so had no idea or training in what to do when it was
erroneously engaged by system.
Then, they think both Aos sensors are working properly.
And, Boeing tells everybody plane is just like previous versions, no need for
simulations.
I'm glad I'm not one of the dead pilots you're blaming.
By the way, it's apparently just chance that the bad sensors affected foreign and not
domestic flights, no public reports that superior domestic pilots had no problem when it hit
the fan on their watch although some domestic airlines were told (warned) that bad sensor
light was optional extra so possibly a domestic plane cancelled flight on account of bad
sensor.
But imagine a really experienced pilot would have saved the day so Boeing should say only
really experienced pilots should fly the plane? Maybe simulators help you get really
experienced, especially with unexpected emergencies?
Personally, I'll avoid the plane for a few years if simulators aren't required hate to have a
pilot not experienced with what we now know is not such a rare event.
We seem to be forgetting that, in the Lion Air case, a really experienced pilot did
save the day the previous day on the same aircraft . The issue was reported, the
airline neglected to repair the issue and nobody seems to have told the new aircrew about the
issue. This seems to support 737 Pilot's position. It is also another egregious failure, this
time on the part of the airline.
That pilot was a third set of eyes. Since he didn't have to fly the plane, he was free to
observe and fortunately his attention eventually focused on the repeating trim wheel
movements. A standard two-person crew doesn't have this luxury. Worth keeping in mind.
That lion crew also seems to have written up the problem incompletely. They didn't
mention, for example, that they had the stick shaker going for the entire flight.
Your point is legitimate but without the benefit of a CVR recording I think you may be
affording too much credit to the jumpseating pilot who is rumored to have provided the flight
crew with the excellent advice of disabling the electric stabilizer trim motor. Even if the
story is entirely true it's not like turning off the Stab trim motor was esoteric knowledge,
maybe 737 pilot can correct me on this but I thought that procedure was a memory item for
trim runaway emergencies, meaning the pilots were supposed to have that bit of knowledge
firmly committed to memory and they were supposed to execute that procedure without any
checklists or undue delay as soon as the condition was recognized. If not a memory item it
was in the 737 QRC or QRH emergency procedures guide that is always present for immediate
reference on the flight deck. The most important thing the crew of Lion Air 43(?) did (the
flight previous to 610 that managed not to crash) was to simply not let themselves become so
frazzled they forgot to pull the thrust levers out of the take-off detent after they reached
a safe altitude, and not overspeeding an out of trim airplane making a bad situation worse.
Maybe the jumpseating pilot had to scream at the crew to reduce thrust and maybe he had to
slap the Captain and reduce the thrust levers himself, but absent a CVR recording to verify
this slightly far-fetched scenario I would say the previous crew deserves the Lion's share
(sorry couldn't resist) of the credit for landing safely.
You are absolutely 100% correct when you point out the non-crashing Captain was far from
exemplary. He laid an absolutely vicious trap for the ill-fated crew of flight 610 by failing
to mention a great number of things he experienced, especially the uncommanded and unwanted
nose down trimming that necessitated turning off the stab trim motor which he also failed to
communicate. Not a shining moment for Lion Air pilots, mechanics or Boeing. Despite the
obvious and multiple shortcomings and blunders of the Captain/crew of Lion Air 43, I believe
that flight proves what the airline pilot commenters here have been saying all along, which
is the 737 Max flaws were serious but survivable with a competent crew. That's not the same
thing as calling the airplane safe or airworthy and it's certainly not excusing Boeing. They
delivered a death trap. Perhaps a bad analogy, but a professional body guard should be able
to easily disarm a five year with a knife, but that doesn't mean a murderous five year with a
knife isn't dangerous or isn't capable of killing you. Airplanes are machines which
inevitably fail and mechanics are humans who make mistakes which is why pilots need to know
how to hand fly airplanes absent automation. Reducing thrust during an emergency to avoid
overspeeding your airplane really isn't a tall ask for a professional pilot. Pilots get this,
non-pilots don't, and it's a point I've grown quite weary of making.
There's been interesting points made back and forth on NC – what do you make of this
from Karl Denninger: basically, "You can't fix the problems the 737Max has with software
alone"? https://market-ticker.org/akcs-www?post=235578
I made the exact same argument here a couple of days ago, but I will say IF the system was
engineered in a way it could have given the Ethiopians a warning prior to eighty knots or V1
(depending on training and pilot judgement) on takeoff, maybe they could have aborted and
kept the plane on the ground avoiding the disaster. Having that disagree light or indication
immediately after rotation on climbout could have soothed the nerves of the pilots and made
them feel more confident trusting the perfectly normal instrumentation on the FO's side of
the airplane. But if the high speed clacker, the airspeed tape and the thrust settings aren't
enough information to convince a overwhelmed, elevator control fixated pilot that he/she has
more than adequate speed to avoid stalling, and they should slow down, then it stands to
reason a secondary warning indication would also not break through the mental logjam of two
very overwhelmed pilots bombarded by warnings and data. In the case of Lion Air 610 the
malfunctioning AOA vane had already caused multiple instrument malfunctions and improper nose
down MCAS trimming on three other flights, so it seems like those guys were hellbent on
flying that plane no matter what. Even if Lion Air would have had the optional warning system
onboard the mechanics most likely would have deferred the warning system as broken. "Ops
checks good". They probably would have removed the bulb or stuck a placard on top of it.
And before anyone feels the need to point it out, yes, I'm engaging in speculation, but so
is everyone claiming this optional safety system would have made a difference in the two
aforementioned tragedies. I'm engaging in speculation as a guy who has reviewed thousands of
logbooks and had hundreds, possibly thousands of interactions with airline maintenance
technicians. Some of those interactions include contentious debates over what is safe to
defer or what can actually legally be deferred so I do have a bit of experience in this
department.
Boeing screwed up. They were hasty, they were greedy, they were cavalier, the MCAS trim
system with a single point of failure was a terrible design that was most likely criminal.
I'm just weighing in on 737 pilot's contention. With a system as poorly designed as the MCAS
stall protection trimming, every safety feature available should have come standard from
Boeing, but sadly additional fault indications don't always matter in emergency situations.
Proper fault diagnosis is only part of any successful emergency outcome. Pilots still have to
possess the knowledge and skill required to follow procedures and fly the airplane.
The only planes I ever flew you'd fly w/o pretty much any instrumentation (WW2 trainers,
hoping to fly a Spitfire or Mustang one day.. ).
But in a modern plane, I'd think that _any_ instrument that is doubled or more (which
implies some sort of criticality) should have an automatic "inputs disagree" indicator, which
would not be possible to turn off.
Not that you'll have to buy it as a special feature.
I have been thinking about the modern 737. My completely uninformed guess is that the
original model, while less "safe" was more informative in a real way than the current
one.
In modern cars, especially something like a hybrid, there is not much "feel" to it. In an
older old fashion gasoline engine car, there is. I could use the Volkswagen as an example,
because it only had some colored lights and the speedometer, and none of the safety features
of a modern car. However, I could sense, smell, see just about everything, often
subconsciously, even before something went kablowie because there was nothing isolating me
from the vehicle and the road. Today, I have to depend on my car's sensors because it has
been designed to be quiet and isolating as possible.
The downward slide of corrupt predatory capitalism is not a pretty picture. These cases
will continue as long as the responsible executives know they have nothing to lose.
Just more proof that self regulation works, just look to our favorite sporting events!
There's no need to have refs on the field because everyone involved is a professional and
would never cheat, disrespect the sport or do something against the rules because the fans
would punish them!
If our sports don't need refs, then surely our markets don't need regulators! Checkmate, big
government stooges!
I suppose I am naive, but I am shocked that the behavior of Boeing's management and the
FAA are not being treated as a criminal matter. What happened was not a business mistake, it
was a crime in which a number of persons deliberately and knowingly decided to risk other
people's lives in order to increase profits, as a result of which hundreds of people were
killed. I believe the term is 'negligent homicide', upon conviction of which lesser beings
than high management and bureaucrats go to jail. In some countries their next of kin would
already have received a bill for bullets and services rendered.
The term used to be criminally negligent homicide, but this no longer applies to those
wearing white collars.
Otherwise we would see charges against bankers, opioid pushers, and others.
But Boeing, as part of a duopoly, recognizes that its customers have nowhere to go .at
least for the next few years, which might as well be eternity as far as MBAs are
concerned.
Even if it meant drastically reducing flights why would any airline buy airplanes that are
not guaranteed to be safe? Losing money through fewer paying customers because you are
choosing to have fewer flights is better than being boycotted or bankrupted by lawsuits, or
arrested and criminally charged.
It is inexplicable that Boeing shut off an indicator system for the Max that had been
standard on earlier versions of the 737, when that AoA sensor disagreement indicator was even
more important for safe flight.
Turning it on in the Max version was possible but was made part of an extra-cost safety
package. How would a purchaser know to buy it when Boeing downplayed its importance so as not
to suggest how different the Max was from supposedly similar earlier versions of the 737?
The more that comes out about the conduct of Boeing and its senior management's decisions,
the more they look criminally reckless.
The FAA is mostly responsible for this fiasco because they have a misguided mission.
Safety should be their only concern, but over the years that's eroded into a "sort of safety"
attitude but mostly being a cheerleader for the aviation industry.
And you can't trust bastards like Boeing to "self-certify" anything, apparently!
"..It took months before Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg issued a video in which, among other
things, he said, "We own it." He was referring to safety of the MAX.
This was widely interpreted as Boeing stepping up and taking responsibility for at least
some of the causes of the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes.
Last Wednesday, he took it all back.
On the first quarter earnings call, Muilenburg denied there was any "technical slip or
gap" in designing the now famous MCAS system. He said "actions not taken" contributed to the
crash, a thinly veiled reference once again to pilot error.."
Boeing and FAA are criminally negligent especially for the Ethiopian Airline crash. The
recovered horizontal stabilizer screw jack from the Lion Air crash was found in the full nose
down position that forced the plane to dive into the sea. It should have never be in this is
flight critical position. Grounding the fleet should have been immediate until the cause and
fix were found. On top of all this, it is simply criminal for Boeing to charge Southwest
Airlines for additional safety features and then turn them off not telling the airline.
It is tragic that it appears that Americans will have to rely on China to force Boeing to
actually fix MCAS and along with Canada to shame the FAA into requiring pilot training on
Flight Simulators before flying passengers on the Max.
A Boeing C-Suite executive has to go to jail. If not, there is no chance for the United
States of America to survive. With government run by and for profiteers, long term planning
is dead. Profit over people. A plague, an economic crash, a world war, a middle-class revolt,
flooded coasts, or an autocratic Caesar become inevitable.
[Nader's] niece, 24-year-old Samya Stumo, was among the 157 victims of an Ethiopian
Airlines flight crash last month, less than six months after a flight on the same aircraft,
the Boeing 737 Max 8, crashed in Indonesia.
"She was compassionate from the get-go. She'd be 8 years old and she'd get a pail of hot
water and go to her great-grandmother and soak her feet and rub her feet and dry them. She
was always that way."
Clifford Law has brought suit on behalf of the Stumo family in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. From the
complaint :
Blinded by its greed, BOEING haphazardly rushed the 737 MAX 8 to market, with the
knowledge and tacit approval of the United States Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"),
while BOEING actively concealed the nature of the automated system defects. Numerous
decisions by BOEING's leadership substantially contributed to the subject crash and
demonstrate BOEING's conscious disregard for the lives of others, including but not limited
to BOEING's role in: designing an aircraft with a powerful automated flight control system
[the MCAS] susceptible to catastrophic failure in the event a single defective sensor;
failing to properly inform pilots of the existence of the new flight control system and
educate and train them in all aspects of its operation; failing to properly address the new
system in the aircraft's flight manual; refusing to include key safety features as standard
in the aircraft rather than optional upgrades; delivering 737 MAX aircraft with a version of
the flight control system that was materially different from the version presented to the FAA
during certification; and failing to take appropriate action after BOEING learned that the
737 MAX aircraft was not performing as intended or safety, as was made tragically clear with
the crash of Lion Air Flight JT 610.
BOEING's decision to put profits over safety is further evident in BOEING's repeated
claims that the 737 MAX 8 is so similar to its earlier models that it does not require
significant retraining for those pilots familiar with the older generation of 737s.
All pretty much conventional wisdom at this point! The suit also calls for exemplary (punitive)
damages ; I've embedded the complaint at the end of the post, in case any readers care to
dig into it. I'm not going to examine the case in this post; rather, I'm going to focus on
three items from Naders letter that I think advance the story: His framing for 737 MAX
airworthiness; his highlighting of Boeing's stock buybacks; and his call for Boeing CEO
Muilenburg's defenestration.
(Stalling, in Nader's telling, being the condition the defective MCAS system was meant to
correct.) Because aircraft that are aerodynamicallly unstable, llke fighter jets, have ejection
seats! Now, a pedant would point out that Nader means commercial aircraft , but as
readers know, I eschew pedantry in all contexts. That said, Nader manages to encapsulate the
problem in a single sentence (using antithesis , isocolon , andanaphora ). Now, we have pilots in
the commentariat who will surely say whether Nader's formulation is correct, but to this
layperson it seems to be. From 737 MAX, a fan/geek site, on the business and technical logic of the MCAS system :
The LEAP engine nacelles are larger and had to be mounted slightly higher and further
forward from the previous NG CFM56-7 engines to give the necessary ground clearance. This new
location and larger size of nacelle cause the vortex flow off the nacelle body to produce
lift at high AoA [Angle of Attack]. As the nacelle is ahead of the C of G, this lift causes a
slight pitch-up effect (ie a reducing stick force) which could lead the pilot to
inadvertently pull the yoke further aft than intended bringing the aircraft closer towards
the stall. This abnormal nose-up pitching is not allowable under 14CFR §25.203(a) "Stall
characteristics". Several aerodynamic solutions were introduced such as revising the leading
edge stall strip and modifying the leading edge vortilons but they were insufficient to pass
regulation. MCAS was therefore introduced to give an automatic nose down stabilizer input
during elevated AoA when flaps are up.
Nader on Stock Buybacks
From Nader's
letter , where he is addressing Muilenberg ("you") directly:
Boeing management's behavior must be seen in the context of Boeing's use of its earned
capital. Did you use the $30 billion surplus from 2009 to 2017 to reinvest in
R&D, in new narrow-body passenger aircraft? Or did you, instead, essentially burn this
surplus with self-serving stock buybacks of $30 billion in that period? Boeing is one of the
companies that MarketWatch labelled as "Five companies that spent lavishly on stock buybacks
while pension funding lagged."
Incredibly, your buybacks of $9.24 billion in 2017 comprised 109% of annual
earnings . As you well know, stock buybacks do not create any jobs. They improve the
metrics for the executive compensation packages of top Boeing bosses [ka-ching]. Undeterred,
in 2018, buybacks of $9 billion constituted 86% of annual earnings .
To make your management recklessly worse, in December 2018, you arranged for your
rubberstamp Board of Directors to approve $20 billion more in buybacks. Apparently, you
had amortized the cost of the Indonesian Lion Air crash victims as not providing any
significant impact on your future guidance to the investor world.
Holy moley, that's real money! Nader's detail on the stock buybacks (see NC here
,
here , and here )
interested me, because it bears on Boeing's 2011 decision not to build a new narrow-body
aircraft in 2011. I
summarized the decision-making back in March:
(2) Choice of Airframe : The
Air Current describes the competitive environment that led Boeing to upgrade the 737 to
the 737 MAX, instead of building a new plane:
Boeing wanted to replace the 737. The plan had even earned the endorsement of its
now-retired chief executive. "We're gonna do a new airplane," Jim McNerney
said in February of that same year. "We're not done evaluating this whole situation
yet, but our current bias is to not re-engine, is to move to an all-new airplane at the end
of the decade." History went in a different direction. Airbus, riding its
same decades-long incremental strategy and chipping away at Boeing's market supremacy,
had made no secret of its plans to put new engines on the A320. But its own re-engined jet
somehow managed to take Boeing by surprise. Airbus and American forced Boeing's hand.
It had to put new engines on the 737 to stay even with its rival .
Why? The earlier butchered launch of the 787:
Boeing justified the decision thusly: There were huge and excruciatingly painful
near-term obstacles on its way to a new single-aisle airplane. In the summer of 2011, the
787 Dreamliner wasn't yet done after billions invested and years of delays. More than 800
airplanes later here in 2019, each 787 costs less to build than sell, but it's still
running a $23 billion production cost deficit. . The 737 Max was Boeing's ticket to
holding the line on its position -- both market and financial -- in the near term.
Abandoning the 737 would've meant walking away from its golden goose that helped finance
the astronomical costs of the 787 and the development of the 777X.
So, we might think of Boeing as a runner who's tripped and fallen: The initial stumble,
followed by loss of balance, was the 787; with the 737 MAX, Boeing hit the surface of the
track.
So, Dennis. How's that workin' out for ya? How does the decision not to build a new
plane look in retrospect? Ygeslias writes in
Vox, in April:
Looking back, Boeing probably wishes it had just stuck with the "build a new plane" plan
and toughed out a few years of rough sales, rather than ending up in the current situation.
Right now the company is, in effect, trying to patch things up piecemeal -- a software update
here, a new warning light there, etc. -- in hopes of persuading global regulatory agencies to
let its planes fly again.
What Nader's focus on stock buybacks shows, is that Boeing had the capital to invest in
developing a new plane .
From Bloomberg in 2019 :
For Boeing and Airbus, committing to an all-new aircraft is a once-in-a-decade event.
Costs are prohibitive, delays are the norm and payoff can take years to materialize. Boeing
could easily spend more than $15 billion on the NMA, according to Ken Herbert,
analyst with Canaccord Genuity, and Airbus may be forced into a clean-sheet design if sales
take off.
The sales force has been fine-tuning the design with airlines for at least five years,
creating a "will it or won't it?" drama around the decision on whether to make the plane,
known internally at Boeing as the NMA, for new, middle-of-market airplane.
Now, it is true that the "huge and excruciatingly painful near-term obstacles" referred to
by the Air Current are sales losses that Boeing would incur from putting a bullet into it's
cash cow, the 737, before it turned into a dog (like now?). Nevertheless, Beoing was clearly
capable, as Yglesias points put, of "tough[ing]out a few years of rough sales." So what
else was "excruciatingly painful"? Losing the stock buybacks (and that sweet, sweet
executive compensation). Readers, I wasn't cynical enough. I should have given consideration to
the possibility that Muilenburg and his merry men were looting the company!
Consider, in addition, the statement of two Harvard scholars -- Leonard J. Marcus and Eric
J. McNulty, authors of the forthcoming book, You're It: Crisis, Change, and How to Lead When
it Matters Most. These gentlemen did not achieve their positions by using strong language.
That is why, the concluding statement in their CNN article on March 27, 2019, merits your
closer attention:
"Of course, if Boeing did not act in good faith in deploying the 737 Max and the Justice
Department's investigation discovers Boeing cut corners or attempted to avoid proper
regulatory reviews of the modifications to the aircraft, Muilenburg and any other executives
involved should resign immediately. Too many families, indeed communities, depend on the
continued viability of Boeing."
These preconditions have already been disclosed and are evidentially based. Your
mismanagement is replete with documentation, including your obsession with shareholder value
and executive compensation. There is no need to wait for some long-drawn out, redundant
inquiry. Management was criminally negligent, 346 lives of passengers and crew were lost. You
and your team should forfeit your compensation and should resign forthwith.
All concerned with aviation safety should have your public response.
I can't find anything to disagree with here. However, I'll quote from commenter Guido at
Leeham News,
March 29, 2019 :
What I don't understand: Muilenburg was the CEO when the MCAS code was implemented.
Muilenburg was the CEO when Boeing "tweaked" the certification of the B737Max. It was the
Boeing management that decided, that the B737Max must under no circumstances trigger
simulator training for pilots.
Muilenburg has for sure not written the code for MCAS by himself, but as the CEO he is
responsible for the mess. He is responsible, that the first version of MCAS was cheap and
fast to implement, but not safe. It was basically Muilenburg, who allowed a strategy, that
was basically: Profits and Quickness before safety. Muilenburg has the responsibility for 346
dead people. You can't kill 346 people with your new product and still be the highly paid CEO
of the company. There have to be consequences.
Why are there no calls, that Muilenburg must step down?
However, a search of court documents and news reports shows the company is facing at least
34 claims from victims' families and one claim seeking class certification on behalf of
shareholders. The claims allege Boeing is responsible for losses after installing an unsafe
anti-stall system, called "MCAS" (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), on its
737 Max 8 planes, suspected to have played a role in both crashes. Boeing CEO Dennis
Muilenburg said it was "apparent" the system had been activated in both crashes.
Added to the uncertainty of potential expenses for Boeing are pending regulator
probes. The U.S. Justice Department initiated a criminal investigation into Boeing's Federal
Aviation Administration certification, as well as how it marketed its 737 Max 8 planes. The
U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General is also conducting an
inquiry.
On April 9, the lawsuit seeking class certification was brought on behalf of shareholders who purchased Boeing stock
between January 8, 2019 and March 21, 2019. The proposed class period covers a time frame
beginning after the Lion Air crash, and extending beyond the Ethiopian Airlines crash, when
Boeing's stock experienced a steep decline.
But then again, Muilenberg may know -- or think -- that Boeing, as a national champion, is
too big to fail. So, if Boeing gracefully exits from the commercial aviation business, it may
find the warm embrace of government contracting more comfortable. Perhaps that's why propaganda
like this suddenly started showing up in my Twitter feed:
I suppose it's too much to ask that the CEO of a too-big-to-fail company be asked to resign,
even if he did kill a lot of people. But if Nader can do with the 737 MAX, at the end of his
career, what he did with
the Corvair ("a one-car accident") , when he was coming up, everybody except for a cabal of
looters and liars in Boeing's Chicago C-suite will be a lot better off. So we can hope.
I keep going back to the DC-10 fiasco in the 1970s.
In 1974, in one of the most horrific air disasters of all time, a THY (Turkish Airlines)
DC-10 crashed after takeoff from Orly Airport outside Paris, killing 346 people. The accident
was traced to a faulty cargo door design. (The same door had nearly caused the crash of an
American Airlines DC-10 two years earlier.) McDonnell Douglas had hurriedly designed a plane
with a door that it knew was defective, then, in the aftermath of Paris, tried to cover the
whole thing up. It was reckless, even criminal. Then, in 1979, American flight 191, also a
DC-10, went down at Chicago-O'Hare, killing 273 -- to this day the deadliest air crash ever
on U.S. soil -- after an engine detached on takeoff. Investigators blamed improper
maintenance procedures (including use of a forklift to raise the engine and its pylon), and
then found pylon cracks in at least six other DC-10s, causing the entire fleet to be grounded
for 37 days. The NTSB cited "deficiencies in the surveillance and reporting procedures of the
FAA," as well as production and quality control problems at McDonnell Douglas.
That's two of history's ten deadliest air crashes, complete with design defects, a
cover-up, and 619 dead people. And don't forget the 737 itself has a checkered past, going
back to the rudder problems that caused the crash of USAir flight 427 in 1994 (and likely the
crash of United flight 585 in 1991). Yet the DC-10, the 737, and America's aviation prestige
along with them, have persevered. If we survived the those scandals we can probably manage
this. I have a feeling that a year from now this saga will be mostly forgotten. Boeing and
its stock price will recover, the MAX will be up and flying again, and on and on we go.
This is how it happens.
Maybe. But in 1974, the United States was commercial aviation. Airbus had launched
its first plane, the A300 , only in 1972. We were also an
imperial hegemon in a way we are not now. For myself, I can't help noticing that it was
Boeing's takeover of a wretched, corrupt McDonnell Douglas -- the
famous reverse takeover -- that ultimately turned Boeing from an engineering company into a
company driven by finance. With resulits that we see.
The fact that the CEO and the Board have not resigned just shows everyone that they lack
all the essential characteristics of human beings.
Stock buybacks should be illegal. Profits should only be distributed via dividends or
reinvested. The fact that companies can do this shows how corrupted our governments are.
The rest of the world may forget this one. I won't and there are millions like me who will
never step aboard a boeing plane again.
The only thing that will save this company now is the US govt, which is likely.
Boeing's management is not going to jail and likely will keep their jobs. The deaths of
over three hundred people means nothing. They are not even American and probably only middle
class so they don't have connections to use. The "American" company Boeing has both money and
connections.
Money gives you rights and if you don't have it, you are not even a human being.
Just look at 2008. The Vampiric Octopus called Wall Street was saved by the Feds with
almost no one going to jail, or even criminally prosecuted. The exceptions of an innocent
small community bank in NYC and some low level employees of a very few loan companies. The
entire planetary economy came to with in hours of freezing and then collapsing. Millions of
Americans lost homes, often through questionably legal foreclosures, with many millions more
losing their jobs.
Nothing going to change and I wish I could believe otherwise.
So I should just fire up my own money press then as should everyone else Money was
invented as a limiter by the ancient church then adopted by governments.. Money isnt
necessary to live and it will b thrown overboard soon enough.
I think money as a concept arose in Sumer about 6-7 thousand years ago with the clay
receipts given by the temple of the local city's patron god for livestock and grain stored
there.
But my knowledge of money's history is limited. If anyone wants to correct or clarify,
please do.
Might be wrong but think (if my memory of Gerber serves) you refer to credit/debt. Actual
money (coin) I think arose along side the use of large scale Armies (armies are both highly
mobile & inherently amorphous -- ie people come & go, die, are wounded, loot must be
traded etc, all of which is difficult in the absence of currency)
Stock buybacks were once illegal because they are a type of stock market manipulation. But
then Reagan got in and wanted to do his banker buddies a favour-
To think that Boeing has Ralph Nader of all people on their case. With apologies to Liam
Neeson, Nader might be saying to Muilenberg right now: "If you are looking for (forgiveness),
I can tell you I don't have (forgiveness). But what I do have are a very particular set of
skills, skills I have acquired over a very long career. Skills that make me a nightmare for
people like you. If you go now, that'll be the end of it."
That sounds like good advice that.
Re-outlawing the "Stock Buyback" would be one useful reNew The Deal reform. Outlawing
compensation in stocks, options, or etc. of any kind except money would be another useful
Newer Deal reform. Both together would force-multiply each other's effect.
I hope the four Old Real Democrats have people reading these threads and taking any
possibly-good ideas back to headquarters. I hope the New Catfood Democrats and their people
aren't spying or eavesdropping on these threads.
I love how Nader brings stock buy-backs into his letter and basically connects the dots
from a recklessly designed aircraft system full circle to an indictment of our current
shareholder value system of capitalism and its perverse incentive structure which includes
safety shortcuts and runaway executive compensation. Such a perfect case study for this
site!
I think Nader really should beat the drum heavily on the perverse incentive structure at
Boeing and how executives shortchanged safety to grab more money for themselves because
that's an easy story for a jury to understand. I see where Nader is going with the inherently
"stall prone" aerodynamic design stuff, and he's not wrong, but I think he may be treading on
dangerous ground. Automatic stabilizer trimming systems designed to overcome the negative
aerodynamic attributes of the new 737 Max wing/engine design is a confusing rabbit hole for
the lay person. Boeing attorneys and expert witnesses may be able to twist the jury's head
into a pretzel on this issue. The debate and discussion here concerning process, decision
making, design philosophy etc at Boeing has generally been of very high quality, but has a
tendency to go off the rails when the discussion dives too deeply into the subject matter of
aerodynamics and aircraft systems. I could see the same dynamic playing out in the courtroom.
Nader is the master class-action consumer advocacy attorney not me, but I think he should go
heavy buybacks and whistle blower warnings while avoiding unforced errors arguing over the
not-so-important point of whether or not the 737 Max crashed because it was stall prone or
because it was too stall adverse. Two brand new Boeings crashed, people died, Boeing was
greedy, Boeing was hasty, the MCAS trim system was garbage and probably criminal. He's got a
slam dunk case arguing the MCAS trim system with a single point of failure was poorly
designed and recklessly conceived, I think he should just stick to that and the greed angle
and avoid the stall prone vs. stall adverse debate. I wish him luck.
They screwed up the plane design then thought an extra layer of software would ameliorate
the problem enough. It sucks but it's probably just good enough. Seems pretty simple.
As JerryDenim touched on, a good defense lawyer would probably be able to defeat this
argument in front of a jury. There are too many examples of successful and safe commercial
aircraft with aerodynamic compromises (the hardware, as you call it) that use software fixes
to overcome these limitations. The focus in this case would need to be on the implementation
of that software and how criminal neglect occurred there.
Boeing's attorneys are going to try and make any lawsuits a question of why the airplanes
ultimately crashed. I hate to spoil it for anyone, but I can tell you Boeing's attorneys are
going to blame it all on the pilots. Airlines and airplane manufactures always do. Nothing
new. Dead pilots can't defend themselves, their families don't have millions in the bank and
they aren't going to be placing any billion dollar aircraft orders in the future. If anyone
has read my frequently maligned comments, you already know the line of attack. Not following
the runaway trim procedures and overspeeding the aircraft with takeoff thrust set. That's why
Nader or anyone else pursuing Boeing would do well to sidestep the "why did two Boeing 737
Max Jets crash" question and stick to the details surrounding the horribly flawed MCAS trim
system and the Boeing corporate greed story. Steer clear of the pilots' actions and the
potentially confusing aerodynamics of modern jetliners, keep the focus squarely on the MCAS
trim system design process and executive greed.
Anyone prosecuting Boeing will have to deal with Boeing's defence, which as noted, will
play up the commoness of such technical compromises. I do wonder whether Boeing will go after
the pilots, though.
Any pilots argument naturally raises Boeing's negligence re : training, flight manuals &
communication. The prosecution case will naturally play up the greed aspect as
cause/motivation/
context for the crashes & Boeing's direct responsibility /negligence.
The defense would likely also pull in the airlines and FAA as targets for liability, as
both have some responsibility for these matters. Attacking the FAA would be fodder for the
de-regulators (Privatize it! Government is incompetent!). The airlines would complain that
competition forces them to cut costs, and that they meet all of the (gutted) legal
requirements.
I agree with focusing on the greed aspect. Nader's letter has some technical errors such
as stating the engines were tilted (they were moved horizontally and vertically, not rotated)
that show he hasn't fully understood the details. It doesn't help that many of the changes
made to the 737 MAX from previous generations are actually quite subtle, and can't really be
discussed individually for this context. It is the sum of these changes that made it an
extremely deadly aircraft.
The other failure/business feature is the concept of modularity. The software designed to
fix the aerodynamic complexities is broken down into modular components, and then sold off as
"options". Once again greed sabotages the system. Modularity is a great way to gouge
customers and lock in higher profits. The level of technical competence needed to properly
evaluate what modules are essential complicates the outcome. But then again, this can be
rationalized as a feature not a bug. Blame for failure can be passed around- the customer
should have purchased the entire package.
The runaway externalities emanating from the current form of capitalism as practiced in
the US must be reigned in. Voluntary compliance to some sort of moral code is useless- worse
than useless in that corrupt operators can hide behind lame excuses for failure.
The bigger problem is that Government regulations could solve these problems quickly, as
in throwing people in jail and confiscating their property. A strong argument can be made for
ill-gotten gains. I surely would vote for that if given the chance. Deal drugs and you can
loose your home. What about conscious business decisions
leading to harm?
You need a strong force external to these business concerns for this to happen. The
separation of government and business. Business should operate at the will of the government.
When the government is run with the wellbeing of the people foremost, then issues like
crashing planes can be rectified.
When the interests of business and government merge, then what you have is fascism.
American fascism will have a happy face. These unfortunate problems of crashing planes and
polluted environments will trundle along into the future. Billionaires will continue to
accumulate their billions while the rest of us will trundle along.
But one day, trundling along won't be an option. Maybe only outsiders to the US system can
see this clearly.
You ask: "So when the original 737 was designed, did the engineers have the option of
using these larger engines? Did they decline to do so because it was a flawed design?"
The larger engines currently in use on the 737 Max 8 were not designed until recently.
They did not decline because the current engine wasn't even invented.
I guess what I am wondering is if the original designers of the 737 had the option of
designing a more powerful engine similar to that used in the 737 MAX but declined to do so.
No doubt engine technology has advanced during the 50 years since the first 737's were built.
Could the engineers 50 years ago have designed engines like those on the 737 MAX? If so, what
were there reasons for not doing so?
I also have a second question. I have been told that stalling can be prevented by placing
small wings at the front of an airplane. Would such a design have resolved the problems with
the 737 MAX?
Fifty years of technological improvement, yes. The new engines aren't more powerful,
they're more fuel efficient. Airbus had put more fuel efficient engines on its planes, so
Boeing rushed new engines of its own into service to compete.
But they're really too large to
be mounted on the 737; they mess up the center of gravity. MCAS was a janky software fix to
solve a fundamental hardware problem, because Boeing didn't want to design a new plane.
And
it didn't want to lose money by requiring airlines to retrain pilots, it sold the plane with
the new engines as being exactly the same as the old, a painless upgrade.
Canards, as the small wings at the front of aircraft are sometimes called, would likely
not have been a fix in this case. There are some light aircraft that use these for stall
prevention by utilizing the aerodynamic properties of the wing. Since a stall (absence of
lift) is often caused by the nose of aircraft being too high, you can design the canard so
that it stalls before the main wing. Thus it's difficult for the whole plane to stall, since
the nose will sink when the canard loses lift first and returns the plane to a more
appropriate attitude. An example here:
In high performance aircraft canards are used to increase maneuverability by providing
another control surface.
We generally don't see them in commercial aircraft for a few reasons:
-Aircraft layout would not be conducive to carrying passengers – jetways would be
awkward, doors would be less accessible, visibility out of the cockpit might be
compromised.
-Control surfaces at the tail of the aircraft are more effective, as the lever distance
they act over is often longer. Tail surfaces are easier to place out of the airflow of the
main wing than to place main wing out of the airflow of canards.
-Added complexity for not much added benefit (if we were to add canards to a plane with
tail surfaces as well).
These are of course all very coarse generalizations – engineering is all about
making technical and economic trade-offs.
A radical example of what can be accomplished by a combination of aerodynamics and
software is the B-2 bomber – only one main wing, no tail or canards. I know, it has
ejection seats but I sincerely doubt any aeronautical engineer has ever sat down and thought,
"Hm, well, that's a sketchy design, but screw it, they can just eject if I messed up".
So would Boeing have to design a new plane to use canards? It would probably require the
737 MAX pilots to have new training. Boeing also seemed to want to hide the instability
problem and the canards would be visual evidence for the problem.
The 737 Was designed in the '60. High bypass turbo fan engines had yet to be developed
then. Upgrading the 737 is like adding a plug in hybrid engine to a Ford F100.
The original 737 was designed to be quite low to the ground, to allow for easier boarding
in an era before widespread jetway use (models have even been offered with integrated pull
out boarding stairs), and to allow for more accessible servicing.
This worked well with the
engines of the time, which were often low bypass turbofans, and thus smaller in diameter.
This combination of height and engines made sense for the market it was designed.
Most modern commercial engines are high bypass turbofans, and therefore larger in
diameter. The move to larger fan diameters has been enabled by advances in materials,
manufacturing technology, and simulation software, with the goal of increasing engine power
and efficiency.
Another factor influencing the engine size that can be used without extensive redesign is
the landing gear operation. Because it folds towards the centerline of the plane, and into
pockets in the bottom of the fuselage, there is a limit on how long it can be before it
becomes too long and each side would collide with the other. And one would need to redesign
the wing box structure to accommodate the moved wheels.
Exactly. This is a textbook case of the looting of America.
The $30 billion dollars made
by cutting costs including quality inspection, using an existing airframe, tax cuts and
ignoring safety went directly to stock buybacks that benefited stockholders and C-suite
compensation.
Just like 2008 Boeing is "too big to fail and jailing the executives would
cause it to collapse". Unless Americans demand an end to the corruption and the restoration
of the rule of law; the plundering will continue until there is nothing left to live on.
Boeing could have designed two brand new safe airliners with that cash that would have
provided jobs and efficient transportation into the future but instead the money went into
the pockets of the connected rich and killed 346 people.
What really gets me is that ultimately that would have given the fools more money because
the orders would have kept on coming and probably increase, which would mean more profit and
more compensation for everyone. Of course that would have taken a few years instead of
immediately. So now the compensation is going to crash. Oh wait! They will just sell again to
themselves, strip the company, and sell the nameplate still affixed to some ruin.
I am starting to understand why the Goths had no resistance when in Italy and during the
sack the city of Rome. Centuries earlier the Republic and then the Empire routinely raised
multiple armies and dealt with catastrophes both natural and man made. At the end, not only
could they not readily create an another army, they could not repair the aqueducts. Like we
are becoming, Rome became a hollow shell.
And probably the only stockholders who even benefited would be the individual or
family-dynasty rich stockholders who own many thousands to millions of shares of a particular
stock at a time. It takes ownership of that many shares for a tiny benefit-per-share to add
up to thousands or millions of tiny little benefits-per-share.
People with pensions or 401ks or whatever may well involuntarily "own" 2 or 3 or maybe 10
shares "apiece" of Boeing. But they derived no benefit from the tiny little benefit per share
this maneuver gained for the shares.
Re: appendix 3, over-steer is counter-intuitive as hell. Once it's underway you have to
steer left during a right turn and vice versa. I have watched race drivers do it (very
skillfully) at the track, but there is no way I would want to be in a car that did that in a
pressure or potential accident situation without a lot of training beforehand.
"your obsession with shareholder value": shareholder value is not being attended to if the
company is driven into the ground by virtue of its planes being driven into the ground.
Clearly the definition of "shareholder value" that these bozos use is as defective as
their engineering decision-making.
Hang a few of them pour encourager les autres . And hang a few of the regulators
who thought it would be a dandy idea to let the firm regulate itself.
And hang a few of the lawmakers and lawbuyers who legislatively de-budgeted and
money-starved FAA into this " turn it over to the plane-makers" corner as well.
There is another case of air disaster often referred to in what is known as *Human
Factors* training a L-1011 which *descended* into the glades; while the crew tried to sort
out a problem with a light bulb. I suggest familiarizing with it for perspective. (not to
exonerate Boeing; just to encourage keeping an open mind)
Ahhh, the infamous Captain Buddy. Immortal tyrant of early CRM training fame
Lambert's mention of the DC-10 and it's fatally flawed, explosive decompressing cargo door
sent me down a hole of DC-10 disasters and accident reports. Some of those DC-10 incidents
like America Airlines flight 96 could have been major tragedies but were saved by level heads
and airmanship that by today's standards would be considered exceptional. The AA 96 crew
landed safely with no fatalities after an explosive decompression, a partially collapsed
floor and severely compromised flight controls. The crew had to work together and use
non-standard asymmetrical thrust and control inputs to overcome the effects of a stuck, fully
deflected rudder and a crippled elevator. The pilots of the ill fated United flight 232,
another DC-10, are celebrated exemplars of the early CRM case studies, both crew members and
a United DC-10 instructor pilot who happened to be occupying the jumpseat all worked together
to heroically crash land their horribly stricken craft in Sioux City Iowa with only partial
aileron control and assymetrical thrust to control the airplane. No elevator, no rudder
control. A good number of passengers perished but most lived. Those pilots in the two
instances I mentioned were exceptional, and they had to resort to exceptional means to
control their aircraft, but in light of airmanship of that caliber from just a few decades
ago, it blows my mind that in 2019 the mere suggestion that professional airline pilots
should probably still be capable of moving the thrust levers during a trim emergency is
somehow controversial enough to expose oneself to charges of racism and bias?! Different
times indeed.
Boeing 737 Max aside, airplanes seem to be a lot safer these days than they were in the
1970's and 80's. Widespread acceptance and adoption of CRM/TEM has made personalities like
Captain Buddy and many bad cockpit automation practices relics from the past, but automation
itself still looks to be increasingly guilty of deskilling professional pilot ranks. In light
of that trend, it's a really good thing passenger jets in 2019 are more reliable than the
DC-10 and easier to land than the MD-11.
Deteriorating pilot skills. Yep. Now you're getting it. Problem is, more automation equals
more pilot skill degradation. Everything is just peachy with highly automated "idiot proof"
airplanes until something breaks, then who is supposed to fly the plane if the pilots can't?
The flight attendants? Whoever is sitting in 1A? Airbus airplanes malfunction too, as
documented in a number of well publicized disasters and not-so-well publicized near
disasters, so while this may be an effective marketing pitch to an airline executive not able
or not willing to pay for highly skilled, experienced pilots, it's not a solution to a pilot
skill crisis. Long term, it makes the situation worse.
Personally I believe in training the hell out of pilots because if I get into a plane, I
want a pilot at the controls and not an airplane-driver. I would bet that even I could be
trained to fly an aircraft where most of the functions are automated but when things go
south, that is when you want a pilot in control. Training is expensive but having an
ill-trained pilot in the cockpit is even more expensive.
A thought . A completely fresh plane design is not necessarily safer. There is aways a
trade off between innovation and proven reliability. It is surprisingly rare for an entirely
new aircraft family to be introduced without at least one problem that threatens (but does
not always take) lives.
787 and 737 MAX are not the only problems Boeing have had.
The 737 NG (Next Generation) airplane using composite materials for the aircraft body, was
also outsourced, The idea was that the Body parts would be built to exacting specifications,
so they could be connected at the stage of final assembly. However, the sub-contractor
couldn't live up to the specifications, so Boeing had to manually re-drill holes to connect
the fuselage parts.
Not long after we had a series of crashes, where the fuselage broke up into its parts,
something almost never seen before in airplanes.
There are other Human Factors at play; regarding pilot ability Measuring ability by simply
looking at *hours flown* (often referred to as *experience*) is misleading. Relevant details
might include just what types of experience. It is possible to get airline positions *ab
initio*, or in-house, if you will (with 500 hours, (IIRC) OR:
Prospective pilots from private sector, or military, may be more likely to have diverse
backgrounds; including Flight Instructor background, Upset Recovery training; Aerobatic
flying; and Glider or sailplane background. These are not necessarily prerequisites for
airline hires. Do they make a difference? in emergencies???
The change in Part 135 minimums for non ab-initio applicants has done little or nothing to
improve safety. It did financially squeeze some very competent and capable career minded
pilots out of the pipeline to the left front seat. (thanks chuck.)(f.u.) His feel-good
legislation:*We're doing something about it!*
It isn't just Boeing that is using share buybacks to goose CEO pay. Shareholders of
American Express have an opportunity to vote to Deduct Impact of BuyBacks on Pay. See
American
Express 2019 Proxy Vote Recommendations
But, but Nader made Al Gore lose in 2000. Good to see him out of the shadows (he has a
podcst BTW).
While Boeing deserves every form of condemnation and Muilenberg should resign I do think
the facts that were all laid out in that should-be-Pulitzer-winning Seattle Times series are
being stretched a bit. The problem seems to be, not that the plane is prone to fall out of
the sky, but that its handling characteristics differ from the earlier, ubiquitous, 737
models. MCAS is the defective part, and Boeing will pay plenty
Florida's presidential election in 2000 was expected to be close and likely to be decisive
in the electoral college vote. Nader was a fairly popular third-party candidate for president
in that election. Many supporters of Gore over Bush pleaded for Nader to exit that race and
ask his supporters to vote for Gore. He did neither. In the end the margin of Bush's win in
Florida was tiny, if it existed at all, so there was reason to be angry at Nader, as I was at
the time, since if he had quit the race in that state, Gore would very likely have become
president instead of Bush.
If you're into counterfactual teleology then you might say Nader's stubborn vanity
therefore led to the Iraq and Afghan wars. I don't but it's worth being aware that some
people do.
I can't find the link right now; but, it stated that after close study, most of the voters
who voted for Nadar would not have voted for Gore and would have just sat out the election
resulting in an even more pronounced victory for Bush. Gore's defeat came from his inability
to win his home state of TN.
The claim ignores other factors. Gore's lackadaisical campaign, for one, and its poor
response to the BushCheney campaign's misuse of the legal system to stop the Florida
recount.
It's not Gore's fault the Supreme Court's conservative majority chose to not let the FL
supreme court determine what FL law means, and chose to decide the election itself. But his
response to the Florida debacle was weak, like his campaign. That might be one reason so many
people voted for Nader. That's on Al and on BushCheney.
Some additional information and clarification about the Corvair.
The Corvair had a rear mounted engine and rear wheel drive. This is a poor design from a
handling perspective as the rear weight bias produces a pendulum effect making the Corvair
prone to oversteer. This tendency was exacerbated by the Corvair's swing axle independent
rear suspension with its inherent camber changes as the wheel moved up and down. These
characteristics of the Corvair were deadly in that while cornering if you let off the
accelerator, the engine brakes the rear wheels creating a condition called "throttle lift
oversteer". Under this situation the counterintutive reaction should be to put your foot on
the accelerator and not the brakes. Some of you may recall that comedian Ernie Kovacs was
killed when his Corvair spun off the road in wet weather and hit a utility pole.
A paradox here is that the Porsche 911 has a design very similar to the Corvair, rear
wheel drive, rear mounted engine and rear weight bias and is praised for its handling. The
Corvair was sometimes referred to as a poor man's 911. It too was prone to severe and violent
oversteer if the throttle was lifted while cornering but in the case of the 911 it was
expected that the driver know that while cornering your foot stayed on the accelerator. As
the horsepower of 911s increased over the years the tendency to oversteer was tamed by
fitting larger tires on the rear wheels. With the advent of technologies like antilock
braking systems ,traction control and advanced computers employing torque vectoring to
control vehicle stablity, cars today do have their versions of MCAS and the Porsche can be
referred to as a triumph of engineering over design.
The 911 had pivots at both ends of the stub axles. It would lift throttle oversteer (boy
would it lift throttle oversteer -lots of fun if you knew what you were doing), but it would
not do the jacking rear-end lift that the corvair (pivots only at the differential end of the
half shaft) would do.
Oddly, the VW bug had the exact same layout but Ralph never went after it.
Nader is right to point out the design flaws, which seem to have the potential to cascade
into failure.
The new engine nacelles create unusual lift. Being placed forward of the center of lift,
that causes the nose of the aircraft to rotate vertically upward. If uncorrected, that would
cause the aircraft inappropriately to rise in altitude and/or to approach a stall.
The nacelle-induced lift increases with an increase in engine thrust. That increases speed
and/or reduces the time the pilot has to react and to correct an inappropriate nose-up
attitude.
Boeing seemed unable to correct that design problem through changes in the aircraft's
shape or control surfaces. It corrected it, instead, by having the computer step in to fly
the aircraft back into the appropriate attitude. Works when it works.
But Boeing seems to have forgotten a CompSci 101 problem: shit in, shit out. If the
sensors feeding the computer report bad data, the computer will generate a bad solution.
Boeing also seems to have designed the s/w to reset after manual attitude correction by the
pilot, forcing a correction loop the pilots would not always win.
Boeing elected not to inform aircraft purchasers or their flight crews of their automated
fix to their new aircraft's inherent instability problem. Murphy's Law being what it is
– if something can go wrong, it will – the pilots should have been made aware of
the recommended fix so that when something went wrong it, they would have a chance of fixing
it with a routine response.
Boeing elected not to do that. In the short run, it avoided the need for expensive
additional pilot training. In the long run, Boeing would have hoped to increase sales. When
hoping for the best, it is normal practice to plan for the worst. Boeing seems not to have
done that either.
All this talk of CEO and top managment resignation . honestly they probably don't care.
They have made millions, if not tens of millions of dollars on bonuses; they can retire once
they walk out the door. To change the behaviour of the C-suite you must affect the C-suite
directly, charge convict them with at least criminal negligence or worse.. A drunk driver who
causes the accident will most likley go to jail if someone dies in the accident, how come a
CEO and his mgmt team, can wilfully go against decades of engineering and aviation best
practices that are codified, and still only have to resign??
"... The article also discusses how some frontline FAA safety inspectors wanted to ground the MAXes until the "AoA Disagree" indicators were re-enabled, but were overridden by higher-ups who insisted that it was not a primary safety feature. ..."
Yes, the very last country to pull the 737-MAX out of use is going to be the first to
put it back. There is some serious money being lost by Boeing and the Airlines, and they
want to put a stop to it. This is all about millions and millions of Benjamins, for "they"
are taking a shortct to save even more money.
Simulators are EXPENSIVE, so the plan is to give the pilots a joystick and a computer,
and maybe throw in some lectures and videos of other pilots using a real flight simulator.
Are you ready to rush to reserve a flight?
This isn't a bad deal just for the flight crews and passengers, but the pure stench of
it is contaminating other arenas. A Denier site I'm not going to link has managed to
leverage the lack of regulator oversight by the FAA to lots of other places.
Planes, Automobiles, Bicycles, Homes, Hospitals, Schools, and Sidewalks Can All Be Made
Unsafe by Mad Science, Rush to Market, and Corrupt Regulators
They don't include "vaccines" in that list because their readers understand perfectly
well that if the FAA is a crap agency, why not the FDA as well? Much as I hate to admit it,
the Deniers didn't have to break a sweat to score these perfectly valid points.
Does anyone imagine Volkswagen could have gotten away with all those years of cheating
on their emissions if the regulators had been doing their jobs?
How did China get away with shipping that cancer-causing blood pressure medicine to the
US for so many years? It's safe to assume some bored "regulator" was just waving the stuff
on past without doing a single test.
This is going to cost us. I'm out of links, but here is a headline to consider.
Russia's Irkut aircraft manufacturer has posted the first video of a direct flight by
its MS-21-300 airliner from Irkutsk to Ulyanovsk-Vostochny Airfield.
The brand-new Russian passenger craft is designed to transport up to 211 people over
a distance of 6,400 kilometres.
There are competitors out there, and they can't be fended off by "sanctions" forever.
Allowing unwatched & unregulated companies to run amok is going to hurt us all in the
long term.
Boeing management's behavior must be seen in the context of Boeing's use of its earned
capital. Did you use the $30 billion surplus from 2009 to 2017 to reinvest in R&D, in
new narrow-body passenger aircraft? Or did you, instead, essentially burn this surplus
with self-serving stock buybacks of $30 billion in that period? Boeing is one of the
companies that MarketWatch labelled as "Five companies that spent lavishly on stock
buybacks while pension funding lagged. "
Feathering the Corporate Nest while stiffing the workers. Just what Wall Street loves.
"Ugly" at Boeing isn't a 'skin deep' issue - it's that way clear to the bone!
The article also discusses how some frontline FAA safety inspectors wanted to ground the
MAXes until the "AoA Disagree" indicators were re-enabled, but were overridden by
higher-ups who insisted that it was not a primary safety feature.
A pilot with 30 years of flying
experience and 40 years of design experience rips decisions made by Boeing and the FAA.
Gregory Travis, a software developer and pilot for 30 years wrote a scathing report on the
limitations of the 737, and the arrogance of software developers unfit to write airplane code.
Travis provides easy to understand explanations including a test you can do by sticking your
hand out the window of a car to demonstrate stall speed.
Design shortcuts meant to make a new plane seem like an old, familiar one are to blame.
This was all about saving money. Boeing and the FAA pretend the 737-Max is the same aircraft as
the original 737 that flew in 1967, over 50 years ago.
Travis was 3 years old at the time. Back then, the 737 was a smallish aircraft with smallish
engines and relatively simple systems. The new 737 is large and complicated.
Boeing cut corners to save money. Cutting corners works until it fails spectacularly.
The original 737 had (by today's standards) tiny little engines, which easily cleared the
ground beneath the wings. As the 737 grew and was fitted with bigger engines, the clearance
between the engines and the ground started to get a little um, tight.
With the 737 Max, the situation became critical. The engines on the original 737 had a fan
diameter (that of the intake blades on the engine) of just 100 centimeters (40 inches); those
planned for the 737 Max have 176 cm. That's a centerline difference of well over 30 cm (a foot),
and you couldn't "ovalize" the intake enough to hang the new engines beneath the wing without
scraping the ground.
The solution was to extend the engine up and well in front of the wing. However, doing so
also meant that the centerline of the engine's thrust changed. Now, when the pilots applied
power to the engine, the aircraft would have a significant propensity to "pitch up," or raise
its nose. This propensity to pitch up with power application thereby increased the risk that the
airplane could stall when the pilots "punched it"
Worse still, because the engine nacelles were so far in front of the wing and so large, a
power increase will cause them to actually produce lift, particularly at high angles of attack.
So the nacelles make a bad problem worse.
I'll say it again: In the 737 Max, the engine nacelles themselves can, at high angles of
attack, work as a wing and produce lift. And the lift they produce is well ahead of the wing's
center of lift, meaning the nacelles will cause the 737 Max at a high angle of attack to go to a
higher angle of attack. This is
aerodynamic malpractice
of the worst kind.
It violated that most ancient of aviation canons and probably violated the certification
criteria of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. But instead of going back to the drawing
board and getting the airframe hardware right, Boeing relied on something called the
"Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System," or MCAS.
It all comes down to money
, and in this case, MCAS was the way for both Boeing and
its customers to keep the money flowing in the right direction. The necessity to insist that the
737 Max was no different in flying characteristics, no different in systems, from any other 737
was the key to the 737 Max's fleet fungibility. That's probably also the reason why the
documentation about the MCAS system was kept on the down-low.
Put in a change with too much visibility, particularly a change to the aircraft's operating
handbook or to pilot training, and someone -- probably a pilot -- would have piped up and said, "Hey.
This doesn't look like a 737 anymore." And then the money would flow the wrong way.
When the flight computer trims the airplane to descend, because the MCAS system thinks it's
about to stall, a set of motors and jacks push the pilot's control columns forward. It turns out
that
the Elevator Feel Computer can put a lot of force into that column -- indeed, so much
force that a human pilot can quickly become exhausted trying to pull the column back, trying to
tell the computer that this really, really should not be happening
.
MCAS is implemented in the flight management computer, even at times when the autopilot is
turned off, when the pilots think they are flying the plane. I
n a fight between the flight
management computer and human pilots over who is in charge, the computer will bite humans until
they give up and (literally) die
. Finally, there's the need to keep the very existence of
the MCAS system on the hush-hush lest someone say, "Hey, this isn't your father's 737," and bank
accounts start to suffer.
Those lines of code were no doubt created by people at the direction of managers.
In a pinch, a human pilot could just look out the windshield to confirm visually and directly
that, no, the aircraft is not pitched up dangerously. That's the ultimate check and should go
directly to the pilot's ultimate sovereignty. Unfortunately, the current implementation of MCAS
denies that sovereignty. It denies the pilots the ability to respond to what's before their own
eyes.
In the MCAS system, the flight management computer is blind to any other evidence that it is
wrong, including what the pilot sees with his own eyes and what he does when he desperately
tries to pull back on the robotic control columns that are biting him, and his passengers, to
death.
The people who wrote the code for the original MCAS system were obviously terribly far
out of their league and did not know it. How can they can implement a software fix, much less
give us any comfort that the rest of the flight management software is reliable?
So Boeing produced a dynamically unstable airframe, the 737 Max. That is big strike No.
1. Boeing then tried to mask the 737's dynamic instability with a software system. Big strike
No. 2. Finally, the software relied on systems known for their propensity to fail
(angle-of-attack indicators) and did not appear to include even rudimentary provisions to
cross-check the outputs of the angle-of-attack sensor against other sensors, or even the other
angle-of-attack sensor. Big strike No. 3.
None of the above should have passed muster. It is likely that MCAS, originally added in
the spirit of increasing safety, has now killed more people than it could have ever saved. It
doesn't need to be "fixed" with more complexity, more software. It needs to be removed
altogether
.
Numerous Bad Decisions at Every Stage
Ultimately 346 people are dead because of really bad decisions, software engineer arrogance, and
Boeing's pretense that the 737 Max is the same aircraft as 50 years ago.
It is incredible that the plane has two sensors but the system only uses one. A look out the
window was enough to confirm the sensor was wrong.
Boeing also offered "cheap" versions of the aircraft without some controls. The two crashed
flights were with the cheaper aircraft.
An experienced pilot with adequate training could have disengaged MACS but in one of the crashed
flights, the pilot was desperately reading a manual trying to figure out how to do that.
Flight Stall Test
If you stick you hand out the window of a car and your hand is level to the ground. You have a
low angle of attack. There is no lift. Tilt your hand a bit and you have lift. Your arm will rise.
When the angle of attack on the wing of an aircraft is too great the aircraft enters aerodynamic
stall. The same thing happens with your hand out a car window.
At a steep enough angle your arm wants to flop down on the car door.
The MACS software overrides what a pilot can see by looking out the window.
Useless Manuals
If you need a manual to stop a plane from crashing mid-flight, the manual is useless.
It's already too late.
The pilot had seconds in which to react. Yet, instead of requiring
additional training, and alerting pilots of the dangers, Boeing put this stuff in a manual.
This was necessary as part of the pretense that a 737 is a 737 is a 737.
In my day Pilot's were repeatedly cautioned not to fly the
aircraft to the scene of an accident since nobody survives a high
speed crash or a stall. Non-pilots can vote me down but the
proper action at the second the pilot lost control of his aircraft
that close to the ground should have been to pull power, drop
flaps, and make a soft field landing that some passengers would
have survived.
Sure it's a flying turd, but it will be back in the air soon. The
CEO can spew buzzwords at the speed of sound. The FAA will approve
any fix Boeing pukes forth cause nobody has the moral courage to
stand in the way of making the big money.
I saw that article in Spectrum and while it makes some points
about software development he mixes it up with generic claims way
beyond his expertise. Editors at Spectrum should be fired.
Cirrus Jet got grounded due to this MACS problem.. This CODE is
all over the place and probably in AIRBUS also [(.. I'm
betting that it was stolen from AIRBUS] Computer controlled fly
by wire is death-in-a-box as it can always be hacked.
Boeing thinks it will fix the problem with its "MCAS" software.
While it may do so on paper, there remains the problem of the
weight distribution of engines, cargo and fuel which is placing
the center of gravity behind the center of pressure for this
modified aircraft during flight near the stall point. That problem
is faulty aerodynamics. Any aircraft that is inherently
aerodynamically unstable should never be flown in a commercial
setting. Ground them all. Fire the stupid fools who allowed this
beast to fly, including those at the FAA. And finally, sell your
Boeing stock.
"... "One of the problems we have with the system is, why put a system like that on an airplane in the first place?" said Slack, who doesn't represent any survivors of either the Lion Air or Ethiopia Airlines crashes. "I think what we're going to find is that because of changes from the (Boeing 737) 800 series to the MAX series, there are dramatic changes in which they put in controls without native pitch stability. It goes to the basic DNA of the airplane. It may not be fixable." ..."
"... But it's also important that the pilots get physical feedback about what is going on. In the old days, when cables connected the pilot's controls to the flying surfaces, you had to pull up, hard, if the airplane was trimmed to descend. You had to push, hard, if the airplane was trimmed to ascend. With computer oversight there is a loss of natural sense in the controls. There is only an artificial feel, a feeling that the computer wants the pilots to feel. And sometimes, it doesn't feel so great. ..."
"... An airplane approaching an aerodynamic stall cannot, under any circumstances, have a tendency to go further into the stall. This is called "dynamic instability," and the only airplanes that exhibit that characteristic -- fighter jets -- are also fitted with ejection seats. ..."
"... The airframe, the hardware, should get it right the first time and not need a lot of added bells and whistles to fly predictably. This has been an aviation canon from the day the Wright brothers first flew at Kitty Hawk. ..."
"... When the flight computer trims the airplane to descend, because the MCAS system thinks it's about to stall, a set of motors and jacks push the pilot's control columns forward. It turns out that the flight management computer can put a lot of force into that column -- indeed, so much force that a human pilot can quickly become exhausted trying to pull the column back, trying to tell the computer that this really, really should not be happening. ..."
"... MCAS is implemented in the flight management computer, even at times when the autopilot is turned off, when the pilots think they are flying the plane. In a fight between the flight management computer and human pilots over who is in charge, the computer will bite humans until they give up and (literally) die ..."
"... Like someone with narcissistic personality disorder, MCAS gaslights the pilots. And it turns out badly for everyone. "Raise the nose, HAL." "I'm sorry, Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that." ..."
"... Travis also describes the bad business incentives that led Boeing to conceptualize and present the 737 Max as just a tweak of an existing design, as opposed to being so areodynamically different as to be a new plane .and require time-consuming and costly recertification. To succeed in that obfuscation, Boeing had to underplay the existence and role of the MCAS system: ..."
"... Travis also explains why the FAA allows for what amounts to self-certification. This practice didn't result from the usual deregulation pressures, but from the FAA being unable to keep technical experts from being bid away by private sector players. Moreover, the industry has such a strong safety culture (airplanes falling out of the sky are bad for business) that the accommodation didn't seem risky. ..."
"... The 737 Max saga teaches us not only about the limits of technology and the risks of complexity, it teaches us about our real priorities. Today, safety doesn't come first -- money comes first, and safety's only utility in that regard is in helping to keep the money coming. The problem is getting worse because our devices are increasingly dominated by something that's all too easy to manipulate: software ..."
Even though Boeing is scrambling to fix the software meant to counter the 737 Max's increased propensity to stall as a result
of the placement of larger, more fuel=efficient engines in a way that reduced the stability of the plane in flight, it's not clear
that this will be adequate in terms of flight safety or the public perception of the plane. And even though the FAA is almost certain
to sign off on Boeing's patch, foreign regulators may not be so forgiving. The divergence we've seen between the FAA and other national
authorities is likely to intensify. Recall that China grounded the 737 Max before the FAA. In another vote of no confidence, even
as Boeing was touting that its changes to its now infamous MCAS software, designed to compensate for safety risks introduced by the
placement of the engines on the 737 Max, the Canadian air regulator said he wanted 737 Max pilots to have flight simulator training,
contrary to the manufacturer's assertion that it isn't necessary. Last week, the Wall Street Journal reported that
American Airlines is developing 737 Max flight simulator training .
But a fundamental question remains: can improved software compensate for hardware shortcomings? Some experts harbor doubts. For
instance, from the Spokane
Spokesman-Review
:
"One of the problems we have with the system is, why put a system like that on an airplane in the first place?" said Slack,
who doesn't represent any survivors of either the Lion Air or Ethiopia Airlines crashes. "I think what we're going to find is
that because of changes from the (Boeing 737) 800 series to the MAX series, there are dramatic changes in which they put in controls
without native pitch stability. It goes to the basic DNA of the airplane. It may not be fixable."
"It is within the realm of possibility that, if much of the basic pitch stability performance of the plane cannot be addressed
by a software fix, a redesign may be required and the MAX might not ever fly," [aviation attorney and former NASA aerospace engineer
Mike] Slack said.
An even more damming take comes in
How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer in IEEE Spectrum (hat tip Marshall Auerback). Author Greg Travis
has been a software developer for 40 years and a pilot. He does a terrific job of explaining the engineering and business considerations
that drove the 737 Max design. He describes why the plane's design is unsound and why the software patch in the form of MCAS was
inadequate, and an improved version is unlikely to be able to compensate for the plane's deficiencies.
Even for those who have been following the 737 Max story, this article has background that is likely to be new. For instance,
to a large degree, pilots do not fly commercial aircraft. Pilots send instructions to computer systems that fly these planes. Travis
explains early on that the As Travis explains:
In the 737 Max, like most modern airliners and most modern cars, everything is monitored by computer, if not directly controlled
by computer. In many cases, there are no actual mechanical connections (cables, push tubes, hydraulic lines) between the pilot's
controls and the things on the wings, rudder, and so forth that actually make the plane move ..
But it's also important that the pilots get physical feedback about what is going on. In the old days, when cables connected
the pilot's controls to the flying surfaces, you had to pull up, hard, if the airplane was trimmed to descend. You had to push,
hard, if the airplane was trimmed to ascend. With computer oversight there is a loss of natural sense in the controls. There is
only an artificial feel, a feeling that the computer wants the pilots to feel. And sometimes, it doesn't feel so great.
Travis also explains why the 737 Max's engine location made the plane dangerously unstable:
Pitch changes with power changes are common in aircraft. Even my little Cessna pitches up a bit when power is applied. Pilots
train for this problem and are used to it. Nevertheless, there are limits to what safety regulators will allow and to what pilots
will put up with.
Pitch changes with increasing angle of attack, however, are quite another thing. An airplane approaching an aerodynamic stall
cannot, under any circumstances, have a tendency to go further into the stall. This is called "dynamic instability," and the only
airplanes that exhibit that characteristic -- fighter jets -- are also fitted with ejection seats.
Everyone in the aviation community wants an airplane that flies as simply and as naturally as possible. That means that conditions
should not change markedly, there should be no significant roll, no significant pitch change, no nothing when the pilot is adding
power, lowering the flaps, or extending the landing gear.
The airframe, the hardware, should get it right the first time and not need a lot of added bells and whistles to fly predictably.
This has been an aviation canon from the day the Wright brothers first flew at Kitty Hawk.
Travis explains in detail why the MCAS approach to monitoring the angle of attack was greatly inferior to older methods .including
having the pilots look out the window. And here's what happens when MCAS goes wrong:
When the flight computer trims the airplane to descend, because the MCAS system thinks it's about to stall, a set of motors
and jacks push the pilot's control columns forward. It turns out that the flight management computer can put a lot of force into
that column -- indeed, so much force that a human pilot can quickly become exhausted trying to pull the column back, trying to
tell the computer that this really, really should not be happening.
Indeed, not letting the pilot regain control by pulling back on the column was an explicit design decision. Because if the
pilots could pull up the nose when MCAS said it should go down, why have MCAS at all?
MCAS is implemented in the flight management computer, even at times when the autopilot is turned off, when the pilots think
they are flying the plane. In a fight between the flight management computer and human pilots over who is in charge, the computer
will bite humans until they give up and (literally) die
Like someone with narcissistic personality disorder, MCAS gaslights the pilots. And it turns out badly for everyone. "Raise
the nose, HAL." "I'm sorry, Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that."
Travis also describes the bad business incentives that led Boeing to conceptualize and present the 737 Max as just a tweak of
an existing design, as opposed to being so areodynamically different as to be a new plane .and require time-consuming and costly
recertification. To succeed in that obfuscation, Boeing had to underplay the existence and role of the MCAS system:
The necessity to insist that the 737 Max was no different in flying characteristics, no different in systems, from any other
737 was the key to the 737 Max's fleet fungibility. That's probably also the reason why the documentation about the MCAS system
was kept on the down-low.
Put in a change with too much visibility, particularly a change to the aircraft's operating handbook or to pilot training,
and someone -- probably a pilot -- would have piped up and said, "Hey. This doesn't look like a 737 anymore."
To drive the point home, Travis contrasts the documentation related to MCAS with documentation Cessna provided with an upgrade
to its digital autopilot, particularly warnings. The difference is dramatic and it shouldn't be. He concludes:
In my Cessna, humans still win a battle of the wills every time. That used to be a design philosophy of every Boeing aircraft,
as well, and one they used against their archrival Airbus, which had a different philosophy. But it seems that with the 737 Max,
Boeing has changed philosophies about human/machine interaction as quietly as they've changed their aircraft operating manuals.
Travis also explains why the FAA allows for what amounts to self-certification. This practice didn't result from the usual deregulation
pressures, but from the FAA being unable to keep technical experts from being bid away by private sector players. Moreover, the industry
has such a strong safety culture (airplanes falling out of the sky are bad for business) that the accommodation didn't seem risky.
But it is now:
So Boeing produced a dynamically unstable airframe, the 737 Max. That is big strike No. 1. Boeing then tried to mask the 737's
dynamic instability with a software system. Big strike No. 2. Finally, the software relied on systems known for their propensity
to fail (angle-of-attack indicators) and did not appear to include even rudimentary provisions to cross-check the outputs of the
angle-of-attack sensor against other sensors, or even the other angle-of-attack sensor. Big strike No. 3.
None of the above should have passed muster. None of the above should have passed the "OK" pencil of the most junior engineering
staff, much less a DER [FAA Designated Engineering Representative].
That's not a big strike. That's a political, social, economic, and technical sin .
The 737 Max saga teaches us not only about the limits of technology and the risks of complexity, it teaches us about our real
priorities. Today, safety doesn't come first -- money comes first, and safety's only utility in that regard is in helping to keep
the money coming. The problem is getting worse because our devices are increasingly dominated by something that's all too easy
to manipulate: software
I believe the relative ease -- not to mention the lack of tangible cost -- of software updates has created a cultural laziness
within the software engineering community. Moreover, because more and more of the hardware that we create is monitored and controlled
by software, that cultural laziness is now creeping into hardware engineering -- like building airliners. Less thought is now
given to getting a design correct and simple up front because it's so easy to fix what you didn't get right later .
It is likely that MCAS, originally added in the spirit of increasing safety, has now killed more people than it could have
ever saved. It doesn't need to be "fixed" with more complexity, more software. It needs to be removed altogether.
There's a lot more in
this meaty piece . Be sure to read it in full.
And if crapification by software has undermined the once-vanuted airline safety culture, why should we hold out hope for any better
with self-driving cars?
Automation is not the issue. Boeing cutting corners and putting only one or two angle of attack sensors is. Just like a man
with two clocks can't tell the time, if one of the sensors malfunctions, the computer has no way of knowing which one is wrong.
That's why Airbus puts three sensors in its aircraft, and why Boeing's Dreamliner has three computers with CPUs from three different
manufacturers to get the necessary triple redundancy.
Thus this is really about Boeing's shocking negligence in putting profits above safety, and the FAA's total capture to the
point Boeing employees did most of the certification work. I would add the corrosion of Boeing's ethical standards was completely
predictable once it acquired McDonnell-Douglas and became a major defense contractor.
I beg to differ since it looks like you didn't read the article in full, as a strongly recommended. The article has a section on the cost of fixing hardware problems versus software problems. Hardware problems are enormously
costly to fix.
The plane has a hardware problem resulting from Boeing not being willing to risk having to recertify a fuel efficient 737.
So rather than making the plane higher off the ground (new landing gear, which other articles indicate was a non-starter since
it would lead to enough other changes so as to necessitate recertification) and trying to fix a hardware problem with software.
That has two knock-on problems: it's not clear this will ever be adequate (not just Travis' opinion) and second, it's risky given
the software industry's propensity to ship and patch later. Boeing created an additional problem, as Travis stresses, by greatly
underplaying the existence of MCAS (it was mentioned after page 700 in the documentation!) and maintaining the fiction that pilots
didn't need simulator training, which some regulators expect will be the case even after the patch.
You also miss the point the article makes: the author argues (unlike in banking), the FAA coming to rely on the airlines for
certification wasn't a decision they made, but an adaptation to the fact that they could no longer hire and retain the engineers
they needed to do the work at the FAA on government pay scales. By contrast, at (say) the SEC, you see a revolving door of lawyers
from plenty fancy firms. You have plenty of "talent" willing to work at the SEC, but with bad incentives.
Thank you for reviewing this. 700+ pages! I thought it was paywalled bec. so slow to download. The resistance to achieving
fuel efficiency is front and center these days. One thing I relate it to is the Macron attitude of punishing the fuel consumer
to change the market. Cart before horse. When the FAA sent down fuel efficiency requirements it might have been similarly preemptive,
now in hindsight. There should have been legislation and regulation which adjusted the profitability of the airline industry via
better tax breaks or regulations against aggressive competition. The safety of airlines would have been upheld if the viability
of the company were protected. So even domestic protectionism when it comes to safety. And in so doing, the FAA/congress could
also have controlled and limited airline use which tries to make up in volume for all the new costs it incurs. It's a serious
problem when you are so carefree as a legislator that you let the free market do it. What a mess. Quality is the first thing to
go.
reminds me of what was said about risk departments inside banks -- deliberately lowly paid, so that anyone with skills would
move on or easily be hired away. Was it you? Bill Black? Luyendijk? I don't remember. Either way..
I did read the article completely and I was an aircraft commander of a C-141A during the Viet Nam war and I am a degreed electrical
engineer.
Having flown the C-141A for several thousand hours I am very familiar with the aircraft pitching up almost uncontrollably.
A favorite trick that C -141 flight instructors pulled on pilots new to aircraft was to tell the student pilot to "go around"
(for the first time during his training) on an approach. The student pilot followed the flight manual procedure and started to
raise the nose while advancing the throttles to full power. However, what wasn't covered in the flight manual was the fact that
a HUGE trim change occurred when the engines went from near idle to full power. To regain control, it took both hands (arms) to
move the yoke away from your chest while running nose down trim. While you were doing this the airplane was trying to stand on
its tail. On the other hand none of us ever forgot the lesson.
The C-141 was not fly by wire; however all control surfaces were equipped with hydraulic assist and "feel springs" to mimic
control feel without the hydraulics. The feel springs for the elevators must have been selected using a human subject like Arnold
Schwarzenegger because (in my opinion) they were much stronger than necessary. The intent was to prevent the pilots from getting
into excessive angles of pitch, which absolutely would occur if you weren't prepared for it on a "go around".
What Fazal & V have said is basically correct. The max has four angle of attack vanes. The MAIN problem was that Boeing decided
to go cheap and only connect one of the vanes to the MCAS. If they had connected two, the MCAS would be able to determine that
one of them was wrong and disconnect itself. That would have eliminated the pitch down problem that caused the two crashes.
Connecting that second AOA vane would not have created any certification issues and would have made Boeing's claim about the
"Max" being the "same" as previous versions much closer to the truth. Had they done that we wouldn't be talking about this.
Another solution would have been to disable the MCAS if there was significant counter force on the yoke applied by the pilot.
This has been used on autopilot systems since the 1960's. But not consistently. The proper programming protocol for the MCAS exists
and should have been used.
I agree that using only one AOA vane and the programming weren't the only really stupid things that Boeing did in this matter.
Insufficient information and training given to the pilots was another.
Yes. second, it's risky given the software industry's propensity to ship and patch later.
-this is one of the main themes in the Dilbert cartoon strip.
the author argues (unlike in banking), the FAA coming to rely on the airlines for certification wasn't a decision they made,
but an adaptation to the fact that they could no longer hire and retain the engineers they needed to do the work at the FAA on
government pay scales.
-That's what happens when you make 'government small enough to drown in a bathtub' , i.e. starve of the funds necessary to
do a good job.
My 2¢ . Boeing's decision to cut manufacturing corners AND give the autopilot MCAS system absolute control might have been
done (just a guess here, based on the all current the 'self-driving' fantasies in technology ) to push more AI 'self-drivingness'
into the airplane. (The 'We don't need expensive pilots, we can use inexpensive pilots, and one day we won't need pilots at all'
fantasy.) Imo, this makes the MCAS system, along with the auto AI self-driving systems now on the road no better than beta
test platforms And early beta test platforms, at that.
It's one thing when MS or Apple push out a not quite ready for prime time OS "upgrade", then wait for all the user feedback
to know where it the OS needs more patches. No one dies in those situations (hopefully). But putting not-ready for prime time
airplanes and cars on the road in beta test condition to get feedback? yikes . my opinion.
It is interesting that a software bug that appears in the field costs very roughly ten times as much as one caught in QA before
being released, yet most managements continue to slight QA in favor of glitzy features. I suppose that preference follows supposed
customer demand.
Boeing, the FAA, and the airlines seriously screwed up the introduction of this aircraft so badly it cost lives. The article
by Travis is however written by someone out of his depth, even though he has more familiarity with aircraft and software than
the average person. There are numerous factual errors and misrepresentations, which many commenters (with more detailed knowledge
of the subjects) on the article point out. One of the principles of aviation safety is to identify and fix failures without finger
pointing, in order to encourage a culture of openness and cooperation. The tone of the article takes the opposite approach while
trying to argue from (undeserved) authority. I agree with his critique that these incidents are a result capitalism run amok –
that should, in my opinion, be separate from a discussion of the technical problems and how to fix them.
If Boeing had adhered to that cardinal principle of openness, there might be no failure to fix via "a culture of openness and
cooperation". These catastrophic failures were a result of Boeing not being open with its customers about the safety implications
of its redesign of the 737 Max and instead choosing the path of obfuscation to sell the idea of seamless fleet fungibility to
airlines.
Looking through the comments the complaints about the article seemed to be in one of three areas-
– Questioning the author's credentials (you're just a Cessna pilot!)
– Parroting the Boeing line that this was all really pilot error
– Focusing on some narrow technical element to discredit the article
The majority of comments were in agreement with the general tenor of the piece, and the author engaged politely and constructively
with some of the points that were brought up. I thought the article was very insightful, and sometimes it does take an outsider
to point out that the emperor has no clothes.
I'd like to see a reference for your assertion that the "principles of aviation safety" preclude finger pointing. Unless I'm
very much mistaken the whole purpose of an FAA accident investigation is to determine the root cause, identify the responsible
party, and, yes, point fingers if necessary.
The general point I was trying to make, perhaps poorly worded, is that the only goal is to identify the problem and fix it,
and not to focus primarily on assigning blame as vigorously as possible. Mistakes occur for many reasons – some of them nefarious,
some not. Excessive finger pointing, especially before a full picture of what went wrong has been developed, fosters a tendency
to coverups and fear, in my opinion.
Regarding your other points, the technical details are vital to understand clearly in almost any aviation incident, as there
is never one cause, and the chain of events is always incredibly complex. Travis' analysis makes the answers too easy.
From what I understand the light touch approach was more about getting people to honestly divulge information during the investigation
period, of which, assisted in determining cause.
This "light touch" approach is used throughout the aviation industry, all the way from initial design to aircraft maintenance,
as the purpose is to make sure that anyone, no matter the rank or experience, can bring up safety concerns before incidents occur
without fear of repercussions for challenging authority. It's likely that this cornerstone of aviation culture was ignored at
too many points along the way here.
I am not defending Boeing, the FAA, or the airlines. Serious, likely criminal, mistakes were made by all.
I however take issue with Travis' approach of assigning blame this early and vigorously while making errors in explaining what
happened. He especially attacks the the development process at Boeing, since software is his speciality, although he makes no
claims as to having worked with real time or avionics software, aside from using products incorporating it. These are quite different
types of software from normal code running a website or a bank. He does not, and can not, know what occurred when the code was
written, yet makes significant declarations as to the incompetence of the engineers and coders involved.
If he were leading the investigation, I believe the most likely outcome would be pushback and coverup by those involved.
It's likely that this cornerstone of aviation culture was ignored at too many points along the way here.
I am not defending Boeing, the FAA, or the airlines. Serious, likely criminal, mistakes were made by all.
I however take issue with Travis' approach of assigning blame this early
I don't disagree with your description of how it used to be. However, since the FAA has reduced its regulatory role, and by
extension given aircraft manufactures more leash to run with ideas that shouldn't be followed, we're left with the situation that
large, potentially crippling tort lawsuits are one of the only checks left on manufacturer stupidity or malfeasance. Think of
the Ford Pinto bolt-too-long-causing-gas-tank-explosions case. If the FCC won't make manufacturers think twice when internal engineers
say 'this isn't a good idea, isn't a good design', maybe the potential of a massive lawsuit will make them think twice.
And this is where we get into pointing the finger, assigning blame, etc. I'm assuming there are good engineers at Boeing who
warned against these multiple design failure and were ignored, the FCC was see-no-evil here-no-evil, and the MCAS went forward.
Now come the law suits. It's the only thing left to 'get Boeing's attention'. I don't know if Travis' is too early. It's likely
there's been plenty of chatter among the Boeing and industry engineers already. imo.
Training a pilot is building a very complicated automation system : what kind of thought process do you expect within the short
timeframe (few minutes) of a crisis in a cockpit ? Kant's critique of pure reason ?Somehow people seem more comfortable from death
coming from human error (I.e. a bad human automation system) that death coming from a design fault, but a death is a death
The problem is not automation vs no automation, it is bad corner-cutting automation vs good systematic and expensive automation.
It is also bad integration between pilot brain based automation and system automation, which also boils out to corner cutting,
because sharing too much information about the real behaviour of the system (if only it is known accurately ) increases the complexity
and the cost of pilot training.
Real safety comes from proven design (as in mathematical proof). It is only achievable on simple systems because proofing is
conceptually very hard. A human is inevitably a very complex system that is impossible to proof, therefore, beyond a certain standard
of reliability, getting the human factor out of the equation is the only way to improve things further. we are probably close
to that threshold with civil aviation.
Similarly, regarding cars, the considerable improvement in death per km travelled in the last 30 years cannot be attributed
only to better drivers, a large part comes from ESP and ABS becoming standard (see
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811182
). If this is not automation, what is ?
It looks as if you didn't read the piece. The problem, which the author makes explicit, is the "ship now, patch later" philosophy
that is endemic in software design.
And it would be better to look at flight safety stats within markets. You have great swathes of the emerging world starting
to fly on airplanes during this period. I'm not saying the general trend isn't correct, but I would anticipate it's to a significant
degree attributable to the maturation of emerging economy air systems. For instance, I flew on Indonesia's Garuda in the early
1990s and was told I was taking a safety risk; I'm now informed that it's a good airline. Similarly, in the early 1980s I was
doing business in Mexico, and the McKinsey partner I was traveling with (who as a hobby read black box transcripts from plane
crashes) was very edgy on the legs of our travels when we had to use AeroMexico (as in he'd natter on in a way that was very out
of character for a typical older WASP-y guy, he was close to white knuckle nervous).
Garuda's transition from "safety risk" to "good airline" was an actual occurrence. At one point Garuda and all other Indonesian
air lines were prohibited from flying in the EU because of numerous crashes that were the result of management issues, that forced
the airline(s) to change their ways.
ABS is an enhancement. MCAS is a kludge to patch up massive weaknesses introduced into the hardware by a chain of bad decisions
going back almost 20 years.
Boeing should have started designing a new narrow-body when they cancelled the 757 in 2004. Instead, they chose to keep relying
on the 737. The end result is MCAS and 300+ deaths.
"There are numerous factual errors and misrepresentations, which many commenters (with more detailed knowledge of the subjects)
on the article point out."
Not sure why anyone would mis-characterise comments. The first comment points out a deficiency, and explains it. There was only
one other commenter, who alleged errors – but without explaining what those could be. He was later identified by another person
as a troll. Almost all other comments were complimentary of the article. So why make the above assertion?
We have a noteworthy number of newbie comments making poorly-substantiated digs at the Spectrum IEEE piece. We've also seen
this sort of non-organic-looking response when we've put up pro-union pieces when political fights were in play, like Wisconsin's
Scott Walker going after unions.
Travis does indeed play fast and loose with a number of things. For example, his 0-360 engine does *not* have pistons the size
of dinner plates (at a 130mm bore it isn't even the diameter of a particularly large saucer). MCAS is a stability augmentation
system not stall prevention system and the 737 MAX wasn't "unstable" it was insufficiently stable. The 737 trim system acts on
the stabilizer not the elevator (which is a completely different control surface). etc.
For the most part, it doesn't affect the thrust of his arguments which are at a higher level. However it does get distracting.
Thank you – I was beginning to wonder what the difference was between unstable and insufficiently stable. Not that this is
a subject to make jokes about.
Yeah, but sometimes the choice is to laugh or cry, and after constantly going WTF!?! every time I read about this horror, even
mordantly grim humor is nice.
Investigators pipe up, but my understanding of a proper investigation is: a. find out what happened; b. find out why the incident
occurred; c. what can be done to prevent.
The public opinion has already sailed I think, against the company. If negligent, adverse-safety decisions were made, the head
people should be prosecuted accordingly.
Yet, I feel this isn't going to happen despite the reality that billions of humans never want to fly a boeing jet again. Why
would you risk it? Toast and deservedly imho
"Agile" "use-case driven" software development: very dangerous, takes the disruptive, crappification approach (under some hands)
of trying to identify the minimum investment to hit the minimal requirements, particularly focusing on an 80/20 Pareto rule distribution
of efforts.
Which may be good enough for video delivery or cell-phone function, but not for life-critical or scientifically-critical equipment
Many people here are assuming Boeing uses modern software-development methodology in spite of flaws that make such an approach
iffy in this field. Why assume that?
When I worked, many years ago now, as a Boeing software engineer, their software-development practices were 15 years behind
the rest of the world. Part of that was sheer caution and conservatism re new things, precisely because of the safety culture,
and part of it was because they did not have many of the best software people. They could rarely hire the best in part because
cautious, super-conservative code is boring. Their management approach was optimized to get solid systems out of ordinary engineers
with a near incomprehensible number of review and testing steps.
Anyone in this audience worked there in software recently? If not, fewer words about how they develop code might be called
for. Yes, the MCAS system was seriously flawed. But we do not have the information to actually know why.
> Anyone in this audience worked there in software recently? If not, fewer words about how they develop code might be called
for.
4/16 Links included a lengthy spiel from Reddit via Hacker News by a
software engineer who worked at Boeing 10 years ago (far more recently than you) which detailed the horrors of Boeing's dysfunctional
corporate culture at length. This is in addition to many other posts covering the story from multiple angles.
NC has covered this topic extensively. Maybe try familiarizing yourself with their content before telling others to shut up.
Excuse me? Are ad hominem attacks fine now? I didn't tell anyone to "shut up" or contradict the great amount of good reporting
on Boeing's management dysfunction.
I just pointed out that at one time, yes way back there, there was a logic to it and that the current criticism here of its
software-development culture in particular seems founded on a combination of speculation and general disgust with the software
industry.
Whatever else I am or however wrong I may sometimes be, I am an engineer, and real engineers look for evidence.
Moving the engines in itself didn't introduce safety risks, this tendency to nose up was always there. The primary problem
is Boeing wanted to pretend MAX is the same plane as NG (the previous version) for certification and pilot training purposes.
Which is why the MCAS is black box deeply hardwired into the control systems and they didn't tell pilots about it. It was supposed
to be invisible, just sort of translating layer between the new airframe and pilots commanding it as the old one.
And this yearning for pre-automation age, for directly controlling the surfaces by cables and all, is misguided. People didn't
evolve for flying, it's all learned the hard way, there is no natural way to feel the plane. In fact in school they will drill
into you to trust the instruments and not your pedestrian instincts. Instruments and computers may fail, but your instincts will
fail far more often.
After all 737 actually is old design, not fly by wire. And one theory of what happened in the Ethiopian case is that when they
disengaged the automatic thing, they were not able to physically overcome the aerodynamic forces pushing on the plane. So there
you have your cables & strings operated machine.
I don't see basis for your assertion about safety risks given the counter-evidence in the form of the very existence of the
MCAS software. Every article written on it points out it was to prevent the possibility of the plane stalling out when "punching
up". And as the article describes, there were two design factors, the placement of the engines and the nacelles, which led to
it generating too much lift in certain scenarios.
And your argument regarding what happened when the pilot turned off the autopilot is yet another indictment of Boeing's design.
This is not "Oh bad pilots," this is "OMG, evidence of another Boeing fuckup." This is what occurred when the pilots disabled
MCAS per instructions.
Have you not heard of purely mechanical systems that allow for the multiplication of force? It's another Boeing design defect
that the pilots couldn't operate the flight stabilizer when the plane was under takeoff stresses. That's a typical use case!
And it was what Boeing told pilots to do and it didn't work!
From Reuters (apparently
written before the black box detail revealed that the pilots could not control the stabilizers):
Boeing pointed to long-established procedures that pilots could have used to handle a malfunction of the anti-stall system,
regardless of whether the pilots knew MCAS existed.
That checklist tells pilots to switch off the two stabilizer trim cutout switches on the central console, and then to adjust
the aircraft's stabilizers manually using trim wheels.
And that's one of they should worry about most, since that's one of highest risk times for flight, and the plane should have
been engineered with that scenario in mind. This raises the possibility that the inability of the pilots to handle the plane manually
in takeoff also somehow resulted from the changes to the aerodynamics resulting from the placement of the bigger engines.
This is his argument about how the reliance on software has led to undue relaxation of good hardware design principles:
The original FAA Eisenhower-era certification requirement was a testament to simplicity: Planes should not exhibit significant
pitch changes with changes in engine power. That requirement was written when there was a direct connection between the controls
in the pilot's hands and the flying surfaces on the airplane. Because of that, the requirement -- when written -- rightly imposed
a discipline of simplicity on the design of the airframe itself. Now software stands between man and machine, and no one seems
to know exactly what is going on. Things have become too complex to understand.
Pitch changes with power changes are common in aircraft. Even my little Cessna pitches up a bit when power is applied. Pilots
train for this problem and are used to it.
Again, the plane already had the habit of picthing up and the changes didn't add that. The question isn't if, but how much
and what to do about it. Nowhere did I read MAX exceeds some safety limits in this regard. If Boeing made the plane to physically
break regulations and tried to fix it with software then indeed that would be bad. However, I'm not aware of that.
As for the Ethiopian scenario, I was talking about
this article . It says when they tried manual, it very well could be beyond their physical ability to turn the wheels and
so they were forced to switch electrical motors back on, but that also turned up MCAS again. In fact it also says this seizing
up thing was present in the old 737 design and pilots were trained to deal with it, but somehow the plane become more reliable
and training for this failure mode was dropped. This to me doesn't look like good old days of aviation design ruined by computers.
You should read the Ethiopian Government's crash preliminary crash report. Very short and easy to read. Contains a wealth of
information. Regarding the pilot's attempt to use the manual trim wheel, according to the crash report, the aircraft was already
traveling at 340 knots indicated airspeed, well past Vmo or the aircraft's certified airspeed when they first attempted to manually
trim the nose up. It didn't work because of the excessive control forces generated by high airspeeds well beyond the aircraft's
certification. I'm not excusing Boeing, the automated MCAS nose down trim system was an engineering abomination, but the pilots
could have made their lives much easier by setting a more normal thrust setting for straight and level flight, slowing their aircraft
to a speed within the normal operating envelope, then working their runaway nose-down pitch emergency.
I didn't like the IEEE Spectrum piece very much since the author seemed to miss or exaggerate some issues, and also seemed
to confuse flying a Cessna with being expert about large airliners or aerospace engineering. The title says "software engineer"
but at the end he says "software executive". Executive doesn't always mean non-engineer but it does mean someone who is full of
themselves, and that shows through the whole article. The stuff I'm seeing from actual engineers (mostly on Hacker News) is a
little more careful. I'm still getting the sense that the 737 MAX is fundamentally a reasonable plane though Boeing fucked up
badly presenting it as a no-retraining-needed tweak to the older 737's.
There's some conventional wisdom that Boeing's crapification stems from the McDonnell merger in 1997. Boeing, then successful,
took over the failing and badly managed McDonnell. The crappy McDonnell managers then spent the next years pushing out the Boeing
managers, and subsequently have been running Boeing into the ground. I don't know how accurate that is, but it's a narrative that
rings true.
You are misrepresenting the Hacker News criticisms, and IMHO they misrepresent the piece. They don't question his software
chops. And if you really knew the software biz, "software executive" often = developer who built a company (and that includes
smallish ones). The guy OWNS a Cessna, which means he's spent as much on a plane as a lot of people spend on a house. If he was
a senior manager as you posit, that means at large company, and no large company would let an employee write something like this.
He's either between gigs or one of the top guys in a smallish private company where mouthing off like this won't hurt the business.
Notice also his contempt for managers in the article).
He's also done flight simulator time on a 757, and one commentor pointed out that depending on the simulator, it could be tantamount
to serious training, as in count towards qualifying hours to be certified to fly a 757.
They do argue, straw manning his piece, that he claims the big failure is with the software. That in fact is not what the article
says. It says that the design changes in the 737 Max made it dynamically unstable, which is an unacceptable characteristic in
any plane, no matter what size. He also describes at length the problem of relying on only one sensor as an input to the MCAS
and how that undermined having the pilots be able to act as a backup .by looking at each other's instrumentation results.
The idea that he's generalizing from a Cessna is absurd. He describes how Cessnas have the pilot having greater mechanical
control than jets like the 737. He describes how the pilots read the instrument results from each side of the plane, something
which cannot occur in a Cessna, a single pilot plane. He refers to the Cessna documentation to make the point that the norm is
to over-inform pilots as to how changes in the software affect how they operate the plane, not radically under-inform them as
Boeing did with the 737 Max.
As to the reasonableness of Travis' concerns, did you miss that a former NASA engineer has the same reservations? Are you trying
to say he doesn't understand how aircraft hardware works?
He owns a 1978 Cessna 172 , goes for about $70K,
so not quite house prices, more like a nice Tesla, whose drive by wire systems he seems to trust far more for some reason.
In regard to "dynamic instability" being unacceptable, this is a red herring. Most modern airliners rely on flight characteristic
augmentation systems in normal operation, trim systems being the most common. Additionally, there are aircraft designed
to be unstable (fighters) but rely on computers to fly them stably, to greatly increase manoeuvrability.
In regard to Cessnas being single pilot planes, the presence of flight controls on both sides of the cockpit would somewhat
bring into question this assertion .? Most 172s do however have only one set of instrumentation. When operating with two pilots
(as with let's say a student pilot and instructor) you would still have the issue of two pilots trying to agree on possibly faulty
readings from one set of non-redundant instruments.
No, it's a 1979 Cessna, and you don't know when he bought it and how much use it had, since price is significantly dependent
on flight hours. The listings I show it costs over $100K. A quick Google search says a plane with a new feel is closer to $300K.
Even $100K in equity is more than most people put down when buying a house
He also glides, and gliders often own or co-own their gliders.
The author acknowledges your point re fighters. Did you miss that he also says they are the only planes where pilots can eject
themselves from the aircraft? Arguing from what is acceptable for a fighter, where you compromise a lot on other factors to get
maneuverability, to a commercial jet is dodgy.
Regarding fighters and instability, I'm not the one that stated it's "an unacceptable characteristic in any plane, no matter
the size".
I am completely on Travis' side when it comes to the issues with culture and business that brought on these incidents. Seeing
however that these affected and overrode good engineering, I believe it's vitally important that the engineering is discussed
as accurately as possible. Hence my criticism of the piece.
Had you looked at prices as you claimed to, Cessnsa 172s specify the year in the headline description. 1977 v. 1978 v 1979
on a page I got Googling for 1979.
You are now well into the terrain of continuing to argue for argument sake.
I agree with you that the article is good and the criticisms I've read seem largely unmerited (quite a few of those btl on
that article are clearly bad faith arguments), but just to clarify:
That in fact is not what the article says. It says that the design changes in the 737 Max made it dynamically unstable,
which is an unacceptable characteristic in any plane, no matter what size.
My understanding (non-engineer, but long time aviation nerd) is that many aircraft, including all Airbus's are dynamically
unstable and use software to maintain stability. The key point I think that the article makes is that there is a fundamental difference
between designing hardware and software in synchronicity to make a safe aircraft (i.e Airbus), and using software as a fudge to
avoid making hard decisions when the hardware engineers find they can't overcome a problem without spending a fortune in redesigns.
Hard engineering 'fudges' are actually really common in aircraft design – little bumps or features added to address stability
problems encountered during testing – an example being the little fore planes on the
Tupolev 144 supersonic airliner. But it seems Boeing
took a short cut with its approach and a lot of people paid for this with their lives. Only time will tell if it was a deep institutional
failure within Boeing or just a flaw caused by a rushed roll-out.
I've personal experience of a catastrophic design flaw (not one that could kill people, just one that could cost hundreds of
millions to fix) which was entirely down to the personal hang-ups of one particular project manager who was in a position to silence
internal misgivings. Of course, in aircraft design this is not supposed to happen.
I'm reminded of the famous "software is eating the world" quote by uber VC Marc Andreessen. He posits that in an era where
Silicon valley style, software led disruption stalks every established industry, even companies that "make things" (hardware)
need a radical rethink in terms of how they see themselves. A company like Boeing, under this worldview, needs to think of itself
as a software company with a hardware arm attached, otherwise it might have its lunch eaten by a plucky upstart (to say nothing
of Apple or Google) punching above its weight.
It's not farfetched to imagine an army of consultants selling this "inoculate yourself from disruption" thinking to companies
like Boeing and being taken seriously. With Silicon valley's obsession with taking humans out of the loop (think driverless cars/trucks,
operator-less forklifts etc) one wonders whether these accidents will highlight the limitations of technology and halt the seemingly
inexorable march towards complex automation reducing pilots to cockpit observers coming along for the ride.
Ad homimem and therefore logically invalid. Plus reading comprehension problem. The "native pitch stability" comment was from
Mike Slack, a former NASA engineer, and not Travis, the Cessna owner.
I think that the point is that there are aircraft that don't take over the controls and dive into the ground. It's possible
to have these kinds of aircraft. These kinds of aircraft are good to have. It's like an existence proof.
No, not dangerously pro-automation. More like dangerously stuck in the past, putting bandaids on a dinosaur to keep false profits
rolling in. AF447 could be argued against excessive automation, but not the Max.
i think they are real profits. And the automation that crashed two planes over a short time span and it wasn't excessive? Band
aids on what was one of the safest planes ever made (how many 737's crashed pre 737 max? the hardware problem was higher landing
gear along with engines that were larger and added lift to the plane. MCAS was intended to fix that. It made it worse. I won't
be flying on a MAX.
Thanks for the article but re the above comments–perhaps that 737 pilot commenter should weigh in because some expert commentary
on this article is badly needed. My impression from the Seattle Times coverage is that the MCAS was not implemented to keep the
plane from falling out of the sky but rather to finesse the retraining issue. In other words a competent pilot could handle the
pitch up tendency with no MCAS assist at all if trained or even informed that such a tendency existed. And if that's the case
then the notion that the plane will be grounded forever is dubious indeed.
This isn't quite correct, and I suggest you read the article in full.
The issue isn't MCAS. It is that MCAS was to compensate for changes in the planes aerodynamics that were so significant that
it should arguably have been recerttified as being a different plane. That was what Boeing was trying to avoid above all Former
NASA engineer Mike Slack makes that point as well. Travis argues that burying the existence of MCAS in the documentation was to
keep pilots from questioning whether this was a different plane:
It all comes down to money, and in this case, MCAS was the way for both Boeing and its customers to keep the money flowing
in the right direction. The necessity to insist that the 737 Max was no different in flying characteristics, no different in
systems, from any other 737 was the key to the 737 Max's fleet fungibility. That's probably also the reason why the documentation
about the MCAS system was kept on the down-low.
Put in a change with too much visibility, particularly a change to the aircraft's operating handbook or to pilot training,
and someone -- probably a pilot -- would have piped up and said, "Hey. This doesn't look like a 737 anymore." And then the
money would flow the wrong way.
I think you just said what I said. My contention is that the only reason the plane could ever be withdrawn is that the design
is so inherently unstable that this extra gizmo–the MCAS–was necessary for it to fly. Whereas it appears the MCAS was for marketing
purposes and if it had never been added to the plane the two accidents quite likely may never have happened–even if Boeing didn't
tell pilots about the pitch up tendency.
But I'm no expert obviously. This is just my understanding of the issue.
From what I've read at related links in the last week, a significant element is common type rating. Manufacturers don't have
to go through expensive recertification if their modifications are minor enough, earning a common type rating. Thus, the successive
incarnations of the 737 over the decades.
I'm only a layman, but a citizen who tries to stay informed and devours material on this topic. The common type rating merry
go round needs to stop. It seems at least that a new engine with a different position that alters the basic physics of the plane
shouldn't qualify for common type rating, which should be reserved only for the most minor of modifications.
As one who has followed the entirety of the MAX stories as detailed by the Seattle Times aviation reporters, it all comes back
to "first principles": a substantive change in aerodynamics by introduction of an entirely new pair of engines should have required
complete re-engineering of the airframe. We know that Boeing eschewed that approach, largely for competitive and cost considerations,
and subsequently tried to mate the LEAP engines to the existing 737 airframe by installing the MCAS, amongst other design "tweaks",
i.e., "kludging" a fix. Boeing management recognized that this wouldn't be the "perfect" aircraft, but with the help of a compliant
FAA and a huge amount of "self-assessment", got the beast certified and airborne -- -- until the two crashes, that is. Whether
the airlines and/or the flying public will ever accept the redo of MCAS and other ancillary fixes is highly problematic, as the
entire concept was flawed from the kick-off.
Also, it should be mentioned in passing that even the LEAP engines are having some material-wear issues:
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/cfm-reviews-fleet-after-finding-leap-1a-durability-i-442669/
Th IEEE Spectrum piece is somewhat reasonable but the author obvious lacks technical knowledge of the 737. He also does not
understand why MCAS was installed in the first place.
For example:
– "However, doing so also meant that the centerline of the engine's thrust changed. Now, when the pilots applied power to the
engine, the aircraft would have a significant propensity to "pitch up," or raise its nose.
– The MAX nose up tendency is a purely aerodynamic effect. The centerline of the thrust did not change much.
– "MCAS is implemented in the flight management computer, "
– No. It is implemented in the Flight Control Computer of which there are two. (There is only on FMC unit.)
-" It turns out that the Elevator Feel Computer can put a lot of force into that column -- "
– The Elevator Feel unit is not a computer but a deterministic hydraulic-mechanical system.
– "Neither such [software] coders nor their managers are as in touch with the particular culture and mores of the aviation
world as much as the people who are down on the factory floor, "
– The coders who make the Boeing and Airbus systems work are specialized in such coding. Software development for aircrafts It
is a rigid formularized process which requires a deep understanding of the aviation world. The coders appropriately implement
what the design engineers require after the design review confirmed it. Nothing less, nothing more.
and more than a dozen other technical misunderstandings and mistakes.
If the author would have read some of the PPRUNE threads on the issue or asked an 737 pilot he would have known all this.
Given what has happened with Boeing manufacture (787s being delivered with tools and bottles rattling around in them), you
have no basis for asserting how Boeing does software in practice these days.
And you have incontrovertible evidence of a coding fail: relying on only one sensor input when the plane had more than one
sensor. I'm sorry, I don't see how you can blather on about safety and coders supposedly understanding airplanes with that coded
in.
JeffC who actually worked at Boeing years ago and said the coding was conservative (lots of people checked it) because they
were safety oriented but also didn't get very good software engineers, since writing software at Boeing was boring.
I still have some trouble blaming the 737 losses, ipso facto, on using automation to extend an old design. There are
considerably more complex aircraft systems than MCAS that have been reliably automated, and building on a thoroughly proven framework
usually causes less trouble than suffering the teething problems of an all new design.
At the risk of repeating the obvious, a basic principle of critical systems, systems which must be reliable, is that they can
not suffer from single point failures. You want to require at least two independent failures to disturb a system, whose combined
probability is so low that other, unavoidable failure sources predominate, for example, weather or overwhelming, human error.
This principle extends to the system's development. The design and programming of a (reliable) critical system can not suffer
from single point failures. This requires a good many, skilled people, paying careful attention to different, specific stages
of the process. Consider a little thing I once worked on: the indicator that confirms a cargo door is closed, or arguably, that
is neither open nor unlatched. I count at least five levels of engineers and programmers, between Boeing and the FAA, that used
to validate, implement and verify the work of their colleagues, one or more levels above and/or below: to insure the result was
safe.
I bet what will ultimately come out is that multiple levels of the validation and verification chain have been grievously degraded
("crapified") to cut costs and increase profits. The first and last levels for a start. I am curious and will ask around.
The MAX isn't a proven framework. Boeing fundamentally altered the 737 design by shifting the position of the engines. The
MCAS fudge doesn't fix that.
My own impression is that there seems to be a clash between three separate philosophies at work here. The first is the business
culture of Boeing which had supplanted Boeing's historical aviation-centric ways of doing things in aircraft design. The bean-counters
& marketing droids took over, outsourced aircraft construction to such places as non-union workshops & other countries, and thought
that cutting corners in aircraft manufacture would have no long-term ill effects. The second philosophy is that of software design
that failed to understand that the software had to be good to go as it was shipped and had little understanding of what happens
when you ship beta-standard software to an operational aircraft in service. This was to have fatal consequences. The third culture
is that of the pilots themselves which seek to keep their skills going in an aviation world that wants to turn them into airplane-drivers.
If there is any move afoot to have self flying aircraft introduced down the track, I hope that this helps kill it.
Boeing is going to take a massive financial hit and so it should. Heads should literally roll over this debacle and it did not
help their case when they went to Trump to keep this plane flying in the US without thought as to what could have happened if
a US or Canadian 737 MAX had augured in. The biggest loser I believe is going to be the US's reputation with aviation. The rest
of the aviation world will no longer trust what the FAA says or advise without checking it themselves. The trust of decades of
work has just been thrown out the door needlessly. Even in the critical field of aircraft crash investigation, the US took a hit
as Ethiopia refused the demands that the black boxes be sent to the US but sent them instead to France. That is something that
has flown under the radar. This is going to have knock-on effects for decades to come.
Beginning to look like a trade war with the EU. airbus, boeing, vw, US cars; but haven't seen Japan drawn into this yet. Mercedes
Benz is saying EV cars are nonsense, they actually create more pollution than diesel engines and they are recommending methane
gasoline (that sounds totally suicidal), and hydrogen power. Hydrogen has always sounded like a good choice, so why no acclaim?
It can only be the resistance of vested interests. The auto industry, like the airline industry, is frantically trying to externalize
its costs. Maybe we should all just settle down and do a big financial mutual insurance company that covers catastrophic loss
by paying the cost of switching over to responsible manufacturing and fuel efficiency. Those corporations cooperate with shared
subsidiaries that manufacture software to patch their bad engineering – why not a truce while they look for solutions?
The whole 737 development reminds me of a story a GM engineer told me. Similarly to the aviation industry, when GM makes modifications
to an existing part on a vehicle, if the change is small enough the part does not need to be recertified for mechanical strength,
etc. One of the vehicles he was working on had a part failure in testing, so they looked at the design history of the part. It
turns out that, similarly to 737, this was a legacy part carried over numerous generations of the vehicle.
Each redesign of the vehicle introduced some changes, they needed to reroute some cabling, so they would punch a new hole through
the part. But because the change was small enough the engineering team had the option of just signing off on the change without
additional testing. So this went on for years, where additional holes or slits were made in the original part and each change
was deemed to be small enough that no recertification was necessary. The cumulative change from the original certification was
that this was now a completely different part and, not surprisingly, eventually it failed.
The interesting part of the story was the institutional inertia. As all these incremental changes were applied to the part,
nobody bothered to check when was the last time part was actually tested and what was the part design as that time. Every step
of the way everybody assumed their change is small enough not to cause any issue and did not do any diligence until a failure
occured.
Which brings me back to the 737, if I am not mistaken, 737 MAX is, for certification purposes, considered an iteration of the
original 737. The aircraft though is very different than the original, increased wingspan (117′ vs 93′), length (140′ vs. 100′).
737 NG is similarly different.
So for me the big issue with the MAX is the institutional question that allowed a plane so different from the original 737
certification to be allowed as a variant of the original, without additional pilot training or plane certification. Upcoming 777X
has the same issue, it's a materially different aircraft (larger wingspan, etc.) that has a kludge (folding wingtips) to allow
it to pass as a variant of the original 777. It will be interesting to see, in the wake of the MAX fiasco, what treatment does
the 777X get when it comes to certification.
The FAA needs to be able to follow these tweaks. Maybe we citizens need a literal social contract that itemizes what we expect
our government to actually do.
BTW, I do not believe that the problems are insoluble, or as a result of a design philosophy, but rather it is a result of
placing sales over engineering.
There are a number of aerodynamic tweaks that could have dealt with this issue (larger horizontal tail comes to mind, but my
background is manufacturing not aerodynamics), but this would require that pilots requalify for a transition between the NG and
the MAX, which would likely mean that many airlines would take a second look at Airbus.
We should avoid blaming "software" or "automation" for this accident. The B737 MAX seems to be a case of "Money first, safety
second" culture, combined with insufficent regulatory control.
The root of the B737 MAX accidents was an erroneous safety hazard assessment: The safety asessment (and the FAA) believed the
MCAS had a 0.6 authority limit. This 0.6 limit meant that an erroneous MCAS function would only have limited consequences. In
the safety jargon, its severity was classifed as "Major", instead of "Catastrophic".
After the "Major" classification was assigned, the subsequente design decions (like using a single sensor, or perhaps insufficient
testing) are acceptable and in line with the civil aviation standards.
The problem is that the safety engineer(s) failed to understand that the 0.6 limit was self-imposed by the MCAS software, not
enforced by any external aircraft element. Therefore, the MCAS software could fail in such a way that it ignored the limit. In
consequence, MCAS should have been classifed "Catastrophic".
Everybody can make mistakes. We know this. That is why these safety assessments should be reviewed and challenged inside the
company and by the FAA. The need to launch the MAX fast and the lack of FAA oversight resources surely played a greater role than
the usage of software and automation.
Yves: Thanks for this post; it has (IMO) a level-headed perspective. It is not about assigning *blame*, it is about *What,
Why, and How to Prevent* what happened from re-occurring. Blame is for courts and juries. Good luck finding jurors who are not
predisposed; due to relentless bombardment with parroted misinformation and factoids.
I wonder how often MCAS kicked in on a typical 737MAX flight, in situation where the weather vane advising of angle attack
was working as per normal. Since we are excluding the time when auto-pilot is working and also the time when the flaps are down,
there is only a very small time window immediately after take off. I would venture to guess that the MCAS would almost always
adjust the plane at least once. This is once too many, if one is to believe that the notion of design improvement includes improvement
in aerodynamic behavior. The fact that MCAS could only be overridden by disabling the entire motor control of the trim suggests
that the MCAS feature is absolutely necessary for the thing to fly without surprise stalls. There is no excuse in a series of
a product for handling associated with basic safety becoming worse with a new model. Fuel efficiency is laudable and a marketable
thing, but not when packaged together with the bad compromise of bad flight behavior. If the fix is only by lines of code, they
really have not fixed it completely. We know they are not going to be able to move the engines or the thrust line or increase
the ground clearance of the plane so the software fix will be sold as the solution. While it probably does not mean that there
will be more planes being trimmed to crash into the ground, it does make for some anxiety for future passengers. Loss of sales
would not be a surprise but more of a surprise will be the deliveries that will be completed regardless.
MCAS was intended to rarely if ever activate. It is supposed to nudge the aircraft to a lower angle of attack if AoA is getting
high to cause instability in certain parts of the flight envelope. An overly aggressive takeoff climb would be an example. Part
of the problem is that a faulty AoA sensor resulted in the system thinking it was at this extreme case, repeatedly, and in a way
that was difficult for the pilots to identify since they had not been properly trained and the UX was badly implemented.
Yes I've heard that. But do not believe it, given how it is implemented. So I really would like to know how it behaves in non-catastrophic
situations. If so benign, why not allow it to turn off without turning off trim controls? Did not the earlier 737's not need this
feature?
In a non-catastrophic situation, and if functioning correctly, it's my understanding it would felt by the flight crew as mild
lowering of the nose by the system. This is is to keep the plane from increasing angle of attack, which could lead to a stall
or other instability.
It's my understanding MCAS should be treated as a separate system from the trim controls, although they both control the pitch
of the stabilator. Trim controls are generally not "highly dynamic", in that the system (or pilot) sets the trim value only occasionally
based primarily on things like the aircraft weight distribution (this could however change during a flight as fuel is burned,
for example). MCAS on the other hand, while monitoring AoA continuously in flight modes where it is activated only kicks in to
correct excessive inputs from the pilots, or as a result of atmospheric disturbances (wind shear would be one possible cause of
excessive AoA readings).
Neither trim nor MCAS are required to manually fly the plane safely if under direct pilot control and the the pilot is fully
situationally aware.
Earlier 737s did not need this feature due to different aerodynamic properties of the plane. They however still have assistive
features such as stick shakers to help prevent leaving the normal flight envelope.
I've read a bit more in regard to allowing MCAS to turn off without turning off trim, I have no idea why it was implemented
as it was, since previous 737s allow separate control of trim and MCAS. More here:
This however still doesn't change the fact that neither is required to fly the plane, given proper training and communication,
both of which were criminally lacking.
IBG, YBG corporate decisions by people who will probably never fly in these planes, complete regulatory capture and distract
with the little people squabbling over technical details. In China there would probably already have been a short trial, a trip
to the river bank, a bullet through the head, organ harvesting for the corporate jocks responsible. Team Amrika on the way down.
On the subject of software, the underlying issue of ship and patch later is because the process of software is full of bad
practice.
Two examples, "if" and "new".
If is a poor use of a stronger mechanism, FSMs, or Finite State Machines.
'new' is a mechanism that leads to memory leaks, and crashes.
I developed some middleware to bridge data between maineframs and Unix systems that ran 7×24 for 7 years continuously without
a failure, because of FSMs and static memory use.
In an email to me (and presumably to all AAdvantage program members) transmitted at 03:00 April 17 UTC ( i.e. , 11 PM
April 16 US EDT), American Airlines states that it is canceling 737 MAX flights through August 19 (instead of June 5 as stated
by the earlier newspaper story cited in this post).
Eliminating introductory and concluding paragraphs that are marketing eyewash (re. passenger safety and convenience), the two
payload paragraphs state in their entirety:
To avoid last-minute changes and to accommodate customers on other flights with as much notice as possible before their
travel date, we have made the decision to extend our cancellations for the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft through August 19, 2019,
while we await recertification of the MAX.
While these changes impact only a small portion of our more than 7,000 departures each day this summer, we can plan more
reliably for the peak travel season by adjusting our schedule now. Customers whose upcoming travel has been impacted as a result
of the schedule change are being contacted by our teams.
I'm surprised this has not already appeared in earlier comments. Anybody else get this?
Now do Tesla & their bs Tesla Autonomy Investor Day please.
It appears to have it all from beta testing several ton vehicles on public roads, (like BA's beta testing of the MAX) to regulatory
capture( of NTSB, & NTHSA as examples) and a currently powerful PR team.
Apparently they're going to show off their "plan" how one will be able to use their Tesla in full autonomous mode while every
other OEM sez it can't be done by the end of this year let alone within a couple decades as the average person perceives autonomous
driving.
First of all, I didn't read the article, so I'm not going to critique it. There were some comments in the excerpt that Yves
provided that I think require some clarification and/or correction.
The 737 is not a fly-by-wire (FBW) aircraft. There are multiple twisted steel control cables that connect the flight control
in the cockpit to the various control surfaces. The flight controls are hydraulically assisted, but in case of hydraulic (or electric)
failure, the cable system is sufficient to control the aircraft.
In both the 737NG and the MAX, there are automation functions that can put in control inputs under various conditions. Every
one of these inputs can be overridden by the pilot.
In the case of the recent MAX accidents, the MCAS system put in an unexpected and large input by moving the stabilizer. The
crews attempted to oppose this input, but they did so mostly by using elevator input (pulling back on the control column). This
required a great deal of arm strength which they eventually could not overcome. However, if either pilot had merely used the strength
of their thumb to depress the stabilizer trim switch on the yoke, they could have easily opposed and cancelled out whatever input
MCAS was trying to put in. Why neither pilot took this fairly basic measure should be one of the key areas of investigation.
These comments are not intended in any way to exonerate Boeing, the FAA, and the compromises that went into the MAX design.
There is a lot there to be concerned about. However, we are not dealing with a case of an automation system that was so powerful
and autonomous that pilots could not override what it was trying to do.
Bjorn over at Leeham had this analysis:
"the Flight Crew followed the procedures prescribed by FAA and Boeing in AD 2018-23-51. And as predicted the Flight Crew could
not trim manually, the trim wheel can't be moved at the speeds ET302 flew."
In other words, the pilots followed the Boeing recommended procedure to turn off the automatic trim, but at the speeds they
were flying and the large angle that MCAS has moved the stabilizer to, the trim wheels were bound up and could not be moved by
human effort.
They then turned electric trim on to try to help their effort, and MCAS put the nose down again.
Also: Did no one ever test the humans factors of this in a simulator? At HP, when we put out a new printer, we had human factors
bring in average users to see if using our documentation, they could install the printer.
It is mind-blowing to me that Boeing and the FAA can release an Air Worthiness Directive (The fix after the Lion crash) that
was apparently never simulator tested to see if actual humans could do it.
None of the above should have passed muster. None of the above should have passed the "OK" pencil of the most junior engineering
staff, much less a DER [FAA Designated Engineering Representative].
That's not a big strike. That's a political, social, economic, and technical sin .
This is the thing that has been nagging me all along about this story. The "most junior engineering staff" thing is not an
exaggeration – engineers get this drilled into them until it's part of their DNA. I read this and immediately thought that it
points to a problem of culture and values (a point I was pleased to see the author make in the next paragraph). Bluntly, it tells
us that the engineers are not the ones running the show at Boeing, and that extends even to safety critical situations where their
assessment should trump everything.
One of two things needs to happen as a result of this. Either Boeing needs to return to the old safety first culture, or it
needs to go out of business. If neither happens, we are going to see a lot more planes falling out of the sky.
I want to reemphasize that all airplane crashes are a chain of events; if one event does not occur there are no causalities.
Lion Air flight should never have flow with a faulty sensor. But afterwards when the elevator jackscrew was found in the full
nose down position that forced the plane to dive into the Java Sea, Boeing and FAA should have grounded the fleet until a fix
was found. The deaths in Ethiopia are on them. The November 2018 737-8 and -9 Airworthiness Directive was criminally negligent.
Without adequate training the Ethiopian Airline pilots were overwhelmed and not could trim the elevator after turning off the
jackscrew electric motor with the manual trim control due to going too fast with takeoff thrust from start to finish. With deregulation
and the end of government oversight, the terrible design of the 737 Max is solely on Boeing and politicians who deregulated certification.
Profit clearly drove corporate decisions with no consideration of the consequences. This is popping up consistently now from VW
to Quantitative Easing, or the restart of the Cold War. Unless the FAA requires pilot and copilot simulator training on how to
manually trim the 737 Max with all hell breaking loose in the cockpit, the only recourse for customers is to boycott flying Boeing.
Ultimately the current economic system that puts profit above all else must end if humans are to survive.
Before last month's crash of a flight that began in Ethiopia, Boeing Co. said in a legal
document that large, upgraded 737s "cannot be used at what are referred to as 'high/hot'
airports."
At an elevation of 7,657 feet -- or more than a mile high -- Addis Ababa's Bole
International Airport falls into that category. High elevations require longer runways and
faster speeds for takeoff.
remove Share link Copy Trump would have been better off Tweeting something like...
"The safety of the flying public worldwide is of the utmost importance to all of us. I have
been in constant contact with Boeings CEO and have complete confidence that the improvements
they are making will make the 737MAX one of the safest planes ever built. No 737 MAX will take
to the skies that I would not put my own family member on".
See the problem with the max is it will never be safe. What boeing did was try and put a
square peg in a round hole. To save costs both in certification and pilot training boeing
decided to just take the 737 airframe and put bigger more fuel efficient engines on it so
they wouldn't loose market share to airbus. That was a stupid mistake. The bigger engines
hung so low they had to mount them higher and more forward thus creating aerodynamic issues.
The new engine mounting causes air flow disruption over the inner wing during climb out. That
is why they messed with the mcas. You cannot break the laws of physics and then fix them with
software. Sorry that will never work.
Boeing is still delivering the 73NG and should make an offer to the airlines to replace
each MAX order 1 for 1 with a 737-800 or -900 at cost. The traveling public will have
immediate confidence, the airlines can fill schedules, and Boeing can clean house on the MAX
"leadership" team.
"... Boeing "effectively put profitability and growth ahead of airplane safety and honesty" by rushing the 737 MAX to market without "extra" or "optional" safety features - a practice that has outraged the company's critics - as it feared ceding market share to Airbus SE. Moreover, Boeing failed to disclose a conflict of interest surrounding its 'regulatory capture' of the FAA, which was revealed to have outsourced much of the approval process for the 737 MAX to Boeing itself. ..."
"... Of course, this shareholder lawsuit is only the tip of the legal iceberg for Boeing. The company will likely face a blizzard of lawsuits filed by family members of those killed during the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes, the first of which has already been filed. ..."
Boeing shareholders who lost money selling their stock after the Ethiopian Airlines crash are suing
the company
for concealing unflattering material information from the public, defrauding
shareholders in the process,
Reuters
reports.
The class-action lawsuit, filed in Chicago, is seeking damages after the
March 10 crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 wiped $34 billion off Boeing's market cap within
two weeks. But if true, the crux of the lawsuit might have broader repercussions for the company as
it tries to convince regulators to lift a grounding order that has kept the Boeing 737 MAX 8
grounded since mid-March.
In essence, the suit alleges that
the company concealed safety concerns about the 737
MAX and its anti-stall software
following the Lion Air crash in October that killed 189
people,
but did nothing to alert the public or correct the issue.
Boeing "effectively put profitability and growth ahead of airplane safety and honesty" by
rushing the 737 MAX to market without "extra" or "optional" safety features - a practice that
has outraged the company's critics - as it feared ceding market share to Airbus SE. Moreover,
Boeing failed to disclose a conflict of interest surrounding its 'regulatory capture' of the
FAA, which was revealed to have outsourced much of the approval process for the 737 MAX to
Boeing itself.
Lead plaintiff Richard Seeks bought 300 Boeing shares in early March and sold them at a loss
after the shares dumped more than 12% in the weeks after the second crash, which would have left
him with a loss between $15,000 and $20,000. The lawsuit seeks damages for Boeing investors who
bought the company's shares from Jan. 8 to March 21. Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg and CFO Gregory
Smith have also been named as defendants.
Of course, this shareholder lawsuit is only the tip of the legal iceberg for Boeing. The company
will likely face a blizzard of lawsuits filed by family members of those killed during the Lion
Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes, the
first of which
has already been filed.
Though its shares have recovered from their post-grounding lows, they have hit another bout of
turbulence this week after the company announced that it would slash production of the 737 MAX by
20%, before announcing that its aircraft orders in Q1 fell to 95 from 180 a year earlier.
Having grown up in Seattle within 15 miles of Plant 2 on Boeing
Field, I know a lot about The Boeing Company. I went to private
high school with Bill Boeing III and during college had a great
summer job at Troy Laundry delivering shop towels and uniforms to
all of the Boeing plants in the region.
I used to laugh because,
when I drove the laundries 20ft UPS style box van through those
enormous sliding doors into Everett's 747 Plant to deliver fresh
laundry and pickup soiled's, I would spend the next 4-hours
driving around 'inside' the building. I got to know dozens of
workers by name, who 'worked the line'.
After college, more than 20% of my graduating class went to
work at 'the lazy B' as it was commonly known. Not me. I went into
sales and started selling computers.....to Boeing and the FAA.
As the size my computer sales territory was increased to
include the entire West Coast I began to fly Boeing aircraft
almost everyday for 10-years. and on-board those aircraft I met
and flew with many Boeing executives.
One day I happened to sit next the 'current' Boeing HR
director, and after getting to know him confided that I
frequently smoked marijuana after work. To which he replied, "I
would gladly have the 15% of our work force that are alcoholics,
or into hard drugs smoke pot because it's effects are short-term
but when people come to work 'hung-over or jacked-up' that is when
bad **** happens and mistakes are made".
Even though, I had been 'on the line' and met many Boeing
employees I had not realized until that moment the seriousness of
what he was saying. The HR guy went on to say, that they 'had to
have redundancy at every step in the construction process to
ensure bad workmanship didn't make it into the final product'.
Fast forward 20-years; and Boeing airplanes are falling from
the sky......and it's not a surprise to me.
The legacy 737 "NG" is a solid aircraft, and its still being
produced down the same build lines as the MAX. Just the
previous generation. That plane drove the vast majority of
Boeings sales. It woulndt be hard to scale down MAX production
and just go back to producing the NG, but they wont do that.
They'll fix the MAX and move on, and as long as no more crashes
occur, eventually the public will forget.
The FED can't let the stock price fall on a company of that
size, so the FED trading desk will lend assistance. There is a
certain evil in this, because the stock
deserves
to
fall, and when it doesn't, it has the effect of vindicating the
company for the events that occurred. This is why free markets
should never be meddled with. It's actually immoral.
This is utterly predictable and something I've already said
repeatedly: Boeing did not tell pilots or its customers about the
mechanism. Boeing is criminally liable for the MURDER of 300+
people. Families will sue and cancellations will follow.
Then
this:
"In essence, the suit alleges that
the company concealed
safety concerns about the 737 MAX and its anti-stall software
following
the Lion Air crash in October that killed 189 people,
but did
nothing to alert the public or correct the issue.
Boeing
"effectively put profitability and growth ahead of
airplane safety and honesty"
Pilots complained about the problem and were IGNORED.
This is good to see. Boeing needs to be held accountable for
MURDER. But instead Trump slaps tariffs on the competitor, AIRBUS,
to pay for Boeing's criminality.
This will not stop companies choosing AIRBUS and its good
safety record over a bunch of psychopathic murderers. If Boeing
had put safety first, it's competitor would not be picking up
business..ironic...
I still don't understand the point of the MCAS. Clearly it causes
the plane to do a face plant into the ground. However, like in
that one situation where the jump seat pilot knew to turn it off,
the plane flew fine. Boeing says the MCAS is to prevent the plane
from stalling at steep angles of attack, but the plane seems to
stay in the air better without it. So which is it? The fact is the
Boeing neglected to put it in the manual suggests it was done on
purpose. The fact that they sold a version with no redundancy to
the AOC sensor seems to be have done on purpose. Since Boeing is
basically an arm of the DOD, the question should be who was on the
flights that crashed? That's the missing link in this debacle.
Check out "
moonofalabama.org
",
very good explanation, plus some further links to pilot forums.
From what I understand, the pilots get into some sort of "catch
22"....even if they switch of the MACS, they are doomed.
I'm not I anyway in the flying biz, but work in power
generating control systems, and funny enough, use quite a lot
of Rosemount sensors in ex areas. They are good sensors, but
always use two in mission critical operations.
Why Boeing opted for just one, really blows my mind.
What would an extra sensor cost, 10.000USD?, altogether with
new software..bla-bla.
Now look what this is costing them.
Well, this is what happens when MBA bean counters take over
a former proud engineering company.
From what I understand, the pilots get into some sort
of "catch 22"....even if they switch of the MACS, they
are doomed.
Sort of like that. The flight surface is controlled by a
big screw. Normally an electric motor spins the nut that
drives the screw up and down. The switch cuts out the motor,
and they have hand cranks to move the screw. But in this
last crash, the too-clever-by-half software system had
already run the screw all the way to the 'nose down' end,
and it would have taken them several minutes of hand
cranking to get it back to the center position. They didn't
have several minutes, and the motor is capable of driving
the screw the other way. Since the problem was intermittent
(software kicks in on a time interval), they were hoping it
would behave for a few seconds, and switched the motor back
on. It didn't.
On a side note, the Airbus does not have these hand-crank
controls. Everything is run by the computer -- so if
anything goes wrong, the pilot must 'reason' with the
computer to correct it. . . "Sorry Dave, I can't do that".
Well, this is what happens when MBA bean counters take
over a former proud engineering company.
This reminds me of Feynman's analysis of what went wrong
with the Space Shuttle Challenger. The engineers said the
O-rings would be too stiff and brittle, and the launch
should wait until it warmed up a bit. But a delay was
costing the shuttle program a million dollars a minute, or
whatever.
Feynman explained that the early space program was run by
the pocket-protector guys with slide rules. And it worked.
But over time the management had been replaced by people
whose careers depended on influencing other people and not
on matter, energy, and materials.
Another thing, the pilots had commanded full throttle and
never throttled back during the whole ordeal. So when
they killed the trim motor, they couldn't overcome the
aerodynamic force on the stab to move the trim screw back
into position.
Apparently they could have got the trim
corrected ENOUGH to make a difference if they could have
moved it more easily, but at the speeds they were going,
the airspeed over the stab was too high to manually move
the screw fast enough to make a difference.
Sort of. When you kill the electric trim motor, you have to
use a manual wheel to adjust trim. The issue came that their
airspeed was so high that the load on the stab made it
nearly impossible to move without the electric motor.
They
had been at full throttle from rotation until they hit the
dirt. The pilot had told the copilot to throttle back but it
got lost in the chaos somewhere and never happened.
So when they killed the trim motor and tried to move it
manually, they had to overcome all the aerodynamic force on
the stab, and they just couldnt do it at those airspeeds
without the electric motor to overcome the force.
The bigger the fuselage the bigger the engines needed. The
bigger the engines needed the more forward on the wing they
go to keep from scraping on the ground. The more forward on the
wing the more unbalanced then plane became. They've stretch a
frame which was developed in the 60's beyond its original
design.
The executives who oversaw the fiasco that is now Boeing, long ago
parachuted out with multi million dollar pensions and stock
options while their Seattle workers had their pensions slashed.
They're now assembling Dreamliners in NC with off the street non
unionized labor, former TacoBell and Subway workers. They moved
their Corp headquarters to Chicago away from where the actual work
was being performed to pursue the "work" of stock buy backs and
cozying up to the FAA. All the above a recipe for disaster. A
perfect mirror of how the 1/10th of 1% operate in the Oligarchy we
call America.
Boeing is in full on crisis mode because of the 737 Max fiasco.
Anything else they say or do is pure show and fraud.
The are not to far from losing the entire narrowbody airline
market, pretty much the meat and bones of Airline production.
Today Airbus still has the A-320 neo, and Russia and China are
chomping at the bit with the MC21 and C919, all far more advanced
and superior than a 1960's designed stretched pulled and too late
737 .
If Boeing loses market share and the narrow body airline
market, shame on the USA.
This will become a text book expample of the fall of a nation
and empire.
How can a Company like Boeing have technology like the B2 and
everything the DOD gives them and lose the international market
for narrowbody airliners..
To call this a national disgrace is a compliment to Boeing and
the US aerospace industies complete disregard and hubris in such
an important component of worldwide aviation.
This in not a sad chapter for Boeing, its sad for the USA
BeanCounters, Parasitoids, and Bells-WhistlesMktg Types Running
an Aerospace/Aviation Engineering and Defense Tech Conglomerate
into the Ground - Literally.
Civil Aviation Div "Jumped the
Shark" the moment they passed on a redesigned Successor to the
737 Base Model in the mid 2000s and decided to strap on Larger
Engines and GunDeck the Revision and Certifications.
Failure to disclose regulatory capture is a tough one. Do you
issue an 8K on that one? Maybe bury it in the 10K in risk
statements
"We maintain several regulatory relationships that
will rubber stamp approvals for our aircraft. In the event of a
major safety violation, those cozy relationships could be exposed
and we be found to not only be negligent, but also nefariously so
through regulatory capture."
You bought an airline manufacturer that had a malfunction.
There's plenty of people to blame, but it's part of the business
you own.
The 737 Max is a legacy of its past, built on
decades-old systems, many that date back to the original version. The strategy, to keep
updating the plane rather than starting from scratch, offered competitive advantages.
Pilots were comfortable flying it, while airlines didn't have to invest in costly new
training for their pilots and mechanics. For Boeing, it was also faster and cheaper to
redesign and recertify than starting anew.
But the strategy has now left the company in crisis, following two deadly crashes in less
than five months. The Max stretched the 737 design, creating a patchwork plane that left
pilots without some safety features that could be important in a crisis -- ones that have
been offered for years on other planes. It is the only modern Boeing jet without an
electronic alert system that explains what is malfunctioning and how to resolve it.
Instead pilots have to check a manual.
The Max also required makeshift solutions to keep the plane flying like its ancestors,
workarounds that may have compromised safety. While the findings aren't final,
investigators suspect that one workaround, an anti-stall system designed to compensate for
the larger engines, was central to the crash last month in Ethiopia and an earlier one in
Indonesia.
"They wanted to A, save money and B, to
minimize the certification and flight-test costs," said Mike Renzelmann, an engineer who
worked on the Max's flight controls. "Any changes are going to require recertification."
Mr. Renzelmann was not involved in discussions about the sensors.
... ... ...
On 737s, a light typically indicates the
problem and pilots have to flip through their paper manuals to find next
steps. In the doomed Indonesia flight, as the Lion Air pilots struggled
with MCAS for control, the pilots consulted the manual moments before
the jet plummeted into the Java Sea, killing all 189 people aboard.
"Meanwhile, I'm flying the jet," said
Mr. Tajer, the American Airlines 737 captain. "Versus, pop, it's on your
screen. It tells you, This is the problem and here's the checklist
that's recommended."
Boeing decided against adding it to the
Max because it could have prompted regulators to require new pilot
training, according to two former Boeing employees involved in the
decision.
The Max also runs on a complex web of
cables and pulleys that, when pilots pull back on the controls, transfer
that movement to the tail. By comparison, Airbus jets and Boeing's more
modern aircraft, such as the 777 and 787, are "fly-by-wire," meaning
pilots' movement of the flight controls is fed to a computer that
directs the plane. The design allows for far more automation, including
systems that prevent the jet from entering dangerous situations, such as
flying too fast or too low. Some 737 pilots said they preferred the
cable-and-pulley system to fly-by-wire because they believed it gave
them more control.
In the recent crashes, investigators
believe the MCAS malfunctioned and moved a tail flap called the
stabilizer, tilting the plane toward the ground. On the doomed Ethiopian
Airlines flight, the pilots tried to combat the system by cutting power
to the stabilizer's motor, according to the preliminary crash report.
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Once the power was cut, the pilots tried
to regain control manually by turning a wheel next to their seat. The
737 is the last modern Boeing jet that uses a manual wheel as its backup
system. But Boeing has long known that turning the wheel is difficult at
high speeds, and may have required two pilots to work together.
In the final moments of the Ethiopian
Airlines flight, the first officer said the method wasn't working,
according to the preliminary crash report. About 1 minute and 49 seconds
later, the plane crashed, killing 157 people.
The Seattle Times published what I consider a
devastating article a few Sundays ago. It highlighted the depth to which Boeing and the FAA cut
corners on the certification of the Max, more specifically the characterization of the impact of
a failure of the new MCAS system. This allowed them to utilize the cheaper single sensor AOA
vane instead of 2 or 3. The aircraft also got delivered with the MCAS system applying many more
nose down units of trim than what was published in the certification process. Topping it off was
the failure of Boeing to disclose to its customers that the MCAS system was installed or what
abnormal or emergency procedures would accompany the system.
True, there are two kinds of pilots, and some are
better. BUT no pilot should be put in a critical situation by bad and rushed design. What was
Boeing thinking? `Yes, there is slight chance that things can go wrong... but if the pilot is
experienced, if the weather is fine, if the FO is focused (and so on...) they will surely make
it.' Why taking that risk? They should design a plane that even a drunk pilot can handle.
The MCAS moves the entire horizontal tail (aka
horizontal stabilizer) not just "a tail flap called the stabilizer". Normal stabilizer trim also
moves the whole horizontal stabilizer. Presumably the "flap" being referred to here,
incorrectly, is the elevator, a flight control surface on the trailing edge of the horizontal
tail, which is control by pulling and pushing the flight control column. Both horizontal
stabilizer trim and elevator affect the pitch (nose up, nose down) of the aircraft. Typically,
horizontal stabilizer trim is used to maintain a particular attitude (e.g. level flight in
cruise) without requiring the pilot to continously apply significant forces to the control
column, which is tiring. When MCAS engages it effectively is attempting to "cancel out" the
pilot's elevator command (pulling back on the control column to bring the nose up by ) by moving
the horizontal stabilizer to counteract the pilots action (rotating the the horizontal
stabilizer so that it's leading edge points down).
Boeing should have gone with a clean sheet of
paper design. Look at the Airbus A220, previously known as Bombardier C Series. It has nearly
similar seating, yet it carries less fuel, but has a longer range than the MAX8. Modern wing
design. Heck, Boeing should have just bought Bombardier 10 years ago. Now they are in the arms
of Airbus.
Why doesn't BA just trash the entire max8 program
and become a subcontractor for A320s instead? After all there is a demand for 5000 aircraft that
now will not be fulfilled. Boeing management should be put on trial for criminal negligence.
Finally, a comprehensive report that doesn't go on
and on about software. The problem was a mechanical and training one, and instead of fixing the
problems, the Bean Counters took over and went on the cheap.
Pilots start some new Boeing planes by turning a knob and flipping two
switches.
The Boeing 737 Max, the newest passenger jet on the market, works differently.
Pilots follow roughly the same seven steps used on the first 737 nearly 52 years ago: Shut off the cabin's
air-conditioning, redirect the air flow, switch on the engine, start the flow of fuel, revert the air flow,
turn back on the air conditioning, and turn on a generator.
The 737 Max is a legacy of its past, built on decades-old systems, many that
date back to the original version. The strategy, to keep updating the plane rather than starting from scratch,
offered competitive advantages. Pilots were comfortable flying it, while airlines didn't have to invest in
costly new training for their pilots and mechanics. For Boeing, it was also faster and cheaper to redesign and
recertify than starting anew.
But the strategy has now left the company in crisis, following
two deadly crashes in less than five months
. The Max stretched the 737 design, creating a patchwork plane
that left pilots without some safety features that could be important in a crisis -- ones that have been offered
for years on other planes. It is the only modern Boeing jet without an electronic alert system that explains
what is malfunctioning and how to resolve it. Instead pilots have to check a manual.
The Max also required makeshift solutions to keep the plane flying like its
ancestors, workarounds that may have compromised safety. While the findings aren't final, investigators suspect
that one workaround, an anti-stall system designed to compensate for the larger engines, was central to the
crash last month in Ethiopia and an earlier one in Indonesia.
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The Max "ain't your father's Buick," said Dennis Tajer, a spokesman for the
American Airlines pilots' union who has flown the 737 for a decade. He added that "it's not lost on us that the
foundation of this aircraft is from the '60s."
Dean Thornton, the president of Boeing, with an engine on the first
737-400 in 1988 in Seattle. The larger engines for Boeing's new Max line of jets prompted a number of
design issues.
Credit
Benjamin
Benschneider/The Seattle Times, via Associated Press
Image
Dean Thornton, the president of Boeing, with an engine on the first 737-400 in 1988 in Seattle. The larger
engines for Boeing's new Max line of jets prompted a number of design issues.
Credit
Benjamin
Benschneider/The Seattle Times, via Associated Press
The Max, Boeing's best-selling model, with more than 5,000 orders, is suddenly
a reputational hazard. It could be weeks or months before regulators around the world lift their ban on the
plane, after Boeing's expected
software fix was delayed
. Southwest Airlines and American Airlines have canceled some flights through May
because of the Max grounding.
The company has
slowed production
of the plane, putting pressure on its profits, and some buyers are reconsidering their
orders. Shares of the company fell over 4 percent on Monday, and are down 11 percent since the Ethiopia crash.
"It was state of the art at the time, but that was 50 years ago," said Rick
Ludtke, a former Boeing engineer who helped design the Max's cockpit. "It's not a good airplane for the current
environment."
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The 737 has long been a reliable aircraft, flying for decades with relatively
few issues. Gordon Johndroe, a Boeing spokesman, defended the development of the Max, saying that airlines
wanted an updated 737 over a new single-aisle plane and that pilots were involved in its design.
"Listening to pilots is an important aspect of our work. Their experienced
input is front-and-center in our mind when we develop airplanes," he said in a statement. "We share a common
priority -- safety -- and we listen carefully to their feedback." He added that American regulators approved the
plane under the same standards they used with previous aircraft.
Video
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Boeing introduced the 737 Max as a reliable fuel- and cost-efficient solution to air travel in the 21st century.
After two fatal Max crashes, all of the Max aircraft in the world are believed to have been grounded.
Credit
Credit
Chang
W. Lee/The New York Times
Boeing's chief executive, Dennis Muilenburg, said in a statement on Friday that
the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia appeared to have been caused by the Max's new anti-stall system. "We have
the responsibility to eliminate this risk, and we know how to do it," he said.
At a factory near Seattle on Jan. 17, 1967, flight attendants christened the
first Boeing 737, smashing champagne bottles over its wing. Boeing pitched the plane as a smaller alternative
to its larger jets, earning it the nickname the "Baby Boeing."
Early on, sales lagged Boeing's biggest competitor, McDonnell Douglas. In 1972,
Boeing had delivered just 14 of the jets, and it considered selling the program to a Japanese manufacturer,
said Peter Morton, the 737 marketing manager in the early 1970s. "We had to decide if we were going to end it,
or invest in it," Mr. Morton said.
Ultimately, Boeing invested. The 737 eventually began to sell, bolstered by
airline deregulation in 1978. Six years later, Boeing updated the 737 with its "classic" series, followed by
the "next generation" in 1997, and the Max in 2017. Now nearly one in every three domestic flights in the
United States is on a 737, more than any other line of aircraft.
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Each of the three redesigns came with a new engine, updates to the cabin and
other changes. But Boeing avoided overhauling the jet in order to appease airlines, according to current and
former Boeing executives, pilots and engineers, some of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the
open investigations. Airlines wanted new 737s to match their predecessors so pilots could skip expensive
training in flight simulators and easily transition to new jets.
Boeing 737 Max: What's Happened After Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air Crashes
Boeing's strategy worked. The Federal Aviation Administration never required
simulator training for pilots switching from one 737 to the next.
"Airlines don't want Boeing to give them a fancy new product if it requires
them to retrain their pilots," said Matthew Menza, a former 737 Max test pilot for Boeing. "So you iterate off
a design that's 50 years old. The old adage is: If it's not broke, don't fix it."
It did require engineering ingenuity, to ensure a decades-old jet handled
mostly the same. In doing so, some of the jet's one-time selling points became challenges.
For instance, in the early years of the 737, jet travel was rapidly expanding
across the world. The plane's low-slung frame was a benefit for airlines and airports in developing countries.
Workers there could load bags by hand without a conveyor belt and maintain the engines without a lift, Mr.
Morton said. In the decades that followed, the low frame repeatedly complicated efforts to fit bigger engines
under the wing.
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By 2011, Boeing executives were starting to question whether the 737 design had
run its course. The company wanted to create an entirely new single-aisle jet. Then Boeing's rival Airbus added
a new fuel-efficient engine to its line of single-aisle planes, the A320, and Boeing quickly decided to update
the jet again.
The 737 Max 8 at Boeing's plant in Renton, Wash. Nearly one in every
three domestic flights in the United States is on a 737, more than any other line of aircraft.
Credit
Ruth
Fremson/The New York Times
Image
The
737 Max 8 at Boeing's plant in Renton, Wash. Nearly one in every three domestic flights in the United States is
on a 737, more than any other line of aircraft.
Credit
Ruth
Fremson/The New York Times
"We all rolled our eyes. The idea that, 'Here we go. The 737 again,'" said Mr.
Ludtke, the former 737 Max cockpit designer who spent 19 years at Boeing.
"Nobody was quite perhaps willing to say it was unsafe, but we really felt like
the limits were being bumped up against," he added.
Some engineers were frustrated they would have to again spend years updating
the same jet, taking care to limit any changes, instead of starting fresh and incorporating significant
technological advances, the current and former engineers and pilots said. The Max still has roughly the
original layout of the cockpit and the hydraulic system of cables and pulleys to control the plane, which
aren't used in modern designs. The flight-control computers have roughly the processing power of 1990s home
computers. A Boeing spokesman said the aircraft was designed with an appropriate level of technology to ensure
safety.
When engineers did make changes, it sometimes created knock-on effects for how
the plane handled, forcing Boeing to get creative. The company added a new system that moves plates on the wing
in part to reduce stress on the plane from its added weight. Boeing recreated the decades-old physical gauges
on digital screens.
As Boeing pushed its engineers to figure out how to accommodate bigger, more
fuel-efficient engines, height was again an issue. Simply lengthening the landing gear to make the plane taller
could have violated rules for exiting the plane in an emergency.
Boeing 737 engines at the company's factory in 2012. By 2011, Boeing
executives were starting to question whether the 737 design had run its course.
Credit
Stephen
Brashear/Associated Press
Image
Boeing 737 engines at the company's factory in 2012. By 2011, Boeing executives were starting to question
whether the 737 design had run its course.
Credit
Stephen
Brashear/Associated Press
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Instead, engineers were able to add just a few inches to the front landing gear
and shift the engines farther forward on the wing. The engines fit, but the Max sat at a slightly uneven angle
when parked.
While that design solved one problem, it created another. The larger size and
new location of the engines gave the Max the tendency to tilt up during certain flight maneuvers, potentially
to a dangerous angle.
To compensate, Boeing engineers created the automated anti-stall system, called
MCAS, that pushed the jet's nose down if it was lifting too high. The software was intended to operate in the
background so that the Max flew just like its predecessor. Boeing didn't mention the system in its training
materials for the Max.
Boeing also designed the system to rely on a single sensor -- a rarity in
aviation, where redundancy is common. Several former Boeing engineers who were not directly involved in the
system's design said their colleagues most likely opted for such an approach since relying on two sensors could
still create issues. If one of two sensors malfunctioned, the system could struggle to know which was right.
Airbus addressed this potential problem on some of its planes by installing
three or more such sensors. Former Max engineers, including one who worked on the sensors, said adding a third
sensor to the Max was a nonstarter. Previous 737s, they said, had used two and managers wanted to limit
changes.
The angle of attack sensor, bottom, on a Boeing 737 Max 8.
Credit
Ruth
Fremson/The New York Times
Image
The
angle of attack sensor, bottom, on a Boeing 737 Max 8.
Credit
Ruth
Fremson/The New York Times
"They wanted to A, save money and B, to minimize the certification and
flight-test costs," said Mike Renzelmann, an engineer who worked on the Max's flight controls. "Any changes are
going to require recertification." Mr. Renzelmann was not involved in discussions about the sensors.
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The Max also lacked more modern safety features.
Most new Boeing jets have electronic systems that take pilots through their
preflight checklists, ensuring they don't skip a step and potentially miss a malfunctioning part. On the Max,
pilots still complete those checklists manually in a book.
A second electronic system found on other Boeing jets also alerts pilots to
unusual or hazardous situations during flight and lays out recommended steps to resolve them.
On 737s, a light typically indicates the problem and pilots have to flip
through their paper manuals to find next steps. In the doomed Indonesia flight, as the Lion Air pilots
struggled with MCAS for control, the pilots consulted the manual moments before the jet plummeted into the Java
Sea, killing all 189 people aboard.
"Meanwhile, I'm flying the jet," said Mr. Tajer, the American Airlines 737
captain. "Versus, pop, it's on your screen. It tells you, This is the problem and here's the checklist that's
recommended."
Boeing decided against adding it to the Max because it could have prompted
regulators to require new pilot training, according to two former Boeing employees involved in the decision.
The Max also runs on a complex web of cables and pulleys that, when pilots pull
back on the controls, transfer that movement to the tail. By comparison, Airbus jets and Boeing's more modern
aircraft, such as the 777 and 787, are "fly-by-wire," meaning pilots' movement of the flight controls is fed to
a computer that directs the plane. The design allows for far more automation, including systems that prevent
the jet from entering dangerous situations, such as flying too fast or too low. Some 737 pilots said they
preferred the cable-and-pulley system to fly-by-wire because they believed it gave them more control.
In the recent crashes, investigators believe the MCAS malfunctioned and moved a
tail flap called the stabilizer, tilting the plane toward the ground. On the doomed Ethiopian Airlines flight,
the pilots tried to combat the system by cutting power to the stabilizer's motor, according to the preliminary
crash report.
Advertisement
Once the power was cut, the pilots tried to regain control manually by turning
a wheel next to their seat. The 737 is the last modern Boeing jet that uses a manual wheel as its backup
system. But Boeing has long known that turning the wheel is difficult at high speeds, and may have required two
pilots to work together.
In the final moments of the Ethiopian Airlines flight, the first officer said
the method wasn't working, according to the preliminary crash report. About 1 minute and 49 seconds later, the
plane crashed, killing 157 people.
Correction :
April
8, 2019
An earlier version of this article transposed the death tolls
in two crashes involving Boeing's 737 Max jets. In the Lion Air crash in Indonesia last year, 189 people
died, not 157; 157 people were killed in the Ethiopian Airlines crash last month, not 189.
Rebecca R. Ruiz and Stephen Grocer contributed reporting. Kitty Bennett contributed research.
A version of this article appears in print on
April 9, 2019
, on Page A 1 of the New York edition with the headline:
Boeing's 737 Max: '60s Design Meets '90s Computing Power.
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Donald Trump Is Trying to Kill You:
Trust the pork producers; fear the wind turbines.
By Paul Krugman
There's a lot we don't know about the legacy Donald Trump will leave behind. And it is, of
course, hugely important what happens in the 2020 election. But one thing seems sure: Even if
he's a one-term president, Trump will have caused, directly or indirectly, the premature
deaths of a large number of Americans.
Some of those deaths will come at the hands of right-wing, white nationalist extremists,
who are a rapidly growing threat, partly because they feel empowered by a president who calls
them "very fine people."
Some will come from failures of governance, like the inadequate response to Hurricane
Maria, which surely contributed to the high death toll in Puerto Rico. (Reminder: Puerto
Ricans are U.S. citizens.)
Some will come from the administration's continuing efforts to sabotage Obamacare, which
have failed to kill health reform but have stalled the decline in the number of uninsured,
meaning that many people still aren't getting the health care they need. Of course, if Trump
gets his way and eliminates Obamacare altogether, things on this front will get much, much
worse.
But the biggest death toll is likely to come from Trump's agenda of deregulation -- or
maybe we should call it "deregulation," because his administration is curiously selective
about which industries it wants to leave alone.
Consider two recent events that help capture the deadly strangeness of what's going
on.
One is the administration's plan for hog plants to take over much of the federal
responsibility for food safety inspections. And why not? It's not as if we've seen safety
problems arise from self-regulation in, say, the aircraft industry, have we? Or as if we ever
experience major outbreaks of food-borne illness? Or as if there was a reason the U.S.
government stepped in to regulate meatpacking in the first place?
Now, you could see the Trump administration's willingness to trust the meat industry to
keep our meat safe as part of an overall attack on government regulation, a willingness to
trust profit-making businesses to do the right thing and let the market rule. And there's
something to that, but it's not the whole story, as illustrated by another event: Trump's
declaration the other day that wind turbines cause cancer.
Now, you could put this down to personal derangement: Trump has had an irrational hatred
for wind power ever since he failed to prevent construction of a wind farm near his Scottish
golf course. And Trump seems deranged and irrational on so many issues that one more bizarre
claim hardly seems to matter.
But there's more to this than just another Trumpism. After all, we normally think of
Republicans in general, and Trump in particular, as people who minimize or deny the "negative
externalities" imposed by some business activities -- the uncompensated costs they impose on
other people or businesses.
For example, the Trump administration wants to roll back rules that limit emissions of
mercury from power plants. And in pursuit of that goal, it wants to prevent the Environmental
Protection Agency from taking account of many of the benefits from reduced mercury emissions,
such as an associated reduction in nitrogen oxide.
But when it comes to renewable energy, Trump and company are suddenly very worried about
supposed negative side effects, which generally exist only in their imagination. Last year
the administration floated a proposal that would have forced the operators of electricity
grids to subsidize coal and nuclear energy. The supposed rationale was that new sources were
threatening to destabilize those grids -- but the grid operators themselves denied that this
was the case.
So it's deregulation for some, but dire warnings about imaginary threats for others.
What's going on?
Part of the answer is, follow the money. Political contributions from the meat-processing
industry overwhelmingly favor Republicans. Coal mining supports the G.O.P. almost
exclusively. Alternative energy, on the other hand, generally favors Democrats.
There are probably other things, too. If you're a party that wishes we could go back to
the 1950s (but without the 91 percent top tax rate), you're going to have a hard time
accepting the reality that hippie-dippy, unmanly things like wind and solar power are
becoming ever more cost-competitive.
Whatever the drivers of Trump policy, the fact, as I said, is that it will kill people.
Wind turbines don't cause cancer, but coal-burning power plants do -- along with many other
ailments. The Trump administration's own estimates indicate that its relaxation of coal
pollution rules will kill more than 1,000 Americans every year. If the administration gets to
implement its full agenda -- not just deregulation of many industries, but discrimination
against industries it doesn't like, such as renewable energy -- the toll will be much
higher.
So if you eat meat -- or, for that matter, drink water or breathe air -- there's a real
sense in which Donald Trump is trying to kill you. And even if he's turned out of office next
year, for many Americans it will be too late.
Trump does not want to go back to the 50s when government policy was to greatly increase
costs by paying more workers more, while driving down prices, and elinimating rents and
scarcity profits.
Trump wants to kill jobs that are paid, but force work that is unpaid.
Well, if you means 1850, by the 50s, that's when Trump would have excelled by raping his
slaves to create more workers he would force to work, probably Brazil style, worked to death
to cut costs, based on continued enslavement of slaves, ie, no ban on slave imports after
1808.
Trump may be trying to kill us...but do Democrats have a plan to save us? So far, I can
discern no coherent message or plan from corrupt, comatose Democrats other than 'Trump is
guilty [of something or other.]
You are simply rejecting Democrats calls to reverse policies since 1970 to MAGA as failed
liberal policies because its not new, never tried before, and not free.
The growth of the 50s and 60s was too costly, requiring people to work, save, and pay ever
rising prices, taxes, and living costs.
You want economics where you can buy a million dollar home for $50,000 and have schools
funded by modest property taxes on million dollar homes, but with low tax rates on houses
assessed at $40,000.
TANSTAAFL
The only way working class families get better off is by paying higher costs.
Meet the democratic socialist who sent Rahm's floor leader packing
By Mark Brown
There's never been a Chicago politician who quite fits the profile of Andre Vasquez, the
former battle rapper and current democratic socialist who just took down veteran 40th Ward
Ald. Patrick O'Connor, Mayor Rahm Emanuel's city council floor leader.
That probably scares some people.
But those folks might want to nod to the wisdom of the 54 percent of voters in the North
Side ward who waded through an onslaught of attack ads and concluded they have nothing to
fear from the 39-year-old AT&T account manager, his music or his politics.
I stopped by Vasquez's campaign office to satisfy my own curiosity about this new breed of
aldermen. Vasquez will be part of a Chicago City Council bloc of at least five, probably six
democratic socialists who, if nothing else, will alter the debate on a range of issues.
Vazquez said he understands democratic socialism as "just injecting a healthy dose of
democracy in a system we already have.
"Where we see the influence of big money and corporations in our government, where we see
the corruption in the council, where we see elected officials as bought and paid for, to me,
democratic socialism is providing a counterbalance," he said.
Vasquez also reminded me that generalizing about democratic socialists is as foolish as
generalizing about Democrats.
"I think even within democratic socialism there's such a spectrum of different folks,
right? I tend to be a counterbalance to some of the louder stuff, the louder hardcore, what
some would view as extreme," said Vasquez, noting that he sometimes takes flak within
democratic socialist circles because he's never read Marx and doesn't "bleed rose red."
"Everyone's got their part to play," he said. "Somebody's going to be the loud one in the
room because you need that kind of impetus to move things forward. And someone's got to be
the one who's making deals on legislation. You can't have ideological fights and think you're
going to come up with solutions."
Though Vasquez prefers the dealmaker role, his background suggests he also could get loud
if the occasion demanded.
Until he decided it was time to do something else with his life around 2010, Vasquez was a
battle rapper who performed under the stage name Prime. He had enough success to pay the
bills for a while, touring nationally and appearing on MTV's "Direct Effect" and HBO's "Blaze
Battle."
For old people like me who are unclear on the concept (begging the pardon of the rest of
you), battle rapping involves performers trading insults in rhyme put to music.
"Then, imagine you have a crowd around you," Vasquez explained. "And now people are
cheering you on, and the insults are getting more vicious and intricate, and it becomes a
sporting match. Right? So, in that arena, you're getting heralded for how well you can insult
the person in front of you while rhyming and improvising all as this stream of consciousness
is coming out."
I suggested a battle rap might occasionally be just the antidote to the drudgery of a
council meeting, but Vasquez wasn't amused.
The problem with battle rapping, as 40th Ward voters were reminded ad nauseam during the
runoff campaign, is that the genre relies heavily on crude insults invoking disrespectful
terms for women and LGBTQ individuals.
"The issue is toxic masculinity plagues everything," said Vasquez, who obliquely fronted
an apology for his past verbal misdeeds early in the campaign -- and more directly when hit
with a barrage of negative mailers detailing a greatest hits of his transgressions.
A lesser candidate would have been toast at that point, but Vasquez had girded himself in
advance through his door-to-door organizing.
By then, enough 40th Ward residents knew who Vasquez really was -- the son of Guatemalan
immigrants, a city kid from the neighborhoods who had become a family guy with two young kids
and a late-discovered talent for politics -- that they couldn't be scared off.
Vasquez, who lives in Edgewater, was introduced to politics when he felt the Bern in 2014
and volunteered for Bernie Sanders presidential campaign. A left-leaning community group,
Reclaim Chicago, then recruited Vasquez to expand upon his organizing talents -- and taught
him how to build a classic grassroots campaign.
The result is a new Latino alderman in a ward where fewer than one-fifth of the voters are
Latino. And a Democratic Socialist representing a ward previously ruled by Emanuel's floor
leader.
"I'm not trying to plant a flag," Vasquez said. "I'm trying to make sure that people can
live here and not be forced out."
"Vasquez, who lives in Edgewater, was introduced to politics when he felt the Bern in 2014
and volunteered for Bernie Sanders presidential campaign. A left-leaning community group,
Reclaim Chicago, then recruited Vasquez to expand upon his organizing talents -- and taught
him how to build a classic grassroots campaign."
I like the centrists like Krugman and liberals here like EMike who dismiss Bernie as a
cult of personality. No he's spurring local organizing which doesn't revolve around him.
Will Bernie as president build walls around big cities like Chicago, build iron Curtains, to
keep the rich inside these cities where all their wealth is taxed away every year, and they
are prevented from moving to the towns outside Chicago city limits?
"... In fact Airbus 320 series never had the same issue as it was properly designed from scratch and not like Max 8 retrofitted to carry bigger engines by that changing distribution of balance of the Aircraft and hence requiring steeper ascending angle and faster speed (for the same wing design) and hence by design more prone to stalling while in takeoff phase. ..."
"... So what is the same in B737 Max and A320 was response of AI software to sensor failures and specific external conditions of flight. In both cases such scenarios were never trained in simulators. ..."
Thanks for the report but I may add that AI auto pilot systems on Airbus are not same or
similar to MCAS as they are all integrated in autopilot on A320 series while on B737 Max 8
they are completely separate from one another not communicating at all.
In fact Airbus 320 series never had the same issue as it was properly designed from
scratch and not like Max 8 retrofitted to carry bigger engines by that changing distribution
of balance of the Aircraft and hence requiring steeper ascending angle and faster speed (for
the same wing design) and hence by design more prone to stalling while in takeoff phase.
The problem with A320 crash over Atlantic was failure of one or two of two sensors and
while in cruise phase of flight autopilot AI software response was just inappropriate in fact
detrimental as pilots were blinded disoriented during night over the ocean trying to figure
out where they are as conflicting data was coming in.
It seems by some accounts they trusted
autopilot decisions and suggestions and simply descended, hit into ocean almost
horizontally.
So what is the same in B737 Max and A320 was response of AI software to sensor failures
and specific external conditions of flight. In both cases such scenarios were never trained
in simulators.
"... Evidence has mounted implicating in both crashes an automated anti-stall system, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which was installed by Boeing in response to the new plane's tendency to pitch upward and go into a potentially fatal stall. On a whole number of fronts -- design, marketing, certification and pilot training -- information from the black boxes of the two planes points to a lack of concern for the safety of passengers and crew on the part of both Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration, reaching the level of criminality. ..."
"... Despite the presence on the plane of two angle-of-attack sensors, which signal a potential stall and trigger the automated downward pitch of the plane's nose, MCAS relied on data from only one of the sensors. This means the standard redundancy feature built into commercial jets to avert disasters resulting from a faulty sensor was lacking. Boeing's main rival to the 737 Max, the European-built Airbus A320neo, for example, uses data from three sensors to manage a system similar to MCAS. ..."
"... Pilot certification for a commercial plane typically requires hundreds of hours of training, both in simulators and in actual flights. Boeing itself is now mandating at least 21 days of training on new Max planes. ..."
"... There is no innocent explanation for these obvious safety issues. They point to reckless and arguably criminally negligent behavior on the part of Boeing executives, who rushed the new plane into service and marketed it against the Airbus A320neo on the basis of its cost-saving features. ..."
"... This is highlighted by a press release the day of the Ethiopian Airlines crash in which Boeing stated that "for the past several months and in aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610," the company "has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX." ..."
"... In other words, both Boeing and the FAA were aware, possibly even before the October 2018 Lion Air crash and certainly afterward, that a system critical to the safe operation of the aircraft needed to be fixed, and still allowed the plane to continue flying. The wording also suggests that the plane shouldn't have been certified for flight in the first place. ..."
"... This was aided and abetted by the Trump administration, which shielded Boeing as long as it could by not ordering the FAA to ground the plane immediately after the Ethiopian Airlines crash. There were no doubt immense concerns that such a move would cut into Boeing's multibillion-dollar profits and affect its stock price, which has nearly tripled since the election of Trump in November 2016, accounting for more than 30 percent of the increase in the Dow Jones index since then. ..."
"... The relationship between Trump and Muilenburg is only a symptom of the much broader collusion between the airline industry and the US government. Starting in 2005 and expanded during the Obama administration, the FAA introduced the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program, which allows the agency to appoint as "designees" airplane manufacturers' employees to certify their own company's aircraft on behalf of the government. ..."
"... This is the logical end of the deregulation of the airline industry as a whole that was spearheaded by the Democratic Carter administration, which passed the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978. With the help of liberal icon Edward Kennedy, the legislation disbanded the Civil Aeronautics Board, which up to that point treated interstate airlines as a regulated public utility, setting routes, schedules and fares. ..."
It is nearly a month since the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, which slammed into
the ground only six minutes after takeoff from Addis Ababa airport, killing all 157 people on
board. That disaster came less than five months after the fatal crash of Lion Air Flight 610
only 13 minutes after takeoff from Jakarta airport, killing all 189 passengers and crew
members.
Both crashes involved the same airplane, the Boeing 737 Max 8, and both followed wild
up-and-down oscillations which the pilots were unable to control.
In the weeks since these disasters, there have been no calls within the media or political
establishment for Boeing executives to be criminally prosecuted for what were evidently
entirely avoidable tragedies that killed a total of 346 people. This speaks to the corrupt
relationship between the US government and the aerospace giant -- the biggest US exporter and
second-largest defense contractor -- as well as the company's critical role in the stock market
surge and the ever-expanding fortunes of major Wall Street investors.
Black box recordings and simulations show that in the 60 seconds the pilots had to respond
to the emergency, faulty software forced the Lion Air flight into a nose dive 24 separate
times, as the pilots fought to regain control of the aircraft before plunging into the ocean at
more than 500 miles per hour.
Evidence has mounted implicating in both crashes an automated anti-stall system, the
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which was installed by Boeing in
response to the new plane's tendency to pitch upward and go into a potentially fatal stall. On
a whole number of fronts -- design, marketing, certification and pilot training -- information
from the black boxes of the two planes points to a lack of concern for the safety of passengers
and crew on the part of both Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration, reaching the level
of criminality.
The most recent revelations concerning the March 10 Ethiopian Airlines crash, based on
preliminary findings from the official investigation, show that the pilots correctly followed
the emergency procedures outlined by Boeing and disengaged the automated flight control system.
Nevertheless, the nose of the plane continued to point downward. This strongly suggests a
fundamental and perhaps fatal flaw in the design of the aircraft. Numerous questions have been
raised about the design and certification process of the 737 Max 8 and MCAS,
including:
Despite the presence on the plane of two angle-of-attack sensors, which signal a
potential stall and trigger the automated downward pitch of the plane's nose, MCAS relied on
data from only one of the sensors. This means the standard redundancy feature built into
commercial jets to avert disasters resulting from a faulty sensor was lacking. Boeing's main
rival to the 737 Max, the European-built Airbus A320neo, for example, uses data from three
sensors to manage a system similar to MCAS.
Boeing Vice President Mike Sinnett admitted last
November that cockpit warning lights alerting pilots of a faulty angle-of-attack sensor were
only optional features on the Max 8. The MCAS system was absent from pilot manuals and flight
simulators, including for the well-known flight training program X-Plane 11, which came out in
2018, one year after the first commercial flight of the 737 Max 8. Pilot training for the 737
Max 8, which has different hardware and software than earlier 737s, was a single one-hour
computer course.
Pilot certification for a commercial plane typically requires hundreds of
hours of training, both in simulators and in actual flights. Boeing itself is now mandating at
least 21 days of training on new Max planes.
There is no innocent explanation for these obvious safety issues. They point to reckless and
arguably criminally negligent behavior on the part of Boeing executives, who rushed the new
plane into service and marketed it against the Airbus A320neo on the basis of its cost-saving
features.
Threatened with a loss of market share and profits to its chief competitor, Boeing
reduced costs by claiming that no significant training on the new Max 8 model, with the money
and time that entails, was necessary for pilots with previous 737 experience.
Such imperatives of the capitalist market inevitably downgrade safety considerations. This
is highlighted by a press release the day of the Ethiopian Airlines crash in which Boeing
stated that "for the past several months and in aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610," the company
"has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX."
In other words, both Boeing and the FAA were aware, possibly even before the October 2018
Lion Air crash and certainly afterward, that a system critical to the safe operation of the
aircraft needed to be fixed, and still allowed the plane to continue flying. The wording also
suggests that the plane shouldn't have been certified for flight in the first place.
This was aided and abetted by the Trump administration, which shielded Boeing as long as it
could by not ordering the FAA to ground the plane immediately after the Ethiopian Airlines
crash. There were no doubt immense concerns that such a move would cut into Boeing's
multibillion-dollar profits and affect its stock price, which has nearly tripled since the
election of Trump in November 2016, accounting for more than 30 percent of the increase in the
Dow Jones index since then.
Trump himself received a call from Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg two days after the Ethiopian
Airlines crash, during which Muilenburg reportedly continued to uphold the Max 8's safety. The
FAA finally grounded the plane on March 13, after every other country in the world had done
so.
The relationship between Trump and Muilenburg is only a symptom of the much broader
collusion between the airline industry and the US government. Starting in 2005 and expanded
during the Obama administration, the FAA introduced the Organization Designation Authorization
(ODA) program, which allows the agency to appoint as "designees" airplane manufacturers'
employees to certify their own company's aircraft on behalf of the government.
As a result, there was virtually no federal oversight on the development of the 737 Max 8.
FAA Acting Administrator Dan Elwell told Congress, "As a result of regular meetings between the
FAA and Boeing teams, the FAA determined in February 2012 that the [Max 8] project qualified
[a] project eligible for management by the Boeing ODA." This extended to the MCAS system as
well.
This is the logical end of the deregulation of the airline industry as a whole that was
spearheaded by the Democratic Carter administration, which passed the Airline Deregulation Act
in 1978. With the help of liberal icon Edward Kennedy, the legislation disbanded the Civil
Aeronautics Board, which up to that point treated interstate airlines as a regulated public
utility, setting routes, schedules and fares.
In a rational world, the ongoing Senate hearings and Department of Justice investigations
would have already brought criminal charges against Muilenburg, Sinnett, Elwell and all those
involved in overseeing the production, certification and sale of the 737 Max 8. This would
include the executives at Boeing and all those who have helped to deregulate the industry at
the expense of human lives.
Under capitalism, however, Boeing will get little more than a slap on the wrist. Experts
estimate the company will likely be fined at most $800 million, less than one percent of the
$90 billion Boeing expects in sales from the Max 8 in the coming years. As in Hurricane
Katrina, the Wall Street crash in 2008, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 and Hurricanes
Harvey and Maria in 2017, the brunt of this disaster will be borne by the working class.
The Boeing 737 Max 8 disasters point to the inherent incompatibility between safe,
comfortable and affordable air transport and private ownership of the airline industry, as well
as the division of the world economy between rival nation-states. These catastrophes were
driven by both the greed of Boeing executives and big investors and the intensifying trade
conflict between the United States and Europe.
The technological advances that make it possible for travelers to move between any two
points in the world in a single day must be freed from the constraints of giant corporations
and the capitalist system as a whole. Major airlines and aerospace companies must be
expropriated on an international scale and transformed into publicly owned and democratically
controlled utilities, as part of the establishment of a planned economy based on social need,
not private profit.
Too many hooray, we are the USSA, America is the best cheerleaders, have no idea of the
gravity of the situation they will face, when the dollar and by extension the Petrodollar
implodes.
The rejection of the USSA has already started, but the average Yank hasn't noticed. When
Ethiopia, can reject a direct request from Uncle Scam and send the Black-Boxes to Europe,
because the USSA cannot be trusted, says it all. It is the little things we miss, things that
seem small and insignificant, that actually reveals a lot and the Ethiopian rejection was
one.
The world has simply had enough of USSA diktats and subsidising them. The USSA is merely
4% of the worlds population, that consumes 24.8% of the worlds resources and this situation
is totally untenable. A nation of exceptionalists. 5%? Yes. The rest? lol
A technical issue that Boeing flagged in a safety warning after the deadly 737 MAX 8 crash
in Indonesia could happen to any other aircraft, and it's "not unlikely" that the manufacturer
knew about it, aviation experts told RT. Earlier this week, Boeing issued a safety update
to pilots flying its newest 737 MAX airliner, warning of a possible fault in a sensor that
could send the aircraft into a violent nosedive.
That sensor measures air flow over a plane's wings, but its failure can lead to an
aerodynamic stall.
International aviation experts told RT that a problem of this kind could doom aircraft of
any type. The tragedy that happened to Lion Air's Boeing 737 MAX is not the first of its kind
to involve a faulty
"Pitot tube" – a critical air-speed sensor that measures the flow velocity
– explained Elmar Giemulla, a leading German expert in air and traffic law.
"This is not unusual in the way it happened before," he noted, mentioning incidents
similar to the Lion Air crash. Back in 1996, a Boeing 757 operated by Turkey's Birgenair
stalled and crashed in the Caribbean because of a blocked pitot tube. Likewise, erroneous
air-speed indications, coupled with pilot errors, led to the crash of an Air France Airbus A330
over the Atlantic in 2009.
While the problem is not entirely new, it is unclear how Boeing had tackled it, according to
Giemulla. "It is not very unlikely" that Boeing knew about the problem, he said, warning
that "more than 200 planes are concerned and this could happen tomorrow again."
There is so much experience with [using Pitot tubes] that it surprises me very much
that this could happen to a newly developed plane.
However, the expert doubted that there has been any cover-up of the issue, instead
suggesting that "obviously gross negligence" had been involved.
A 737 MAX 8 servicing Lion Air flight 610 last week ploughed into the waters of the Java Sea
shortly after take-off from Jakarta, killing all 189 people on board. Investigators say there
is a possibility that inaccurate readings fed into the MAX's computer could have sent the plane
into a sudden descent.
If markets were truly free and there was real capitalism then airlines would be looking at
the new and excellent Russian MC-21 which does what Boeing was trying to do with the 737 Max.
The MC-21 will safely handle passengers in the 140 to 160 passengers and is a mid range plane
that can go as far as 4,000 miles.
Instead – Boeing lobbies the corrupt U.S. AIPAC Congress to keep a Boeing
monopoly of death traps like the 737 Max allowing some Airbus sales. They also blocked a nice
Bombardier mid range jet from Canada.
I've flown in the Bombardier in South America– it is a fine aircraft.
"... "Sadly, these two entirely preventable airline crashes demonstrate that the FAA is ill-equipped to oversee the aerospace industry and will downplay serious hazards and safety risks to the public rather than sound the alarm about safety concerns, problems, issues and hazards that pose substantial, probable, and/or foreseeable risks to human life," attorneys for Stumo said in the lawsuit. ..."
"... "Boeing, and the regulators that enabled it, must be held accountable for their reckless actions." The chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee said this week that whistleblowers have come forward to report that FAA safety inspectors, including those involved with approvals for the 737 Max, lacked proper training and certifications. ..."
"... But legal experts have said the second disaster could prove even more damaging for the company. That's because plaintiffs will argue the manufacturer was put on notice by the earlier tragedy that there was something dangerously wrong with its planes that should have been fixed. ..."
The parents of Samya Stumo, 24, alleged Boeing was "blinded by its greed" and rushed the 737
Max 8 to market with the "knowledge and tacit approval" of the FAA, while hiding defects in its
automated flight-control system. The suit also cites a similar flaw in the
Lion Air flight of a 737 Max 8 jet that crashed into the Java Sea on October 29 , killing
189.
The complaint alleges that decisions by Boeing leaders contributed to the crash and
"demonstrate Boeing's conscious disregard for the lives of others," including designing an
aircraft with a flight-control system that is "susceptible to catastrophic failure" in the
event of a single defective sensor made by Rosemount Aerospace.
'Ill-equipped'
"Sadly, these two entirely preventable airline crashes demonstrate that the FAA is
ill-equipped to oversee the aerospace industry and will downplay serious hazards and safety
risks to the public rather than sound the alarm about safety concerns, problems, issues and
hazards that pose substantial, probable, and/or foreseeable risks to human life," attorneys for
Stumo said in the lawsuit.
"Boeing, and the regulators that enabled it, must be held
accountable for their reckless actions." The chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee said
this week that whistleblowers have come forward to report that FAA safety inspectors, including
those involved with approvals for the 737 Max, lacked proper training and certifications.
Senator Roger Wicker, a Mississippi Republican, said those claims prompted him to investigate
potential connections between training and certification shortcomings and the FAA's evaluation
of the airliner.
The Senate panel's probe is the latest in a string of investigations by US
officials and lawmakers into how the FAA cleared the 737 Max as safe to fly. The Transportation
Department's inspector general is reviewing the FAA's process for approving the airworthiness
of new jets and aiding a Justice Department criminal probe.
Criminal probe
A grand jury convened by US prosecutors last month subpoenaed a former Boeing engineer
demanding he provide testimony and documents related to the 737 Max.
FAA Acting Administrator Dan Elwell has said the agency "welcomes external review of our
systems, processes and recommendations." Boeing faces the prospect of substantial payouts to
the families of passengers if it's found responsible for both the Ethiopia Air and Lion Air
crashes.
But legal experts have said the second disaster could prove even more damaging for the
company. That's because plaintiffs will argue the manufacturer was put on notice by the earlier
tragedy that there was something dangerously wrong with its planes that should have been
fixed.
The company failed itself by replacing engineers with Wall Street accountants.... typical
US corporation destroyed from withing by asset strippers, chiselers, deregulators... the
complete gamut of "free enterprise" vampires leaving the US economy in shambles.
Agree with that, theres been a serious drive to focus on bean-counting and bringing in
"mainstream" business leadership from companies like GE/Toyota/3m (think outsourcing/stock
buybacks/automate/layoff type)
Its one of the few companies that has a real hard time getting rid of skilled labor,
because building an aircraft is an incredibly huge undertaking, with lots of hand fitting and
a wide array of technical skills, so getting rid of the labor hasnt worked to this point.
But they're trying hard to get inline with the typical "modern" business model, and it
hasnt been great for morale.
Boeing has been working on a fix to the anti-stall software for some time now. However,
Reuters today reported that regulators including EASA knew that the MAX's trim control was
confusing.
"... No. Possibly Boeing & the FAA will solve the immediate issue, but they have destroyed Trust. ..."
"... It has emerged on the 737MAX that larger LEAP-1B engines were unsuited to the airframe and there is no way now to alter the airframe to balance the aircraft. ..."
"... Boeing failed to provide training or training material to pilots or even advise them the existence of MCAS. There was a complex two step process required of pilots in ET302 and JT610 crashes and their QRH handbook did not explain this: ..."
No. Possibly
Boeing & the FAA will solve the immediate issue, but they have
destroyed Trust.
Other brands of
aircraft like Airbus with AF447 established trust after their A330
aircraft plunged into the Atlantic in a mysterious accident.
With Airbus
everyone saw transparency & integrity in how their accidents were
investigated. How Boeing & FAA approached accident investigation
destroyed public Trust.
By direct
contrast in the mysterious disappearance of MH370, Boeing
contributed nothing to the search effort and tried to blame the
pilot or hijackers.
With the 737MAX
in Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes Boeing again tried to blame
pilots, poor training, poor maintenance and then when mechanical
defect was proven, Boeing tried to downplay how serious the issue
was and gave false assurances after Lion Air that the plane was
still safe. ET302 proved otherwise.
It is no longer
possible to trust the aircraft's certification. It is no longer
possible to trust that safety was the overriding principle in
design of the Boeing 737 MAX nor several other Boeing designs for
that matter.
The Public have
yet to realize that the Boeing 777 is an all electric design where
in certain scenarios like electrical fire in the avionics bay, an
MEC override vent opens allowing cabin air pressure to push out
smoke. This silences the cabin depressurization alarms.
As an
electrical failure worsens, in that scenario another system called
ELMS turns off electrical power to the Air Cycle Machine which
pumps pressurized air into the cabin. The result of ELMS cutting
power means the override vent fails to close again and no new
pressurized air maintains pressure in the cabin. Pilots get no
warning.
An incident in
2007 is cited as AD 2007–07–05 by the FAA in which part but not
all of this scenario played out in a B777 at altitude.
MH370 may have
been the incident in which the full scenario played out, but of
course Boeing is not keen for MH370 to be found and unlike Airbus
which funded the search for AF447, Boeing contributed nothing to
finding MH370.
It has emerged
on the 737MAX that larger LEAP-1B engines were unsuited to the
airframe and there is no way now to alter the airframe to balance
the aircraft.
It also emerged
that the choice to fit engines to this airframe have origins in a
commercial decision to please Southwest Airlines and cancel the
Boeing 757.
Boeing failed
to provide training or training material to pilots or even advise
them the existence of MCAS. There was a complex two step process
required of pilots in ET302 and JT610 crashes and their QRH
handbook did not explain this:
The MAX is
an aerodynamically unbalanced aircraft vulnerable to any sort of
disruption, ranging from electrical failure, out of phase
generator, faulty AOA sensor, faulty PCU failure alert, digital
encoding error in the DFDAU.
Jason Eaton
Former Service Manager
Studied at University of
Life
Lives in Sydney,
Australia
564k answer views
50.7k
this month
Answered Mar 24, 2019
·
No I wouldn't.
I'm not a pilot or an aerospace technician but I am a mechanical
engineer, so I know a little bit about physics and stuff.
The 737–8
is carrying engines it was never designed for, that cause it to
become inherently unstable. So unstable in fact, that it can't be
controlled by humans and instead relies on computer aided control
to maintain the correct attitude, particularly during ascent and
descent.
The MCAS system
is, effectively, a band aid to fix a problem brought about by poor
design philosophy. Boeing should have designed a new airframe that
complements the new engines, instead of ruining a perfectly good
aircraft by bolting on power units it's not designed to carry, and
then trying to solve the resulting instability with software. And
if that isn't bad enough, the system relies on data from just the
one sensor which if it doesn't agree with, it'll force the
aircraft nose down regardless of the pilots' better judgement.
That might be
ok for the Eurofighter Typhoon but it's definitely not ok for fare
paying passengers on a commercial jetliner.
So, no. I won't
be flying on a 737–8 until it's been redesigned to fly safely. You
know, like a properly designed aeroplane should.
4.8k
Views
·
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"... Under the circumstances, Boeing's best option was to just take the hit for a few years and accept that it was going to have to start selling 737s at a discount price while it designed a whole new airplane. That would, of course, be time-consuming and expensive, and during the interim, it would probably lose a bunch of narrow-body sales to Airbus. ..."
"... As late as February 2011, Boeing chair and CEO James McNerney was sticking to the plan to design a totally new aircraft. ..."
"... Committing to putting a new engine that didn't fit on the plane was the corporate version of the Fyre Festival's "let's just do it and be legends, man" moment, and it unsurprisingly wound up leading to a slew of engineering and regulatory problems. ..."
"... The problem is that an airplane is a big, complicated network of interconnected parts. To get the engine under the 737 wing, engineers had to mount the engine nacelle higher and more forward on the plane. But moving the engine nacelle (and a related change to the nose of the plane) changed the aerodynamics of the plane, such that the plane did not handle properly at a high angle of attack ..."
"... But note that the underlying problem isn't really software; it's with the effort to use software to get around a whole host of other problems. ..."
"... Looking back, Boeing probably wishes it had just stuck with the "build a new plane" plan and toughed out a few years of rough sales, rather than ending up in the current situation. Right now the company is, in effect, trying to patch things up piecemeal -- a software update here, a new warning light there, etc. -- in hopes of persuading global regulatory agencies to let its planes fly again. ..."
"... That said, on March 27, FAA officials faced the Senate Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Aviation and Space at a hearing called by subcommittee Chair Ted Cruz (R-TX). Regulators committed at the hearing to revamp the way they certify new planes , in light of the flaws that were revealed in the previous certification process. ..."
"... a central element of this story is the credibility of the FAA's process ..."
Claiming responsibility was part of an attempt to get the planes approved to fly again.
Boeing was trying to say that it now understands why the planes crashes -- flawed software --
and has a plan in place to replace it with new software that will eliminate the problem and
persuade regulators to get the planes off the ground. But then Friday morning, the company
announced that it had found a second,
unrelated software flaw that it also needs to fix and will somewhat delay the process of
getting the planes cleared to fly again.
All of which, of course, raises the question of why such flawed systems were allowed to fly
in the first place.
And that story begins nine years ago when Boeing was faced with a major threat to its bottom
line, spurring the airline to rush a series of kludges through the certification process --
with an underresourced Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) seemingly all too eager to help an
American company threatened by a foreign competitor, rather than to ask tough questions about
the project.
The specifics of what happened in the regulatory system are still emerging (and despite
executives' assurances, we don't even really know what happened on the flights yet). But the
big picture is coming into view: A major employer faced a major financial threat, and
short-term politics and greed won out over the integrity of the regulatory system. It's a
scandal. The A320neo was trouble for Boeing
Jet fuel is a major cost for airlines. With labor costs largely driven by collective
bargaining agreements and regulations that require minimum ratios of flight attendants per
passenger, fuel is the cost center airlines have the most capacity to do something about.
Consequently, improving fuel efficiency has emerged as one of the major bases of competition
between airline manufacturers.
If you roll back to 2010, it began to look like Boeing had a real problem in this
regard.
Airbus was coming out with an updated version of the
A320 family that it called the A320neo , with "neo" meaning "new engine option." The new
engines were going to be more fuel-efficient, with a larger diameter than previous A320
engines, that could nonetheless be mounted on what was basically the same airframe. This was a
nontrivial engineering undertaking both in designing the new engines and in figuring out how to
make them work with the old airframe, but even though it cost a bunch of money, it basically
worked. And it raised the question of whether Boeing would respond.
Initial word was that it wouldn't. As CBS Moneywatch's Brett
Snyder wrote in December 2010 , the basic problem was that you couldn't slap the new
generation of more efficient, larger-diameter engines onto the 737:
One of the issues for Boeing is that it takes more work to put new engines on the 737 than
on the A320. The 737 is lower to the ground than the A320, and the new engines have a
larger diameter . So while both manufacturers would have to do work, the Boeing guys
would have more work to do to jack the airplane up. That will cost more while reducing
commonality with the current fleet. As we know from last week, reduced commonality means
higher costs for the airlines as well.
Under the circumstances, Boeing's best option was to just take the hit for a few years and
accept that it was going to have to start selling 737s at a discount price while it designed a
whole new airplane. That would, of course, be time-consuming and expensive, and during the
interim, it would probably lose a bunch of narrow-body sales to Airbus.
The original version of the 737 first flew in 1967, and a decades-old decision about how
much height to leave between the wing and the runway left them boxed out of 21st-century engine
technology -- and there was simply nothing to be done about it.
Unless there was.
Boeing decided to put on the too-big engines anyway
As late as February 2011, Boeing chair and CEO James McNerney was sticking to the plan to
design a totally new aircraft.
"We're not done evaluating this whole situation yet," he
said on an analyst call , "but our current bias is to move to a newer airplane, an all-new
airplane, at the end of the decade, beginning of the next decade. It's our judgment that our
customers will wait for us."
It's not entirely clear what happened, but, reading between the lines, it seems that in
talking to its customers Boeing reached the conclusion that airlines would not wait for them.
Some critical mass of carriers (American Airlines seems to have been particularly influential)
was credible enough in its threat to switch to Airbus equipment that Boeing decided it needed
to offer 737 buyers a Boeing solution sooner rather than later.
Committing to putting a new engine that didn't fit on the plane was the corporate version of
the Fyre Festival's "let's
just do it and be legends, man" moment, and it unsurprisingly wound up leading to a slew of
engineering and regulatory problems.
New engines on an old plane
As the industry trade publication Leeham News and Analysis explained earlier in March,
Boeing engineers had been
working on the concept that became the 737 Max even back when the company's plan was still
not to build it. In a March 2011 interview with Aircraft Technology, Mike Bair, then the head of 737 product
development, said that reengineering was possible. "There's been fairly extensive engineering work on it," he said. "We figured out a way to
get a big enough engine under the wing."
The problem is that an airplane is a big, complicated network of interconnected parts. To
get the engine under the 737 wing, engineers had to mount the engine nacelle higher and more
forward on the plane. But moving the engine nacelle (and a related change to the nose of the
plane) changed the aerodynamics of the plane, such that the plane did not handle properly at a
high angle of attack.
That, in turn, led to the creation of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
(MCAS). It fixed the angle-of-attack problem in most situations, but it created new problems in
other situations when it made it difficult for pilots to directly control the plane without
being overridden by the MCAS.
On Wednesday, Boeing rolled out a software patch that it says corrects the problem, and it
hopes to persuade the FAA to agree.
But note that the underlying problem isn't really software; it's with the effort to use
software to get around a whole host of other problems.
1of x: BEST analysis of what really is happening on the #Boeing737Max
issue from my brother in law @davekammeyer , who's a pilot,
software engineer & deep thinker. Bottom line don't blame software that's the band aid
for many other engineering and economic forces in effect.
Recall, after all, that the whole point of the 737 Max project was to be able to say that
the new plane was the same as the old plane. From an engineering perspective, the preferred
solution was to actually build a new plane. But for business reasons, Boeing didn't want a "new
plane" that would require a lengthy certification process and extensive (and expensive) new
pilot training for its customers. The demand was for a plane that was simultaneously new and
not new.
But because the new engines wouldn't fit under the old wings, the new plane wound up having
different aerodynamic properties than the old plane. And because the aerodynamics were
different, the flight control systems were also different. But treating the whole thing as a
fundamentally different plane would have undermined the whole point. So the FAA and Boeing
agreed to sort of fudge it.
The new planes are pretty different
As far as we can tell, the 737 Max is a perfectly airworthy plane in the sense that
error-free piloting allows it to be operated safely.
But pilots of planes that didn't crash kept noticing the same basic pattern of behavior that
is suspected to have been behind the two crashes, according to a Dallas Morning News review of
voluntary aircraft incident reports to a NASA database:
The disclosures found by the News reference problems with an autopilot system, and they
all occurred during the ascent after takeoff. Many mentioned the plane suddenly nosing down.
While records show these flights occurred in October and November, the airlines the pilots
were flying for is redacted from the database.
These pilots all safely disabled the MCAS and kept their planes in the air. But one of the
pilots reported to the
database that it was "unconscionable that a manufacturer, the FAA, and the airlines would
have pilots flying an airplane without adequately training, or even providing available
resources and sufficient documentation to understand the highly complex systems that
differentiate this aircraft from prior models."
The training piece is important because a key selling feature of the 737 Max was the idea
that since it wasn't really a new plane, pilots didn't really need to be retrained for the new
equipment. As the New York Times reported, "For many new airplane models, pilots train for
hours on giant, multimillion-dollar machines, on-the-ground versions of cockpits that mimic the
flying experience and teach them new features" while the experienced 737 Max pilots were
allowed light refresher courses that you could do on an iPad.
That let Boeing get the planes into customers' hands quickly and cheaply, but evidently at
the cost of increasing the possibility of pilots not really knowing how to handle the planes,
with dire consequences for everyone involved.
The FAA put a lot of faith in Boeing
In a blockbuster March 17 report for the Seattle Times, the newspaper's aerospace reporter
Dominic Gates details the extent to which
the FAA delegated crucial evaluations of the 737's safety to Boeing itself . The
delegation, Gates explains, is in part a story of a years-long process during which the FAA,
"citing lack of funding and resources, has over the years delegated increasing authority to
Boeing to take on more of the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes."
But there are indications of failures that were specific to the 737 Max timeline. In
particular, Gates reports that "as certification proceeded, managers prodded them to speed the
process" and that "when time was too short for FAA technical staff to complete a review,
sometimes managers either signed off on the documents themselves or delegated their review back
to Boeing."
Most of all, decisions about what could and could not be delegated were being made by
managers concerned about the timeline, rather than by the agency's technical experts.
It's not entirely clear at this point why the FAA was so determined to get the 737 cleared
quickly (there will be more investigations), but if you recall the political circumstances of
this period in Barack Obama's presidency, you can quickly get a general sense of the issue.
Boeing is not just a big company with a significant lobbying presence in Washington; it's a
major manufacturing company with a strong global export presence and a source of many
good-paying union jobs. In short, it was exactly the kind of company the powers that be were
eager to promote -- with the Obama White House, for example, proudly going to bat for the
Export-Import Bank as a key way to sustain America's aerospace industry.
A story about overweening regulators delaying an iconic American company's product launch
and costing good jobs compared to the European competition would have looked very bad. And the
fact that the whole purpose of the plane was to be more fuel-efficient only made getting it off
the ground a bigger priority. But the incentives really were reasonably aligned, and Boeing has
only caused problems for itself by cutting corners.
Boeing is now in a bad situation
One emblem of the whole situation is that as the 737 Max engineering team piled kludge on
top of kludge, they came up with a cockpit
warning light that would alert the pilots if the plane's two angle-of-attack sensors
disagreed.
But then, as
Jon Ostrower reported for the Air Current , Boeing's team decided to make the warning light
an optional add-on, like how car companies will upcharge you for a moon roof.
The
light cost $80,000 extra per plane and neither Lion Air nor Ethiopian chose to buy it,
perhaps figuring that Boeing would not sell a plane (nor would the FAA allow it to) that was
not basically safe to fly. In the wake of the crashes, Boeing has decided to revisit this
decision and make the light standard on all aircraft.
This, fundamentally, is one reason the FAA has become comfortable working so closely with
Boeing on safety regulations: The nature of the airline industry is such that there's no real
money to be made selling airplanes that have a poor safety track record. One could even imagine
sketching out a utopian libertarian argument to the effect that there's no real need for a
government role in certifying new airplanes at all, precisely because there's no reason to
think it's profitable to make unsafe ones.
The real world, of course, is quite a bit different from that, and different individuals and
institutions face particular pressures that can lead them to take actions that don't
collectively make sense. Looking back, Boeing probably wishes it had just stuck with the
"build a new plane" plan and toughed out a few years of rough sales, rather than ending up in
the current situation. Right now the company is, in effect, trying to patch things up piecemeal
-- a software update here, a new warning light there, etc. -- in hopes of persuading global
regulatory agencies to let its planes fly again.
But even once that's done, Boeing faces the task of convincing airlines to actually buy its
planes. An
informative David Ljunggren article for Reuters reminds us that a somewhat comparable
situation arose in 1965 when three then-new Boeing 727 jetliners crashed.
There wasn't really anything unsound about the 727 planes, but many pilots didn't fully
understand how to operate the new flaps -- arguably a parallel to the MCAS situation with the
737 Max -- which spurred some additional training and changes to the operation manual.
Passengers avoided the planes for months, but eventually came back as there were no more
crashes, and the 727 went on to fly safely for decades. Boeing hopes to have a similar happy
ending to this saga, but so far it seems to be a long way from that point. And the immediate
future likely involves more tough questions.
A political scandal on slow burn
The 737 Max was briefly a topic of political controversy in the United States as foreign
regulators grounded the planes, but President Donald Trump -- after speaking personally to
Boeing's CEO -- declined to follow. Many members of Congress (from both parties) called on him
to reconsider, which he rather quickly did, pushing the whole topic off Washington's front
burner.
But Trump is generally friendly to Boeing (he even has a former Boeing executive, Patrick
Shanahan, serving as acting
defense secretary, despite an ongoing ethics inquiry into charges that Shanahan unfairly
favors his former employer), and Republicans are generally averse to harsh regulatory
crackdowns. The most important decisions in the mix appear to have been made back during the
Obama administration, so it's also difficult for Democrats to go after this issue. Meanwhile,
Washington has been embroiled in wrangling over special counsel Robert Mueller's investigation,
and a new health care battlefield opened up as well.
That said, on March 27, FAA officials faced the Senate Commerce Committee's Subcommittee
on Aviation and Space at a hearing called by subcommittee Chair Ted Cruz (R-TX). Regulators
committed at the hearing to revamp the way they certify new
planes , in light of the flaws that were revealed in the previous certification
process.
The questions at stake, however, are now much bigger than one subcommittee. Billions of
dollars are on the line for Boeing, the airlines that fly 737s, and the workers who build the
planes. And since a central element of this story is the credibility of the FAA's
process -- in the eyes of the American people and of foreign regulatory agencies -- it
almost certainly won't get sorted out without more involvement from the actual decision-makers
in the US government.
Ralph Nader, the noted consumer rights advocate, called for a recall and consumer boycott of the
Boeing
jet grounded by regulators across the globe after two deadly crashes.
His niece, 24-year-old Samya
Stumo, was among the 157 victims of an Ethiopian Airlines flight crash last month, less than six months after a
flight on the same aircraft, the Boeing 737 Max 8, crashed in Indonesia.
"Those planes should never fly again," said Nader, speaking by phone at a news conference after Stumo's family
filed a lawsuit against Chicago-based Boeing, one of its suppliers and Ethiopian Airlines. The family also filed a
claim against the
Federal Aviation Administration
.
Stumo's family's lawsuit is one of several filed by relatives of passengers killed in the Ethiopian Airlines and
Lion Air crashes. All those families have "such huge holes" because of the aircraft's problems, said Nadia Milleron,
Stumo's mother, who said she had met others who lost loved ones in Ethiopia.
"As someone who's lost the dearest person in my life, I want her death not to be in vain. I don't want anybody
else to die," she said at the news conference in Chicago.
"Those in charge of creating and selling this plane did not treat Samya as they would their own daughters," said
Milleron, who was visibly emotional as she spoke about her daughter.
"This could have been prevented, and that's what makes me cry," she said.
Nader's book "Unsafe at Any Speed"
helped bring about a series of auto safety laws
, including the creation the federal agency that became the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which oversees the auto industry. He later turned his attention to
various consumer protection efforts related to food, drug and workplace safety and clean air and water.
On Thursday, he took aim at Boeing, blaming the crashes on design problems that he argued were the result of the
company's focus on getting the plane on the market quickly to compete with its rival manufacturer Airbus.
He also criticized the relationship between Boeing and the federal agency tasked with overseeing aviation industry
safety.
"If we don't end the cozy relationship between the patsy FAA and the Boeing company, 5,000 of these fatally flawed
planes will be in the air all over the world with millions of passengers," Nader said.
Boeing said Thursday it is reviewing a preliminary report on last month's crash from Ethiopian authorities that
said the same anti-stall system that came under scrutiny in the Lion Air crash was activated on the Ethiopian
Airlines flight.
Most accidents are the result of a chain of events, but when that system is activated in error, it adds to "what
is already a high-workload environment," Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg
said in
a video
released by the company on Thursday.
"It's our responsibility to eliminate this risk. We own it, and we know how to do it," he said.
Boeing said it is still working with the FAA and regulatory agencies to develop and certify a software update
designed to keep the system from being activated unintentionally, along with additional training for pilots.
Nader said he doesn't think the software fix is enough to make the plane safe since it can't predict all potential
problems with a plane that is "prone to stall."
While Boeing has worked to show it is taking steps to address safety concerns, the FAA is planning changes to its
oversight of airplane development, which delegates some authority for certifying new aircraft to their manufacturers,
the Associated
Press reported
.
"... [We] can now reveal how it's possible the aircraft can crash despite using the Cut-Out switches. To verify, we ran it all in a simulator together with MentourPilot Youtube channel over the last days. ..."
"... Nowhere is it described the trim could be impossible to move if the Cut-Out switches were cut at the slightest miss-trim at the speeds flown. And there is no warning on when to move the Cut-Out switches, the checklist says "Cut, then trim manually." This is not the whole truth . ..."
"... The high speed of 340kts indicated airspeed and the trim at 2.3 units causes the Stabilator manual trim to jam, one can't move it by hand. The crew is busy trying to hand trim the next two minutes but no trim change is achieved. ..."
"... It's easy to say "Why didn't they trim then?". Because they are going down at 20 degrees nose down (which is a lot, a normal landing approach is 3°) and at 400kts. Then you just pull for all you have. And the aircraft is not reacting to the largest Control Column displacement since takeoff. This makes them pull even harder, the aircraft is unresponsive and they are fighting for theirs and all the passenger lives. ..."
"... Moreover their description of the MCAS was incomplete . It is only now known that the MCAS trims the stabilizer at a speeed of 0.27 units (degrees) per second while the pilots electric trim moves the stabilizer at only 0.18 units per second: ..."
"... If MCAS keeps tripping, and if pilots do not shut off electric trim entirely, the result is what Tajer describes as a two-steps-back, one-step-forward scenario, with MCAS maintaining an edge. ..."
"... "The MCAS knows but one speed, which is 0.27, which is the most-aggressive speed," Tajer says. "If you look at the balance sheet on it, MCAS is winning, and you are losing." ..."
"... That additional problem pertains to software affecting flaps and other flight-control hardware and is therefore classified as critical to flight safety, said two officials with knowledge of the investigation. ..."
"... This is not about sensor failure. It is about the profit of cheap parts and greed. The insiders at Boeing tipped off the Big Boys that they needed more than the gizmos installed on export versions if they were going to survive. ..."
"... Engineering Manufacturing company with a sales division works alright. But a Sales Company with a manufacturing subsidiary does not, as we see. Boeing is typical for end-stage Imperial Corporations - all show, no go, and get the money quick... ..."
"... A mistake is one or two errors. This was one horrible string of deliberate corner cutting, about 7-8 totally disastrous decisions by the management, that could have only led to deaths of people uninformed enough to purchase the travel risk from this plane supplier. ..."
< to include the new system into training material for the pilots which Boeing, for
commercial reasons, did not do.>
After the Lion Air crash the Federal Aviation Administration
issued an Airworthiness
Directive 2018-23-51 which adviced 737 MAX pilots how to handle an MCAS failure.
The FAA told 737 MAX pilots to use the Stabilizer Trim Cutoff switches to interupt the
power supply for the system's actuator, a motor driven jackscrew in the back of the airplane.
The pilots should then use the manual trim wheels in the cockpit, which move the jackscrew
and stabilizer via steel cables, to righten the aircraft.
On March 10 a 737 MAX flown by Ethiopian Airline crashed shortly after take off. 157
people died. Radar data and debris found showed that the cause was likely a similar MCAS
failure as had happened on the Indonesian Lion Air flight.
All 737 MAX planes were grounded with the U.S. being the last country to order it.
Some U.S. pilots, as well as some commentators here, publicly blamed the darker skin
pilots for not using the simple procedure the FAA had put out: "Why didn't they just flip the
switches? Stupid undertrained third-world dudes."
The preliminary report clearly showed that the Ethiopian Airlines pilots who were
commanding Flight ET 302/10 March have followed the Boeing recommended and FAA approved
emergency procedures to handle the most difficult emergency situation created on the
airplane. Despite their hard work and full compliance with the emergency procedures, it was
very unfortunate that they could not recover the airplane from the persistence of nose
diving.
The procedure Boeing and the FAA advised to use was insufficient to bring the aircraft
back under control. It was in fact impossible to recover the plane. The possibility of this
to happen was discussed in pilot fora and on specialized websites for some time.
The MCAS system moves the front of the stablizer up to turn the nose of the airplane down.
The plane then decends very fast. The aerodynamic forces (the "wind") pushing against the
stabilizer gets so strong that a manual counter-trim becomes impossible.
With the 737MAX cutout switches, MCAS runaway is stopped by throwing both switches, losing
electric trim altogether. In this case, the flight crew must rely on manual trim via
turning the trim wheel/crank. As discussed above, the manual crank can bind up , making
flying much more difficult.
Bjorn Fehrm, a senior engineeer and pilot now writing at Leeham News , came to a
similar
conclusion :
[We] can now reveal how it's possible the aircraft can crash despite using the Cut-Out
switches. To verify, we ran it all in a simulator together with MentourPilot Youtube
channel over the last days.
...
At a miss-trimmed Stabilator, you either have to re-engage Electric trim or off-load the
Stabilator jackscrew by stick forward, creating a nose-down bunt maneuver, followed by
trim.
Stick forward to trim was not an option for ET302, they were at 1,000ft above ground.
According to The Wall Street Journal, the ET302 crew re-engaged electrical trim to save the
situation, to get the nose up. It was their only chance. But too late. The aggressive MCAS
kicked in and worsened the situation before they could counter it.
On the FAA's Airworthiness Directive Fehrm writes:
Nowhere is it described the trim could be impossible to move if the Cut-Out switches were
cut at the slightest miss-trim at the speeds flown. And there is no warning on when to move
the Cut-Out switches, the checklist says "Cut, then trim manually." This is not the whole
truth .
An detailed analysis of the flight recorder data as documented in the preliminary crash
report confirms
the conclusions :
The high speed of 340kts indicated airspeed and the trim at 2.3 units causes the Stabilator
manual trim to jam, one can't move it by hand. The crew is busy trying to hand trim the
next two minutes but no trim change is achieved.
The pilots then do the only thing possible. They reengage the electric stabilizer trim to
righten the aircraft.
But the aggressive MCAS, trimming with a speed 50% higher than the pilot and for a full
nine seconds, kicks in at 8 with a force they didn't expect. Speed is now at 375kts and
MCAS was never designed to trim at these Speed/Altitude combinations. Dynamic pressures,
which governs how the aircraft reacts to control surface movements, is now almost double it
was when last MCAS trimmed (Dynamic pressure increases with Speed squared).
The Pilots are thrown off their seats, hitting the cockpit roof. Look at the Pitch
Attitude Disp trace and the Accel Vert trace. These are on the way to Zero G and we can see
how PF loses stick pull in the process (Ctrl Column Pos L). He can barely hold on to the
Yoke, let alone pull or trim against.
His reduced pull increases the pitch down further, which increases the speed even more.
At 05.45.30 the Pilots have hit the seats again (Accel Vert trace and Ctrl Columns force
trace) and can start pulling in a desperate last move. But it's too late. Despite them
creating the largest Control Column movement ever, pitch down attitude is only marginally
affected.
The pilots and their passengers lose the fight:
It's easy to say "Why didn't they trim then?". Because they are going down at 20 degrees
nose down (which is a lot, a normal landing approach is 3°) and at 400kts. Then you
just pull for all you have. And the aircraft is not reacting to the largest Control Column
displacement since takeoff. This makes them pull even harder, the aircraft is unresponsive
and they are fighting for theirs and all the passenger lives.
A diligent safety anlysis would have predicted this outcome. Neither Boeing nor the FAA
seems to have done such after the first 737 MAX crashed. They provided an Airworthiness
Directive with procedures that were insufficiant to correct the system induce
misbehavior.
Moreover their description of the MCAS
was incomplete . It is only now known that the MCAS trims the stabilizer at a speeed of
0.27 units (degrees) per second while the pilots electric trim moves the stabilizer at only
0.18 units per second:
"It's like a Tasmanian devil in there," says Dennis Tajer, a 737 pilot and communications
chair for Allied Pilots Association, which represents American Airlines' pilots.
... If MCAS keeps tripping, and if pilots do not shut off electric trim entirely, the result is
what Tajer describes as a two-steps-back, one-step-forward scenario, with MCAS maintaining
an edge.
"The MCAS knows but one speed, which is 0.27, which is the most-aggressive speed," Tajer
says. "If you look at the balance sheet on it, MCAS is winning, and you are losing."
The insufficient advice to pilots given after the first crash only adds to the long list
of criminal mistakes Boeing made and which the FAA allowed to pass.
Boeing confirmed to The Washington Post that it had found a second software problem that
the Federal Aviation Administration has ordered fixed -- separate from the anti-stall
system that is under investigation in the two crashes and is involved in the worldwide
grounding of the aircraft.
That additional problem pertains to software affecting flaps and other flight-control
hardware and is therefore classified as critical to flight safety, said two officials with
knowledge of the investigation.
The criminals at Boeing again offer no explanation and play down the issue:
In a statement, Boeing called the additional problem "relatively minor" but did not offer
details of how it affects the plane's flight-control system. "We are taking steps to
thoroughly address this relatively minor issue and already have the solution in work to do
that," it said.
What other 'features' were secretly implemented into the 737 MAX without sufficiant
analysis about their side effects and consequences?
---
Previous Moon of Alabama posts on the 737 MAX crashes:
"... The Pilots are thrown off their seats, hitting the cockpit roof
..."
I should think that at that point in the narrative, one of the flight crew must either
have fallen unconscious or ended up too injured to be able to do anything, let alone fight a
rogue MCAS system.
I presume the pilots would still have their seatbelts on, unless the forces generated by
the constant battle to stabilise the aircraft while fighting the MCAS system were too strong
and broke the seatbelts or dislocated the seats themselves.
As for other "features" that were secretly placed into the 737 MAX jets that Boeing
"neglected" to tell FAA or its clients about, what about the "features" that should have been
made compulsory but which Boeing decided were optional at the clients' own expense?
As a layman, my main question at this stage is: "Who is going to prison and for how long?" Everyone involved in the decision to sell those flying death traps should be tried for
manslaughter at the least. The guilty ones should serve prison sentences appropriate for
criminals who caused hundreds of people to die for their own profit.
How long a sentence does a poor man get, who kills a well-off tourist for the money in his
wallet - or even for his shoes?
Now multiply that by several hundred - adding on, of course, extra years to allow for the
Boeing executives' privileged lives, top-flight education, and (above all) the generous
sufficiency they already enjoy.
In China such people are routinely shot, which seems the right course. In the USA, while
poor people are executed all the time, apparently the wealthy and privileged get a free
pass.
Is a direct result of Boing monopoly - they are division of the military.
And why did european agency roll-over?
Will this warrant cancellation of orders?
Oh, and the people at the FAA need to be tried in a criminal court too. Not only were they
criminally negligent - they did it while being generously remunerated by the taxpayer. Perhaps a few years as galley slaves would be appropriate punishment - to teach them not
to be lazy.
This cheap seat Boeing export death trap was doomed from the beginning. Once these
planes nose 'up' it is heading to a crash. Any engineer with a basic understanding of aero
dynamic/physics knows this. This is not about sensor failure. It is about the profit of cheap
parts and greed. The insiders at Boeing tipped off the Big Boys that they needed more than
the gizmos installed on export versions if they were going to survive.
Tom @3 makes note the Chinese have a great quality control program. Boeing execs will up
their kickback slop to US politicians and the final report will say, 'well accidents will
happen'.
You can be sure that if this was Airbus, and two were crashed in the USA, that there would be
hearings, threats, congressional investigations, lawsuits, calls for criminal investigations,
Wall Street shorting the company, ...and on and on until the company would be disbanded.
Criminal, well yes but so what! Peons do not matter, right.
Engineering Manufacturing company with a sales division works alright. But a Sales Company
with a manufacturing subsidiary does not, as we see.
Boeing is typical for end-stage Imperial Corporations - all show, no go, and get the money
quick...
Sorta like GE's BWR's and Fukushima, fake it on the cheap and run with the money to
retirement.
The Pilots are thrown off their seats, hitting the cockpit roof ..."
Posted by: Jen | Apr 5, 2019 6:27:26 AM | 1
My interpretation is the same as yours. It's an incident report which is supposed to be
bland statements of fact - neither overstated nor understated. If the report says the pilots
hit the roof then that's what happened (airliner cockpits don't have cathedral ceilings so
only inches clearance when standing erect).
OTOH I find it hard to believe that the pilots would unbuckle before they had achieved cruise
status and given passengers the OK to do the same.
Seat belts can break but not under the relatively mild stresses generated by violent flight
maneuvers of an intact aircraft.
When I purchase an airline ticket I purchase the risk profile of the airline and the risk
profile of the plane manufacturer, because either can kill me.
A mistake is one or two errors. This was one horrible string of deliberate corner cutting,
about 7-8 totally disastrous decisions by the management, that could have only led to deaths
of people uninformed enough to purchase the travel risk from this plane supplier.
Uninformed just like I was before I recently saw some old investigative footage about
Boeing's disregard for elementary quality in the earlier 737 hull manufacturing and the
company's treatment of the whistleblowers trying to help the company by exposing such wrong
doing: "Just put a coat of paint on it".
Intentionally (spin) or unintentionally, there is too much talk about detail such as
software, pilot capability and decisions, training and the lack of it and so on. This only
hides the big picture of an utter disregard for the value of human life, traded off for
management bonuses and stock holder dividends. It is a complete reversal of the original
engineering-focused Boeing which made Boeing an icon that it used to be. Perhaps, somewhere
in the Washington lobbying swamp the dividing line between the engineering for killing people
and the engineering for transporting people became too blurred. As the profit strategy, on
MIC business overcharge, on airliner business underdeliver, and ruthlessly so on both:
rip-off money from the tax-payers and lives from the travellers.
Please convince me that this is not a symptom of the rot of the whole society, when an
icon such as Boeing sinks deep into nastiest morally debased profiteering. I posit that the
society which so easily kills people using bombs, rockets and drones cannot make good quality
products any more. This is because killing and destroying is just too easy compared with
creating something good . Without the good will of the people in a society to morally
rebalance, the societal endeavours for creation can never compete against the endeavours for
destruction. In other words, US had become too much about destruction to be still capable of
creation.
Finally, there would be one way to get back on the right track - life-in-jail for both
Boeing and FAA involved. It is ultimately ironic that in the highly criticised China the
shitbags would probably be put in front of a firing squad for corruption. In US, they will
receive bonuses and continue on to the next killing enterprise. Until they finally launch
nuclear tipped missiles against the creation oriented foreign competitors. Do they still know
of any other way to win?
Touching and informative press conference with the Stumo family (Ralph Nader's grandniece,
Samyo Stumo, was killed on the 737 MAX crash in Ethiopia) and two law firms that filed a
lawsuit against Boeing and others. At @ 28 min one lawyer displays an anonymous email from a
737 MAX pilot detailing how the MCAS system can thwart a pilot's ability to recover control
of the jet. This email was posted to a pilots' forum/aviation network after the Lion Air
crash in Indonesia last October.
@Steve...if you say it, then it's true. Of course, if you knew more about it, then you would
say something else.
But real expert Gundersen says differently. I worked with some of the GE engineers, and I
know what they said.
You are 100% incorrect about the diesels, the problem included primary, ultimate heat sink
loss due to the elevation of the pumps, and the pressure vessels we know to be unsafe.
GE BWR's designed in the US by US GE engineers, some of whom quit rather than sign off on
the design..."fuze was lit for Fukushima in 1965" >see fairewinds, amigo.
@SteveK9 12
As far as I understand, the main Fukushima problem was the concrete reactor encasing design
which did not cater for the possibility of excessive hydrogen release from the reactor. It
worked well when not in trouble, but in an accident situation (who would have expected an
accident) the concrete encasing without a release valve became a pressure cooker filled with
flammable hydrogen. What a surprise that it went boom!?
What you write here about the water cooling system generators you probably believe in but
it resembles the pilot blaming spin of Boeing. The truth has a nasty tendency to end up owned
by those with most money.
I always remember how our old friend pharaoh Ramses paid hundreds of stone masons to go
around Egypt and chisel out the achievements of all the previous pharaohs and chisel in his.
Then even several thousands of years later, when the archeologists finally learned to read
hieroglyphs, they only had propaganda and spin left to read. Thus nothing less than the son
of the supreme Egyptian deity the sun god Ra, the propaganda paying Ramses became the
greatest pharaoh of all time.
"As a layman, my main question at this stage is: 'Who is going to prison and for how
long?'"
The first to go should obviously be the individuals in charge of the FAA. These people, I
imagine, were appointed by Obama. When we look at the regulatory system in the US bear in
mind that the current irresponsibility arose in a long descent-since the days of Nixon I
suspect-into neo-liberal corporate capture.
Just recently the deceits practised in the fake science which allowed the licensing of Round
Up were revealed. The entire system is rotten and nowhere is it more corrupt than in the
United States.
" They reengage the electric stabilizer trim to righten the aircraft"
That's the problem. While the plane may have remained unstable due to the lack of rapid
response of the manual trim control and difficulties turning.the wheel at high speed low
altitude flight,the planes altitude was still increasing. They should have either returned to
the airport or continued ascent in the hope they could restore trim at high altitude and low
air pressure.
Altitude immediately plummeted when they rengaged the MCAS and the plane was not
recoverable at that point.
Such mistakes should be made in flight simulators . Hence it's lack of training at fault
here, and the blame for that is still on Boeing.
Not sure even the flight simulator training will solve this mess
TBH
This whole business is sickening and infuriating. What is especially infuriating is that the
FAA is extremely onerous in enforcement of ancient regulations with respect to general
aviation. The owner of a small plane is actually prohibited from casually upgrading any of
the antiquated instruments, even radios, on his Made in 1975 private plane, and must stick
with what was originally certified by the manufacturer as originally constructed--unless he
is willing to expend huge amounts of money to find an updated, certified (e.g., "safe")
upgraded component from someone willing to go the lengthy and expensive process of having the
FAA certify that product, then have a certified mechanic install the certified part and
certify it was done according to the precise procedures established. In effect, the FAA
actively discourages safety improvements of the general aviation fleet by unthinking
resistance to technological change.
Unless you're Boeing.
Having experience with the "other" FAA, this is what's especially dumbfounding to me.
While there may be some justification in permitting a trusted manufacturer to establish and
certify as safe minor details, anything involving the actual flight characteristics of the
plane should NEVER be delegated, and doubly so with respect to commercial airliners. And how
could any regulator be anything but incredulous if a manufacturer says "Well, we've decided
to make this commercial airliner INHERENTLY UNSTABLE, but we have a whole box of bandaids
which should do a bang-up job of keeping it in the air!" WTF!! "Fail-safe" isn't actually a
fix or a mechanism, the term is supposed to describe a design philosophy, in which if there
is a failure, the resulting condition is still safe (well, at least not less safe). Ditto
redundancy, which is why it is unheard-of that such an apparently vital bandaid relied on
only one sensor.
It's one thing to build a fighter that is inherently unstable (although even that is
perhaps questionable), but an airliner filled with passengers? Ludicrous. And the FAA and
Boeing both know it, and knew it from the start. In a just world heads would literally roll,
but sadly, nothing real is likely to happen.
I already thought that the whole setup had faulty logic. If the plane could be adequately
controlled by pilots, "manually", then extra training would be cheaper than introducing an
automatic system. If the plane could not be adequately controlled by the pilots, "switching
to manual" is futile.
I have a minor experience with "automatic control" when the chip of my car went wrong. In
old, old times one has to add a bit of extra gas to start the car engine, and as a result one
could flood the engine, then wait a few minutes for the gasoline to evaporate and try again.
In contemporary cars you do not press gas at all when you start, and the chip regulates how
much gasoline should be injected to the engine based on its temperature. Then after 10 years
of happy use the chip "noticed" that the engine is cold when it is actually hot. So I am
driving on a windy narrow road and the car accelerates going 40 mph without pressing the gas
(65 kmh), 15 mhp above the legal speed limit, and did I mention that the road had curves?
Frankly, it happened few times before that, but on a straight road you just get the feel of
cruise control. Anyway, brakes remedied the situation, luckily, they could overcome the
engine and the chip was replaced for mere 800 dollars.
Here it seems that Boeing designers entered the kludge road and kept compensating for this
or that and lost the total picture. Isn't it suspicious that the automatic trim was so
aggressive? I also do not understand at all what "manual" means, seem impossible that actual
muscle force of the pilot was applied to the tail? Should there be an emergence procedure in
which a cabin steward under voice control of the captain adjusts the tail with a crank, or
perhaps something like a capstan that could be moved by the entire cabin crew? That would be
a true manual system.
My conclusion is that once you rely on automatic solutions because the crew cannot do it
in some situations, you must crank up the reliability to something "average million years
without failure or more". It is not a ship that can drop anchors, giving a few days to figure
out the problem etc. (although this is something that should be avoided too). Boeing setup
was something that should flunk students in Industrial Engineering (they have courses on
control systems). For example, an internal device with a gyroscope could track the speed and
its three-dimensional angle, so if one of external sensors malfunction the system can
automatically decide which reading makes more sense. External sensor measure speed in respect
to air which is important too, but if the plane approaches the ground, that should be noted
to,. With few gismos you could get sufficient redundancy with some "voting scheme" or a
"decision tree".
Just use logic for a moment. Boeing: We're presenting this new (redesigned) plane for
certification, and it comes with it's very own MCRASH system. FAA: MCRASH system...what's
that? Boeing: Well, the plane has a pronounced tendency to go into stalls and fall out of the
sky. FAA: That's an interesting feature. Are pilots going to be able to handle these
aggravated power-on stalls (the worst kind, incidentally)? Boeing: Oh, no. There's no way
pilots would be able to detect the condition and react quickly enough to save the plane, so
we've devised an automated system that is faster than a human can react to save the day. We
present MCRASH.
From annals of idiocy in design. Some time in the 1st decade of this century the Polish state
rail road decided to embrace modernity and introduced automatic ticketing system. It would
fabulously till the end of that year when it shut down. Apparently, there was a "sanity
check" disallowing tickets to have arrival before the departure, someone forgot about the
pesky case of arrival after New Year following departure in December, and the system could
not cope with a wave of "illegal requests". Luckily, because the system did not operate that
long prior to collapse, there were still people who could manually write the tickets until
the bug was removed.
would -> work, I must say that the setup not allowing to correct the post after it is made
is also an example of a "suboptimal" design, many sites give you 10-15 minutes with a
permission to edit or delete.
would -> work, I must say that the setup not allowing to correct the post after it is
made is also an example of a "suboptimal" design, many sites give you 10-15 minutes with a
permission to edit or delete.
B hosts Moon of Alabama on Typepad. Typepad costs $15/month, including hosting and support
(best value in web hosting for a busy weblog). Typepad apparently doesn't have a post-comment
grace period editing option or B would have added it.
I used to be an advocate of MoA moving over to WordPress (I'm a full time software
architect/designer who builds WordPress driven web application and a pro video player).
There's lots of nice bells and whistles which could be added including comment editing and a
much more attractive and innovative design.
Having seen the endless security issues and silly site breaking updates which Matt
Mullenweg and Automattic have pushed out over the last four years, B would be wise to stay
put on Typepad. Typepad is clunky, it's a bit ugly but it works reliably and is inexpensive.
Maintaining and updating a WordPress site costs either lots of man hours or lots of money
(good IT help is not cheap).
terrorist lieberal , Apr 5, 2019 11:37:47 AM |
link
Tom @ 5,
Obviously you know no one will ever be prosecuted or lose anything. This country is in the
hands of the rich and powerful, just note how the great Obama couldn't jail one crooked
banker and they all got to keep everything they stole at the expense of millions and millions
of people, lives ruined, and they live the high life as some exceptional people, yeah right,
God Bless America, home of the biggest terrorist organization the world has known.
terrorist lieberal , Apr 5, 2019 11:39:09 AM |
link
thank you b! who is going to be held accountable? i say no one...
@13 donkeytale.. that sounds about right... i imagine it's happening in any industry where
money is involved in the usa - which is basically every industry.. get rid of the mechanisms
for protecting people and just make sure to protect the moneyed interests..
capitalism devoid of morals and ethics is just peachy..
Thanks for the comprehensive account of what happened. I really hope this will result in a
hefty judicial price tag for the cynicals and greedies at Boeing.
You can be sure that if this was Airbus, and two were crashed in the USA, that there
would be hearings, threats, congressional investigations, lawsuits, calls for criminal
investigations, Wall Street shorting the company, ...and on and on until the company would be
disbanded.
There were two Boeing MAX crashes outside of the U.S. and there ARE now hearings, threats,
congressional investigations, lawsuits and even a criminal investigation. Boeing's stock
price fell by some 10% since the second crash.
-
@Hoarsewhisperer @14
It's an incident report which is supposed to be bland statements of fact - neither
overstated nor understated. If the report says the pilots hit the roof then that's what
happened (airliner cockpits don't have cathedral ceilings so only inches clearance when
standing erect).
The phrase "the Pilots are thrown off their seats, hitting the cockpit roof" is not from
the incident report but from an interpretation at the Leeham News site. It is not meant
literally.
It is based on a suddden change on g-force in the plane which goes from around 1g to 0g
when MCAS again kicks in. This has the effect that the pilots are suddenly weightless and no
longer have power to pull the yoke back.
Source and effect of this are visible in the diagram.
-
Do airline pilots wear seatbelts on take off. I take it there would be some rules and
regulations on this. I have always taken it for granted the pilots would be wearing seatbelt
on take off and landing, also if expecting turbulence during a flight.
Impossible to control anything if you're getting tossed around.
Unless the EU and other governing bodies divorce themselves from our seemingly privatized
FAA, expect more of this. Unless, of course, ALL flight safety orgs, globally, are equally
corrupted.
I have no idea if global corruption is the case/or worse, but there is now pretty strong
evidence that the US FAA is not the unassailable leader in certification protocols that the
whole planet has depended upon - up to now.
Hmmm.... Proper retribution. Load Boeing's Board of Directors, senior engineers that signed
off on the entire MAX project, senior accountants, any others tied to the entire boondoggle,
all FAA "regulators" who approved boondoggle, and all others who helped cause the fatalities
into several MAX airplanes designed to fail just as the ill-fated jets did manned by the
Boeing pilots who approved the faulty design and force them to takeoff with flight paths over
water. Yes, proper retribution for the crime. Cruel and unusual objections? No. Proper
retribution.
The entire Neoliberal philosophy must suffer a similar fate along with its promoters and
their Neocon allies. The Class War has always been deadly. It's high time elites began taking
casualties. Too radical? Take a good look at the world and the circumstances of those
besieged by Neoliberals and Neocons and try to argue against.
That is a true statement, but with so many things going wrong – you need to
understand that it is a basic instinct of pilots to keep engine power up so you can climb and
get out of trouble.
Very basic: Power = Good and No-Power = Bad.
So they should have reduced power and done a slight nose down to unload the jack screw and
re-trimmed manually. The problem was they had no altitude to work with, just 1000 ft or
so.
So the end story is that not only did the pilot do well, but the low-hour co-pilot was
also surprising competent. It was team work all the way.
So the bottom line is that our Western system has become so corrupt that it is no longer
even safe to fly. And this is just the beginning. It is all downhill from now on. More gender
studies and who needs engineers anyway?
Boeing Max 8 was a flying design mistake.
Boeing, You Ain't no Airbus!
You can' t just slap some heavier bulkiet engines on a tinny single body crap that barely
flew straight at the first time and expect everything to be right, slapping some hiden
software autocorrections on just in case.. and sell this crap all over the world. Enjoy the
torrent of lawsuits now!
You ain't no European aircraft maker. They tend to think 2 to 3 design steps ahead in to the
future.
You guys at the US cant even barrely ellect a pres. who is right in the head.
Apologies to everyone for the thread hijack, but nuclear power nonsense annoys me.
@Walter 18
Gundersen is a very well-known anti-nuke fanatic and a liar. His qualifications are BS. At
this point I think you and I can leave it and either of us can read more if we are so
inclined.
@Kiza 20
Hydrogen release was an effect from the overheating and meltdown, caused by the lack of
emergency cooling. There were no hydrogen recombiners present in these reactors, although
they had been installed in every BWR in the US long before.
As I mentioned the reactor nearest the quake suffered no damage, because its emergency
generators continued to operate, as they were not flooded. I forgot the plant name ... you
could look it up ... it actually served as a shelter during the flood. As a consequence there
was no release of hydrogen there (this happens when the zirconium cladding on the fuel reacts
with water at high temperature to release hydrogen).
I'm not an expert in reactor design (although I have a PhD in Chemical Physics). I reached
my own conclusions a very long time ago, and am not really interested in digging up evidence
or providing explanations. There is a mountain of information out there if one wants to look
... and I don't mean Greenpeace (although the founder, Patrick Moore is currently a supporter
of nuclear power).
Oh and btw, about United States aviation related products leading the race in global
aviation...
Struggling to produce an effective design for an airframe for the Martian atmosphere
(planet Mars) back in the earlier decade, using the top of the line comercial aviation
simulation products with aircraft design options bundled in, as a way of researching a NASA
info web campaign about flying vehicles on Mars, managed after much trying to produce a
somehow reliable generic airframe for that very thin atmosphere and low gravity environments,
which it would generaly resemble a mix of U2's and Predator drones frames (twice large than a
U2 wing span) but with major tail wings modifications and you would get adequate performance
if you flew it inside the enormous Martian cannyons which have a higher atmosphere pessure
than rest of Martian surface. Mil air force drones were generally non existant as information
back then. The software was the only product FAA approved a license for actual comercial
aviation simulation training hours for training of real pilots...End of story, this design
came third ...and the actual algorithms in the software decided that an actual UFO shaped
craft would be behaving much better in Martian wind/atmosphere... We incorporated the
solution of small rockets for generating initial lift for take off and emergency
altitude.
FAA and the leading edge researchers decided that the ALIENS WOULD WIN!
I was almost sure that even Nasa people (which names was on the program approval credits)
used same software without noticing anything strange before the Aliens stole the win...
So the jack screw that manually controls the stabilizer did not work due to high speed. Isn't
that what hydraulics are for?
After all, Slim Pickens managed to kick that bombay door open in Strangelove
Hoarse, I also was confused by the reasoning in the Seattle paper. But then again, I
learned all I know about the affect of air flowing over a surface in flight by sticking my
hand out the car window as a kid.
To avoid such crashes, training is needed more professionally and, in addition, the worn-out
parts of the planes should be removed and replaced with new ones. In the vast majority of
aircraft, due to high costs, little importance is given to worn parts, which causes people to
fall and get dead.
Scotch Bingeington , Apr 5, 2019 4:44:34 PM |
link
@ Meshpal | 38
More gender studies and who needs engineers anyway?
I think you're barking up the wrong tree there. I wholeheartedly agree with the second
(sarcastic) bit, no doubt about that. But the guy who had overall responsibility for the 737
MAX desaster holds a "degree" in "Business Administration". James McNerney, B.A. from Yale,
MBA from Harvard, member of Delta Kappa Epsilon - Chairman, President and CEO of The Boeing
Company 2005-2016. I have a strong feeling that gender studies wouldn't exactly be his cup of
tea. Just an ordinary, boring, utterly predictable, Pavlovian, run-of-the-mill business
tosser. He thought he could do it all, and so off he went, again and again. From British
United Provident Association (healthcare) to G.D. Searle (pharmaceuticals) to Procter &
Gamble to McKinsey to General Electric to 3M. And what the heck, let's add Boeing into the
mix with a pay of 30 million USD in 2014 alone. What a spec-taaaa-cular career!
Easy to anticipate a consumer boycott of this plane. I wouldn't buy a ticket on a Max 8
flight, and began double-checking the airliner after the crash last October.
In horizontal flight the stabilizer exerts a moderate amount of downward force to keep the
tail level (so as to balance the torques on the airplane). When the infographic says "a small
downward force pushes the nose down" it is merely saying the downward force on the tail was
now less than that required to keep the plane level, so the tail rose and the nose fell.
With respect for your PhD in Chemistry Physics, you are obviously not an engineer. In most
societies, it is around the third year of study that engineers learn about redundancy and
contingency planning. Therefore, not thinking trough all the possible disaster scenarios when
designing life-critical contraptions is simply criminal: Fukushima nuclear power plants.
Perhaps Boeing should have hired a couple of engineering interns to tell them that they
must not:
1) slap unsuitable new engines on an obsolete old air frame,
2) try to fix a serious hardware problem using software,
3) override pilots with their lives on the line by the decisions of some software cretin paid
by the hour with no skin in the game,
4) hang lives of 180 people on a single sensor unavailable for replacement on an airport in
Timbuktu,
5) play the no-training-needed tune when the structure of the product was substantially
changed and operator training was essential and so on.
The engineers are blue collar workers, the more so the closer they are to the assembly
floor. They have no decision power, they do what they are told. Yet, it is a society in deep
moral crisis when the engineers keep silent whilst virtually all basic tenants of the proper
design are broken by the profiteers managing them. Doing all the wrong things and expecting
the right result? No, not really, just grab the money and run. Après nous le
déluge.
BTW, I heard from a Lockheed lobbyist that Lockheed would never do something like this.
They only rip off the US tax payers for godzillion of dollars whilst making the best killing
machines that money can buy.
God,,, What humans will do to save little pieces of paper loosely called money. This is
criminal. The entire board should be charged with murder or at least manslaughter. But it
won't happen. Corpgov will step in to save them as they're to big to jail.
It is my understanding, and please correct me if I'm wrong, that the only thing the pilots
could have done was to realize -- by a pure miracle -- that the captain's AoA sensor has
failed and switch to the first officer's flight computer, which was connected to another,
working AoA sensor. Of course, if Boeing had installed their "mismatching AoA data" indicator
as a standard feature, the pilots wouldn't really need a miracle.
Boeing is slowing the production rate of 737 Max by 20%. Another chicken has come home to
roost. To safely fly the aircraft with passengers, a new flight control system is required
with multiple sensors including gyroscopes plus triple redundant electronics. Not just two
position sensors as proposed by Boeing which is the pilot flipping a coin in the chaotic 40
seconds to do the right thing while the plane is trying to kill you. Pilot and co-pilot
training on flight simulators is also required. If the FAA approves anything less, sooner or
later, another 737 Max will crash. Similarly, the Trump Administration is turning over pork
inspection to the slaughter houses. A million Chinese pigs were culled to attempt to stop the
spread of African Swine Fever but the deadly pig disease continues to spread through Asia.
One day soon the contagion will be fatal to humans. Climate change is here. The forever wars
continue. The bottom line is that public safety which is the basic function of government is
collapsing. Oligarchs are getting rich on the bodies of the dead.
@38 Meshpal "Zerohedge has an article that says the pilots should have reduced engine power."
From the report: "At 05:39:42, Level Change mode was engaged. The selected altitude was
32000 ft. Shortly after the mode change, the selected airspeed was set to 238 kt."
Then a minute later: "From 05:40:42 to 05:43:11 (about two and a half minutes), the
stabilizer position gradually moved in the AND direction from 2.3 units to 2.1 units. During
this time, aft force was applied to the control columns which remained aft of neutral
position. The left indicated airspeed increased from approximately 305 kt to approximately
340 kt (VMO). The right indicated airspeed was approximately 20-25 kt higher than the
left."
Note that the pilots were getting conflicting airspeed readings (the difference would
eventually grow to around 50 kt).
There is nothing in the report that suggests that either of the pilots opened the
throttles, and by the time the "overspeed clacker" started its warning the pilots had rather
more pressing problems to deal with.
I don't quite understand why this isn't addressed in the report: the pilots set the speed
to 238 kt, and if they then opened the throttles the report should have said so (it doesn't).
But if they didn't touch the throttle then what accounts for the speed being at 305 kt
(rather than 238 kt) when the plane started its first dive?
There is a mountain of information out there if one wants to look ... and I don't mean
Greenpeace (although the founder, Patrick Moore is currently a supporter of nuclear power).
Patrick Moore Did Not Found Greenpeace
Patrick Moore frequently portrays himself as a founder or co-founder of Greenpeace, and
many news outlets have repeated this characterization. Although Mr. Moore played a
significant role in Greenpeace Canada for several years, he did not found Greenpeace. Phil
Cote, Irving Stowe, and Jim Bohlen founded Greenpeace in 1970. Patrick Moore applied for a
berth on the Phyllis Cormack in March, 1971 after the organization had already been in
existence for a year.
Thanks for confirming that the retribution I prescribe @36 is right and proper as is what
must follow. Only one quibble with your comment, the death trap MAXs should never, ever
again be certified as airworthy as they clearly are not .
> I forgot the plant name ... you could look it up
@SteveK9 | Apr 5, 2019 3:26:36 PM | 40
It was all the same. Fukushima Dai-Ichi (Number One) was the Nuclear Power Plant
consisting of 6 "Reactor Buildings"
#1 was relatively small, US-designed US-built one. It had passive residual cooling -
gravity-powered water flow from the tank.
#2 was larger reactor in the same Mark-1 containment, US-designed and US-buit. The
residual cooling though could not be gravity-driven. It required the pump (or maybe there was
a way to set temperature-driven convection, if valves could be put right - i heard it but did
not dig into it)
Obviously, USA does not care about tsunami-driven floods: USA has enough soil to build
NPPs away from sea shores.
#3 and #4 were those larger reactors in more modern containment, US-designed but build by
Japanese companies. Japanese did know what tsunami is, but they dared not to deviate from USA
designs until they make succesfulyl working verbatim coopies.
#5 and #6 were Japanese-built after they got experience with #3 and #4 and proived they
can do verbatim copies. Those latter blocks were altered: for #1 to #4 shore ground was
removed to almost ocean sea levelm as close to the shorelines earth was considered wet and
unreliable, but #5 and #6 were instead moved away from the sea enough to earth be stable even
on elevation.
When the wave came, blocks #1 to $4 were flooded (with their electric circuits probably
located in basements a la Americana, thus immediately got short-circuited with salted sea
water), and diesels were located immediately at water edge with all the consequences for the
communications. Blocks #5 and #6, located away from the sea shopre and on elevated grounds,
and their diesels located near them, were not reached by the tsunami.
P.S. but people still repeat old propaganda about Chernobyl being sabotaged by suicidal
operating crew, what do you want... When people read MSM they do not care much what exactly
happened, so they just swallow it without labour of critical acclaim. If much later they
suddenly grow interested in some issues - their "point of view" is already long internalized,
so they do search relentlessly now - but for ideas supporting their pre-formed cognitive
bias.
P.P.S. I agree though that hi-jacking Boeing-related thread for in-depth discussion of NP
issues would be not proper to do.
"THE BOEING 737 MAX MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO FLY AGAIN." {Emphasis original]
The discussion here resembles that being conducted by Boeing to exonerate itself. The MAX
was purposely designed to be unsafe. Nader puts it thusly:
" The overriding problem is the basic unstable design of the 737 Max. An aircraft
has to be stall proof not stall prone . An aircraft manufacturer like Boeing,
notwithstanding its past safety record, is not entitled to more aircraft disasters that are
preventable by following long-established aeronautical engineering practices and
standards." [My Emphasis]
Trying to fix something so fundamentally broken that people with priceless lives are
jeopardized if the fix(es) fail is so utterly immoral words fail to detail just how deep that
immorality is. It's not just Righteous Indignation or even Righteous Indignation on
Steroids--it goes well beyond that to the utterly dysfunctional immorality of placing profit
over the safety of something money cannot buy or replace-- PEOPLE'S LIVES .
You know that I and others agree as well with your strong sentiments.
It will be interesting to see how this plays out as a telltale of empire's demise or
resilience.
It is not just the 737 Max that I would stay off. Think about the profit mentality that
built/allowed the Max to go forward and extrapolate that to the replacement parts for all the
other Boeing planes. Do people not understand that the same mentality of profit over safety
that brought down the 737 Max is putting other, considered more reliable, Boeing planes at
risk....for a few pennies more
Americans are brainwashed into believing that profit belongs between them and good health
care so it could be described as a slippery slope to write of 99% of humans not valuing their
lives very highly......because brainwashed by TV is my observation
There are people in Boeing that need to see the inside of a prison cell forever.
I remember in 2008 during the recession depression seeing an idiot at the beach wearing a
Goldman Sachs t shirt. I looked at the idiot in disbelief saying nothing. The next time I see
an idiot in SC/Georgia I will not be holding my tongue. "Relentlessly focused on safety" my
ass. The crapification continues.
And the "AoA Disagree" indicator is not even a physical light indicator, as I initially
thought, but a purely software
feature for the primary flight display ! Unbelievable! 346 people had to die because
someone decided to charge an exorbitant fee for a few lines of code that basically consist of
two conditionals, a timer variable, and a bitmap blit call.
'It looks like the 55 year old 737 air-frame design, which is very low to the ground when
compared to more modern designs, is incompatible with the bigger engines required for fuel
efficiency.
Being very low to the ground, Boeing was forced to put the engines out in front, which
upset the airplane's balance, making the plane essentially unstable. To counter the
instability they added the 'MCAS?' control system.
This solution violates a fundamental tenant of design for safety-critical systems. The
tenant of 'fail-safe'. If something goes wrong the system is supposed to fail in a manner
that preserves safety. For the 737 Max, when the this stability control system fails, the
plane is fundamentally unstable. For this system it is not 'fail-safe'. It is
'fail-crash'.'
This is pretty much in agreement with (Posted by: karlof1 | Apr 5, 2019 8:39:49 PM |
58).
I fully agree with the sentiment that this plane should never fly again. I can't imagine
any thinking person volunteering to get on to such a fundamentally flawed aircraft.
That is a true statement, but with so many things going wrong – you need to
understand that it is a basic instinct of pilots to keep engine power up so you can climb
and get out of trouble.
Very basic: Power = Good and No-Power = Bad.
This is what I've heard for as long as I've been reading about airplanes. A search turned
up some "sayings" popular with pilots.
It's best to keep the pointed end going forward as much as possible.
The only time you have too much fuel is when you're on fire.
Speed is life, altitude is life insurance. No one has ever collided with the sky.
If you're gonna fly low, do not fly slow! ASW pilots know this only too well.
I've just visited a West Australian newspaper - the one where the brand spanking new
Aviation Editor spoke of stupid pilots and unbearably wonderful Boeing. They have a new essay
about the Report, but 1) the jackass troll for Boeing has been given a minder in the form of
a co-author, and 2) the article plays it straight this time.
Boeing admits 737 software was factor in crashes
The Ethiopian crew performed all of the procedures provided by Boeing but was unable
to control the aircraft.
The problems of the B737 Max are not a disaster for Boeing, but for the over 300
fatalities.
They lost no shareholder value or return, they lost their lives.
They are also certainly not represented by expensive top lawyers like Boeing itself, who can
then mitigate, delay or even completely avert the consequences of Boeing's decisions.
They, the people (who had confidence in American technology/products), crashed on the ground,
burned or plunged into the sea without ever having had the slightest chance of averting the
disaster.
Interesting story you linked on the Boeing KC-46. The Air Force pilots won't fly it
because the loose tools and debris they found in the planes raised doubts about the planes
manufacturing integrity. The crisis was/is one degree (of four graduated degrees of
seriousness) away from shutting down the production line completely.
What's key is how Boeing proceeded to address the problem: by taking employee time away
from production in order to perform final inspection, i.e. quality control. Which makes it
clear where the original quality control was lost, by being absorbed into production, to make
more product per employee hour.
And this is just one, visible part of the process, where we can observe concrete examples
of inadequate QC.
Commenters here who point to these plane crashes as a failure in the integrity of Boeing
itself are exactly correct. The flawed plane built by the flawed company was an inevitable
fruit of the poisoned tree.
And I agree that one would be mad to trust anything bearing Boeing's name ever again. One
would be wise also to look for similar poisoned trees in all fields, and thread one's way
cautiously though this perilous, neoliberalized world.
So the jack screw that manually controls the stabilizer did not work due to high speed.
Isn't that what hydraulics are for?
By design.
The screw is designed to work within certain criteria.
1.Load,caused by thick or thin air pressure depending on altitude, on the moving part.
2. Speed, which again increases the load depending on the planes speed through the air, on
the moving part.
The speed and altitude are known from the panes onboard sensors.
Great load will possibly damage or break away the moving part, leading to an
uncontrollable crash.
Hence use of the jack screw adjustment, by the hydraulic system, will only be available
within its design envelope of load and speed.
We had already been told that in the
Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 crash which killed all 157 people on board, the 4-month old 737 MAX
8's anti-stall software reengaged itself four times in 6 minutes as the pilots struggled to
straighten the plane post-takeoff. In the end, the anti-stall software won and pushed the plane
nose-down towards the earth. Now, Ethiopia -finally?!- released its report in the March 10 crash:
Minister of Transport Dagmawit Moges said that the crew of the Ethiopian Airlines flight
from Addis Ababa to Nairobi on 10 March "performed all the procedures repeatedly provided by the
manufacturer but were not able to control the aircraft." As result, investigations have
concluded that Boeing should be required to review the so-called manoeuvring characteristics
augmentation system on its 737 Max aircraft before the jets are permitted to fly again, she
said.
The results of the preliminary investigation led by Ethiopia's Accident Investigation
Bureau and supported by European investigators were presented by Ms Moges at a press conference
in Addis Ababa on Thursday morning.
Ethiopia is being kind to Boeing. However, though the anti-stall software played a big role in
what happened, Boeing's assertion (hope?!) that a software fix is all that is needed to get the
737MAX's back in the air around the globe rests on very shaky ground (no pun intended whatsoever).
737 MAX 8. The angle-of- attack (AOA) sensor is the lower device below the cockpit
windshield on both sides of the fuselage. (Mike Siegel/The Seattle Times)
The Seattle Times did an article on March 26 that explains a lot more than all other articles on
the topic combined. The paper of course resides in Boeing's backyard, but can that be the reason we
haven't seen the article quoted all over?
If the assertions in the article are correct, it would appear that
a software fix is the
least of Boeing's problems. For one thing, it needs to address serious hardware, not software,
issues with its planes. For another, the company better hire a thousand of the world's best lawyers
for all the lawsuits that will be filed against it.
Its cost-cutting endeavors may well be responsible for killing a combined 346 people in the
October 29 Lion Air crash and the Ethiopian Airlines one. Get a class-action suit filed in the US
and Boeing could be fighting for survival.
Boeing has long embraced the power of redundancy to protect its jets and their passengers
from a range of potential disruptions, from electrical faults to lightning strikes. The company
typically uses two or even three separate components as fail-safes for crucial tasks to reduce
the possibility of a disastrous failure. Its most advanced planes, for instance, have
three
flight computers that function independently, with each computer containing three different
processors manufactured by different companies
. So even some of the people who have
worked on Boeing's new 737 MAX airplane were baffled to learn that the company had designed
an
automated safety system that abandoned the principles of component redundancy, ultimately
entrusting the automated decision-making to just one sensor -- a type of sensor that was known to
fail.
That one paragraph alone is so potentially damaging it's hard to fathom why everyone's still
discussing a software glitch.
Boeing's rival, Airbus, has typically depended on three such sensors.
"A single
point of failure is an absolute no-no,"
said one former Boeing engineer who worked on
the MAX, who requested anonymity to speak frankly about the program in an interview with The
Seattle Times. "That is just a huge system engineering oversight. To just have missed it, I
can't imagine how." Boeing's design made the flight crew the fail-safe backup to the safety
system known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS. The Times has
interviewed eight people in recent days who were involved in developing the MAX, which remains
grounded around the globe in the wake of two crashes that killed a total of 346 people.
The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) was already a late addition
that Boeing had not planned for initially.
They wanted a plane that was so like older ones
that no training would be needed, but did put a much heavier engine in it, which was why MCAS was
needed. As I wrote earlier today,
they cut corners until there was no corner left.
On hardware, on software, on pilot training (simulator), everything was done to be cheaper than
Airbus.
The angle-of-attack (AOA) sensor of the 737 MAX is the bottom piece of equipment below just
below the cockpit windshield. (Mike Siegel / The Seattle Times)
A faulty reading from an angle-of-attack sensor (AOA) -- used to assess whether the plane
is angled up so much that it is at risk of stalling -- is now suspected in the October crash of a
737 MAX in Indonesia, with data suggesting that MCAS pushed the aircraft's nose toward Earth to
avoid a stall that wasn't happening. Investigators have said another crash in Ethiopia this
month has parallels to the first.
Boeing has been working to rejigger its MAX software in recent months, and that includes
a plan to have MCAS consider input from both of the plane's angle-of-attack sensors, according
to officials familiar with the new design. "Our proposed software update incorporates additional
limits and safeguards to the system and reduces crew workload," Boeing said in a statement. But
one
problem with two-point redundancies is that if one sensor goes haywire, the plane may not be
able to automatically determine which of the two readings is correct
, so Boeing has
indicated that the MCAS safety system will not function when the sensors record substantial
disagreement.
The underlying idea is so basic and simple it hurts: safety come in groups of three:
three
flight computers that function independently, with each computer containing three different
processors manufactured by different companies
, and three sensors. The logic behind this
is so overwhelming it's hard to see how anyone but a sociopathic accountant can even ponder
ditching it.
And then here come the clinchers:
Some observers, including the former Boeing engineer, think the safest option would be
for Boeing to have
a third sensor to help ferret out an erroneous reading, much like the
three-sensor systems on the airplanes at rival Airbus. Adding that option, however, could
require a physical retrofit of the MAX.
See? It's not a software issue. It's hardware, and in all likelihood not just computer hardware
either.
Clincher no. 2:
Andrew Kornecki, a former professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University who has
studied redundancy systems in Airbus and Boeing planes, said operating
the automated
system with one or two sensors would be fine if all the pilots were sufficiently trained in how
to assess and handle the plane in the event of a problem.
But, he said, if he were
designing the system from scratch, he would emphasize the training while also building the plane
with three sensors.
The professor is not 100% honest, I would think. There is zero reason to opt for a two-sensor
system, and 1001 reasons not to. It's all just about cost being more important than people. That
last bit explains why Boeing went there against better judgment:
[..] Boeing had been exploring the construction of an all-new airplane earlier this
decade. But
after American Airlines began discussing orders for a new plane from Airbus
in 2011, Boeing abruptly changed course
, settling on the faster alternative of
modifying its popular 737 into a new MAX model. Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing engineer who worked
on designing the interfaces on the MAX's flight deck, said managers mandated that any
differences from the previous 737 had to be small enough that they wouldn't trigger the need for
pilots to undergo new simulator training.
That left the team working on an old architecture and layers of different design
philosophies that had piled on over the years, all to serve an international pilot community
that was increasingly expecting automation. "It's become such a kludge, that we started to
speculate and wonder whether it was safe to do the MAX," Ludtke said. Ludtke didn't work
directly on the MCAS, but he worked with those who did. He said that
if the group had
built the MCAS in a way that would depend on two sensors, and would shut the system off if one
fails, he thinks the company would have needed to install an alert in the cockpit to make the
pilots aware that the safety system was off.
There you go: A two-sensor system is fundamentally unsound, and it's therefore bonkers to even
discuss, let alone contemplate it.
And if that happens, Ludtke said, the pilots would potentially need training on the new
alert and the underlying system. That could mean simulator time, which was off the table. "The
decision path they made with MCAS is probably the wrong one," Ludtke said. "It shows how the
airplane is a bridge too far."
Kudos to the Seattle Times for their research. And yeah, we get it, at over 5000 orders
for the plane, which costs $121 million each, there's big money involved. Here's hoping that Boeing
will find out in the courts just how much.
The preliminary report contains flight data recorder information indicating the airplane had an
erroneous angle of attack sensor input that activated the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation
System (MCAS) function during the flight, as it had during the Lion Air 610 flight.
To
ensure unintended MCAS activation will not occur again, Boeing has developed and is planning to
release a software update to MCAS and an associated comprehensive pilot training and supplementary
education program for the 737 MAX.
As previously announced, the update adds additional layers of protection and will prevent
erroneous data from causing MCAS activation. Flight crews will always have the ability to override
MCAS and manually control the airplane.
Boeing continues to work with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and other
regulatory agencies worldwide on the development and certification of the software update and
training program.
Boeing also is continuing to work closely with the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) as technical advisors in support of the AIB investigation. As a party providing technical
assistance under the direction of investigating authorities, Boeing is prevented by international
protocol and NTSB regulations from disclosing any information relating to the investigation. In
accordance with international protocol, information about the investigation is provided only by
investigating authorities in charge.
* * *
Update (1100ET)
: Ethiopian investigators have called on Boeing to carry
out a full review of the anti-stall system on its 737 Max aircraft after finding pilots of a plane
that crashed near Addis Ababa last month had followed the stipulated emergency procedures but were
unable to save the aircraft.
Key highlights from the report make it very clear this is Boeing's problem...
*ALTITUDE, AIRSPEED READINGS FROM 737 WERE ERRONEOUS ON ONE SIDE
*ETHIOPIAN ANGLE OF ATTACK SENSORS DIFFERED BY 59.2 DEGREES
*AUTOMATIC NOSE-DOWN COMMANDS SHOW ANTI-STALL SYSTEM ACTIVATED
*ETHIOPIAN REPORT: NOSE DOWN PITCH EVENTUALLY REACHED 40 DEGREES
*CAPTAIN REQUESTED COPILOT `PITCH UP WITH HIM': REPORT
As The FT reports,
Ethiopian minister of transport Dagmawit Moges called on the
embattled aircraft manufacturer to
carry out a full review of the anti-stall system on its
737 Max aircraft before they are allowed to fly again
, after finding that the
pilots were not to blame
for the crash last month.
Boeing stock is higher somehow on the back of all this??
A lawsuit against Boeing Co was filed in U.S. federal court on Thursday in what appeared to
be the first suit over a March 10 Ethiopian Airlines 737 MAX crash that killed 157
people.
The lawsuit was filed in Chicago federal court by the family of Jackson Musoni, a
citizen of Rwanda, and alleges that Boeing, which manufactures the 737 MAX, had defectively
designed the automated flight control system.
Boeing said it could not comment on the lawsuit.
"Boeing ... is working with the authorities to evaluate new information as it becomes
available," it said, adding all inquiries about the ongoing accident investigation must be
directed to the investigating authorities.
The 737 MAX planes were grounded worldwide following the Ethiopian Airlines disaster, which
came five months after a Lion Air crash in Indonesia that killed 189 people.
Boeing said on Wednesday it had reprogrammed software on its 737 MAX to prevent erroneous
data from triggering an anti-stall system that is facing mounting scrutiny in the wake of two
deadly nose-down crashes in the past five months.
The planemaker said the anti-stall system, which is believed to have repeatedly forced the
nose lower in at least one of the accidents, in Indonesia last October, would only do so once
per event after sensing a problem, giving pilots more control.
The crash of Boeing's passenger jet in Ethiopia raised the chances that families of the
victims, even non-U.S. residents, will be able to sue in U.S. courts, where payouts are much
larger than in other countries, some legal experts have said.
Wednesday's complaint was filed by Musoni's three minor children, who are Dutch citizens
residing in Belgium.
The lawsuit says Boeing failed to warn the public, airlines and pilots of the airplane's
allegedly erroneous sensors, causing the aircraft to dive automatically and uncontrollably.
Ethiopian officials and some analysts have said the Ethiopian Airlines jet behaved in a
similar pattern as the 737 MAX involved in October's Lion Air disaster. The investigation into
the March crash, which is being led by the Ethiopian Transport Ministry, is still at an early
stage.
Thought it hasn't been publicly released yet, a preliminary report on the circumstances that caused
flight ET302 to plunge out of the sky just minutes after takeoff was completed earlier this week,
and some of the details have leaked to Reuters and the Wall Street Journal. And for Boeing
shareholders, the findings aren't pretty.
Appearing to contradict Boeing's insistence that
procedures for deactivating its MCAS anti-stall software were widely disseminated, and that pilots
at airlines around the world had been trained on these procedures,
WSJ
reported that the pilots of ET302 successfully switched off MCAS as they struggled to right
the plane after the software had automatically tipped its nose down. As they struggled to right the
plane, the pilots ended up reactivating the software, while trying a few other steps from their
training, before the plane began its final plunge toward a field outside Addis Ababa, where the
ensuing crash killed all 157 people on board.
Though the pilots deviated from Boeing's emergency checklist as they tried to right the plane,
investigators surmised that they gave up on the procedures after they failed to right the plane.
But when MCAS reengaged, whether intentionally, or on accident, it pushed the nose of the plane
lower once again.
The pilots on Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 initially reacted to the emergency by shutting
off power to electric motors driven by the automated system, these people said, but then appear
to have re-engaged the system to cope with a persistent steep nose-down angle.
It wasn't
immediately clear why the pilots turned the automated system back on
instead of
continuing to follow Boeing's standard emergency checklist,
but government and industry
officials said the likely reason would have been because manual controls to raise the nose
didn't achieve the desired results.
After first cranking a manual wheel in the cockpit that controls the same movable surfaces on
the plane's tail that MCAS had affected, the pilots turned electric power back on, one of these
people said. They began to use electric switches to try to raise the plane's nose, according to
these people. But the electric power also reactivated MCAS, allowing it to continue its strong
downward commands, the people said.
Reuters
, which was also the recipient of leaks from investigators, offered a slightly different
version of events. It reported that MCAS was reengaged four times as pilots scrambled to right the
plane,
and that investigators were looking into the possibility that the software might
have reengaged without prompting from the pilots.
After the Lion Air crash that killed 189 people back in October, Boeing and the FAA published a
bulletin reminding pilots to follow the emergency procedures to deactivate the software if a faulty
sensor - like the one that is believed to have contributed to the Lion Air crash - feeds erroneous
data to the system.
The data show the pilots maneuvered the plane back upward twice before deactivating the
software. But between the two reports, one detail is made abundantly clear.
The software's
reengagement is what doomed everybody aboard. That is an unequivocally bad look for Boeing, which
has been deflecting questions about the software's bugs, and gaps in the dissemination of its
training materials, while working on an update that the company says will make the software less
reliant on automated systems.
The aviation industry has been trying to make the human pilots
obsolete, just as in so many industries. But they all do their,
these days, their R & D on the job. Recall the Amazon Robot that
went berserk recently. The idea is to rid all industry of people
progressively so that they can end up not needing people at all.
They'll end up with nothing. Some how they think that if they take
people out then profits will be assured, which is actually
psychotic. They have had remote auto pilot for 7 decades now. They
can bring down any aircraft at will, and do so regularly. They can
shut down or affect engines remotely, or alter the actions as is
imbedded into just about all new machinery, other than knives,
forks and spoons. Yet they still need consumers and workers to
create hedged exchange to profit from. That is the dilemma
industry owners are facing, that without pesky people they are
doomed as much as the doom they are creating for even their own
off spring = psychosis.
The 757 and 767 are a more obvious airframe to build upon, as a response to the Airbus the
new 737MAX design was very poorly thought out, it's airframe vs. engine placement and thrust.
Having trained on Boeing 767-300ERs myself a pilot becomes very in tune with it's quirks and
it does have them, speed bugs and so on.
When you watch certain aircraft taking off in routine operations, unreasonable angles of
attack V-speed, now many pilots will engage 1 autopilots minutes after take off while flaps
are partially extended still(it stabalizes a positive rate of climb), this is so that the
aircraft is more efficient, cost effective and reaches it's crusie altitude and destination
on time.
The 767 has 3 autopilot computers, 2 of them receive data as to angle of attack and speed
when the stall warning activates as the stick shakes, the autopilots are off, period, no more
input from the computers other than warnings - these too can often lead to confusion and
sometimes with fatal results.
Sometimes you will re-engage one after you've corrected the airspeed (nose down) and stall
to regain and maintain a efficient airflow lift. Although in some cases the pitot tubes
malfunction to due ice, so trusting what the machine was telling the pilots can be fatal.
[In 737MAX] The pilot simply cannot take full control the aircraft when he needs to do so.
Hence the pilots in the 737MAX cases scrambling to work through the problem by checklist, if
you're doing this something is going wrong and will be wrong.
Ever notice the difference between a soft smooth landing and a 'rough one' that shakes
passengers - note these are totally normal landings, the computer assisted ones in clear blue
skies and calm winds are not.
That's the pilots on a VFR or visual landing which the computer usually tries to interfere
with, if a hybrid semi-assisted landing, especially on an ILS glideslope in bad weather.
A pilot should know these skills but many now do not. They have to rely on the input from
the computers and Boeing tried unsuccessfully to introduce this new MCAS system seamlessly,
when you've got 3 autopilots why is only 1 receiving the flight data of angle of attack and
v-speed?!
There was a prominent no-show among the 200 regulators, pilots and airline managers that
Boeing Co.
invited to preview a crucial software update for the 737 Max this week, said people familiar with
the matter: European safety officials.
The planemaker is sending a team across the Atlantic to brief the European Union Aviation Safety Agency on the
proposed changes after two of the jetliners plunged to the ground within five months, said one of the people, who
asked not to be identified because the discussions are private. Representatives of EASA didn't return requests for
comment.
Intentional or not, EASA's snub points to the delicate politics Boeing faces in convincing regulators the Max
is safe as the company seeks to restore confidence in its best-selling jet, which has been grounded for more than
two weeks. The reputation of U.S. regulators has taken a hit in the scrutiny of the 737 Max's approval process,
and foreign agencies are less likely to rubber-stamp aircraft certifications simply because they have been cleared
by the Federal Aviation Administration.
EASA is expected to play an influential role in determining how long and complicated the review of the Max will
be, while safety officials from China to Canada have vowed to conduct their own rigorous analysis.
"EASA's determination should be important for the rest of the world, given its sophistication and perceived
independence," Seth Seifman, analyst with JPMorgan Chase & Co., said in a note to clients.
A spokesman for the FAA declined to comment.
'Productive' Sessions
"We had productive information sessions this week and continue to work closely with our customers and
regulators on software and training updates for the 737 Max," Boeing spokesman Paul Bergman said by email.
As of late Friday, the Chicago-based planemaker was still finishing up paperwork needed to certify a software
upgrade and revised pilot training for the 737 Max. One prominent pilots union criticized the proposed training as
insufficient.
The software changes, intended to prevent stall-prevention software from engaging in normal flight, have been
in the works since the system pointed a Lion Air jet's nose downward about two dozen times before pilots lost
control Oct. 29. That accident killed 189 people, while 157 died when an Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max 8 crashed
March 10.
While certifying the software upgrade is the first step toward returning the Max to flight, it doesn't assure
the grounding will be speedily lifted by the FAA or its counterparts around the world. The EU, China and Canada
all grounded the 737 Max more quickly than the FAA in the wake of the Ethiopian crash.
Software Changes
The break between FAA and overseas authorities on the initial decision to ground the plane, combined with
worldwide public furor and a U.S. criminal probe of the Max certification, "all make it hard for us to see how
foreign regulators can avoid coming back with their own questions and doing some of their own due diligence,"
Seifman said in his report.
Crash investigators suspect that a damaged or malfunctioning sensor triggered anti-stall technology in the
Ethiopian Airlines plane, Bloomberg
reported
Friday. Investigators think that caused the plane's nose to point downward, and the pilots struggled
to counteract the software-based system, according to people familiar with the crash probe. That scenario would be
similar to the crash that brought down the Lion Air flight last year in Indonesia.
Boeing is planning software revisions that restrict the number of times the Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System, or MCAS, kicks in to a single interaction. The update is also designed so that MCAS can't
command the horizontal stabilizer to push a plane's nose down with more force than what pilots can counter by
pulling back on the steering column.
The enhancements appeared to work as billed, said pilots who viewed demonstrations of the upgrades by company
test pilots in flight simulators at the event March 27 in Renton, Washington.
"We were confident flying the aircraft in its present state," said Roddy Guthrie,
American Airlines Group Inc.
's 737 fleet captain, who was at the Boeing briefings. The improvements "were
needed. They've put some checks and balances in the system now that will make the system much better."
Simulator Demonstrations
Still, Boeing representatives faced caustic comments from some at the Wednesday session, said one of the people
familiar with the discussions. As Boeing test pilots demonstrated old and new versions of MCAS, attendees were
especially interested in re-enacting the sequence of events leading to the Lion Air crash, the person said. Pilots
also demonstrated how the 737 Max would behave if an angle-of-attack vane was sheared off by, say, a bird strike.
One pilot group walked away from the event feeling that Boeing needs to do more work on a new 30-minute iPad
course, followed by a test, that is intended to help pilots of the older generation of 737 planes prepare for the
Max. The newest version of Boeing's workhorse single-aisle jet debuted less than two years ago.
Pilots who saw the preliminary version of the training "characterized it as nice for an elementary level of
understanding, but pilots will definitely need a more textured and layered instructional piece," said Dennis Tajer,
spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association, which represents pilots at American. "That was the hands-down
consensus."
"... All this is ignoring the real issue with complex aircraft today. To save money airlines pushed to eliminate the Flight Engineer. ..."
"... As the MCAS system has such authority to cause the plane to crash, a system like this should be quadruple-redundant to prevent a single source of bad data from causing a catastrophic loss of life. ..."
All this is ignoring the real issue with complex aircraft today. To save money airlines
pushed to eliminate the Flight Engineer.
The one time this scenario was avoided was when a jump seat pilot saw what was going on.
Both the captain and the co pilot had tunnel vision just trying to fly the damn plane. It's a
myth modern aircraft are less complex the older generation aircraft that required a Flight
Engineer. The computers work fine when everything is ok or the issue is straight forward but
when complexity enters during an emergency its far more complex than any old piston or early
jet aircraft.
None of these crashes would have occurred if a flight engineer was onboard. They have the
big picture on the air-frame and train to know that air frame backwards an forwards. The
pilots fly the aircraft while the flight engineer operates the systems.
Ask any qualified pilot these questions. You will get the same answer as above.
As the MCAS system has such authority to cause the plane to crash, a system like this
should be quadruple-redundant to prevent a single source of bad data from causing a
catastrophic loss of life.
This is compounded by the fact the pilots were unable to easily override the system and
unable to know _why_ they could not control the plane when MCAS malfunctioned.
There should be outrage that this was allowed to go into production.
These aircraft would be impossible to fly without automation. You would need at least 3 or
4 pilots and 15 engineers to keep on top of everything. There are hundreds of systems running
in the background. Airbus A series for example have anywhere between 80 to 120 million lines
of code depending on the type and configuration. Pilot's these days are computer terminal
operators. Errors are unavoidable in software until they fail.
The trick is simulation ,
clearly Boeing did not simulate any of this , this aircraft should not have been
certified.
The solution is less reliance on automation, at least not until AI is actually able to
intervene when sensors and software malfunction, and ESPECIALLY not with aircraft, for God's
sake.
One H1b to anotherH1b, "I thought you were supposed to fix those 297 stubbed out error
conditions on the MCAS stall sensor?" "No, I fixed the stubbed out error conditions on the
SQUALL sensor!"
"It's right there on the assignment schedule."
"What's the matter can't you read English?"
( The H-1B is a visa in the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act,
section 101(a)(15)(H) that allows U.S. employers to temporarily employ foreign workers in
specialty occupations. )
I got out of the coding business when they started putting these MFturkeys in charge!
This tragedy is as much about government corruption (FAA approvals) as it is about a POS
company, it's shitbag execs, or third world pilots for that matter.
Without cross limiting; where 2 or more inputs cross reference each other and limit output
if the variation exceeds a predetermined setpoint; Boeing employed a control system with a
single point failure.
Analogous to a cars cruise control speeding up if the speedometer failed and registered
zero mph.
I read that the Operator's Manual for this aircraft is 1400 pages. Is that possible? And
if so, is this MCAS system info just hidden on page 419 like in a financial document? 1400
pages is almost as long as the cautions in a new drug advertisement. And I'm sure the
technical translations for Indonesian and Ethiopian pilots are perfectly done and readily
understood.
That is why commercial pilots get paid high wages to do their jobs and know the aircraft
they are flying. They just don't walk into a new aircraft cold turkey. This issue is covered
in the manual and it is an issue that any pilot would note as a big deal. In 1965/66 the
well-loved 727 had 4 crashes because pilots didn't know the aircraft. This is the same
thing.
As the MCAS system has such authority to cause the plane to crash, a system like this
should be quadruple-redundant to prevent a single source of bad data from causing a
catastrophic loss of life.
This is compounded by the fact the pilots were unable to easily override the system and
unable to know _why_ they could not control the plane when MCAS malfunctioned.
There should be outrage that this was allowed to go into production.
The FAA had the final call on this and they failed to do their job. The MCAS was never
designed to mask the airflow issues created by hanging over sized engines on an airframe
designed for smaller nacelles. These bigger engines had to be mounted higher and more forward
creating airflow disruption over the wing during critical climb out conditions. This bird
should never have flown! It was flawed from the get go and the FAA let it slide. Now hundreds
of people are dead!
If the US government doesn't intervene, all would be very easy lawsuits to win. But I
suspect there will be political pressure placed to limit the liability of Boeing or a deal
struck to have US taxpayers bail them out.
I do not believe this story or any other story of how the Boeing 737 crashed. On a private
jet the engines are set in the tail. If the angle of attack is high, little to no air will
flow into the engines as the wings block sufficient air movement thus stalling. Hondajet has
improved this by placing the engines on the wing. The engines of a Boeing 737 are placed in
front of the wing, thus there should be very little effect to the airflow, unless of course
the angle of attack is approaching a very large attack angle of over 70 degrees.
With power settings reduced to lower fuel consumption aka costs, it doesn't really make a
damn where the engines are mounted.
Fed-up with being Sick and Tired , 33 minutes ago
link
The question is thus begged: did this NEW Anti-Stall System replace one that had caused
issues in the past? WAS THIS NEW SYSTEM needed? Are pilots not trained to invoke changes to
NOSE ATTITUDE when stall indicators, in the past, were alarmed?
The "let's assassinate some peps" system, through which remote control access and false
data injection into a so called "closed" system exists. The public are done being played as
fools, Boeing. How much did you sell the encryption keys for access into that closed system
to 3rd parties? Why did that northern Scandinavian country spend millions removing this very
system from their purchased Boeing planes? Was it because they knew? The CEO of Lion Air
knows also.
This makes a big assumption, that being the AOA was faulty and MCAS came on for no reason.
That's a big assumption and probably very wrong. MCAS comes on in stalls or high bank turns
which we know the ethiopian pilot executed a high bank turn. The likely scenario is that the
inexperienced third world pilot with his 0 hours of training on the Max miscalculated the
weight of the plane on takeoff and stalled it in a turn right after he put the gear up and
took the flaps off. MCAS came on as it was supposed to do, and would be the right thing to do
to save the plane. If he had taken his hands off the yoke and gone to have a pee, all those
people would still be alive as the computer, which is much smarter than the third world
pilot, would have flown the plane. Not understanding his plane, the 28 year old pilot fought
the MCAS at 1000 feet and bought the farm. The next shoe to drop will be the more interesting
one. They have already released the innuendo, next to come will be the hard facts. Let's
see.
The only winners in this will be the lawyers. My Dad frequently told me that lawyers were
bleached souls in tan suits. I didn't understand at the time but I do now.
We know that's not exactly what happened because Trump called them out with his double
meaning "737 killers" talking about CA death penalty and this obvious deep state distraction
murder.
Surely this will mean the plane has to be 're-certified' after maybe modifications like
additional sensors, software updates and extra pilot training have been factored in.
Increasingly looking like there will be no 'quick fix', and admitting MCAS was at fault is
going to open Boeing up to tons of lawsuits, not to mention cancelled orders. They'll need to
drop the 737 MAX name too I would guess, it's too tarnished now.
I'm very surprised that a responsible company like Boeing would put out such a bad system.
The program should have used readings from both sensors to ensure accuracy, and the cockpit
warning mechanism should not have been optional equipment given the critical nature of the
system.
"... The stall-prevention system on the Boeing Co. 737 Max jet automatically switched on before the crash in Ethiopia this month, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing preliminary findings from data on the aircraft's black boxes. ..."
The stall-prevention system on the Boeing Co. 737 Max jet automatically switched on before
the crash in Ethiopia this month, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing preliminary findings
from data on the aircraft's black boxes.
The conclusion was relayed at a briefing at the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration on
Thursday and is the strongest indication yet that the same system malfunctioned in both the
Ethiopian Airlines flight and the
Lion Air disaster in Indonesia in October, the newspaper said.
"... Boeing compromised on sound engineering with the 737 Max . Recall the origins of the problem: Boeing was at risk of losing big orders to a more fuel-efficient Airbus model. Rather than sacrifice market share, Boeing put more fuel-efficient, larger engines on the existing 737 frames. The placement of the engine created a new safety risk, that under some circumstances, the plane could "nose up" at such a steep angle as to put it in a stall. The solution was to install software called MCAS which would force the nose down if the "angle of attack" became too acute. ..."
"... Merriam-Webster defines kludge -- sometimes spelled kluge -- as "a haphazard or makeshift solution to a problem and especially to a computer or programming problem." Oxford defines it as, in computing, "A machine, system, or program that has been badly put together, especially a clumsy but temporarily effective solution to a particular fault or problem." ..."
"... In the case of the 737 Max, it's the combination of how two separate problems interacted -- a plane whose design introduced aerodynamics issues and what now appears to have been a poorly designed anti-stall system -- that seems to be drawing many to turn to Granholm's term. The problems were compounded in many ways, including by the fact that pilots were not told of or trained for the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) before the Lion Air crash, which killed all 189 on board. ..."
"... "My concern is that Boeing may have developed the MCAS software as a profit-driven kludge to mitigate the Max 8's degraded flight characteristics due to the engine relocation required to maintain ground clearance," commented Philip Wheelock on a New York Times story about the plane's certification process this week. "Not convinced that software is an acceptable solution for an older design that has been pushed to its inherent aeronautical design limits." ..."
"... "Indeed, it seems the 737 MAX was a kludge to an existing design, and that MCAS was a kludge on top of that," said a commenter on Hackaday . ..."
"... Boeing has long embraced the power of redundancy to protect its jets and their passengers from a range of potential disruptions, from electrical faults to lightning strikes. The company typically uses two or even three separate components as fail-safes for crucial tasks to reduce the possibility of a disastrous failure. So even some of the people who have worked on Boeing's new 737 MAX airplane were baffled to learn that the company had designed an automated safety system that abandoned the principles of component redundancy, ultimately entrusting the automated decision-making to just one sensor -- a type of sensor that was known to fail. ..."
"... That no one who wrote the MCAS software for the 737 MAX seems to have even raised the issue of using multiple inputs, including the opposite angle of attack sensor, in the computer's determination of an impending stall is mind-blowing. ..."
"... As a lifetime member of the software development fraternity, I don't know what toxic combination of inexperience, hubris, or lack of cultural understanding led to this. But I do know that it's indicative of a much deeper and much more troubling problem. The people who wrote the code for the original MCAS system were obviously terribly far out of their league and did not know it. How can we possibly think they can implement a software fix, much less give us any comfort whatsoever that the rest of the flight management software, which is ultimately in ultimate control of the aircraft, has any fidelity at all? ..."
"... And we're giving short shrift to how Boeing compounded the problem, for instance, by making it an upcharge to have the 737 Max have a light showing that its angle of attack sensors disagreed (the planes did have two, but bizarrely, only one would be giving data to the MCAS system on any day), or hiding the fact that there was a new safety automated safety system in two paragraphs after page 700 in the flight manual. ..."
"... It's about an airplane manufacturer that put engines on an airframe they weren't designed for, having to add a flight control override to guard against said airplane's new tendency to nose up, and then adding insult to injury by driving that system with a single sensor when two are available. Oh – and charging airlines extra for the privilege of their pilots being told when one of those sensors is providing bad data. ..."
"... Officials investigating the fatal crash of a Boeing Co. BA 0.06% 737 MAX in Ethiopia have reached a preliminary conclusion that a suspect flight-control feature automatically activated before the plane nose-dived into the ground, according to people briefed on the matter, the first findings based on data retrieved from the flight's black boxes. ..."
"... Boeing is doubling down on its mistakes . The lesson of the Tylenol poisoning is that if a company has a safety problem, even if it isn't its fault, it needs to do everything it can to rectify the defects and protect customers. If there is any doubt, the company needs to err of the side of safety. ..."
"... Here, unlike with Johnson & Johnson, the failings that led to 737 Max groundings all originated with Boeing. Yet rather than own the problems and go overboard on fixing them to restore confidence in the plane and in Boeing, Boeing is acting as if all it has to put in place are merely adequate measures. ..."
"... [Former Boeing engineer Mr. [Rick] Ludtke [who worked on 737 MAX cockpit features] recalled midlevel managers telling subordinates that Boeing had committed to pay the airline $1 million per plane if its design ended up requiring pilots to spend additional simulator time. "We had never, ever seen commitments like that before," he said. ..."
"... I hope the pilots in our readership speak up, but as a mere mortal, I've very uncomfortable with pilots being put in a position of overriding a system in emergency conditions when they haven't even test driven it. When I learn software, reading a manual is useless save for learning what the program's capabilities are. In order to be able to use it, I have to spend time with it, hands on. Computer professionals tell me the same thing. It doesn't seem likely that pilots are all that different. ..."
"... Boeing does not seem to comprehend that it is gambling with its future. What if international flight regulators use the Max 737 as a bloody flag and refuse to accept FAA certifications of Boeing planes, or US origin equipment generally? Do you think for a nanosecond that the European and Chinese regulators wouldn't use disregarding the FAA as a way to advance their interests? Europe would clearly give preference to Airbus, and the Chinese could use Boeing to punish the US for going after Huawei. ..."
"... And yet we do not see anyone suggesting the obvious solution to this problem; eliminating the 737 MAX type of aircraft altogether. ..."
"... I don't think that Boeing can afford to drop the 737 MAX. This aircraft was in response to the Airbus as they did not have any new aircraft designs on the boards to take it on. So they modified a 1970s design as a profitable stopgap solution. ..."
"... Boeing were designing a follow-on to the 737, but panicked when the A320Neo came and went for the MAX instead as they could deliver it much quicker and cheaper than a new aircraft. ..."
"... If its true that they are another example of a once great engineering company enslaved to the quarterly results, then it may well be that all work on the replacement stopped when they put their engineers to work on the MAX line. If that's the case, then they really are screwed. Ten years is an absolute minimum to get a brand new aircraft delivered to customers from a standing start. ..."
"... The newer versions of the 737 have nearly twice the max takeoff weight of the original, but with the same landing gear and nearly the same wing area. ..."
"... Airbus probably can't produce enough Neo to make up for the shortfall, but they essentially own the Bombardier C-Series now (ironically, made in Mobile, Alabama and relabelled the Airbus 220) which could prove an excellent investment by Airbus. ..."
"... Regarding the FAA I have read in Spanish press that Daniel Elwell declared in the congress (translated from Spanish) that "I can't believe that airline companies tried to save a few thousand dollars on a feature that increases safety". This is a bad try to shift blame from Boeing to airline companies and if anything will reduce (eliminate) the international confidence on FAA regulations. ..."
"... Managers telling this to engineers before a plane is designed is one thing. Telling it to them after the plane been designed but while its user interface is being designed is outrageous. ..."
"... And I think the plane actually has two (one on each side) , but for some reason, their inputs weren't combined. There's a slight subtlety that the air flow is 3 dimensional, so when the plane is turning, and particularly turning+climbing, the readings of the two might vary slightly – but that's for the software to sort out. They reportedly didn't hook both of them up to both flight computers – why is an interesting question. There's probably a practical reason, but ..."
"... What the folks at Boeing may not realise is that the more they double-down on this bizarre tactic of using spin-doctoring as a crisis management tool aimed at an audience that is rapidly losing trust in the company ( and frankly may no longer believe anything coming out of the corporate communications department at Boeing), the harder it's going to be to reverse course by coming out and saying "we screwed up and will do whatever it takes to fix this". This debacle has all the makings of a large scale cover up and the continued mala fide attempts to deflect focus away from taking ownership of and accountability for this crisis will only result in continued assault on an already battered reputation. ..."
"... As an aside, the malaise at the FAA has been much documented on these pages and elsewhere recently, from the egregious abdication of its regulatory responsibilities to Boeing to having a top position go unfilled for over a year, my question to US readers is whether a comparable level of capture by corporate interests has similarly defanged the FDA? ..."
Boeing compromised on sound engineering with the 737 Max . Recall the origins of the problem: Boeing was at risk of losing
big orders to a more fuel-efficient Airbus model. Rather than sacrifice market share, Boeing put more fuel-efficient, larger engines
on the existing 737 frames. The placement of the engine created a new safety risk, that under some circumstances, the plane could
"nose up" at such a steep angle as to put it in a stall. The solution was to install software called MCAS which would force the nose
down if the "angle of attack" became too acute.
Merriam-Webster defines kludge -- sometimes
spelled
kluge -- as "a haphazard or makeshift solution to a problem and especially to a computer or
programming problem." Oxford defines it as,
in computing, "A machine, system, or program that has been badly put together, especially a clumsy but temporarily effective solution
to a particular fault or problem."
In the case of the 737 Max, it's the combination of how two separate problems interacted -- a plane whose design introduced
aerodynamics issues and what now appears to have been a poorly designed anti-stall system -- that seems to be drawing many to
turn to Granholm's term. The problems
were compounded in many ways,
including by the fact that pilots were not told of or trained for the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) before
the Lion Air crash, which killed all 189 on board.
"My concern is that Boeing may have developed the MCAS software as a profit-driven kludge to mitigate the Max 8's degraded
flight characteristics due to the engine relocation required to maintain ground clearance,"
commented Philip Wheelock on
a New York Times
story about the plane's certification process this week. "Not convinced that software is an acceptable solution for an older
design that has been pushed to its inherent aeronautical design limits."
"Indeed, it seems the 737 MAX was a kludge to an existing design, and that MCAS was a kludge on top of that," said
a commenter
on Hackaday .
Lambert found more damning takes, which he featured in Water Cooler yesterday. First
from the Seattle Times :
Boeing has long embraced the power of redundancy to protect its jets and their passengers from a range of potential disruptions,
from electrical faults to lightning strikes. The company typically uses two or even three separate components as fail-safes for
crucial tasks to reduce the possibility of a disastrous failure. So even some of the people who have worked on Boeing's new 737
MAX airplane were baffled to learn that the company had designed an automated safety system that abandoned the principles of component
redundancy, ultimately entrusting the automated decision-making to just one sensor -- a type of sensor that was known to fail.
Boeing's rival, Airbus, has typically depended on three such sensors. "A single point of failure is an absolute no-no," said one
former Boeing engineer who worked on the MAX, who requested anonymity to speak frankly about the program in an interview with
The Seattle Times. "That is just a huge system engineering oversight. To just have missed it, I can't imagine how."
And the second, from software developer Greg Travis who happens also to be a pilot and aircraft owner:
That no one who wrote the MCAS software for the 737 MAX seems to have even raised the issue of using multiple inputs, including
the opposite angle of attack sensor, in the computer's determination of an impending stall is mind-blowing.
As a lifetime member of the software development fraternity, I don't know what toxic combination of inexperience, hubris,
or lack of cultural understanding led to this. But I do know that it's indicative of a much deeper and much more troubling problem.
The people who wrote the code for the original MCAS system were obviously terribly far out of their league and did not know it.
How can we possibly think they can implement a software fix, much less give us any comfort whatsoever that the rest of the flight
management software, which is ultimately in ultimate control of the aircraft, has any fidelity at all?
Ouch.
And we're giving short shrift to how Boeing compounded the problem, for instance, by making it an upcharge to have the 737
Max have a light showing that its angle of attack sensors disagreed (the planes did have two, but bizarrely, only one would be giving
data to the MCAS system on any day), or hiding the fact that there was a new safety automated safety system in two paragraphs after
page 700 in the flight manual. As Wall Street Journal reader Erich Greenbaum said in comments on an older article,
How Boeing's 737 MAX Failed :
No – this isn't about "planes that fly by themselves." It's about an airplane manufacturer that put engines on an airframe
they weren't designed for, having to add a flight control override to guard against said airplane's new tendency to nose up, and
then adding insult to injury by driving that system with a single sensor when two are available. Oh – and charging airlines extra
for the privilege of their pilots being told when one of those sensors is providing bad data.
The 737 Max has gotten a bad name not just for itself but also for the airlines that were big buyers. Southwest had taken the
most 737 Max deliveries, and American was second. I happened to be looking at American for flights last night. This is what I got
when I went to aa.com:
I came back to the page later to make sure I hadn't hit the 737 Max message randomly, by loading the page just when that image came
up in a cycle .and that doesn't appear to be the case. I landed on the 737 Max splash a second time.
This result suggests that American has gotten so many customer queries about the 737 Max that it felt it had to make providing
information about it a priority. If you click through, the next page explains how all 737 Max planes have been grounded, that American
is using other equipment to fly on routes previously scheduled for those planes, but it has still had to cancel 90 flights a day.
Officials investigating the fatal crash of a Boeing Co. BA 0.06% 737 MAX in Ethiopia have reached a preliminary conclusion
that a suspect flight-control feature automatically activated before the plane nose-dived into the ground, according to people
briefed on the matter, the first findings based on data retrieved from the flight's black boxes.
The emerging consensus among investigators, one of these people said, was relayed during a high-level briefing at the Federal
Aviation Administration on Thursday, and is the strongest indication yet that the same automated system, called MCAS, misfired
in both the Ethiopian Airlines flight earlier this month and a Lion Air flight in Indonesia, which crashed less than five months
earlier. The two crashes claimed 346 lives.
Boeing is doubling down on its mistakes . The lesson of the Tylenol poisoning is that if a company has a safety problem, even
if it isn't its fault, it needs to do everything it can to rectify the defects and protect customers. If there is any doubt, the
company needs to err of the side of safety.
Here, unlike with Johnson & Johnson, the failings that led to 737 Max groundings all originated with Boeing. Yet rather than
own the problems and go overboard on fixing them to restore confidence in the plane and in Boeing, Boeing is acting as if all it
has to put in place are merely adequate measures.
Reuters, which has a bias towards understatement, has an atypically pointed farming Boeing's refusal to recommend pilot simulator
training for the MCAS:
Boeing Co said it will submit by the end of this week a training package that 737 MAX pilots are required to take before a
worldwide ban can be lifted, proposing as it did before two deadly crashes that those pilots do not need time on flight simulators
to safely operate the aircraft.
In making that assessment, the world's largest planemaker is doubling down on a strategy it promoted to American Airlines Group
Inc and other customers years ago. Boeing told airlines their pilots could switch from the older 737NG to the new MAX without
costly flight simulator training and without compromising on safety, three former Boeing employees said.
The company had promised Southwest Airlines Co. , the plane's biggest customer, to keep pilot training to a minimum so the
new jet could seamlessly slot into the carrier's fleet of older 737s, according to regulators and industry officials.
[Former Boeing engineer Mr. [Rick] Ludtke [who worked on 737 MAX cockpit features] recalled midlevel managers telling subordinates
that Boeing had committed to pay the airline $1 million per plane if its design ended up requiring pilots to spend additional
simulator time. "We had never, ever seen commitments like that before," he said.
I've never flown Southwest and now I will make sure never to use them.
I hope the pilots in our readership speak up, but as a mere mortal, I've very uncomfortable with pilots being put in a position
of overriding a system in emergency conditions when they haven't even test driven it. When I learn software, reading a manual is
useless save for learning what the program's capabilities are. In order to be able to use it, I have to spend time with it, hands
on. Computer professionals tell me the same thing. It doesn't seem likely that pilots are all that different.
In other words, Boeing's refusal to recommend simulator training looks to be influenced by avoiding triggering a $31 million penalty
payment to Southwest. This is an insane back-assward sense of priorities. Boeing had over $10 billion in profits in 2018. A $31 million
payment isn't material and would almost certainly be lower after tax.
Boeing does not seem to comprehend that it is gambling with its future. What if international flight regulators use the Max
737 as a bloody flag and refuse to accept FAA certifications of Boeing planes, or US origin equipment generally? Do you think for
a nanosecond that the European and Chinese regulators wouldn't use disregarding the FAA as a way to advance their interests? Europe
would clearly give preference to Airbus, and the Chinese could use Boeing to punish the US for going after Huawei.
Boeing's comeuppance is long overdue. The company's decision to break its union, outsource, and move to Chicago as a device for
shedding seasoned employees was a clear statement of its plan to compromise engineering in the name of profit. Something like the
Max 737 train wreck was bound to happen.
And yet we do not see anyone suggesting the obvious solution to this problem; eliminating the 737 MAX type of aircraft
altogether.
The crashes of the early de Havilland Comet commercial jet aircraft all but destroyed English commercial jet production. Boeing
should suffer a similar fate as de Havilland. Indeed, since the Comet crashes were the result of a previously unsuspected design
flaw, and Boeing's problems are self inflicted, Boeing should suffer a more drastic punishment.
I don't think that Boeing can afford to drop the 737 MAX. This aircraft was in response to the Airbus as they did not have
any new aircraft designs on the boards to take it on. So they modified a 1970s design as a profitable stopgap solution.
If they dump the 737 MAX then they have nothing good to go for years. In that space of time Airbus would move in and take over
many of Boeing's markets and there would be new aircraft from Russia and China coming online as well.
I do not think that it would destroy Boeing as the US government would bail it out first, but it would be a colossal setback.
I doubt that they would end up on this list-
I understand that it can take up to ten years to develop a new aircraft, but the basic design of the 737 has been around since
the Jefferson Airplane's "White Rabbit" (!). Given that Airbus, like Avis, was going to be trying harder for more market share,
was it totally beyond Boeing's capacity to develop a follow-on for the 737 over the past, say, 20 years?
Boeing were designing a follow-on to the 737, but panicked when the A320Neo came and went for the MAX instead as they could
deliver it much quicker and cheaper than a new aircraft. What I don't know is if they are still working on a replacement
or if they shelved the plans entirely.
If its true that they are another example of a once great engineering company enslaved to the quarterly results, then it
may well be that all work on the replacement stopped when they put their engineers to work on the MAX line. If that's the case,
then they really are screwed. Ten years is an absolute minimum to get a brand new aircraft delivered to customers from a standing
start.
The 737 was designed to be low to the ground because it was to serve small airports where the passengers had to climb stairs
to enter (which I remember doing at Burbank and Ontario years ago) The 737 Max is what you would get if the 757 and 737 had a
child. The newer versions of the 737 have nearly twice the max takeoff weight of the original, but with the same landing gear
and nearly the same wing area.
Perhaps a shorter version of the 757 would have been the correct move, but Southwest would have screamed bloody murder.
The problem for airlines is the need to have more energy efficient aircraft for both cost and environment pressure reasons.
The 737 max is a response to the airbus 321neo, but as I understand it, Airbus does not have the capacity to takeover cancelled
orders for the 737 max.
Do airlines stick with older 737 or brazen it out with Boeing that the max problems have been resolved? And passengers. I imagine
they will fall into the brackets I will never fly on a 737 max, or I trust Boeing/airline, or a fatalistic if my number is up,
my number is up'.
I regularly fly with Norwegian in Europe. However I for one will never fly a max and will now prefer SAS with the 321neo. As
for Ryanair, that has max on order, if they take delivery, bye bye them.
Maybe the new Russian and Chinese versions can be an option? Or will Trump sanction any airline brave enough to order them
instead of Boeing?
Airbus probably can't produce enough Neo to make up for the shortfall, but they essentially own the
Bombardier C-Series now (ironically, made in Mobile, Alabama
and relabelled the Airbus 220) which could prove an excellent investment by Airbus.
There are four other potential competitors –
the Sukhoi Superjet (which is a little
smaller so may not be a direct replacement),
The French have a significant input to the Sukhoi, while Bombardier were involved with the Comac. None of those are direct
replacements (they are generally smaller and shorter range), but they might suit many airlines who need aircraft quickly but won't
touch the Max.
None of the above can match the Boeing or Airbus for state of the art engineering, but they are cheaper to buy, so they may
well now be more attractive to budget airlines and third world airlines. The big one to look out for is Ryanair – they've long
been Boeings biggest customer outside the US and have stuck with 737's consistently.
They will do their usual tactic of demanding huge discounts every time Boeing look weak, and no doubt they will do the same
now. But they may decide to look elsewhere (especially as they don't really need the longer range as they operate exclusively
in Europe). If they opt for something like the A220 or the Irkut, then that will be an enormous blow to Boeing, because others
will follow Ryanairs lead.
PK, you said that the Sukhoi Superjet had significant French input. Does that mean physical components as well? If so, I would
be surprised after the Mistral amphibious assault ships fiasco. On this topic, I saw this week how the French were taking out
German components out of joint French-German weapons systems and replacing them with French ones as the Germans are wary about
arming countries like Saudi Arabia and so have a say in these joint systems much to the disgust of the French, hence the swap-out
so the French can continue to sell these systems.
I was thinking of the engines , which are a joint
project between a French and Russian company. Ironically, the core of the engine for the Sukhoi is the M88, the engine the French
developed for the Rafaele fighter. The French are exceptionally good at using military research to help their commercial companies,
and vice versa.
The French are also very ruthless (i.e. immoral) when it comes to export sales. This is why they usually only partner with
the British, as they know the British share their rather loose definition of ethical policy in weapons sales. And they insist
on Frenchifying their systems as much as they can so there is nobody to interfere with sales.
Kludge translates in spanish into "chapuza" and in my view expresses very well the "solution" that Boeing brougth to the 737
Max.
Regarding the FAA I have read in Spanish press that Daniel Elwell declared in the congress (translated from Spanish) that
"I can't believe that airline companies tried to save a few thousand dollars on a feature that increases safety". This is a bad
try to shift blame from Boeing to airline companies and if anything will reduce (eliminate) the international confidence on FAA
regulations.
Boeing is doubling down on its mistakes. The lesson of the Tylenol poisoning is that if a company has a safety problem,
even if it isn't its fault , it needs to do everything it can to rectify the defects and protect customers. If there is any
doubt, the company needs to err of the side of safety.
And that might, precisely the difference between the Tylenol and the 737 MAX affairs. Boeing knows it is their fault and the
blame feeling prevents them to act as rationally as Johnson&Johnson did.
The Reuters article also says the following, which seems incredibly damning:
At Boeing's factory in Renton, Washington, managers told engineers working on the MAX, including its anti-stall system known
as MCAS, their designs could not trigger Level C or D training designations from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration,
the three former Boeing employees and a senior industry executive with knowledge of MAX development told Reuters. Otherwise,
pilots would have to spend time in simulators before flying the new planes.
Managers telling this to engineers before a plane is designed is one thing. Telling it to them after the plane been designed
but while its user interface is being designed is outrageous.
Certainly a relatively delicate sensor with external moving parts is a super obvious point of failure that any engineer would
flag down instantly.
And I think the plane actually has two (one on each side) , but for some reason, their inputs weren't combined. There's
a slight subtlety that the air flow is 3 dimensional, so when the plane is turning, and particularly turning+climbing, the readings
of the two might vary slightly – but that's for the software to sort out. They reportedly didn't hook both of them up to both
flight computers – why is an interesting question. There's probably a practical reason, but
Sometimes in industry what happens is you are updating a system or product, you don't want to re-certify your electronics (to
make schedule or cost) , but you used all the input capacity on your logic systems/comms/wiring and still need more. So you have
to "get creative" squeezing functionality into your legacy electronics. I really hope it wasn't something like that.
ISTR that there was a crash in South America a few years back because both artificial horizons were getting info from a single
pitot tube that had been taped over when the plane was being washed. The thing is, there was a switch in the cockpit to select
whether the dual instruments were both using the left pitot, both the right one, or one on each. Using two sensors is not a new
idea.
As a business owner who also happens to be a pilot and aircraft owner, I've been following this fiasco with great care. While
not widely reported, Boeing submitted a software update to the FAA back in January. They're still dragging their feet and as a
consequence, folks needlessly died the EA crash. To those who would say, "Nope, this is all on Boeing and the FAA for letting
them run roughshod over the regulations!", let me share a bit of news with you to help you grok what dealing with the FAA is like.
Did you know AVGAS (aviation gasoline, e.g. the fuel used in the entire piston-powered fleet) still has lead in it? This, decades
after MOGAS (motor vehicle gasoline, e.g. what we buy for our automobiles) was banned from using tetraethyl lead (TEL) as an antiknock
compound!
Yet there's a drop in replacement available. Drop in meaning, refiners like Shell, Mobile, et al can begin mixing and distributing
it using existing pipelines and trucks without so much as having to first clean the equipment or change anything whatsoever. So
why isn't it used? It's because the FAA has been dragging their feet on approval. Put another way, the FAA would rather people
continue being adversely affected by lead in the environment than fast tracking this.
Source? I know the owner of the company, and stand up guy if ever there was on, plus I've got friends who have flown with this
fuel – extensively to help with testing. Bottom line? It works!
And while there's speculation this has to do with big oil not wanting to pay the patent holder and thus lobbying the FAA to
obstruct permission, I'm not going down that rabbit hole. Suffice to say this stuff has been available for years and the patent
clock is running down so you figure it out. Me? I do believe it's all about the Benjamins and am greatly saddened we're still
damaging the environment when a replacement fuel is available we could begin using by next week! I kid you not.
Just to confirm, my town is on the Colonial pipeline that runs up the east coast and one of the local terminal's operators
told me that they do add the lead for avgas here at the distribution facility. Switching to a different octane booster would be
quite possible.
On the other hand I'm not sure the limited amount of leaded gas used by prop planes should be considered that big an environmental
hazard (perhaps as someone who hangs around airports you feel differently).
–I'm guessing that sort of safety practice wasn't inculcated into the software engineers in the same way that it was for old
school aerospace engineers. Software is often a poorly documented, partially tested black box.
Trim systems have been a part of airplanes from the earliest experiments with powered flight. They can be as simple as a bungee
cord pulling on a stick, or as complex as multiple computers interacting in a *fly-by-wire* scenario. Pilots have to demonstrate
more than awareness of these systems; they must demonstrate competency in their operation and oversight.They have been trained
in how to identify, override, and compensate for malfunctions in any misbehaving flight control system in the aircraft for which
they receive authorization. One big unknown here (in my mind) is whether a malfunctioning trim system would (or should) have been
obvious to the flight crew. Another other big question is whether means of deactivation (not speaking of *override*) of the system
was the same as in the previous 737 variants. Typically; this might involve pulling a labeled circuit breaker to remove power,
and then manually adjusting a trim wheel on the console; or near the flight controls.
"an aircraft is a mechanical device; any component of which can fail" which I remember but increasingly; a COMPLEX electrical-mechanical
device .with input from multiple people's minds and hands
The history of aircraft design and flight testing is full of unanticipated complications; frequently addressed by tweaks to
details of structure and/or operational limits. The goal is to cover all possible permutations of problematic interactions of
aircraft; environment, and human beings. There is a great deal of precedence in this topic.
What the folks at Boeing may not realise is that the more they double-down on this bizarre tactic of using spin-doctoring
as a crisis management tool aimed at an audience that is rapidly losing trust in the company ( and frankly may no longer believe
anything coming out of the corporate communications department at Boeing), the harder it's going to be to reverse course by coming
out and saying "we screwed up and will do whatever it takes to fix this". This debacle has all the makings of a large scale cover
up and the continued mala fide attempts to deflect focus away from taking ownership of and accountability for this crisis will
only result in continued assault on an already battered reputation.
As an aside, the malaise at the FAA has been much documented on these pages and elsewhere recently, from the egregious
abdication of its regulatory responsibilities to Boeing to having a top position go unfilled for over a year, my question to US
readers is whether a comparable level of capture by corporate interests has similarly defanged the FDA? I only ask because
I see a lot of supplements and other medicinal products sold here in South Africa with the "Approved by the US FDA" seal of approval
and wonder whether deferring to US regulators by international regulatory bodies is still a good idea under the current climate.
The following statistical categories might generate interesting numbers.
#1: Total flight operations of all 737 types since introduction. (wheels up to wheels down)
#2: Same for Max variant in question.
#3: Difficulty reports filed for all 737 (flight related)
#4: Difficulty reports filed for Max (flight related)
Flight simulators are expensive and scheduling will likely be backed up, given the large number of existing and planned 737
Max aircraft. It's an important problem to fix, but not with the current workaround, which seems to be to use a tablet computer
instead.
One would think a tablet computer would be a poor platform for a computer game, let alone to simulate flying a commercial aircraft
with new s/w or h/w, the flight conditions under which they fail, and how to respond to them. All a tablet computer could simulate
is turning the pages in the flight manual.
Your note should be a useful reminder to the current generation of executives at Johnson & Johnson.
They and their peers at other companies seem to have discarded the crisis management gold standard established by J & J during
the Tylenol scare. It is cheaper, it seems, and provides fewer avenues of attack for the tort bar, to substitute scripts provided
by the apology industry, which can trace its origins to that same Tylenol scare.
"... The MCAS system is poorly engineered and the design should never have been certified in the first place. But the issue is even worse. The certification that was given relied on false data. ..."
"... The first MCAS design, on which the safety analysis and certification was based, allowed for a maximum trim movement by MCAS of 0.6 degree of a maximum of 5 degree. Flight tests proved that to be too little to achieve the desired effects and the maximum movement was changed to 2.5 degree. ..."
"... No safety analysis for the much greater movement was conducted. The FAA and foreign regulators were not informed of it. Their certification of the 737 MAX was based on misleading data. ..."
"... But even those certifications were only conditional. They required from Boeing to include relevant training material that explained the MCAS trim system and its potential problems to the pilots. ..."
"... The original certification for the 737 MAX was issued by the U.S. regulator FAA. The European regulator EASA based its certification on the one the FAA provided but it added several of its own requirements. There is now documentary evidence that Boeing neglected to fulfill at least one of those requirements. ..."
"... The FAA is as regulator far too cozy with lobbyists and aircraft manufacturers. It outsources too much of the certification testing to the manufacturers. It should not have allowed Boeing to install a MCAS that depended on a sole sensor. ..."
"... "It's become such a kludge, that we started to speculate and wonder whether it was safe to do the MAX," Ludtke said. ..."
"... MCAS was not the only change that made the 737 MAX a 'kludge'. The design errors were inexcusable . Boeing did not inform the regulators when it quadrupled the maximum effect the MCAS system could have. These changes had side effects that were not properly analyzed. Failure of the system was hazardous and extremely difficult to handle . Indicators lights showing that the system may have failed, a safety feature, were sold as extras . ..."
"... It will take quite long to certify the changes Boeing announced for the 737 MAX. Lawsuits were filed against the company. Orders were canceled . The company is under criminal investigation. The commercial damage to Boeing will likely be larger than currently estimated. It comes on top of a recent WTO ruling that Boeing illegally received billions of dollars in subsidies and will need to compensate its competition. ..."
"... The development and production of the 787 Dreamliner, announced in 2003, was outsourced all over the world. That led to years of delays and billions in development cost overruns. In 2010 Airbus announced the A-320 NEO as a better alternative to the 737 NG. Boeing was still busy to get the 787 into the air. It had neither the engineering capacity nor the money to counter the NEO with a brand new plane. It hastily revamped the 737, a design from the 1960s, into the 737 MAX. It promised to airlines that the new plane would not require to retrain their pilots. MCAS was specifically designed to allow for that. It was a huge mistake. ..."
"... Boeing once was an engineering company with an attached sales department. It 2001, when it moved its headquarter to Chicago , it became a dealership with an attached engineering wing. The philosophical difference is profound. It is time for the company to find back to its roots. ..."
For commercial reasons Boeing wanted the new 737 version to handle like the old ones. But
changes in the new version required an additional system to handle certain flight situations.
The development of that system and the safety analysis of its implications were rushed
through. Pilots were not informed of it and not trained to counter its failure.
The added 'maneuver characteristics augmentation system' (MCAS) depended on only one sensor.
When the sensor provided false data MCAS engaged and pointed the planes towards the ground.
Manual trim using the plane's trim wheel was required to regain flight stability. The pilots
were not aware of that. The regulators who certified the plane as safe
were unaware of the extend of the problem:
The MCAS system is poorly engineered and the design should never have been certified in the
first place. But the issue is even worse. The certification that was given relied on false
data.
The first MCAS design, on which the safety analysis and certification was based, allowed
for a maximum trim movement by MCAS of 0.6 degree of a maximum of 5 degree. Flight tests
proved that to be too little to achieve the desired effects and the maximum movement was
changed to 2.5 degree.
No safety analysis for the much greater movement was conducted. The FAA and foreign
regulators were not informed of it. Their certification of the 737 MAX was based on misleading
data.
But even those certifications were only conditional. They required from Boeing to include
relevant training material that explained the MCAS trim system and its potential problems to
the pilots.
The original certification for the 737 MAX was issued by the U.S. regulator FAA. The
European regulator EASA based its certification on the one the FAA provided but it added
several of its own requirements. There is now documentary evidence that Boeing neglected to
fulfill at least one of those requirements.
Page 15 of the Explanatory Note discusses "Longitudinal trim at Vmo". Vmo is the maximum
operational speed. The trim sets the nose of the plane up or down, independent of other pilot
input. Too high up and the plane with lose lift and stall, too low down and the plane will hit
terrain.
A failure of the MCAS system could trim the nose down. As a countermeasure the pilots would
have to switch the trim system off. They would then manually trim the plane back into a level
flight. This was a concern. The EASA note says:
Subsequent to flight testing, the FAA-TAD expressed concern with compliance to the reference
regulation based on an interpretation of the intent behind "trim". The main issue being that
longitudinal trim cannot be achieved throughout the flight envelope using thumb switch trim
only.
EASA considered the need to use manual trim "unusual". But it allowed it to pass because the
required training material would "clearly explain" the issue:
The need to use the trim wheel is considered unusual, as it is only required for manual
flight in those corners of the envelope.
The increased safety provided by the Boeing design limits on the thumb switches (for
out-of-trim dive characteristics) provides a compensating factor for the inability to use the
thumb switches throughout the entire flight envelope. Furthermore, the additional crew
procedures and training material will clearly explain to pilots the situations where use of
the trim wheel may be needed due to lack of trim authority with the wheel mounted
switches.
While the EASA was convinced (by Boeing?) that those situations would be discussed in
"additional crew procedures and training material", Boeing did not include it in the training
materials for the airlines that bought the planes:
Those situations, however, were not listed in the flight manual, according to a copy from
American Airlines seen by Reuters.
Without the additional procedures and training material the 737 MAX would not have been
certified. By providing the plane without the required training material Boeing essentially
handed incomplete planes to its customers.
The FAA is as regulator
far too cozy with lobbyists and aircraft manufacturers. It outsources too much of the
certification testing to the manufacturers. It should not have allowed Boeing to install a MCAS
that depended on a sole sensor.
But the bigger culprit here is clearly Boeing. The plane was developed in a rush
. Even its own engineers
doubted that it was safe:
Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing engineer who worked on designing the interfaces on the MAX's
flight deck, said managers mandated that any differences from the previous 737 had to be
small enough that they wouldn't trigger the need for pilots to undergo new simulator
training.
That left the team working on an old architecture and layers of different design
philosophies that had piled on over the years, all to serve an international pilot community
that was increasingly expecting automation.
"It's become such a kludge, that we started to speculate and wonder whether it was safe to
do the MAX," Ludtke said.
MCAS was
not the only change that made the 737 MAX a 'kludge'. The design errors were
inexcusable . Boeing did not inform the regulators when it quadrupled the maximum effect
the MCAS system could have. These changes
had side effects that were not properly analyzed. Failure of the system was hazardous and
extremely difficult
to handle . Indicators lights showing that the system may have failed, a safety feature,
were sold as
extras .
And today we learned that Boeing did not even provide its customers with the "clear
explanations" the certifications required it to deliver.
These were not 'mistakes' by some lowly technicians. These were breaches of legal
requirements and of trust.
It will take quite long to certify the
changes Boeing announced for the 737 MAX. Lawsuits
were filed against the company. Orders were
canceled . The company is under criminal investigation. The commercial damage to Boeing
will likely be larger than currently estimated. It comes on top of
a recent WTO ruling that Boeing illegally received billions of dollars in subsidies and
will need to compensate its competition.
All these are consequences of bad management decisions.
The development and production of the 787 Dreamliner, announced in 2003, was outsourced all
over the world. That led to years of delays and
billions in development cost overruns. In 2010 Airbus announced the A-320 NEO as a better
alternative to the 737 NG. Boeing was still busy to get the 787 into the air. It had neither
the engineering capacity nor the money to counter the NEO with a brand new plane. It hastily
revamped the 737, a design from the 1960s, into the 737 MAX. It promised to airlines that the
new plane would not require to retrain their pilots. MCAS was specifically designed to allow
for that. It was a huge mistake.
Boeing once was an engineering company with an attached sales department. It 2001, when it
moved its headquarter
to Chicago , it became a dealership with an attached engineering wing. The philosophical
difference is profound. It is time for the company to find back to its roots.
Posted by b on March 29, 2019 at 09:29 AM |
Permalink
Boeing must be lobbying really hard and it's a shame that a respectable entity like
Washington Post is helping the narrative to shift the blame to pilots who are now dead. If
it's a Boeing, I'll have second thoughts.
1. Boeing wanted a new plane with larger enginers but without spending money on a new
fuselage. 2. Sold their planes to customers saying that Max type is same as the NG and that
no cost is involved for retraining pilots. 3. Make the MCAS system so that the new and plane
and old plane feel theoretically same to the pilot. 4. Not tell pilots about MCAS or hide
critical details about the system. 5. 300+ people dead. I hope the Boeing management can
sleep well knowing they have blood on their hands.
Sounds like they created a dangerously unstable craft that requires a computer system to
keep from stalling. Even if pilot turns off plane may have already got in situation hard to
recover from manually especially near ground. Two planes found this out.
FAA rep is a clown! It is not FAA fault and Boeing was under pressure. If one of your family
was in one of those crashes, you would never shill for those corporate murders.
He is a clown! It is not FAA fault and Boeing was under pressure. If one of your family
was in one of those crashes, you would never shill for those corporate murders.
Ex FAA employees have come out and say FAA doesn't have the expertise and have to rely on
Boeing for aspects of the certifications, why? because dumb Americans buy politicians ever
selling lower taxes. Hey dudes, u gotta spend money to hire good people duh! something gotta
give. Cheap government, cheap results. U deserve what u paid for America.
The MCAS system was not revealed to the first receivers of the Max 8's, nor was it in the
Manuals. Boeing thought it would quietly do it's job in the background, but they were wrong.
After the first accident from Lion Air, out of Indonesia, then all airliners were informed of
this. The pilots in Ethiopia may or may not have been aware of this, and if they were they
lacked insufficient training on how to deal with this problem. The MCAS system works to bring
the nose of the plane down so it can fly at a level flight. MCAS get's it's information from
AOA sensors that send info to the plane as to what angle the plane is flying at. Pilots have
reported that the AOA sensors are faulty and sending "wrong information" and "activating" the
MCAS system when it shouldn't have, causing the planes nose to point downward, and causing
the plane to go into a nose dive, and this is what happened. Basically the MCAS was needed
because Boeing redesigned the engines, that were bigger, and were mounted differently -- more
forward and up on the wing, throwing off the center of gravity of the new 737 Max 8.The old
737 does not have this problem. AOA sensors, stands for Angle of Attack, to make sure air
flow is right both over and under the wings, to make the plane aerodynamic. According to
reports from pilots, you can "disengage" the MCAS SYSTEM, buy pulling back on the yoke, and
this will do it. At the same time there are wheels by the throttle that you turn manually, to
trim the planes stabilizer manually by yourself. This was done many times by well trained
American pilots, who averted crashes with this jet. So, proper training and awareness could
have saved a lot of lives. Let's not forget these MAX 8 jets have been flying for a couple
years, with thousands of flights in North America and developed countries with "no"
accidents, and pilots say the plane flies beautifully. They say it's a very smooth flying
aircraft, and a pleasure to pilot. So, who's responsible for this -- well it's Boeing, for
non disclosure of the MCAS system, and what to do, if it functions in error, and how to
manually disengage the system. In my opinion, all pilots should know how to manually take a
plane from takeoff, and land it smoothly with no automation, or computers to help them --
just like in the old days. Over the last 20 years, there have been so very few major aircraft
go down. I'm all for automation, but I fully support proper pilot training should some of
this automation fail -- like faulty sensors. It's completely crazy to rely on robots or
Artificial Intelligence ( AI ) to fly planes, if you don't understand how the computers work,
and how they fly the plane, and in the event of a failure of the computer, you can then shut
it off, and have "no problem" , and take control of the aircraft yourself,- "manually" with a
lot of confidence. I SHOULD ADD - this MCAS system and it's AOA sensors, should all be
mandatory on a plane, and not be sold as extras, same as brakes on a car. You don't play
around with peoples lives, to make a few extra dollars, selling "options." These features
"must be standard equipment", on all these aircraft sold, PERIOD. This is why I'm "very
against" self driving cars'. Can you imagine all the accidents that will happen from "faulty
sensors." WOW , it will be a nightmare. Faulty sensors could be caused by snow, ice, extreme
heat or cold. Are we getting so lazy that we need to have Artificial Intelligence driving our
cars. No thanks for me, I'll drive my own car, and hope that people will rebel against this
idea, and the makers of these cars, won't sell any of them, and thus, taking them off the
market.This Boeing Max 8 should send a good example, of things to come if we allow driverless
cars. Not for me, and I hope the general public will agree with this.
Terrorists aren't needed to bring down airliners and frighten the public. Boeing and a
failed Trump policy, that won't staff FAA department with a permanent and qualified leader,
are managing the same thing through their fashionable neglect and arrogance.
Just look at the investigation of sinking and tilting Mellilium Tower in sanfransico.
Building concrete Foundation and glasses are cracking and investigators are still studying
what caused the two glass windows to crack. Similar investigation is going on how these two
Boeing max crashed.
Deadly strategie from Boeing for quick profits and market shares . Airliners are built to
be operated for at least a couple of decades Boeing was providing worldwidely flying coffins
made by mixing new technologies (leap engine ) with cheap and old technologies (1/2 century
old airframe).A new well designed aircraft is stable, well-balanced without extra software's
help.
Trump nominated his personal pilot to head up the FAA. After 2 years, they still have an
"acting" director. Tim Boeing shows up at Mar-a-lago every weekend. What could possibly go
wrong?
This been a long time coming. Who cut the FAA? BOTH PARTIES DID! The system is gonna fall
apart because too much damage has been done. Just keep paying people peanuts and have them
try to do a skilled job. My cousin quit the airline industry because they don't want people
to be able to pay for the education needed for these jobs. Like who program these
systems.
Looks like I'll be getting that 🚲 sooner than later. I won't be traveling by plane
for a few Give it time for all the smoke to clear and heads to roll😳
"... Profit before people. Computer says no! Failsafe failed. No manual over ride. Sorry folks. Say Your prayers. The problem maybe rebranded. Best case scenario. Impeccable flying from technical progress made. ..."
"... Totally unnecessary crash that was caused by cutting corners and greed. ..."
Ethiopian Airlines is one of the best known safe reputation. Of course Indonesian Airlines
is the best too. The crash was very similar after take off and dive into the ground. Boing is
just protecting itself for its market.
Boeing needs to be sued for $2 billion for each victim of the Lion Air and Ethiopian
Airlines plus $300 billion in punitive damages, and jail time for some executives ~ they
knowingly put up unsafe planes. In its early days, the 737 also had several
cashes.
Obviously Boeing knew about the shortcomings of their design in earlier stages and instead
of fixing their design they chose to use a software to fix it without informing the airlines
or giving pilots adequate training in order to save costs.
Profit before people. Computer says no! Failsafe failed. No manual over ride. Sorry folks.
Say Your prayers. The problem maybe rebranded. Best case scenario. Impeccable flying from
technical progress made.
With the 737 Max still grounded after last week's deadly Ethiopian Airlines crash, the focus
turns to Boeing. The company offered a warning system that -- for a price -- might have helped
prevent the crashes. Kris Van Cleave reports.
$80 thousand for a warning light??? Unbelievable.... How much money can an indicator light
cost? Software for detecting sensor malfunction should've been there in the first place....
For such a critical sensor, those safety systems should've been built into the systems in a
$120 million dollar plane in the first place.
Why charge more for safety? It should be included by default. Then they kept saying it was
safe for flight but excluded a crucial piece. It's all for profit... smh. 🧐 they are
trying to deflect blame on the airline. Those planes should have never been sold in the first
place.
Actually they should be charged with manslaughter for both plans ! Enough playing games
with just a public court hearing then a fine ! Some Big People need to be held accountable by
full law ! Jail time !
I would bet that the actual labor and materials are less than $2000. The engineering had
already been completed as it is an option. Why then would safety be optional? Criminal greed,
or a low value placed on human lives. Whomever is responsible has no moral or social compass
and should be punished. Not with a fine but a lengthy prison term in Leavenworth.
if we can have recalls for cars, why cant we have the same for aircraft and force those
chaps to install foolproof sensors in triplicate, complete with warning inidicators at no
additional cost to the airlines!
At the root of almost every problem today is 'cost cutting' for short term profits to
satisfy roaming vulture capitalist greed. Why is the FAA 'under funded'? Why is it 'too
expensive' to give pilots the sim time they need even after hundeds of people are
dead??
Engines too far forward wings too swept back computer and pilot can't find center of
balance and it piledrives into earth, its not a mystery. If I wanted to take a perfectly good
737 and turn it into an unflyable plane, well they did it.
Just fix the auto pilot issue. Also, what in all of God's green earth? Pilots only learned
about flying this new model with just textual information? No simulation? No wounder pilots
of both airlines were confound by the conflicting warnings blaring at them in the
cockpit.
Ha ha ha there is no money for the faa, but the government had enough money to go on a
bombing run around the world. So now who is responsible ? Boeing faa or other aviation
authorities like the icao or others ? Who is going to be jailed for this mass murdering?
Since they have accepted it so the faa chief should be put behind bars for lying about the
inspection and the certificate !!!!!!
The recent Ethiopian Airlines crash led to the grounding of Boeing's 737 MAX planes across
much of the globe. But as new details emerge about the cause of the model's second crash within
five months, questions are being raised about how the plane's safety was approved in the first
place. John Yang talks to Jeff Wise, a pilot and author of a book about MH370, the flight that
vanished in 2014.
$80,000 for a safety warning light! It should have been standard. How could they justify
charging $80,000 for a warning light? It's like Ford charging $800 for Brake Fluid warning
light, they would never have gotten away with that!
The Other Recent Deadly Boeing Crash No One Is Talking About
(nymag.com)
65 Posted by EditorDavid on Saturday March 23, 2019 @01:34PM from the
searching-for-answers dept. New York magazine's Intelligencer remembers last month's
crash of a Boeing 767 carrying cargo for Amazon and the U.S. Postal Service -- and shares a
new theory that its cause wasn't a suicidal pilot or an autopilot malfunction:
In online pilot discussion forums, a third idea has been gaining adherents: that the
pilots succumbed to a phenomenon called somatogravic illusion, in which lateral acceleration
due to engine thrust
creates the sensation that one is tipping backward in one's seat .
The effect is particularly strong when a plane is lightly loaded, as it would be at the
end of a long flight when the fuel tanks are mostly empty, and in conditions of poor
visibility, as Atlas Air 3591 was as it worked its way through bands of bad weather. The idea
is that perhaps one of the pilots accidentally or in response to wind shear set the engines
to full power, and then believed that the plane had become dangerously nose-high and so
pushed forward on the controls.
This would cause a low-g sensation that might have been so disorienting that by the
time the plane came barreling out of the bottom of the clouds there wasn't enough time to
pull out of the dive.
It has been speculated that this might have been the cause of another bizarre and
officially unsolved accident from three years ago: Flydubai Flight 981, which crashed 2016 in
Rostov-on-Don, Russia....
While it's still too early to draw any kind of conclusions about Atlas Air 3591, the
possibility exists that a firm conclusion will never be drawn -- and if it is, the cause
could turn out not to be a design flaw or software malfunction that can be rectified, but a
basic shortcoming in human perception and psychology that cannot be fixed as long as humans
are entrusted with the control of airplanes.
Yes, commercial pilots are taught to "fly their instruments". General aviation pilots may
enjoy more "seat-of-the-pants" flying, but even they are taught to trust instruments over
human perceptions, which are easily fooled, as even simple demos will show.
I used to work for an aircraft instrument maker, and our user interfaces, everything the
pilot interacts with, got more care and attention than the rest of the instrument. Of course
we had to display nothing but totally accurate data, and do so promptly, but we also had to
do so in ways that were obvious and clear, so the pilot can take in the most important
information with a quick glance.
The pilot's standard "scan" is perhaps the most-trained skill. To look at everything on
the instrument panels and outside the windows often enough to not miss anything, yet slow
enough to take in all vital information.
When things get hectic, the pilot still does this scan, interrupting it as needed to
deal with situations, but still doing it. Because, as the saying goes, "trouble often comes
in threes": Stopping everything to handle an initial situation may mask what's really going
on, and lead to a cascade of failures.
With ever more data being aimed at the pilot, there is a distinct risk of information
overload, especially when tired, or during tense but otherwise normal situations, such as
take-off, landing, or flying through turbulence. This overload often encourages the pilot to
rely more on signals from the body, which need less conscious processing, rather than focus
on all that data.
Here, again, is where commercial pilots receive extra training, but perhaps not often
enough. This is one of the factors that keep commercial pilot mandatory retirement ages so
low: The risk of overload increases with age, even when all other factors match those of a
younger person.
Plus, staying in peak training for decades is fatiguing, and relatively few can do so
"naturally". Which is one of the reasons we're running out of commercial aircraft
pilots.
It may seem counter-intuitive, but this overload risk is often handled by adding more
automation, more automatic systems to "help" the pilot. So much so that actually manually
"driving" a commercial aircraft, with hands on the controls, is an increasingly rare part of
a normal flight.
Our instruments also tried to take pilot fatigue into account, saving our brightest and
loudest alarms only for the most desperate situations, to punch-through that overload to help
ensure prompt and correct reactions.
One product I worked on was a TAWS (Terrain Awareness and Warning System) instrument,
which basically stayed quiet unless there was a risk of the pilot flying into the ground, to
help prevent "CFIT" accidents (Controlled Flight Into the Ground). It has special modes for
take-off and landing, though our instrument was designed to actually *avoid* making the pilot
depend on it's display: Useful for information as part of the scan, but not to be used to
navigate the aircraft. Our main function was to provide visual and audible alerts only when
needed.
I believe 100% of US commercial aircraft (and perhaps now even biz-jets) are required to
have TAWS on-board and active. Any TAWS-equipped plane approaching the ground outside of an
approved approach path for a know airport will give the pilot "Terrain ahead. Pull up! Pull
up!" alerts until the hazard no longer exists.
Unfortunately, if a stall is also immanent, the pilot will simultaneously receive an alert
to push the nose down. And increase power. And other things as well. An overload of alerts,
which a skilled and calm pilot will respond to with the most correct action. But which can
overload a stressed or tired pilot, or one with the beginnings of a cold or flu.
The thing is, every alert can be silenced, to reduce the confusion and distractions.
But an overloaded pilot can forget even this simple aid to keeping full awareness and
control.
This is a big part of why pilots are so often blamed for crashes: Because, for whatever
reason, they failed to take the appropriate action demanded by the situation.
As a former aircraft instrument developer, I was always well aware of my instruments'
contribution to the pilot's mental load. Our teams agonized over tiny changes to font
selection and sizes and colors and contrast. And how many button presses were needed to
accomplish a function. And how easy it was to switch modes or silence an alert. Which is why
we had a massive alpha test system that got even the earliest versions of our instruments in
front of pilots with experimental aircraft and ratings. (Experimental aircraft and the pilots
who fly them are rare and precious things to instrument developers, even when we owned and
operated our own corporate test aircraft.)
Fortunately, our efforts paid off, and pilots (and the FAA) loved our instruments. Some of
our design innovations were adopted into instrument regulations by the FAA, so all
manufacturers had to build to our standard. But always hovering over our success was the fear
of news of the crash of a plane flying our instruments. And the fear that information
overload from our instruments would be shown to be a contributing factor.
Which is why part of our required reading was any and all reports (mainly NTSB and NASA)
that even mention pilot overload. Even a decade after leaving that industry, I still read
these reports.
``...the cause could turn out not to be a design flaw or software malfunction that can
be rectified, but a basic shortcoming in human perception and psychology that cannot be
fixed as long as humans are entrusted with the control of airplanes.''
On the other hand, we have two recent examples of what can happen when a flight computer
is given control of the plane and it is unable to avoid doing something stupid like -- as the
old euphemism goes -- `make inadvertent contact with the terrain'.
Until we know more about how this was supposed work and exactly why it
didn't , I think I'll trust the human with his hands on the controls more than the flight
computer.
(Thankfully, the occasions for my needing to fly are few and far between.)
If you look at it and you are headed down (and you have good airspeed), you don't need to
keep trying to nose down - regardless of what your senses are telling you.
What about looking at how the altimeter is changing?
The artificial horizon gives you a lot of information when your sense of direction is
playing tricks on you (in the clouds and feeling like you are going up,down, rolling,
etc.)
"... "It's a very, very serious investigation into basically, was there fraud by Boeing in the certification of the 737 MAX 8 ?" Arthur Rosenberg, an aviation attorney who is representing six families whose relatives died in the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air crashes, explained. ..."
"... Rosenberg expects the criminal probe to question whether Boeing fully disclosed to the FAA the engineering of the 737 Max 8's MCAS flight control system, called MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), during the plane's certification process. The flight control system was designed to prevent the plane from stalling. ..."
"... Unfortunately for Boeing and the passengers its crashed aircraft were carrying, the MCAS system was very poorly implemented. ..."
"... The single sensor was the result of regulatory capture, not to say gaming; see below. ..."
"... Black box data retrieved after the Lion Air crash indicates that a single faulty sensor -- a vane on the outside of the fuselage that measures the plane's "angle of attack," the angle between the airflow and the wing -- triggered MCAS multiple times during the deadly flight, initiating a tug of war as the system repeatedly pushed the nose of the plane down and the pilots wrestled with the controls to pull it back up, before the final crash. ..."
"... Regulatory Capture : Commercial aircraft need to be certified by the FAA before launch. The Washington Post labels today's process "self-certification": ..."
"... In practice, one Boeing engineer would conduct a test of a particular system on the Max 8, while another Boeing engineer would act as the FAA's representative , signing on behalf of the U.S. government that the technology complied with federal safety regulations, people familiar with the process said. ..."
"... (Note that a 10-year-old process would have begun in the Obama administration, so the regulatory process is bipartisan.) I understand that " safety culture " is real and strong, but imagine the same role-playing concept applied to finance: One bankers plays the banker, and the other banker plays Bill Black, and after a time they switch roles . Clearly a system that will work until it doesn't. More: ..."
"... The process was occurring during a period when the Transportation Department's Office of Inspector General was warning the FAA that its oversight of manufacturers' work was insufficient. ..."
"... The FAA, citing lack of funding and resources, has over the years delegated increasing authority to Boeing to take on more of the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes. ..."
"... Alert readers will note the similarity to the Neoliberal Playbook , where government systems are sabotaged in order to privatize them, but in this case regulatory capture seems to have happened "by littles," rather than out of open, ideological conviction (as with the UKs's NHS, or our Post Office, our Veteran's Administration, etc.). ..."
"... Several FAA technical experts said in interviews that as certification proceeded, managers prodded them to speed the process. Development of the MAX was lagging nine months behind the rival Airbus A320neo. Time was of the essence for Boeing . ..."
"... In this atmosphere, the System Safety Analysis on MCAS, just one piece of the mountain of documents needed for certification, was delegated to Boeing . ..."
"... It should be clear at this point that the central claims of Muilenburg's letter are false. ..."
"... The self-certification debacle that allowed MCAS to be released happened on Muilenburg's watch and is already causing Boeing immense reputational damage, and a criminal case, not to mention the civil cases that are surely coming, will only increase that damage. Mr. Market, the Beltway, and even Trump, if his trade deals are affected, will all soon be bellowing for a sacrificial victim. Muilenburg should recognize the inevitable and gracefully resign. Given his letter, it looks unlikely that he will do the right thing. ..."
"... Beyond that ultimate problem is the ultimate regulatory problem: regulatory capture of the FAA by the airline companies. As a result, the FAA represents "its customers" the airplane makers, not the public users and customers. This is like the banks capturing the Fed, the Justice Dept. and Treasury to promote their own interests by claiming that "self-regulation" works. Self-regulation is the polite word for fraudulent self-indulgence. ..."
"... I would be surprised if the European Airbus competitors do not mount a campaign to block the 737-Max's from landing, and insisting that Boeing buy them back. This gives Airbus a few years to grab the market for these planes. ..."
"... This probably will throw Trump's China trade fight into turmoil, as China was the first country to ground the 737-Max's and is unlikely to permit their recovery without a "real" federal safety oversight program. Maybe Europe, China and other countries henceforth will each demand that their own public agencies certify the plane, so as to represent users and stakeholders, not only stockholders. ..."
"... The moral: Neoliberalism Kills. ..."
"... Rule #2 of Neoliberalism: Go die. ..."
"... > "Maybe Europe, China and other countries henceforth will each demand that their own public agencies certify the plane." ..."
"... As if the 737 MAX were the chlorinated chicken of aircraft. ..."
"... "This gives Airbus a few years to grab the market for these planes." ..."
"... Regulatory capture is rampant throughout the economy. Boeing self-certification being delegated by the FAA is not unlike the situation with electric transmission utilities. ..."
"... that is subject to both FERC and NERC regulation. ..."
"... In hindsight Boeing would have perhaps been better off to leave off the MCAS altogether and depend on pilot retraining to cover the altered handling. ..."
"... Reports I've read indicates that Boeing ignored even the clearly inadequate certification. "Documentation provided to the FAA claims that the MCAS system can only adjust the horizontal tail on the plane by 0.6 degrees out of a maximum of five-degrees of nose-down movement. But that limit was later increased to 2.5-degrees of nose-down movement. Boeing didn't communicate the change from 0.6-degrees to 2.5-degrees until after Lion Air." ..."
"... Boeing could also be liable for damages due to 737 groundings and due to delays in delivery of contracted planes. ..."
"... The analogy has been made between this the 737 MAX story and the Tylenol story. J&J got out in front of the problem and saved the product (and their company). Boeing's problem is of that order, and Muilenberg -- that letter! -- seems incapable of understanding that; insular, arrogant. One more reason to fire the dude toot sweet. If he comes out of his next review with a raise -- Everything Is Like CalPERS™ -- consider shorting Boeing ..."
"... Allowing this to happen seems the ultimate in short term thinking by Boeing. US manufacturers have always had an advantage over competitors because the FAA was held in such high regard worldwide that it was the de facto world safety regulatory body – every country followed its lead. But this chipping away of its authority has led to a near fatal loss of faith, and will no doubt lead to European and Asian regulatory authorities being strengthened. And no doubt commercial realities will mean they will look much more closely at US manufactured aircraft if there is some benefit to their own manufacturers. ..."
"... The Times thinks Boeing is too big to fail. Without a blockbuster Max, I don't see how Boeing maintains its current status in the industry. ..."
"... I also think they have been completely afflicted by the defense contractor mentality. ..."
"... Yes, the famous McDonnell-Douglas reverse takeover , where financial engineers inserted their sucking mandibles into an actual ..."
"... Note that Muilenberg came up through the defense side of the company not the commercial aircraft side. He may simply not have been equipped to understand FAA regulation at any deep level, hence the rot that finally surfaced. ..."
"... The tragedy is that corporate media in pursuit of profits will keep us up to date but will never mention the 6 or 8 minutes of terror for the 346 souls aboard the two flights. They will cover the criminal negligence trial if there are ever indictments. But, the news reports never will say that neoliberalism, deregulation, and privatization are the root causes of the deaths. ..."
"... Boeing also clearly did not know its customers . It should be engineering for the sort of pilots who are going to be hired by Lion Air, or any rapidly expanding airline in what we used to all the Third World. Hegemony, it seems, makes you insular and provincial. ..."
"... "The FAA, citing lack of funding and resource": I don't suppose I'll survive to see any arm of government not blame lack of funds for its boneheaded or corrupt incompetence. ..."
"... That's how I feel. The tech doc department at Boeing sounds like a horrible place to work; MBAs or their goons telling you all the time to do stuff you know is wrong. It's not surprising people were willing to talk to the Seattle Times; I bet there are more people. (Hey, Seattle Times! How about people testing the 737 MAX in simulators (assuming this is done)). ..."
"... Interestingly, and maybe relevant to the problem of confusion for the pilots, is that Boeing has had another automatic trim-modifier operating on its 737s for some time, the speed-trim system (STS): ..."
"... This system also modifies the stabilizer position during manual flight. Like MCAS, it was brought in to improve stability under certain flight conditions (the reasons for which are far beyond my knowledge). There is an indication that the pilots on the flight before the Lion Air crash misinterpreted MCAS actions for STS behavior. ..."
"... authority would revert to the pilot ..."
"... How many years ago did Wall Street take over the fortunes of the company? Why did they move their headquarters from their birthplace of Seattle to Chicago? Why did they start assembling planes in South Carolina and China? Was it to improve aviation safety? Or, to allow the profiteering parasites to feed off the carcass of the company? ..."
"... President Trump, here's a reelection tip: "Today I am declaring that all American registered aircraft flying in American airspace must be maintained in the U.S." ..."
"... Amazingly, Trump seems to have done OK on this. First, he didn't cave to Muilenberg's (insane, goofy, tone-deaf) request to keep the 737 flying; then he frames the issue as complexity (correct, IMNSHO), and then he manages to nominate a Delta CEO as head of the FAA . ..."
"... we're seeing signs that a crapification process has begun on the safety side in this industry. (It has been proceeding for years on the service/amenities side.) ..."
"... Considering the fact that all these 737s are grounded as no airline trust them to not kill a plane load of passengers and crew, this is a really big deal. Putting aside the technical and regulatory issues, the fact is that the rest of the world no longer trusts the US in modern aviation so what we have here is a trust issue which is an even bigger deal. ..."
"... Loss or at least wobbliness of imperial hegemony, like. It's not just the aircraft, it's US standards-setting bodies, methods, "safety culture," even -- dare we say it -- English as the language of aviation. French is no longer the language of diplomacy, after all, though it had a good run. ..."
"... Because markets. Neoliberalism puts everything up for sale. Including regulation. Oversimplifying absurdly: And so you end up with the profit-driven manufacturer buying the regulator, its produce killing people, and the manufacturer canceling its future profits. That's what the Bearded One would call a contradiction.* ..."
"... know your customer ..."
"... Like you, I am a retired software engineer, so I have followed an aviation blog discussion of this issue quite closely since it emerged as a probable software and system design failure. As the blog is open to all, its signal-to-noise ratio is pretty low, but it seems not too difficult for any technically-minded person to separate the wheat from the chaff. My current understanding, which I believe others here are in a position to correct, if necessary: ..."
"... this story is really fascinating and seems to be true a sign of the times. ..."
"... The Post's article on the FAA and Regulatory Capture is incomplete. The process for the FAA (and probably MANY government agencies) started under Reagan, did not revert to safety under Clinton (make government smaller and all that), and then accelerated under Bush II in 2005 (not a bi-partisan time). In particular, big changes to the FAA were made in 2005 that were executive in nature and did not require Congressional approval. CF: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/delegating-aircraft-safety-assessments-to-boeing-is-nothing-new-for-the-faa/ ..."
At some point in the future, I'd like to do failure matrix for the pathways to misfortune (
example of such a matrix here ) that precipitated
two deadly Boeing 737 MAX crashes on take-off in five months , but I don't feel that I have enough information yet. (I'm not
unsympathathetic to the view
that the wholesale 737 MAX grounding was premature on technical grounds , but then trade and even geopolitical factors enter
in, given that Boeing is a "national champion.") We do not yet have results from the cockpit voice and flight data recorders of either
aircraft, for example. But what we do know is sufficiently disturbing -- a criminal investigation into Boeing had already been initiated
after the Lion Air crash, but before the Ethiopian Airlines crash -- that I think it's worthwhile doing a play-by-play on the causes
of the crashes, so far as we can know them.
About that criminal investigation
:
According to the Wall Street Journal, a Washington D.C. grand jury issued a March 11 subpoena requesting emails, correspondence,
and other messages from at least one person involved in the development of the aircraft.
"It's a very, very serious investigation into basically, was there fraud by Boeing in the certification of the 737
MAX 8 ?" Arthur Rosenberg, an aviation attorney who is representing six families whose relatives died in the Ethiopian Airlines
and Lion Air crashes, explained.
"Nobody knows the answer to that yet," Rosenberg cautioned, adding that he had not yet seen the Justice Department's subpoena
and therefore could not know its full scope.
Rosenberg expects the criminal probe to question whether Boeing fully disclosed to the FAA the engineering of the 737 Max
8's MCAS flight control system, called MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), during the plane's certification
process. The flight control system was designed to prevent the plane from stalling.
A possible criminal investigation during an aircraft accident investigation is highly unusual . While airline accidents
have at times raised criminal issues, such as after the 1996 crash of a ValuJet plane in the Florida Everglades, such cases are
the exception.
Safety is at the core of who we are at Boeing, and ensuring safe and reliable travel on our airplanes is an enduring value
and our absolute commitment to everyone. This overarching focus on safety spans and binds together our entire global aerospace
industry and communities. We're united with our airline customers, international regulators and government authorities in our
efforts to support the most recent investigation, understand the facts of what happened and help prevent future tragedies. Based
on facts from the Lion Air Flight 610 accident and emerging data as it becomes available from the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302
accident, we're taking actions to fully ensure the safety of the 737 MAX. We also understand and regret the challenges for our
customers and the flying public caused by the fleet's grounding.
Boeing has been in the business of aviation safety for more than 100 years, and we'll continue providing the best products,
training and support to our global airline customers and pilots. This is an ongoing and relentless commitment to make safe
airplanes even safer .
Soon we'll release a software update and related pilot training for the 737 MAX that will address concerns discovered in the
aftermath of the Lion Air Flight 610 accident.
Fine words. Are they true? Can Boeing's "commitment to everyone to ensure " safe and reliable travel" really be said to be "absolute"?
That's a high bar. Let's see!
I've taken the structure that follows from
a tweetstorm by Trevor Sumner (apparently derived from
a Facebook post by his brother-law,
Dave Kammeyer ). However, I've added topic headings, changed others,
and helpfully numbered them all, so you can correct, enhance, or rearrange topics easily in comments (or even suggest new topics).
Let me also caveat that this is an enormous amount of material, and time presses, so this will not be as rich in links as I would
normally like it to be. Also note that the level of abstraction for each topic varies significantly: From "The Biosphere" all the
way to "Pilot Training." A proper failure matrix would sort that out.
* * *
(1) The Biosphere : The 737 MAX story beings with a customer requirement for increased fuel efficiency. This is, at bottom,
a carbon issue (and hence a greenhouse gas issue , especially as the demand for air travel increases, especially in Asia). New
biosphere-driven customer demands will continue to emerge as climate change increases and intensifies, and hence the continued 737
MAX-like debacles should be expected, all else being equal. From
CAPA – Centre for Aviation :
The main expected impacts of climate change on aviation result from changes in temperature, precipitation (rain and snow),
storm patterns, sea level and wind patterns. In addition, climate change is expected to lead to increased drought, impacts on
the supply of water and energy, and changes in wildlife patterns and biodiversity. Consequences for aviation include reduced aircraft
performance, changing demand patterns, potential damage to infrastructure, loss of capacity and schedule disruption.
All of these factors will affect aircraft design, manufacturing, maintenance, and use, stressing the system.
(2) Choice of Airframe :
The Air Current
describes the competitive environment that led Boeing to upgrade the 737 to the 737 MAX, instead of building a new plane:
Boeing wanted to replace the 737. The plan had even earned the endorsement of its now-retired chief executive. We're gonna
do a new airplane," Jim McNerney
said in February of that same year. "We're not done evaluating this whole situation yet, but our current bias is to not re-engine,
is to move to an all-new airplane at the end of the decade." History went in a different direction. Airbus, riding its
same decades-long incremental strategy and chipping away at Boeing's market supremacy, had made no secret of its plans to
put new engines on the A320. But its own re-engineered jet somehow managed to take Boeing by surprise. Airbus and American forced
Boeing's hand. It had to put new engines on the 737 to stay even with its rival .
Why? The earlier butchered launch of the 787:
Boeing justified the decision thusly: There were huge and excruciatingly painful near-term obstacles on its way to a new single-aisle
airplane. In the summer of 2011, the 787 Dreamliner wasn't yet done after billions invested and years of delays. More than 800
airplanes later here in 2019, each 787 costs less to build than sell, but it's
still running a $23 billion production
cost deficit. .
The 737 Max was Boeing's ticket to holding the line on its position "both market and financial" in the near term. Abandoning
the 737 would've meant walking away from its golden goose that helped finance the astronomical costs of the 787 and the development
of the 777X.
So, we might think of Boeing as a runner who's tripped and fallen: The initial stumble, followed by loss of balance, was the 787;
with the 737 MAX, Boeing hit the surface of the track.
(3) Aerodynamic Issues : The
Air Current
also describes the aerodynamic issues created by the decision to re-engine the 737:
Every airplane development is a series of compromises, but to deliver the 737 Max with its promised fuel efficiency, Boeing
had to fit 12 gallons into a 10 gallon jug. Its bigger engines made for creative solutions as it found a way to mount the larger
CFM International turbines under the notoriously low-slung jetliner. It lengthened the nose landing gear by eight inches, cleaned
up the aerodynamics of the tail cone, added new winglets, fly-by-wire spoilers and big displays for the next generation of pilots.
It pushed technology, as it had done time and time again with ever-increasing costs, to deliver a product that made its jets more-efficient
and less-costly to fly.
In the case of the 737 Max, with its nose pointed high in the air, the larger engines "generating their own lift" nudged it
even higher. The risk Boeing found through analysis and later flight testing was that under certain high-speed conditions both
in wind-up turns and wings-level flight, that upward nudge created a greater risk of stalling.
Its solution was MCAS , the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System control law that would allow for both generations
of 737 to behave the same way. MCAS would automatically trim the horizontal stabilizer to bring the nose down, activated with
Angle of Attack data. It's now at the center of the Lion Air investigation and stalking the periphery of the Ethiopian crash.
(4) Systems Engineering : Amazingly, there is what in a less buttoned-down world that commercial aviation would be called a Boeing
737 fan site, which describes the MCAS system in more technical terms
:
MCAS was introduced to counteract the pitch up effect of the LEAP-1B engines at high AoA [Angle of Attack]. The engines were
both larger and relocated slightly up and forward from the previous NG CFM56-7 engines to accomodate their larger diameter. This
new location and size of the nacelle causes it to produce lift at high AoA; as the nacelle is ahead of the CofG [Center of Gravity]
this causes a pitch-up effect which could in turn further increase the AoA and send the aircraft closer towards the stall. MCAS
was therefore introduced to give an automatic nose down stabilizer input during steep turns with elevated load factors (high AoA)
and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall.
Unfortunately for Boeing and the passengers its crashed aircraft were carrying, the MCAS system was very poorly implemented.Reading between the lines (I've helpfully labeled the pain points):
Boeing have been working on a software modification to MCAS since the Lion Air accident. Unfortunately although originally
due for release in January it has still not been released due to both engineering challenges and differences of opinion among
some federal and company safety experts over how extensive the changes should be.
Apparently there have been discussions about potentially adding [A] enhanced pilot training and possibly mandatory [B] cockpit
alerts to the package. There also has been consideration of more-sweeping design changes that would prevent [C] faulty signals
from a single sensor from touching off the automated stall-prevention system.
[A] Pilot training was originally not considered necessary, because MCAS was supposed to give 737 MAX the same flight
characteristics as earlier 737s; that's why pilots weren't told about it. (This also kept the price low.) [B] Such alerts exist now,
as part of an optional package, which Lion did not buy. [C] The single sensor was the result of regulatory capture, not to say
gaming; see below.
(The MCAS system is currently the system fingered as the cause of both the Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes; we won't know for sure
until the forensics are complete. Here, however, is
the scenario for an MCAS-induced crash :
Black box data retrieved after the Lion Air crash indicates that a single faulty sensor -- a vane on the outside of the
fuselage that measures the plane's "angle of attack," the angle between the airflow and the wing -- triggered MCAS multiple times
during the deadly flight, initiating a tug of war as the system repeatedly pushed the nose of the plane down and the pilots wrestled
with the controls to pull it back up, before the final crash.
(5) Regulatory Capture : Commercial aircraft need to be certified by the FAA before launch. The
Washington Post labels today's process "self-certification":
The FAA's publication of pilot training requirements for the Max 8 in the fall of 2017 was among the final steps in a multiyear
approval process carried out under the agency's now 10-year-old policy of entrusting Boeing and other aviation manufacturers to
certify that their own systems comply with U.S. air safety regulations.
In practice, one Boeing engineer would conduct a test of a particular system on the Max 8, while another Boeing engineer
would act as the FAA's representative , signing on behalf of the U.S. government that the technology complied with federal safety
regulations, people familiar with the process said.
(Note that a 10-year-old process would have begun in the Obama administration, so the regulatory process is bipartisan.) I
understand that " safety culture " is real and strong, but imagine the same
role-playing concept applied to finance: One bankers plays the banker, and the other banker plays Bill Black, and after a time they
switch roles . Clearly a system that will work until it doesn't. More:
The process was occurring during a period when the Transportation Department's Office of Inspector General was warning
the FAA that its oversight of manufacturers' work was insufficient.
Four years after self-certification began, fires aboard Boeing's 787 Dreamliner jets led to the grounding of the fleet and
a wave of questions about whether self-certification had affected the FAA's oversight.
Why "self-certification"? Investigative reporting from
the Seattle Times -- the article is worth reading in full -- explains:
The FAA, citing lack of funding and resources, has over the years delegated increasing authority to Boeing to take on more
of the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes.
Alert readers will note the similarity to
the Neoliberal Playbook , where government systems are sabotaged in order to privatize them, but in this case regulatory capture
seems to have happened "by littles," rather than out of open, ideological conviction (as with the UKs's NHS, or our Post Office,
our Veteran's Administration, etc.).
(6) Transfer of Authority to Boeing : In the case of the 737 Max, regulatory capture was so great that certification authority
was transferred to Boeing. In order to be certified, a "System Safety Analysis" for MCAS had to be performed.
The Seattle Times :
The safety analysis:
Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the
plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther
than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of
the system repeatedly pushing the airplane's nose downward. Assessed a failure of the system as one level below "catastrophic."
But even that "hazardous" danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor --
and yet that's how it was designed.
So who certified MCAS? Boeing self-certified it. Once again
The Seattle Times :
Several FAA technical experts said in interviews that as certification proceeded, managers prodded them to speed the process.
Development of the MAX was lagging nine months behind the rival Airbus A320neo. Time was of the essence for Boeing .
"There wasn't a complete and proper review of the documents," the former engineer added. "Review was rushed to reach certain
certification dates."
In this atmosphere, the System Safety Analysis on MCAS, just one piece of the mountain of documents needed for certification,
was delegated to Boeing .
(I'm skipping a lengthy discussion of even more technical detail for MCAS, which includes discrepancies between what Boeing self-certified,
and what the FAA thought that it had certified, along with the MCAS system acting like a ratchet, so it didn't reset itself, meaning
that each time it kicked in, the nose was pitched down even lower. Yikes. Again, the article is worth reading in full; if you've
ever done tech doc, you'll want to scream and run.)
(7) Political Economy : This tweet is especially interesting, because even I know that
Muddy Waters Research is a famous short seller:
What's the
result? Two $BA planes have been grounded:
787 and Max. Last FAA grounding of a type of plane was 1979. In the case of the Max, FAA outsourced more than planned bc BA was
9 months behind Airbus 320neo 3/4 2 replies 4 retweets 19 likes
This is a great example of real short-termism by a corporate. It's clearly in
$BA LT interest to have robust cert system,
but those chickens come home to roost years later, allowing mgmt to meet ST expectations. BTW, semi-annual reporting would do
NOTHING to fix this mentality. 4
And here we are! There are a myriad of other details, but many of them will only prove out once the black boxes are examined and
the forensics are complete.
* * *
It should be clear at this point that the central claims of Muilenburg's letter are false. I understand that commercial
aviation is a business, but if that is so, then Muilenburg's claim that Boeing's commitment to safety is "absolute" cannot possibly
be true; indeed, the choice to re-engine the 737 had nothing to do with safety. Self-certification makes Boeing "a judge in its own
cause," and that clearly contradicts Muilenburg's absurd claim that "safety" -- as opposed to profit -- "is at the core of who we
are."
The self-certification debacle that allowed MCAS to be released happened on Muilenburg's watch and is already causing Boeing
immense reputational damage, and a criminal case, not to mention the civil cases that are surely coming, will only increase that
damage. Mr. Market, the Beltway, and even Trump, if his trade deals are affected, will all soon be bellowing for a sacrificial victim.
Muilenburg should recognize the inevitable and gracefully resign. Given his letter, it looks unlikely that he will do the right thing.
IIRC, one of the big constraints that was leveled was the need to keep the 737, regardless of version, into the same height
relative to all other generations of the 737, whereas Airbus kept their height a lot higher than the 737.
If you look at many 737's over the years, some of the engine's nacelles were flat at the bottom to accommodate larger engine.
Why? Boeing kept the height the same in order to maintain built-in stairs that, with virtually all airports having adjustable
jetways, was basically redundant.
When you compare an A320xeo against a B737, you'll find that the Airbus rides higher when it comes to the jetways.
It seems to me that the Boeing 737-Max with the heavier, larger fuel-saving engines is so unbalanced (tilting over and then
crashing if not "overridden" by a computer compensation) that it never should have been authorized in the first place.
When Boeing decided to add a much larger engine, it should have kept the airplane in balance by (1) shifting it forward or
backward so that the weight did not tip the plane, and (2) created a larger landing-gear base so that the large engines wouldn't
scrape the ground.
The problem was that Boeing tried to keep using the old chassis with the larger engines under the wings – rather than changing
the wings, moving them forward or aft, and expanding the plane to permit a more appropriate landing gear.
The computer system has been blamed for not being a "smart enough" workaround to tell the plane not to plunge down when it
already is quite close to the ground – with no perception of altitude, not to mention double-checking on the wind speed from both
sensors.
Beyond that ultimate problem is the ultimate regulatory problem: regulatory capture of the FAA by the airline companies.
As a result, the FAA represents "its customers" the airplane makers, not the public users and customers. This is like the banks
capturing the Fed, the Justice Dept. and Treasury to promote their own interests by claiming that "self-regulation" works. Self-regulation
is the polite word for fraudulent self-indulgence.
I would be surprised if the European Airbus competitors do not mount a campaign to block the 737-Max's from landing, and
insisting that Boeing buy them back. This gives Airbus a few years to grab the market for these planes.
This probably will throw Trump's China trade fight into turmoil, as China was the first country to ground the 737-Max's
and is unlikely to permit their recovery without a "real" federal safety oversight program. Maybe Europe, China and other countries
henceforth will each demand that their own public agencies certify the plane, so as to represent users and stakeholders, not only
stockholders.
> "Maybe Europe, China and other countries henceforth will each demand that their own public agencies certify the plane."
As if the 737 MAX were the chlorinated chicken of aircraft.
* * *
I'm not sure about redesigning the wing and the landing gear. That might be tantamount to designing a new plane. (I do know
that the landing gear is so low because the first 737s needed to accommodate airports without jetways, and so there may be other
facets of the design that also depend on those original requirements that might have to be changed.)
Regulatory capture is rampant throughout the economy. Boeing self-certification being delegated by the FAA is not unlike
the situation with electric transmission utilities.
After the 2003 northeast & Canada blackout, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005. It directed FERC to create an "electric
reliability organization". Previously there were voluntary organizations set up after the 1966 blackout to establish operating
standards in the industry. One of them was the North American Electric Reliability Council which morphed into the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) in 2006.
NERC is headquartered in Atlanta and employs hundreds of people. The standards setting generally takes place in NERC Committees
and Subcommittees and sometimes from FERC itself. These are typically packed with industry people, with a patina of diversity
that includes some governmental types and large industrial consumers. Let it suffice to say the electric transmission industry
itself largely sets the rules how it operates.
Now consider the article in yesterday's NYT "
How PG&E Ignored
California Fire Risks in Favor of Profits ". The transmission circuit featured in the article (the Caribou-Palermo line) that
caused the destruction of Paradise is a transmission line that is subject to both FERC and NERC regulation. As described
in the article the circuit had many previous failures and was well beyond its design life.
However, both FERC and NERC have a laser focus on "market players" (think Enron or JP Morgan) and system operations (e.g.,
prevent collapses like the blackout of 2003). AFIK, neither FERC or NERC have prescriptive standards for routine maintenance or
inspection and replacement (i.e., very expensive capital replacement that was not done on the Caribou-Palermo line), these are
left to the discretion of the transmission owner. While substantive information about electric reliability is maintained by industry
trade groups and submitted to FERC, what is available to the public is generally useless and subjected to scrubbing and polishing
(often under the guise of Critical Energy Infrastructure Information).
We can see how self-policing work, can't we??? Rent-seeking market players can arbitrage markets, inflating prices consumers
pay and make billions in profits, while California burns.
The neglectful rot in California is endemic in the industry as a whole.
That Seattle Times investigative story is indeed very good and a rare instance of newspaper writers troubling to carefully
and cogently explain a technical issue.
In hindsight Boeing would have perhaps been better off to leave off the MCAS altogether and depend on pilot retraining
to cover the altered handling.
One reason they may not have was that crash several years ago of a commuter plane in upstate NY where the plane started to
stall and the confused pilot pulled up on the controls rather than making the airplane dive to regain speed. Still one has to
believe that no automation is better than badly designed or malfunctioning automation.
"depend on pilot retraining to cover the altered handling"
IANAP, but maybe the problem is that "nose up" situations can go south very quickly. For those with the stomach for it, there
are videos on youtube of the 747 freighter that went nose up at Bagram a few years ago (perhaps due to loose cargo shifting backwards
on takeoff). It was over very quickly.
Yes, I was impressed with it. Unfortunately the investigation precludes Boeing from responding as they did indicate they would
have had something to say about it otherwise. But the analysis looks pretty cut and dried:
Boeing underestimated the risk rating for the sensor, excluding the possibility of a catastrophic failure as occurred in
the two incidents to date;
Boeing also failed to implement the redundancy that would have been required even for their lower risk rating;
Manual correction by the pilot as a possible risk mitigation was constrained by the fact that pilots weren't trained on
the new system due to commercial factors.
Fixing any one of those three issues would have averted the disasters, although #3 is pretty precarious as you're relying on
manual pilot actions to correct what is a clear systems defect at that point.
It sounds like #1 was partly because they failed to account for all the scenarios, like repeat activation raising the risk
profile in certain circumstances. This is very easy to do and a robust review process is your best defense. So we could add the
tight timelines and rushed process as a contributing factor for #1, and probably the others as well.
People who work on accident investigation would probably agree on 2 things:
(o) Accidents are invariably a confluence of a myriad of factors that all happened to line up on one day. There is never
a single cause of an accident.
(o) A minor change to some part of the system would have prevented the accident.
So while there is much to be profitably learned by investigating everything here, an effective "fix" may be surprisingly (or
suspiciously) small in scope. There will be much clamoring for the whole plane to be resigned or scrapped, for better or worse.
The Colgan crash, whose pilot, Renfrew, was chatting with the co-pilot below the allowed altitude? And who had apparently lied
about his background, and had a pay-to-play pilot's license?
I think the Air France Airbus 447 also had a high-altitude stall (due to a faulty air speed sensor) and needed its nose pushed
down, not up (which the copilots didn't realize).
Also, very informative article / OP, thanks for posting.
MCAS was added to change the behavior of the plane from to tend to stall as speed increases. That is stall and crash, because
such a high speed stall makes polit recovery very, very difficult.
In addition the MCAS driven amount of elevator change was initially 0.6 to 2.5, which indicates the 0.6 increment was found
to be too low.
According to a detailed FAA briefing to legislators, Boeing will change the MCAS software to give the system input from
both angle-of-attack sensors.
It will also limit how much MCAS can move the horizontal tail in response to an erroneous signal. And when activated, the
system will kick in only for one cycle, rather than multiple times.
Boeing also plans to update pilot training requirements and flight crew manuals to include MCAS.
–Seattle Times
So apparently the greater elevator setting is not so necessary that they are not willing to reduce it. Also the max power setting
would normally be on take off when the pilots are required to manually fly the plane.
Yes, that was an excellent Seattle times piece. Surprising to see that kind of truth-telling and, especially, *clarity* in
an MSM piece these days. So what's the angle?
Reports I've read indicates that Boeing ignored even the clearly inadequate certification. "Documentation provided to the
FAA claims that the MCAS system can only adjust the horizontal tail on the plane by 0.6 degrees out of a maximum of five-degrees
of nose-down movement. But that limit was later increased to 2.5-degrees of nose-down movement. Boeing didn't communicate the
change from 0.6-degrees to 2.5-degrees until after Lion Air."
Apparently this was done after simulations showed that 0.6 degrees was inadequate and the new 2.5 degree setting was not extensively
tested before the planes were rolled out. IANAL, but this may be a serious problem for Boeing. Boeing could also be liable
for damages due to 737 groundings and due to delays in delivery of contracted planes.
Big question is how 737 issues will affect 777X rollout, due at the end of the year. If 777X certification is called into question,
this may cause further delays and put it at a further disadvantage against A350.
The 777 has been a great plane. Let's all pray the MBAs didn't fuck it up, too.
If I were Boeing, I'd have a team looking into the 777 certification process right now. And I'd set up a whistleblower line
(so the Seattle Times doesn't get to the story first).
The analogy has been made between this the 737 MAX story and the Tylenol story. J&J got out in front of the problem and
saved the product (and their company). Boeing's problem is of that order, and Muilenberg -- that letter! -- seems incapable of
understanding that; insular, arrogant. One more reason to fire the dude toot sweet. If he comes out of his next review with a
raise -- Everything Is Like CalPERS™ -- consider shorting Boeing
Thanks, Lambert, for post and comments. I don't know if this angle has been covered or explored: the relatively new way that
Boeing now "manufactures" "tests" and "assembles" parts of its planes. I had dinner with new acquaintance, Boeing engineer for
decades (I live near a plant in WA state). For the last few years, this engineer is stationed half year in Russia annually to
oversee assembly there. In this newish, more profitable manufacturing system for Boeing, the parts come in from around the world
with sketchy quality control, are then assembled by Russian workers this engineer (and other Boeing employees sent from States)
supposedly oversees. But the engineer doesn't speak Russian and has too little access to translators .Needless to say, this engineer
is planning an exit as soon as possible. Having grown up in WA state for 60 years with neighbors/friends who were Boeing engineers,
assemblers, line workers, etc it makes me heart sick to see the current decimation of talent, rigor and wages with additional
far-flung assembly factories (Russia with few translators?! who knew?). Might these manufacturing/assemblying "improvements" also
be a contributing factor in these terrifying woes for Boeing?
Thanks for this Lambert, fantastically informative and interesting post.
Self regulation only works when liability is transferred with it – over example, in construction whereby certification by the
engineers or architects designing the building are also taking on liability in the event something goes wrong. It seems unlikely
that this is the situation with Boeing.
Allowing this to happen seems the ultimate in short term thinking by Boeing. US manufacturers have always had an advantage
over competitors because the FAA was held in such high regard worldwide that it was the de facto world safety regulatory
body – every country followed its lead. But this chipping away of its authority has led to a near fatal loss of faith, and will
no doubt lead to European and Asian regulatory authorities being strengthened. And no doubt commercial realities will mean they
will look much more closely at US manufactured aircraft if there is some benefit to their own manufacturers.
Airbus will no doubt try to take advantage – just as Boeing (with some justification) tried to focus attention on the Air France
Airbus loss which was attributed at least in part to excessive automation. China is pushing hard with its new Comac aircraft,
but they seem to be poorly regarded worldwide (only Chinese airlines are buying). The Canadians have missed their chance with
the Bombadier C-series.
The more I read of this the more baffling it is. What was there stopping Boeing from just highlighting the changes and installing
an easy manual override instead of this hidden change with effectively no way to permanently do so? Especially when in crisis
mode? One could make a case of no extra training needed so long as the pilot knows about it and can easily turn it off.
I didn't see this before I posted my response. A more concise statement of my thoughts. This plus more robust redundant sensors.
Penny wise and pound foolish.
The Times thinks Boeing is too big to fail. Without a blockbuster Max, I don't see how Boeing maintains its current status
in the industry.
I am leaning towards thinking the kludgy design of the 727 Max could have been rolled out with no major problems if Boeing
had been up front about design changes, made a robust and conservative MCAS, fully at the command of the pilot, and provided ample
training for the new aircraft.
They still could have saved billions on the airframe. They would have had to acknowledge the significant modifications to the
airlines with the attendant training and other costs and delays. They would have lost some sales. They still would have been far
ahead of Airbus and light years ahead of where they are now.
I also think they have been completely afflicted by the defense contractor mentality.
Note that Muilenberg came up through the defense side of the company not the commercial aircraft side. He may simply not
have been equipped to understand FAA regulation at any deep level, hence the rot that finally surfaced.
The 737 Max crashes and Brexit are the chickens coming home to roost. NC is a treasure for your coverage of both.
Clearly upper management in Chicago only knows short term finance. Boeing stuck with old fashion hydraulic controls in the
737 but faced with an unacceptable flight characteristics of the larger more efficient engines added a fly-by-wire system to compensate
for it.
The criminal charges are that besides being a faulty design (it relies on one fragile exposed sensor that if out of position
keeps triggering dives until switched off) but Boeing hid it and self-certified that it was safe. Adding a discrepancy warning
and position indicator for the two independent flight sensors to the cockpit video display is an extra cost feature.
Neither of the planes that crashed had the added safety display. All are cost saving measures. Finally, if a faulty sensor
triggers dives, the pilot at the controls is busy with both hands on the yoke forcing the airplane to stay in the air with stall
and proximity warnings are sounding. The second pilot also must realize what's going on, immediately turn off the electricity
to the screw jack motor and manually turn the stabilizer trim wheel to neutral.
You can't learn this on an iPad. Both pilots should practice it together in a Flight Simulator. If the co-pilot was experienced,
unlike the one in the Ethiopian crash; just maybe, they could have survived the repeated attempts by the airplane to dive into
the ground on takeoff.
The tragedy is that corporate media in pursuit of profits will keep us up to date but will never mention the 6 or 8 minutes
of terror for the 346 souls aboard the two flights. They will cover the criminal negligence trial if there are ever indictments.
But, the news reports never will say that neoliberalism, deregulation, and privatization are the root causes of the deaths.
> if a faulty sensor triggers dives, the pilot at the controls is busy with both hands on the yoke forcing the airplane
to stay in the air with stall and proximity warnings are sounding. The second pilot also must realize what's going on, immediately
turn off the electricity to the screw jack motor and manually turn the stabilizer trim wheel to neutral. You can't learn this
on an iPad. Both pilots should practice it together in a Flight Simulator. If the co-pilot was experienced, unlike the one
in the Ethiopian crash; just maybe, they could have survived the repeated attempts by the airplane to dive into the ground
on takeoff.
That's what I mean by horrid UI/UX. Might as well as both pilots to pat their heads and rub their tummies in synch. And since
the two pilots have to both understand what's going on, we've multiplied the chances for failure.
Boeing also clearly did not know its customers . It should be engineering for the sort of pilots who are going to be hired
by Lion Air, or any rapidly expanding airline in what we used to all the Third World. Hegemony, it seems, makes you insular and
provincial.
Added cost, "mandatory" safety feature. Does not seem to square with the [soon to be former?] CEO's apology-industry written
claim to be committed to absolute safety.
"The FAA, citing lack of funding and resource": I don't suppose I'll survive to see any arm of government not blame
lack of funds for its boneheaded or corrupt incompetence.
But the bigger picture: suppose the FAA is to do its job properly. From where is it going to recruit its staff?
Smaller picture: it doesn't really matter whether the cocked-up MCAS killed all those people or not. Even if it's innocent
of the charge, the account of its development and application is a horror story.
Bigger picture: what other horrors have been hidden by Boeing?
> the account of its development and application is a horror story.
That's how I feel. The tech doc department at Boeing sounds like a horrible place to work; MBAs or their goons telling
you all the time to do stuff you know is wrong. It's not surprising people were willing to talk to the Seattle Times; I bet there
are more people. (Hey, Seattle Times! How about people testing the 737 MAX in simulators (assuming this is done)).
Sounds like the MBAs in Chicago have been busy planting land mines everywhere. Somebody stepped on this one; there are others.
The unfortunate pilots were made test pilots; the unsuspecting passengers: Guinea pigs. Lab rats. And paid for the privilege.
Some others may share this opinion. Change one little thing? Chaos Theory Rules. Same with weather/climate; folks. That rant is
for later.
Boeing stuck with old fashion hydraulic controls in the 737 but faced with an unacceptable flight characteristics of the
larger more efficient engines added a fly-by-wire system to compensate for it.
Interestingly, and maybe relevant to the problem of confusion for the pilots, is that Boeing has had another automatic
trim-modifier operating on its 737s for some time, the speed-trim system (STS):
This system also modifies the stabilizer position during manual flight. Like MCAS, it was brought in to improve stability
under certain flight conditions (the reasons for which are far beyond my knowledge). There is an indication that the pilots on
the flight before the Lion Air crash misinterpreted MCAS actions for STS behavior.
At what point does "crapification" become insufficient to describe Boeing's product and process here? At what point do we have
to speak of " ford-pintofication"?
OK, I'm told to resubmit my crib re: "Boeing options" from the ZeroHedge "tweetstorm" by Trevot Sumner, and include a link
got it:
Economic problem. Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light, which lets
pilots know that this problem was happening. Both 737MAXes that crashed were delivered without this option. No 737MAX with
this option has ever crashed
Ooops! "Options package"? Wait, a "package" that in the interim corrects a potentially catastrophic mfg. defect and airlines
have to pay for it? Whoa, here's your late capitalism in play.
> Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light
This is one of the details I could not get to (and we don't 100% know this is an issue until the forensics are done. Right
now, we have narrative. Truly excellent narrative to be sure -- if only we thought of government the same way as pilots think
of their aircraft! -- but narrative nonetheless).
Let me see if I have this right. Pilots, chime in!
"Authority" is one of the big words in this discussion; MCAS takes authority away from the pilot (and can do in such a drastic
fashion as to crash the plane). Worse, the default case is that it can do so on the basis of a single sensor reading. In a design
appropriate to the consequences for failure (i.e., a different design from that described in the "System Safety Analysis" that
Boeing self-certified) MCAS would take readings from two sensors, and if they disagreed, authority would revert to the pilot
. That's a general principle at Boeing, and so it's reasonable for pilots to assume that they retain authority of MCAS has not
told them they don't have it any more.
Hence, the disagree light, which tells the pilots to take back authority because the sensors are confused. However, I think
there are UI/UX issues with that, given that the 737 cockpit is extremely noisy and pilots have a lot to do on take-off. So a
light might not be the answer. (The light also strikes me as a kludge; first, MCAS feels to me like a kludge, in that we're making
the aircraft flyable only through software.* Fine for fighter jets, which can be inherently unstable, but perhaps not so fine
for commercial aircraft? Then we have a second kludge, a light to tell us that the first kludge has kicked in. I dunno.)
NOTE * However, it's also true that automation affects flight characteristics all the time. So I'm not sure how savage to make
this indictment.
The AOA indication is Service Bulletin 737-31-1650 (there may be others) and is on the both Pilot Flight Displays (PFDs). Pilots
would likely abort a takeoff if they saw the indication come on before getting airborne.
"Boeing has been in the business of aviation safety for more than 100 years, "
How many years ago did Wall Street take over the fortunes of the company? Why did they move their headquarters from their
birthplace of Seattle to Chicago? Why did they start assembling planes in South Carolina and China? Was it to improve aviation
safety? Or, to allow the profiteering parasites to feed off the carcass of the company?
I want to fly on Boeing planes put together by well paid members of the Seattle Machinists Union, not low wage peons. Let's
not even mention the maintenance of American aircraft in China and El Salvador.
President Trump, here's a reelection tip: "Today I am declaring that all American registered aircraft flying in American
airspace must be maintained in the U.S."
> "Today I am declaring that all American registered aircraft flying in American airspace must be maintained in the U.S."
Amazingly, Trump seems to have done OK on this. First, he didn't cave to Muilenberg's (insane, goofy, tone-deaf) request
to keep the 737 flying; then he frames the issue as complexity (correct, IMNSHO), and then he manages to
nominate a Delta CEO as head of the FAA .
And your suggestion is very good one. I wonder if he could do that by executive order? And I wonder how many grey-beards would
come off the golf courses to help out? I bet a lot.
The aircraft is NOT CRAP!!! However. It should have been flown A WHOLE LOT MORE before receiving certification.
*Real* test pilots should have their a–es on the line ; operating for a lot more hours at *the edge of the envelope*, as it
is known. Stability should be by design; not software*patch*. Patch this!
What portion of its' MCAS system flight testing was in computer simulation? Like the so-called Doppler Radar; which *magically*
predicts what the future will bring; while the experts pitch it as fact? And make life-or-death decisions on the theoretical data???
Rush to market; markets rule. We can die.
Agreed, but I think we're seeing signs that a crapification process has begun on the safety side in this industry. (It
has been proceeding for years on the service/amenities side.)
Didn't say it was. The headline reads "Boeing Crapification," not "737 Crapification."
That said, the 737 clearly has issues, as Boeing itself knew, since if they'd had their druthers, they would have launched
a new plane to replace it. See point #2.
> What portion of its' MCAS system flight testing was in computer simulation?
That is a very good question. If I understand the aerodynamics issues aright, MCAS would be most likely to kick in at takeoff,
which raises a host of UI/UX issues because the pilots are very busy at that time. So was MCAS not tested in the simulators? If
so, how on earth was a scenario that included sensor failure not included? It may be that there are more issues with Boeing's
engineering process than the documentation issues raised by the Seattle Times, though those are bad enough.
I say the 737-whatever is a flying Turd, and always has been. It has a bad wing design which means it has to fly nose up compared
to other models( I always remember that when going to the restroom while going somewhere on one). And because of its poor design
it has to takeoff and land at higher speeds. So when flying into someplace like Mexico City it can be quite a harrowing experience,
and the smell of cooking brakes is relatively normal.
Boeing never should have let go of the 757. Now that was a good plane that was simply ahead of its time.
Considering the fact that all these 737s are grounded as no airline trust them to not kill a plane load of passengers and
crew, this is a really big deal. Putting aside the technical and regulatory issues, the fact is that the rest of the world no
longer trusts the US in modern aviation so what we have here is a trust issue which is an even bigger deal.
We now know that the FAA does not audit the work done for these aircraft but the airlines themselves do it. It cannot be just
Boeing but the other aircraft manufacturers as well. Other countries are going to be asking some very hard questions before forking
over their billions to a US aircraft manufacturer in future. Worse is when Ethiopia refused to hand over the black boxes to the
US but gave them instead to a third party.
That was saying that based on how you treated the whole crash, we do not trust you to do the job right and not to change some
of the results. It has been done before, ironically enough by France who the Ethiopians gave the black boxes to. And when you
lose trust, it takes a very long time to gain it back again – if ever. But will the changes be made to do so? I would guess no.
But if the discount foreign airlines had just trained their pilots and paid for the non-crashintothegroundat500mph upgrade,
all of this could have been avoided.
> we have here is a trust issue which is an even bigger deal
Loss or at least wobbliness of imperial hegemony, like. It's not just the aircraft, it's US standards-setting bodies, methods,
"safety culture," even -- dare we say it -- English as the language of aviation. French is no longer the language of diplomacy,
after all, though it had a good run.
Because markets. Neoliberalism puts everything up for sale. Including regulation. Oversimplifying absurdly: And so you
end up with the profit-driven manufacturer buying the regulator, its produce killing people, and the manufacturer canceling its
future profits. That's what the Bearded One would call a contradiction.*
NOTE * There ought to be a way to reframe contradiction in terms of Net Present Value which would not be what we think it is,
under that model.
I wish it were as complete as it should be! There are a ton of horrid details about sensors, the UI/UX for the MCAS system,
737 cockpit design, decisions by the marketing department, and training and maintenance for Asian airlines that I just couldn't
get to. (Although most of those presume that the forensics have already been done.) But I felt that dollying back for the big
picture was important to. Point #1 is important, in that all the factors that drove the 737 decision making are not only still
in place, they're intensifying, so we had better adjust our systems (assuming Boeing remains a going concern -- defenestrating
Muilenberg would be an excellent way to show we accept the seriousness of customer and international concern).
Bloomberg is reporting that : "The Indonesia safety committee report said the plane had had multiple failures on previous flights
and hadn't been properly repaired."
And the day before when the same plane had the problem that killed everyone the next day: "The so-called dead-head pilot on
the earlier flight from Bali to Jakarta told the crew to cut power to the motor driving the nose down, according to the people
familiar, part of a checklist that all pilots are required to memorize."
There's an enormous expansion of air travel in Asia. The lower end -- not flag -- carriers like Lion Air and also Air Asia
are in that business to be cheap ; they're driven by expansion and known to be run by cowboys.
That said, know your customer . I would translate this into an opportunity for Boeing to sell these airlines a service
package for training their ground operations. But it seems that cutting costs is the only thing the MBAs in Chicago understand.
Pilots, pipe up!
Pilot training and requirements are in the hands of the country, not Boeing. If the story that the copilot of the Ethiopian
Airlines plane had only 200 hours of experience that is astounding.
In the US that requirement is 1500 hours. In addition most US airlines would require more than that. And then they slot 'beginning'
pilots for flights in good (better) weather as high minimums pilot.
"sell these airlines a service package" That won't help an airline that is in the business to be cheap. The Indonesia airplane
was repeatedly reported for problems in prior days/flights that was never fixed.
and this quote makes an interesting follow-on to the thread yesterday with 737 Pilot (which Lambert linked to in the first
paragraph here):
"The combination of factors required to bring down a plane in these circumstances suggests other issues may also have occurred
in the Ethiopia crash, said Jeffrey Guzzetti, who also directed accident investigations at FAA and is now a consultant.
"It's simply implausible that this MCAS deficiency by itself can down a modern jetliner with a trained crew," Guzzetti said."
Setting aside Mr Guzzetti's background (dismissing his claim here as tendentious right off the bat would strike me as uncharitable),
and without wishing to exculpate anyone, it does lend some credence to the idea that Ethiopia Airlines may have some contributory
negligence here, staffing the flight with such an inexperienced first officer.
Setting aside Mr Guzzetti's background (dismissing his claim here as tendentious right off the bat would strike me as uncharitable),
and without wishing to exculpate anyone, it does lend some credence to the idea that Ethiopia Airlines may have some contributory
negligence here, staffing the flight with such an inexperienced first officer.
One can often point to inexperience, incompetence, stupidity, incompetence or just bad luck when some disaster happens, but
Boeing counted on perfect performance from flight crews to successfully work with a workaround needed for other workarounds that
needed perfect performance to not catastrophically fail. I know enough about complexity that you cannot depend on perfection because
something will always fail.
Your excellent summary lacks some MCAS details that are not widely reported by the general-audience press.
Like you, I am a retired software engineer, so I have followed an aviation blog discussion of this issue quite closely
since it emerged as a probable software and system design failure. As the blog is open to all, its signal-to-noise ratio is pretty
low, but it seems not too difficult for any technically-minded person to separate the wheat from the chaff. My current understanding,
which I believe others here are in a position to correct, if necessary:
A. The requirement for MCAS apparently emerged very late in the MAX's development, when it became clear that the upper cowling
around the larger engines, being moved up and forward with respect to earlier 737 versions, adds nose-up force as the angle of
attack (AoA) approaches the upper limits of the MAX's operating envelope because at such angles, the cowling itself generates
lift beyond that of the wing.
B. As perceived by a pilot flying manually (not on autopilot), this added nose-up force makes it easier to pull back on the
control column ("stick"), increasing the AoA further. This is like a car running off the asphalt onto a muddy shoulder: the steering
wheel wants to turn the wrong way (toward the ditch) rather than the right way (back on the road).
C. An FAA regulation prohibits certification of an aircraft that presents the pilot with changing stick forces near stall that
nudge the pilot toward the wrong reaction, 14 CFR 25.203(a)
, IIRC (unfortunately, I can't find the original blog citation).
D. MCAS was put in place to satisfy this certification requirement -- not to automagically correct stalls without pilot action.
E. Other means of meeting this requirement exist, ranging from an airframe redesign that avoids the extra nose-up effect of
the larger repositioned engines down to a "stick pusher" that increases the force a pilot would need to pull the stick back further
in this situation.
F. Any of the other options would negate one or both of the MAX's chief selling points: little cost or schedule impact to Boeing
(in a rush to meet the Airbus 320 NEO challenge) and to its customers ("No new flight crew training necessary, because to the
pilot, the MAX feels just like its 737 predecessors.") That is, all the other options introduce new hardware to a completed design
and the more fundamental changes could require new type certification.
G. The easiest fix was pure software: at high indicated AoA, under manual control, and with flaps up, automatically rotate
the horizontal stabilizer a little bit nose-down, which increases the pressure needed to pull the stick back (nose-up). No need
to tell the pilot about this in training or real time, since it's just to make MAX feel like any other 737.
H. The design presented for certification described a single small rotation. Testing showed this was insufficient to provide
the tactile feedback necessary for certification in all cases, so the software fix was obvious: if the trigger conditions still
hold after a 5 sec. pause, do it again.
I. Apparently nobody asked at that point, "What if the AoA indication is stuck high?" We're under schedule and cost pressure,
so who wants to complexify things by (1) adding additional sanity-checking to the aircraft's AoA computations or (2) limiting
how many times we add a little bit of nose-down.
J. When these details combine with a consistently erroneous AoA reading, MCAS can -- if not repeatedly countermanded or disabled
and manually reversed -- eventually rotate the horizontal stabilizer to its maximum nose-down position, where it was found in
both recent incidents, IIRC.
Even if the pilots figure out that's what's happening amid a cacophony of seemingly contradictory instrument readings and warnings
(stick-shaker, trim wheel clacking, alarm chimes, and synthesized voices), the pilots still have to (1) cut power to the electrical
trim systems and (2) restore the required trim, which may then require as many as 50 manual turns of a trim wheel. If you're near
the ground, time is short
A minority of commenting pilots assert that any competently trained cockpit crew should be able to identify MCAS misbehavior
quickly and power off automatic trim per the same checklist that was prescribed for "runaway automatic trim" on every 737 variant,
MAX included. Most seem to agree that with aircraft control difficulties, multiple alarms, and disagreement among the pilot's
and first officer's airspeed and AoA readings almost from the moment of takeoff (not yet officially confirmed), an MCAS-commanded
runaway trim event may feel very different from the runaway trim flavors for which pilots have had simulator training, making
problem identification difficult even given knowledge of the earlier Lion Air incident.
I imagine most software developers and engineers have seen cost/schedule pressures lead to short cuts. If their life was at
stake, I doubt that many would think self-certification that such a project complies with all relevant safety requirements is
a good idea.
Thank you for that. And just 'wow'. I don't really know anything about aircraft/flying but this story is really fascinating
and seems to be true a sign of the times. I guess we'll know what the current 'temperature' is out there when the fallout
(civil liability, criminal liability, plane orders cancelled/ returned, etc) manifests. If Boeing skates, we'll know we've got
a long way to go.
The Post's article on the FAA and Regulatory Capture is incomplete. The process for the FAA (and probably MANY government
agencies) started under Reagan, did not revert to safety under Clinton (make government smaller and all that), and then accelerated
under Bush II in 2005 (not a bi-partisan time). In particular, big changes to the FAA were made in 2005 that were executive in
nature and did not require Congressional approval. CF:
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/delegating-aircraft-safety-assessments-to-boeing-is-nothing-new-for-the-faa/
Yes, but. Part of what we are seeing in this case is a rush to judgement based on less than full evidence and analysis, and
so prejudices and ideological positions (which I share actually) are plainly to be seen (and perhaps worth analyzing). "Crapification,"
says the headline.
Yet, I cannot say that I disagree with BA's business decisions as such in a highly competitive environment as regards the tradeoffs
in the development of the MAX and there is a certain absurdity in the idea that Boeing would knowingly take a high reputational
risk, in an industry where failure is front page news (contrast banking or pharma failures).
I have no reason to believe that an FAA fully in charge of all aspects of certification would have prevented these crashes,
as banking and drug regulators have not kept us safe either. What seems worthy of note is that neither the airlines that buy the
product nor the foreign aviation regulators nor pilots' associations do their own testing and certification, in an area where
more redundancy would be good. Nor is there any kind of private third party watchdog testing, like a Moody's or S&P, evaluating
potentially toxic products and services for a price.
Finally, I suppose we have to ask ourselves why the price of the stock is holding up fairly well even as the news flow on these
tragedies is helping the short sellers. Lest we forget that Boeing is the 5th largest defense contractor in the US.
Is engine throttle automated in the flight regime where these accidents occurred? Or are the pilots controlling power? Is the
lag in thrust response interacting with the MCAS in an unanticipated way? Aerodynamic lift of nacelles is mentioned several times;
there is another lift factor relating to the thrust angle; which is not necessarily aligned with the fuselage axis in flight.
Departure procedures often require speed limits and altitude changes; so it is likely multiple power demand levels get set through
takeoff and climb until cruise altitude is reached. Does Autopilot/Flight Director integrate with MCAS; or are they independent
systems? Even without touching flight controls; power changes affect pitch forces. I am wondering if consequences of manual power
changes on an otherwise automated departure were adequately investigated in the certification of the MCAS. Please excuse my ignorance
of these details.
Regulatory elements that have been getting attention include the use of *standard* weights for passengers; IIRC, 170 lbs for
US (and possibly ICAO) passengers comes to mind . Many aircraft accidents have an element of disregard for proper weight distribution,
either accidental, or negligent. For instance: Tail-heavy bad! Intentional loading outside of subsequently approved C.G. and/or
max weight limits is a common, if not ubiquitous part of determining certification limits.There is a safety factor in the certificated
limits; but banking on this; using estimates; is proven risky or disastrous when actual weights, and distribution thereof, is
uncertain. Cargo with false weight values could also occur. One might find incentive to claim lower weights than actual to save
on freight charges. How many 170 lb passengers do you know? I am not familiar with scales being used to check aircraft weight
and balance before takeoff; only calculations; based on formulas and charts.
Scales ARE USED during certain maintenance procedures; for airworthiness certificates; and following certain modifications.
Here is an interesting article by a professional pilot blogger Patrick Smith. He calls the 737, "the Frankenplane", and traces
its history all the way back to the 707 in 1959. According to Smith, "We wonder if the 737 MAX even needed to exist in the first
place. Somewhere deep down, maybe the heart of this whole fiasco is Boeing's determination to keep the 737 line going, variant
after variant, seemingly forever. I'm not saying this is the reason for what happened in Indonesia or Ethiopia, but the whole
737 program just seems misguided and unnecessary. Instead of starting from scratch with a new airframe, they took what was essentially
conceived as a regional jet in the mid-1960s, and have pushed and pushed and pushed the thing -- bigger and bigger engines, fancier
avionics and more seats -- into roles it was never intended for. The "Frankenplane," I call it.
See the article here .
As a pilot myslef, I feel the airlines have a lot to answer for as well. Their constant "dumbing down" of pilots, which comes
from making pilots work long hours for low pay, results in pilots not being the best of the best. And training is a cost to airlines.
Training doesn't result in revenue. Better to have the pilots actually flying, hence Boeing selling this new version of the 737
as not requiring further training. But, training and practice is everything in flying. Flying a plane is actually a relatively
easy skill to acquire. Most people can learn to fly a trainer in 5 hours or so. Most people solo (fly the plane without an instructor)
with only 10-20 hours of instruction. It takes a lot longer to learn how to drive a car for most people (45 hours is the average).
So it really isn't that difficult .until something goes WRONG. That is when the training kicks in. An often quoted flying truism,
is that flying is "99% boredom and 1% stark terror". What happened with these two crashes is that you had some inexperienced pilots
who were not fully trained on the systems (a lot of that blame goes to Boeing). When things start going wrong, information overload
can easily occur if you have not been properly trained, even with two pilots.
Thanks for that correction. We can expect a deluge of blame-the-other-guy PR from the aircraft manufacturer and certification
agencies. Billions are on the line for Boeing if a cascade of judgments it made materially contributed to these crashes. The usual
strategic corporate bankruptcy might follow. I presume Boeing is considered much TBTF by the USG.
Great job summarizing and connecting dots Lambert. I might add one more bullet point though. Items #5 and #6 were aided, abetted
and perhaps somewhat necessitated by 'ye ole NeoLiberal playbook' you spoke of, but more specifically, the current regulatory
FAA/Boeing milieu is attributable to years of budget cuts and strategically applied austerity. The old Grover Norquist, ' not
destroyed, but small and weak enough to be drowned in a shallow bath' saw. Exact same thing we've witnessed with other formally
effective regulators like the EPA, the SEC or the IRS.
I remember having a conversation with an FAA maintenance inspector, an old timer, about ten years ago. He looked to be upwards
of seventy, and he told me he was eight years beyond eligibility for a full retirement. He informed me that a few years back he
was supervising a team of ten people that was now down to two. Their positions had been cut outright or eliminated after they
resigned or transferred when the remaining positions were made miserable by the increased workload and bureaucratic headaches.
The inspector said he had not retired yet because he knew he would not be replaced and he felt the work was important. I asked
him if his department was atypical and he said it was not. Same thing, across the board, with the exception of the executive level
desk jobs in DC and Oklahoma City. Readers can draw their own conclusions but when it comes to funding Federal regulators, I believe
you should never attribute anything to incompetence that you could attribute to malice.
No doubt Neo-Liberal ideologues in high places pushing the corrosive "customer/client" model of regulating along with the requisite
deference and obsequious to industry played a large role as well.
I understand the published materials to boil down to this possible scenario:
To remain competitive and profitable, Boeing needed to improve the fuel efficiency and flight characteristics of a mainstay
medium-haul aircraft. Instead of designing a new aircraft, it modified an existing airframe. Among other changes, it added more
powerful engines, new lift and control surfaces, and enhanced computerized controls.
The modified Max aircraft **did not** fly like the earlier version. That meant Boeing would have to disclose information about
those changes. It would need to train pilots in them, in how to integrate new protocols into existing ones, and in what to do
if the enhanced computer controls malfunctioned, requiring the pilot to regain manual control.
These steps could have increased cost and time to market, might have involved new certifications, and might have reduced sales.
Boeing appears to have relied on enhanced computer flight controls to avoid them.
The newly enhanced computerized controls meant that the computer would do more of the actual flying – the part that was different
from the pre-Max version – and the pilot less. It gave the pilot the virtual – but not real – experience of flying the older aircraft,
obviating the need, in Boeing's judgment, for additional disclosures and training. That worked except when it didn't. (See, driverless
car development.)
One possible failure mode derives from the Max's reliance on a single sensor to detect its angle of attack, the aircraft's
nose-up or nose-down deviation from level flight. Reliance on a single sensor would make it harder to detect and correct a fault.
(Boeing's version of commitment to "absolute" safety.)
In these two crashes, the sensor may have given a faulty reading, indicating that the aircraft's nose was higher than it should
have been for that stage of flight, an attitude that risked a stall. The programmed response was to drop the nose and increase
power. A normal reaction to a real stall, this response can become catastrophic when unexpected or when the pilot cannot correct
it.
In both crashes, it appears that the pilot did attempt to correct the computer's error. Doing so, however, reset the automated
control, leading the computer to reread the faulty sensor to mean "stall." It again dropped the nose and increased speed. The
pilot recorrected the error in what would become a deadly loop, a tug of war that ended in a powered dive into the ground.
What is interesting is what comes next. The FAA was drowned in the bath tub along with the EPA, FDA, SEC, etc. It doesn't have
the money or staff to recertify the 737 Max. An incompetent Administration that is interested only in extracting resources is
in charge. It is clear that Boeing hid the changes to save money and time. Adding a warning indicator that the flight sensors
are not in the correct position to the pilot's display, including it in the preflight checklist, plus flight training would have
prevented the Indonesian crash. But these changes would have raised questions on the adequacy of the new flight critical system
and may have delayed certification overseas. It is easy to overlook problems if your paycheck is at risk. The Boeing managers
who pushed this through deserve jail time for manslaughter.
Canada said it will recertify the 737 Max before it flies in their airspace. China won't recertify the Max until the Trump
Trade War is over. Also, a delay boosts their replacement airliner. If Chicago and DC paper this over like the 2008 Great Recession;
the final nails will have been hammered into the coffin of the hegemon. Trust is gone
The Pentagon's inspector general has formally opened an investigation into a watchdog
group's allegations that acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan has used his office to
promote his former employer, Boeing Co.
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington filed an ethics complaint with the
Pentagon's inspector general a week ago, alleging that Shanahan has appeared to make statements
promoting Boeing and disparaging competitors, such as Lockheed Martin.
Shanahan, who was traveling with President Donald Trump to Ohio on Wednesday, spent more
than 30 years at Boeing, leading programs for commercial planes and missile defense systems. He
has been serving as acting Pentagon chief since the beginning of the year, after James Mattis
stepped down.
The probe comes as Boeing struggles to deal with a public firestorm over two deadly crashes
of the Boeing 737 Max 8 jetliner within the last five months. And it focuses attention on
whether Trump will nominate Shanahan as his formal pick for defense chief, rather than letting
him languish as an acting leader of a major federal agency.
Dwrena Allen, spokeswoman for the inspector general, said Shanahan has been informed of the
investigation. And, in a statement, Pentagon spokesman Tom Crosson said Shanahan welcomes the
review.
"Acting Secretary Shanahan has at all times remained committed to upholding his ethics
agreement filed with the DoD," said Crosson. "This agreement ensures any matters pertaining to
Boeing are handled by appropriate officials within the Pentagon to eliminate any perceived or
actual conflict of interest issue(s) with Boeing."
During a Senate hearing last week, Shanahan was asked by U.S. Sen. Richard Blumenthal,
D-Conn., about the 737 Max issue. Shanahan said he had not spoken to anyone in the
administration about it and had not been briefed on it. Asked whether he favored an
investigation into the matter, Shanahan said it was for regulators to investigate.
On Wednesday, Blumenthal said that scrutiny of Shanahan's Boeing ties is necessary. "In
fact, it's overdue. Boeing is a behemoth 800-pound gorilla -- raising possible questions of
undue influence at DOD, FAA and elsewhere," said Blumenthal.
Shanahan signed an ethics agreement in June 2017, when he was being nominated for the job of
deputy defense secretary, a job he held during Mattis' tenure. It outlined the steps he would
take to avoid "any actual or apparent conflict of interest," and said he would not participate
in any matter involving Boeing.
The CREW ethics complaint, based to a large part on published reports, including one by
Politico in January, said Shanahan has made comments praising Boeing in meetings about
government contracts, raising concerns about "whether Shanahan, intentionally or not, is
putting his finger on the scale when it comes to Pentagon priorities."
One example raised by the complaint is the Pentagon's decision to request funding for
Boeing 15EX fighter jets in the 2020 proposed budget. The Pentagon is requesting about $1
billion to buy eight of the aircraft.
Shanahan, 56, joined Boeing in 1986, rose through its ranks and is credited with rescuing
a troubled Dreamliner 787 program. He also led the company's missile defense and military
helicopter programs.
Trump has seemed attracted to Shanahan partially for his work on one of the president's
pet projects -- creating a Space Force. He also has publicly lauded Shanahan's former employer,
Boeing, builder of many of the military's most prominent aircraft, including the Apache and
Chinook helicopters, the C-17 cargo plane and the B-52 bomber, as well as the iconic
presidential aircraft, Air Force One.
This is only the third time in history that the Pentagon has been led by an acting chief,
and Shanahan has served in that capacity for longer than any of the others.
Presidents typically take pains to ensure the Pentagon is being run by a Senate-confirmed
official, given the grave responsibilities that include sending young Americans into battle,
ensuring the military is ready for extreme emergencies like nuclear war and managing overseas
alliances that are central to U.S. security.
3 hours ago Why did Trump
appoint a former Boeing executive and industry lobbyist to the the Secretary of Defense to
replace General Mattis? What in Shananhan's background makes him qualified to lead our nation's
military forces? 3 hours ago WITHOUT A DOUBT HE DID., ALSO INVESTIGATE NIKKI HALEY'S APPOINTED
ON BOEING'S BOARD TO REPLACE SHANAHAN. FOLLOW THE HOEING KICKBACKS(MONEY), TO DONALD TRUMP'S
FAMILY. 3 hours ago
Shanahan probably helped Boeing on the promise of a later payback just like Ms. Nikki Haley did
while Gov of SC where Boeing built a new plant on her watch. She helped big time to keep the
Unions out of the new Boeing plant and now Boeing is going to put her on their board of
directors. Nothing like a bit of an obvious payoff. 2 hours ago Reminds me of the Bush Jr days in
the White House. During the Gulf War (#2) Vice President #$%$ Cheney awarded oil company
Halliburton (Cheney was CEO before accepting the VP job) to deliver meals for the troops. The
contract was ?No Bid.? Why was an oil company delivering food to troops with a no bid contract?
After Cheney?s Job was over being VP he went back to being CEO at Halliburton and moved
Halliburton?s headquarters to Dubai. What an American! 2 hours ago Now we understand why Boeing
& the FAA hesitated to ground those planes for few days despite many countries who did
grounded those plane which is a precedent for a country to ground & NOT wait for the
manufacturer. ONLY after Canada grounded those planes Boeing & the FAA & that's because
Canada IS a the #1 flight partner of the US ! 4 hours ago Years ago there was a Boeing
procurement scandal and Trump does love the swamp he claims to hate.
He has long been a vocal critic of the Federal Aviation Administration, saying the agency
lacks the resources and willpower to aggressively police airlines and manufacturers.
Mr. Nader said Boeing may be exposed to civil and possibly criminal liability. After the
first fatal crash in October -- a Lion Air flight that crashed into the Java Sea minutes after
takeoff -- company officials "were put on notice about the problem" with an automated
stall-prevention system that can misfire and override pilot commands by repeatedly pushing down
an aircraft's nose, he said.
The Justice and Transportation Departments are
scrutinizing Boeing's dealings with the FAA over safety certifications, people familiar
with the matter have said.
... ... ...
Mr. Nader has expressed his concerns to lawmakers and former regulators, and called for
congressional hearings. Before
the U.S. grounded the planes last week, he championed the idea of a sweeping boycott of all
versions of 737 MAX aircraft. He also has stressed the importance of having Mr. Muilenburg,
Boeing's CEO, testify on Capitol Hill about safety issues with the fleet.
Criticizing Boeing's original design of the automated flight-control feature, dubbed MCAS,
Mr. Nader said it reflected a misguided view driven by engineering overconfidence and called it
"the arrogance of the algorithms."
The people who died in last Sunday's plane crash were not just killed by Boeing. Their deaths stemmed from an ideology that puts
business interests above human life.
... ... ...
Boeing is not just a lobbying juggernaut that donates prodigiously to politicians all over the country; it's also a company in
which numerous
members
of Congress
are personally invested, and it cultivates
mutually
beneficial
financial relationships with
top
officials
. Meanwhile, as William McGee of Consumer Reports
told
Amy Goodman
, these issues are rooted in the FAA's lax, business-friendly oversight of the very industry it's meant to
regulate, a case of
regulatory
capture
that stretches back long before this administration.
Whatever the black box from the Ethiopian Airlines flight reveals, the lives put at risk by
lax
regulations
are not apolitical tragedies; they are caused by an administration that time and again has shown itself to be
callous and indifferent to the lives of the people it claims to fight for, whether Puerto Ricans left to
fend
for themselves
in the wake of natural disaster, or federal workers used as
bargaining
chips
in a game of political brinkmanship.
But more than that, they are victims of an ideology that tells us the greatest insult to human life is not the death and misery
that comes from unchecked greed, but efforts to democratically control it through public institutions. The real problems aren't
unsafe products, pollution, dangerous chemicals, and the like, we're told, but "red tape" and the taxes used to fund the bodies
regulating them. Meanwhile, activists like Nader have long been
painted
as
"
wacky
"
extremists in the pursuit of some quixotic ideological crusade simply for trying to do things like prevent people from
dying
in cars without seat belts
.
When social-democratic policies are enacted, wealthy people take less home after taxes, and businesses are inconvenienced by
regulations meant to secure the common good. But when neoliberal policies are put in place, people and their families go hungry,
they lose their homes, they get injured on the job, they get sick, and, sometimes, they die. The public should be enraged by the
actions of governments like Trump's and Trudeau's; but we should also be angry at a political narrative that tells us trying to
stop such tragedies is "ideological" instead of common sense. We owe it to the crash victims to create no more of them.
hen United Airlines flight 1462 made an unexpected landing in Chicago last month, it was not due to mechanical issues, weather
conditions, or flight logistics, but a battle over legroom in the aisles. As one passenger
tried
to
recline her seat and another used a $20 device called a
Knee
Defender
to prevent the occupant ahead of him from leaning back, the battle over personal space descended into a scuffle. The
pilot opted to make an additional stop to remove the unruly passengers.
Flight 1462 hasn't been alone. Not just the random dispute of irate travelers, similar flights have been diverted because of the
airlines' frenzied drive to wring as much money out of customers as possible. Airlines are increasingly cramming more passengers
onto each flight, termed "densification," and regularly overbooking flights. Any aspect of a flight that was once provided free
of charge -- from a checked bag to a complementary drink to using a credit card to pay for a ticket -- can now be charged à la
carte.
So relentless has this nickel and diming been that when
news
reports
claimed the discount airline Ryan Air was about to start charging for in-flight bathroom use, many people took them
seriously. But the story wasn't true -- it was all a ploy for free press from a company unwilling to pay for advertising,
help
disabled
passengers, or
provide
ice
for drinks.
Such frugality is only one of the problems wrought by airline deregulation. If the greatest benefit of deregulation has been that
more people can afford to fly, it has come at the cost of increased tumult within the industry and
reduced
pay
for workers.
Before the airlines were deregulated under President Jimmy Carter, the Civil Aeronautics Bureau (CAB) maintained flight pricing
structures, airport gate access, and flight paths. There were rules that stipulated which airlines could compete in which market
and what prices they could charge. Loosening restrictions meant abandoning the CAB and its pricing structures, and allowing an
unmediated flow of competition.
With fewer restrictions, upstart fly-by-night airlines could compete against major airlines like American/US Airways, United,
Delta, Alaskan, and Hawaiian Airways. Such competition, conservative and
liberal
advocates
claimed, would bring down flight costs, providing more savings and convenience to the customer.
But allowing this level of competition also unleashed chaos. While the discount airlines would win over passengers for a time by
offering flights half as expensive, the major airlines would respond by slashing their prices in an attempt to drive the upstarts
out of business.
By drastically reducing ticket costs, the major airlines would take on an unsustainable amount of debt that, combined with the
loss of business to the new entrants, would lead to layoffs or bankruptcy. Pension funds were then raided and labor contracts
voided to pay for the price wars. With each airline company collapse, thousands of employees were laid off, decimating union
membership.
To compete, the legacy airlines also
drove down
the
salaries of their pilots, and cut benefits and vacation time. Besides a reduction in compensation, a two-tiered pay system has
been set up with decent pay for incumbent pilots and markedly low wages for new entrants.
Starting
salaries
for pilots are now as low as $15,000 a year, even as CEO pay rises inexorably.
Remarking
on
a career in which he had seen his pay cut in half and his pension eliminated, captain Sully Sullenberger told the BBC in 2009
that he did not know "a single professional pilot who wants his or her children to follow in their footsteps."
While unions were still strong in the industry, they were constantly embroiled in bitter labor disputes. Between the voided
contracts and the hemorrhaging membership caused by regular bankruptcy, they were left fighting to maintain wage standards in an
unnecessarily competitive industry.
The only way discount airlines could offer such low prices was by paying their workers less, using less experienced pilots and
sometimes non-unionized labor, offering fewer frills, and running spartan operations that only serviced a handful of routes with
a single type of jet liner (thus simplifying pilot and mechanic training). Instead of a single union representing
employees across the industry -- typified by the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), which represented a majority of pilots --
some discount airlines maintained relationships with offshoot unions with smaller membership rolls and less leverage.
The discount airlines also depended on secondary, class-B airports that charged less in landing fees. But those discounts
eventually disappeared when the secondary airports no longer needed to cut their fees to attract business.
To maintain their dominance over the market, the major airlines shifted from a direct city-to-city flight standard to the
hub-and-spoke system of today. The hub-and-spoke setup allowed large centralized airports like Dallas-Ft. Worth and Atlanta to be
ruled by a single company that determines which flights can use which terminals and at what cost.
While the hub-and-spoke system has some benefits, it's largely inefficient, dependent as it is on multi-stage connecting flights.
Combined with the need to cut costs, it would also cause longer airport delays as planes were left waiting on the tarmac to make
sure all passengers from connecting flights made it aboard. A single delay in a connecting flight could throw passengers'
itineraries askew, leaving them stuck in a random airport overnight.
The major airlines used other tricks to keep out nascent airlines. They paid off travel agents and travel reservation sites to
give preference to their particular airline. They introduced frequent flier miles to maintain brand allegiance.
Upstart discount airlines like
Southwest
were
able to survive the vicious price wars by leaning on quality of service and direct flights, but most did not. The list of
companies that were liquidated, temporarily or permanently, as a result is impressively long considering what it takes to start
an airline: America West, PanAm, TransWorld, Western, Piedmont, Frontier, Northwest, National, Texas International, People
Express, ValuJet, Air Florida, Eastern, Braniff, Skytrain, Pacific Southwest, Western Pacific, and many more.
Once bankrupt, the major airlines then bought the upstarts, creating an effective oligopoly. So much for competition.
Already on a spending spree during the heady years of the 1990s dot-com boom, buying up failed companies only saddled major
airlines with more debt. While most people assume that the airlines had to be bailed out in 2001 because of the decrease in
traffic after the September 11 attacks, it was also because the airlines
were
insolvent
from previous financial problems, largely as a result of the price wars.
The actions of the major airlines may seem ruthless, but they were largely protecting their position in a deregulated industry
that allowed the discount airlines to undercut labor standards just to offer cheaper prices to customers. They were defending
themselves from disruption.
Considering the skill, education, and investment needed to maintain a safe and reliable airline, it is not exactly a business
that needs to be disrupted. Running an airline is labor intensive, and it only turns a profit at random intervals. There's little
money to be skimmed off.
With profit margins so thin, tickets on a half-empty flight have to cost twice as much as a fully booked one. Which is why, for a
time, smaller cities that weren't necessarily travel hubs bore the brunt of deregulation. Routes that weren't fully booked
experienced skyrocketing flight costs, which, for small-town travelers, was a huge disincentive to fly.
The bilking of transportation costs to and from smaller cities after a run of chaotic competition is eerily similar to what
happened during the railway mania of the 1800s. Investors rushed to build rail lines everywhere and anywhere while money was
flush. But once cash became tight, the rail industry used their monopoly power to charge exorbitant prices for anybody trying to
ship in and out of smaller towns like Cincinnati. Such predatory pricing is what led to transportation regulation in the first
place.
Since the 2001 airline bailout, things have calmed down a bit. It no longer costs $600 to fly from New York to Pittsburgh. Fewer
discount airlines are entering the market, and the handful that are still in operation work with the major airlines on various
routes (e.g. "flight provided by Frontier"). The price wars have settled to a quiet struggle played out on online travel
registration websites like Kayak.com and Hipmunk.com, which have wholly replaced the job of travel agents.
But for airlines, the lower revenue from cheaper tickets has to be made up somewhere, and convenience may be the easiest element
to remove. Airlines are pushing petty indignities on passengers and flight attendants by way of a million miscellaneous charges.
Half the time, the discounts saved by cheaper tickets from deregulation are recouped in add-on fees. Eventually airlines may just
offer extra-saver flights devoid of the most basic accommodations and simply force passengers who can't afford first-class seats
to be stacked in the cargo hold like cord wood.
So what's the alternative? The airline industry is close to being a natural monopoly, there's little reason to foster
competition. Indeed, the industry would benefit from nationalization or a well-regulated public option. At the very least, more
regulation is necessary.
Without subsidization and some rules about flight costs, there is little incentive for the airline industry to provide affordable
flights to locations that aren't fully booked. The irony is that we already subsidize airline travel. It just occurs through
bailouts and bankruptcies after each airline has fought tooth and nail for market dominance. Public funds wind up paying for a
wasteful, inefficient system characterized by irrational, destructive competition.
Through regulation or more aggressive means, it's quite possible to ensure good wages and working conditions and safe,
affordable, reliable service -- all without blackout dates, three layovers, or all-out battles for legroom.
RALPH NADER : Boeing is used to getting its way with the patsy FAA . And this time, however,
it's in really hot water. If it continues to dig its heels in, it's going to expose itself and
its executives to potential criminal prosecution, because they are now on notice, with two
crashes -- Indonesia and Ethiopia. There's probably a lot more to come out in terms of the
technical dissent, in the, what was called, "heated discussions" about the plane software
between the FAA , the pilots' union, Boeing. And you can't suppress technical dissent forever.
And Senators Markey and Blumenthal are calling for the release of all the relevant information.
And while that happens, the planes must be grounded. You see, they're on notice now. This is
the future of passenger business for Boeing. They've got orders for over 3,000 planes from all
over the world. They've produced and delivered about 350. Southwest is the leading owner and
operator of these planes. It's digging its heels in, and so is American Airlines, I believe,
and Air Canada. And Boeing is not going to get away with this, because this is not some old
DC-9 about to be phased out. This is their future strategic plan. And they better own up. 2013,
they grounded the 787 because of battery fires, and they had about 50 or 60 of those planes.
So, there's plenty of precedent.
And the most important thing that people can do is: Do not fly this plane, the 737 MAX 8 and
9. Ask the airline, when you book the flight, whether it's that plane. The airline should not
dare charge you for reservation changes. And I'm calling for a boycott of that plane. If
several hundred thousand air passengers boycott that plane and there are more and more empty
seats, that will do more to bring Boeing around than the patsy FAA and a rather serene
Congress, which, by the way, gets all kinds of freebies from the airlines that ordinary people
don't get. We've sent a survey last year, twice, to every member of Congress, asking them to
disclose all these freebies. We didn't get one answer. And that helps account for, over the
years, the total reluctance of members of Congress even to do such things as deal with seat
size, restroom space and other conveniences, never mind just the safety of the aircraft. So,
this is important for consumers. Just don't fly 737 MAX 8 or 9. Make sure that you're informed
about it. And for up-to-date information, you can go to FlyersRights.org . That's run by Paul Hudson, who lost his
daughter in the Pan Am 103, 30 years ago, and has been a stalwart member of the FAA Advisory
Committee. And that's where you get up-to-date information, FlyersRights.org .
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Well, we're also joined by William McGee, who's the aviation adviser
for Consumer Reports . Could you give us your perspective on what's happened here? And
also, could you expand on what Ralph Nader was talking about, about the use of artificial
intelligence in these new planes?
WILLIAM McGEE: Sure, absolutely, Juan. You know, there are so many unanswered questions
here, but many of them are focused on the time period between the first crash in late October
with Lion Air and the crash on Sunday with Ethiopian. Again, for perspective here, as Ralph
noted, we're not talking about old aircraft. This is an airplane that's only been in service
since 2017. This is the Boeing 737 MAX 8, a recent derivative of the 737. Now, in that time
period, the aircraft that crashed in October was 2 months old; the one that crashed on Sunday
was 4 months old. This is really unprecedented in all the years that I've been in this
industry. We don't see brand-new airplanes crash on takeoff like this under similar
circumstances.
... ... ...
WILLIAM McGEE: Absolutely. And, you know, this goes back many years. Ralph mentioned that
the FAA is known throughout the industry, even among some of its own employees and to airline
employees, as the "tombstone agency." And that phrase comes from the fact that the FAA has
shown time and time again that it is reluctant to act unless there's a tragedy and,
unfortunately, unless there are fatalities. Now, we have seen this as recently as last year,
when, you may recall, over Philadelphia, a Southwest 737 had a major engine malfunction that
punctured a hole in the fuselage and killed a woman who was nearly sucked out of the aircraft.
Well, what wasn't as well reported was that two years prior, that same engine type and that
same airline, Southwest, same aircraft type, 737, also had an uncontained engine failure. But
in 2016, there were no injuries, and there were no fatalities. Instead of the FAA stepping in
and saying, "We need to, you know, have all of these engine blades inspected on this engine
type, on all the carriers that are operating it," the FAA asked the industry, "What would you
like to do? How long would you like to take to look at this?" And the industry dragged its
heels, not surprisingly, and said, "We need more time." Two years later, in 2018, there was a
fatality. And then, two days after that, last April 2018, two days after that woman was killed,
the FAA issued what's called an AD, an airworthiness directive. That's what should have been
issued in 2016, where that death wouldn't have happened. So, we have seen this time and
again.
And you mentioned Attention All Passengers , my book. Much of the book, about a third
of it, is devoted to the issue of the FAA oversight of airline maintenance. We could easily
talk about it for two or three more days. But the bottom line is that the entire model of how
the airline industry works in the United States has been changed dramatically in the last 15
years or so. All airlines in the United States -- without question, all of them -- in 2019,
outsource some or most or just about all of their maintenance, what they call heavy
maintenance. Much of it is done outside of the United States -- El Salvador, Mexico, Brazil,
China, Singapore. Again, we're talking about U.S. airlines. And although the FAA , on paper,
says there is one standard for maintenance of U.S. airlines, the reality is there isn't. There
are waivers given all the time, so that when work is done outside the United States, there are
waivers so that there are no security background checks, there are no alcohol and drug
screening programs put in place. And, in fact, many -- in some cases, most -- of the
technicians cannot even be called mechanics, because they're not licensed. They're not licensed
as they're required to be in the U.S. So, basically, you have two sets of rules. You have one
that's for in-house airline employees and another for the outsourced facilities. And this all
leads back to the FAA . I have sat in a room with FAA senior officials and asked them about
this, and they say that they don't think it's a problem. It is a problem.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And what impact --
WILLIAM McGEE: I've spoken to --
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: What impact have the mergers, of the constant mergers of airlines,
had, so we basically have a handful of U.S. airlines now, on all of this?
WILLIAM McGEE: Oh, no question. We have an oligopoly now. And, you know, even just going
back as far as 2001, you know, there were four or five major carriers that we don't have
anymore: America West, Continental, US Airways, TWA . You know, so what we have now is
effectively an oligopoly. And this is unprecedented in the history of the aviation industry
here in the United States. And so, you know, even when -- Ralph was talking about boycotts,
and, you know, it's an excellent idea. But it's more challenging now than it would have been a
few years ago. You know, there might have been more pressure on Southwest and American 10 or 15
years ago, when consumers had more choices. Now it's getting harder and harder for consumers to
express their displeasure. We saw this after the Dr. Dao incident, where that passenger was
dragged off United. In the long term, it didn't really affect United's bookings. It would have
in another time, but so many people are locked in, particularly outside New York, Washington,
Los Angeles. They're locked in, where they don't have a lot of choice on carriers.
AMY GOODMAN : Ralph Nader, I wanted to get your response both to this news that they were
working on a fix -- they know there's a software glitch, that somehow, when on automatic pilot,
when the plane is taking off, it takes this precipitous dive, and the way to deal with it is to
take it off automatic and put it on manual. Now, AP has been doing a deep dive into the
database of pilots complaining over and over again about this problem and saying they have to
quickly switch to manual to prevent the plane from nosediving into the ground. And this latest
news from The Wall Street Journal that while they're talking about this glitch being
fixed in the next five weeks or so, that five weeks were lost in January because of the
government shutdown.
RALPH NADER : Well, that's what Paul Hudson wrote in his press release at Flyers
Rights. The focus has got to be on inaccurate or nonexisting information in Boeing's training
manuals and inadequate flight training requirements. They sold this plane on the basis, among
other things, of having larger engines. It's supposed to be 10 percent more fuel-efficient. But
they sold it on the grounds that "You don't have to really train your pilots, airlines. This is
really just a small modification of the reliable 737 that's all over the world." The question
really comes down to cost cutting. They tantalize the airlines by saying, "This isn't really a
new plane. It's very easy to fly, if you can fly a 737." And that turned out to be quite
false...
On May 12, 2010, the New York Times ran an article by economics editor Catherine Rampell
titled "The New Poor: In Job Market Shift, Some Workers Are Left Behind"that focused on the
largely middle-aged unemployed who will probably never work again. For example, 52 year old
administrative assistant Cynthia Norton has been working part-time at Walmart while sending
resumes everywhere but nobody gets back to her. She is part of a much bigger picture:
Ms. Norton is one of 1.7 million Americans who were employed in clerical and
administrative positions when the recession began, but were no longer working in that
occupation by the end of last year. There have also been outsize job losses in other
occupation categories that seem unlikely to be revived during the economic recovery. The
number of printing machine operators, for example, was nearly halved from the fourth quarter
of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2009. The number of people employed as travel agents fell by
40 percent.
But Ms. Rampell finds the silver lining in this dark cloud:
This "creative destruction" in the job market can benefit the economy.
Pruning relatively less-efficient employees like clerks and travel agents, whose work can be
done more cheaply by computers or workers abroad, makes American businesses more efficient.
Year over year, productivity growth was at its highest level in over 50 years last quarter,
pushing corporate profits to record highs and helping the economy grow.
The term "creative destruction" might ring a bell. It was coined by Werner Sombart in his
1913 book "War and Capitalism". When he was young, Sombart considered himself a Marxist. His
notion of creative destruction was obviously drawn from Karl Marx, who, according to some, saw
capitalism in terms of the business cycle. With busts following booms, like night follows day,
a new round of capital accumulation can begin. This interpretation is particularly associated
with Volume Two of Capital that examines this process in great detail. Looking at this
material, some Marxists like Eduard Bernstein drew the conclusion that capitalism is an
infinitely self-sustaining system.
By 1913, Sombart had dumped the Marxist commitment to social revolution but still retained
the idea that there was a basis in Karl Marx for upholding the need for "creative destruction",
a view buttressed by an overly positive interpretation of this passage in the Communist
Manifesto:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of
production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of
society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary,
the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing
of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty
and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.
By the 1930s, Sombart had adapted himself fairly well to the Nazi system although he was not
gung-ho like Martin Heidegger or Carl Schmitt. The wiki on Sombart notes:
In 1934 he published Deutscher Sozialismus where he claimed a "new spirit" was beginning
to "rule mankind". The age of capitalism and proletarian socialism was over and with "German
socialism" (National-Socialism) taking over.
But despite this, he remained critical. In 1938 he wrote an anthropology text that found
fault with the Nazi system and many of his Jewish students remained fond of him.
I suspect, however, that Rampell is familiar with Joseph Schumpeter's use of the term rather
than Sombart since Schumpeter was an economist, her chosen discipline. In 1942, he wrote a book
titled Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy that, like Sombart, retained much of Karl Marx's methodology but without the
political imperative to destroy the system that utilized "creative destruction". He wrote:
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development
from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of
industrial mutation–if I may use that biological term–that incessantly
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one,
incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact
about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got
to live in. . . .
The wiki on Schumpeter claims that this theory is wedded to Nikolai Kondratiev's "long wave"
hypothesis that rests on the idea that there are 50 year cycles in which capitalism grows,
decays and enters a crisis until a new round of capital accumulation opens up. Not only was the
idea attractive to Schumpeter, it was a key part of Ernest Mandel's economic theories. Unlike
Schumpeter, Mandel was on the lookout for social agencies that could break the cycle and put
development on a new footing, one based on human need rather than private profit.
Returning to Rampell's article, there is one dimension entirely missing. She assumes that
"creative destruction" will operate once again in order to foster a new upswing in the
capitalist business cycle. But how exactly will that manifest itself? All the signs point to a
general decline in business activity unless there is some kind of technological breakthrough
equivalent to the computer revolution that fueled growth for decades. Does anybody believe that
"green manufacturing" will play the same role? I don't myself.
One thing does occur to me. Sombart's book was written in 1913, one year before WWI and was
even titled eerily enough "War and Capitalism". One wonders if the Great War would be seen as
part and parcel of "creative destruction". War, after all, does have a knack for clearing the
playing field with even more finality than layoffs. Schumpeter wrote his in 1942, one year into
WWII. My guess is that he did not theorize war as the ultimate (and necessary?) instrument of
creative destruction but history will record that WWII did introduce a whole rafter of new
technology, including aluminum, radar, nuclear power, etc., while bombing old modes of
production into oblivion. What a great opportunity it was for capitalism to rebuild Japan,
especially after firebombing and atomic bombs did their lovely work.
In my view, there's something disgusting about this "creative destruction" business
especially when it is articulated by a young, pro-capitalist Princeton graduate like Catherine
Rampell who wrote for Slate, the Village Voice and other such b-list publications before
crawling her way up into an editorial job at the NYT. She clearly has learned how to cater her
reporting to the ideological needs of the newspaper of record, growing more and more
reactionary as the crisis of capitalism deepens.
he crash of the Ethiopian Max-8 Flight 409 on March 10, 2019, resulted in the grounding of
all the Boeing 737 Max series aircraft – even the last hold-out, the United States,
belatedly grounded them when President Trump acted and overruled the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) that opposed any halt to flights.
In the United States, the FAA certifies aircraft as airworthy, puts out bulletins and
advisories on problems and fixes and often is the "go to" agency for many aviation flight
authorities around the world.
The 737 Max series is a new version of the venerable 737, equipped with new engines and
other modifications that have impacted the aircraft's performance in good ways and bad.
Almost every expert today puts the blame for both flight disasters on faulty software that
took over running the plane's flight control system. Many have pointed to Boeing's alleged lack
of transparency in telling pilots what to do if the software malfunctioned. In addition, there
had been at least eight pilot-reported flight control incidents prior to the first Lion Air
crash.
Experienced pilots
Three of the pilots on the two doomed planes each had more than 8,000 hours flying
experience – quite a lot – and the pilots of the Ethiopian airlines had additional
information on the plane's flight characteristics and what to do in an emergency.
While we are still awaiting a final report on last year's Lion Air crash, we do have a quite
informative initial report, although it lacks hard findings. In the Ethiopian case, we only
have flight track information from ground radar and some incomplete reporting on what the
pilots were saying to ground control. More will become available as the flight recorders are
analyzed.
Yet despite this, we can understand some of what happened and clearly it is more than a
single software glitch. This may help explain why Boeing did not meet its proposed deadline of
January for installing updated software. Now in March Boeing says the replacement software will
be available in April. But even if it is, there are more issues involving both hardware and
software.
The software which so far has received virtually all the attention is called MCAS, for
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. MCAS was added to the Max-8 series because
new, heavier and larger engines replaced the old engines and as a result, the updated Max
planes had a strong tendency to pitch nose up.
The new engine, CFM Leap-1B, was selected by Boeing because it was much more fuel efficient
than the older models, one of the big reasons customers want the 737 Max.
The new engines forced re-engineering of parts of the 737.
Fitting the new engines meant moving them forward and lengthening the front landing gear to
keep the engines from scraping on the ground. In turn, this changed the plane's center of
gravity and also altered the air flow on the wings.
MCAS was a band-aid to fix the pitch up problem caused by the relocated and heavier new
engines. MCAS is designed to push the nose down and prevent the aircraft from going into a
stall. MCAS was intended to deal only with a specific flight risk.
1. MCAS operates by receiving information from a special sensor that measures the flying
angle of the plane and takes over the flight controls if the angle is too great – meaning
the aircraft could stall. A stall happens when a plane has too low an airspeed and not enough
lift and the plane will literally fall out of the air.
There are two sensors that measure the angle of attack or nose-up condition of the Boeing
737 Max, one that provides data to the pilot and another that provides data to the copilot. The
sensors are known as Angle of Attack Sensors, or AoA.
In the Lion Air aircraft, the pilot's AoA sensor had been found to be faulty on an earlier
flight as reported by the pilot. That AoA sensor was replaced and tested by aircraft
maintenance before the fatal flight.
The pilot gets no console or other warnings that his AoA sensor might be faulty. The pilot
can ask his copilot what reading he is getting and see if there is a difference. That is
exactly what happened on the Lion Air flight.
It would appear that the MCAS software is driven by information from the pilot's sensor. If
the sensor itself is not at fault, there could still be wiring and connection problems that
could feed bad information to MCAS. These conditions cannot be determined in flight.
If it is true that MCAS relies on information from only one sensor, that could be a design
error. Modern aircraft are famous for built-in flight system redundancy, but apparently not in
the case of MCAS. In addition, the pilot cannot manually change the MCAS choice of sensor.
2. No one has yet explained why the pilot's stick shaker was running on from the start of
the flight and never stopped. The stick shaker is a motor with an unbalanced flywheel that is
attached to the pilot's control stick, and another is attached to the co-pilot's stick. The
stick shaker is supposed to warn the pilot of a potential stall. But why was it on nearly the
whole time? And why was the co-pilot's stick shaker not on?
3. The pilots are supposed to be able to shut down MCAS, which only operates when the
aircraft is manually operated, by switching the electronic trim control to off. The trim
control is what MCAS uses to change the nose pitch of the 737 Max. But in the Lion Air case, we
know the pilots turned off the electronic trim control. But MCAS kept adjusting the trim nose
down, against the pilots' wishes. Or possibly something else was driving the trim control nose
down, such as a shorted circuit or bad wiring.
4. The pilots also tried turning the aircraft's autopilot on, according to the report. MCAS
is only supposed to work when the autopilot is off, that is only when the plane is operated
under manual pilot control. The autopilot should have disabled MCAS but apparently it did not
– in fact, the Lion Air autopilot would not turn on. There is no explanation for this.
Was the autopilot locked out by MCAS? Or was there some other software or hardware foul up?
5. Pilots also had a very difficult time handling the aircraft stick, meaning that the
flight control stick required a great deal of force to operate, especially when the pilots
were, repeatedly, trying to recover the plane that was headed nose down, gaining speed and
losing altitude. Stick force "feel" in 737s is artificial and is controlled by a couple of
pitot tube sensors at the rear of the aircraft above the horizontal stabilizer.
There have been repeated
problems on older 737s with the planes forward and rear pitot tubes, due partly to icing
conditions and to pitot tube heater problems which are supposed to remove ice. Some pitot tubes
have failed because of fouling. Pitot tubes detect aircraft speed and they do this by comparing
the force of incoming air on the pitot tubes to what are called static ports located elsewhere
on the plane. Accidents have been attributed to faulty or fouled pitot tubes.
It is not clear how the flight speed information from the pitot tubes is integrated into the
MCAS if it is. But speed information is fed into the flight computer and if it is faulty it
could create ambiguities in the MCAS and the flight computer.
6. Would better pilot training have helped pilots avoid disaster? Boeing has been criticized
for not initially providing information about MCAS to Max pilots, and only later issuing a
bulletin on how to deal with some MCAS anomalies. Boeing also apparently did not offer any
additional pilot training, leaving pilots to find their way through a morass of complex
problems made worse by possible hardware and software faults.
As it is, it appears the Lion Air pilots acted in the best way they could but were unable to
overcome the instability of the aircraft as it headed nose down to disintegrate in the ocean.
We don't yet know how the Ethiopian Airline pilots performed, but they had the advantage of
advisories from Boeing and the FAA. Still, the same final result.
What is clear is that there is more than one single cause for the two aircraft crashes. And
we know that other planes experienced control problems but recovered. These disasters suggest
there was a complex of problems that caused the two disasters.
Boeing's engineers need to assess the entire flight control system, the electronics and
mechanics, before a satisfactory solution is at hand.
"... The United States held out to the last. Trump personally requested to ground the flagship aircraft of the American company only late evening yesterday, when Canada joined the interdiction. ..."
Today, Russia, following Europe and America, banned the flights of Boeing 737 MAX. Dozens of
countries have stopped using this aircraft after the Sunday crash in Ethiopia.
The United States held out to the last. Trump personally requested to ground the flagship
aircraft of the American company only late evening yesterday, when Canada joined the
interdiction.
737 is out of date considering the modern bigger fuel efficient engines don't fit
it.They're just applying band aid to fix it's short coming. Airbus A320 has no problems with
these new engines as it sits higher.
40 countries banned these aircraft from their airspace..... Comparable to the vicious,
aggressive, malign, thoughtless, selfish and self aggrandising SANCTIONS the US regime and
its vassals slap on innocent countries in attempts to impoverish or/and change their
governments!!!!!!!!!
But this is self inflicted!!!!!! I hope the US regime can see the irony in this!!!!
Boeing should thank China for being the first to ground it's entire fleet, if one of the
96 planes that China operated, god forbid, had gone down, Boeing is done, 3-strikes you're
out
Something is wrong with these planes and it is a good thing that they're being grounded
world-wide until the problem is fixed. It is prudent both from the side of Rosaviatsiya and
the FAA to not permit these planes to fly in the meanwhile to prevent further potential
tragedies. However this is no reason to simply write off the huge fleet of Boeing 737 MAX
planes in service world-wide. Right now engineers at Boeing are working on the problem and
then those planes will be retrofitted asap. Personally I have no particular concerns flying
in a Boeing 737 MAX once the problem is fixed.
The Boeing Company BA recently won a $250 million contract to offer weapon system
integration for the Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) Cruise Missile. Work related to the deal is
scheduled to be completed by Dec 31, 2024.
The contract was awarded by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida. Per the terms of the deal, this aerospace giant will provide aircraft and missile
carriage equipment development and modification, engineering, testing, software development,
training, facilities and support necessary to fully integrate the LRSO Cruise Missile on the
B-52H bomber platform.
Attributes of LRSO
The LRSO is a nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile, under development. It is set to
replace the current AGM-86 air launched cruise missile (ALCM). LRSO, might be up to about 50%
longer than Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) and still be
suitable for internal carriage by the B-2 and B-52.
Our View
AGM-86 ALCM has been serving the U.S. Air Force quite efficiently. However, with
increasingly sophisticated air defense systems developed by America's nemeses, especially
Russia, demand for a new stealth nuclear-armed cruise missile capable of either destroying
these defenses or penetrating them has been increasing consistently. In this scenario, the LRSO
comes as the most credible stealthy and low-yield option available to the United States
(according to Strategic Studies Quarterly Report).
Boeing's B-52, which has been the U.S. Air Force's one of the most preferred bombers, is
completely dependent on long-range cruise missiles and cannot continue in the nuclear mission
beyond 2030 without LRSO. As B-52 is expected to play a primary role in the U.S. nuclear
mission for at least next decade and ALCM is already well beyond its originally planned end of
life, we may expect more contracts similar to the latest one to usher in from the Pentagon in
the coming days. This, in turn, should prove conducive to Boeing.
Price Performance
In a year's time, shares of Boeing have gained about 16.5% against the industry's 2.2%
decline.
Tom Enders just couldn't resist the swipe at the competition. It was June 2011, and the chief executive officer of
Airbus SE was on a stage at the Paris air show after the planemaker
won in a matter of days an unprecedented 600 orders for its upgraded A320neo airliner, while
Boeing Co. stood on the sidelines.
"If our colleagues in Seattle still maintain we're only catching up with their 737, I must ask myself what these guys are smoking,"
Enders blurted out, to the general amusement of the audience, while Boeing representatives at the back of the room looked on.
Boeing had wavered on its decision whether to follow Airbus's lead and re-engine the 737 or go with an all-new aircraft. Customers
were willing to wait for "something more revolutionary," as Jim Albaugh, at the time Boeing's head of commercial aircraft, said then.
But the European manufacturer's blow-out success with the A320neo, essentially a re-engined version of its popular narrow-body
family, would soon force Boeing's hand.
As the A320neo became the fastest-selling plane in civil aviation history as Airbus picked off loyal Boeing customers like
American Airlines Group Inc. , the U.S. company ditched the
pursuit of an all-new jet and responded in July 2011 with its own redesign, the 737 Max.
"The program was launched in a panic," said Sash Tusa, an analyst at
Agency Partners , an equity research firm in London. "What
frightened Boeing most of all was losing their biggest and most important customer. American Airlines was the catalyst."
It turned out that Chicago-based Boeing wasn't too late to the party in the end: While the Max didn't quite replicate the neo's
order book, it did become the company's fastest seller as airlines scrambled to cut their fuel bills with new engines that promised
savings of 20 percent or more. All told, the Max raked in about 5,000 orders, keeping the playing field fairly level in the global
duopoly between Airbus and Boeing.
Close Scrutiny
Now the 737 Max is grounded globally, after two almost factory-fresh jets crashed in rapid succession. As a result, the repercussions
of Boeing's response to Airbus's incursion are under the microscope. Getting particular scrutiny are the use of more powerful, fuel-saving
engines and automated tools to help pilots control the aircraft.
After the grounding, Boeing said that it "continues to have full confidence in the safety of the 737 Max, and that it was supporting
the decision to idle the jets "out of an abundance of caution." The company declined to comment beyond its public statements.
In late October, a plane operated by Lion Air went down
minutes after taking off in Jakarta, killing all 189 people on board. Then on March 10, another 737 Max crashed, this time in Ethiopia
en route to Kenya. Again, none of the 157 people on board survived the impact.
There are other similarities that alarmed airlines and regulators and stirred public opinion, leading to the grounding of the
737 Max fleet of more than 350 planes. According to the Federal
Aviation Administration , "the track of the Ethiopian Airlines
flight was very close and behaved very similar to the Lion Air flight."
After decades of steadily declining aircraft accidents, the question of how two identical new planes could simply fall out of
the sky minutes after takeoff has led to intense scrutiny of the 737 Max's systems. Adding to the chorus in the wake of the crash
was President Donald Trump, who lamented the complexities of modern aviation, suggesting that people in the cockpit needed to be
more like nuclear physicists than pilots to command a jet packed with automated systems.
"Airplanes are becoming far too complex to fly. Pilots are no longer needed, but rather computer scientists from MIT," the president
said in the first of a pair of tweets on March 12, darkly warning that "complexity creates danger."
Analog Machine
Automation plays a limited role in the 737 Max. That's because the aircraft still has essential analog design and layout features
dating back to the 1960s, when it was conceived. It's a far older concept than the A320, which came to market at the end of the 1980s
and boasted innovations like fly-by-wire controls, which manipulate surfaces such as flaps and horizontal tail stabilizers with electrical
impulses and transducers rather than heavier hydraulic links.
Upgrading the 737 to create the Max came with its own set of issues. For example, the 737 sits considerably lower to the ground,
so fitting the bigger new engines under the wings was a structural challenge (even with the squished underbelly of the engine casing).
In response, Boeing raised the front landing gear by a few inches, but this and the size of the engines can change the plane's center
of gravity and its lift in certain maneuvers.
Boeing's technical wizardry for the 138- to 230-seat Max was a piece of software known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation
System, or MCAS. It intervenes automatically when a single sensor indicates the aircraft may be approaching a stall. Some pilots
complained, though, that training on the new system wasn't sufficient and properly documented.
"The benefits of automation are great, but it requires a different level of discipline and training,'' said Thomas Anthony, director
of the Aviation Safety and Security Program at the University of Southern California. Pilots must make a conscious effort to monitor
the plane's behavior. And reliance on automation means they will take back control only in the worst situations, he said.
Errant Sensor
With the Lion Air crash, data from the recovered flight recorders points to a battle in the cockpit between the software and the
pilots who struggled in vain to keep control. The data showed that an errant sensor signaled the plane was in danger of stalling
and prompted the MCAS to compensate by repeatedly initiating a dive. The pilots counteracted by flipping a switch several times to
raise the nose manually, which temporarily disabled MCAS. The cycle repeated itself more than two dozen times before the plane entered
its final deadly dive, according to the flight data.
With the flight and cockpit voice recorders of the Ethiopian plane now in France for analysis, the interaction between the MCAS
system and the pilots will again be under close scrutiny, probably rekindling the broader debate about who or what is in control
of the cockpit.
That man-versus-machine conundrum has been central to civil aviation for years. Automation has without doubt made commercial flying
much safer, as planemakers added systems to help pilots set engine thrust, navigate with greater precision and even override human
error in the cockpit.
For example, automation on modern aircraft keeps pilots within a so-called flight envelope to avoid erratic maneuvers that might
destabilize the aircraft. Analyses of flight data show that planes have more stable landings in stormy, low-visibility conditions
when automation is in charge than on clear days when they land by sight.
Sully's Miracle Landing
The most daring descent in recent memory, Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger's landing of US Airways Flight 1549 in the Hudson River
in early 2009, is Exhibit A of how an interconnected cockpit worked hand-in-hand with an experienced pilot. Automatic pitch trim
and rudder coordination assisted manual inputs and kept the Airbus A320 steady on its smooth glide into the icy water. The drama
showed that automation can play a crucial support function, provided a pilot is fully trained and the aircraft properly maintained.
"Some people are saying modern aircraft such as the 737 Max are too complex," said Dave Wallsworth, a
British Airways captain on the Airbus A380 double-decker.
"I disagree. The A380 is a far more complex aircraft and we fly it very safely every day. Pilots are capable of understanding aircraft
systems so long as the manuals contain the information we need."
Airbus traditionally has pushed the envelope on automation and a more modern cockpit layout, with larger screens and steering
by joystick rather than a central yoke, turning pilots into something akin to systems operators. Boeing's philosophy, on the other
hand, has been to leave more authority in the hands of pilots, though newer designs also include some computerized limits. Like Airbus
planes, the latest aircraft from Seattle -- where Boeing makes most of its jetliners -- are equipped with sophisticated autopilots,
fly-by-wire controls or systems to set speed during landings.
"The big automation steps came in the 1980s with the entry into service of the A320 and the whole fly-by-wire ethos," said John
Strickland, an independent aviation analyst. "I don't think automation per se is a problem, we see it in wide-scale use in the industry,
and as long as it is designed to work hand-in-hand with pilots and pilots understand how to use it, it shouldn't be an issue."
Erratic Movements
But the counter-argument is that increasingly complex systems have led computers to take over, and that many pilots may have forgotten
how to manually command a jet -- particularly in a moment of crisis. That criticism was leveled at Airbus, for example, after the
mid-Atlantic crash of Air France Flight 447 in 2009 that killed all 228 people on board. Analysis of the flight recorders showed
the crew was confused by stall warnings and unreliable speed readings, leading to erratic maneuvers that ended in catastrophe.
>
"I grew up on steam gauges and analog, and the modern generation on digital and automation," said Jon Weaks, president of the
Southwest Airlines Pilots Association and a Boeing 737
captain for the Dallas-based airline. "No matter what you grew up on, you have to fly the plane. If the automation is doing something
you don't want it to do or that you don't understand, you have to disconnect it and fly the plane."
A 2013 report by the FAA found more than 60 percent of 26 accidents over a decade involved pilots making errors after automated
systems abruptly shut down or behaved in unexpected ways. And the 2016 inspector general's report at the FAA noted that as the use
of automation increases, "pilots have fewer opportunities to use manual flying skills."
"As a result, the opportunities air carrier pilots have during live operations to maintain proficiency in manual flight are limited
and are likely to diminish," the report found.
The grounding of the 737 Max fleet has left Boeing in crisis. The company couldn't get through with its message that the plane
was safe to fly, as the group of regulators and airlines idling the jet kept expanding. The 737 program is Boeing's cash cow, accounting
for a third of its profit, and Boeing's stock dropped sharply in the days after the disaster.
Get in Line
The Max gave Boeing a relatively cheap path back into the narrow-body game that it was at risk of losing to the Airbus neo. At
the time, Boeing had to make a quick decision, as it was still burdened financially by the 787 Dreamliner wide-body that was over
budget and behind schedule.
Both manufacturers have said they won't come out with an all-new single-aisle model until well into the next decade, preferring
to wait for further technological advancements before committing to massive spending. The success of both the neo and the Max bought
the companies that extra time, with orders books stretching years into the future.
Half a century after it was launched almost as an afterthought, the 737 program has become the lifeblood of Boeing that helps
finance the rest of the corporation -- the biggest U.S. exporter. It's the one aircraft that Boeing cannot afford to give up.
"The Max was the right decision for the time," said Richard Aboulafia, an aviation analyst with the consultancy
Teal Group . "Yes, there may be an issue with MCAS needing
a software patch. Yes, there may need to be some additional training. But these are not issues that cause people to change to the
other guys' jet. The other guys have a waiting line, and when you get to the back of that line, you burn more fuel."
-- With assistance by Alan Levin, Benjamin D Katz, Margaret Newkirk, Michael Sasso, and Mary Schlangenstein
Conventional wisdom is that it is too early to speculate why in the past six months two
Boeing 737 Max 8 planes have gone down shortly after take off, so if all that follows is wrong
you will know it very quickly. Last night I predicted that the first withdrawals of the plane
would happen within two days, and this morning China withdrew it. So far, so good. (Indonesia
followed a few hours ago).
Why should I stick my neck out with further predictions? First, because we must speculate
the moment something goes wrong. It is natural, right and proper to note errors and try to
correct them.(The authorities are always against "wild" speculation, and I would be in
agreement with that if they had an a prior definition of wildness). Second, because putting
forward hypotheses may help others test them (if they are not already doing so). Third, because
if the hypotheses turn out to be wrong, it will indicate an error in reasoning, and will be an
example worth studying in psychology, so often dourly drawn to human fallibility. Charmingly,
an error in my reasoning might even illuminate an error that a pilot might make, if poorly
trained, sleep-deprived and inattentive.
I think the problem is that the Boeing anti-stall patch MCAS is poorly configured for pilot
use: it is not intuitive, and opaque in its consequences.
By the way of full disclosure, I have held my opinion since the first Lion Air crash in
October, and ran it past a test pilot who, while not responsible for a single word here, did
not argue against it. He suggested that MCAS characteristics should have been in a special
directive and drawn to the attention of pilots.
I am normally a fan of Boeing. I have flown Boeing more than any other plane, and that might
make me loyal to the brand. Even more powerfully, I thought they were correct to carry on with
the joystick yoke, and that AirBus was wrong to drop it, simply because the position of the
joystick is something visible to pilot and co-pilot, whereas the Airbus side stick does not
show you at a glance how high the nose of the plane is pointing.
Pilots are bright people, but they must never be set a badly configured test item with tight
time limits and potentially fatal outcomes.
The Air France 447 crash had several ingredients, but one was that the pilots of the Airbus
A330-203 took too long to work out they were in a stall. In fact, that realization only hit
them very shortly before they hit the ocean. Whatever the limitations of the crew (sleep
deprived captain, uncertain co-pilot) they were blinded by a frozen Pitot air speed indicator,
and an inability to set the right angle of attack for their airspeed.
For the industry, the first step was to fit better air speed indicators which were less
likely to ice up. However, it was clear that better stall warning and protection was
required.
Boeing had a problem with fitting larger and heavier engines to their tried and trusted 737
configuration, meaning that the engines had to be higher on the wing and a little forwards, and
that made the 737 Max have different performance characteristics, which in turn led to the need
for an anti-stall patch to be put into the control systems.
It is said that generals always fight the last war. Safety officials correct the last
problem, as they must. However, sometimes a safety system has unintended consequences.
The key of the matter is that pilots fly normal 737s every day, and have internalized a
mental model of how that plane operates. Pilots probably actually read manuals, and safety
directives, and practice for rare events. However, I bet that what they know best is how a
plane actually operates most of the time. (I am adjusting to a new car, same manufacturer and
model as the last one, but the 9 years of habit are still often stronger than the manual-led
actions required by the new configuration). When they fly a 737 Max there is a bit of software
in the system which detects stall conditions and corrects them automatically. The pilots should
know that, they should adjust to that, they should know that they must switch off that system
if it seems to be getting in the way, but all that may be steps too far, when something so
important is so opaque.
What is interesting is that in emergencies people rely on their most validated mental
models: residents fleeing a burning building tend to go out their usual exits, not even the
nearest or safest exit. Pilots are used to pulling the nose up and pushing it down, to adding
power and to easing back on it, and when a system takes over some of those decisions, they need
to know about it.
After Lion Air I believed that pilots had been warned about the system, but had not paid
sufficient attention to its admittedly complicated characteristics, but now it is claimed that
the system was not in the training manual anyway. It was deemed a safety system that pilots did
not need to know about.
This farrago has an unintended consequence, in that it may be a warning about artificial
intelligence. Boeing may have rated the correction factor as too simple to merit human
attention, something required mainly to correct a small difference in pitch characteristics
unlikely to be encountered in most commercial flying, which is kept as smooth as possible for
passenger comfort.
It would be terrible if an apparently small change in automated safety systems designed to
avoid a stall turned out have given us a rogue plane, killing us to make us safe.
Pilots are used to pulling the nose up and pushing it down, to adding power and to
easing back on it, and when a system takes over some of those decisions, they need to know
about it.
I have read that Boeing kept MCAS out of the limelight as otherwise the 737 MAX would need
to be certified as a new plane and airlines would need to do $$$ pilot retraining, making
their product less competitive.
Interesting response from a "by-stander", who compares a sophisticated aircraft with a new
model car !!!
As an experienced captain on 737s (not the MAX) I say, let the investigation begin; and
let us not have by-standers giving their penny worth. A normal 737 . is there also an
abnormal 747 or 777 or 787, or a 737 ??
Pilots carry the can . but, are the most respected profession in the world. What ever
happened, let the investigation decide the outcome, and not the "un-trained" (is there such a
term !!!!).
If one takes a look at the (released to date) information about the Lion Air crash –
"unreliable airspeeds" (the airspeed indicator is providing erroneous information during a
critical phase of flight (like climb out after take-off)) could have been the cause of that
aircraft crash – not AI.
A simple explanation – the airspeed indicator is "unreliable", as one moment the
indication is under-speed, then overspeed, followed by under-speed, and so it goes; like a
yoyo going up and down; the indicated speed is erroneous and the pilots cannot rely on what
is presented on the airspeed indicator. Pilots, according to the Boeing Training Manual, are
trained to handle unreliable airspeeds – the key is to fly the plane based solely on
pitch attitude and thrust (there are memory items for unreliable airspeed occurrences, along
with the reference items in aircraft's Quick Reference Handbook – the QRH (Boeing term)
is the pilots "bible" for any issues and problems when the aircraft is in the air !! ).
The point of the above paragraph is to enlighten the 'un-trained' as to not speculate too
soon with ideas and a "hypothesis" of what may have happened, until the knowledgeable ones
– the aircraft manufacturer (probably being the most knowledgable), the country's
aviation authority, the engine manufacturer, and (dear I say) the FAA (the Yanks just cannot
help themselves delving into other countries' affairs; when for 9/11 not one minutes was
spent by anyone (FAA, Boeing, no one) investigating the so-called crashes of four aircraft
– on one day, within one and a half hours of each other, and in the most protected
airspace in the world (got the hint !!) – I have digressed, though for reason .. have
completed their investigations.
I can assure you that no pilot wants to crash a plane we (pilots) all want to live to 100,
and beyond.
Humans make mistakes, but technology needs humans to correct technology's mistakes. Boeing
build reliable and trustworthy aircraft; pilots undertake their duties in a safe and
controlled manner (according to training and aircraft manufacturer stipulated standards); but
errors happen – and the investigator is there to establish what happened, so that these
do not happen again. Unfortunately, it is just possible that the cause of the first MAX
accident is the same as the second. But, let the knowledgable ones determine that fact
– and let me, and us, not speculate.
AI in the MAX hhmmmmm – let Boeing release that information, before we start
speculating again (on AI – is an auto pilot AI; the B737 I fly has two auto pilots; is
that double AI ??).
To the rest of the travelling public – airline travel remains, and has been, the
safest form of transport for decades. I am confident that the status quo will remain.
Time will reveal the answers to these two accidents, when the time is right – when
the investigators (for both) have concluded their deliberations.
My guess is, the majority of people will have forgotten these two MAX events (but, for
those who have lost loved ones), as some other crisis/event will have occurred in their lives
and/or in the world.
@Captain 737 I respect your analysis especially coming from a seasoned 737 captain. I
have over 5,000 flying hours in single and twin-engine, conventional and jet, all military. I
have not flown since 1974 so the advances in auto-pilot technology are beyond my
comprehension. My question to you is simple–I think. If the aircraft took off in VFR
conditions I assume the pilots knew the pitch attitude all during the takeoff phase. Is there
no way to manually overpower the auto-pilot once the pilots knew the pitch attitude was
dangerously high or low?
If this is a made in china airplane, the empire would mobilize the whole world to ground the
entire fleet. The diatribes, lies, cruel sick jokes, lawsuits, etc, etc, would fly to the
heavens.
But NO, this is an empire plane. Designed, built and (tested?) in the heart of the empire.
And despite the fact that more than 300 people had died, IT IS STILL SAFE to fly!
Quite a short and to-the-point article, although the link to "artificial intelligence" is
tenuous at best.
What is sold as Artificial Intelligence nowadays is massive statistical processing in a
black box (aka as "Neural Network Processing"), it's not intelligent.
The most surprising fact is that it works so well.
Neural Networks won't be in high-assurance software soon. No-one knows what they really do
once configured (although there are efforts underway to
attack that problem ). They are impossible to really test or design to specification.
Will someone underwrite that a system incorporating them does work? Hardly. You may find them
in consumer electronics, research, "self driving cars" that never really self-drive without
surprises and possibly
bleeding edge military gear looking for customers or meant to explode messily anyway.
But not in cockpits. (At least I hope).
Check out this slideshow about the ACAS-X
Next Generation Collision Airborne Collision Avoidance System. It has no neural network in
sight, in fact if I understand correctly it doesn't even have complex decision software
in-cockpit: it's all decision tables precomputed from a high-level, understandable
description (aka. code, apparently in Julia) to assure safe outcome in a fully testable and
simulatable approach.
In this accident, we may have a problem with the system, as opposed to with the software.
While the software may work correctly and to specification (and completely unintelligently)
the system composed of software + human + physical machinery will interact in interesting,
unforeseen, untested ways, leading to disaster. In fact the (unintelligent software + human)
part may disturbingly behave like those Neural Networks that are being sold as AI.
@Anatoly Karlin I'm guessing that it would require a change in the TCDS and possibly a
different type rating, which would be anathema for sales.
I'm a little airplane person, not a big airplane person (and the 737 is a Big Airplane
even in its smallest configuration) but I know there have been several instances where
aircraft had changes that required that pilots of the type have a whole different type
rating, even though the changes seemed minor. I'm guessing airlines are training averse and
don't want to take crews off revenue service beyond what is statutorily required. The margins
in airline flying are apparently much leaner now than in the glory days.
I never approved of allowing fly by wire in commercial airliners, I never even really
liked the idea of FADEC engine control (supervisory DEC was fine) because a classical
advantage of gas turbines (and diesels) was that they could run in an absolutely electrically
dead environment once lit. Indeed, the J-58 (JT11-D in P&W parlance) had no electrical
system to speak of beyond the instrumentation: it started by mechanical shaft drive and
ignited by triethyl borane chemical injection. The Sled could make it home on needle-ball and
alcohol compass, and at least once it did. Total electrical failure in any FBW aircraft means
losing the airplane. Is the slight gain in efficiency worth it? I'm told the cables, pulleys,
fairleads and turnbuckles add 200 pounds to a medium size airliner, the FBW stuff weighs 80
or so.
The jet transports we studied in A&P school had a pitot head and static port on either
side of the flight deck and the captain and F/O had inputs from different ones, though IIRC
the altimeter and airspeed were electrically driven from sensors at the pitot head or inboard
of it. I have a 727 drum-pointer (why are three pointer altimeters even legal anymore??)
altimeter and it has no aneroids, just a couple of PCBs full of TTL logic and op amps and a
DB style connector on the back. Do crews not cross check airspeed and altitude or is there no
indicator to flag them when the two show something different?
Also, not being a jet pilot myself, my understanding is that anyone with T-38 experience
is forever after thinking in terms of AOA and not airspeed per se, because that airplane has
to be flown by AOA in the pattern, and classically a lot of airline pilots had flown Talons.
Is there no AOA indicator in the 737? Flying in the pattern/ILS would make airspeed pretty
dependent on aircraft weight, and on a transport that can change a lot with fuel burn, do
they precisely calculate current weight from a totalizer and notate speeds needed? (I presume
airliners don't vary weight other than fuel burn, not being customarily in the business of
throwing stuff out of the airplane, although they used to fly jumpers out of a chartered 727
at the parachute meet in Quincy)
Many problems in the world arise because many computing people reckon themselves very clever
when they are merely rather clever. And often they combine what cleverness they have with a
blindness about humans and their ways. I shouldn't be at all surprised if programmers at
Boeing decided that they always knew better than pilots and doomed the planes accordingly.
I saw recently an expression that made me grin: "midwits". It describes rather well many
IT types of my acquaintance.
@fish And that's the problem, as Mr. Kief also points out. The individuals at the
decision making level (let's call them "executives") don't or can't think that far ahead, at
least when the corporation they run is concerneed.
@dearieme One corollary is that the Midwits take such joy in their cleverness that they
assume their wit has value in and of itself. This is most evident when they design clever
solutions to invented problems. Billions of dollars of venture capital have been set on fire
in that way, when technical and financial midwittery combine.
@Andrei Martyanov It's almost nitpicking. But – James Thompson says it above: The
MCAS in this Boing model 737 MAX 8 is used to cover up a basic construction flaw. This has
undoubtedly worked for quite some time – but it came with a risk. And this risk might
turn out to have caused numerous deaths. In this case, if it will turn out, that the MACS
system didn't do what it was supposed to do and thus caused numerous deaths – will this
then be looked upon as a problem of the application of artificial intelligence? Yes, but
not only . It was a combination of a poorly built (constructed) airliner and software,
which might not have been able to compensate for this flawed construction under all
conditions.
It's cheaper to compensate via software – and this might (might) turn out to be a
rather irresponsible way to save money. But as I said: Even in this case, the technical
problem would have to be looked upon as twofold: Poor construction plus insufficient
software compensation. I'd even tend to say, that poor construction would then be the main
(=basic) fault. With the zeitgeisty (and cheap!) software-"solution" for this poor
construction a close second.
@Captain 737 Curiously, this is "Captain 737″'s first and only comment here.
It's almost as if Boeing hired a high-priced PR firm whose offerings include pseudonymous
online "messaging" to "shape opposition perceptions" etc. Note the over-obvious handle. (Just
like globalist shills like to pretend to be regular blue-collar guys in small fly-over
towns.)
By their words shalt ye know them.
PREDICTION: In 3-4 years, we will "discover" a long paper trail of engineers warning early
on about the risk of hastily kludging a half-assed anti-stall patch MCAS onto a system that
had undergone years of testing and refinement WITHOUT the patch.
Only somebody PAID not to see the problem could fail to perceive that this means that as
so altered, the ENTIRE SYSTEM goes back to being technically immature.
@Dieter Kief What "basic construction flaw" are we discussing here? The 737 airframe is
pretty well established and has a good record-there have been incidents but most have been
well dealt with.
@Anonymous I've read today, that in the aviation world there is a consensus, that what
James Thompson says in his article is right:
"Boeing had a problem with fitting larger and heavier engines to their tried and trusted 737
configuration, meaning that the engines had to be higher on the wing and a little forwards,
and that made the 737 Max have different performance characteristics, which in turn led to
the need for an anti-stall patch to be put into the control systems."
– A German engineer wrote in a comment in the Berlin daily Die weLT, this
construction flaw makes the 737 MAX 8 something like a flying traktor . He concluded,
that Boing proved, that you can make a tractor fly, alright. But proper engineering would
have looked otherwise – and would for sure had come at a higher cost.
(The different performance charactersitics mentioned by James Thompson is an
extraordinarily nice way to express, that the 737 MAX 8 is a tad more likely to stall, just
because of the very design-changes, the bigger turbines made necessary. And this is a rather
nasty thing to say about an airplane, that a new design made it more likely to stall!
).
The 737 family is the best selling commercial airliner series in history with more than
10,000 units produced. However, this airplane in its various configurations has had many
crashes since it first entered service in 1968.
"... To implement a security relevant automatism that depends on only one sensor is extremely bad design. To have a flight control automatism engaged even when the pilot flies manually is also a bad choice. But the real criminality was that Boeing hid the feature. ..."
"... The Ethiopian Airlines plane that crashed went down in a similar flight profile as the Indonesian plane. It is highly likely that MCAS is the cause of both incidents. While the pilots of the Ethiopian plane were aware of the MCAS system they might have had too little time to turn it off. The flight recorders have been recovered and will tell the full story. ..."
"... The FAA certifies all new planes and their documentation. I was for some time marginally involved in Airbus certification issues. It is an extremely detailed process that has to be followed by the letter. Hundreds of people are full time engaged for years to certify a modern jet. Every tiny screw and even the smallest design details of the hardware and software have to be documented and certified. ..."
"... How or why did the FAA agree to accept the 737 MAX with the badly designed MCAS? How could the FAA allow that MCAS was left out of the documentation? What steps were taken after the Indonesian flight crashed into the sea? ..."
"... That the marketing department has more say than the engineers who design and test the hardware and the software in passenger jets tells us a great deal about the Potemkin-style workplace culture that prevails in Boeing and similar large US corporations. The surface sheen is more important than the substance. The marketing brochures and manuals are no different from mainstream news media in the level of BS they spew. ..."
"... The Indonesian pilots did not have the time to figure out and realise that something else was controlling the plane's flight, much less deactivate what is effectively a second autopiloting system. ..."
"... B is right. This is a criminal act of deception and fraud thats cost hundreds their lives. Boeing executives responsible should be prosecuted and then jailed. ..."
"... while all the technical discussion around how to fly a plane is truly interesting, what's really at issue here is corporate and institutional betrayal of trust. ..."
"... The corporate aspect is Boeing, obviously. The institutional aspect is FAA, which used to lead the world in trust when it came to life and death matters. ..."
"... But now, in what Bloomberg, even while trying to support FAA, has no choice but to report as a "stunning rebuff" to FAA's integrity, countries around the world are grounding this flawed plane. Germany, among others, has closed its airspace to the 737. ..."
"... "Should anyone be flying 737MAXes before the black box data has been evaluated?" ..."
"... Before, the civilian airliners were falling out of the sky because of an immature technology, that is because of the learning curve. Now that the technology involved is fully mature the airliners are falling out of the sky for profit taking. ..."
"... Is it really so hard to connect the secrecy about MCAS and why it was needed in the first place? The lawyers will have a ball of the decade with this: the defendant created a secret software solution to turn a Lego airplane into a real airplane, made the software dependent on a single sensor, and made it difficult to switch the software off. ..."
"... I cannot believe that Boeing shares dropped only 7.5%, this is a statement of how untouchable Boeing is and how protected it will be by the Corrupt. ..."
Boeing, The FAA, And Why Two 737 MAX Planes Crashedpsychohistorian , Mar 12, 2019 4:55:32 PM |
link
On Sunday an Ethiopian Airlines flight crashed, killing all on board. Five month earlier
an Indonesian Lion Air jet crashed near Jakarta. All crew and passengers died. Both airplanes
were Boeing 737-8 MAX. Both incidents happened shortly after take off.
Boeing 737 MAX aircraft are now grounded
about everywhere except in the United States. That this move follows only now is sad.
After the first crash it was already obvious that the plane is not safe to fly.
The Boeing 737 and the Airbus 320 types are single aisle planes with some 150 seats. Both
are bread and butter planes sold by the hundreds with a good profit. In 2010 Airbus decided
to offer its A-320 with a New Engine Option (NEO) which uses less fuel. To counter the Airbus
move Boeing had to follow up. The 737 would also get new engines for a more efficient flight
and longer range. The new engines on the 737 MAX are bigger and needed to be placed a bit
different than on the older version. That again changed the flight characteristics of the
plane by giving it a nose up attitude.
The new flight characteristic of the 737 MAX would have require a retraining of the
pilots. But Boeing's marketing people had told
their customers all along that the 737 MAX would not require extensive new training. Instead
of expensive simulator training for the new type experienced 737 pilots would only have to
read some documentation about the changes between the old and the new versions.
To make that viable Boeing's engineers had to use a little trick. They added a 'maneuver
characteristics augmentation system' (MCAS) that pitches the nose of the plane down if a
sensor detects a too high angle of attack (AoA) that might lead to a stall. That made the
flight characteristic of the new 737 version similar to the old one.
But the engineers screwed up.
The 737 MAX has two flight control computers. Each is connected to only one of the two
angle of attack sensors. During a flight only one of two computer runs the MCAS control. If
it detects a too high angle of attack it trims the horizontal stabilizer down for some 10
seconds. It then waits for 5 seconds and reads the sensor again. If the sensor continues to
show a too high angle of attack it again trims the stabilizer to pitch the plane's nose
done.
MCSA is independent of the autopilot. It is even active in manual flight. There is a
procedure to deactivate it but it takes some time.
One of the angle of attack sensors on the Indonesian flight was faulty. Unfortunately it
was the one connected to the computer that ran the MCAS on that flight. Shortly after take
off the sensor signaled a too high angle of attack even as the plane was flying in a normal
climb. The MCAS engaged and put the planes nose down. The pilots reacted by disabling the
autopilot and pulling the control stick back. The MCAS engaged again pitching the plane
further down. The pilots again pulled the stick. This happened some 12 times in a row before
the plane crashed into the sea.
To implement a security relevant automatism that depends on only one sensor is
extremely bad design. To have a flight control automatism engaged even when the pilot flies
manually is also a bad choice. But the real criminality was that Boeing hid the
feature.
Neither the airlines that bought the planes nor the pilots who flew it were told about
MCAS. They did not know that it exists. They were not aware of an automatic system that
controlled the stabilizer even when the autopilot was off. They had no idea how it could be
deactivated.
Nine days after the Indonesian Lion Air Flight 610 ended in a deadly crash, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA)
issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive.
The 737 MAX pilots were aghast. The APA pilot union
sent a letter to its members:
"This is the first description you, as 737 pilots, have seen. It is not in the AA 737
Flight Manual Part 2, nor is there a description in the Boeing FCOM (flight crew operations
manual)," says the letter from the pilots' union safety committee. "Awareness is the key
with all safety issues."
The Ethiopian Airlines plane that crashed went down in a similar flight profile as the
Indonesian plane. It is highly likely that MCAS is the cause of both incidents. While the
pilots of the Ethiopian plane were aware of the MCAS system they might have had too little
time to turn it off. The flight recorders have been recovered and will tell the full
story.
Boeing has sold nearly 5,000 of the 737 MAX. So far some 380 have been delivered. Most of
these are now grounded. Some family members of people who died on the Indonesian flight are
suing Boeing. Others will follow. But Boeing is not the only one who is at fault.
The FAA certifies all new planes and their documentation. I was for some time
marginally involved in Airbus certification issues. It is an extremely detailed process that
has to be followed by the letter. Hundreds of people are full time engaged for years to
certify a modern jet. Every tiny screw and even the smallest design details of the hardware
and software have to be documented and certified.
How or why did the FAA agree to accept the 737 MAX with the badly designed MCAS? How
could the FAA allow that MCAS was left out of the documentation? What steps were taken after
the Indonesian flight crashed into the sea?
Up to now the FAA was a highly regarded certification agency. Other countries followed its
judgment and accepted the certifications the FAA issued. That most of the world now grounded
the 737 MAX while it still flies in the States is a sign that this view is changing. The
FAA's certifications of Boeing airplanes are now in doubt.
Today Boeing's share price dropped some 7.5%. I doubt that it is enough to reflect the
liability issues at hand. Every airline that now had to ground its planes will ask for
compensation. More than 330 people died and their families deserve redress. Orders for 737
MAX will be canceled as passengers will avoid that type.
Boeing will fix the MCAS problem by using more sensors or by otherwise changing the
procedures. But the bigger issue for the U.S. aircraft industry might be the damage done to
the FAA's reputation. If the FAA is internationally seen as a lobbying agency for the U.S.
airline industry it will no longer be trusted and the industry will suffer from it. It will
have to run future certification processes through a jungle of foreign agencies.
Congress should take up the FAA issue and ask why it failed.
Posted by b on March 12, 2019 at 04:39 PM |
Permalink
Comments
next page " @ b who wrote
"
But the engineers screwed up.
"
I call BS on this pointing of fingers at the wrong folk
Engineers get paid to build things that accountants influence. The West is a world in
which the accountants have more sway than engineers.
It is all about the money b and to lead folks in some other direction is not like what I
think of you.
The elite that own global private finance and everything else killed those people in the
planes because they set the standards that the accountants follow and then force the
engineers to operate within
"Congress should take up the FAA issue and ask why it failed."
If there had been any chance of that happening, the planes would probably still be flying and
dead passengers alive.
This, if you are right and I suspect that you are, is symptomatic of an empire dying of
corruption. It is no accident that both the new secretary of defence and the neo-con cult
itself were born of Boeing. A fact memorialised in the UK where the Blairites rally in the
Henry Jackson society.
Last night I wrote on a previous thread:
Over the space of a few months 2 almost new Boeing 737 MAX aircraft have crashed. Rather than
going to the expense of designing an entirely new fuselage and normal length landing gear for
its larger and much more powerful 737 MAX engines Boeing stuck with the now ancient 737
fuselage design that sits only 17 inches from the ground – necessitating changes to the
positioning of the engines on the wing, which together with the vast increase in power,
created aerodynamic instability in the design that Boeing tried to correct with software,
while not alerting pilots to the changes.
Through the 1980s and early 1990s Boeing executives had largely resisted pressure from Wall
Street to cut staff numbers, move plant to non-union states and outsource. The 777 was the
last real Boeing, though significant outsourcing did take place – but under the strict
control and guidance of Boeing engineers. After the "reverse" takeover of MacDonnell Douglas
in 1997 the MDD neoliberal culture swamped Boeing and its HQ was moved from the firm's home
near Seattle to Chicago so executives could hobnob with speculators. Wall Street had taken
down another giant.
The story I have most interest in, at the moment, is the state of the power blackout in
Venezuela and whether this was a cyber attack by the United States. If it was, it is, in my
opinion, a weapon of mass destruction and a very major war crime. The story seems to be
fading from the news so I'm hoping b. will be able to gather more information about it.
I don't know if this is true by my sister who was an engineer working on military jets said
that she'd heard that because of various design requirements, the 737-MAX was inherently
unstable but stability was provided by the fly-by-wire system. In military jets, this feature
provides greater maneuverability and survivability but has no place on civilian aircraft as
the outcome of a system failure would be catastrophic with the pilots being unable to do
anything about it. Anyone heard anything similar?
b - thanks for addressing this.. subservient canada is also flying them
still..) canada is going the same way as the usa-faa - into a ditch long term... it is
really sad for the people who have died and for the fact that as @1 psychohistorian notes -
the decisions are being put in the hands of the wrong people...
Gotta agree with psychohistorian @1, that the engineers aren't totally responsible.
Deregulation pukes at FAA, bean counters at Boeing and their managers who approved it all are
morally culpable. Airline executives aren't immune either, although many will likely plead
ignorance.
If the US were a sane country, a Congressional investigation would follow, but it's not, and
Congress is going to be more concerned with Boeing's bottom line than in public safety or the
integrity of the FAA. That's probably why the planes haven't been grounded in the US.
Congress is much more likely to impede investigation and accountability.
You omit important facts: the pilots know by heart how to quickly cut off electronic control
of the stabilizers and fly manually. The pilots on the preceding lion air flight had had the
same problem, and immediately solved it. The defective sensor should have been immediately
replaced, and would have in the United States. On the next flight, the pilots (the copilot
being quite unexperienced) spent 10 minutes not doing what they were trained to do in an
emergency where the stabilizers are out of control: disable them.
When some flight crews get it right, but others don't, it's not a design flaw but a
problem with the flight crews.
Through the history of Boeing senior executives lived in modest middle-class houses. They
traveled on Boeing aircraft to get pilot's responses. But when Phil Condit (Wall Street's
man) took over he immediately bought private jets and started living the lifestyle. The
difference between productive capitalism and financial capitalism.
the broken dreams documentary above spells it out very clearly the documentary is from
2014.
it even has undercover folks in the boeing factory saying they would not fly on one.
if you fly you should watch that old al jazeera investigation.
the company does not pay tax and
the head of boeing paid himself 100s of millions of dollars
But the bigger issue for the U.S. aircraft industry might be the damage done to the FAA's
reputation.
I'd counter this by asking "what reputation?"
I've known for years how it took take a "smoking hole" for the FAA to get off the can and
actually do something about a problem with an airplane or airline. But things evolve, and
here we have TWO such smoking holes and the FAA still allows it to fly. I'm not trying to
pick on the current FAA leader, for the man is utterly typical of the people who are allowed
to gain his position. From his wiki:
But the bigger issue for the U.S. aircraft industry might be the damage done to the FAA's
reputation.
Elwell joined Airlines for America (A4A) in 2013[3] where he was the Senior Vice
President for Safety, Security, and Operations. Elwell left this role in 2015.
(Skipping to the A4A wiki:) Airlines for America
Officially, the A4A has announced five "core elements" of a national airline policy include
reducing taxes on the industry, reducing regulation , increased access to foreign
markets, making the industry more attractive for investors , and improving the air
traffic control system.
I suspect that grounding the 737-MAX would contradict the goal of "making the industry
more attractive for investors".
About an hour ago I sent out an all-points email suggesting my family members avoid
boarding a 737 MAX until the facts are better known and solutions are in place. The FAA may
not care about them taking risks, but I sure do.
"Boeing is among the largest global aircraft manufacturers; it is the fifth-largest
defense contractor in the world based on 2017 revenue, and is the largest exporter in the
United States by dollar value".
I agree with Psychohistorian @ 1 in less forthright terms: the engineers did not "screw up".
On the contrary they most likely did what they could with the money and the time deadline
they were given to carry out what essentially was a patch-up job that would make Boeing look
good, save money and maintain its stock in sharemarkets.
Probably the entire process, in which the engineers played a small part - and that part in
which they had no input into whoever was making the decisions - was a disaster from start to
finish. The engineers should have been consulted at an early stage in the re-design of the
aircraft's flight and safety features. Only when the appropriate re-design has been tested,
changed where necessary and given the thumbs-up by relevant pilots' unions and other
organisations with regard to passenger safety can the marketing department go ahead and
advise airlines who buy the redesigned planes what training their pilots need.
That the marketing department has more say than the engineers who design and test the
hardware and the software in passenger jets tells us a great deal about the Potemkin-style
workplace culture that prevails in Boeing and similar large US corporations. The surface
sheen is more important than the substance. The marketing brochures and manuals are no
different from mainstream news media in the level of BS they spew.
One can think of other organisations where the administration has more power in the
corporate decision-making process and eats up more of the corporate budget while the people
who do the actual work are increasingly ignored in boardrooms and their share of the budget
correspondingly decreases. Hospitals and schools come to mind.
Boeing got taken over Wall Street, which means cheapest solution to anything. Engineers
are stuck with what they are given. What part of that do you still not understand.
A mitigating factor to the flightcrew is the take-off to 10,000ft is the busiest time. There
is enough going on without having to deal with runaway stab. This is especially true for new
crew to a new aircraft. Rode in many cockpits before 9.11.01 when company employees were
allowed and the standing rule was no conversations below 10,000 and keep you eyes open for
traffic. I also include my Maintenance brethren in that equation. Spent 30 years as a
Avionics Tech. on both military and commercial aircraft so I am not really fond of giving flightcrew a break but I
might this time.
Why is Boeing suffering from this design problem and not A320neo is that 737's wings are
much lower to the ground than the A320. Unfortunately, more fuel-efficient engines require a
larger air inlet, so the newer generation engines are much larger than the previously
installed V2500 or CFM56 (anyone can verify that - the older engines are much, much smaller
than the newer ones).
When Airbus introduced the Pratt & Whitney GTF on its A320s
(calling it the neo - new engine option), it led to an increase (high single digits %)
increase in fuel efficiency. Boeing had to respond to that. If they wanted to increase the
height of the wings of the 737 from the ground, they would have had to redesign the fuselage
which would have cost billions (and which they should have done, in hindsight). Instead, they
listened to the investors and the bean counters as you have called them here and they jiggled
the position of the wings a bit and introduced the new automatic stabiliser.
The people at Boeing are good or at least the engineers are. Imagine how many times this
problem would have been brought up by someone for him/her to be shut down. It's not like they
were not aware of the issue, but they were unwilling to let their bottom line suffer.
Instead, they were okay with carrying the risk of killing hundreds of people.
Agree with both of your comments. It looks like the 55 year old 737 air-frame design,
which is very low to the ground when compared to more modern designs, is incompatible with
the bigger engines required for fuel efficiency.
Being very low to the ground, Boeing was forced to put the engines out in front, which
upset the airplane's balance, making the plane essentially unstable. To counter the
instability they added the 'MCAS?' control system.
This solution violates a fundamental tenant of design for safety-critical systems. The
tenant of 'fail-safe'. If something goes wrong the system is supposed to fail in a manner
that preserves safety. For the 737 Max, when the this stability control system fails, the
plane is fundamentally unstable. For this system it is not 'fail-safe'. It is
'fail-crash'.
Why would Boeing do this? Because Bombardier was building a clean sheet design, that would
eat the 737's lunch. Boeing (and Airbus) were desperate to do something quick to minimize the
20% fuel burn advantage of the C-series. The more modern Airbus 320 air frame allowed it to
re-engine their plane. Boeing's did not. But Boeing went ahead anyway and built an
fundamentally unstable airplane, because the alternative was to walk away from their most
important market.
To me, this looks like it could be catastrophic for Boeing. It reminds me of G.M.'s
'Corvair' moment (Unsafe at any speed), from the 1960s.
Steven @ 13: The Indonesian Lion Air jet still crashed with all onboard dying, even after the
pilots did as you said. B's post explains why: the MCAS system has to be deactivated
separately as it is still active when autopilot is off and the pilots are flying
manually. The Indonesian pilots did not have the time to figure out and realise that
something else was controlling the plane's flight, much less deactivate what is effectively a
second autopiloting system.
how is this for reassuring? press release from boeing today... this info is from someone
else, and i haven't verified it..
"For the past several months and in the aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610, Boeing has been
developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already
safe aircraft even safer."
"Boeing got taken over Wall Street, which means cheapest solution to anything. Engineers are
stuck with what they are given. What part of that do you still not understand."
Why they colluded with and indeed implemented what they knew to be - and now proven to be
- a mass killing system. What do you not understand here?
There is much more behind the covering up of this "design flaw" from the start. The
concept that, in this day and age, sensors used in the aviation field and close to brand new
are defective is a stretch of the imagination. The current effort by Boeing to do a software
upgrade, I suspect, is cover for something more damaging.
How easy is it these days to access the MAX's operation and flight control computers? Can
it be done via WI-fi or Bluetooth from the airfield? We are well aware that in the newer
heavies Seattle can take basic control via satellite.
You clowns don't understand what you're telling me I'm "getting wrong." MCAS ISN'T part of
the autopilot, and I never said it was.
737 pilots have to be able to do about 10 procedures in their sleep. One is when the
electrical control of the horizontal stabilizers doesn't work; Aa few steps but basically
pull a breaker and revert to manual control only, no power assist.
The crew on the previous flight did this and flew on with zero problem.
It's outrageous that lionair didn't find out why emergency procedures had had to be used
and fix them before they let the airplane fly again.
If airlines do not adhere to Minimal safety standards, it's not Boeing's fault if it's
planes crash.
"This is the first description you, as 737 pilots, have seen. It is not in the AA 737
Flight Manual Part 2, nor is there a description in the Boeing FCOM (flight crew operations
manual)," says the letter from the pilots' union safety committee. "Awareness is the key
with all safety issues."
Well it's good to know that Canada is still allowing this death trap to fly, I couldn't bare
the thought that Boeing might lose more stock value merely because of a defective product
that kills! Seriously though, the silence from the Canadian media on this subject is
deafening. CBC news didn't even cover the banning of these planes in the rest of the world
until an hour ago and even then they seemed more concerned about the impact on Boeing then
the you know 300 people killed because of this flawed plane. Eventually (before Friday) I
think Canada will be forced to ground it's fleet of 737-8s. With the current corruption
scandal, Trudeau is too weak right now to stand up in Question period and claim the 737-8s
are safe to fly. Even Trump is getting in on the action and blaming Boeing for the accidents.
FAA may end up being the biggest loser from this situations with a huge hit to its'
trustworthiness, I remember when the FAA would issue emergency maintenance/inspection orders
after any crash suspected to be caused by maintenance issues and ground entire fleets of
aircraft if two planes crashed within 2 years. You know, the FAAs behaviour now reminds me of
the old Soviet joke, "our planes never crash, their just indefinitely delayed"
These people did not die they were murdered. Long ago, I had worked with Boeing on a computer
project and I had the highest respect for the company and engineers. Facts and reality were
paramount for Boeing. Things started a slow downhill slope when that TWA flight that was
accidentally shot down by a missile. I noticed how uncomfortable the engineers were to talk
about it – just a short comment that the fuel tank was not the cause. When politics and
management go away from reality and facts, it is just a matter of time. But for the life of
me I do not understand how Boeing can come to this:
Fault 1: As B says, it should never have been designed like this.
Fault 2: Don't tell the pilots about MCSA.
Fault 3: Real time flight tracking altitude data show wild swings – red light ignored.
No need to wait for a plane to crash.
Fault 4: Lion Air Flight 610 crash showed that this MCSA system is at fault and nothing much
was done. The murder of 189 people.
Fault 5: Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409 murdering an additional 157 people.
Fault 6: FAA says everything is ok.
Especially the Ethiopian Flight 409 crash should never have happened. This issue became
well known to engineers and flight crews world wide after Lion Air. A good question is: was
the disable MCSA switch now a memory item or a check list item for the flight crew? Or did
Boeing want to wait for the final report of Lion Air?
I noticed that the Ethiopian pilot was not western, but looks like from Indian decent. I
would not doubt his abilities, but rather say that he would follow the rules more than a
western pilot. Western pilots would network and study this thing on their own and would not
wait for Boeing. They would have penciled this into their flight deck routine - just to be
safe.
One can always find a benefit in the sanctions, albeit coincidental.
Iran avoided a lot of damage from Boeing. They had ordered 140 of 737's. All got canceled.
Congratulations.
@40 Alpi57
Iran always has the option of buying the Irkut MC-21 which in my opinion is the best
narrowbody plane that anyone can buy now. Fully redesigned body with significantly higher
composite percentage and comes with the best engine in the world for narrowbodies - the
P&W GTF. And Russia will be happy.
Before you guys and gals bash b, hop over to Zerohedge citing Dallas Morning News revealing
FAA database Pilots on Boeing 737Max complained for months...Manual inadequate ...criminally
insufficient .just for starters.
I was a big fan of the 6-part BBC doco series Black Box from the 1990s. The main conclusion
drawn was that the industry is way too fond of blaming as many mishaps as possible on Pilot
Error, and way too slow to react to telltale signs that a particular aircraft model might
have a fatal flaw. There was a tendency to ignore FAA edicts for inspection of a suspected
design weakness. Two cases that come to mind were incorrectly locked DC 9 cargo doors ripping
off with a big chunk of the plane plus half a dozen occupied seats, and a tendency of 727s to
nose-dive into the "surface" at Mach 0.99.
I'll be very surprised if any part of b's analysis, conclusions and predictions turns out
to incorrect.
Lights in Venezuela on.
US Boeing stocks down.
More evidence for the Lockheed f-16 downing. Reports it was a dogfight between an old MiG-21
(with modernised radar and missiles) that brought the modern US Lockheed f-16 down and maybe
not from a launch of MiGs modern bvr missile.
The problem with a "new" airplane is the Western Content. Over a certain percentage, the
US basically controls the situation. Another issue is servicing the things. If an airplane is
sitting in Podunk Airport with a broken widget, the airline wants it fixed right now! Some
planes like the 737 have been around for decades and there are probably parts for it - even
at Podunk. A new plane will probably be grounded until a new part is transported in - a
process which will take many hours even in the best of circumstances. Advantage to the 737
and other 'legacy' airplanes.
Just saw an interesting headline at Reuters - I'd suppose it is some friendly advice from
Wall Street disguised as "news".
Change "watchdog" to "lapdog" and that would be about right. It seems to me a sensible
proposal, for if Boeing must take a beating out of this, the company ought to at least adopt
a pose of "really caring" and "doing the right thing". Try for the brownie points.
@ Zachary Smith who wrote
"
It seems to me a sensible proposal, for if Boeing must take a beating out of this, the
company ought to at least adopt a pose of "really caring" and "doing the right thing".
"
China is coming to teach the West morals which are currently ranked below profit and
ongoing private control of global finance
The Ethiopian airlines flight was an international flight, so the pilots will have been
certified to international standards. I don't know the details of international standards for
type training, but you are basically saying that the fault is not with Boeing, it is with the
type training of international pilot crews. Can you elaborate and does this mean that we are
equally in danger regardless of the aircraft model and that it is just coincidence that both
these crew failures were on 737 Max models?
The evidences and recognizably legitimate information (there is always a lot of
through-the-hat blather-yap from internet-"engineers") suggests thrust angle, not structure
or CG destabilization. "larger" engines are not necessarily significantly heavier, but,
today, and if more efficient, will be larger diameter for more fan, for more thrust (which in
jet and fan engines is more power). Larger diameter nacelles will require modification of
placement, higher, lower, larger weight will require modification of placement, forward,
backward. Clearance restrictions may require modification of engine thrust-line angle,
relative to fuselage, and fuselage-fit control surface lines (which include flight surfaces).
Thrust changes with thrust changes, which means thrust-angle change will change thrust-effect
at differing thrust amounts: Take-off and climb thrusts are near maximums, wherefore angular
component will be near max then (cruise maximums are less, or less effective, or radical, for
altitude air thinning).
What this means is that if larger engines on a 737 MAX, for larger bulk are slightly
angled for clearance,the angling may have little effect except in specific instances and
attitudes, such as take-off and climb. It sounds as if Boeing angled thrust slightly for
engine fitting, and assumed a computer control fix could handle the off-line thrust component
effect during the short duration times it was sufficient to effect flight characteristics,
which, if the thrust-angling was up, would add a nose-up tail-down thrust rotation component,
greater at greater power. to compensate which the software would add nose-down control
surface counteraction, as incident described.
What it sounds like the pilot in the first, non-crash, case most likely did, that saved
the aircraft, was not 'disable' an automatic system he had no information about, for it being
not intended for disablement, but was reduce power, reducing the off-line thrust effect, so
the auto system backed off. In the other incidents, especially if the airports were
get-em-high-fast airports (to 'leave' the noise at the airport) the pilots would incline to
not reduce power, and would be more likely to get into a war with the too automated
auto-system, the way Tesla drivers can do with their over-automated systems.
All auto-control "AI" systems need human-override options built in, so that human-robot
stand-offs to impact cannot occur. The real culprits in stand-off accident situations are the
techie-guppies who think robotic control can always do everything better, and fail to think
of the situation where the "right" response is wrong.
Lion Air's engineers had previously identified and tried to fix issues with the jet that
crashed in October 2018.
The day before the jet took off from Jakarta airport and crashed, killing all 189 onboard,
one of its Angle of Attack sensors had been replaced by engineers in Denpasar. Unfortunately
the source I checked (see link below) doesn't say if this replacement AoA sensor was the one
linked to the computer running the MCAS on the flight.
Delta once initiated a fuel saving measure whereby aircraft were insufficiently topped off
with fuel to prevent pilots from wasting fuel. Once this information began to leak, the
measure was ended.
Thanks for Bean Counters! I so much wanted to use Bean Counters in my rant but thought I
should stick to their standard appellation....
Bean Counters need to be taken seriously because they are not going to go away in any form
of social organization and represent where the rubber meets the road when it comes to social
decision making/risk management
Bean Counters (along with their bosses) need to be required to place morals as a higher
value than profit and forced to operate with maximum public transparency and input; then, all
will be good.
Thank you for the accurate information. The basic problem seems to be that the
low-consumption engines protrude too far. A well-designed, reliable aircraft becomes a faulty
design. To try to solve this using software is a precarious approach. The FAA should have
rejected this in principle. But because to design an aircraft completely from scratch
naturally takes longer and would have given the competitor Airbus time to take over the to
much market share, this 'solution' was accepted. This type of corruption will cost the u.s. a
lot.
But first let's wait for Tronald's tweet, which will certainly be aired by tomorrow at the
latest, in which he states that the 737 Max is a great, great aircraft - if not the best
ever...
There is no doubt that both Boeing and FAA are to blame, but we pay the Government to ensure
safety. Businesses have always chased profit, some more ruthlessly than others. But when
the real corruption sets in then the Government regulator works for the businesses at the
expense of the public . Regarding FAA reputation, there was a time when US was the leader
in aviation, military as well as commercial. This means that the best experts were in US and
thus FAA had the best and the most knowledgeable people. It is similar with FDA, all
countries in the World used to follow the touchstone drug approvals by FDA. Now the
"Federal" in any US acronym has become a synonym for "Corruption" (FBI
anyone?).
The expertise does not matter any more, only greasing of the hands does. In the old times,
anyone from FAA whose signature was on this planes approval to fly would get a life sentence
in jail. But 330 people dead is less than a days worth of US global victims - business as
usual for US. It is just that these victims are getting much more publicity than the silent
victims. We will be lucky if anyone influential from FAA even resigns let alone goes to jail.
There will be many more dead before the World understands this new reality.
Would you fly on any Boeing plane designed or delivered after the company was taken over
by the Wall Street wizards in the 90s?
Re the engineers - they agreed to build an out of balance aircraft (thrust vs weight and
drag) and to try and rectify this with software. What we will do for money. Both the bean
counters and engineers are at fault, perhaps the beancounters and shiney butts more so as
they did not inform buyers and pilots of the faults.
Posted by: fast freddy | Mar 12, 2019 8:26:15 PM | 52
(Fuel 'economy')
QANTAS once decreed that pilots rely on brakes and treat reverse thrust as emergency-only
procedure, until a 747 skidded off the end of a runway with the nose-wheel inside the cabin
and bruised engines = lots of down-time + very large repair bill.
Not just Delta; Ryanair did the same, at least until there was a major storm in Spain
(Valencia, I think) and all flights had to be rerouted to other airports. That was fine, with
dozens of planes flying around waiting for a window to land, until the handful of Ryanair
planes that had been rerouted to Madrid and other places called for emergency landings,
because they didn't have enough fuel to fly for even 30 minutes longer than planned
flights.
I'm still amazed that the EU regulators and EU fucking commission didn't downright dismantle
such a bloody greedy and downright criminal company. That they basically did nothing is proof
enough, imho, of the insane level of capitalism-worship and of corruption going on in
Brussels (of course it's even worse in Washington DC, but that's basically a given).
the toronto star is carrying this story
Headline:
"Ottawa exempts Boeing 737 Max jets from standards meant to minimize passenger injuries"
"Air Canada and WestJet are flying the Boeing 737 Max aircraft exempt from regulatory
standards meant to limit passenger injuries in the event of an accident, the Star has
learned."
B is right. This is a criminal act of deception and fraud thats cost hundreds their lives.
Boeing executives responsible should be prosecuted and then jailed.
Instead the safety agency regulating them will cover it up, backed by the criminal
congress.
We see similar crimes against humanity being committed in many other areas. FDA, CDC, EPA,
FCC , USDA, etc covering up for Big Agra, Big Pharma, Big Telecom with dangerous products
like vaccines, glyphosate,4G/5G, GMO foods, gene edited livestock, etc. Safety standards are
lax and inadequate, safety testing is minimal and in some cases fraudulent or completely
lacking. Defects and adverse effects are covered up. A revolving door between these agencies
and the industry they cover presents significant conflict of interest. These industries
finance congressional members campaigns. Public safety is sacrificed for the greater good
(profits and personal gain). Whistleblowers are muzzled, attacked or ridiculed as the MSM are
their lap dogs.
That said, the airline industry has had a remarkable safety record over the last 30 years if
you can overlook their failure to have adequate locks on cockpit doors in 2001. However, the
lack of competition and increasing corruption and continuing moral decay we see in society ,
government and industry has obviously taken its toll on the industry. This is inexcusable.
Heads should roll (dont hold your breath).
Congress flies on these aircraft to and fro from Washington to their districts. It is to
their interests to have these Boeing 737 permanently grounded.
Re: 59 Bevin, "Ottawa exempts Boeing 737 Max jets from standards meant to minimize passenger
injuries"
- what this means is that Washington called Ottawa and ordered little Justin that he had
to allow the 737 8's to fly and Justin said yes sir! However, someone at the Transportation
Safety Board of Canada, told Justin that the threat these plane pose to travellers was so
obvious that they couldn't just ignore it and that they would instead have to issue a waiver
to show that they have done due diligence - apparently this person or someone else within the
department then called the Star in order to leak the information and embarrass Justin into
reversing his decision. I imagine tomorrow at 4:00pm during the question hour, Justin will
get raked through the coals over his - Justin's whole defense of his actions during the Lavin
scandal has been "I needed to protect Canadian jobs", I imagine the NDP or Conservatives will
then retort something along the lines of "you'll break the law to protect Jobs, why won't you
obey the law to protect Canadian lives!", I should point out that 8 Canadians were killed in
the most recent crash in Ethiopia
Steven is correct. Totally correct. I suspect that he is an airline pilot, as am I. Everybody
else is wrong at least in part and most between 50% and 100%(The description of the cause of
the QANTAS hull loss).
Pilots MUST know all about aircraft systems operation. It is crazy for Boeing to have
functions not in the AFM.
The system in question is not operative with autopilot engaged. In manual flight if at any
time one gets an uncommanded stab trim movement one should immediately disable electrical
trim(One switch, half a second, no "procedure" required. In manual flight if the trim wheel
moves and you hadn't touched the trim switches you have uncommanded trim. Immediately disable
electrical trim.
There is procedure for reestablishment of electrical trim, that does take time. The defeat
of the runaway trim does not take time. B737 has provision for manual trim(but it's very
slow.
I grew up reading Boeing's weekly employee newspaper. Times have changed too much since then.
Moving the headquarters from Seattle to Chicago and a second 787 assembly line in South
Carolina to bust their unions are proof that Boeing is a multinational corporation superior
to national governments. The company is the Empire's armorer for profit. It is criminal to
design an unstable passenger airplane that must be controlled by fly by wire sensors and
computers to stay in the air. The problem is the aircraft industry duopoly and deregulation.
Airbus has lost at least three aircraft to problems with the pilot computer interface. I was
shocked when NBC put this first last night. I though it would be silenced. I blame Trump
Derangement Syndrome. His trade wars and dissing have ticked off the world. When China
grounded the 737 Max 8 everybody followed to show what they really think about the North
American Empire. This could be devastating to the last manufacturing industry left in the
USA.
Boeing in my view took a cynical decision. That is, there would only be a few crashes within
a set period. Thus the insurance companies would pick up the tab for their profits. However
the loss of two planes so close together could destroy the company. The aforesaid insurance
companies will not pay a single dime if they can stick corporate murder charges onto Boeing.
This smells of the Ford Pinto scandal where Ford knew that there was a problem with the
fuel system if the car was rear-ended ( the vehicle burst into flames ) but it was cheaper to
pay the compensation than fix the problem.
B is missing the point that fitting new engines caused airplane to take off close to stalling
horizontal speeds and angles at very low altitude and more steeply ascending to flight
altitude and that has left little time for pilots to react. That is very dangerous as much
weaker tail wind may confuse pilots and sensors. To remedy that without recertification AI
software was installed to react faster and overriding actions of pilot who was assumed not be
aware of situation at the moment he had to immediately react at the latest.
Lack of sensor redundancy is also criminal as determination of sensor malfunction is
critical for pilot. That is AI application correcting "human" physical mental deficiencies and that is deadly
trap.
If it goes to court, interesting case will be, whose error was that as MCAS system acted
correctly against pilot based on faulty sensor causing pilot to make mistake recovering from
correct but suicidal software actions.
People must be warned of cultish trust in technology and AI which is ultimate guilty party
together with greed that killed those people.
There are unlimited dollars for any intervention they choose, publicly allocated or not.
There is a reason 21 trillion in pentagon spending is unaccounted for. This does not count
dark money from illicit means used to fund covert operations.
The fact its public just means Trump wants congress to sanction it, which they will.
Seized Venezuela assets will serve as collateral for future reimbursement.
@65 acementhead - "It is crazy for Boeing to have functions not in the AFM"
No, it's criminal. And while all the technical discussion around how to fly a plane is truly interesting,
what's really at issue here is corporate and institutional betrayal of trust.
The corporate aspect is Boeing, obviously. The institutional aspect is FAA, which used to
lead the world in trust when it came to life and death matters.
But now, in what Bloomberg, even while trying to support FAA, has no choice but to report
as a "stunning rebuff" to FAA's integrity, countries around the world are grounding this
flawed plane. Germany, among others, has closed its airspace to the 737.
This situation has only a little to do with how to fly a plane. It has vastly more to do
with the face of capitalism we see leering at us as our families live their last few moments,
on the way to the ground. It has to do with how the corporate spin departments will attempt
to cover up and evade responsibility for these crimes.
And it has to do with how the global consumer market will start to book its flights based
not on price or time or seat location but on make of plane.
And despite your claim that "Everybody else is wrong at least in part..." , I doubt
very much that most of the commenters here are wrong in their appreciation of the
situation.
I don't think Boeing made a decision, they had little choice (stockholders were first, the
jobs were essential to the politicians, and market share would become competitive if Boeing
dropped out), it was the pressure of the system that charted their course.
Capitalism is
about competition in a just, fairly well managed government regulated environment. In order
for capitalism not to over step the bounds of competitive capitalism; government must remain
present, to prevent foul play and to deny all hints of monopoly power...
Capitalism without
an honest government becomes organized crime or, worse, it degenerates to allow private
enterprise and special interest to dictate how the rule making and military arms of
government should be used, against domestic and foreign competition. . Economic Zionism is
what I call this last degenerative stage.
Defensively EZ teaches the winner to completely and totally destroy the
infrastructure, the resources and the people (including competitive personnel with the brains
to develop competition) of those who refuse to conform or those who insist on competing;
offensively , EZ teaches the winner to take all and to take-over, own and keep the
goodies taken from those destroyed, and in the matter of profit making and wealth
keeping EZ teaches only winners are allowed to produce-and -profit everyone else is to be
made to feed the monopoly that eliminated competition produced. The residual of eliminated,
decimated competitive opposition = monopoly power
It is the king of the mountain monopoly that produces the wealth and power and feeds the
corruption that makes the rich richer.
I think this case makes clear, privatization of government responsibility nearly always
turns sour . The Government should take over and keep the operation of all of the
Airlines strictly in government hands (privatization is proven to be problematic). When I
grew up all of the airlines were so tightly regulated they were part of the government; the
airlines were investors and operators following government rules and regulations. pricing was
based on point to point fixed in price and terms (and the same for all airlines) and that was
a time when aircraft design was not so accurate, meals were served and jets were nearly not
existent but still there were very few accidents. Same for the Trucking Industry and the
railroad.. Why should roads be government obligations, but rail, trucks and planes be
privately owned?
I am not a communist or a socialist, I just know that private influence will always find a
way to wrongly influence public sector employees when private interest wants something from
government.
For a number issues/reasons, I quit flying in 2007, vowing never to set foot in an aircraft
again. Trains or ships, okay.
So far so good; the 737 Max just firms my rsolve...
The aircraft did not undergo piece by piece certification or type certification . It
underwent supplemental type certification that shortens the investigative process.
This is a potential disaster for Boeing. The stock is falling and it'll go into free fall
if decision is made to ground this aircraft. FAA will also face a legal tsunami. If this is
the reason they didn't ground the planes yet; it's going to look really damning when the find
themselves in court later.
This is shaping up to be unnecessarily messy for the industry.
Yesterday's Oz edition of PBS Newshour went over most of the topics touched on in b's posting
but stopped short of finger-pointing although it insinuated that Boeing had blundered.
Today's edition posed a question I was going to pose here...
"Should anyone be flying 737MAXes before the black box data has been evaluated?"
The answer, delivered by a female ex-Inspector General (of precisely what I didn't hear) is
"No. Absolutely not!"
@35 steven... i will take that as a compliment, referring to me as a clown.. i have high
regard for clowns, although i don't think there is anything funny about the topic at hand..
innocent people dying and it being based on a corporation that might be negligent in it's
responsibility to it's passengers, is something we will have to wait and find out about.. i
am definitely not thinking it is pilot error here, as you suggest.. i saw what the canadian
airpilot association said - essentially they don't believe Canada should be flying them
either, as i read it..
@43 karlof1.. as i pointed out in the link @7 - the fact canada allows them to continue to
be flown makes no sense to me..poor judgment call is what it looks like to me.. the canuck
gov't and etc are living in the shadows of what b has described about the FAA.. a lot of
credibility is on the line here as i see it..
i apologize for not reading all the comments, as i was out most of the day and just got
back..
"...fitting new engines caused airplane to take off close to stalling horizontal speeds
and angles at very low altitude and more steeply ascending to flight altitude and that has
left little time for pilots to react. That is very dangerous as much weaker tail wind may
confuse pilots and sensors. ..."
This is absolute garbage. Nothing but a "word salad" it has nothing to do with
reality.
The Ethiopian crash is due to a useless pilot. A different crew, on the same plane, the
day before had the same problem. They handled it correctly, which is EASY, and completed the
day's flying without problem. Third world airlines have HUGE numbers of absolutely
incompetent pilots.
Anyone interested in the operational aspects of this should go to an aviation site. PPRUNE
has some good discussion of this event. There are a few idiots posting but very few. Most
people there are very knowledgeable. I had a look at Airliners.net mostly rubbish.
Kalen 69
Installing the new engines changed the angle of thrust.
In a balanced aircraft, engine thrust is pushing centrally on wight and drag.
If the thrust is below center of weight, it will nose up while accelerating. If thrust is
below center of drag, the aircraft will be trying to nose up while cruising.
The original aircraft was most likely balanced, with thrust centered to weight and drag.
Mounting new engines lower means the aircraft will tend to nose up when accelerating, and
nose up during cruise. Relying on sensors and software to keep an unstable aircraft stable is
not a good thing. To not notify pilots of this problem is worse than not a good thing.
@ acementhead with insistence that the pilot was at error.
Without the black box data you are sticking your **ck out a long way. I find it interesting that in both your comments you are insistent that the pilot was the
problem. You wrote in your first comment
"
Pilots MUST know all about aircraft systems operation. It is crazy for Boeing to have
functions not in the AFM.
"
The 2nd sentence is your only criticism of Boeing but then you spend the rest of the comment
describing what the pilot should have done.....before black box data says what
happened.
When a relative asked me recently why did the new Ethiopian plane crash, I generated a
sound-bite like explanation. Before, the civilian airliners were falling out of the sky
because of an immature technology, that is because of the learning curve. Now that the
technology involved is fully mature the airliners are falling out of the sky for profit
taking.
The scariest thing is that 737MAX model was a botched Boeing reaction to the market change
towards budget flight. If the plane manufacturer and the approval authority were prepared to
cut corners so badly to remain "market competitive", one can only imagine the compromises
that budget airlines are making to sell cheap whilst increasing profits. Some airlines must
be treating planes worst than buses are treated by the bus companies.
US citizens entrust their wallets to the private bank, The Federal=Corrupt Reserve, which
prints money and gives it to the most exceptional among the exceptional (did you think that
there was no hierarchy within the exceptionality?). We entrust our heads to the
Federal=Corrupt Aviation Administration whose bureaucrats work for the porky revolving door
consulting jobs that come after a stint in the Corrupt.
As Aussies would say: using software to solve a hardware problem is like putting lipstick on
a pig. More than 300 people dead are a terrible testament to this wisdom.
Yet, it is fascinating that you are blaming the engineers and some others are asking in
the comments for whistleblowers in Boeing and FAA.
Well, if I were an engineer at Boeing I would probably have resigned if asked to do this
design monstrosity of putting unfitting engines on a differently designed plane - creating a
Lego airplane, but I never had a home mortgage over my head. Regarding whistleblowing, we all
know how suicidal it is, why do supposedly intelligent people expect other to be so dumb to
commit one? Before you expect others to self-sacrifice ask yourself if you would do so in
their shoes.
It seems that the U.S. now wants to manipulate the investigation of the Ethiopian Airlines
crash. WSJ
U.S., Ethiopia Maneuver Over Crashed Plane's Black BoxesWashington wants NTSB to download data from recorders, while African nation's officials
prefer U.K. experts.
U.S. air-safety investigators on Tuesday engaged in intense behind-the-scenes discussions
with their Ethiopian counterparts regarding where the black-box recorders found amid the
wreckage of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 will be downloaded, according to people familiar
with the matter.
Kiza 85 "Before you expect others to self-sacrifice ask yourself if you would do so in their
shoes."
"Self sacrifice" ... Most of my life I have been self employed, but for a few years when I
was young and then as I got older and ill health slowed me down, I have worked for
others.
If told to do a job that I believed was destined to fail, I would pull out. What you call
self sacrifice simply comes down to money, and as I put in an earlier comment "what we do for
money" Engineers that put this schumozzel together were simply putting in the hours to
received their pay check at the end of the week with no thought as to the people hurt or
killed when this bodge job failed. The fault is equally with engineers who sell their souls
for money and the bean counters who did not inform purchasers or pilots.
What you wrote is asinine garbage, my friend. Everybody except for bribed FAA dumped B737 Max
8 until notice. It is simply too dangerous to fly.
It is you who are trolling for Boeing, the problem was discovered five months ago never
fixed, blamed pilots despite previous complaints. Now FAA admitted that fact by demanding
software fix in April or they will ground the fleet. PILOT ERROR????? Of course not and they
know it.
Not only worldwide airlines dumped this model so far but also they closed the airspace for
them in EU, China, HK etc.,because the plane is dangerous and may require recertification of
plane and pilots since Boeing lied about it and its flight parameters,p the trust was broken,
they were cheating with deadly consequences was revealed. Expect hundreds of lawsuits, as
American were also onboard.
Interestingly that anti-stalling software cannot be disabled on the ground only in flight
in manual mode only after it was engaged exactly for reasons I mentioned about near-stalling
dangerous flight parameters.
US Boeing are very much competing with France airbus and also the coming Chinese Russian
airliner.
The US is very much batting for the home team (as the mad monk told the Australian
Broadcasting Commission to do so).
Is it really so hard to connect the secrecy about MCAS and why it was needed in the first
place? The lawyers will have a ball of the decade with this: the defendant created a secret
software solution to turn a Lego airplane into a real airplane, made the software dependent
on a single sensor, and made it difficult to switch the software off.
The networked Western pilots learned how to compensate for the faulty design, but
non-networked foreign pilots never got in on the flying tricks needed for this new plane
because it was never been in their training. Also, the critical sensor may not be available
on an airport in Ethiopia or Indonesia or .....
I cannot believe that Boeing shares dropped only 7.5%, this is a statement of how
untouchable Boeing is and how protected it will be by the Corrupt.
The Last but not LeastTechnology is dominated by
two types of people: those who understand what they do not manage and those who manage what they do not understand ~Archibald Putt.
Ph.D
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