...one can generally infer the actual intent of a system
by assuming
that a surviving system is providing
desirable functions to those who decided
to create it.
Bureaucracies are systems of power -- social organizations
whose purpose is to control material, informational, and especially human resources.
And as such they very quickly deviate from stated external goals replacing
them with internal goals of top bureaucrats.
One way to view corruption is to see it as the way of getting something that
should not be for sale by those who have the legal status as trustees of persons
or property:
“The corrupt buy or sell what was not supposed to be for sale – a vote, for
example, or public property. They turn to personal advantage their legal
status as trustees of persons or property. Or they grant only to a privileged
few what is purportedly available to all or available only through open and
fair competition.”
This represents corruption of the worst kind, corruption of institutional purpose. If you think about it "turning official position into source of personal advantages"
is the essence of behavior of bureaucrats. In a way this is immanent feature not
a deviation. So the legitimate question is "How do modern organizational forms permit
it, and what do they do to deter it?" not "How to eliminate it?" The latter is
naive.
In one of his earlier writings, Karl Marx described bureaucracy like this:
"The principle of its knowledge is...authority, and its
mentality is the idolatry of authority.
But within bureaucracy the spiritualism turns into crass materialism,
the materialism of passive obedience,
faith in authority, the mechanism of fixed and formal behavior, fixed principles,
attitudes, traditions. As far as the individual
bureaucrat is concerned, the aim of the state becomes his private aim, in the
form of the race for higher posts, of careerism."
Any large enterprise or a department in a large corporation should be viewed
as a political coalition, not merely as a functional unit that produces specific
type of goods or serves. Typical case of autocratic manager ("kiss
up kick down") is just one political form: monarchy reproduced in the firm with
all typical attributes (court of sycophants, etc). That means that the fundamental
assumption that large public firms maximize profits "as if" an individual owner/decision
maker was running the firm is deeply, fundamentally wrong in case of bureaucratic
organizations. They behave quite differently. In a large public company conflict
exists on several levels:
Managerial vs. shareholder compensation vs. survivability and
the future of the firm,
Short-run vs. long-run goal setting (intersects with (1) especially
if options are used for managerial compensation). ,
Conflict between the labor and management, recently fought in the
area of outsourcing.
If we view the public business firm as a Political Coalition it is clear that
the firm’s executive is like a party leader. “His problem …[is] to select a coalition
so as to maximize the difference between the demands of his coalition members and
the potential return from the environment of the coalition.” [March, p. 674.
Important concept here is the concept of the minimum-winning
coalition. It is related to situation in US Senate: when building
a coalition in Senate, it is important not to give away more than needed for 51
votes.
The book Bureaucratic Phenomenon by Crozier's was a landmark in
the development of both the sociology of organizations and the study of French society
in the 1960s. He analkysed the role of trade unions in the US and France during
the cold war.
This led to his main cultural finding that in bureaucracies exists
the fear of face-to-face communication.And it
requires impersonal mediation to avoid confrontation with those in authority.
That's why number of layers of management never reflects that real necessities of
the organization.
Ashutosh has over 18 yrs of exp. in managing business & IT teams. He holds a Bachelors degree in Electronics Engineering and a
In this lesson, you will explore the things that make organizations complex. You will understand various strategies for reducing
the complexity of an organization and the benefits of this reduction.
Organizational Complexity
Imagine that you work for a large organization. Not only does this organization have several departments but lots of different
projects are going on with several people working on each project. If this was your company, you'd be considered a complex organization.
To really understand this term, it's helpful to break down the definition.
Organizational complexity is how multiple entities of an organization differentiate among themselves. It refers to the
number of resources that are involved in a division, project, or team. If the size of the organizational structure or system is huge
that organization is said to be complex.
For example, a school is considered a less complex organization as compared to a hospital, simply because a hospital requires
a large diversity of specialists and doctors in order to function properly. Organizations that utilize underlying technology are
also considered complex, like a nuclear plant or Amazon's data center. To really understand organizational complexity, it's important
to understand why an organization might be complex.
Sometimes it's not bad for an organization to be complex. There are a few reasons that an organization might be complex, including:
Multiple stakeholders, like customers, suppliers, regulators, investors, media, and competitors
Multiple organizational structures, like divisions, subsidiaries, and joint ventures
Multiple people are involved in completing a particular job
Multiple steps that have to be followed in a process to get a job done
Now that we know why an organization might be complex, let's look at the strategies for simplifying organizational complexity.
Strategies
In many organizations, complexity poses a recurring challenge for management. It impedes competitiveness and lowers employee morale
and retention. In a study by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), more than half of executives at large companies around the world
said that organizational complexity cuts into their profits. The effect of organizational complexity is found more in the IT and
technology industry than in any other industries.
Many companies have taken a variety of steps to reduce organizational complexities. Among the strategies that have been applied
are:
Avoid Strict and Complicated Rules
The first step in reducing the organizational complexity is to avoid strict and complicated rules and adopt a lean thinking process
that helps prioritize and optimize the organization's management efforts. It will also save time, which can be devoted to other important
activities.
Improve Customer Engagements
Apart from employees in sales and marketing, employees in development teams can also have regular interactions with the customers
that help in understanding how they use products or services. Getting regular feedback and other interactions can add value to the
products. Better understanding the customer can help to simplify the complexity.
Who are the 50 "former" intelligence professionals and what is their political
affiliation? It has now boiled down to politics and is no longer putting country first.
First order of business should be to abolish the government employees union. The second
should be to abolish the Civil Service Commission.
turbojarhead , 9 hours ago
Well, imagine if CreepyJoe DOES steal the election-think how stunning it is that the
Chinese (for a start) have terrabytes of blackmail info on the president of the USA..pretty
frightening..
REDinFL , 8 hours ago
True, but it also will be obvious that it will do no good. "Leverage" isn't leverage if
it's just a "so-what?"
Hal n back , 8 hours ago
sure, but our real problem will be his far left policies
Unknown User , 9 hours ago
First order of business should be to abolish the government employees union.
WTF? How about abolish the crony pro-corporate government?
BrutusTheBomber , 9 hours ago
How about both?...
WHATDIFFERENCEDOESITMAKE , 8 hours ago
Its all the same with our bureaucracy, they are the real tools behind the scene.
Tristan Ludlow , 8 hours ago
The crony pro-corporate government is made up of individuals who are protected by the
government employee unions and are also protected by the civil service commission.
You can't discipline or fire any of them without extensive investment. Time, money,
manpower. When you do have the goods on them, they simply retire and get their pensions. Does
Lois Lerner ring a bell as a good example?
Lyndy33 , 8 hours ago
Abolish 50 intel officers. The day before Tet 1968 the intel officer told us the
Vietnamese will shoot guns in celebration of Tet, no worry. He didn't mention they would be
shooting at us. Intelligence officer is a misnomer.
REDinFL , 8 hours ago
Or, a potential oxymoron. Always wondered abut the derivation of the word. Then, as I got
out into the world, I found out.
Quia Possum , 8 hours ago
The former intelligence professionals signed the letter on condition of anonymity.
Nonsense. They started managing it early. A couple weeks ago they took US passengers off the
infected cruise ship and flew them in tight security to isolation facilities in various
places. One of those facilities is at a hospital here in Spokane, and they've been training
and waiting for four years. This is the first use of the facility. I'd call that preparation.
"The staff members were sent to Travis Air Force Base and March Air Reserve Base and were
ordered to enter quarantined areas, including a hangar where coronavirus evacuees were being
received. They were not provided training in safety protocols until five days later..."
"Without proper training or equipment, some of the exposed staff members moved freely
around and off the bases, with at least one person staying in a nearby hotel and leaving
California on a commercial flight. Many were unaware of the need to test their temperature
three times a day."
"The first American case of coronavirus in a patient with no known contact with hot zones
or other coronavirus patients emerged near Travis Air Force Base this week."
This country is so scr*wed. Trump and his band of completely incompetent people will lead to
thousands infected and hundreds dead. I think the only upside is that this debacle will end
with the removal of Trump from office. How can any thinking person let this happen?
Yeah well, the merry band of Trump Grifters and Cronies can easily turn a disaster into a
catastrophe. The latest info shows that the people charged with quarantining the infected
people from the cruise ship in No Cal were under trained and did not have protective
equipment. Now there is an infected case from that same county that is not traced to China
travel. Workers who complained were told "they weren't good team players".
The refusal by some Trump followers to even acknowledge the ineptness and incompetence (see below), is Jim-Jones-level
(Jonestown) cult behavior. A real moral/spiritual sickness with self-deception at its core.
---------
"The staff members were sent to Travis Air Force Base and March Air Reserve Base and were
ordered to enter quarantined areas, including a hangar where coronavirus evacuees were being
received. They were not provided training in safety protocols until five days later..."
"Without proper training or equipment, some of the exposed
staff members moved freely around and off the bases, with at least one person staying in a
nearby hotel and leaving California on a commercial flight. Many were unaware of the need to
test their temperature three times a day."
"The first American case of coronavirus in a patient with no known contact with hot zones
or other coronavirus patients emerged near Travis Air Force Base this week."
"The staff members were sent to Travis Air Force Base and March Air
Reserve Base and were ordered to enter quarantined areas, including a
hangar where coronavirus evacuees were being received. They were not
provided training in safety protocols until five days later..."
"Without proper training or equipment, some of the exposed
staff members moved freely around and off the bases, with at least one
person staying in a nearby hotel and leaving California on a commercial
flight. Many were unaware of the need to test their temperature three
times a day."
"The first American case of coronavirus in a patient with no known contact
with hot zones or other coronavirus patients emerged near Travis Air
Force Base this week."
In fact, other Trump policies will probably contribute to the spread. What happens when
illegal immigrants start catching the virus? In general, they are trying to avoid all contact
with the government, and cannot afford to pay for health care, so they are not likely to seek
early treatment. Many of them have jobs that involve handling food or cleaning living spaces.
I'm not advocating that we ignore illegal immigration, but I think there are situations in
which it makes sense to turn a judicious blind eye to the problem. I don't think this
administration is capable of that kind of nuance.
Interesting, but we are not even close to that. Still only 60 US cases. They might actually
be better conditioned to avoiding the virus, at least in those industries.
Agree. And by all means stay away from places like the upcoming Democratic Primaries and
Caucuses where the risk of catching it can be very high! The Democratic leadership refuses to
cancel them.
Despite a female chief doctor has reported this disease on Dec. 26 last year as a unknown
contagious pneumonia, Chinese officials didn't treat it seriously other than did routine such
as notified UN on Jan. 7 this year.
Only until patients with high fever crowded hospitals' emergency room, then, they realized
this is a big issue.
Hopefully, we won't that happen in US but it is possible.
Government needs to stock necessary medical suppliers, need to select hospitals to treat
this highly contagious diseases, need ... many things but it seems that they only prepare to
brag that through their efforts, this disease doesn't spread.
I agree with 2014-era Donald Trump. We need an expert with "experience in infectious disease
control" in charge of pandemic response.
Yet instead we get the former governor of Indiana.
DJT, 10/17/2014: "Obama just appointed an Ebola Czar with zero experience in the medical
area and zero experience in infectious disease control. A TOTAL JOKE!"
So I understand that Trump has appointed Mr. Pence and two highly placed FINANCIAL ADVISORS
to manage our national response. His priorities could not be more blatant .Why is it that our
Republican legislators are not beating him over the head with this obvious mismanagement of a
potential medical crisis, and allow him to focus on the financial ramifications (and
associated impacts on his reelection campaign)?
"Why is it that our Republican legislators are not beating him over the
head with this obvious mismanagement of a potential medical crisis, and
allow him to focus on the financial ramifications (and associated
impacts on his reelection campaign)?"
Hey, a pile of Coronavirus corpses is just par for the course in MAGA-land.
Trump's constant lying, his focus on appearances instead of reality, his rewarding loyalty
over competence, expertise, and integrity, all of it has hindered the government response to
this crisis. If we avoid the worst, we'll owe thanks to God, certainly not to Trump and his
bunch of liars and incompetents. My 2016 vote for Trump was the worst one I ever cast.
Trump's been very lucky so far, there have been no crises other than those he created
himself. Now we have a real one, and his government's initial response has been muddled at
best.
Appointing Pence is just a way to deflect the blame. Whether Pence can handle the job or
not doesn't matter anyway...Trump will be constantly sticking his nose and Twitter thumbs
into the process and making it impossible for anyone to do the job, even if they were
competent.
If this lasts until November and his polling numbers aren't looking great, a part of me
wonders if he'll 'postpone' the elections out of 'public health' concerns.
But the rest of me tells me that I'm skirting a little too close to the Q crazy line by
thinking about that.
Incompetence is not a bug of the Trump administration. It is a feature.
The Government is the problem, so declared Saint Ronald, and the Donald is the guy who will
finally bring it to its knees, just in time for a pandemic.
Who knew that a moron could not be trusted with the office of POTUS. I did not see this
coming
Bottom line - neither the administration nor Democratic Party response the coronavirus issue
as a public health issue. They all want to score in their political ambitions:
1. At the epidemic lost control in China, the administration is busy to use it to contain
China and hope to achieve de-coupling and de facto economic blockage - travel ban
announced
2. As the epidemic reaches US and stock market tumbles - both sides want their
^&#%$@
Very few politicians care:
1. Do we have a strategy to handle the epidemic if it spread out in US?
2. Do we have enough hospital beds to handle this?
3. Have we designated hospitals to treat this highly contagious diseases (not to mingle
with other patients)
4. Do we have enough supplies to handle an e[odemic
Of course, there are more to be considered.
Meanwhile, politicians and their supporters DESERVE bad outcomes from their political
operations.
If you fire 70% of the admirals and generals
you will increase the military capabilities of the US military by 40%.
They are incompetent hacks who are better on their knees in front of the MIC and Congress
then they are on any battlefield.
At least during WWII we had less of them and no one was hesitant to fire at least some of
them for incompetence. I say sum of them because many of the war hero generals needed to be
removed including Bradly, Eisenhower, Halsey, Nimitz, and even MacArthur.
But today, no one gets fired for anything.
Literally they have a special class of MBA's being generals and and strategic thinkers and
it has turned out to be a disaster for the military and the US.
An example by way of analogy is look at Boeing. How much better would Boeing be if they
fired all the MBA's and replaced them with engineers who loved air planes. Boeing would make a
lot less profit but its planes would be the best in the world.
"... "The cost cannot be measured only in lost opportunities, lives and money. There will be a long hangover of shame. Its essence was summed up by Col. Ted Westhusing, an Army scholar of military ethics who was an innocent witness to corruption, not a participant, when he died at age 44 of a gunshot wound to the head while working for Gen. David Petraeus training Iraqi security forces in Baghdad in 2005. He was at the time the highest-ranking officer to die in Iraq." ..."
"... " 'I cannot support a msn that leads to corruption, human rights abuse and liars,' Colonel Westhusing wrote, abbreviating the word mission. 'I am sullied.' " ..."
In my opinion the most under-reported event of the Iraq war was the suicide of military Ethicist Colonel Ted Westhusing. It was
reported at the end of a Frank Rich column that appeared in the NY Times of 10-21-2007:
"The cost cannot be measured only in lost opportunities, lives and money. There will be a long hangover of shame. Its essence
was summed up by Col. Ted Westhusing, an Army scholar of military ethics who was an innocent witness to corruption, not a participant,
when he died at age 44 of a gunshot wound to the head while working for Gen. David Petraeus training Iraqi security forces in
Baghdad in 2005. He was at the time the highest-ranking officer to die in Iraq."
"Colonel Westhusing's death was ruled a suicide, though some believe he was murdered by contractors fearing a whistle-blower,
according to T. Christian Miller, the Los Angeles Times reporter who documents the case in his book "Blood Money."
Either way, the angry four-page letter the officer left behind for General Petraeus and his other commander, Gen. Joseph Fil,
is as much an epitaph for America's engagement in Iraq as a suicide note."
" 'I cannot support a msn that leads to corruption, human rights abuse and liars,' Colonel Westhusing wrote, abbreviating
the word mission. 'I am sullied.' "
"The tiny pink candies at the bottom of the urinals are reserved for Field Grade and Above." --sign over the urinals in the "O"
Club at Tan Son Nhut Airbase, 1965.
Now that sentiment, is Officer-on-Officer. The same dynamic tension exists throughout all Branches and ranks.
My background includes a Combat Infantry Badge and a record of having made Spec Four , two times. If you don't know what that
means, stop reading here.
I feel that no one should be promoted E-5 or O-4, if they are to command men in battle, unless they have had that life experience
themselves. It becomes virgins instructing on sexual etiquette.
Within the ranks, there exists a disdain for officers, in general. Some officers overcome this by their actions, but the vast
majority cement that assessment the same way.
What makes the thing run is the few officers who are superior human beings, and the NCOs who are of that same tribe. And there
is a love there, from top to bottom and bottom to top, a brotherhood of warriors which the civilian population will forever try
to discern, parse and examine to their lasting frustration and ignorance.
It is the spirit of this nation [Liberty, e pluribus unum and In God We Trust ] that is the binding filament of it all. The
civilians responsible for the welfare of the armed services need to be more fully aware of that spirit and they need to bring
it into the air-conditioned offices they inhabit when they make decisions about men who know sacrifice.
This is another remnant for Bush neocon team, a protégé of Bolton. Trump probably voluntarily appointed this rabid neocon, a
chickenhawk who would shine in Hillary State Department.
Interestingly she came from working class background. So much about Marx theory of class struggle. Brown, David (March 4, 2017).
"Miner's daughter
tipped as Trump adviser on Russia" . The Times.
She also illustrate level pf corruption of academic science, because she got
PhD in history from Harvard in 1998 under Richard
Pipes, Akira Iriye, and
Roman Szporluk. But at least this was history, not
languages like in case of Ciaramella.
Such appointment by Trump is difficult to describe with normal words as he understood what he is buying. So he is himself to blame for his current troubles and his inability
to behave in a diplomatic way when there was important to him question about role of CrowdStrike in 2016 election and creation of Russiagate
witch hunt.
There is something in the USA that creates conditions for producing rabid female neocons, some elevator that brings ruthless female
careerists with sharp elbows them to the establishment. She sounds like a person to the right of Madeline Albright, which is an achievement
With such books It is unclear whether she is different from Max Boot. She buys official Skripal story like hook and sinker. The
list of her book looks like produced in UK by Luke Harding
Being miner daughter raised in poverty we can also talk about betrayal of her class and upbringing.
This also rises wisdom of appointing emigrants to the Administration and the extent they pursue policies beneficial for their
native countries.
She testified in public before the same body on November 21, 2019. [12] While being
questioned by Steve Castor , the counsel for the House Intelligence
Committee's Republican minority, Hill commented on Gordon
Sondland 's involvement in the Ukraine matter: "It struck me when (Wednesday), when you put up on the screen Ambassador Sondland's
emails, and who was on these emails, and he said these are the people who need to know, that he was absolutely right," she said.
"Because he was being involved in a domestic political errand, and we were being involved in national security foreign policy. And
those two things had just diverged." [13] In response
to a question from that committee's chairman, Rep. Adam Schiff
, Hill stated: "The Russians' interests are frankly to delegitimize our entire presidency. The goal of the Russians [in 2016]
was really to put whoever became the president -- by trying to tip their hands on one side of the scale -- under a cloud."
[
The most interesting part of testimony is that CrowdStrike machinations in case of DNC leak which was artificially turns into
Russian hack (and probably not without Crowdstyle server located in Ukraine). As this is connected to Steel which is a hot
spot for the UK government was swiped under the carpet.
She actually met with Steele. She was shown Steele dossier before it was published.
CrowdStrike was mentioned only is passing and was instantly dismissed by rabid neocon Hill.
While this was the central issue with Zelensky administration.
All questioning was about semi-senile Biden, who is probably the most favorable contender on
Democratic side for Trump.
Garryowen in Glory, the 7th Cavalry Regiment at Ap Bu Nho
By a quirk of fate, "D" 2/7 Cavalry, was given the chance to demonstrate the plausibility of
Spinoza's despair several weeks later. A Montagnard agent reported that the 141 st
NVA Regiment was temporarily in position just to the west of the Montagnard resettlement
village of Ap (village) Bu Nho about 20 kilometers southwest of Song Be. This village, like
several others in Phuoc Long province, had been created in the course of earlier years of war
and migration throughout Indochina. It was perfectly rectangular, three streets wide and five
hundred feet long with the long axis running east-west, with a dirt road extending to the tar
two lane road connecting Song Be with the south. The Song Be River passed north-south to the
west of the village. There was a roughly circular patch of woods just northwest of the village.
The wood was about one kilometer in diameter. The river ran along the west side of the wood. On
the eastern side of the wood, there was a large open "field" covered with grass nearly hip
high. The field extended along the whole northern side of the village out to the tar road and
beyond. The inhabitants were three or four hundred in number, living in tribal style in long
houses and other small flimsily built shacks. They had originally lived in the area of Camp
Roland in the northeastern corner of PhuocLongProvince, and had moved or been moved to this
site during the First Indochina War. They were S'tiengan people. The agent was one of them and
lived in Bu Nho.
I drove to Landing Zone "Buttons" with this information to visit the command post of the
Second Battalion, Seventh Cavalry, then operating out of the landing zone. In the underground
facility, I talked to the S-2 (Intelligence Staff Officer) of the battalion. I had been
providing this officer with information for some time. An example had been the information that
led to the BDA mission mentioned above. While we two intelligence officers were discussing the
report, the lieutenant colonel commanding 2/7 Cav entered the command post. He was new, having
arrived in country within the previous month, and having joined the battalion the week before.
In his late thirties, blond, and in his new found dignity, he had a "lean and hungry look." The
S-2 introduced me to him, told him how valuable the detachment's information had been in the
past. The Bn. CO seemed to have a hard time understanding who I was. In talking to me he seemed
to be more interested in "showing off" for his operations staff who had followed him into the
bunker than in listening. The idea of an intelligence officer resident in the province who had
brought him information seemed more than he could handle. After a few minutes, he tired of the
whole thing, and asked to be shown on the map. After a glance, he asked the S-3, another
superior being and soi-disant tactical virtuoso, what "D" Company was doing the next
day. The major said that "D" was in LZ "Buttons" resting and refitting. The CO casually said
"Well, put'em in there at first light." His finger indicated the big, grassy clearing in the
angle between Bu Nho and the round woods to the west. The S-2 looked at me, opened his mouth
and then said nothing.
I thought What the hell! I don't work for this man.. "Colonel," I began, "there is at
least a battalion of the 141 st NVA Regiment in that wood. They are the best troops
in the 7 th NVA Division, which is the best in their army. They have been in that
wood for at least two weeks. They will be ready." The CO was irritated. "That's all right,
Captain," he said. "You are really a captain, aren't you? We'll take it from here. Most of
these reports are untrue. Why, when I was here as an adviser in the Delta, none of the stuff we
got from you people was true." So, the man didn't believe the report and was just
looking for something for "D" Company to do. This was a delicate situation. "I must
protest, sir," I began. "I would be negligent..." "That will be all!" the CO barked. "Good
Day!" The sycophants on the staff bristled in the hope that their master would recognize them
as the good dogs they were.
I drove back to Song Be and called my higher headquarters to tell them that a disaster was
about to occur. The foreseeable reply from 525 th MIG in Saigon was that they would
not attempt to interfere with the exercise of command by a line officer in command of troops in
the field. I then asked for a helicopter to come to Song Be to be at my disposal the next day.
This was agreed. The "Huey" showed up early and I was sitting in the thing at 3,000 feet
listening to the 1 st Cavalry Division when the fire preparation of Ap Bu Nho
commenced.
" They will not grow old, as we who are left grow old,
Age will not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun, and in the mornings,
We shall remember them.."
A.E. Housman - inscribed in Washington Archat VMI
First, there was a lot of fire from corps heavy artillery batteries, including the one at
Victor 241 airfield. Then, there were Tacair fighter strikes with bombs and rockets, then there
was a massive fire preparation by armed helicopters, of which the 1 st Cavalry
Division had many. The bombs, shells, and rockets searched the round wood and the big, grassy
field. While the armed helicopters were still working on the patch of forest, the twenty odd
"Huey Slicks", (transports unarmed except for a machine gun on each side), swooped onto the
scene from the east, having picked up "D" Company at LZ "Buttons." Throughout the preparation,
there had not been a shot fired from the area under bombardment. I could hear the Cavalry
Division talking about it on the air. Their opinion was that this would be a "cold" LZ, and
that the enemy were not present. With mixed feelings, I watched the assault unfold. The landing
was in two columns of helicopters, which were perhaps fifty yards apart. There were about ten
helicopters in each column. The cavalry troops scrambled out and headed for the round wood.
The 141 st NVA Infantry Regiment had held its fire throughout the preparatory
bombardment, a remarkable display of fire discipline. Now, as the helicopters lifted in unison,
they opened fire in a roaring, ripping demonstration of just how much firepower a well trained
and disciplined light infantry force can possess. Four "Slicks" were shot down on the LZ. All
four exploded. It was not likely that anyone lived. The fire balls killed a number of "D"
Company men nearby. Several more helicopters were badly damaged and departed smoking. The NVA
had organized the defense of the wood in such a way that interlocking bands of machine gun fire
from log and earth bunkers cris-crossed out in the field. The guns appeared to have been laid
so that the fire was about two to three feet above the ground. The inevitable dips in the
ground (dead space) were filled with the fires of mortars shooting from positions behind the
bunker line. A general in the War Between the States remarked on a similar occasion that "not
even a chicken could live under that fire." It was thus. The NVA were all in the round wood.
The bunkers themselves, as later inspected, were solid with two layers of hardwood logs
separated by a foot of packed earth and with another layer of earth on top. They had firing
embrasures six inches high, were sited for mutual support and were staggered in depth. "D"
Company 2/7 Cavalry was "dead meat" out in that field in the bright sunlight. They could not
move forward and to move back meant rising which was certain death.
The fighters and armed helicopters returned to repeatedly bomb and rocket the woods. Corps
artillery joined in whenever the aircraft left off.. It did not help. 12.7 mm heavy machine
guns and RPG-7 teams engaged the aircraft from within the NVA position. The iron grip of the
141 st NVA held "D" Company fast. Everyone was pinned flat on the LZ, face to the
dirt.
Additional Cavalry troops began to be inserted into the fight. The rest of 2/7 Cav landed to
the east of "D" Company, 1/5 Cav landed north of the round wood, and 2/12 Cav landed to the
west of the Song Be river, west of the round wood. All these insertions were by helicopter.
What they discovered, as they closed on the wood, was that the 141 st had organized
the position for a 360 degree, all around defense. The fire and bunkers were just as solid on
the other sides as on the east. The position was so large and so well put together that it may
well have contained the whole 141 st Regiment. The reinforcements got nowhere. The
only difference between their situations and that of "D" Company was that they were not pinned
down at close quarters. All of these units took substantial losses in this fight.
Wounded from "D" Company crawled toward the eastern side of the clearing, toward the earthen
"dike" that carried the main north-south road. They could be seen with the naked eye from the
air. As some got across the road, Med-evac helicopters (Dustoffs) began landing in the fire
shadow of the road to pick them up. The warrant officer flying the 525 th MIG "Huey"
told me he intended to land to pick up wounded. Altogether, the strange helicopter with the
blue boomerang insignia on the tail boom, made four trips from LZ "Buttons" to Ap Bu Nho
carrying 2/7 Cav's wounded. After a while, the floor of the bird was slippery, and everyone in
back was busy trying to keep some of them alive long enough to deliver them to the medics. The
helicopter took a number of hits.
About four in the afternoon, the CO of 2/7 Cav made a fatal error. He requested a napalm
strike on the round wood. December was the height of the dry season, and the wind was blowing
steadily from the west. This could be seen by the direction that smoke was drifting across the
battlefield. The napalm strike went in, delivered by two F-4s. It may have done some damage to
the NVA, but what it did for certain was to light a grass fire that swept toward the east,
toward "D" Company. The Company now faced an ancient dilemma. My great-grandfather had spoken
of having faced the same problem in the Wilderness in 1864. The choice was to lie prone and
burn or stand and be shot. According to the medics, most preferred to be shot. In the course of
this process, "D" Company's commander, a young captain, who happened to be a Citadel man,
decided he had had enough. With his pockets full of grenades, he crawled as close as possible
to the nearest machine gun bunker, and with half a dozen of his men firing in support he rushed
the bunker throwing grenades, jumped down into the position and killed all within with his
pistol. With this crack in the enemy position, "D" Company moved forward behind him and by
nightfall had broken the outer defense perimeter of the 141 st . They held half a
dozen bunkers. The sun went down. The fight ended. All night long the Cavalry Division moved
forces into the area to finish the 141 st the next morning.
" Good! Whenever you find a real bastard, especially a dumb bastard
make sure you stake'em down, through the heart, through the heart!"
LTC (Ret.) Walter P. Langto his son, June, 1969
"It is not a mercy to tolerate incompetence in officers , think of the poor
men.."
Robert E. Lee , thinking of Bristoe Station
In the morning, the enemy had gone, departed, taking their dead and wounded with them. They
had slipped out through some gap in the surrounding lines and simply vanished. "D" Company was
extracted and mustered at LZ "Buttons" that afternoon. There were 12 men in the ranks. 52
killed and over 70 wounded was the "Butcher's Bill" at Ap Bu Nho. This may have been the worst
single day's bloodletting in the Seventh Cavalry since the Little Big Horn in 1876. There too,
they had been commanded by a fool. At the muster, the company commander, who was unscathed,
stood dry eyed before his remnant while strong men wept, among them, me. I asked the battalion
commander and the S-3 how they spelled their names and left. I would have happily killed them
both with my own hand, and they seemed to know that.
I sent a report of the action disguised as an intelligence report on the performance of the
141 st . It went to every echelon of command above 2/7 Cavalry. Under investigation
by division headquarters, the lieutenant colonel later claimed that the agent's report had been
a "provocation" intended to lure him into an ambush. The Division commander was not deceived.
525 th MIG saw through my subterfuge and I was admonished for responding to the
Operations side's attempt to scapegoat Intelligence for its own failure. This was the first
instance in which I saw this syndrome of the leadership of the intelligence community. I
continued to see it for the rest of my government career." from the memoir of W. Patrick
Lang
This description brings tears to my eyes as well yours in that battle. It graphically
demonstrates the difference between auctoritas and podestas as well as much more. Thank you
for sharing, remembering, and reminding us.
I found the NVA to be a very worthy foe. I learned of the "hold them by the belt buckle"
tactic the hard way. Just south of the DMZ one of our companies stumbled into a Regimental
CP. The Marines were driven back by AK & MG fire. The Marines laid down in the elephant
grass about 50m in front of the forward bunkers while we ran air support "danger close".
After 3 flights of snake & napalm, the company assaulted again just before dark and was
met again with heavy fire. We evacuated our wounded & settled in for the night. When we
moved forward the next morning the scorched bunkers were empty. Trails in the grass showed
that when the Marines pulled back 50m, the NVA had crawled forward about 35m. After observing
a very close air strike, the NVA had crawled back into their buckers & thwarted our
second assault. Discipline & guts.
Booby,
I would say they were desperate. Did whatever they thought would get a edge over the US
troops. Considering the number of casualties they took, they never had a easy life.
desperate ? Think you're living in a parallel universe ... Maybe it's a consolation to you
and It does something for your ego, but not sure it's of any help when analyzing why that war
was lost.
Military medicine got steadily better throughout the 20th Century so the ratio of killed
to wounded became lower and lower. Medevac helicopters and forward surgical hospitals made a
big difference, but the 52 KIA here in tis one company were killed outright on the field of
battle. I do not know how many of the WIA died of their wounds. Remember there were a lot of
casualties in the other units of our encirclement. The NVA had a widely distributed system of
underground hospitals supplied through the Laos/Cambodia corridor (HCM Trail) but they had to
live long enough to be carried to them. I agree with Booby that the NVA were a remarkably
tough and dedicated enemy. pl
BTW, I have looked at this place in Google Earth. The Vietnamese government has built a
widespread network of hydroelectric dams in the highlands since the war. As a result the site
of this combat is buried under a prosperous Vietnamese town. This is one of the few instances
of the outright defeat of US forces in the field in the war, along with the loss of Lang Vei
SF camp and LZ Albany. At Song Be a few miles away there are actual memorials to the
protracted battle in February-March 1969 but not at this place. pl
Just finished watching an hour PBS episode
about James "Maggie" Magellas the most
decorated soldier in the history of the 82nd
Airborne. To paraphrase" How could I send
young 18 and 19 year olds to lead and I stay
in the rear. " A remarkable man for anytime,
he is still alive at 98. That we would have more
like him in all fields of endeavor.
Thank you Colonel. That story really brings it home to me. I was on a somewhat similar
disastrous mission during the 1972 NVA Easter offensive. The NVA had taken Quang Tri City,
and we were inserting South Vietnamese soldiers at key points around the city of Quang Tri to
cut off supplies. Unfortunately, I can't tell you anything about the tactical situation on
this particular mission. I was but a WO1 front seat co-pilot gunner in a Cobra gunship at the
time. On this particular mission, we (about 10 gunships as I recall) were gun cover for a US
Marine insertion of South Vietnamese marines. There were I think about 15 CH-54 Jolly Greens
full of the marines. At that time, because of the SA-7 heat-seekers, we had to fly low level.
We took massive fire beginning at least 8 or 10 klicks out from the LZ, and then the LZ was
hot. The US Marine pilots told us at least half of the troops were dead or wounded from
ground fire before they ever got to the LZ. Two of the Jolly Greens went down. Actually, I
never made it to the LZ. About 3 kicks out my pilot was hit and the command ship directed us
back to the staging area for the pilot to be attended to. His wound turned out to be
superficial and he was ok. Like I said, I don't know anything about the tactical situation,
but surely there must have been an intelligence failure. Either that, or they felt the risk
was worth the prize. They eventually re-took Quang Tri, but it was several months later.
"I was but a WO1 front seat co-pilot gunner in a Cobra gunship at the time."
WO1? Would there be backseat gunners too.
"At that time, because of the SA-7 heat-seekers, we had to fly low level. We took massive
fire beginning at least 8 or 10 klicks out from the LZ, and then the LZ was hot."
My guess at klicks or kicks, which you use later suggests a distance from a battlefield LZ
to an LZ with a slightly longer "life-span" then the battlefield LZ.
Got that completely wrong. Kicks, klicks?
Sounds like a dangerous missing anyway. You have to be low to target MANPAD's or whatever
it was, but this also endangers you heavily.
WO1 = Warrant Officer grade 1. After grade 1 they are called Chief Warrant officers, or
CW-2,3,and 4. 4 is the highest grade. About half the U.S. Army helicopter pilots were warrant
officers, and half commissioned officers. The warrants flew pretty much full time with no
other command duties, other than flight related command duties.
You can fly the Cobra from either seat, but the primary duty of the front seat is to man
the turret weapons. The back seat primary duty is to fly the aircraft and shoot the wing
store weapons which shoot in the same direction that the aircraft is pointing. The wing store
weapons are rockets and/or 20mm gatling gun. The turret weapons are the 6.62 gatling gun and
the 40mm grenade gun. You can shoot any of the weapons from either seat and fly the aircraft
from either seat, but those are the primary duties. The back seat cannot move the turret but
only fire it in the direction of the aircraft.
Its klicks, not kicks. Sorry for the typo. Its just slang for a kilometer.
When flying a few yards above the ground, tree tops, or buildings, it is more difficult
for a heat seeker to lock on to the heat. Of course then one is more vulnerable to small
arms, but they are the lesser of two evils. Our company commander and his crew were lost to
an SA-7 a few weeks prior to that particular mission.
Thanks FND, I realized at one point I may have read this not carefully enough: You really
made it quite clear with your "because of the FA-7 heat-seekers" - BECAUSE
In other words the Jolly Greens in your story above while higher where a good target for
the heat-seekers, while your mission partly was to ideally find and destroy them before they
could hit them. ...
The problem with trying to understand this as a layman is that there is a high chance you
misunderstand details in context.
What a great bird the Cobra was. The Marines didn't get the Cobra until '69.
When I was there (67-68)we had the huey gunships, and I first saw the Cobra being flown by
the 101st whose AO was next to ours in Northern I Corp. I was fortunate to fly it for over
2000 hours in the National Guard but never got to fly it in combat.
Thank you for posting this. Never having been in combat it is humbling to read what others
have endured, and in this as in many other situations having done so under incompetent
leadership.
all,
found this article that described the life of a VC (I think he may have joined to fight the
french ) fighter who joined the fight in 1950s and fought until the end.
Although the article has been written with a sense of humor in mind, I thought it was a
worthy read.
Indeed interesting, Aka. But strictly no surprise. ...
I encountered the same respect as Pat's shows here for his "battle counterpart", for loss
of a better term, among war correspondents for the ones killed reporting for the other side.
...
FND's comment above triggered memories of their stories and images combined with Pat's
story.
Were Jolly Green's the type of helicopters that did not only carry materials but also
journalists occasionally?
I may be mistaken but that was my basic google impression while looking into military
terms.
Yes, thanks, now I see something FND mentioned above. Although it leaves me at an odd as to
why it makes sense to be able to fly the type of helicopters he flew from both the front and
back-seat. Supposing the design was somewhat meant to help the crew.
Apparently, when I saw some photos years ago my attention was somewhere else. Or it wasn't
the focus of the image. And I cannot ask Horst anymore. Seems bigger then the one I had in
mind, anyway.
A "click" is US Army slang for a kilometer. A "WO1" is a warrant officer. That is a rank
between the enlisted ranks and the commissioned officers, lieutenants and up. The US Army and
US Marine Corps have warrant officer pilots as well as commissioned officer pilots. These
last are normally the commanders. "LZ" means "Landing Zone." This is the place where the
south Vietnamese Marines in this story were to be landed. pl
I looked up LZ. But I understand that LZ could have both a longer existence, or exist for
a slightly longer time then a single LZ for a specific battle. In which case the first type
of LZ would be the starting base? Like LZ "Buttons"?
More specifically were only "2/5 Cav" based at "Buttons" and the others were "inserted
(?)/were brought in" later, as support? Or was the whole 5 cav, I understand, located
there?
In the late '60's a Marine LtCol., William Corson, published a book "The Betrayal"
criticizing US strategy & tactics in VN. In the final chapter he hypothesized that the
Soviet Union could dramatically change the helicopter war in VN any time they wished by
giving the NVA the Strela shoulder fired AA missile. In the Easter Offensive, the Soviets
played that card. Helo & OV-10 losses in the Quang Tri area were devastating & forced
an immediate change of helo tactics. Fly low or die. It took us a decade to develop effective
counter-measures to these missiles.
Years later I had a SNCO who worked for me who had crewed a CH-46 inserting VN Marines
along the coast north of Quang Tri during '72. The LZ brief warned of a "dead" NVA tank in
the LZ. As his AC landed beside the "dead" tank, he saw the turret turn & he was looking
down the barrel. The tank fired; but, either it was too close to the helo or the thin
aluminum skin of the helo didn't activate the fuse & the round went through his AC as a
solid shot.
The SA-7s were indeed deadly. We would rather take our chances flying ground level. The guy
whose helicopter took the tank round is very lucky. I'm glad he and the others made it.
William Corson a very interesting person and I met him long after RVN days.
I had a 10 week course at Ft.Bliss on the REDEYE MANPAD after completing OCS and all my
classmates could do was think about these in the context of AirCav units.
I was in VN in '72 and remember the advent of the SA-7. as an immediate expedient defense
we threw thermite grenades out the doors when we saw one fired. I don't know if that worked
well, but I am still here. I also remember seeing an NVA team fir an RPG at a Cobra. The
missile did not arm and went right through the boom. pl
They also put what we called toilet bowles on the engine exhaust to direct the exhaust up to
the rotors so that the heat would be dispersed, but I don't think it worked that well.
In the largely helicopter transported war an LZ could be either a semi-permanent base for
aircraft as well as a convenient place where troops could be billeted and supplied or the
place where troops would be landed by air in a single operation as in the Quang Tri story. LZ
Buttons was named for some officer's girl friend. I think she was a Red Cross girl in Saigon.
2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment just happened to be based at LZ Buttons just then. During
the VN period US Army infantry and cavalry fighting as infantry were organized by battalions.
The regiment, as in this case, 5th Cavalry, only existed as a tradition. Armored Cavalry
sxisted as a whole regiment and the 11th Cavalry in VN (the Black Horse) were a formidable
group. The US Marines, who, I am sure you know are not part of the Army still had regimental
formations. pl
One lucky Cobra crew. Usually when a helo & an RPG met, it was catastrophic for the
helo. I hated being shot at with RPG's because the projectile moved slow enough that you
could see them coming. Time moves real slowly when you see one coming. I've had them pass
through my rotor disc & still don't understand how the projectile could make it through
without hitting or being hit by a rotor blade.
A CH-46 from my squadron became a part of Marine Corps history after being hit by an RPG
on Mutter's Ridge, just below the DMZ. The climax of the novel "Matterhorn" was based on this
incident. A Company was assaulting a hill that was an abandoned Marine LZ. The NVA were
fighting from the old Marine bunkers. The CH-46 was departing a neighboring hill with
Medevacs when it was hit in the aft pylon by an RPG & burst into flames. The pilot saw a
LZ directly below him & shot an emergency landing. The pilot was unaware that the NVA
held the hill & the Marines were assaulting the hill & engaged in close combat. The
NVA were startled by a flaming CH-46 crashing on them & their defense was disrupted. Some
NVA climbed aboard the burning helo & were trying to take the 50 caliber machine guns.
There was a gunfight between the crew & the NVA in the cabin of the helo. The Marines won
& the NVA abandoned the hill. The Grunts gave our squadron credit for capturing the hill
- a 1st & only in Marine Corps history.
Rumor was that it had to do with the woman's anatomy. I don't know. I didn't know her. At
Dien Bien Phu the French strongpoints were all named for De Castries' mistresses. Isabelle,
etc. V- 241 was a Japanese built airfield from WW2. pl
My oldest uncle was at Dien Bien Phu with "8e bataillon parachutiste de choc". He was one of
the few men in his unit to have survived the battle. I flew back with him to DBP in 2004 and
we visited the battlefield with an former viet Minh vet as a tour guide.
my uncle and him had fought against each other some 50 years earlier, in muddy trenches,
using grenades, flame throwers and bayonets and there they were, two old men, talking to each
other in broken french and broken Vietnamese, remembering those who had not been worn down by
age.
The Vietnamese were very gracious hosts to us, and my uncle had no hard feelings against
them. However, he never forgave the French army generals who had designed the battle plan,
totally underestimating the viet Minh. It is something he has passed onto me and its been
quite useful a reminder sometimes.
Thx for this piece PL !
Patrick's comment reminds me of my limits not only concerning the military but also
suggested by Patrick's comment below: the larger historical context during and after WWII in
which Viet Minh via Ho Chi Ming mutated into Viet Cong. ;)
P.L. and ALL: It has taken sometime for me to formulate a comment to this post and thread.
Why? First because it gives important insights that anyone in the US Army today of any rank
might learn from. Second, while I never served in RVN by spring summer 1968 Artillery OCS at
Ft. Sill was totally dedicated to furnishing officers for the war in RVN. 8 of the 110 in my
graduating class did not serve in RVN. I was one of the eight.
But two things stick in my mind from OCS. The first how to help create a firebase for an
artillery unit. And second how to defend an artillery firebase from ground assault.
Yes, realism had cretp into artillery by summer 1968 and no more emphasis on stopping Soviet
tank armies in northern Europe. 3 members of my OCS class were in firing batteries overrun by
NVA. I believe the two that survived both recieved Silver Stars. One of the survivors after
spiking guns survived by E&E. The other succeeded in defending his battery.
Receiving my draft notice on June 12th, having been married June 10th [and graduated from
Law School June 7th] I realized that despite two years of AFROTC and with rejections from
both the Navy and Air Force in hand over winter 1966-67 for reasons of vision I realized that
not being a Kennedy Father I was destined for RVN in one form or another. So I started
reading: first any Bernard Fall book or article I could get my hands on. Second, because the
Combat Arms were open to me through OCS [Army JAG was giving priority to those who signed up
for the longest service --often up to 10 years (and they almost all served in RVN] it seemed
wise to be in shape and learn how to survive. So before reporting on September 10th, 1967, to
Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri for Basic I read all of S.L.A Marshall's studies of combat in Viet
Nam. Reading some French I stumbled through the travails of the PARA against the Viet Minh. I
also read some biographies of Uncle HO!
THIS POST AND THREAD SHOULD BE POINTED OUT TO DoD leadership AS TO WHY THIS BLOG SHOULD BE
AVAILABLE TO ALL THROUGH its servers.
More later!
BTW there is a move on to ban flechette arty rounds under International Law!
It wasn't our battalion, but we lay alongside it,
So the story is as true as the telling is frank.
They hadn't one Line-officer left, after Arras,
Except a batty major and the Colonel, who drank.
'B' Company Commander was fresh from the Depot,
An expert on gas drill, otherwise a dud;
So Sergeant-Major Money carried on, as instructed,
And that's where the swaddies began to sweat blood.
His Old Army humour was so well-spiced and hearty
That one poor sod shot himself, and one lost his wits;
But discipline's maintained, and back in rest-billets
The Colonel congratulates 'B' Company on their kits.
The subalterns went easy, as was only natural
With a terror like Money driving the machine,
Till finally two Welshmen, butties from the Rhondda,
Bayoneted their bugbear in a field-canteen.
Well, we couldn't blame the officers, they relied on Money;
We couldn't blame the pitboys, their courage was grand;
Or, least of all, blame Money, an old stiff surviving
In a New (bloody) Army he couldn't understand.
Thank you for sharing this riveting excerpt from your memoir. Is this body of work to be
published by any chance? I for one would be grateful for the opportunity to read more of such
a fascinating life.
Brings back a lot of memories. In 1968 I was a senior in high school reading about the
marines at Khe Sahn. In 70-71 I was up on the DMZ with the 1st Bde, 5th Mech that had
replaced the 3rd Marine Division. Spent the first six months at Con Thien, Charlie 4, Dong
Ha, Quang Tri, patrols in the DMZ. Then got promoted to the General's security platoon just
in time to go west when the Vietnamese went into Laos. Got to visit Lang Vei, Khe Sanh, Camp
Carrol, all those places I had read about in high School.
Back in the states in 1972 in college reading again about Vietnam. How the PVA (I think
they prefer that to NVA) had come across the DMZ and captured the provincial capital of Quang
Tri. Went to visit the Traveling Vietnam Memorial Wall today. Didn't last 3 minutes.
This is how the Iraq vets must feel when they read about Ramadi, Fallujah, etc. Shades of
Manstein- Lost Victories?
We had a butter bar who continuously violated procedure by going out on the road before it
was swept in the morning. One day he took off with his driver and another EM, they hit a mine
and all died. Years later the Lt's brother found me via an internet site. His brother's
college fraternity was going to do a memorial tribute and he wanted to know what I knew. I
saw no value in telling him what really happened so I didn't. Nothing like this account but
it sticks with you.
Let me see. Bad judgment, trouble concentrating, impulsive, reckless, hot-tempered. I'd
say there was no telling how many American soldiers that battalion commander would have
gotten killed and maimed for no good reason on his way to the rank of colonel.
But he was stopped.
Another thought about your account: Somebody had to provide evidence that the Montagnard
agent had not given deliberately misleading intelligence -- that on the contrary he'd warned
that the enemy had been dug in for two weeks, a clear indication they were well-prepared for
an assault. So although you were admonished by 525th MIG, your subterfuge would have allowed
the operational upper echelon to include your report in their investigation. That might have
been the only way they could have nailed the CO, given his blame-shifting.
From my reading of an article by Thomas Ricks ("General Failure"), by the Vietnam War the
emphasis on accountability in the U.S. military was being replaced by careerism. So that CO
might have gotten away with it, if you had not filed a report.
In the ABN fight a cobra expended its load at the bunkers and then turned to leave. An NVA
RPG team standing on a bunker roof shot it through the boom. the rocket did not arm (too
close maybe?) and the Cobra staggered away heading for LZ Buttons. pl
I've heard a lot of stories like that. To be made of aluminum sheeting and rivets those birds
were amazingly resilient. I wasn't quite so lucky, the same thing happened to me but the shot
severed the tail rotor and we came crashing down. Fortunately there was no fire and no one
was seriously injured. After we were picked up a flight of F-4s naped the wreckage to prevent
the NVA from salvaging anything useful.
I've read this at least four times and still find it riveting. Think your memoirs should be
published.
I worked with a locomotive engineer who took a 50 caliber in the leg as a helicopter pilot
in VN. Don't know where or when. He was good natured and one of the best hogheads I worked
with.
FWIW this same Battalion (2/7 Cav) lost 155 KIA at LZ Albany in 1965. I became old at Ap
Bu Nho although there were worse fights. In my second tour I was often given the additional
job of recruiting NVA officers for our side from the RVN National Interrogation Center. I was
quite good at this. They were old soldiers like me pl
To the Col.
I was always amazed at the "Kit Carson Scouts with our Bn. They often walked point for us.
I'll always remember a platoon passing thru our position in the northern end of the Ashau
Valley. The 1st "Marine" thru the wire was a Kit Carson on point. It had been a long, hard
patrol. He approached me, threw down his NVA pack, looked me in the eye & smiled before
saying, "Maline Corps number 10 G**Damned Thou." A bitching Marine is a happy Marine.
I thought I remembered for many years that the Bn involved was 2/5 Cav but a historian
researching my time in VN proved to me that the unit was actually 2/7 Cav.
And I was spared to tell the tale. I must honor the dead of both sides. I remember seeing
a two man NVA RPG team mount the roof of a bunker to duel with a Cobra at a hundred yards or
so. Bullets from the Cobra's Gatling gun kicked up dust all around them They stood solidly
until they fired a round that wounded the Cobra. Foemen worthy of our steel.
11 November 2019Ap Bu Nho - A Remembrance for Veteran's Day
Garryowen in Glory, the 7th Cavalry Regiment at Ap Bu Nho
By a quirk of fate, "D" 2/7 Cavalry, was given the chance to demonstrate the plausibility of
Spinoza's despair several weeks later. A Montagnard agent reported that the 141 st
NVA Regiment was temporarily in position just to the west of the Montagnard resettlement
village of Ap (village) Bu Nho about 20 kilometers southwest of Song Be. This village, like
several others in Phuoc Long province, had been created in the course of earlier years of war
and migration throughout Indochina. It was perfectly rectangular, three streets wide and five
hundred feet long with the long axis running east-west, with a dirt road extending to the tar
two lane road connecting Song Be with the south. The Song Be River passed north-south to the
west of the village. There was a roughly circular patch of woods just northwest of the village.
The wood was about one kilometer in diameter. The river ran along the west side of the wood. On
the eastern side of the wood, there was a large open "field" covered with grass nearly hip
high. The field extended along the whole northern side of the village out to the tar road and
beyond. The inhabitants were three or four hundred in number, living in tribal style in long
houses and other small flimsily built shacks. They had originally lived in the area of Camp
Roland in the northeastern corner of PhuocLongProvince, and had moved or been moved to this
site during the First Indochina War. They were S'tiengan people. The agent was one of them and
lived in Bu Nho.
I drove to Landing Zone "Buttons" with this information to visit the command post of the
Second Battalion, Seventh Cavalry, then operating out of the landing zone. In the underground
facility, I talked to the S-2 (Intelligence Staff Officer) of the battalion. I had been
providing this officer with information for some time. An example had been the information that
led to the BDA mission mentioned above. While we two intelligence officers were discussing the
report, the lieutenant colonel commanding 2/7 Cav entered the command post. He was new, having
arrived in country within the previous month, and having joined the battalion the week before.
In his late thirties, blond, and in his new found dignity, he had a "lean and hungry look." The
S-2 introduced me to him, told him how valuable the detachment's information had been in the
past. The Bn. CO seemed to have a hard time understanding who I was. In talking to me he seemed
to be more interested in "showing off" for his operations staff who had followed him into the
bunker than in listening. The idea of an intelligence officer resident in the province who had
brought him information seemed more than he could handle. After a few minutes, he tired of the
whole thing, and asked to be shown on the map. After a glance, he asked the S-3, another
superior being and soi-disant tactical virtuoso, what "D" Company was doing the next
day. The major said that "D" was in LZ "Buttons" resting and refitting. The CO casually said
"Well, put'em in there at first light." His finger indicated the big, grassy clearing in the
angle between Bu Nho and the round woods to the west. The S-2 looked at me, opened his mouth
and then said nothing.
I thought What the hell! I don't work for this man.. "Colonel," I began, "there is at
least a battalion of the 141 st NVA Regiment in that wood. They are the best troops
in the 7 th NVA Division, which is the best in their army. They have been in that
wood for at least two weeks. They will be ready." The CO was irritated. "That's all right,
Captain," he said. "You are really a captain, aren't you? We'll take it from here. Most of
these reports are untrue. Why, when I was here as an adviser in the Delta, none of the stuff we
got from you people was true." So, the man didn't believe the report and was just
looking for something for "D" Company to do. This was a delicate situation. "I must
protest, sir," I began. "I would be negligent..." "That will be all!" the CO barked. "Good
Day!" The sycophants on the staff bristled in the hope that their master would recognize them
as the good dogs they were.
I drove back to Song Be and called my higher headquarters to tell them that a disaster was
about to occur. The foreseeable reply from 525 th MIG in Saigon was that they would
not attempt to interfere with the exercise of command by a line officer in command of troops in
the field. I then asked for a helicopter to come to Song Be to be at my disposal the next day.
This was agreed. The "Huey" showed up early and I was sitting in the thing at 3,000 feet
listening to the 1 st Cavalry Division when the fire preparation of Ap Bu Nho
commenced.
" They will not grow old, as we who are left grow old,
Age will not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun, and in the mornings,
We shall remember them.."
A.E. Housman - inscribed in Washington Archat VMI
First, there was a lot of fire from corps heavy artillery batteries, including the one at
Victor 241 airfield. Then, there were Tacair fighter strikes with bombs and rockets, then there
was a massive fire preparation by armed helicopters, of which the 1 st Cavalry
Division had many. The bombs, shells, and rockets searched the round wood and the big, grassy
field. While the armed helicopters were still working on the patch of forest, the twenty odd
"Huey Slicks", (transports unarmed except for a machine gun on each side), swooped onto the
scene from the east, having picked up "D" Company at LZ "Buttons." Throughout the preparation,
there had not been a shot fired from the area under bombardment. I could hear the Cavalry
Division talking about it on the air. Their opinion was that this would be a "cold" LZ, and
that the enemy were not present. With mixed feelings, I watched the assault unfold. The landing
was in two columns of helicopters, which were perhaps fifty yards apart. There were about ten
helicopters in each column. The cavalry troops scrambled out and headed for the round wood.
The 141 st NVA Infantry Regiment had held its fire throughout the preparatory
bombardment, a remarkable display of fire discipline. Now, as the helicopters lifted in unison,
they opened fire in a roaring, ripping demonstration of just how much firepower a well trained
and disciplined light infantry force can possess. Four "Slicks" were shot down on the LZ. All
four exploded. It was not likely that anyone lived. The fire balls killed a number of "D"
Company men nearby. Several more helicopters were badly damaged and departed smoking. The NVA
had organized the defense of the wood in such a way that interlocking bands of machine gun fire
from log and earth bunkers cris-crossed out in the field. The guns appeared to have been laid
so that the fire was about two to three feet above the ground. The inevitable dips in the
ground (dead space) were filled with the fires of mortars shooting from positions behind the
bunker line. A general in the War Between the States remarked on a similar occasion that "not
even a chicken could live under that fire." It was thus. The NVA were all in the round wood.
The bunkers themselves, as later inspected, were solid with two layers of hardwood logs
separated by a foot of packed earth and with another layer of earth on top. They had firing
embrasures six inches high, were sited for mutual support and were staggered in depth. "D"
Company 2/7 Cavalry was "dead meat" out in that field in the bright sunlight. They could not
move forward and to move back meant rising which was certain death.
The fighters and armed helicopters returned to repeatedly bomb and rocket the woods. Corps
artillery joined in whenever the aircraft left off.. It did not help. 12.7 mm heavy machine
guns and RPG-7 teams engaged the aircraft from within the NVA position. The iron grip of the
141 st NVA held "D" Company fast. Everyone was pinned flat on the LZ, face to the
dirt.
Additional Cavalry troops began to be inserted into the fight. The rest of 2/7 Cav landed to
the east of "D" Company, 1/5 Cav landed north of the round wood, and 2/12 Cav landed to the
west of the Song Be river, west of the round wood. All these insertions were by helicopter.
What they discovered, as they closed on the wood, was that the 141 st had organized
the position for a 360 degree, all around defense. The fire and bunkers were just as solid on
the other sides as on the east. The position was so large and so well put together that it may
well have contained the whole 141 st Regiment. The reinforcements got nowhere. The
only difference between their situations and that of "D" Company was that they were not pinned
down at close quarters. All of these units took substantial losses in this fight.
Wounded from "D" Company crawled toward the eastern side of the clearing, toward the earthen
"dike" that carried the main north-south road. They could be seen with the naked eye from the
air. As some got across the road, Med-evac helicopters (Dustoffs) began landing in the fire
shadow of the road to pick them up. The warrant officer flying the 525 th MIG "Huey"
told me he intended to land to pick up wounded. Altogether, the strange helicopter with the
blue boomerang insignia on the tail boom, made four trips from LZ "Buttons" to Ap Bu Nho
carrying 2/7 Cav's wounded. After a while, the floor of the bird was slippery, and everyone in
back was busy trying to keep some of them alive long enough to deliver them to the medics. The
helicopter took a number of hits.
About four in the afternoon, the CO of 2/7 Cav made a fatal error. He requested a napalm
strike on the round wood. December was the height of the dry season, and the wind was blowing
steadily from the west. This could be seen by the direction that smoke was drifting across the
battlefield. The napalm strike went in, delivered by two F-4s. It may have done some damage to
the NVA, but what it did for certain was to light a grass fire that swept toward the east,
toward "D" Company. The Company now faced an ancient dilemma. My great-grandfather had spoken
of having faced the same problem in the Wilderness in 1864. The choice was to lie prone and
burn or stand and be shot. According to the medics, most preferred to be shot. In the course of
this process, "D" Company's commander, a young captain, who happened to be a Citadel man,
decided he had had enough. With his pockets full of grenades, he crawled as close as possible
to the nearest machine gun bunker, and with half a dozen of his men firing in support he rushed
the bunker throwing grenades, jumped down into the position and killed all within with his
pistol. With this crack in the enemy position, "D" Company moved forward behind him and by
nightfall had broken the outer defense perimeter of the 141 st . They held half a
dozen bunkers. The sun went down. The fight ended. All night long the Cavalry Division moved
forces into the area to finish the 141 st the next morning.
" Good! Whenever you find a real bastard, especially a dumb bastard
make sure you stake'em down, through the heart, through the heart!"
LTC (Ret.) Walter P. Langto his son, June, 1969
"It is not a mercy to tolerate incompetence in officers , think of the poor
men.."
Robert E. Lee , thinking of Bristoe Station
In the morning, the enemy had gone, departed, taking their dead and wounded with them. They
had slipped out through some gap in the surrounding lines and simply vanished. "D" Company was
extracted and mustered at LZ "Buttons" that afternoon. There were 12 men in the ranks. 52
killed and over 70 wounded was the "Butcher's Bill" at Ap Bu Nho. This may have been the worst
single day's bloodletting in the Seventh Cavalry since the Little Big Horn in 1876. There too,
they had been commanded by a fool. At the muster, the company commander, who was unscathed,
stood dry eyed before his remnant while strong men wept, among them, me. I asked the battalion
commander and the S-3 how they spelled their names and left. I would have happily killed them
both with my own hand, and they seemed to know that.
I sent a report of the action disguised as an intelligence report on the performance of the
141 st . It went to every echelon of command above 2/7 Cavalry. Under investigation
by division headquarters, the lieutenant colonel later claimed that the agent's report had been
a "provocation" intended to lure him into an ambush. The Division commander was not deceived.
525 th MIG saw through my subterfuge and I was admonished for responding to the
Operations side's attempt to scapegoat Intelligence for its own failure. This was the first
instance in which I saw this syndrome of the leadership of the intelligence community. I
continued to see it for the rest of my government career." from the memoir of W. Patrick
Lang
Colonel Lang,
This description brings tears to my eyes as well yours in that battle. It graphically
demonstrates the difference between auctoritas and podestas as well as much more. Thank you
for sharing, remembering, and reminding us.
I found the NVA to be a very worthy foe. I learned of the "hold them by the belt buckle"
tactic the hard way. Just south of the DMZ one of our companies stumbled into a Regimental
CP. The Marines were driven back by AK & MG fire. The Marines laid down in the elephant
grass about 50m in front of the forward bunkers while we ran air support "danger close".
After 3 flights of snake & napalm, the company assaulted again just before dark and was
met again with heavy fire. We evacuated our wounded & settled in for the night. When we
moved forward the next morning the scorched bunkers were empty. Trails in the grass showed
that when the Marines pulled back 50m, the NVA had crawled forward about 35m. After observing
a very close air strike, the NVA had crawled back into their buckers & thwarted our
second assault. Discipline & guts.
Booby,
I would say they were desperate. Did whatever they thought would get a edge over the US
troops. Considering the number of casualties they took, they never had a easy life.
desperate ? Think you're living in a parallel universe ... Maybe it's a consolation to you
and It does something for your ego, but not sure it's of any help when analyzing why that war
was lost.
Military medicine got steadily better throughout the 20th Century so the ratio of killed
to wounded became lower and lower. Medevac helicopters and forward surgical hospitals made a
big difference, but the 52 KIA here in tis one company were killed outright on the field of
battle. I do not know how many of the WIA died of their wounds. Remember there were a lot of
casualties in the other units of our encirclement. The NVA had a widely distributed system of
underground hospitals supplied through the Laos/Cambodia corridor (HCM Trail) but they had to
live long enough to be carried to them. I agree with Booby that the NVA were a remarkably
tough and dedicated enemy. pl
BTW, I have looked at this place in Google Earth. The Vietnamese government has built a
widespread network of hydroelectric dams in the highlands since the war. As a result the site
of this combat is buried under a prosperous Vietnamese town. This is one of the few instances
of the outright defeat of US forces in the field in the war, along with the loss of Lang Vei
SF camp and LZ Albany. At Song Be a few miles away there are actual memorials to the
protracted battle in February-March 1969 but not at this place. pl
Just finished watching an hour PBS episode
about James "Maggie" Magellas the most
decorated soldier in the history of the 82nd
Airborne. To paraphrase" How could I send
young 18 and 19 year olds to lead and I stay
in the rear. " A remarkable man for anytime,
he is still alive at 98. That we would have more
like him in all fields of endeavor.
Thank you Colonel. That story really brings it home to me. I was on a somewhat similar
disastrous mission during the 1972 NVA Easter offensive. The NVA had taken Quang Tri City,
and we were inserting South Vietnamese soldiers at key points around the city of Quang Tri to
cut off supplies. Unfortunately, I can't tell you anything about the tactical situation on
this particular mission. I was but a WO1 front seat co-pilot gunner in a Cobra gunship at the
time. On this particular mission, we (about 10 gunships as I recall) were gun cover for a US
Marine insertion of South Vietnamese marines. There were I think about 15 CH-54 Jolly Greens
full of the marines. At that time, because of the SA-7 heat-seekers, we had to fly low level.
We took massive fire beginning at least 8 or 10 klicks out from the LZ, and then the LZ was
hot. The US Marine pilots told us at least half of the troops were dead or wounded from
ground fire before they ever got to the LZ. Two of the Jolly Greens went down. Actually, I
never made it to the LZ. About 3 kicks out my pilot was hit and the command ship directed us
back to the staging area for the pilot to be attended to. His wound turned out to be
superficial and he was ok. Like I said, I don't know anything about the tactical situation,
but surely there must have been an intelligence failure. Either that, or they felt the risk
was worth the prize. They eventually re-took Quang Tri, but it was several months later.
"I was but a WO1 front seat co-pilot gunner in a Cobra gunship at the time."
WO1? Would there be backseat gunners too.
"At that time, because of the SA-7 heat-seekers, we had to fly low level. We took massive
fire beginning at least 8 or 10 klicks out from the LZ, and then the LZ was hot."
My guess at klicks or kicks, which you use later suggests a distance from a battlefield LZ
to an LZ with a slightly longer "life-span" then the battlefield LZ.
Got that completely wrong. Kicks, klicks?
Sounds like a dangerous missing anyway. You have to be low to target MANPAD's or whatever
it was, but this also endangers you heavily.
WO1 = Warrant Officer grade 1. After grade 1 they are called Chief Warrant officers, or
CW-2,3,and 4. 4 is the highest grade. About half the U.S. Army helicopter pilots were warrant
officers, and half commissioned officers. The warrants flew pretty much full time with no
other command duties, other than flight related command duties.
You can fly the Cobra from either seat, but the primary duty of the front seat is to man
the turret weapons. The back seat primary duty is to fly the aircraft and shoot the wing
store weapons which shoot in the same direction that the aircraft is pointing. The wing store
weapons are rockets and/or 20mm gatling gun. The turret weapons are the 6.62 gatling gun and
the 40mm grenade gun. You can shoot any of the weapons from either seat and fly the aircraft
from either seat, but those are the primary duties. The back seat cannot move the turret but
only fire it in the direction of the aircraft.
Its klicks, not kicks. Sorry for the typo. Its just slang for a kilometer.
When flying a few yards above the ground, tree tops, or buildings, it is more difficult
for a heat seeker to lock on to the heat. Of course then one is more vulnerable to small
arms, but they are the lesser of two evils. Our company commander and his crew were lost to
an SA-7 a few weeks prior to that particular mission.
Thanks FND, I realized at one point I may have read this not carefully enough: You really
made it quite clear with your "because of the FA-7 heat-seekers" - BECAUSE
In other words the Jolly Greens in your story above while higher where a good target for
the heat-seekers, while your mission partly was to ideally find and destroy them before they
could hit them. ...
The problem with trying to understand this as a layman is that there is a high chance you
misunderstand details in context.
What a great bird the Cobra was. The Marines didn't get the Cobra until '69.
When I was there (67-68)we had the huey gunships, and I first saw the Cobra being flown by
the 101st whose AO was next to ours in Northern I Corp. I was fortunate to fly it for over
2000 hours in the National Guard but never got to fly it in combat.
Thank you for posting this. Never having been in combat it is humbling to read what others
have endured, and in this as in many other situations having done so under incompetent
leadership.
all,
found this article that described the life of a VC (I think he may have joined to fight the
french ) fighter who joined the fight in 1950s and fought until the end.
Although the article has been written with a sense of humor in mind, I thought it was a
worthy read.
Indeed interesting, Aka. But strictly no surprise. ...
I encountered the same respect as Pat's shows here for his "battle counterpart", for loss
of a better term, among war correspondents for the ones killed reporting for the other side.
...
FND's comment above triggered memories of their stories and images combined with Pat's
story.
Were Jolly Green's the type of helicopters that did not only carry materials but also
journalists occasionally?
I may be mistaken but that was my basic google impression while looking into military
terms.
Yes, thanks, now I see something FND mentioned above. Although it leaves me at an odd as to
why it makes sense to be able to fly the type of helicopters he flew from both the front and
back-seat. Supposing the design was somewhat meant to help the crew.
Apparently, when I saw some photos years ago my attention was somewhere else. Or it wasn't
the focus of the image. And I cannot ask Horst anymore. Seems bigger then the one I had in
mind, anyway.
A "click" is US Army slang for a kilometer. A "WO1" is a warrant officer. That is a rank
between the enlisted ranks and the commissioned officers, lieutenants and up. The US Army and
US Marine Corps have warrant officer pilots as well as commissioned officer pilots. These
last are normally the commanders. "LZ" means "Landing Zone." This is the place where the
south Vietnamese Marines in this story were to be landed. pl
I looked up LZ. But I understand that LZ could have both a longer existence, or exist for
a slightly longer time then a single LZ for a specific battle. In which case the first type
of LZ would be the starting base? Like LZ "Buttons"?
More specifically were only "2/5 Cav" based at "Buttons" and the others were "inserted
(?)/were brought in" later, as support? Or was the whole 5 cav, I understand, located
there?
In the late '60's a Marine LtCol., William Corson, published a book "The Betrayal"
criticizing US strategy & tactics in VN. In the final chapter he hypothesized that the
Soviet Union could dramatically change the helicopter war in VN any time they wished by
giving the NVA the Strela shoulder fired AA missile. In the Easter Offensive, the Soviets
played that card. Helo & OV-10 losses in the Quang Tri area were devastating & forced
an immediate change of helo tactics. Fly low or die. It took us a decade to develop effective
counter-measures to these missiles.
Years later I had a SNCO who worked for me who had crewed a CH-46 inserting VN Marines
along the coast north of Quang Tri during '72. The LZ brief warned of a "dead" NVA tank in
the LZ. As his AC landed beside the "dead" tank, he saw the turret turn & he was looking
down the barrel. The tank fired; but, either it was too close to the helo or the thin
aluminum skin of the helo didn't activate the fuse & the round went through his AC as a
solid shot.
The SA-7s were indeed deadly. We would rather take our chances flying ground level. The guy
whose helicopter took the tank round is very lucky. I'm glad he and the others made it.
William Corson a very interesting person and I met him long after RVN days.
I had a 10 week course at Ft.Bliss on the REDEYE MANPAD after completing OCS and all my
classmates could do was think about these in the context of AirCav units.
I was in VN in '72 and remember the advent of the SA-7. as an immediate expedient defense
we threw thermite grenades out the doors when we saw one fired. I don't know if that worked
well, but I am still here. I also remember seeing an NVA team fir an RPG at a Cobra. The
missile did not arm and went right through the boom. pl
They also put what we called toilet bowles on the engine exhaust to direct the exhaust up to
the rotors so that the heat would be dispersed, but I don't think it worked that well.
In the largely helicopter transported war an LZ could be either a semi-permanent base for
aircraft as well as a convenient place where troops could be billeted and supplied or the
place where troops would be landed by air in a single operation as in the Quang Tri story. LZ
Buttons was named for some officer's girl friend. I think she was a Red Cross girl in Saigon.
2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment just happened to be based at LZ Buttons just then. During
the VN period US Army infantry and cavalry fighting as infantry were organized by battalions.
The regiment, as in this case, 5th Cavalry, only existed as a tradition. Armored Cavalry
sxisted as a whole regiment and the 11th Cavalry in VN (the Black Horse) were a formidable
group. The US Marines, who, I am sure you know are not part of the Army still had regimental
formations. pl
One lucky Cobra crew. Usually when a helo & an RPG met, it was catastrophic for the
helo. I hated being shot at with RPG's because the projectile moved slow enough that you
could see them coming. Time moves real slowly when you see one coming. I've had them pass
through my rotor disc & still don't understand how the projectile could make it through
without hitting or being hit by a rotor blade.
A CH-46 from my squadron became a part of Marine Corps history after being hit by an RPG
on Mutter's Ridge, just below the DMZ. The climax of the novel "Matterhorn" was based on this
incident. A Company was assaulting a hill that was an abandoned Marine LZ. The NVA were
fighting from the old Marine bunkers. The CH-46 was departing a neighboring hill with
Medevacs when it was hit in the aft pylon by an RPG & burst into flames. The pilot saw a
LZ directly below him & shot an emergency landing. The pilot was unaware that the NVA
held the hill & the Marines were assaulting the hill & engaged in close combat. The
NVA were startled by a flaming CH-46 crashing on them & their defense was disrupted. Some
NVA climbed aboard the burning helo & were trying to take the 50 caliber machine guns.
There was a gunfight between the crew & the NVA in the cabin of the helo. The Marines won
& the NVA abandoned the hill. The Grunts gave our squadron credit for capturing the hill
- a 1st & only in Marine Corps history.
Rumor was that it had to do with the woman's anatomy. I don't know. I didn't know her. At
Dien Bien Phu the French strongpoints were all named for De Castries' mistresses. Isabelle,
etc. V- 241 was a Japanese built airfield from WW2. pl
My oldest uncle was at Dien Bien Phu with "8e bataillon parachutiste de choc". He was one of
the few men in his unit to have survived the battle. I flew back with him to DBP in 2004 and
we visited the battlefield with an former viet Minh vet as a tour guide.
my uncle and him had fought against each other some 50 years earlier, in muddy trenches,
using grenades, flame throwers and bayonets and there they were, two old men, talking to each
other in broken french and broken Vietnamese, remembering those who had not been worn down by
age.
The Vietnamese were very gracious hosts to us, and my uncle had no hard feelings against
them. However, he never forgave the French army generals who had designed the battle plan,
totally underestimating the viet Minh. It is something he has passed onto me and its been
quite useful a reminder sometimes.
Thx for this piece PL !
Patrick's comment reminds me of my limits not only concerning the military but also
suggested by Patrick's comment below: the larger historical context during and after WWII in
which Viet Minh via Ho Chi Ming mutated into Viet Cong. ;)
P.L. and ALL: It has taken sometime for me to formulate a comment to this post and thread.
Why? First because it gives important insights that anyone in the US Army today of any rank
might learn from. Second, while I never served in RVN by spring summer 1968 Artillery OCS at
Ft. Sill was totally dedicated to furnishing officers for the war in RVN. 8 of the 110 in my
graduating class did not serve in RVN. I was one of the eight.
But two things stick in my mind from OCS. The first how to help create a firebase for an
artillery unit. And second how to defend an artillery firebase from ground assault.
Yes, realism had cretp into artillery by summer 1968 and no more emphasis on stopping Soviet
tank armies in northern Europe. 3 members of my OCS class were in firing batteries overrun by
NVA. I believe the two that survived both recieved Silver Stars. One of the survivors after
spiking guns survived by E&E. The other succeeded in defending his battery.
Receiving my draft notice on June 12th, having been married June 10th [and graduated from
Law School June 7th] I realized that despite two years of AFROTC and with rejections from
both the Navy and Air Force in hand over winter 1966-67 for reasons of vision I realized that
not being a Kennedy Father I was destined for RVN in one form or another. So I started
reading: first any Bernard Fall book or article I could get my hands on. Second, because the
Combat Arms were open to me through OCS [Army JAG was giving priority to those who signed up
for the longest service --often up to 10 years (and they almost all served in RVN] it seemed
wise to be in shape and learn how to survive. So before reporting on September 10th, 1967, to
Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri for Basic I read all of S.L.A Marshall's studies of combat in Viet
Nam. Reading some French I stumbled through the travails of the PARA against the Viet Minh. I
also read some biographies of Uncle HO!
THIS POST AND THREAD SHOULD BE POINTED OUT TO DoD leadership AS TO WHY THIS BLOG SHOULD BE
AVAILABLE TO ALL THROUGH its servers.
More later!
BTW there is a move on to ban flechette arty rounds under International Law!
It wasn't our battalion, but we lay alongside it,
So the story is as true as the telling is frank.
They hadn't one Line-officer left, after Arras,
Except a batty major and the Colonel, who drank.
'B' Company Commander was fresh from the Depot,
An expert on gas drill, otherwise a dud;
So Sergeant-Major Money carried on, as instructed,
And that's where the swaddies began to sweat blood.
His Old Army humour was so well-spiced and hearty
That one poor sod shot himself, and one lost his wits;
But discipline's maintained, and back in rest-billets
The Colonel congratulates 'B' Company on their kits.
The subalterns went easy, as was only natural
With a terror like Money driving the machine,
Till finally two Welshmen, butties from the Rhondda,
Bayoneted their bugbear in a field-canteen.
Well, we couldn't blame the officers, they relied on Money;
We couldn't blame the pitboys, their courage was grand;
Or, least of all, blame Money, an old stiff surviving
In a New (bloody) Army he couldn't understand.
Thank you for sharing this riveting excerpt from your memoir. Is this body of work to be
published by any chance? I for one would be grateful for the opportunity to read more of such
a fascinating life.
Brings back a lot of memories. In 1968 I was a senior in high school reading about the
marines at Khe Sahn. In 70-71 I was up on the DMZ with the 1st Bde, 5th Mech that had
replaced the 3rd Marine Division. Spent the first six months at Con Thien, Charlie 4, Dong
Ha, Quang Tri, patrols in the DMZ. Then got promoted to the General's security platoon just
in time to go west when the Vietnamese went into Laos. Got to visit Lang Vei, Khe Sanh, Camp
Carrol, all those places I had read about in high School.
Back in the states in 1972 in college reading again about Vietnam. How the PVA (I think
they prefer that to NVA) had come across the DMZ and captured the provincial capital of Quang
Tri. Went to visit the Traveling Vietnam Memorial Wall today. Didn't last 3 minutes.
This is how the Iraq vets must feel when they read about Ramadi, Fallujah, etc. Shades of
Manstein- Lost Victories?
We had a butter bar who continuously violated procedure by going out on the road before it
was swept in the morning. One day he took off with his driver and another EM, they hit a mine
and all died. Years later the Lt's brother found me via an internet site. His brother's
college fraternity was going to do a memorial tribute and he wanted to know what I knew. I
saw no value in telling him what really happened so I didn't. Nothing like this account but
it sticks with you.
Let me see. Bad judgment, trouble concentrating, impulsive, reckless, hot-tempered. I'd
say there was no telling how many American soldiers that battalion commander would have
gotten killed and maimed for no good reason on his way to the rank of colonel.
But he was stopped.
Another thought about your account: Somebody had to provide evidence that the Montagnard
agent had not given deliberately misleading intelligence -- that on the contrary he'd warned
that the enemy had been dug in for two weeks, a clear indication they were well-prepared for
an assault. So although you were admonished by 525th MIG, your subterfuge would have allowed
the operational upper echelon to include your report in their investigation. That might have
been the only way they could have nailed the CO, given his blame-shifting.
From my reading of an article by Thomas Ricks ("General Failure"), by the Vietnam War the
emphasis on accountability in the U.S. military was being replaced by careerism. So that CO
might have gotten away with it, if you had not filed a report.
In the ABN fight a cobra expended its load at the bunkers and then turned to leave. An NVA
RPG team standing on a bunker roof shot it through the boom. the rocket did not arm (too
close maybe?) and the Cobra staggered away heading for LZ Buttons. pl
I've heard a lot of stories like that. To be made of aluminum sheeting and rivets those birds
were amazingly resilient. I wasn't quite so lucky, the same thing happened to me but the shot
severed the tail rotor and we came crashing down. Fortunately there was no fire and no one
was seriously injured. After we were picked up a flight of F-4s naped the wreckage to prevent
the NVA from salvaging anything useful.
I've read this at least four times and still find it riveting. Think your memoirs should be
published.
I worked with a locomotive engineer who took a 50 caliber in the leg as a helicopter pilot
in VN. Don't know where or when. He was good natured and one of the best hogheads I worked
with.
FWIW this same Battalion (2/7 Cav) lost 155 KIA at LZ Albany in 1965. I became old at Ap
Bu Nho although there were worse fights. In my second tour I was often given the additional
job of recruiting NVA officers for our side from the RVN National Interrogation Center. I was
quite good at this. They were old soldiers like me pl
To the Col.
I was always amazed at the "Kit Carson Scouts with our Bn. They often walked point for us.
I'll always remember a platoon passing thru our position in the northern end of the Ashau
Valley. The 1st "Marine" thru the wire was a Kit Carson on point. It had been a long, hard
patrol. He approached me, threw down his NVA pack, looked me in the eye & smiled before
saying, "Maline Corps number 10 G**Damned Thou." A bitching Marine is a happy Marine.
I thought I remembered for many years that the Bn involved was 2/5 Cav but a historian
researching my time in VN proved to me that the unit was actually 2/7 Cav.
And I was spared to tell the tale. I must honor the dead of both sides. I remember seeing
a two man NVA RPG team mount the roof of a bunker to duel with a Cobra at a hundred yards or
so. Bullets from the Cobra's Gatling gun kicked up dust all around them They stood solidly
until they fired a round that wounded the Cobra. Foemen worthy of our steel.
Warfare typically includes a lot of mistakes and misinformation. Messages get garbled,
coordinates get mixed up, people make mistakes, and there are always some "blue-on-blue"
casualties. Then these mistakes must be covered up and papered over by the military hierarchy
which controls the "news." It happens.
"... One of my old university lecturers once worked for the CIA as a researcher. The CIA was his first employer after he left university. He was of Polish background, knew some Polish, did not know any German - so where was he set to work? He was put to work in the section on East Germany to read its newspapers and reports, and listen to East German radio broadcasts. Someone he knew who was fluent in German but no other major eastern European language was relegated to the Bulgarian section. ..."
That is very interesting information about Iran's elimination of Microsoft Windows from
its military systems. I assume also that Microsoft was also purged from all other databases
in the Iranian govt and its agencies.
Spook organizations like the CIA, MI5 / MI6 and others not good at real hacking? Heck,
were they ever good at collecting "intelligence"?
One of my old university lecturers once worked for the CIA as a researcher. The CIA was
his first employer after he left university. He was of Polish background, knew some Polish,
did not know any German - so where was he set to work? He was put to work in the section on
East Germany to read its newspapers and reports, and listen to East German radio broadcasts.
Someone he knew who was fluent in German but no other major eastern European language was
relegated to the Bulgarian section.
With regard to comment 88, I'd be curious to know what sort of people were actually on the
P-8 spy plane. One online report (I forget the source now) said Special Forces people were on
board. So if we were to suppose that the Iranians failed to notice this plane and the drone,
how far could they have penetrated Iranian airspace and what might their ultimate purpose
have been?
Pentagon serves Wall Street and is controlled by CIA which is actually can be viewed as a
Wall Street arm as well.
Notable quotes:
"... This time, though, the general got to talking about Russia. So I perked up. He made it crystal clear that he saw Moscow as an adversary to be contained, checked, and possibly defeated. There was no nuance, no self-reflection, not even a basic understanding of the general complexity of geopolitics in the 21st century. ..."
"... General It-Doesn't-Matter-His-Name thundered that we need not worry, however, because his tanks and troops could "mop the floor" with the Russians, in a battle that "wouldn't even be close." It was oh-so-typical, another U.S. Army general -- who clearly longs for the Cold War fumes that defined his early career -- overestimating the Russian menace and underestimating Russian military capability . ..."
"... The problem with the vast majority of generals, however, is that they don't think strategically. What they call strategy is really large-scale operations -- deploying massive formations and winning campaigns replete with battles. Many remain mired in the world of tactics, still operating like lieutenants or captains and proving the Peter Principle right, as they get promoted past their respective levels of competence. ..."
"... If America's generals, now and over the last 18 years, really were strategic thinkers, they'd have spoken out about -- and if necessary resigned en masse over -- mission sets that were unwinnable, illegal (in the case of Iraq), and counterproductive . Their oath is to the Constitution, after all, not Emperors Bush, Obama, and Trump. Yet few took that step. It's all symptomatic of the disease of institutionalized intellectual mediocrity. ..."
"... Let's start with Mattis. "Mad Dog" Mattis was so anti-Iran and bellicose in the Persian Gulf that President Barack Obama removed him from command of CENTCOM. ..."
"... Furthermore, the supposedly morally untainted, "intellectual" " warrior monk " chose, when he finally resigned, to do so in response to Trump's altogether reasonable call for a modest troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and Syria. ..."
The two-star army general strode across the stage in his rumpled combat fatigues, almost
like George Patton -- all that was missing was the cigar and riding crop. It was 2017 and I was
in the audience, just another mid-level major attending yet another mandatory lecture in the
auditorium of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The general then commanded one of the Army's two true armored divisions and had plenty of
his tanks forward deployed in Eastern Europe, all along the Russian frontier. Frankly, most
CGSC students couldn't stand these talks. Substance always seemed lacking, as each general
reminded us to "take care of soldiers" and "put the mission first," before throwing us a few
nuggets of conventional wisdom on how to be good staff officers should we get assigned to his
vaunted command.
This time, though, the general got to talking about Russia. So I perked up. He made it
crystal clear that he saw Moscow as an adversary to be contained, checked, and possibly
defeated. There was no nuance, no self-reflection, not even a basic understanding of the
general complexity of geopolitics in the 21st century. Generals can be like that --
utterly "in-the-box," "can-do" thinkers. They take pride in how little they discuss policy and
politics, even when they command tens of thousands of troops and control entire districts,
provinces, or countries. There is some value in this -- we'd hardly want active
generals meddling in U.S. domestic affairs. But they nonetheless can take the whole "aw shucks"
act a bit too far.
General It-Doesn't-Matter-His-Name thundered that we need not worry, however, because
his tanks and troops could "mop the floor" with the Russians, in a battle that "wouldn't even
be close." It was oh-so-typical, another U.S. Army general -- who clearly longs for the Cold
War fumes that defined his early career -- overestimating the Russian menace and
underestimating Russian military
capability . Of course, it was all cloaked in the macho bravado so common among
generals who think that talking like sergeants will win them street cred with the troops.
(That's not their job anymore, mind you.) He said nothing, of course, about the role
of mid- and long-range nuclear weapons that could be the catastrophic consequence of an
unnecessary war with the Russian Bear.
I got to thinking about that talk recently as I reflected in wonder at how the latest
generation of mainstream "liberals" loves to fawn over generals, admirals -- any flag officers,
really -- as alternatives to President Donald Trump. The irony of that alliance should not be
lost on us. It's built on the standard Democratic fear of looking "soft" on terrorism,
communism, or whatever-ism, and their visceral, blinding hatred of Trump. Some of this is
understandable. Conservative Republicans masterfully paint liberals as "weak sisters" on
foreign policy, and Trump's administration is, well, a wild card in world affairs.
The problem with the vast majority of generals, however, is that they don't think
strategically. What they call strategy is really large-scale operations -- deploying massive
formations and winning campaigns replete with battles. Many remain mired in the world of
tactics, still operating like lieutenants or captains and proving the Peter Principle right, as they
get promoted past their respective levels of competence.
If America's generals, now and over the last 18 years, really were strategic thinkers,
they'd have spoken out about -- and if necessary resigned en masse over -- mission sets that
were unwinnable, illegal (in the case of Iraq), and counterproductive . Their oath is to
the Constitution, after all, not
Emperors Bush, Obama, and Trump. Yet few took that step. It's all symptomatic of the
disease of institutionalized intellectual mediocrity. More of the same is all they know:
their careers were built on fighting "terror" anywhere it raised its evil head. Some, though no
longer most, still subscribe to the faux intellectualism of General Petraeus and his legion of
Coindinistas
, who never saw a problem that a little regime change, followed by expert counterinsurgency,
couldn't solve. Forget that they've been proven wrong time and again and can count
zero victories since 2002. Generals (remember this!) are never held accountable.
Flag officers also rarely seem to recognize that they owe civilian policymakers more than
just tactical "how" advice. They ought to be giving "if" advice -- if we invade Iraq,
it will take 500,000 troops to occupy the place, and even then we'll ultimately destabilize the
country and region, justify al-Qaeda's worldview, kick off a nationalist insurgency, and become
immersed in an unwinnable war. Some, like Army Chief General Eric Shinseki and CENTCOM head
John Abizaid, seemed to
know this deep down. Still, Shinseki quietly retired after standing up to Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Abizaid rode out his tour to retirement.
Generals also love to tell the American people that victory is
"just around the corner," or that there's a "light at the end of the tunnel." General
William Westmoreland used the very same language when predicting imminent victory in Vietnam.
Two months later, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong unleashed the largest uprising of the war,
the famed Tet Offensive.
Take Afghanistan as exhibit A: 17 or so generals have now commanded U.S. troops in this,
America's longest war. All have commanded within the system and framework of their
predecessors. Sure, they made marginal operational and tactical changes -- some preferred
surges, others advising, others counterterror -- but all failed to achieve anything close to
victory, instead laundering failure into false optimism. None refused to play the same-old game
or question the very possibility of victory in landlocked, historically xenophobic Afghanistan.
That would have taken real courage, which is in short supply among senior officers.
Exhibit B involves Trump's former cabinet generals -- National Security Advisor H.R.
McMaster, Chief of Staff John Kelley, and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis -- whom adoring and
desperate liberals took as saviors and canonized as the supposed adults
in the room . They were no such thing. The generals' triumvirate consisted ultimately of
hawkish conventional thinkers married to the dogma of American exceptionalism and empire.
Period.
Let's start with Mattis. "Mad Dog" Mattis was so anti-Iran and bellicose in the Persian
Gulf that President Barack Obama
removed him from command of CENTCOM.
Furthermore, the supposedly morally untainted, "intellectual" " warrior
monk " chose, when he finally resigned, to do so in response to Trump's altogether
reasonable call for a modest troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and Syria.
Helping Saudi Arabia terror bomb Yemen and starve 85,000 children to death? Mattis rebuked
Congress and
supported that. He never considered resigning in opposition to that war crime. No, he fell
on his "courageous" sword over downgrading a losing 17-year-old war in Afghanistan. Not to
mention he came to Trump's cabinet straight from the board of contracting giant General
Dynamics, where he collected hundreds of thousands of military-industrial complex dollars.
Then there was John Kelley, whom Press Secretary Sarah Sanders implied
was above media questioning because he was once a four-star marine general. And there's
McMaster, another lauded intellectual who once wrote an interesting book and taught history at
West Point. Yet he still drew all
the wrong conclusions in his famous book on Vietnam -- implying that more troops, more
bombing, and a mass invasion of North Vietnam could have won the war. Furthermore, his work
with Mattis on Trump's unhinged
, imperial National Defense Strategy proved that he was, after all, just another devotee of
American hyper-interventionism.
So why reflect on these and other Washington generals? It's simple: liberal veneration for
these, and seemingly all, military flag officers is a losing proposition and a formula for more
intervention, possible war with other great powers, and the creeping militarization of the
entire U.S. government. We know what the generals expect -- and potentially
want -- for America's foreign policy future.
Just look at the curriculum at the various war and staff colleges from Kansas to Rhode
Island. Ten years ago, they were all running war games focused on counterinsurgency in the
Middle East and Africa. Now those same schools are drilling for future "contingencies" in the
Baltic, Caucasus, and in the South China Sea. Older officers have always lamented the end of
the Cold War "good old days," when men were men and the battlefield was "simple." A return to a
state of near-war with Russia and China is the last thing real progressives should be
pushing for in 2020.
The bottom line is this: the faint hint that mainstream libs would relish a Six Days in May– style military coup is more than a little disturbing, no matter what you think
of Trump. Democrats must know the damage such a move would do to our ostensible republic. I
say: be a patriot. Insist on civilian control of foreign affairs. Even if that
means two more years of The Donald.
Danny Sjursen is a retired U.S. Army Major and regular contributor to Truthdig . His
work has also appeared in Harper's, the Los Angeles Times , The Nation , Tom Dispatch , and The
Hill . He served combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, and later taught history at his alma
mater, West Point. He is the author of Ghostriders of
Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the Surge . Follow him on Twitter @SkepticalVet .
[ Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author, expressed in an
unofficial capacity, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.]
This
basic fact pattern has been revealed to be worse than it first appeared by virtue of Boeing not
having been explicit that the angle of attack sensor alerts had been disabled on the 737 Max.
Why should Boeing have cleared its throat and said something? Recall that the sales pitch for
the 737 Max was that it was so much like existing 737s that it didn't require FAA
recertification or pilot simulator training. But the angle of attack sensor alert had been a
standard feature in all previous 737s, meaning buyers would assume it was part of the plane
unless they were told otherwise. And on top of that, the non-upgraded 737 Max did have lights
in the pilots' controls for this alert. But they didn't work unless the buyer had purchased the
package of safety extras.
And the proof that Boeing was playing way too cute with its pointed silence about its
deactivation of what had been a standard feature? The biggest customer for the 737 Max,
Southwest Airlines, had inaccurate information in its pilots' manual because the airline had
mistakenly assumed the angle of attack sensor alerts worked as they had on earlier 737s.
From the Wall Street Journal:
Boeing Co. didn't tell Southwest Airlines Co. and other carriers when they began flying
its 737 MAX jets that a safety feature found on earlier models that warns pilots about
malfunctioning sensors had been deactivated, according to government and industry
officials.
Federal Aviation Administration safety inspectors and supervisors responsible for
monitoring Southwest, the largest 737 MAX customer, also were unaware of the change, the
officials said.
The alerts inform pilots whether a sensor known as an "angle-of-attack vane" is
transmitting errant data about the pitch of a plane's nose .
Southwest's management and cockpit crews didn't know about the lack of the warning system
for more than a year after the planes went into service in 2017, industry and government
officials said. They and most other airlines operating the MAX learned about it only after
the Lion Air crash in October led to scrutiny of the plane's revised design.
"Southwest's own manuals were wrong" about the availability of the alerts, said the
Southwest pilots union president, Jon Weaks.
Boeing reduced the production rate on the 737 line in mid-April from 52/mo to 42/mo in
response to the grounding of the airplane by regulators worldwide.
The company and others said they didn't know how long the airplane would be
grounded.
But Boeing told suppliers to keep producing parts, components and the fuselage at rate
52.
Boeing already had a ramp-up plan in place;
According to the information LNA learned at the, this is the schedule for ramping back
up:
• Rate 42/mo, April and May;
• Rate 47, June;
• Rate 51.5, July and August; and
• Rate 57, September.
Boeing originally planned to go to 57/mo in June or July.
Good luck with that. The upside is that this corporate controlled flight into terrain
will someday make a great B-school case study.
Edit: If you Captcha-train an autonomous vehicle not to run into bicycles, and it gets
into an accident,
are you legally liable? Asking for a friend.
Oh man, this is bad. Really bad. This story just gets worse and worse over time. It's like
one of those Russian Matryoshka dolls – just when you think that you have a handle on
what happened, you find that there is a whole new layer of ugliness underneath. When the hell
did safety become an optional extra on Boeing aircraft? After reading this, I think that it
was a minor miracle that there were no 737 MAX crashes in the continental United States. By
the sounds of this article, it would have likely been a Southwest airliner if it had
happened. I am wondering what else will come out of this saga that we don't know about
yet.
I would say that Boeing easily falls into the 'Too big to fail.' category.
So no matter what happened they will be either made whole (more defense contracts,
taxpayer bailout if necessary, whatever is needed) or protected in some way tbd. They are a
100 billion a year company with 150,000+ employees and untold numbers of other contractors
and jobs depending on their existence. Going away is just not going to happen.
Okay, Boeing screwed the pooch again, and they should have been more clear in their
communications to the airlines. However, let me add some perspective as a 737 operator.
Given the AOA malfunction in either the Lion Air or Ethiopian accidents, an "AOA Disagree"
warning annunciation would have possibly been helpful, but not really crucial to the safe
recovery of the aircraft. There were plenty of other indications that the AOA's were
disagreeing – namely that only one of the stick shakers was activated. Once you get
over the initial surprise, it shouldn't have been that hard to determine this fact. The lack
of the AOA display and disagree annunciator is not what doomed these crews.
I've never had a flight emergency as a pilot, but had a few as a diver. I suspect that for
both of those, when they hit, you need to resolve things quickly and efficiently, with panic
being the worst enemy.
Panic in my experience stems from a number of things here, but two crucial ones are:
– input overload
– not knowing what to do, or learned actions not having any effect
Both of them can be, to a very large extent, overcome with training, training, and more
training (of actually practising the emergency situation, not just reading about it and
filling questionairres).
So, if the crews were expecting to see AoA disagree but it wasn't there, they could have
easily be misled and confused. The crews weren't (from what I've seen) hugely experienced. So
any confusion would have made a bad situation even worse. How big an impact it made is hard
to judge w/o any other materials.
Well it is rarely just one thing that causes an "accident". There are multiple
contributors here. But the one basic overarching cause was Boeing's insistence that
there-will-not-be-any-additional-training.
Without that management decree, the Max could be flown without the hack of MCAS, just that
the pilots be trained on the new pitchup characteristics.
And releasing MCAS into the wild without even alerting pilots to its existence, well, that
is manslaughter, if not outright murder.
My takeaway from the IEEE article was that the AOA sensor is almost a red herring. The dog
that didn't bark was a pitch sensor, and the cardinal sin (from a software perspective) was
that the MCAS algo did not consider pitch sensor values when deciding whether or not to angle
the plane towards ground.
I suggest reading some of the other pieces on the 737 debacle on NC. There's been
extensive discussion of the details, and yes the pilots may be partially to blame, but are
the least culpable out of all parties involved.
Given that story states that Boeing was more or less silent on the disabling of the sensor
alerts, it's is reasonable to posit that any 737 pilot stepping into a 737 MAX would expect
the sensor to be active.
I can understand the position that a pilot still needs to be skilled enough to not be 100%
reliant on sensors, warning lights etc. to fly the plane. However, if I already assume that a
sensor is active and it's not providing a signal that I would be potentially anticipating,
it's going to seed doubt in my mind in a scenario where you don't have much time at all to
think things through.
On the other hand: a safety light that is deactivated without telling the airlines and
pilots gives false negatives to pilots at a critical juncture. They assume it's active, check
it, and see a false negative they don't realize is false.
Imagine having a 'check engine' or 'oil' light on your car's dashboard that's been
deactivated. They never come on. But they're still there. The driver assumes they'll light if
there's engine trouble that needs attention.
Boeing's actions don't pass the 'reasonable man' test.
Yeah, normally if a mechanical gauge "knows" that it isn't working there will be a little
flag that pops up across the display. Leaving the light there but inoperative instead of
either removing the light or covering it up with an "inoperative" cover is a really bad idea.
It is EVEN WORSE than making safety features optional, and that is bad enough.
Let's see
First, they didn't know MCAS existed, so had no idea or training in what to do when it was
erroneously engaged by system.
Then, they think both Aos sensors are working properly.
And, Boeing tells everybody plane is just like previous versions, no need for
simulations.
I'm glad I'm not one of the dead pilots you're blaming.
By the way, it's apparently just chance that the bad sensors affected foreign and not
domestic flights, no public reports that superior domestic pilots had no problem when it hit
the fan on their watch although some domestic airlines were told (warned) that bad sensor
light was optional extra so possibly a domestic plane cancelled flight on account of bad
sensor.
But imagine a really experienced pilot would have saved the day so Boeing should say only
really experienced pilots should fly the plane? Maybe simulators help you get really
experienced, especially with unexpected emergencies?
Personally, I'll avoid the plane for a few years if simulators aren't required hate to have a
pilot not experienced with what we now know is not such a rare event.
We seem to be forgetting that, in the Lion Air case, a really experienced pilot did
save the day the previous day on the same aircraft . The issue was reported, the
airline neglected to repair the issue and nobody seems to have told the new aircrew about the
issue. This seems to support 737 Pilot's position. It is also another egregious failure, this
time on the part of the airline.
That pilot was a third set of eyes. Since he didn't have to fly the plane, he was free to
observe and fortunately his attention eventually focused on the repeating trim wheel
movements. A standard two-person crew doesn't have this luxury. Worth keeping in mind.
That lion crew also seems to have written up the problem incompletely. They didn't
mention, for example, that they had the stick shaker going for the entire flight.
Your point is legitimate but without the benefit of a CVR recording I think you may be
affording too much credit to the jumpseating pilot who is rumored to have provided the flight
crew with the excellent advice of disabling the electric stabilizer trim motor. Even if the
story is entirely true it's not like turning off the Stab trim motor was esoteric knowledge,
maybe 737 pilot can correct me on this but I thought that procedure was a memory item for
trim runaway emergencies, meaning the pilots were supposed to have that bit of knowledge
firmly committed to memory and they were supposed to execute that procedure without any
checklists or undue delay as soon as the condition was recognized. If not a memory item it
was in the 737 QRC or QRH emergency procedures guide that is always present for immediate
reference on the flight deck. The most important thing the crew of Lion Air 43(?) did (the
flight previous to 610 that managed not to crash) was to simply not let themselves become so
frazzled they forgot to pull the thrust levers out of the take-off detent after they reached
a safe altitude, and not overspeeding an out of trim airplane making a bad situation worse.
Maybe the jumpseating pilot had to scream at the crew to reduce thrust and maybe he had to
slap the Captain and reduce the thrust levers himself, but absent a CVR recording to verify
this slightly far-fetched scenario I would say the previous crew deserves the Lion's share
(sorry couldn't resist) of the credit for landing safely.
You are absolutely 100% correct when you point out the non-crashing Captain was far from
exemplary. He laid an absolutely vicious trap for the ill-fated crew of flight 610 by failing
to mention a great number of things he experienced, especially the uncommanded and unwanted
nose down trimming that necessitated turning off the stab trim motor which he also failed to
communicate. Not a shining moment for Lion Air pilots, mechanics or Boeing. Despite the
obvious and multiple shortcomings and blunders of the Captain/crew of Lion Air 43, I believe
that flight proves what the airline pilot commenters here have been saying all along, which
is the 737 Max flaws were serious but survivable with a competent crew. That's not the same
thing as calling the airplane safe or airworthy and it's certainly not excusing Boeing. They
delivered a death trap. Perhaps a bad analogy, but a professional body guard should be able
to easily disarm a five year with a knife, but that doesn't mean a murderous five year with a
knife isn't dangerous or isn't capable of killing you. Airplanes are machines which
inevitably fail and mechanics are humans who make mistakes which is why pilots need to know
how to hand fly airplanes absent automation. Reducing thrust during an emergency to avoid
overspeeding your airplane really isn't a tall ask for a professional pilot. Pilots get this,
non-pilots don't, and it's a point I've grown quite weary of making.
There's been interesting points made back and forth on NC – what do you make of this
from Karl Denninger: basically, "You can't fix the problems the 737Max has with software
alone"? https://market-ticker.org/akcs-www?post=235578
I made the exact same argument here a couple of days ago, but I will say IF the system was
engineered in a way it could have given the Ethiopians a warning prior to eighty knots or V1
(depending on training and pilot judgement) on takeoff, maybe they could have aborted and
kept the plane on the ground avoiding the disaster. Having that disagree light or indication
immediately after rotation on climbout could have soothed the nerves of the pilots and made
them feel more confident trusting the perfectly normal instrumentation on the FO's side of
the airplane. But if the high speed clacker, the airspeed tape and the thrust settings aren't
enough information to convince a overwhelmed, elevator control fixated pilot that he/she has
more than adequate speed to avoid stalling, and they should slow down, then it stands to
reason a secondary warning indication would also not break through the mental logjam of two
very overwhelmed pilots bombarded by warnings and data. In the case of Lion Air 610 the
malfunctioning AOA vane had already caused multiple instrument malfunctions and improper nose
down MCAS trimming on three other flights, so it seems like those guys were hellbent on
flying that plane no matter what. Even if Lion Air would have had the optional warning system
onboard the mechanics most likely would have deferred the warning system as broken. "Ops
checks good". They probably would have removed the bulb or stuck a placard on top of it.
And before anyone feels the need to point it out, yes, I'm engaging in speculation, but so
is everyone claiming this optional safety system would have made a difference in the two
aforementioned tragedies. I'm engaging in speculation as a guy who has reviewed thousands of
logbooks and had hundreds, possibly thousands of interactions with airline maintenance
technicians. Some of those interactions include contentious debates over what is safe to
defer or what can actually legally be deferred so I do have a bit of experience in this
department.
Boeing screwed up. They were hasty, they were greedy, they were cavalier, the MCAS trim
system with a single point of failure was a terrible design that was most likely criminal.
I'm just weighing in on 737 pilot's contention. With a system as poorly designed as the MCAS
stall protection trimming, every safety feature available should have come standard from
Boeing, but sadly additional fault indications don't always matter in emergency situations.
Proper fault diagnosis is only part of any successful emergency outcome. Pilots still have to
possess the knowledge and skill required to follow procedures and fly the airplane.
The only planes I ever flew you'd fly w/o pretty much any instrumentation (WW2 trainers,
hoping to fly a Spitfire or Mustang one day.. ).
But in a modern plane, I'd think that _any_ instrument that is doubled or more (which
implies some sort of criticality) should have an automatic "inputs disagree" indicator, which
would not be possible to turn off.
Not that you'll have to buy it as a special feature.
I have been thinking about the modern 737. My completely uninformed guess is that the
original model, while less "safe" was more informative in a real way than the current
one.
In modern cars, especially something like a hybrid, there is not much "feel" to it. In an
older old fashion gasoline engine car, there is. I could use the Volkswagen as an example,
because it only had some colored lights and the speedometer, and none of the safety features
of a modern car. However, I could sense, smell, see just about everything, often
subconsciously, even before something went kablowie because there was nothing isolating me
from the vehicle and the road. Today, I have to depend on my car's sensors because it has
been designed to be quiet and isolating as possible.
The downward slide of corrupt predatory capitalism is not a pretty picture. These cases
will continue as long as the responsible executives know they have nothing to lose.
Just more proof that self regulation works, just look to our favorite sporting events!
There's no need to have refs on the field because everyone involved is a professional and
would never cheat, disrespect the sport or do something against the rules because the fans
would punish them!
If our sports don't need refs, then surely our markets don't need regulators! Checkmate, big
government stooges!
I suppose I am naive, but I am shocked that the behavior of Boeing's management and the
FAA are not being treated as a criminal matter. What happened was not a business mistake, it
was a crime in which a number of persons deliberately and knowingly decided to risk other
people's lives in order to increase profits, as a result of which hundreds of people were
killed. I believe the term is 'negligent homicide', upon conviction of which lesser beings
than high management and bureaucrats go to jail. In some countries their next of kin would
already have received a bill for bullets and services rendered.
The term used to be criminally negligent homicide, but this no longer applies to those
wearing white collars.
Otherwise we would see charges against bankers, opioid pushers, and others.
But Boeing, as part of a duopoly, recognizes that its customers have nowhere to go .at
least for the next few years, which might as well be eternity as far as MBAs are
concerned.
Even if it meant drastically reducing flights why would any airline buy airplanes that are
not guaranteed to be safe? Losing money through fewer paying customers because you are
choosing to have fewer flights is better than being boycotted or bankrupted by lawsuits, or
arrested and criminally charged.
It is inexplicable that Boeing shut off an indicator system for the Max that had been
standard on earlier versions of the 737, when that AoA sensor disagreement indicator was even
more important for safe flight.
Turning it on in the Max version was possible but was made part of an extra-cost safety
package. How would a purchaser know to buy it when Boeing downplayed its importance so as not
to suggest how different the Max was from supposedly similar earlier versions of the 737?
The more that comes out about the conduct of Boeing and its senior management's decisions,
the more they look criminally reckless.
The FAA is mostly responsible for this fiasco because they have a misguided mission.
Safety should be their only concern, but over the years that's eroded into a "sort of safety"
attitude but mostly being a cheerleader for the aviation industry.
And you can't trust bastards like Boeing to "self-certify" anything, apparently!
"..It took months before Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg issued a video in which, among other
things, he said, "We own it." He was referring to safety of the MAX.
This was widely interpreted as Boeing stepping up and taking responsibility for at least
some of the causes of the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes.
Last Wednesday, he took it all back.
On the first quarter earnings call, Muilenburg denied there was any "technical slip or
gap" in designing the now famous MCAS system. He said "actions not taken" contributed to the
crash, a thinly veiled reference once again to pilot error.."
Boeing and FAA are criminally negligent especially for the Ethiopian Airline crash. The
recovered horizontal stabilizer screw jack from the Lion Air crash was found in the full nose
down position that forced the plane to dive into the sea. It should have never be in this is
flight critical position. Grounding the fleet should have been immediate until the cause and
fix were found. On top of all this, it is simply criminal for Boeing to charge Southwest
Airlines for additional safety features and then turn them off not telling the airline.
It is tragic that it appears that Americans will have to rely on China to force Boeing to
actually fix MCAS and along with Canada to shame the FAA into requiring pilot training on
Flight Simulators before flying passengers on the Max.
A Boeing C-Suite executive has to go to jail. If not, there is no chance for the United
States of America to survive. With government run by and for profiteers, long term planning
is dead. Profit over people. A plague, an economic crash, a world war, a middle-class revolt,
flooded coasts, or an autocratic Caesar become inevitable.
[Nader's] niece, 24-year-old Samya Stumo, was among the 157 victims of an Ethiopian
Airlines flight crash last month, less than six months after a flight on the same aircraft,
the Boeing 737 Max 8, crashed in Indonesia.
"She was compassionate from the get-go. She'd be 8 years old and she'd get a pail of hot
water and go to her great-grandmother and soak her feet and rub her feet and dry them. She
was always that way."
Clifford Law has brought suit on behalf of the Stumo family in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. From the
complaint :
Blinded by its greed, BOEING haphazardly rushed the 737 MAX 8 to market, with the
knowledge and tacit approval of the United States Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"),
while BOEING actively concealed the nature of the automated system defects. Numerous
decisions by BOEING's leadership substantially contributed to the subject crash and
demonstrate BOEING's conscious disregard for the lives of others, including but not limited
to BOEING's role in: designing an aircraft with a powerful automated flight control system
[the MCAS] susceptible to catastrophic failure in the event a single defective sensor;
failing to properly inform pilots of the existence of the new flight control system and
educate and train them in all aspects of its operation; failing to properly address the new
system in the aircraft's flight manual; refusing to include key safety features as standard
in the aircraft rather than optional upgrades; delivering 737 MAX aircraft with a version of
the flight control system that was materially different from the version presented to the FAA
during certification; and failing to take appropriate action after BOEING learned that the
737 MAX aircraft was not performing as intended or safety, as was made tragically clear with
the crash of Lion Air Flight JT 610.
BOEING's decision to put profits over safety is further evident in BOEING's repeated
claims that the 737 MAX 8 is so similar to its earlier models that it does not require
significant retraining for those pilots familiar with the older generation of 737s.
All pretty much conventional wisdom at this point! The suit also calls for exemplary (punitive)
damages ; I've embedded the complaint at the end of the post, in case any readers care to
dig into it. I'm not going to examine the case in this post; rather, I'm going to focus on
three items from Naders letter that I think advance the story: His framing for 737 MAX
airworthiness; his highlighting of Boeing's stock buybacks; and his call for Boeing CEO
Muilenburg's defenestration.
(Stalling, in Nader's telling, being the condition the defective MCAS system was meant to
correct.) Because aircraft that are aerodynamicallly unstable, llke fighter jets, have ejection
seats! Now, a pedant would point out that Nader means commercial aircraft , but as
readers know, I eschew pedantry in all contexts. That said, Nader manages to encapsulate the
problem in a single sentence (using antithesis , isocolon , andanaphora ). Now, we have pilots in
the commentariat who will surely say whether Nader's formulation is correct, but to this
layperson it seems to be. From 737 MAX, a fan/geek site, on the business and technical logic of the MCAS system :
The LEAP engine nacelles are larger and had to be mounted slightly higher and further
forward from the previous NG CFM56-7 engines to give the necessary ground clearance. This new
location and larger size of nacelle cause the vortex flow off the nacelle body to produce
lift at high AoA [Angle of Attack]. As the nacelle is ahead of the C of G, this lift causes a
slight pitch-up effect (ie a reducing stick force) which could lead the pilot to
inadvertently pull the yoke further aft than intended bringing the aircraft closer towards
the stall. This abnormal nose-up pitching is not allowable under 14CFR §25.203(a) "Stall
characteristics". Several aerodynamic solutions were introduced such as revising the leading
edge stall strip and modifying the leading edge vortilons but they were insufficient to pass
regulation. MCAS was therefore introduced to give an automatic nose down stabilizer input
during elevated AoA when flaps are up.
Nader on Stock Buybacks
From Nader's
letter , where he is addressing Muilenberg ("you") directly:
Boeing management's behavior must be seen in the context of Boeing's use of its earned
capital. Did you use the $30 billion surplus from 2009 to 2017 to reinvest in
R&D, in new narrow-body passenger aircraft? Or did you, instead, essentially burn this
surplus with self-serving stock buybacks of $30 billion in that period? Boeing is one of the
companies that MarketWatch labelled as "Five companies that spent lavishly on stock buybacks
while pension funding lagged."
Incredibly, your buybacks of $9.24 billion in 2017 comprised 109% of annual
earnings . As you well know, stock buybacks do not create any jobs. They improve the
metrics for the executive compensation packages of top Boeing bosses [ka-ching]. Undeterred,
in 2018, buybacks of $9 billion constituted 86% of annual earnings .
To make your management recklessly worse, in December 2018, you arranged for your
rubberstamp Board of Directors to approve $20 billion more in buybacks. Apparently, you
had amortized the cost of the Indonesian Lion Air crash victims as not providing any
significant impact on your future guidance to the investor world.
Holy moley, that's real money! Nader's detail on the stock buybacks (see NC here
,
here , and here )
interested me, because it bears on Boeing's 2011 decision not to build a new narrow-body
aircraft in 2011. I
summarized the decision-making back in March:
(2) Choice of Airframe : The
Air Current describes the competitive environment that led Boeing to upgrade the 737 to
the 737 MAX, instead of building a new plane:
Boeing wanted to replace the 737. The plan had even earned the endorsement of its
now-retired chief executive. "We're gonna do a new airplane," Jim McNerney
said in February of that same year. "We're not done evaluating this whole situation
yet, but our current bias is to not re-engine, is to move to an all-new airplane at the end
of the decade." History went in a different direction. Airbus, riding its
same decades-long incremental strategy and chipping away at Boeing's market supremacy,
had made no secret of its plans to put new engines on the A320. But its own re-engined jet
somehow managed to take Boeing by surprise. Airbus and American forced Boeing's hand.
It had to put new engines on the 737 to stay even with its rival .
Why? The earlier butchered launch of the 787:
Boeing justified the decision thusly: There were huge and excruciatingly painful
near-term obstacles on its way to a new single-aisle airplane. In the summer of 2011, the
787 Dreamliner wasn't yet done after billions invested and years of delays. More than 800
airplanes later here in 2019, each 787 costs less to build than sell, but it's still
running a $23 billion production cost deficit. . The 737 Max was Boeing's ticket to
holding the line on its position -- both market and financial -- in the near term.
Abandoning the 737 would've meant walking away from its golden goose that helped finance
the astronomical costs of the 787 and the development of the 777X.
So, we might think of Boeing as a runner who's tripped and fallen: The initial stumble,
followed by loss of balance, was the 787; with the 737 MAX, Boeing hit the surface of the
track.
So, Dennis. How's that workin' out for ya? How does the decision not to build a new
plane look in retrospect? Ygeslias writes in
Vox, in April:
Looking back, Boeing probably wishes it had just stuck with the "build a new plane" plan
and toughed out a few years of rough sales, rather than ending up in the current situation.
Right now the company is, in effect, trying to patch things up piecemeal -- a software update
here, a new warning light there, etc. -- in hopes of persuading global regulatory agencies to
let its planes fly again.
What Nader's focus on stock buybacks shows, is that Boeing had the capital to invest in
developing a new plane .
From Bloomberg in 2019 :
For Boeing and Airbus, committing to an all-new aircraft is a once-in-a-decade event.
Costs are prohibitive, delays are the norm and payoff can take years to materialize. Boeing
could easily spend more than $15 billion on the NMA, according to Ken Herbert,
analyst with Canaccord Genuity, and Airbus may be forced into a clean-sheet design if sales
take off.
The sales force has been fine-tuning the design with airlines for at least five years,
creating a "will it or won't it?" drama around the decision on whether to make the plane,
known internally at Boeing as the NMA, for new, middle-of-market airplane.
Now, it is true that the "huge and excruciatingly painful near-term obstacles" referred to
by the Air Current are sales losses that Boeing would incur from putting a bullet into it's
cash cow, the 737, before it turned into a dog (like now?). Nevertheless, Beoing was clearly
capable, as Yglesias points put, of "tough[ing]out a few years of rough sales." So what
else was "excruciatingly painful"? Losing the stock buybacks (and that sweet, sweet
executive compensation). Readers, I wasn't cynical enough. I should have given consideration to
the possibility that Muilenburg and his merry men were looting the company!
Consider, in addition, the statement of two Harvard scholars -- Leonard J. Marcus and Eric
J. McNulty, authors of the forthcoming book, You're It: Crisis, Change, and How to Lead When
it Matters Most. These gentlemen did not achieve their positions by using strong language.
That is why, the concluding statement in their CNN article on March 27, 2019, merits your
closer attention:
"Of course, if Boeing did not act in good faith in deploying the 737 Max and the Justice
Department's investigation discovers Boeing cut corners or attempted to avoid proper
regulatory reviews of the modifications to the aircraft, Muilenburg and any other executives
involved should resign immediately. Too many families, indeed communities, depend on the
continued viability of Boeing."
These preconditions have already been disclosed and are evidentially based. Your
mismanagement is replete with documentation, including your obsession with shareholder value
and executive compensation. There is no need to wait for some long-drawn out, redundant
inquiry. Management was criminally negligent, 346 lives of passengers and crew were lost. You
and your team should forfeit your compensation and should resign forthwith.
All concerned with aviation safety should have your public response.
I can't find anything to disagree with here. However, I'll quote from commenter Guido at
Leeham News,
March 29, 2019 :
What I don't understand: Muilenburg was the CEO when the MCAS code was implemented.
Muilenburg was the CEO when Boeing "tweaked" the certification of the B737Max. It was the
Boeing management that decided, that the B737Max must under no circumstances trigger
simulator training for pilots.
Muilenburg has for sure not written the code for MCAS by himself, but as the CEO he is
responsible for the mess. He is responsible, that the first version of MCAS was cheap and
fast to implement, but not safe. It was basically Muilenburg, who allowed a strategy, that
was basically: Profits and Quickness before safety. Muilenburg has the responsibility for 346
dead people. You can't kill 346 people with your new product and still be the highly paid CEO
of the company. There have to be consequences.
Why are there no calls, that Muilenburg must step down?
However, a search of court documents and news reports shows the company is facing at least
34 claims from victims' families and one claim seeking class certification on behalf of
shareholders. The claims allege Boeing is responsible for losses after installing an unsafe
anti-stall system, called "MCAS" (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), on its
737 Max 8 planes, suspected to have played a role in both crashes. Boeing CEO Dennis
Muilenburg said it was "apparent" the system had been activated in both crashes.
Added to the uncertainty of potential expenses for Boeing are pending regulator
probes. The U.S. Justice Department initiated a criminal investigation into Boeing's Federal
Aviation Administration certification, as well as how it marketed its 737 Max 8 planes. The
U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General is also conducting an
inquiry.
On April 9, the lawsuit seeking class certification was brought on behalf of shareholders who purchased Boeing stock
between January 8, 2019 and March 21, 2019. The proposed class period covers a time frame
beginning after the Lion Air crash, and extending beyond the Ethiopian Airlines crash, when
Boeing's stock experienced a steep decline.
But then again, Muilenberg may know -- or think -- that Boeing, as a national champion, is
too big to fail. So, if Boeing gracefully exits from the commercial aviation business, it may
find the warm embrace of government contracting more comfortable. Perhaps that's why propaganda
like this suddenly started showing up in my Twitter feed:
I suppose it's too much to ask that the CEO of a too-big-to-fail company be asked to resign,
even if he did kill a lot of people. But if Nader can do with the 737 MAX, at the end of his
career, what he did with
the Corvair ("a one-car accident") , when he was coming up, everybody except for a cabal of
looters and liars in Boeing's Chicago C-suite will be a lot better off. So we can hope.
I keep going back to the DC-10 fiasco in the 1970s.
In 1974, in one of the most horrific air disasters of all time, a THY (Turkish Airlines)
DC-10 crashed after takeoff from Orly Airport outside Paris, killing 346 people. The accident
was traced to a faulty cargo door design. (The same door had nearly caused the crash of an
American Airlines DC-10 two years earlier.) McDonnell Douglas had hurriedly designed a plane
with a door that it knew was defective, then, in the aftermath of Paris, tried to cover the
whole thing up. It was reckless, even criminal. Then, in 1979, American flight 191, also a
DC-10, went down at Chicago-O'Hare, killing 273 -- to this day the deadliest air crash ever
on U.S. soil -- after an engine detached on takeoff. Investigators blamed improper
maintenance procedures (including use of a forklift to raise the engine and its pylon), and
then found pylon cracks in at least six other DC-10s, causing the entire fleet to be grounded
for 37 days. The NTSB cited "deficiencies in the surveillance and reporting procedures of the
FAA," as well as production and quality control problems at McDonnell Douglas.
That's two of history's ten deadliest air crashes, complete with design defects, a
cover-up, and 619 dead people. And don't forget the 737 itself has a checkered past, going
back to the rudder problems that caused the crash of USAir flight 427 in 1994 (and likely the
crash of United flight 585 in 1991). Yet the DC-10, the 737, and America's aviation prestige
along with them, have persevered. If we survived the those scandals we can probably manage
this. I have a feeling that a year from now this saga will be mostly forgotten. Boeing and
its stock price will recover, the MAX will be up and flying again, and on and on we go.
This is how it happens.
Maybe. But in 1974, the United States was commercial aviation. Airbus had launched
its first plane, the A300 , only in 1972. We were also an
imperial hegemon in a way we are not now. For myself, I can't help noticing that it was
Boeing's takeover of a wretched, corrupt McDonnell Douglas -- the
famous reverse takeover -- that ultimately turned Boeing from an engineering company into a
company driven by finance. With resulits that we see.
The fact that the CEO and the Board have not resigned just shows everyone that they lack
all the essential characteristics of human beings.
Stock buybacks should be illegal. Profits should only be distributed via dividends or
reinvested. The fact that companies can do this shows how corrupted our governments are.
The rest of the world may forget this one. I won't and there are millions like me who will
never step aboard a boeing plane again.
The only thing that will save this company now is the US govt, which is likely.
Boeing's management is not going to jail and likely will keep their jobs. The deaths of
over three hundred people means nothing. They are not even American and probably only middle
class so they don't have connections to use. The "American" company Boeing has both money and
connections.
Money gives you rights and if you don't have it, you are not even a human being.
Just look at 2008. The Vampiric Octopus called Wall Street was saved by the Feds with
almost no one going to jail, or even criminally prosecuted. The exceptions of an innocent
small community bank in NYC and some low level employees of a very few loan companies. The
entire planetary economy came to with in hours of freezing and then collapsing. Millions of
Americans lost homes, often through questionably legal foreclosures, with many millions more
losing their jobs.
Nothing going to change and I wish I could believe otherwise.
So I should just fire up my own money press then as should everyone else Money was
invented as a limiter by the ancient church then adopted by governments.. Money isnt
necessary to live and it will b thrown overboard soon enough.
I think money as a concept arose in Sumer about 6-7 thousand years ago with the clay
receipts given by the temple of the local city's patron god for livestock and grain stored
there.
But my knowledge of money's history is limited. If anyone wants to correct or clarify,
please do.
Might be wrong but think (if my memory of Gerber serves) you refer to credit/debt. Actual
money (coin) I think arose along side the use of large scale Armies (armies are both highly
mobile & inherently amorphous -- ie people come & go, die, are wounded, loot must be
traded etc, all of which is difficult in the absence of currency)
Stock buybacks were once illegal because they are a type of stock market manipulation. But
then Reagan got in and wanted to do his banker buddies a favour-
To think that Boeing has Ralph Nader of all people on their case. With apologies to Liam
Neeson, Nader might be saying to Muilenberg right now: "If you are looking for (forgiveness),
I can tell you I don't have (forgiveness). But what I do have are a very particular set of
skills, skills I have acquired over a very long career. Skills that make me a nightmare for
people like you. If you go now, that'll be the end of it."
That sounds like good advice that.
Re-outlawing the "Stock Buyback" would be one useful reNew The Deal reform. Outlawing
compensation in stocks, options, or etc. of any kind except money would be another useful
Newer Deal reform. Both together would force-multiply each other's effect.
I hope the four Old Real Democrats have people reading these threads and taking any
possibly-good ideas back to headquarters. I hope the New Catfood Democrats and their people
aren't spying or eavesdropping on these threads.
I love how Nader brings stock buy-backs into his letter and basically connects the dots
from a recklessly designed aircraft system full circle to an indictment of our current
shareholder value system of capitalism and its perverse incentive structure which includes
safety shortcuts and runaway executive compensation. Such a perfect case study for this
site!
I think Nader really should beat the drum heavily on the perverse incentive structure at
Boeing and how executives shortchanged safety to grab more money for themselves because
that's an easy story for a jury to understand. I see where Nader is going with the inherently
"stall prone" aerodynamic design stuff, and he's not wrong, but I think he may be treading on
dangerous ground. Automatic stabilizer trimming systems designed to overcome the negative
aerodynamic attributes of the new 737 Max wing/engine design is a confusing rabbit hole for
the lay person. Boeing attorneys and expert witnesses may be able to twist the jury's head
into a pretzel on this issue. The debate and discussion here concerning process, decision
making, design philosophy etc at Boeing has generally been of very high quality, but has a
tendency to go off the rails when the discussion dives too deeply into the subject matter of
aerodynamics and aircraft systems. I could see the same dynamic playing out in the courtroom.
Nader is the master class-action consumer advocacy attorney not me, but I think he should go
heavy buybacks and whistle blower warnings while avoiding unforced errors arguing over the
not-so-important point of whether or not the 737 Max crashed because it was stall prone or
because it was too stall adverse. Two brand new Boeings crashed, people died, Boeing was
greedy, Boeing was hasty, the MCAS trim system was garbage and probably criminal. He's got a
slam dunk case arguing the MCAS trim system with a single point of failure was poorly
designed and recklessly conceived, I think he should just stick to that and the greed angle
and avoid the stall prone vs. stall adverse debate. I wish him luck.
They screwed up the plane design then thought an extra layer of software would ameliorate
the problem enough. It sucks but it's probably just good enough. Seems pretty simple.
As JerryDenim touched on, a good defense lawyer would probably be able to defeat this
argument in front of a jury. There are too many examples of successful and safe commercial
aircraft with aerodynamic compromises (the hardware, as you call it) that use software fixes
to overcome these limitations. The focus in this case would need to be on the implementation
of that software and how criminal neglect occurred there.
Boeing's attorneys are going to try and make any lawsuits a question of why the airplanes
ultimately crashed. I hate to spoil it for anyone, but I can tell you Boeing's attorneys are
going to blame it all on the pilots. Airlines and airplane manufactures always do. Nothing
new. Dead pilots can't defend themselves, their families don't have millions in the bank and
they aren't going to be placing any billion dollar aircraft orders in the future. If anyone
has read my frequently maligned comments, you already know the line of attack. Not following
the runaway trim procedures and overspeeding the aircraft with takeoff thrust set. That's why
Nader or anyone else pursuing Boeing would do well to sidestep the "why did two Boeing 737
Max Jets crash" question and stick to the details surrounding the horribly flawed MCAS trim
system and the Boeing corporate greed story. Steer clear of the pilots' actions and the
potentially confusing aerodynamics of modern jetliners, keep the focus squarely on the MCAS
trim system design process and executive greed.
Anyone prosecuting Boeing will have to deal with Boeing's defence, which as noted, will
play up the commoness of such technical compromises. I do wonder whether Boeing will go after
the pilots, though.
Any pilots argument naturally raises Boeing's negligence re : training, flight manuals &
communication. The prosecution case will naturally play up the greed aspect as
cause/motivation/
context for the crashes & Boeing's direct responsibility /negligence.
The defense would likely also pull in the airlines and FAA as targets for liability, as
both have some responsibility for these matters. Attacking the FAA would be fodder for the
de-regulators (Privatize it! Government is incompetent!). The airlines would complain that
competition forces them to cut costs, and that they meet all of the (gutted) legal
requirements.
I agree with focusing on the greed aspect. Nader's letter has some technical errors such
as stating the engines were tilted (they were moved horizontally and vertically, not rotated)
that show he hasn't fully understood the details. It doesn't help that many of the changes
made to the 737 MAX from previous generations are actually quite subtle, and can't really be
discussed individually for this context. It is the sum of these changes that made it an
extremely deadly aircraft.
The other failure/business feature is the concept of modularity. The software designed to
fix the aerodynamic complexities is broken down into modular components, and then sold off as
"options". Once again greed sabotages the system. Modularity is a great way to gouge
customers and lock in higher profits. The level of technical competence needed to properly
evaluate what modules are essential complicates the outcome. But then again, this can be
rationalized as a feature not a bug. Blame for failure can be passed around- the customer
should have purchased the entire package.
The runaway externalities emanating from the current form of capitalism as practiced in
the US must be reigned in. Voluntary compliance to some sort of moral code is useless- worse
than useless in that corrupt operators can hide behind lame excuses for failure.
The bigger problem is that Government regulations could solve these problems quickly, as
in throwing people in jail and confiscating their property. A strong argument can be made for
ill-gotten gains. I surely would vote for that if given the chance. Deal drugs and you can
loose your home. What about conscious business decisions
leading to harm?
You need a strong force external to these business concerns for this to happen. The
separation of government and business. Business should operate at the will of the government.
When the government is run with the wellbeing of the people foremost, then issues like
crashing planes can be rectified.
When the interests of business and government merge, then what you have is fascism.
American fascism will have a happy face. These unfortunate problems of crashing planes and
polluted environments will trundle along into the future. Billionaires will continue to
accumulate their billions while the rest of us will trundle along.
But one day, trundling along won't be an option. Maybe only outsiders to the US system can
see this clearly.
You ask: "So when the original 737 was designed, did the engineers have the option of
using these larger engines? Did they decline to do so because it was a flawed design?"
The larger engines currently in use on the 737 Max 8 were not designed until recently.
They did not decline because the current engine wasn't even invented.
I guess what I am wondering is if the original designers of the 737 had the option of
designing a more powerful engine similar to that used in the 737 MAX but declined to do so.
No doubt engine technology has advanced during the 50 years since the first 737's were built.
Could the engineers 50 years ago have designed engines like those on the 737 MAX? If so, what
were there reasons for not doing so?
I also have a second question. I have been told that stalling can be prevented by placing
small wings at the front of an airplane. Would such a design have resolved the problems with
the 737 MAX?
Fifty years of technological improvement, yes. The new engines aren't more powerful,
they're more fuel efficient. Airbus had put more fuel efficient engines on its planes, so
Boeing rushed new engines of its own into service to compete.
But they're really too large to
be mounted on the 737; they mess up the center of gravity. MCAS was a janky software fix to
solve a fundamental hardware problem, because Boeing didn't want to design a new plane.
And
it didn't want to lose money by requiring airlines to retrain pilots, it sold the plane with
the new engines as being exactly the same as the old, a painless upgrade.
Canards, as the small wings at the front of aircraft are sometimes called, would likely
not have been a fix in this case. There are some light aircraft that use these for stall
prevention by utilizing the aerodynamic properties of the wing. Since a stall (absence of
lift) is often caused by the nose of aircraft being too high, you can design the canard so
that it stalls before the main wing. Thus it's difficult for the whole plane to stall, since
the nose will sink when the canard loses lift first and returns the plane to a more
appropriate attitude. An example here:
In high performance aircraft canards are used to increase maneuverability by providing
another control surface.
We generally don't see them in commercial aircraft for a few reasons:
-Aircraft layout would not be conducive to carrying passengers – jetways would be
awkward, doors would be less accessible, visibility out of the cockpit might be
compromised.
-Control surfaces at the tail of the aircraft are more effective, as the lever distance
they act over is often longer. Tail surfaces are easier to place out of the airflow of the
main wing than to place main wing out of the airflow of canards.
-Added complexity for not much added benefit (if we were to add canards to a plane with
tail surfaces as well).
These are of course all very coarse generalizations – engineering is all about
making technical and economic trade-offs.
A radical example of what can be accomplished by a combination of aerodynamics and
software is the B-2 bomber – only one main wing, no tail or canards. I know, it has
ejection seats but I sincerely doubt any aeronautical engineer has ever sat down and thought,
"Hm, well, that's a sketchy design, but screw it, they can just eject if I messed up".
So would Boeing have to design a new plane to use canards? It would probably require the
737 MAX pilots to have new training. Boeing also seemed to want to hide the instability
problem and the canards would be visual evidence for the problem.
The 737 Was designed in the '60. High bypass turbo fan engines had yet to be developed
then. Upgrading the 737 is like adding a plug in hybrid engine to a Ford F100.
The original 737 was designed to be quite low to the ground, to allow for easier boarding
in an era before widespread jetway use (models have even been offered with integrated pull
out boarding stairs), and to allow for more accessible servicing.
This worked well with the
engines of the time, which were often low bypass turbofans, and thus smaller in diameter.
This combination of height and engines made sense for the market it was designed.
Most modern commercial engines are high bypass turbofans, and therefore larger in
diameter. The move to larger fan diameters has been enabled by advances in materials,
manufacturing technology, and simulation software, with the goal of increasing engine power
and efficiency.
Another factor influencing the engine size that can be used without extensive redesign is
the landing gear operation. Because it folds towards the centerline of the plane, and into
pockets in the bottom of the fuselage, there is a limit on how long it can be before it
becomes too long and each side would collide with the other. And one would need to redesign
the wing box structure to accommodate the moved wheels.
Exactly. This is a textbook case of the looting of America.
The $30 billion dollars made
by cutting costs including quality inspection, using an existing airframe, tax cuts and
ignoring safety went directly to stock buybacks that benefited stockholders and C-suite
compensation.
Just like 2008 Boeing is "too big to fail and jailing the executives would
cause it to collapse". Unless Americans demand an end to the corruption and the restoration
of the rule of law; the plundering will continue until there is nothing left to live on.
Boeing could have designed two brand new safe airliners with that cash that would have
provided jobs and efficient transportation into the future but instead the money went into
the pockets of the connected rich and killed 346 people.
What really gets me is that ultimately that would have given the fools more money because
the orders would have kept on coming and probably increase, which would mean more profit and
more compensation for everyone. Of course that would have taken a few years instead of
immediately. So now the compensation is going to crash. Oh wait! They will just sell again to
themselves, strip the company, and sell the nameplate still affixed to some ruin.
I am starting to understand why the Goths had no resistance when in Italy and during the
sack the city of Rome. Centuries earlier the Republic and then the Empire routinely raised
multiple armies and dealt with catastrophes both natural and man made. At the end, not only
could they not readily create an another army, they could not repair the aqueducts. Like we
are becoming, Rome became a hollow shell.
And probably the only stockholders who even benefited would be the individual or
family-dynasty rich stockholders who own many thousands to millions of shares of a particular
stock at a time. It takes ownership of that many shares for a tiny benefit-per-share to add
up to thousands or millions of tiny little benefits-per-share.
People with pensions or 401ks or whatever may well involuntarily "own" 2 or 3 or maybe 10
shares "apiece" of Boeing. But they derived no benefit from the tiny little benefit per share
this maneuver gained for the shares.
Re: appendix 3, over-steer is counter-intuitive as hell. Once it's underway you have to
steer left during a right turn and vice versa. I have watched race drivers do it (very
skillfully) at the track, but there is no way I would want to be in a car that did that in a
pressure or potential accident situation without a lot of training beforehand.
"your obsession with shareholder value": shareholder value is not being attended to if the
company is driven into the ground by virtue of its planes being driven into the ground.
Clearly the definition of "shareholder value" that these bozos use is as defective as
their engineering decision-making.
Hang a few of them pour encourager les autres . And hang a few of the regulators
who thought it would be a dandy idea to let the firm regulate itself.
And hang a few of the lawmakers and lawbuyers who legislatively de-budgeted and
money-starved FAA into this " turn it over to the plane-makers" corner as well.
There is another case of air disaster often referred to in what is known as *Human
Factors* training a L-1011 which *descended* into the glades; while the crew tried to sort
out a problem with a light bulb. I suggest familiarizing with it for perspective. (not to
exonerate Boeing; just to encourage keeping an open mind)
Ahhh, the infamous Captain Buddy. Immortal tyrant of early CRM training fame
Lambert's mention of the DC-10 and it's fatally flawed, explosive decompressing cargo door
sent me down a hole of DC-10 disasters and accident reports. Some of those DC-10 incidents
like America Airlines flight 96 could have been major tragedies but were saved by level heads
and airmanship that by today's standards would be considered exceptional. The AA 96 crew
landed safely with no fatalities after an explosive decompression, a partially collapsed
floor and severely compromised flight controls. The crew had to work together and use
non-standard asymmetrical thrust and control inputs to overcome the effects of a stuck, fully
deflected rudder and a crippled elevator. The pilots of the ill fated United flight 232,
another DC-10, are celebrated exemplars of the early CRM case studies, both crew members and
a United DC-10 instructor pilot who happened to be occupying the jumpseat all worked together
to heroically crash land their horribly stricken craft in Sioux City Iowa with only partial
aileron control and assymetrical thrust to control the airplane. No elevator, no rudder
control. A good number of passengers perished but most lived. Those pilots in the two
instances I mentioned were exceptional, and they had to resort to exceptional means to
control their aircraft, but in light of airmanship of that caliber from just a few decades
ago, it blows my mind that in 2019 the mere suggestion that professional airline pilots
should probably still be capable of moving the thrust levers during a trim emergency is
somehow controversial enough to expose oneself to charges of racism and bias?! Different
times indeed.
Boeing 737 Max aside, airplanes seem to be a lot safer these days than they were in the
1970's and 80's. Widespread acceptance and adoption of CRM/TEM has made personalities like
Captain Buddy and many bad cockpit automation practices relics from the past, but automation
itself still looks to be increasingly guilty of deskilling professional pilot ranks. In light
of that trend, it's a really good thing passenger jets in 2019 are more reliable than the
DC-10 and easier to land than the MD-11.
Deteriorating pilot skills. Yep. Now you're getting it. Problem is, more automation equals
more pilot skill degradation. Everything is just peachy with highly automated "idiot proof"
airplanes until something breaks, then who is supposed to fly the plane if the pilots can't?
The flight attendants? Whoever is sitting in 1A? Airbus airplanes malfunction too, as
documented in a number of well publicized disasters and not-so-well publicized near
disasters, so while this may be an effective marketing pitch to an airline executive not able
or not willing to pay for highly skilled, experienced pilots, it's not a solution to a pilot
skill crisis. Long term, it makes the situation worse.
Personally I believe in training the hell out of pilots because if I get into a plane, I
want a pilot at the controls and not an airplane-driver. I would bet that even I could be
trained to fly an aircraft where most of the functions are automated but when things go
south, that is when you want a pilot in control. Training is expensive but having an
ill-trained pilot in the cockpit is even more expensive.
A thought . A completely fresh plane design is not necessarily safer. There is aways a
trade off between innovation and proven reliability. It is surprisingly rare for an entirely
new aircraft family to be introduced without at least one problem that threatens (but does
not always take) lives.
787 and 737 MAX are not the only problems Boeing have had.
The 737 NG (Next Generation) airplane using composite materials for the aircraft body, was
also outsourced, The idea was that the Body parts would be built to exacting specifications,
so they could be connected at the stage of final assembly. However, the sub-contractor
couldn't live up to the specifications, so Boeing had to manually re-drill holes to connect
the fuselage parts.
Not long after we had a series of crashes, where the fuselage broke up into its parts,
something almost never seen before in airplanes.
There are other Human Factors at play; regarding pilot ability Measuring ability by simply
looking at *hours flown* (often referred to as *experience*) is misleading. Relevant details
might include just what types of experience. It is possible to get airline positions *ab
initio*, or in-house, if you will (with 500 hours, (IIRC) OR:
Prospective pilots from private sector, or military, may be more likely to have diverse
backgrounds; including Flight Instructor background, Upset Recovery training; Aerobatic
flying; and Glider or sailplane background. These are not necessarily prerequisites for
airline hires. Do they make a difference? in emergencies???
The change in Part 135 minimums for non ab-initio applicants has done little or nothing to
improve safety. It did financially squeeze some very competent and capable career minded
pilots out of the pipeline to the left front seat. (thanks chuck.)(f.u.) His feel-good
legislation:*We're doing something about it!*
It isn't just Boeing that is using share buybacks to goose CEO pay. Shareholders of
American Express have an opportunity to vote to Deduct Impact of BuyBacks on Pay. See
American
Express 2019 Proxy Vote Recommendations
But, but Nader made Al Gore lose in 2000. Good to see him out of the shadows (he has a
podcst BTW).
While Boeing deserves every form of condemnation and Muilenberg should resign I do think
the facts that were all laid out in that should-be-Pulitzer-winning Seattle Times series are
being stretched a bit. The problem seems to be, not that the plane is prone to fall out of
the sky, but that its handling characteristics differ from the earlier, ubiquitous, 737
models. MCAS is the defective part, and Boeing will pay plenty
Florida's presidential election in 2000 was expected to be close and likely to be decisive
in the electoral college vote. Nader was a fairly popular third-party candidate for president
in that election. Many supporters of Gore over Bush pleaded for Nader to exit that race and
ask his supporters to vote for Gore. He did neither. In the end the margin of Bush's win in
Florida was tiny, if it existed at all, so there was reason to be angry at Nader, as I was at
the time, since if he had quit the race in that state, Gore would very likely have become
president instead of Bush.
If you're into counterfactual teleology then you might say Nader's stubborn vanity
therefore led to the Iraq and Afghan wars. I don't but it's worth being aware that some
people do.
I can't find the link right now; but, it stated that after close study, most of the voters
who voted for Nadar would not have voted for Gore and would have just sat out the election
resulting in an even more pronounced victory for Bush. Gore's defeat came from his inability
to win his home state of TN.
The claim ignores other factors. Gore's lackadaisical campaign, for one, and its poor
response to the BushCheney campaign's misuse of the legal system to stop the Florida
recount.
It's not Gore's fault the Supreme Court's conservative majority chose to not let the FL
supreme court determine what FL law means, and chose to decide the election itself. But his
response to the Florida debacle was weak, like his campaign. That might be one reason so many
people voted for Nader. That's on Al and on BushCheney.
Some additional information and clarification about the Corvair.
The Corvair had a rear mounted engine and rear wheel drive. This is a poor design from a
handling perspective as the rear weight bias produces a pendulum effect making the Corvair
prone to oversteer. This tendency was exacerbated by the Corvair's swing axle independent
rear suspension with its inherent camber changes as the wheel moved up and down. These
characteristics of the Corvair were deadly in that while cornering if you let off the
accelerator, the engine brakes the rear wheels creating a condition called "throttle lift
oversteer". Under this situation the counterintutive reaction should be to put your foot on
the accelerator and not the brakes. Some of you may recall that comedian Ernie Kovacs was
killed when his Corvair spun off the road in wet weather and hit a utility pole.
A paradox here is that the Porsche 911 has a design very similar to the Corvair, rear
wheel drive, rear mounted engine and rear weight bias and is praised for its handling. The
Corvair was sometimes referred to as a poor man's 911. It too was prone to severe and violent
oversteer if the throttle was lifted while cornering but in the case of the 911 it was
expected that the driver know that while cornering your foot stayed on the accelerator. As
the horsepower of 911s increased over the years the tendency to oversteer was tamed by
fitting larger tires on the rear wheels. With the advent of technologies like antilock
braking systems ,traction control and advanced computers employing torque vectoring to
control vehicle stablity, cars today do have their versions of MCAS and the Porsche can be
referred to as a triumph of engineering over design.
The 911 had pivots at both ends of the stub axles. It would lift throttle oversteer (boy
would it lift throttle oversteer -lots of fun if you knew what you were doing), but it would
not do the jacking rear-end lift that the corvair (pivots only at the differential end of the
half shaft) would do.
Oddly, the VW bug had the exact same layout but Ralph never went after it.
Nader is right to point out the design flaws, which seem to have the potential to cascade
into failure.
The new engine nacelles create unusual lift. Being placed forward of the center of lift,
that causes the nose of the aircraft to rotate vertically upward. If uncorrected, that would
cause the aircraft inappropriately to rise in altitude and/or to approach a stall.
The nacelle-induced lift increases with an increase in engine thrust. That increases speed
and/or reduces the time the pilot has to react and to correct an inappropriate nose-up
attitude.
Boeing seemed unable to correct that design problem through changes in the aircraft's
shape or control surfaces. It corrected it, instead, by having the computer step in to fly
the aircraft back into the appropriate attitude. Works when it works.
But Boeing seems to have forgotten a CompSci 101 problem: shit in, shit out. If the
sensors feeding the computer report bad data, the computer will generate a bad solution.
Boeing also seems to have designed the s/w to reset after manual attitude correction by the
pilot, forcing a correction loop the pilots would not always win.
Boeing elected not to inform aircraft purchasers or their flight crews of their automated
fix to their new aircraft's inherent instability problem. Murphy's Law being what it is
– if something can go wrong, it will – the pilots should have been made aware of
the recommended fix so that when something went wrong it, they would have a chance of fixing
it with a routine response.
Boeing elected not to do that. In the short run, it avoided the need for expensive
additional pilot training. In the long run, Boeing would have hoped to increase sales. When
hoping for the best, it is normal practice to plan for the worst. Boeing seems not to have
done that either.
All this talk of CEO and top managment resignation . honestly they probably don't care.
They have made millions, if not tens of millions of dollars on bonuses; they can retire once
they walk out the door. To change the behaviour of the C-suite you must affect the C-suite
directly, charge convict them with at least criminal negligence or worse.. A drunk driver who
causes the accident will most likley go to jail if someone dies in the accident, how come a
CEO and his mgmt team, can wilfully go against decades of engineering and aviation best
practices that are codified, and still only have to resign??
"... The article also discusses how some frontline FAA safety inspectors wanted to ground the MAXes until the "AoA Disagree" indicators were re-enabled, but were overridden by higher-ups who insisted that it was not a primary safety feature. ..."
Yes, the very last country to pull the 737-MAX out of use is going to be the first to
put it back. There is some serious money being lost by Boeing and the Airlines, and they
want to put a stop to it. This is all about millions and millions of Benjamins, for "they"
are taking a shortct to save even more money.
Simulators are EXPENSIVE, so the plan is to give the pilots a joystick and a computer,
and maybe throw in some lectures and videos of other pilots using a real flight simulator.
Are you ready to rush to reserve a flight?
This isn't a bad deal just for the flight crews and passengers, but the pure stench of
it is contaminating other arenas. A Denier site I'm not going to link has managed to
leverage the lack of regulator oversight by the FAA to lots of other places.
Planes, Automobiles, Bicycles, Homes, Hospitals, Schools, and Sidewalks Can All Be Made
Unsafe by Mad Science, Rush to Market, and Corrupt Regulators
They don't include "vaccines" in that list because their readers understand perfectly
well that if the FAA is a crap agency, why not the FDA as well? Much as I hate to admit it,
the Deniers didn't have to break a sweat to score these perfectly valid points.
Does anyone imagine Volkswagen could have gotten away with all those years of cheating
on their emissions if the regulators had been doing their jobs?
How did China get away with shipping that cancer-causing blood pressure medicine to the
US for so many years? It's safe to assume some bored "regulator" was just waving the stuff
on past without doing a single test.
This is going to cost us. I'm out of links, but here is a headline to consider.
Russia's Irkut aircraft manufacturer has posted the first video of a direct flight by
its MS-21-300 airliner from Irkutsk to Ulyanovsk-Vostochny Airfield.
The brand-new Russian passenger craft is designed to transport up to 211 people over
a distance of 6,400 kilometres.
There are competitors out there, and they can't be fended off by "sanctions" forever.
Allowing unwatched & unregulated companies to run amok is going to hurt us all in the
long term.
Boeing management's behavior must be seen in the context of Boeing's use of its earned
capital. Did you use the $30 billion surplus from 2009 to 2017 to reinvest in R&D, in
new narrow-body passenger aircraft? Or did you, instead, essentially burn this surplus
with self-serving stock buybacks of $30 billion in that period? Boeing is one of the
companies that MarketWatch labelled as "Five companies that spent lavishly on stock
buybacks while pension funding lagged. "
Feathering the Corporate Nest while stiffing the workers. Just what Wall Street loves.
"Ugly" at Boeing isn't a 'skin deep' issue - it's that way clear to the bone!
The article also discusses how some frontline FAA safety inspectors wanted to ground the
MAXes until the "AoA Disagree" indicators were re-enabled, but were overridden by
higher-ups who insisted that it was not a primary safety feature.
A pilot with 30 years of flying
experience and 40 years of design experience rips decisions made by Boeing and the FAA.
Gregory Travis, a software developer and pilot for 30 years wrote a scathing report on the
limitations of the 737, and the arrogance of software developers unfit to write airplane code.
Travis provides easy to understand explanations including a test you can do by sticking your
hand out the window of a car to demonstrate stall speed.
Design shortcuts meant to make a new plane seem like an old, familiar one are to blame.
This was all about saving money. Boeing and the FAA pretend the 737-Max is the same aircraft as
the original 737 that flew in 1967, over 50 years ago.
Travis was 3 years old at the time. Back then, the 737 was a smallish aircraft with smallish
engines and relatively simple systems. The new 737 is large and complicated.
Boeing cut corners to save money. Cutting corners works until it fails spectacularly.
The original 737 had (by today's standards) tiny little engines, which easily cleared the
ground beneath the wings. As the 737 grew and was fitted with bigger engines, the clearance
between the engines and the ground started to get a little um, tight.
With the 737 Max, the situation became critical. The engines on the original 737 had a fan
diameter (that of the intake blades on the engine) of just 100 centimeters (40 inches); those
planned for the 737 Max have 176 cm. That's a centerline difference of well over 30 cm (a foot),
and you couldn't "ovalize" the intake enough to hang the new engines beneath the wing without
scraping the ground.
The solution was to extend the engine up and well in front of the wing. However, doing so
also meant that the centerline of the engine's thrust changed. Now, when the pilots applied
power to the engine, the aircraft would have a significant propensity to "pitch up," or raise
its nose. This propensity to pitch up with power application thereby increased the risk that the
airplane could stall when the pilots "punched it"
Worse still, because the engine nacelles were so far in front of the wing and so large, a
power increase will cause them to actually produce lift, particularly at high angles of attack.
So the nacelles make a bad problem worse.
I'll say it again: In the 737 Max, the engine nacelles themselves can, at high angles of
attack, work as a wing and produce lift. And the lift they produce is well ahead of the wing's
center of lift, meaning the nacelles will cause the 737 Max at a high angle of attack to go to a
higher angle of attack. This is
aerodynamic malpractice
of the worst kind.
It violated that most ancient of aviation canons and probably violated the certification
criteria of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. But instead of going back to the drawing
board and getting the airframe hardware right, Boeing relied on something called the
"Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System," or MCAS.
It all comes down to money
, and in this case, MCAS was the way for both Boeing and
its customers to keep the money flowing in the right direction. The necessity to insist that the
737 Max was no different in flying characteristics, no different in systems, from any other 737
was the key to the 737 Max's fleet fungibility. That's probably also the reason why the
documentation about the MCAS system was kept on the down-low.
Put in a change with too much visibility, particularly a change to the aircraft's operating
handbook or to pilot training, and someone -- probably a pilot -- would have piped up and said, "Hey.
This doesn't look like a 737 anymore." And then the money would flow the wrong way.
When the flight computer trims the airplane to descend, because the MCAS system thinks it's
about to stall, a set of motors and jacks push the pilot's control columns forward. It turns out
that
the Elevator Feel Computer can put a lot of force into that column -- indeed, so much
force that a human pilot can quickly become exhausted trying to pull the column back, trying to
tell the computer that this really, really should not be happening
.
MCAS is implemented in the flight management computer, even at times when the autopilot is
turned off, when the pilots think they are flying the plane. I
n a fight between the flight
management computer and human pilots over who is in charge, the computer will bite humans until
they give up and (literally) die
. Finally, there's the need to keep the very existence of
the MCAS system on the hush-hush lest someone say, "Hey, this isn't your father's 737," and bank
accounts start to suffer.
Those lines of code were no doubt created by people at the direction of managers.
In a pinch, a human pilot could just look out the windshield to confirm visually and directly
that, no, the aircraft is not pitched up dangerously. That's the ultimate check and should go
directly to the pilot's ultimate sovereignty. Unfortunately, the current implementation of MCAS
denies that sovereignty. It denies the pilots the ability to respond to what's before their own
eyes.
In the MCAS system, the flight management computer is blind to any other evidence that it is
wrong, including what the pilot sees with his own eyes and what he does when he desperately
tries to pull back on the robotic control columns that are biting him, and his passengers, to
death.
The people who wrote the code for the original MCAS system were obviously terribly far
out of their league and did not know it. How can they can implement a software fix, much less
give us any comfort that the rest of the flight management software is reliable?
So Boeing produced a dynamically unstable airframe, the 737 Max. That is big strike No.
1. Boeing then tried to mask the 737's dynamic instability with a software system. Big strike
No. 2. Finally, the software relied on systems known for their propensity to fail
(angle-of-attack indicators) and did not appear to include even rudimentary provisions to
cross-check the outputs of the angle-of-attack sensor against other sensors, or even the other
angle-of-attack sensor. Big strike No. 3.
None of the above should have passed muster. It is likely that MCAS, originally added in
the spirit of increasing safety, has now killed more people than it could have ever saved. It
doesn't need to be "fixed" with more complexity, more software. It needs to be removed
altogether
.
Numerous Bad Decisions at Every Stage
Ultimately 346 people are dead because of really bad decisions, software engineer arrogance, and
Boeing's pretense that the 737 Max is the same aircraft as 50 years ago.
It is incredible that the plane has two sensors but the system only uses one. A look out the
window was enough to confirm the sensor was wrong.
Boeing also offered "cheap" versions of the aircraft without some controls. The two crashed
flights were with the cheaper aircraft.
An experienced pilot with adequate training could have disengaged MACS but in one of the crashed
flights, the pilot was desperately reading a manual trying to figure out how to do that.
Flight Stall Test
If you stick you hand out the window of a car and your hand is level to the ground. You have a
low angle of attack. There is no lift. Tilt your hand a bit and you have lift. Your arm will rise.
When the angle of attack on the wing of an aircraft is too great the aircraft enters aerodynamic
stall. The same thing happens with your hand out a car window.
At a steep enough angle your arm wants to flop down on the car door.
The MACS software overrides what a pilot can see by looking out the window.
Useless Manuals
If you need a manual to stop a plane from crashing mid-flight, the manual is useless.
It's already too late.
The pilot had seconds in which to react. Yet, instead of requiring
additional training, and alerting pilots of the dangers, Boeing put this stuff in a manual.
This was necessary as part of the pretense that a 737 is a 737 is a 737.
In my day Pilot's were repeatedly cautioned not to fly the
aircraft to the scene of an accident since nobody survives a high
speed crash or a stall. Non-pilots can vote me down but the
proper action at the second the pilot lost control of his aircraft
that close to the ground should have been to pull power, drop
flaps, and make a soft field landing that some passengers would
have survived.
Sure it's a flying turd, but it will be back in the air soon. The
CEO can spew buzzwords at the speed of sound. The FAA will approve
any fix Boeing pukes forth cause nobody has the moral courage to
stand in the way of making the big money.
I saw that article in Spectrum and while it makes some points
about software development he mixes it up with generic claims way
beyond his expertise. Editors at Spectrum should be fired.
Cirrus Jet got grounded due to this MACS problem.. This CODE is
all over the place and probably in AIRBUS also [(.. I'm
betting that it was stolen from AIRBUS] Computer controlled fly
by wire is death-in-a-box as it can always be hacked.
Boeing thinks it will fix the problem with its "MCAS" software.
While it may do so on paper, there remains the problem of the
weight distribution of engines, cargo and fuel which is placing
the center of gravity behind the center of pressure for this
modified aircraft during flight near the stall point. That problem
is faulty aerodynamics. Any aircraft that is inherently
aerodynamically unstable should never be flown in a commercial
setting. Ground them all. Fire the stupid fools who allowed this
beast to fly, including those at the FAA. And finally, sell your
Boeing stock.
"... "One of the problems we have with the system is, why put a system like that on an airplane in the first place?" said Slack, who doesn't represent any survivors of either the Lion Air or Ethiopia Airlines crashes. "I think what we're going to find is that because of changes from the (Boeing 737) 800 series to the MAX series, there are dramatic changes in which they put in controls without native pitch stability. It goes to the basic DNA of the airplane. It may not be fixable." ..."
"... But it's also important that the pilots get physical feedback about what is going on. In the old days, when cables connected the pilot's controls to the flying surfaces, you had to pull up, hard, if the airplane was trimmed to descend. You had to push, hard, if the airplane was trimmed to ascend. With computer oversight there is a loss of natural sense in the controls. There is only an artificial feel, a feeling that the computer wants the pilots to feel. And sometimes, it doesn't feel so great. ..."
"... An airplane approaching an aerodynamic stall cannot, under any circumstances, have a tendency to go further into the stall. This is called "dynamic instability," and the only airplanes that exhibit that characteristic -- fighter jets -- are also fitted with ejection seats. ..."
"... The airframe, the hardware, should get it right the first time and not need a lot of added bells and whistles to fly predictably. This has been an aviation canon from the day the Wright brothers first flew at Kitty Hawk. ..."
"... When the flight computer trims the airplane to descend, because the MCAS system thinks it's about to stall, a set of motors and jacks push the pilot's control columns forward. It turns out that the flight management computer can put a lot of force into that column -- indeed, so much force that a human pilot can quickly become exhausted trying to pull the column back, trying to tell the computer that this really, really should not be happening. ..."
"... MCAS is implemented in the flight management computer, even at times when the autopilot is turned off, when the pilots think they are flying the plane. In a fight between the flight management computer and human pilots over who is in charge, the computer will bite humans until they give up and (literally) die ..."
"... Like someone with narcissistic personality disorder, MCAS gaslights the pilots. And it turns out badly for everyone. "Raise the nose, HAL." "I'm sorry, Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that." ..."
"... Travis also describes the bad business incentives that led Boeing to conceptualize and present the 737 Max as just a tweak of an existing design, as opposed to being so areodynamically different as to be a new plane .and require time-consuming and costly recertification. To succeed in that obfuscation, Boeing had to underplay the existence and role of the MCAS system: ..."
"... Travis also explains why the FAA allows for what amounts to self-certification. This practice didn't result from the usual deregulation pressures, but from the FAA being unable to keep technical experts from being bid away by private sector players. Moreover, the industry has such a strong safety culture (airplanes falling out of the sky are bad for business) that the accommodation didn't seem risky. ..."
"... The 737 Max saga teaches us not only about the limits of technology and the risks of complexity, it teaches us about our real priorities. Today, safety doesn't come first -- money comes first, and safety's only utility in that regard is in helping to keep the money coming. The problem is getting worse because our devices are increasingly dominated by something that's all too easy to manipulate: software ..."
Even though Boeing is scrambling to fix the software meant to counter the 737 Max's increased propensity to stall as a result
of the placement of larger, more fuel=efficient engines in a way that reduced the stability of the plane in flight, it's not clear
that this will be adequate in terms of flight safety or the public perception of the plane. And even though the FAA is almost certain
to sign off on Boeing's patch, foreign regulators may not be so forgiving. The divergence we've seen between the FAA and other national
authorities is likely to intensify. Recall that China grounded the 737 Max before the FAA. In another vote of no confidence, even
as Boeing was touting that its changes to its now infamous MCAS software, designed to compensate for safety risks introduced by the
placement of the engines on the 737 Max, the Canadian air regulator said he wanted 737 Max pilots to have flight simulator training,
contrary to the manufacturer's assertion that it isn't necessary. Last week, the Wall Street Journal reported that
American Airlines is developing 737 Max flight simulator training .
But a fundamental question remains: can improved software compensate for hardware shortcomings? Some experts harbor doubts. For
instance, from the Spokane
Spokesman-Review
:
"One of the problems we have with the system is, why put a system like that on an airplane in the first place?" said Slack,
who doesn't represent any survivors of either the Lion Air or Ethiopia Airlines crashes. "I think what we're going to find is
that because of changes from the (Boeing 737) 800 series to the MAX series, there are dramatic changes in which they put in controls
without native pitch stability. It goes to the basic DNA of the airplane. It may not be fixable."
"It is within the realm of possibility that, if much of the basic pitch stability performance of the plane cannot be addressed
by a software fix, a redesign may be required and the MAX might not ever fly," [aviation attorney and former NASA aerospace engineer
Mike] Slack said.
An even more damming take comes in
How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer in IEEE Spectrum (hat tip Marshall Auerback). Author Greg Travis
has been a software developer for 40 years and a pilot. He does a terrific job of explaining the engineering and business considerations
that drove the 737 Max design. He describes why the plane's design is unsound and why the software patch in the form of MCAS was
inadequate, and an improved version is unlikely to be able to compensate for the plane's deficiencies.
Even for those who have been following the 737 Max story, this article has background that is likely to be new. For instance,
to a large degree, pilots do not fly commercial aircraft. Pilots send instructions to computer systems that fly these planes. Travis
explains early on that the As Travis explains:
In the 737 Max, like most modern airliners and most modern cars, everything is monitored by computer, if not directly controlled
by computer. In many cases, there are no actual mechanical connections (cables, push tubes, hydraulic lines) between the pilot's
controls and the things on the wings, rudder, and so forth that actually make the plane move ..
But it's also important that the pilots get physical feedback about what is going on. In the old days, when cables connected
the pilot's controls to the flying surfaces, you had to pull up, hard, if the airplane was trimmed to descend. You had to push,
hard, if the airplane was trimmed to ascend. With computer oversight there is a loss of natural sense in the controls. There is
only an artificial feel, a feeling that the computer wants the pilots to feel. And sometimes, it doesn't feel so great.
Travis also explains why the 737 Max's engine location made the plane dangerously unstable:
Pitch changes with power changes are common in aircraft. Even my little Cessna pitches up a bit when power is applied. Pilots
train for this problem and are used to it. Nevertheless, there are limits to what safety regulators will allow and to what pilots
will put up with.
Pitch changes with increasing angle of attack, however, are quite another thing. An airplane approaching an aerodynamic stall
cannot, under any circumstances, have a tendency to go further into the stall. This is called "dynamic instability," and the only
airplanes that exhibit that characteristic -- fighter jets -- are also fitted with ejection seats.
Everyone in the aviation community wants an airplane that flies as simply and as naturally as possible. That means that conditions
should not change markedly, there should be no significant roll, no significant pitch change, no nothing when the pilot is adding
power, lowering the flaps, or extending the landing gear.
The airframe, the hardware, should get it right the first time and not need a lot of added bells and whistles to fly predictably.
This has been an aviation canon from the day the Wright brothers first flew at Kitty Hawk.
Travis explains in detail why the MCAS approach to monitoring the angle of attack was greatly inferior to older methods .including
having the pilots look out the window. And here's what happens when MCAS goes wrong:
When the flight computer trims the airplane to descend, because the MCAS system thinks it's about to stall, a set of motors
and jacks push the pilot's control columns forward. It turns out that the flight management computer can put a lot of force into
that column -- indeed, so much force that a human pilot can quickly become exhausted trying to pull the column back, trying to
tell the computer that this really, really should not be happening.
Indeed, not letting the pilot regain control by pulling back on the column was an explicit design decision. Because if the
pilots could pull up the nose when MCAS said it should go down, why have MCAS at all?
MCAS is implemented in the flight management computer, even at times when the autopilot is turned off, when the pilots think
they are flying the plane. In a fight between the flight management computer and human pilots over who is in charge, the computer
will bite humans until they give up and (literally) die
Like someone with narcissistic personality disorder, MCAS gaslights the pilots. And it turns out badly for everyone. "Raise
the nose, HAL." "I'm sorry, Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that."
Travis also describes the bad business incentives that led Boeing to conceptualize and present the 737 Max as just a tweak of
an existing design, as opposed to being so areodynamically different as to be a new plane .and require time-consuming and costly
recertification. To succeed in that obfuscation, Boeing had to underplay the existence and role of the MCAS system:
The necessity to insist that the 737 Max was no different in flying characteristics, no different in systems, from any other
737 was the key to the 737 Max's fleet fungibility. That's probably also the reason why the documentation about the MCAS system
was kept on the down-low.
Put in a change with too much visibility, particularly a change to the aircraft's operating handbook or to pilot training,
and someone -- probably a pilot -- would have piped up and said, "Hey. This doesn't look like a 737 anymore."
To drive the point home, Travis contrasts the documentation related to MCAS with documentation Cessna provided with an upgrade
to its digital autopilot, particularly warnings. The difference is dramatic and it shouldn't be. He concludes:
In my Cessna, humans still win a battle of the wills every time. That used to be a design philosophy of every Boeing aircraft,
as well, and one they used against their archrival Airbus, which had a different philosophy. But it seems that with the 737 Max,
Boeing has changed philosophies about human/machine interaction as quietly as they've changed their aircraft operating manuals.
Travis also explains why the FAA allows for what amounts to self-certification. This practice didn't result from the usual deregulation
pressures, but from the FAA being unable to keep technical experts from being bid away by private sector players. Moreover, the industry
has such a strong safety culture (airplanes falling out of the sky are bad for business) that the accommodation didn't seem risky.
But it is now:
So Boeing produced a dynamically unstable airframe, the 737 Max. That is big strike No. 1. Boeing then tried to mask the 737's
dynamic instability with a software system. Big strike No. 2. Finally, the software relied on systems known for their propensity
to fail (angle-of-attack indicators) and did not appear to include even rudimentary provisions to cross-check the outputs of the
angle-of-attack sensor against other sensors, or even the other angle-of-attack sensor. Big strike No. 3.
None of the above should have passed muster. None of the above should have passed the "OK" pencil of the most junior engineering
staff, much less a DER [FAA Designated Engineering Representative].
That's not a big strike. That's a political, social, economic, and technical sin .
The 737 Max saga teaches us not only about the limits of technology and the risks of complexity, it teaches us about our real
priorities. Today, safety doesn't come first -- money comes first, and safety's only utility in that regard is in helping to keep
the money coming. The problem is getting worse because our devices are increasingly dominated by something that's all too easy
to manipulate: software
I believe the relative ease -- not to mention the lack of tangible cost -- of software updates has created a cultural laziness
within the software engineering community. Moreover, because more and more of the hardware that we create is monitored and controlled
by software, that cultural laziness is now creeping into hardware engineering -- like building airliners. Less thought is now
given to getting a design correct and simple up front because it's so easy to fix what you didn't get right later .
It is likely that MCAS, originally added in the spirit of increasing safety, has now killed more people than it could have
ever saved. It doesn't need to be "fixed" with more complexity, more software. It needs to be removed altogether.
There's a lot more in
this meaty piece . Be sure to read it in full.
And if crapification by software has undermined the once-vanuted airline safety culture, why should we hold out hope for any better
with self-driving cars?
Automation is not the issue. Boeing cutting corners and putting only one or two angle of attack sensors is. Just like a man
with two clocks can't tell the time, if one of the sensors malfunctions, the computer has no way of knowing which one is wrong.
That's why Airbus puts three sensors in its aircraft, and why Boeing's Dreamliner has three computers with CPUs from three different
manufacturers to get the necessary triple redundancy.
Thus this is really about Boeing's shocking negligence in putting profits above safety, and the FAA's total capture to the
point Boeing employees did most of the certification work. I would add the corrosion of Boeing's ethical standards was completely
predictable once it acquired McDonnell-Douglas and became a major defense contractor.
I beg to differ since it looks like you didn't read the article in full, as a strongly recommended. The article has a section on the cost of fixing hardware problems versus software problems. Hardware problems are enormously
costly to fix.
The plane has a hardware problem resulting from Boeing not being willing to risk having to recertify a fuel efficient 737.
So rather than making the plane higher off the ground (new landing gear, which other articles indicate was a non-starter since
it would lead to enough other changes so as to necessitate recertification) and trying to fix a hardware problem with software.
That has two knock-on problems: it's not clear this will ever be adequate (not just Travis' opinion) and second, it's risky given
the software industry's propensity to ship and patch later. Boeing created an additional problem, as Travis stresses, by greatly
underplaying the existence of MCAS (it was mentioned after page 700 in the documentation!) and maintaining the fiction that pilots
didn't need simulator training, which some regulators expect will be the case even after the patch.
You also miss the point the article makes: the author argues (unlike in banking), the FAA coming to rely on the airlines for
certification wasn't a decision they made, but an adaptation to the fact that they could no longer hire and retain the engineers
they needed to do the work at the FAA on government pay scales. By contrast, at (say) the SEC, you see a revolving door of lawyers
from plenty fancy firms. You have plenty of "talent" willing to work at the SEC, but with bad incentives.
Thank you for reviewing this. 700+ pages! I thought it was paywalled bec. so slow to download. The resistance to achieving
fuel efficiency is front and center these days. One thing I relate it to is the Macron attitude of punishing the fuel consumer
to change the market. Cart before horse. When the FAA sent down fuel efficiency requirements it might have been similarly preemptive,
now in hindsight. There should have been legislation and regulation which adjusted the profitability of the airline industry via
better tax breaks or regulations against aggressive competition. The safety of airlines would have been upheld if the viability
of the company were protected. So even domestic protectionism when it comes to safety. And in so doing, the FAA/congress could
also have controlled and limited airline use which tries to make up in volume for all the new costs it incurs. It's a serious
problem when you are so carefree as a legislator that you let the free market do it. What a mess. Quality is the first thing to
go.
reminds me of what was said about risk departments inside banks -- deliberately lowly paid, so that anyone with skills would
move on or easily be hired away. Was it you? Bill Black? Luyendijk? I don't remember. Either way..
I did read the article completely and I was an aircraft commander of a C-141A during the Viet Nam war and I am a degreed electrical
engineer.
Having flown the C-141A for several thousand hours I am very familiar with the aircraft pitching up almost uncontrollably.
A favorite trick that C -141 flight instructors pulled on pilots new to aircraft was to tell the student pilot to "go around"
(for the first time during his training) on an approach. The student pilot followed the flight manual procedure and started to
raise the nose while advancing the throttles to full power. However, what wasn't covered in the flight manual was the fact that
a HUGE trim change occurred when the engines went from near idle to full power. To regain control, it took both hands (arms) to
move the yoke away from your chest while running nose down trim. While you were doing this the airplane was trying to stand on
its tail. On the other hand none of us ever forgot the lesson.
The C-141 was not fly by wire; however all control surfaces were equipped with hydraulic assist and "feel springs" to mimic
control feel without the hydraulics. The feel springs for the elevators must have been selected using a human subject like Arnold
Schwarzenegger because (in my opinion) they were much stronger than necessary. The intent was to prevent the pilots from getting
into excessive angles of pitch, which absolutely would occur if you weren't prepared for it on a "go around".
What Fazal & V have said is basically correct. The max has four angle of attack vanes. The MAIN problem was that Boeing decided
to go cheap and only connect one of the vanes to the MCAS. If they had connected two, the MCAS would be able to determine that
one of them was wrong and disconnect itself. That would have eliminated the pitch down problem that caused the two crashes.
Connecting that second AOA vane would not have created any certification issues and would have made Boeing's claim about the
"Max" being the "same" as previous versions much closer to the truth. Had they done that we wouldn't be talking about this.
Another solution would have been to disable the MCAS if there was significant counter force on the yoke applied by the pilot.
This has been used on autopilot systems since the 1960's. But not consistently. The proper programming protocol for the MCAS exists
and should have been used.
I agree that using only one AOA vane and the programming weren't the only really stupid things that Boeing did in this matter.
Insufficient information and training given to the pilots was another.
Yes. second, it's risky given the software industry's propensity to ship and patch later.
-this is one of the main themes in the Dilbert cartoon strip.
the author argues (unlike in banking), the FAA coming to rely on the airlines for certification wasn't a decision they made,
but an adaptation to the fact that they could no longer hire and retain the engineers they needed to do the work at the FAA on
government pay scales.
-That's what happens when you make 'government small enough to drown in a bathtub' , i.e. starve of the funds necessary to
do a good job.
My 2¢ . Boeing's decision to cut manufacturing corners AND give the autopilot MCAS system absolute control might have been
done (just a guess here, based on the all current the 'self-driving' fantasies in technology ) to push more AI 'self-drivingness'
into the airplane. (The 'We don't need expensive pilots, we can use inexpensive pilots, and one day we won't need pilots at all'
fantasy.) Imo, this makes the MCAS system, along with the auto AI self-driving systems now on the road no better than beta
test platforms And early beta test platforms, at that.
It's one thing when MS or Apple push out a not quite ready for prime time OS "upgrade", then wait for all the user feedback
to know where it the OS needs more patches. No one dies in those situations (hopefully). But putting not-ready for prime time
airplanes and cars on the road in beta test condition to get feedback? yikes . my opinion.
It is interesting that a software bug that appears in the field costs very roughly ten times as much as one caught in QA before
being released, yet most managements continue to slight QA in favor of glitzy features. I suppose that preference follows supposed
customer demand.
Boeing, the FAA, and the airlines seriously screwed up the introduction of this aircraft so badly it cost lives. The article
by Travis is however written by someone out of his depth, even though he has more familiarity with aircraft and software than
the average person. There are numerous factual errors and misrepresentations, which many commenters (with more detailed knowledge
of the subjects) on the article point out. One of the principles of aviation safety is to identify and fix failures without finger
pointing, in order to encourage a culture of openness and cooperation. The tone of the article takes the opposite approach while
trying to argue from (undeserved) authority. I agree with his critique that these incidents are a result capitalism run amok –
that should, in my opinion, be separate from a discussion of the technical problems and how to fix them.
If Boeing had adhered to that cardinal principle of openness, there might be no failure to fix via "a culture of openness and
cooperation". These catastrophic failures were a result of Boeing not being open with its customers about the safety implications
of its redesign of the 737 Max and instead choosing the path of obfuscation to sell the idea of seamless fleet fungibility to
airlines.
Looking through the comments the complaints about the article seemed to be in one of three areas-
– Questioning the author's credentials (you're just a Cessna pilot!)
– Parroting the Boeing line that this was all really pilot error
– Focusing on some narrow technical element to discredit the article
The majority of comments were in agreement with the general tenor of the piece, and the author engaged politely and constructively
with some of the points that were brought up. I thought the article was very insightful, and sometimes it does take an outsider
to point out that the emperor has no clothes.
I'd like to see a reference for your assertion that the "principles of aviation safety" preclude finger pointing. Unless I'm
very much mistaken the whole purpose of an FAA accident investigation is to determine the root cause, identify the responsible
party, and, yes, point fingers if necessary.
The general point I was trying to make, perhaps poorly worded, is that the only goal is to identify the problem and fix it,
and not to focus primarily on assigning blame as vigorously as possible. Mistakes occur for many reasons – some of them nefarious,
some not. Excessive finger pointing, especially before a full picture of what went wrong has been developed, fosters a tendency
to coverups and fear, in my opinion.
Regarding your other points, the technical details are vital to understand clearly in almost any aviation incident, as there
is never one cause, and the chain of events is always incredibly complex. Travis' analysis makes the answers too easy.
From what I understand the light touch approach was more about getting people to honestly divulge information during the investigation
period, of which, assisted in determining cause.
This "light touch" approach is used throughout the aviation industry, all the way from initial design to aircraft maintenance,
as the purpose is to make sure that anyone, no matter the rank or experience, can bring up safety concerns before incidents occur
without fear of repercussions for challenging authority. It's likely that this cornerstone of aviation culture was ignored at
too many points along the way here.
I am not defending Boeing, the FAA, or the airlines. Serious, likely criminal, mistakes were made by all.
I however take issue with Travis' approach of assigning blame this early and vigorously while making errors in explaining what
happened. He especially attacks the the development process at Boeing, since software is his speciality, although he makes no
claims as to having worked with real time or avionics software, aside from using products incorporating it. These are quite different
types of software from normal code running a website or a bank. He does not, and can not, know what occurred when the code was
written, yet makes significant declarations as to the incompetence of the engineers and coders involved.
If he were leading the investigation, I believe the most likely outcome would be pushback and coverup by those involved.
It's likely that this cornerstone of aviation culture was ignored at too many points along the way here.
I am not defending Boeing, the FAA, or the airlines. Serious, likely criminal, mistakes were made by all.
I however take issue with Travis' approach of assigning blame this early
I don't disagree with your description of how it used to be. However, since the FAA has reduced its regulatory role, and by
extension given aircraft manufactures more leash to run with ideas that shouldn't be followed, we're left with the situation that
large, potentially crippling tort lawsuits are one of the only checks left on manufacturer stupidity or malfeasance. Think of
the Ford Pinto bolt-too-long-causing-gas-tank-explosions case. If the FCC won't make manufacturers think twice when internal engineers
say 'this isn't a good idea, isn't a good design', maybe the potential of a massive lawsuit will make them think twice.
And this is where we get into pointing the finger, assigning blame, etc. I'm assuming there are good engineers at Boeing who
warned against these multiple design failure and were ignored, the FCC was see-no-evil here-no-evil, and the MCAS went forward.
Now come the law suits. It's the only thing left to 'get Boeing's attention'. I don't know if Travis' is too early. It's likely
there's been plenty of chatter among the Boeing and industry engineers already. imo.
Training a pilot is building a very complicated automation system : what kind of thought process do you expect within the short
timeframe (few minutes) of a crisis in a cockpit ? Kant's critique of pure reason ?Somehow people seem more comfortable from death
coming from human error (I.e. a bad human automation system) that death coming from a design fault, but a death is a death
The problem is not automation vs no automation, it is bad corner-cutting automation vs good systematic and expensive automation.
It is also bad integration between pilot brain based automation and system automation, which also boils out to corner cutting,
because sharing too much information about the real behaviour of the system (if only it is known accurately ) increases the complexity
and the cost of pilot training.
Real safety comes from proven design (as in mathematical proof). It is only achievable on simple systems because proofing is
conceptually very hard. A human is inevitably a very complex system that is impossible to proof, therefore, beyond a certain standard
of reliability, getting the human factor out of the equation is the only way to improve things further. we are probably close
to that threshold with civil aviation.
Similarly, regarding cars, the considerable improvement in death per km travelled in the last 30 years cannot be attributed
only to better drivers, a large part comes from ESP and ABS becoming standard (see
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811182
). If this is not automation, what is ?
It looks as if you didn't read the piece. The problem, which the author makes explicit, is the "ship now, patch later" philosophy
that is endemic in software design.
And it would be better to look at flight safety stats within markets. You have great swathes of the emerging world starting
to fly on airplanes during this period. I'm not saying the general trend isn't correct, but I would anticipate it's to a significant
degree attributable to the maturation of emerging economy air systems. For instance, I flew on Indonesia's Garuda in the early
1990s and was told I was taking a safety risk; I'm now informed that it's a good airline. Similarly, in the early 1980s I was
doing business in Mexico, and the McKinsey partner I was traveling with (who as a hobby read black box transcripts from plane
crashes) was very edgy on the legs of our travels when we had to use AeroMexico (as in he'd natter on in a way that was very out
of character for a typical older WASP-y guy, he was close to white knuckle nervous).
Garuda's transition from "safety risk" to "good airline" was an actual occurrence. At one point Garuda and all other Indonesian
air lines were prohibited from flying in the EU because of numerous crashes that were the result of management issues, that forced
the airline(s) to change their ways.
ABS is an enhancement. MCAS is a kludge to patch up massive weaknesses introduced into the hardware by a chain of bad decisions
going back almost 20 years.
Boeing should have started designing a new narrow-body when they cancelled the 757 in 2004. Instead, they chose to keep relying
on the 737. The end result is MCAS and 300+ deaths.
"There are numerous factual errors and misrepresentations, which many commenters (with more detailed knowledge of the subjects)
on the article point out."
Not sure why anyone would mis-characterise comments. The first comment points out a deficiency, and explains it. There was only
one other commenter, who alleged errors – but without explaining what those could be. He was later identified by another person
as a troll. Almost all other comments were complimentary of the article. So why make the above assertion?
We have a noteworthy number of newbie comments making poorly-substantiated digs at the Spectrum IEEE piece. We've also seen
this sort of non-organic-looking response when we've put up pro-union pieces when political fights were in play, like Wisconsin's
Scott Walker going after unions.
Travis does indeed play fast and loose with a number of things. For example, his 0-360 engine does *not* have pistons the size
of dinner plates (at a 130mm bore it isn't even the diameter of a particularly large saucer). MCAS is a stability augmentation
system not stall prevention system and the 737 MAX wasn't "unstable" it was insufficiently stable. The 737 trim system acts on
the stabilizer not the elevator (which is a completely different control surface). etc.
For the most part, it doesn't affect the thrust of his arguments which are at a higher level. However it does get distracting.
Thank you – I was beginning to wonder what the difference was between unstable and insufficiently stable. Not that this is
a subject to make jokes about.
Yeah, but sometimes the choice is to laugh or cry, and after constantly going WTF!?! every time I read about this horror, even
mordantly grim humor is nice.
Investigators pipe up, but my understanding of a proper investigation is: a. find out what happened; b. find out why the incident
occurred; c. what can be done to prevent.
The public opinion has already sailed I think, against the company. If negligent, adverse-safety decisions were made, the head
people should be prosecuted accordingly.
Yet, I feel this isn't going to happen despite the reality that billions of humans never want to fly a boeing jet again. Why
would you risk it? Toast and deservedly imho
"Agile" "use-case driven" software development: very dangerous, takes the disruptive, crappification approach (under some hands)
of trying to identify the minimum investment to hit the minimal requirements, particularly focusing on an 80/20 Pareto rule distribution
of efforts.
Which may be good enough for video delivery or cell-phone function, but not for life-critical or scientifically-critical equipment
Many people here are assuming Boeing uses modern software-development methodology in spite of flaws that make such an approach
iffy in this field. Why assume that?
When I worked, many years ago now, as a Boeing software engineer, their software-development practices were 15 years behind
the rest of the world. Part of that was sheer caution and conservatism re new things, precisely because of the safety culture,
and part of it was because they did not have many of the best software people. They could rarely hire the best in part because
cautious, super-conservative code is boring. Their management approach was optimized to get solid systems out of ordinary engineers
with a near incomprehensible number of review and testing steps.
Anyone in this audience worked there in software recently? If not, fewer words about how they develop code might be called
for. Yes, the MCAS system was seriously flawed. But we do not have the information to actually know why.
> Anyone in this audience worked there in software recently? If not, fewer words about how they develop code might be called
for.
4/16 Links included a lengthy spiel from Reddit via Hacker News by a
software engineer who worked at Boeing 10 years ago (far more recently than you) which detailed the horrors of Boeing's dysfunctional
corporate culture at length. This is in addition to many other posts covering the story from multiple angles.
NC has covered this topic extensively. Maybe try familiarizing yourself with their content before telling others to shut up.
Excuse me? Are ad hominem attacks fine now? I didn't tell anyone to "shut up" or contradict the great amount of good reporting
on Boeing's management dysfunction.
I just pointed out that at one time, yes way back there, there was a logic to it and that the current criticism here of its
software-development culture in particular seems founded on a combination of speculation and general disgust with the software
industry.
Whatever else I am or however wrong I may sometimes be, I am an engineer, and real engineers look for evidence.
Moving the engines in itself didn't introduce safety risks, this tendency to nose up was always there. The primary problem
is Boeing wanted to pretend MAX is the same plane as NG (the previous version) for certification and pilot training purposes.
Which is why the MCAS is black box deeply hardwired into the control systems and they didn't tell pilots about it. It was supposed
to be invisible, just sort of translating layer between the new airframe and pilots commanding it as the old one.
And this yearning for pre-automation age, for directly controlling the surfaces by cables and all, is misguided. People didn't
evolve for flying, it's all learned the hard way, there is no natural way to feel the plane. In fact in school they will drill
into you to trust the instruments and not your pedestrian instincts. Instruments and computers may fail, but your instincts will
fail far more often.
After all 737 actually is old design, not fly by wire. And one theory of what happened in the Ethiopian case is that when they
disengaged the automatic thing, they were not able to physically overcome the aerodynamic forces pushing on the plane. So there
you have your cables & strings operated machine.
I don't see basis for your assertion about safety risks given the counter-evidence in the form of the very existence of the
MCAS software. Every article written on it points out it was to prevent the possibility of the plane stalling out when "punching
up". And as the article describes, there were two design factors, the placement of the engines and the nacelles, which led to
it generating too much lift in certain scenarios.
And your argument regarding what happened when the pilot turned off the autopilot is yet another indictment of Boeing's design.
This is not "Oh bad pilots," this is "OMG, evidence of another Boeing fuckup." This is what occurred when the pilots disabled
MCAS per instructions.
Have you not heard of purely mechanical systems that allow for the multiplication of force? It's another Boeing design defect
that the pilots couldn't operate the flight stabilizer when the plane was under takeoff stresses. That's a typical use case!
And it was what Boeing told pilots to do and it didn't work!
From Reuters (apparently
written before the black box detail revealed that the pilots could not control the stabilizers):
Boeing pointed to long-established procedures that pilots could have used to handle a malfunction of the anti-stall system,
regardless of whether the pilots knew MCAS existed.
That checklist tells pilots to switch off the two stabilizer trim cutout switches on the central console, and then to adjust
the aircraft's stabilizers manually using trim wheels.
And that's one of they should worry about most, since that's one of highest risk times for flight, and the plane should have
been engineered with that scenario in mind. This raises the possibility that the inability of the pilots to handle the plane manually
in takeoff also somehow resulted from the changes to the aerodynamics resulting from the placement of the bigger engines.
This is his argument about how the reliance on software has led to undue relaxation of good hardware design principles:
The original FAA Eisenhower-era certification requirement was a testament to simplicity: Planes should not exhibit significant
pitch changes with changes in engine power. That requirement was written when there was a direct connection between the controls
in the pilot's hands and the flying surfaces on the airplane. Because of that, the requirement -- when written -- rightly imposed
a discipline of simplicity on the design of the airframe itself. Now software stands between man and machine, and no one seems
to know exactly what is going on. Things have become too complex to understand.
Pitch changes with power changes are common in aircraft. Even my little Cessna pitches up a bit when power is applied. Pilots
train for this problem and are used to it.
Again, the plane already had the habit of picthing up and the changes didn't add that. The question isn't if, but how much
and what to do about it. Nowhere did I read MAX exceeds some safety limits in this regard. If Boeing made the plane to physically
break regulations and tried to fix it with software then indeed that would be bad. However, I'm not aware of that.
As for the Ethiopian scenario, I was talking about
this article . It says when they tried manual, it very well could be beyond their physical ability to turn the wheels and
so they were forced to switch electrical motors back on, but that also turned up MCAS again. In fact it also says this seizing
up thing was present in the old 737 design and pilots were trained to deal with it, but somehow the plane become more reliable
and training for this failure mode was dropped. This to me doesn't look like good old days of aviation design ruined by computers.
You should read the Ethiopian Government's crash preliminary crash report. Very short and easy to read. Contains a wealth of
information. Regarding the pilot's attempt to use the manual trim wheel, according to the crash report, the aircraft was already
traveling at 340 knots indicated airspeed, well past Vmo or the aircraft's certified airspeed when they first attempted to manually
trim the nose up. It didn't work because of the excessive control forces generated by high airspeeds well beyond the aircraft's
certification. I'm not excusing Boeing, the automated MCAS nose down trim system was an engineering abomination, but the pilots
could have made their lives much easier by setting a more normal thrust setting for straight and level flight, slowing their aircraft
to a speed within the normal operating envelope, then working their runaway nose-down pitch emergency.
I didn't like the IEEE Spectrum piece very much since the author seemed to miss or exaggerate some issues, and also seemed
to confuse flying a Cessna with being expert about large airliners or aerospace engineering. The title says "software engineer"
but at the end he says "software executive". Executive doesn't always mean non-engineer but it does mean someone who is full of
themselves, and that shows through the whole article. The stuff I'm seeing from actual engineers (mostly on Hacker News) is a
little more careful. I'm still getting the sense that the 737 MAX is fundamentally a reasonable plane though Boeing fucked up
badly presenting it as a no-retraining-needed tweak to the older 737's.
There's some conventional wisdom that Boeing's crapification stems from the McDonnell merger in 1997. Boeing, then successful,
took over the failing and badly managed McDonnell. The crappy McDonnell managers then spent the next years pushing out the Boeing
managers, and subsequently have been running Boeing into the ground. I don't know how accurate that is, but it's a narrative that
rings true.
You are misrepresenting the Hacker News criticisms, and IMHO they misrepresent the piece. They don't question his software
chops. And if you really knew the software biz, "software executive" often = developer who built a company (and that includes
smallish ones). The guy OWNS a Cessna, which means he's spent as much on a plane as a lot of people spend on a house. If he was
a senior manager as you posit, that means at large company, and no large company would let an employee write something like this.
He's either between gigs or one of the top guys in a smallish private company where mouthing off like this won't hurt the business.
Notice also his contempt for managers in the article).
He's also done flight simulator time on a 757, and one commentor pointed out that depending on the simulator, it could be tantamount
to serious training, as in count towards qualifying hours to be certified to fly a 757.
They do argue, straw manning his piece, that he claims the big failure is with the software. That in fact is not what the article
says. It says that the design changes in the 737 Max made it dynamically unstable, which is an unacceptable characteristic in
any plane, no matter what size. He also describes at length the problem of relying on only one sensor as an input to the MCAS
and how that undermined having the pilots be able to act as a backup .by looking at each other's instrumentation results.
The idea that he's generalizing from a Cessna is absurd. He describes how Cessnas have the pilot having greater mechanical
control than jets like the 737. He describes how the pilots read the instrument results from each side of the plane, something
which cannot occur in a Cessna, a single pilot plane. He refers to the Cessna documentation to make the point that the norm is
to over-inform pilots as to how changes in the software affect how they operate the plane, not radically under-inform them as
Boeing did with the 737 Max.
As to the reasonableness of Travis' concerns, did you miss that a former NASA engineer has the same reservations? Are you trying
to say he doesn't understand how aircraft hardware works?
He owns a 1978 Cessna 172 , goes for about $70K,
so not quite house prices, more like a nice Tesla, whose drive by wire systems he seems to trust far more for some reason.
In regard to "dynamic instability" being unacceptable, this is a red herring. Most modern airliners rely on flight characteristic
augmentation systems in normal operation, trim systems being the most common. Additionally, there are aircraft designed
to be unstable (fighters) but rely on computers to fly them stably, to greatly increase manoeuvrability.
In regard to Cessnas being single pilot planes, the presence of flight controls on both sides of the cockpit would somewhat
bring into question this assertion .? Most 172s do however have only one set of instrumentation. When operating with two pilots
(as with let's say a student pilot and instructor) you would still have the issue of two pilots trying to agree on possibly faulty
readings from one set of non-redundant instruments.
No, it's a 1979 Cessna, and you don't know when he bought it and how much use it had, since price is significantly dependent
on flight hours. The listings I show it costs over $100K. A quick Google search says a plane with a new feel is closer to $300K.
Even $100K in equity is more than most people put down when buying a house
He also glides, and gliders often own or co-own their gliders.
The author acknowledges your point re fighters. Did you miss that he also says they are the only planes where pilots can eject
themselves from the aircraft? Arguing from what is acceptable for a fighter, where you compromise a lot on other factors to get
maneuverability, to a commercial jet is dodgy.
Regarding fighters and instability, I'm not the one that stated it's "an unacceptable characteristic in any plane, no matter
the size".
I am completely on Travis' side when it comes to the issues with culture and business that brought on these incidents. Seeing
however that these affected and overrode good engineering, I believe it's vitally important that the engineering is discussed
as accurately as possible. Hence my criticism of the piece.
Had you looked at prices as you claimed to, Cessnsa 172s specify the year in the headline description. 1977 v. 1978 v 1979
on a page I got Googling for 1979.
You are now well into the terrain of continuing to argue for argument sake.
I agree with you that the article is good and the criticisms I've read seem largely unmerited (quite a few of those btl on
that article are clearly bad faith arguments), but just to clarify:
That in fact is not what the article says. It says that the design changes in the 737 Max made it dynamically unstable,
which is an unacceptable characteristic in any plane, no matter what size.
My understanding (non-engineer, but long time aviation nerd) is that many aircraft, including all Airbus's are dynamically
unstable and use software to maintain stability. The key point I think that the article makes is that there is a fundamental difference
between designing hardware and software in synchronicity to make a safe aircraft (i.e Airbus), and using software as a fudge to
avoid making hard decisions when the hardware engineers find they can't overcome a problem without spending a fortune in redesigns.
Hard engineering 'fudges' are actually really common in aircraft design – little bumps or features added to address stability
problems encountered during testing – an example being the little fore planes on the
Tupolev 144 supersonic airliner. But it seems Boeing
took a short cut with its approach and a lot of people paid for this with their lives. Only time will tell if it was a deep institutional
failure within Boeing or just a flaw caused by a rushed roll-out.
I've personal experience of a catastrophic design flaw (not one that could kill people, just one that could cost hundreds of
millions to fix) which was entirely down to the personal hang-ups of one particular project manager who was in a position to silence
internal misgivings. Of course, in aircraft design this is not supposed to happen.
I'm reminded of the famous "software is eating the world" quote by uber VC Marc Andreessen. He posits that in an era where
Silicon valley style, software led disruption stalks every established industry, even companies that "make things" (hardware)
need a radical rethink in terms of how they see themselves. A company like Boeing, under this worldview, needs to think of itself
as a software company with a hardware arm attached, otherwise it might have its lunch eaten by a plucky upstart (to say nothing
of Apple or Google) punching above its weight.
It's not farfetched to imagine an army of consultants selling this "inoculate yourself from disruption" thinking to companies
like Boeing and being taken seriously. With Silicon valley's obsession with taking humans out of the loop (think driverless cars/trucks,
operator-less forklifts etc) one wonders whether these accidents will highlight the limitations of technology and halt the seemingly
inexorable march towards complex automation reducing pilots to cockpit observers coming along for the ride.
Ad homimem and therefore logically invalid. Plus reading comprehension problem. The "native pitch stability" comment was from
Mike Slack, a former NASA engineer, and not Travis, the Cessna owner.
I think that the point is that there are aircraft that don't take over the controls and dive into the ground. It's possible
to have these kinds of aircraft. These kinds of aircraft are good to have. It's like an existence proof.
No, not dangerously pro-automation. More like dangerously stuck in the past, putting bandaids on a dinosaur to keep false profits
rolling in. AF447 could be argued against excessive automation, but not the Max.
i think they are real profits. And the automation that crashed two planes over a short time span and it wasn't excessive? Band
aids on what was one of the safest planes ever made (how many 737's crashed pre 737 max? the hardware problem was higher landing
gear along with engines that were larger and added lift to the plane. MCAS was intended to fix that. It made it worse. I won't
be flying on a MAX.
Thanks for the article but re the above comments–perhaps that 737 pilot commenter should weigh in because some expert commentary
on this article is badly needed. My impression from the Seattle Times coverage is that the MCAS was not implemented to keep the
plane from falling out of the sky but rather to finesse the retraining issue. In other words a competent pilot could handle the
pitch up tendency with no MCAS assist at all if trained or even informed that such a tendency existed. And if that's the case
then the notion that the plane will be grounded forever is dubious indeed.
This isn't quite correct, and I suggest you read the article in full.
The issue isn't MCAS. It is that MCAS was to compensate for changes in the planes aerodynamics that were so significant that
it should arguably have been recerttified as being a different plane. That was what Boeing was trying to avoid above all Former
NASA engineer Mike Slack makes that point as well. Travis argues that burying the existence of MCAS in the documentation was to
keep pilots from questioning whether this was a different plane:
It all comes down to money, and in this case, MCAS was the way for both Boeing and its customers to keep the money flowing
in the right direction. The necessity to insist that the 737 Max was no different in flying characteristics, no different in
systems, from any other 737 was the key to the 737 Max's fleet fungibility. That's probably also the reason why the documentation
about the MCAS system was kept on the down-low.
Put in a change with too much visibility, particularly a change to the aircraft's operating handbook or to pilot training,
and someone -- probably a pilot -- would have piped up and said, "Hey. This doesn't look like a 737 anymore." And then the
money would flow the wrong way.
I think you just said what I said. My contention is that the only reason the plane could ever be withdrawn is that the design
is so inherently unstable that this extra gizmo–the MCAS–was necessary for it to fly. Whereas it appears the MCAS was for marketing
purposes and if it had never been added to the plane the two accidents quite likely may never have happened–even if Boeing didn't
tell pilots about the pitch up tendency.
But I'm no expert obviously. This is just my understanding of the issue.
From what I've read at related links in the last week, a significant element is common type rating. Manufacturers don't have
to go through expensive recertification if their modifications are minor enough, earning a common type rating. Thus, the successive
incarnations of the 737 over the decades.
I'm only a layman, but a citizen who tries to stay informed and devours material on this topic. The common type rating merry
go round needs to stop. It seems at least that a new engine with a different position that alters the basic physics of the plane
shouldn't qualify for common type rating, which should be reserved only for the most minor of modifications.
As one who has followed the entirety of the MAX stories as detailed by the Seattle Times aviation reporters, it all comes back
to "first principles": a substantive change in aerodynamics by introduction of an entirely new pair of engines should have required
complete re-engineering of the airframe. We know that Boeing eschewed that approach, largely for competitive and cost considerations,
and subsequently tried to mate the LEAP engines to the existing 737 airframe by installing the MCAS, amongst other design "tweaks",
i.e., "kludging" a fix. Boeing management recognized that this wouldn't be the "perfect" aircraft, but with the help of a compliant
FAA and a huge amount of "self-assessment", got the beast certified and airborne -- -- until the two crashes, that is. Whether
the airlines and/or the flying public will ever accept the redo of MCAS and other ancillary fixes is highly problematic, as the
entire concept was flawed from the kick-off.
Also, it should be mentioned in passing that even the LEAP engines are having some material-wear issues:
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/cfm-reviews-fleet-after-finding-leap-1a-durability-i-442669/
Th IEEE Spectrum piece is somewhat reasonable but the author obvious lacks technical knowledge of the 737. He also does not
understand why MCAS was installed in the first place.
For example:
– "However, doing so also meant that the centerline of the engine's thrust changed. Now, when the pilots applied power to the
engine, the aircraft would have a significant propensity to "pitch up," or raise its nose.
– The MAX nose up tendency is a purely aerodynamic effect. The centerline of the thrust did not change much.
– "MCAS is implemented in the flight management computer, "
– No. It is implemented in the Flight Control Computer of which there are two. (There is only on FMC unit.)
-" It turns out that the Elevator Feel Computer can put a lot of force into that column -- "
– The Elevator Feel unit is not a computer but a deterministic hydraulic-mechanical system.
– "Neither such [software] coders nor their managers are as in touch with the particular culture and mores of the aviation
world as much as the people who are down on the factory floor, "
– The coders who make the Boeing and Airbus systems work are specialized in such coding. Software development for aircrafts It
is a rigid formularized process which requires a deep understanding of the aviation world. The coders appropriately implement
what the design engineers require after the design review confirmed it. Nothing less, nothing more.
and more than a dozen other technical misunderstandings and mistakes.
If the author would have read some of the PPRUNE threads on the issue or asked an 737 pilot he would have known all this.
Given what has happened with Boeing manufacture (787s being delivered with tools and bottles rattling around in them), you
have no basis for asserting how Boeing does software in practice these days.
And you have incontrovertible evidence of a coding fail: relying on only one sensor input when the plane had more than one
sensor. I'm sorry, I don't see how you can blather on about safety and coders supposedly understanding airplanes with that coded
in.
JeffC who actually worked at Boeing years ago and said the coding was conservative (lots of people checked it) because they
were safety oriented but also didn't get very good software engineers, since writing software at Boeing was boring.
I still have some trouble blaming the 737 losses, ipso facto, on using automation to extend an old design. There are
considerably more complex aircraft systems than MCAS that have been reliably automated, and building on a thoroughly proven framework
usually causes less trouble than suffering the teething problems of an all new design.
At the risk of repeating the obvious, a basic principle of critical systems, systems which must be reliable, is that they can
not suffer from single point failures. You want to require at least two independent failures to disturb a system, whose combined
probability is so low that other, unavoidable failure sources predominate, for example, weather or overwhelming, human error.
This principle extends to the system's development. The design and programming of a (reliable) critical system can not suffer
from single point failures. This requires a good many, skilled people, paying careful attention to different, specific stages
of the process. Consider a little thing I once worked on: the indicator that confirms a cargo door is closed, or arguably, that
is neither open nor unlatched. I count at least five levels of engineers and programmers, between Boeing and the FAA, that used
to validate, implement and verify the work of their colleagues, one or more levels above and/or below: to insure the result was
safe.
I bet what will ultimately come out is that multiple levels of the validation and verification chain have been grievously degraded
("crapified") to cut costs and increase profits. The first and last levels for a start. I am curious and will ask around.
The MAX isn't a proven framework. Boeing fundamentally altered the 737 design by shifting the position of the engines. The
MCAS fudge doesn't fix that.
My own impression is that there seems to be a clash between three separate philosophies at work here. The first is the business
culture of Boeing which had supplanted Boeing's historical aviation-centric ways of doing things in aircraft design. The bean-counters
& marketing droids took over, outsourced aircraft construction to such places as non-union workshops & other countries, and thought
that cutting corners in aircraft manufacture would have no long-term ill effects. The second philosophy is that of software design
that failed to understand that the software had to be good to go as it was shipped and had little understanding of what happens
when you ship beta-standard software to an operational aircraft in service. This was to have fatal consequences. The third culture
is that of the pilots themselves which seek to keep their skills going in an aviation world that wants to turn them into airplane-drivers.
If there is any move afoot to have self flying aircraft introduced down the track, I hope that this helps kill it.
Boeing is going to take a massive financial hit and so it should. Heads should literally roll over this debacle and it did not
help their case when they went to Trump to keep this plane flying in the US without thought as to what could have happened if
a US or Canadian 737 MAX had augured in. The biggest loser I believe is going to be the US's reputation with aviation. The rest
of the aviation world will no longer trust what the FAA says or advise without checking it themselves. The trust of decades of
work has just been thrown out the door needlessly. Even in the critical field of aircraft crash investigation, the US took a hit
as Ethiopia refused the demands that the black boxes be sent to the US but sent them instead to France. That is something that
has flown under the radar. This is going to have knock-on effects for decades to come.
Beginning to look like a trade war with the EU. airbus, boeing, vw, US cars; but haven't seen Japan drawn into this yet. Mercedes
Benz is saying EV cars are nonsense, they actually create more pollution than diesel engines and they are recommending methane
gasoline (that sounds totally suicidal), and hydrogen power. Hydrogen has always sounded like a good choice, so why no acclaim?
It can only be the resistance of vested interests. The auto industry, like the airline industry, is frantically trying to externalize
its costs. Maybe we should all just settle down and do a big financial mutual insurance company that covers catastrophic loss
by paying the cost of switching over to responsible manufacturing and fuel efficiency. Those corporations cooperate with shared
subsidiaries that manufacture software to patch their bad engineering – why not a truce while they look for solutions?
The whole 737 development reminds me of a story a GM engineer told me. Similarly to the aviation industry, when GM makes modifications
to an existing part on a vehicle, if the change is small enough the part does not need to be recertified for mechanical strength,
etc. One of the vehicles he was working on had a part failure in testing, so they looked at the design history of the part. It
turns out that, similarly to 737, this was a legacy part carried over numerous generations of the vehicle.
Each redesign of the vehicle introduced some changes, they needed to reroute some cabling, so they would punch a new hole through
the part. But because the change was small enough the engineering team had the option of just signing off on the change without
additional testing. So this went on for years, where additional holes or slits were made in the original part and each change
was deemed to be small enough that no recertification was necessary. The cumulative change from the original certification was
that this was now a completely different part and, not surprisingly, eventually it failed.
The interesting part of the story was the institutional inertia. As all these incremental changes were applied to the part,
nobody bothered to check when was the last time part was actually tested and what was the part design as that time. Every step
of the way everybody assumed their change is small enough not to cause any issue and did not do any diligence until a failure
occured.
Which brings me back to the 737, if I am not mistaken, 737 MAX is, for certification purposes, considered an iteration of the
original 737. The aircraft though is very different than the original, increased wingspan (117′ vs 93′), length (140′ vs. 100′).
737 NG is similarly different.
So for me the big issue with the MAX is the institutional question that allowed a plane so different from the original 737
certification to be allowed as a variant of the original, without additional pilot training or plane certification. Upcoming 777X
has the same issue, it's a materially different aircraft (larger wingspan, etc.) that has a kludge (folding wingtips) to allow
it to pass as a variant of the original 777. It will be interesting to see, in the wake of the MAX fiasco, what treatment does
the 777X get when it comes to certification.
The FAA needs to be able to follow these tweaks. Maybe we citizens need a literal social contract that itemizes what we expect
our government to actually do.
BTW, I do not believe that the problems are insoluble, or as a result of a design philosophy, but rather it is a result of
placing sales over engineering.
There are a number of aerodynamic tweaks that could have dealt with this issue (larger horizontal tail comes to mind, but my
background is manufacturing not aerodynamics), but this would require that pilots requalify for a transition between the NG and
the MAX, which would likely mean that many airlines would take a second look at Airbus.
We should avoid blaming "software" or "automation" for this accident. The B737 MAX seems to be a case of "Money first, safety
second" culture, combined with insufficent regulatory control.
The root of the B737 MAX accidents was an erroneous safety hazard assessment: The safety asessment (and the FAA) believed the
MCAS had a 0.6 authority limit. This 0.6 limit meant that an erroneous MCAS function would only have limited consequences. In
the safety jargon, its severity was classifed as "Major", instead of "Catastrophic".
After the "Major" classification was assigned, the subsequente design decions (like using a single sensor, or perhaps insufficient
testing) are acceptable and in line with the civil aviation standards.
The problem is that the safety engineer(s) failed to understand that the 0.6 limit was self-imposed by the MCAS software, not
enforced by any external aircraft element. Therefore, the MCAS software could fail in such a way that it ignored the limit. In
consequence, MCAS should have been classifed "Catastrophic".
Everybody can make mistakes. We know this. That is why these safety assessments should be reviewed and challenged inside the
company and by the FAA. The need to launch the MAX fast and the lack of FAA oversight resources surely played a greater role than
the usage of software and automation.
Yves: Thanks for this post; it has (IMO) a level-headed perspective. It is not about assigning *blame*, it is about *What,
Why, and How to Prevent* what happened from re-occurring. Blame is for courts and juries. Good luck finding jurors who are not
predisposed; due to relentless bombardment with parroted misinformation and factoids.
I wonder how often MCAS kicked in on a typical 737MAX flight, in situation where the weather vane advising of angle attack
was working as per normal. Since we are excluding the time when auto-pilot is working and also the time when the flaps are down,
there is only a very small time window immediately after take off. I would venture to guess that the MCAS would almost always
adjust the plane at least once. This is once too many, if one is to believe that the notion of design improvement includes improvement
in aerodynamic behavior. The fact that MCAS could only be overridden by disabling the entire motor control of the trim suggests
that the MCAS feature is absolutely necessary for the thing to fly without surprise stalls. There is no excuse in a series of
a product for handling associated with basic safety becoming worse with a new model. Fuel efficiency is laudable and a marketable
thing, but not when packaged together with the bad compromise of bad flight behavior. If the fix is only by lines of code, they
really have not fixed it completely. We know they are not going to be able to move the engines or the thrust line or increase
the ground clearance of the plane so the software fix will be sold as the solution. While it probably does not mean that there
will be more planes being trimmed to crash into the ground, it does make for some anxiety for future passengers. Loss of sales
would not be a surprise but more of a surprise will be the deliveries that will be completed regardless.
MCAS was intended to rarely if ever activate. It is supposed to nudge the aircraft to a lower angle of attack if AoA is getting
high to cause instability in certain parts of the flight envelope. An overly aggressive takeoff climb would be an example. Part
of the problem is that a faulty AoA sensor resulted in the system thinking it was at this extreme case, repeatedly, and in a way
that was difficult for the pilots to identify since they had not been properly trained and the UX was badly implemented.
Yes I've heard that. But do not believe it, given how it is implemented. So I really would like to know how it behaves in non-catastrophic
situations. If so benign, why not allow it to turn off without turning off trim controls? Did not the earlier 737's not need this
feature?
In a non-catastrophic situation, and if functioning correctly, it's my understanding it would felt by the flight crew as mild
lowering of the nose by the system. This is is to keep the plane from increasing angle of attack, which could lead to a stall
or other instability.
It's my understanding MCAS should be treated as a separate system from the trim controls, although they both control the pitch
of the stabilator. Trim controls are generally not "highly dynamic", in that the system (or pilot) sets the trim value only occasionally
based primarily on things like the aircraft weight distribution (this could however change during a flight as fuel is burned,
for example). MCAS on the other hand, while monitoring AoA continuously in flight modes where it is activated only kicks in to
correct excessive inputs from the pilots, or as a result of atmospheric disturbances (wind shear would be one possible cause of
excessive AoA readings).
Neither trim nor MCAS are required to manually fly the plane safely if under direct pilot control and the the pilot is fully
situationally aware.
Earlier 737s did not need this feature due to different aerodynamic properties of the plane. They however still have assistive
features such as stick shakers to help prevent leaving the normal flight envelope.
I've read a bit more in regard to allowing MCAS to turn off without turning off trim, I have no idea why it was implemented
as it was, since previous 737s allow separate control of trim and MCAS. More here:
This however still doesn't change the fact that neither is required to fly the plane, given proper training and communication,
both of which were criminally lacking.
IBG, YBG corporate decisions by people who will probably never fly in these planes, complete regulatory capture and distract
with the little people squabbling over technical details. In China there would probably already have been a short trial, a trip
to the river bank, a bullet through the head, organ harvesting for the corporate jocks responsible. Team Amrika on the way down.
On the subject of software, the underlying issue of ship and patch later is because the process of software is full of bad
practice.
Two examples, "if" and "new".
If is a poor use of a stronger mechanism, FSMs, or Finite State Machines.
'new' is a mechanism that leads to memory leaks, and crashes.
I developed some middleware to bridge data between maineframs and Unix systems that ran 7×24 for 7 years continuously without
a failure, because of FSMs and static memory use.
In an email to me (and presumably to all AAdvantage program members) transmitted at 03:00 April 17 UTC ( i.e. , 11 PM
April 16 US EDT), American Airlines states that it is canceling 737 MAX flights through August 19 (instead of June 5 as stated
by the earlier newspaper story cited in this post).
Eliminating introductory and concluding paragraphs that are marketing eyewash (re. passenger safety and convenience), the two
payload paragraphs state in their entirety:
To avoid last-minute changes and to accommodate customers on other flights with as much notice as possible before their
travel date, we have made the decision to extend our cancellations for the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft through August 19, 2019,
while we await recertification of the MAX.
While these changes impact only a small portion of our more than 7,000 departures each day this summer, we can plan more
reliably for the peak travel season by adjusting our schedule now. Customers whose upcoming travel has been impacted as a result
of the schedule change are being contacted by our teams.
I'm surprised this has not already appeared in earlier comments. Anybody else get this?
Now do Tesla & their bs Tesla Autonomy Investor Day please.
It appears to have it all from beta testing several ton vehicles on public roads, (like BA's beta testing of the MAX) to regulatory
capture( of NTSB, & NTHSA as examples) and a currently powerful PR team.
Apparently they're going to show off their "plan" how one will be able to use their Tesla in full autonomous mode while every
other OEM sez it can't be done by the end of this year let alone within a couple decades as the average person perceives autonomous
driving.
First of all, I didn't read the article, so I'm not going to critique it. There were some comments in the excerpt that Yves
provided that I think require some clarification and/or correction.
The 737 is not a fly-by-wire (FBW) aircraft. There are multiple twisted steel control cables that connect the flight control
in the cockpit to the various control surfaces. The flight controls are hydraulically assisted, but in case of hydraulic (or electric)
failure, the cable system is sufficient to control the aircraft.
In both the 737NG and the MAX, there are automation functions that can put in control inputs under various conditions. Every
one of these inputs can be overridden by the pilot.
In the case of the recent MAX accidents, the MCAS system put in an unexpected and large input by moving the stabilizer. The
crews attempted to oppose this input, but they did so mostly by using elevator input (pulling back on the control column). This
required a great deal of arm strength which they eventually could not overcome. However, if either pilot had merely used the strength
of their thumb to depress the stabilizer trim switch on the yoke, they could have easily opposed and cancelled out whatever input
MCAS was trying to put in. Why neither pilot took this fairly basic measure should be one of the key areas of investigation.
These comments are not intended in any way to exonerate Boeing, the FAA, and the compromises that went into the MAX design.
There is a lot there to be concerned about. However, we are not dealing with a case of an automation system that was so powerful
and autonomous that pilots could not override what it was trying to do.
Bjorn over at Leeham had this analysis:
"the Flight Crew followed the procedures prescribed by FAA and Boeing in AD 2018-23-51. And as predicted the Flight Crew could
not trim manually, the trim wheel can't be moved at the speeds ET302 flew."
In other words, the pilots followed the Boeing recommended procedure to turn off the automatic trim, but at the speeds they
were flying and the large angle that MCAS has moved the stabilizer to, the trim wheels were bound up and could not be moved by
human effort.
They then turned electric trim on to try to help their effort, and MCAS put the nose down again.
Also: Did no one ever test the humans factors of this in a simulator? At HP, when we put out a new printer, we had human factors
bring in average users to see if using our documentation, they could install the printer.
It is mind-blowing to me that Boeing and the FAA can release an Air Worthiness Directive (The fix after the Lion crash) that
was apparently never simulator tested to see if actual humans could do it.
None of the above should have passed muster. None of the above should have passed the "OK" pencil of the most junior engineering
staff, much less a DER [FAA Designated Engineering Representative].
That's not a big strike. That's a political, social, economic, and technical sin .
This is the thing that has been nagging me all along about this story. The "most junior engineering staff" thing is not an
exaggeration – engineers get this drilled into them until it's part of their DNA. I read this and immediately thought that it
points to a problem of culture and values (a point I was pleased to see the author make in the next paragraph). Bluntly, it tells
us that the engineers are not the ones running the show at Boeing, and that extends even to safety critical situations where their
assessment should trump everything.
One of two things needs to happen as a result of this. Either Boeing needs to return to the old safety first culture, or it
needs to go out of business. If neither happens, we are going to see a lot more planes falling out of the sky.
I want to reemphasize that all airplane crashes are a chain of events; if one event does not occur there are no causalities.
Lion Air flight should never have flow with a faulty sensor. But afterwards when the elevator jackscrew was found in the full
nose down position that forced the plane to dive into the Java Sea, Boeing and FAA should have grounded the fleet until a fix
was found. The deaths in Ethiopia are on them. The November 2018 737-8 and -9 Airworthiness Directive was criminally negligent.
Without adequate training the Ethiopian Airline pilots were overwhelmed and not could trim the elevator after turning off the
jackscrew electric motor with the manual trim control due to going too fast with takeoff thrust from start to finish. With deregulation
and the end of government oversight, the terrible design of the 737 Max is solely on Boeing and politicians who deregulated certification.
Profit clearly drove corporate decisions with no consideration of the consequences. This is popping up consistently now from VW
to Quantitative Easing, or the restart of the Cold War. Unless the FAA requires pilot and copilot simulator training on how to
manually trim the 737 Max with all hell breaking loose in the cockpit, the only recourse for customers is to boycott flying Boeing.
Ultimately the current economic system that puts profit above all else must end if humans are to survive.
Before last month's crash of a flight that began in Ethiopia, Boeing Co. said in a legal
document that large, upgraded 737s "cannot be used at what are referred to as 'high/hot'
airports."
At an elevation of 7,657 feet -- or more than a mile high -- Addis Ababa's Bole
International Airport falls into that category. High elevations require longer runways and
faster speeds for takeoff.
remove Share link Copy Trump would have been better off Tweeting something like...
"The safety of the flying public worldwide is of the utmost importance to all of us. I have
been in constant contact with Boeings CEO and have complete confidence that the improvements
they are making will make the 737MAX one of the safest planes ever built. No 737 MAX will take
to the skies that I would not put my own family member on".
See the problem with the max is it will never be safe. What boeing did was try and put a
square peg in a round hole. To save costs both in certification and pilot training boeing
decided to just take the 737 airframe and put bigger more fuel efficient engines on it so
they wouldn't loose market share to airbus. That was a stupid mistake. The bigger engines
hung so low they had to mount them higher and more forward thus creating aerodynamic issues.
The new engine mounting causes air flow disruption over the inner wing during climb out. That
is why they messed with the mcas. You cannot break the laws of physics and then fix them with
software. Sorry that will never work.
Boeing is still delivering the 73NG and should make an offer to the airlines to replace
each MAX order 1 for 1 with a 737-800 or -900 at cost. The traveling public will have
immediate confidence, the airlines can fill schedules, and Boeing can clean house on the MAX
"leadership" team.
"... Boeing "effectively put profitability and growth ahead of airplane safety and honesty" by rushing the 737 MAX to market without "extra" or "optional" safety features - a practice that has outraged the company's critics - as it feared ceding market share to Airbus SE. Moreover, Boeing failed to disclose a conflict of interest surrounding its 'regulatory capture' of the FAA, which was revealed to have outsourced much of the approval process for the 737 MAX to Boeing itself. ..."
"... Of course, this shareholder lawsuit is only the tip of the legal iceberg for Boeing. The company will likely face a blizzard of lawsuits filed by family members of those killed during the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes, the first of which has already been filed. ..."
Boeing shareholders who lost money selling their stock after the Ethiopian Airlines crash are suing
the company
for concealing unflattering material information from the public, defrauding
shareholders in the process,
Reuters
reports.
The class-action lawsuit, filed in Chicago, is seeking damages after the
March 10 crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 wiped $34 billion off Boeing's market cap within
two weeks. But if true, the crux of the lawsuit might have broader repercussions for the company as
it tries to convince regulators to lift a grounding order that has kept the Boeing 737 MAX 8
grounded since mid-March.
In essence, the suit alleges that
the company concealed safety concerns about the 737
MAX and its anti-stall software
following the Lion Air crash in October that killed 189
people,
but did nothing to alert the public or correct the issue.
Boeing "effectively put profitability and growth ahead of airplane safety and honesty" by
rushing the 737 MAX to market without "extra" or "optional" safety features - a practice that
has outraged the company's critics - as it feared ceding market share to Airbus SE. Moreover,
Boeing failed to disclose a conflict of interest surrounding its 'regulatory capture' of the
FAA, which was revealed to have outsourced much of the approval process for the 737 MAX to
Boeing itself.
Lead plaintiff Richard Seeks bought 300 Boeing shares in early March and sold them at a loss
after the shares dumped more than 12% in the weeks after the second crash, which would have left
him with a loss between $15,000 and $20,000. The lawsuit seeks damages for Boeing investors who
bought the company's shares from Jan. 8 to March 21. Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg and CFO Gregory
Smith have also been named as defendants.
Of course, this shareholder lawsuit is only the tip of the legal iceberg for Boeing. The company
will likely face a blizzard of lawsuits filed by family members of those killed during the Lion
Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes, the
first of which
has already been filed.
Though its shares have recovered from their post-grounding lows, they have hit another bout of
turbulence this week after the company announced that it would slash production of the 737 MAX by
20%, before announcing that its aircraft orders in Q1 fell to 95 from 180 a year earlier.
Having grown up in Seattle within 15 miles of Plant 2 on Boeing
Field, I know a lot about The Boeing Company. I went to private
high school with Bill Boeing III and during college had a great
summer job at Troy Laundry delivering shop towels and uniforms to
all of the Boeing plants in the region.
I used to laugh because,
when I drove the laundries 20ft UPS style box van through those
enormous sliding doors into Everett's 747 Plant to deliver fresh
laundry and pickup soiled's, I would spend the next 4-hours
driving around 'inside' the building. I got to know dozens of
workers by name, who 'worked the line'.
After college, more than 20% of my graduating class went to
work at 'the lazy B' as it was commonly known. Not me. I went into
sales and started selling computers.....to Boeing and the FAA.
As the size my computer sales territory was increased to
include the entire West Coast I began to fly Boeing aircraft
almost everyday for 10-years. and on-board those aircraft I met
and flew with many Boeing executives.
One day I happened to sit next the 'current' Boeing HR
director, and after getting to know him confided that I
frequently smoked marijuana after work. To which he replied, "I
would gladly have the 15% of our work force that are alcoholics,
or into hard drugs smoke pot because it's effects are short-term
but when people come to work 'hung-over or jacked-up' that is when
bad **** happens and mistakes are made".
Even though, I had been 'on the line' and met many Boeing
employees I had not realized until that moment the seriousness of
what he was saying. The HR guy went on to say, that they 'had to
have redundancy at every step in the construction process to
ensure bad workmanship didn't make it into the final product'.
Fast forward 20-years; and Boeing airplanes are falling from
the sky......and it's not a surprise to me.
The legacy 737 "NG" is a solid aircraft, and its still being
produced down the same build lines as the MAX. Just the
previous generation. That plane drove the vast majority of
Boeings sales. It woulndt be hard to scale down MAX production
and just go back to producing the NG, but they wont do that.
They'll fix the MAX and move on, and as long as no more crashes
occur, eventually the public will forget.
The FED can't let the stock price fall on a company of that
size, so the FED trading desk will lend assistance. There is a
certain evil in this, because the stock
deserves
to
fall, and when it doesn't, it has the effect of vindicating the
company for the events that occurred. This is why free markets
should never be meddled with. It's actually immoral.
This is utterly predictable and something I've already said
repeatedly: Boeing did not tell pilots or its customers about the
mechanism. Boeing is criminally liable for the MURDER of 300+
people. Families will sue and cancellations will follow.
Then
this:
"In essence, the suit alleges that
the company concealed
safety concerns about the 737 MAX and its anti-stall software
following
the Lion Air crash in October that killed 189 people,
but did
nothing to alert the public or correct the issue.
Boeing
"effectively put profitability and growth ahead of
airplane safety and honesty"
Pilots complained about the problem and were IGNORED.
This is good to see. Boeing needs to be held accountable for
MURDER. But instead Trump slaps tariffs on the competitor, AIRBUS,
to pay for Boeing's criminality.
This will not stop companies choosing AIRBUS and its good
safety record over a bunch of psychopathic murderers. If Boeing
had put safety first, it's competitor would not be picking up
business..ironic...
I still don't understand the point of the MCAS. Clearly it causes
the plane to do a face plant into the ground. However, like in
that one situation where the jump seat pilot knew to turn it off,
the plane flew fine. Boeing says the MCAS is to prevent the plane
from stalling at steep angles of attack, but the plane seems to
stay in the air better without it. So which is it? The fact is the
Boeing neglected to put it in the manual suggests it was done on
purpose. The fact that they sold a version with no redundancy to
the AOC sensor seems to be have done on purpose. Since Boeing is
basically an arm of the DOD, the question should be who was on the
flights that crashed? That's the missing link in this debacle.
Check out "
moonofalabama.org
",
very good explanation, plus some further links to pilot forums.
From what I understand, the pilots get into some sort of "catch
22"....even if they switch of the MACS, they are doomed.
I'm not I anyway in the flying biz, but work in power
generating control systems, and funny enough, use quite a lot
of Rosemount sensors in ex areas. They are good sensors, but
always use two in mission critical operations.
Why Boeing opted for just one, really blows my mind.
What would an extra sensor cost, 10.000USD?, altogether with
new software..bla-bla.
Now look what this is costing them.
Well, this is what happens when MBA bean counters take over
a former proud engineering company.
From what I understand, the pilots get into some sort
of "catch 22"....even if they switch of the MACS, they
are doomed.
Sort of like that. The flight surface is controlled by a
big screw. Normally an electric motor spins the nut that
drives the screw up and down. The switch cuts out the motor,
and they have hand cranks to move the screw. But in this
last crash, the too-clever-by-half software system had
already run the screw all the way to the 'nose down' end,
and it would have taken them several minutes of hand
cranking to get it back to the center position. They didn't
have several minutes, and the motor is capable of driving
the screw the other way. Since the problem was intermittent
(software kicks in on a time interval), they were hoping it
would behave for a few seconds, and switched the motor back
on. It didn't.
On a side note, the Airbus does not have these hand-crank
controls. Everything is run by the computer -- so if
anything goes wrong, the pilot must 'reason' with the
computer to correct it. . . "Sorry Dave, I can't do that".
Well, this is what happens when MBA bean counters take
over a former proud engineering company.
This reminds me of Feynman's analysis of what went wrong
with the Space Shuttle Challenger. The engineers said the
O-rings would be too stiff and brittle, and the launch
should wait until it warmed up a bit. But a delay was
costing the shuttle program a million dollars a minute, or
whatever.
Feynman explained that the early space program was run by
the pocket-protector guys with slide rules. And it worked.
But over time the management had been replaced by people
whose careers depended on influencing other people and not
on matter, energy, and materials.
Another thing, the pilots had commanded full throttle and
never throttled back during the whole ordeal. So when
they killed the trim motor, they couldn't overcome the
aerodynamic force on the stab to move the trim screw back
into position.
Apparently they could have got the trim
corrected ENOUGH to make a difference if they could have
moved it more easily, but at the speeds they were going,
the airspeed over the stab was too high to manually move
the screw fast enough to make a difference.
Sort of. When you kill the electric trim motor, you have to
use a manual wheel to adjust trim. The issue came that their
airspeed was so high that the load on the stab made it
nearly impossible to move without the electric motor.
They
had been at full throttle from rotation until they hit the
dirt. The pilot had told the copilot to throttle back but it
got lost in the chaos somewhere and never happened.
So when they killed the trim motor and tried to move it
manually, they had to overcome all the aerodynamic force on
the stab, and they just couldnt do it at those airspeeds
without the electric motor to overcome the force.
The bigger the fuselage the bigger the engines needed. The
bigger the engines needed the more forward on the wing they
go to keep from scraping on the ground. The more forward on the
wing the more unbalanced then plane became. They've stretch a
frame which was developed in the 60's beyond its original
design.
The executives who oversaw the fiasco that is now Boeing, long ago
parachuted out with multi million dollar pensions and stock
options while their Seattle workers had their pensions slashed.
They're now assembling Dreamliners in NC with off the street non
unionized labor, former TacoBell and Subway workers. They moved
their Corp headquarters to Chicago away from where the actual work
was being performed to pursue the "work" of stock buy backs and
cozying up to the FAA. All the above a recipe for disaster. A
perfect mirror of how the 1/10th of 1% operate in the Oligarchy we
call America.
Boeing is in full on crisis mode because of the 737 Max fiasco.
Anything else they say or do is pure show and fraud.
The are not to far from losing the entire narrowbody airline
market, pretty much the meat and bones of Airline production.
Today Airbus still has the A-320 neo, and Russia and China are
chomping at the bit with the MC21 and C919, all far more advanced
and superior than a 1960's designed stretched pulled and too late
737 .
If Boeing loses market share and the narrow body airline
market, shame on the USA.
This will become a text book expample of the fall of a nation
and empire.
How can a Company like Boeing have technology like the B2 and
everything the DOD gives them and lose the international market
for narrowbody airliners..
To call this a national disgrace is a compliment to Boeing and
the US aerospace industies complete disregard and hubris in such
an important component of worldwide aviation.
This in not a sad chapter for Boeing, its sad for the USA
BeanCounters, Parasitoids, and Bells-WhistlesMktg Types Running
an Aerospace/Aviation Engineering and Defense Tech Conglomerate
into the Ground - Literally.
Civil Aviation Div "Jumped the
Shark" the moment they passed on a redesigned Successor to the
737 Base Model in the mid 2000s and decided to strap on Larger
Engines and GunDeck the Revision and Certifications.
Failure to disclose regulatory capture is a tough one. Do you
issue an 8K on that one? Maybe bury it in the 10K in risk
statements
"We maintain several regulatory relationships that
will rubber stamp approvals for our aircraft. In the event of a
major safety violation, those cozy relationships could be exposed
and we be found to not only be negligent, but also nefariously so
through regulatory capture."
You bought an airline manufacturer that had a malfunction.
There's plenty of people to blame, but it's part of the business
you own.
The 737 Max is a legacy of its past, built on
decades-old systems, many that date back to the original version. The strategy, to keep
updating the plane rather than starting from scratch, offered competitive advantages.
Pilots were comfortable flying it, while airlines didn't have to invest in costly new
training for their pilots and mechanics. For Boeing, it was also faster and cheaper to
redesign and recertify than starting anew.
But the strategy has now left the company in crisis, following two deadly crashes in less
than five months. The Max stretched the 737 design, creating a patchwork plane that left
pilots without some safety features that could be important in a crisis -- ones that have
been offered for years on other planes. It is the only modern Boeing jet without an
electronic alert system that explains what is malfunctioning and how to resolve it.
Instead pilots have to check a manual.
The Max also required makeshift solutions to keep the plane flying like its ancestors,
workarounds that may have compromised safety. While the findings aren't final,
investigators suspect that one workaround, an anti-stall system designed to compensate for
the larger engines, was central to the crash last month in Ethiopia and an earlier one in
Indonesia.
"They wanted to A, save money and B, to
minimize the certification and flight-test costs," said Mike Renzelmann, an engineer who
worked on the Max's flight controls. "Any changes are going to require recertification."
Mr. Renzelmann was not involved in discussions about the sensors.
... ... ...
On 737s, a light typically indicates the
problem and pilots have to flip through their paper manuals to find next
steps. In the doomed Indonesia flight, as the Lion Air pilots struggled
with MCAS for control, the pilots consulted the manual moments before
the jet plummeted into the Java Sea, killing all 189 people aboard.
"Meanwhile, I'm flying the jet," said
Mr. Tajer, the American Airlines 737 captain. "Versus, pop, it's on your
screen. It tells you, This is the problem and here's the checklist
that's recommended."
Boeing decided against adding it to the
Max because it could have prompted regulators to require new pilot
training, according to two former Boeing employees involved in the
decision.
The Max also runs on a complex web of
cables and pulleys that, when pilots pull back on the controls, transfer
that movement to the tail. By comparison, Airbus jets and Boeing's more
modern aircraft, such as the 777 and 787, are "fly-by-wire," meaning
pilots' movement of the flight controls is fed to a computer that
directs the plane. The design allows for far more automation, including
systems that prevent the jet from entering dangerous situations, such as
flying too fast or too low. Some 737 pilots said they preferred the
cable-and-pulley system to fly-by-wire because they believed it gave
them more control.
In the recent crashes, investigators
believe the MCAS malfunctioned and moved a tail flap called the
stabilizer, tilting the plane toward the ground. On the doomed Ethiopian
Airlines flight, the pilots tried to combat the system by cutting power
to the stabilizer's motor, according to the preliminary crash report.
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Once the power was cut, the pilots tried
to regain control manually by turning a wheel next to their seat. The
737 is the last modern Boeing jet that uses a manual wheel as its backup
system. But Boeing has long known that turning the wheel is difficult at
high speeds, and may have required two pilots to work together.
In the final moments of the Ethiopian
Airlines flight, the first officer said the method wasn't working,
according to the preliminary crash report. About 1 minute and 49 seconds
later, the plane crashed, killing 157 people.
The Seattle Times published what I consider a
devastating article a few Sundays ago. It highlighted the depth to which Boeing and the FAA cut
corners on the certification of the Max, more specifically the characterization of the impact of
a failure of the new MCAS system. This allowed them to utilize the cheaper single sensor AOA
vane instead of 2 or 3. The aircraft also got delivered with the MCAS system applying many more
nose down units of trim than what was published in the certification process. Topping it off was
the failure of Boeing to disclose to its customers that the MCAS system was installed or what
abnormal or emergency procedures would accompany the system.
True, there are two kinds of pilots, and some are
better. BUT no pilot should be put in a critical situation by bad and rushed design. What was
Boeing thinking? `Yes, there is slight chance that things can go wrong... but if the pilot is
experienced, if the weather is fine, if the FO is focused (and so on...) they will surely make
it.' Why taking that risk? They should design a plane that even a drunk pilot can handle.
The MCAS moves the entire horizontal tail (aka
horizontal stabilizer) not just "a tail flap called the stabilizer". Normal stabilizer trim also
moves the whole horizontal stabilizer. Presumably the "flap" being referred to here,
incorrectly, is the elevator, a flight control surface on the trailing edge of the horizontal
tail, which is control by pulling and pushing the flight control column. Both horizontal
stabilizer trim and elevator affect the pitch (nose up, nose down) of the aircraft. Typically,
horizontal stabilizer trim is used to maintain a particular attitude (e.g. level flight in
cruise) without requiring the pilot to continously apply significant forces to the control
column, which is tiring. When MCAS engages it effectively is attempting to "cancel out" the
pilot's elevator command (pulling back on the control column to bring the nose up by ) by moving
the horizontal stabilizer to counteract the pilots action (rotating the the horizontal
stabilizer so that it's leading edge points down).
Boeing should have gone with a clean sheet of
paper design. Look at the Airbus A220, previously known as Bombardier C Series. It has nearly
similar seating, yet it carries less fuel, but has a longer range than the MAX8. Modern wing
design. Heck, Boeing should have just bought Bombardier 10 years ago. Now they are in the arms
of Airbus.
Why doesn't BA just trash the entire max8 program
and become a subcontractor for A320s instead? After all there is a demand for 5000 aircraft that
now will not be fulfilled. Boeing management should be put on trial for criminal negligence.
Finally, a comprehensive report that doesn't go on
and on about software. The problem was a mechanical and training one, and instead of fixing the
problems, the Bean Counters took over and went on the cheap.
Pilots start some new Boeing planes by turning a knob and flipping two
switches.
The Boeing 737 Max, the newest passenger jet on the market, works differently.
Pilots follow roughly the same seven steps used on the first 737 nearly 52 years ago: Shut off the cabin's
air-conditioning, redirect the air flow, switch on the engine, start the flow of fuel, revert the air flow,
turn back on the air conditioning, and turn on a generator.
The 737 Max is a legacy of its past, built on decades-old systems, many that
date back to the original version. The strategy, to keep updating the plane rather than starting from scratch,
offered competitive advantages. Pilots were comfortable flying it, while airlines didn't have to invest in
costly new training for their pilots and mechanics. For Boeing, it was also faster and cheaper to redesign and
recertify than starting anew.
But the strategy has now left the company in crisis, following
two deadly crashes in less than five months
. The Max stretched the 737 design, creating a patchwork plane
that left pilots without some safety features that could be important in a crisis -- ones that have been offered
for years on other planes. It is the only modern Boeing jet without an electronic alert system that explains
what is malfunctioning and how to resolve it. Instead pilots have to check a manual.
The Max also required makeshift solutions to keep the plane flying like its
ancestors, workarounds that may have compromised safety. While the findings aren't final, investigators suspect
that one workaround, an anti-stall system designed to compensate for the larger engines, was central to the
crash last month in Ethiopia and an earlier one in Indonesia.
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The Max "ain't your father's Buick," said Dennis Tajer, a spokesman for the
American Airlines pilots' union who has flown the 737 for a decade. He added that "it's not lost on us that the
foundation of this aircraft is from the '60s."
Dean Thornton, the president of Boeing, with an engine on the first
737-400 in 1988 in Seattle. The larger engines for Boeing's new Max line of jets prompted a number of
design issues.
Credit
Benjamin
Benschneider/The Seattle Times, via Associated Press
Image
Dean Thornton, the president of Boeing, with an engine on the first 737-400 in 1988 in Seattle. The larger
engines for Boeing's new Max line of jets prompted a number of design issues.
Credit
Benjamin
Benschneider/The Seattle Times, via Associated Press
The Max, Boeing's best-selling model, with more than 5,000 orders, is suddenly
a reputational hazard. It could be weeks or months before regulators around the world lift their ban on the
plane, after Boeing's expected
software fix was delayed
. Southwest Airlines and American Airlines have canceled some flights through May
because of the Max grounding.
The company has
slowed production
of the plane, putting pressure on its profits, and some buyers are reconsidering their
orders. Shares of the company fell over 4 percent on Monday, and are down 11 percent since the Ethiopia crash.
"It was state of the art at the time, but that was 50 years ago," said Rick
Ludtke, a former Boeing engineer who helped design the Max's cockpit. "It's not a good airplane for the current
environment."
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The 737 has long been a reliable aircraft, flying for decades with relatively
few issues. Gordon Johndroe, a Boeing spokesman, defended the development of the Max, saying that airlines
wanted an updated 737 over a new single-aisle plane and that pilots were involved in its design.
"Listening to pilots is an important aspect of our work. Their experienced
input is front-and-center in our mind when we develop airplanes," he said in a statement. "We share a common
priority -- safety -- and we listen carefully to their feedback." He added that American regulators approved the
plane under the same standards they used with previous aircraft.
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Boeing introduced the 737 Max as a reliable fuel- and cost-efficient solution to air travel in the 21st century.
After two fatal Max crashes, all of the Max aircraft in the world are believed to have been grounded.
Credit
Credit
Chang
W. Lee/The New York Times
Boeing's chief executive, Dennis Muilenburg, said in a statement on Friday that
the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia appeared to have been caused by the Max's new anti-stall system. "We have
the responsibility to eliminate this risk, and we know how to do it," he said.
At a factory near Seattle on Jan. 17, 1967, flight attendants christened the
first Boeing 737, smashing champagne bottles over its wing. Boeing pitched the plane as a smaller alternative
to its larger jets, earning it the nickname the "Baby Boeing."
Early on, sales lagged Boeing's biggest competitor, McDonnell Douglas. In 1972,
Boeing had delivered just 14 of the jets, and it considered selling the program to a Japanese manufacturer,
said Peter Morton, the 737 marketing manager in the early 1970s. "We had to decide if we were going to end it,
or invest in it," Mr. Morton said.
Ultimately, Boeing invested. The 737 eventually began to sell, bolstered by
airline deregulation in 1978. Six years later, Boeing updated the 737 with its "classic" series, followed by
the "next generation" in 1997, and the Max in 2017. Now nearly one in every three domestic flights in the
United States is on a 737, more than any other line of aircraft.
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Each of the three redesigns came with a new engine, updates to the cabin and
other changes. But Boeing avoided overhauling the jet in order to appease airlines, according to current and
former Boeing executives, pilots and engineers, some of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the
open investigations. Airlines wanted new 737s to match their predecessors so pilots could skip expensive
training in flight simulators and easily transition to new jets.
Boeing 737 Max: What's Happened After Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air Crashes
Boeing's strategy worked. The Federal Aviation Administration never required
simulator training for pilots switching from one 737 to the next.
"Airlines don't want Boeing to give them a fancy new product if it requires
them to retrain their pilots," said Matthew Menza, a former 737 Max test pilot for Boeing. "So you iterate off
a design that's 50 years old. The old adage is: If it's not broke, don't fix it."
It did require engineering ingenuity, to ensure a decades-old jet handled
mostly the same. In doing so, some of the jet's one-time selling points became challenges.
For instance, in the early years of the 737, jet travel was rapidly expanding
across the world. The plane's low-slung frame was a benefit for airlines and airports in developing countries.
Workers there could load bags by hand without a conveyor belt and maintain the engines without a lift, Mr.
Morton said. In the decades that followed, the low frame repeatedly complicated efforts to fit bigger engines
under the wing.
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By 2011, Boeing executives were starting to question whether the 737 design had
run its course. The company wanted to create an entirely new single-aisle jet. Then Boeing's rival Airbus added
a new fuel-efficient engine to its line of single-aisle planes, the A320, and Boeing quickly decided to update
the jet again.
The 737 Max 8 at Boeing's plant in Renton, Wash. Nearly one in every
three domestic flights in the United States is on a 737, more than any other line of aircraft.
Credit
Ruth
Fremson/The New York Times
Image
The
737 Max 8 at Boeing's plant in Renton, Wash. Nearly one in every three domestic flights in the United States is
on a 737, more than any other line of aircraft.
Credit
Ruth
Fremson/The New York Times
"We all rolled our eyes. The idea that, 'Here we go. The 737 again,'" said Mr.
Ludtke, the former 737 Max cockpit designer who spent 19 years at Boeing.
"Nobody was quite perhaps willing to say it was unsafe, but we really felt like
the limits were being bumped up against," he added.
Some engineers were frustrated they would have to again spend years updating
the same jet, taking care to limit any changes, instead of starting fresh and incorporating significant
technological advances, the current and former engineers and pilots said. The Max still has roughly the
original layout of the cockpit and the hydraulic system of cables and pulleys to control the plane, which
aren't used in modern designs. The flight-control computers have roughly the processing power of 1990s home
computers. A Boeing spokesman said the aircraft was designed with an appropriate level of technology to ensure
safety.
When engineers did make changes, it sometimes created knock-on effects for how
the plane handled, forcing Boeing to get creative. The company added a new system that moves plates on the wing
in part to reduce stress on the plane from its added weight. Boeing recreated the decades-old physical gauges
on digital screens.
As Boeing pushed its engineers to figure out how to accommodate bigger, more
fuel-efficient engines, height was again an issue. Simply lengthening the landing gear to make the plane taller
could have violated rules for exiting the plane in an emergency.
Boeing 737 engines at the company's factory in 2012. By 2011, Boeing
executives were starting to question whether the 737 design had run its course.
Credit
Stephen
Brashear/Associated Press
Image
Boeing 737 engines at the company's factory in 2012. By 2011, Boeing executives were starting to question
whether the 737 design had run its course.
Credit
Stephen
Brashear/Associated Press
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Instead, engineers were able to add just a few inches to the front landing gear
and shift the engines farther forward on the wing. The engines fit, but the Max sat at a slightly uneven angle
when parked.
While that design solved one problem, it created another. The larger size and
new location of the engines gave the Max the tendency to tilt up during certain flight maneuvers, potentially
to a dangerous angle.
To compensate, Boeing engineers created the automated anti-stall system, called
MCAS, that pushed the jet's nose down if it was lifting too high. The software was intended to operate in the
background so that the Max flew just like its predecessor. Boeing didn't mention the system in its training
materials for the Max.
Boeing also designed the system to rely on a single sensor -- a rarity in
aviation, where redundancy is common. Several former Boeing engineers who were not directly involved in the
system's design said their colleagues most likely opted for such an approach since relying on two sensors could
still create issues. If one of two sensors malfunctioned, the system could struggle to know which was right.
Airbus addressed this potential problem on some of its planes by installing
three or more such sensors. Former Max engineers, including one who worked on the sensors, said adding a third
sensor to the Max was a nonstarter. Previous 737s, they said, had used two and managers wanted to limit
changes.
The angle of attack sensor, bottom, on a Boeing 737 Max 8.
Credit
Ruth
Fremson/The New York Times
Image
The
angle of attack sensor, bottom, on a Boeing 737 Max 8.
Credit
Ruth
Fremson/The New York Times
"They wanted to A, save money and B, to minimize the certification and
flight-test costs," said Mike Renzelmann, an engineer who worked on the Max's flight controls. "Any changes are
going to require recertification." Mr. Renzelmann was not involved in discussions about the sensors.
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The Max also lacked more modern safety features.
Most new Boeing jets have electronic systems that take pilots through their
preflight checklists, ensuring they don't skip a step and potentially miss a malfunctioning part. On the Max,
pilots still complete those checklists manually in a book.
A second electronic system found on other Boeing jets also alerts pilots to
unusual or hazardous situations during flight and lays out recommended steps to resolve them.
On 737s, a light typically indicates the problem and pilots have to flip
through their paper manuals to find next steps. In the doomed Indonesia flight, as the Lion Air pilots
struggled with MCAS for control, the pilots consulted the manual moments before the jet plummeted into the Java
Sea, killing all 189 people aboard.
"Meanwhile, I'm flying the jet," said Mr. Tajer, the American Airlines 737
captain. "Versus, pop, it's on your screen. It tells you, This is the problem and here's the checklist that's
recommended."
Boeing decided against adding it to the Max because it could have prompted
regulators to require new pilot training, according to two former Boeing employees involved in the decision.
The Max also runs on a complex web of cables and pulleys that, when pilots pull
back on the controls, transfer that movement to the tail. By comparison, Airbus jets and Boeing's more modern
aircraft, such as the 777 and 787, are "fly-by-wire," meaning pilots' movement of the flight controls is fed to
a computer that directs the plane. The design allows for far more automation, including systems that prevent
the jet from entering dangerous situations, such as flying too fast or too low. Some 737 pilots said they
preferred the cable-and-pulley system to fly-by-wire because they believed it gave them more control.
In the recent crashes, investigators believe the MCAS malfunctioned and moved a
tail flap called the stabilizer, tilting the plane toward the ground. On the doomed Ethiopian Airlines flight,
the pilots tried to combat the system by cutting power to the stabilizer's motor, according to the preliminary
crash report.
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Once the power was cut, the pilots tried to regain control manually by turning
a wheel next to their seat. The 737 is the last modern Boeing jet that uses a manual wheel as its backup
system. But Boeing has long known that turning the wheel is difficult at high speeds, and may have required two
pilots to work together.
In the final moments of the Ethiopian Airlines flight, the first officer said
the method wasn't working, according to the preliminary crash report. About 1 minute and 49 seconds later, the
plane crashed, killing 157 people.
Correction :
April
8, 2019
An earlier version of this article transposed the death tolls
in two crashes involving Boeing's 737 Max jets. In the Lion Air crash in Indonesia last year, 189 people
died, not 157; 157 people were killed in the Ethiopian Airlines crash last month, not 189.
Rebecca R. Ruiz and Stephen Grocer contributed reporting. Kitty Bennett contributed research.
A version of this article appears in print on
April 9, 2019
, on Page A 1 of the New York edition with the headline:
Boeing's 737 Max: '60s Design Meets '90s Computing Power.
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Donald Trump Is Trying to Kill You:
Trust the pork producers; fear the wind turbines.
By Paul Krugman
There's a lot we don't know about the legacy Donald Trump will leave behind. And it is, of
course, hugely important what happens in the 2020 election. But one thing seems sure: Even if
he's a one-term president, Trump will have caused, directly or indirectly, the premature
deaths of a large number of Americans.
Some of those deaths will come at the hands of right-wing, white nationalist extremists,
who are a rapidly growing threat, partly because they feel empowered by a president who calls
them "very fine people."
Some will come from failures of governance, like the inadequate response to Hurricane
Maria, which surely contributed to the high death toll in Puerto Rico. (Reminder: Puerto
Ricans are U.S. citizens.)
Some will come from the administration's continuing efforts to sabotage Obamacare, which
have failed to kill health reform but have stalled the decline in the number of uninsured,
meaning that many people still aren't getting the health care they need. Of course, if Trump
gets his way and eliminates Obamacare altogether, things on this front will get much, much
worse.
But the biggest death toll is likely to come from Trump's agenda of deregulation -- or
maybe we should call it "deregulation," because his administration is curiously selective
about which industries it wants to leave alone.
Consider two recent events that help capture the deadly strangeness of what's going
on.
One is the administration's plan for hog plants to take over much of the federal
responsibility for food safety inspections. And why not? It's not as if we've seen safety
problems arise from self-regulation in, say, the aircraft industry, have we? Or as if we ever
experience major outbreaks of food-borne illness? Or as if there was a reason the U.S.
government stepped in to regulate meatpacking in the first place?
Now, you could see the Trump administration's willingness to trust the meat industry to
keep our meat safe as part of an overall attack on government regulation, a willingness to
trust profit-making businesses to do the right thing and let the market rule. And there's
something to that, but it's not the whole story, as illustrated by another event: Trump's
declaration the other day that wind turbines cause cancer.
Now, you could put this down to personal derangement: Trump has had an irrational hatred
for wind power ever since he failed to prevent construction of a wind farm near his Scottish
golf course. And Trump seems deranged and irrational on so many issues that one more bizarre
claim hardly seems to matter.
But there's more to this than just another Trumpism. After all, we normally think of
Republicans in general, and Trump in particular, as people who minimize or deny the "negative
externalities" imposed by some business activities -- the uncompensated costs they impose on
other people or businesses.
For example, the Trump administration wants to roll back rules that limit emissions of
mercury from power plants. And in pursuit of that goal, it wants to prevent the Environmental
Protection Agency from taking account of many of the benefits from reduced mercury emissions,
such as an associated reduction in nitrogen oxide.
But when it comes to renewable energy, Trump and company are suddenly very worried about
supposed negative side effects, which generally exist only in their imagination. Last year
the administration floated a proposal that would have forced the operators of electricity
grids to subsidize coal and nuclear energy. The supposed rationale was that new sources were
threatening to destabilize those grids -- but the grid operators themselves denied that this
was the case.
So it's deregulation for some, but dire warnings about imaginary threats for others.
What's going on?
Part of the answer is, follow the money. Political contributions from the meat-processing
industry overwhelmingly favor Republicans. Coal mining supports the G.O.P. almost
exclusively. Alternative energy, on the other hand, generally favors Democrats.
There are probably other things, too. If you're a party that wishes we could go back to
the 1950s (but without the 91 percent top tax rate), you're going to have a hard time
accepting the reality that hippie-dippy, unmanly things like wind and solar power are
becoming ever more cost-competitive.
Whatever the drivers of Trump policy, the fact, as I said, is that it will kill people.
Wind turbines don't cause cancer, but coal-burning power plants do -- along with many other
ailments. The Trump administration's own estimates indicate that its relaxation of coal
pollution rules will kill more than 1,000 Americans every year. If the administration gets to
implement its full agenda -- not just deregulation of many industries, but discrimination
against industries it doesn't like, such as renewable energy -- the toll will be much
higher.
So if you eat meat -- or, for that matter, drink water or breathe air -- there's a real
sense in which Donald Trump is trying to kill you. And even if he's turned out of office next
year, for many Americans it will be too late.
Trump does not want to go back to the 50s when government policy was to greatly increase
costs by paying more workers more, while driving down prices, and elinimating rents and
scarcity profits.
Trump wants to kill jobs that are paid, but force work that is unpaid.
Well, if you means 1850, by the 50s, that's when Trump would have excelled by raping his
slaves to create more workers he would force to work, probably Brazil style, worked to death
to cut costs, based on continued enslavement of slaves, ie, no ban on slave imports after
1808.
Trump may be trying to kill us...but do Democrats have a plan to save us? So far, I can
discern no coherent message or plan from corrupt, comatose Democrats other than 'Trump is
guilty [of something or other.]
You are simply rejecting Democrats calls to reverse policies since 1970 to MAGA as failed
liberal policies because its not new, never tried before, and not free.
The growth of the 50s and 60s was too costly, requiring people to work, save, and pay ever
rising prices, taxes, and living costs.
You want economics where you can buy a million dollar home for $50,000 and have schools
funded by modest property taxes on million dollar homes, but with low tax rates on houses
assessed at $40,000.
TANSTAAFL
The only way working class families get better off is by paying higher costs.
Meet the democratic socialist who sent Rahm's floor leader packing
By Mark Brown
There's never been a Chicago politician who quite fits the profile of Andre Vasquez, the
former battle rapper and current democratic socialist who just took down veteran 40th Ward
Ald. Patrick O'Connor, Mayor Rahm Emanuel's city council floor leader.
That probably scares some people.
But those folks might want to nod to the wisdom of the 54 percent of voters in the North
Side ward who waded through an onslaught of attack ads and concluded they have nothing to
fear from the 39-year-old AT&T account manager, his music or his politics.
I stopped by Vasquez's campaign office to satisfy my own curiosity about this new breed of
aldermen. Vasquez will be part of a Chicago City Council bloc of at least five, probably six
democratic socialists who, if nothing else, will alter the debate on a range of issues.
Vazquez said he understands democratic socialism as "just injecting a healthy dose of
democracy in a system we already have.
"Where we see the influence of big money and corporations in our government, where we see
the corruption in the council, where we see elected officials as bought and paid for, to me,
democratic socialism is providing a counterbalance," he said.
Vasquez also reminded me that generalizing about democratic socialists is as foolish as
generalizing about Democrats.
"I think even within democratic socialism there's such a spectrum of different folks,
right? I tend to be a counterbalance to some of the louder stuff, the louder hardcore, what
some would view as extreme," said Vasquez, noting that he sometimes takes flak within
democratic socialist circles because he's never read Marx and doesn't "bleed rose red."
"Everyone's got their part to play," he said. "Somebody's going to be the loud one in the
room because you need that kind of impetus to move things forward. And someone's got to be
the one who's making deals on legislation. You can't have ideological fights and think you're
going to come up with solutions."
Though Vasquez prefers the dealmaker role, his background suggests he also could get loud
if the occasion demanded.
Until he decided it was time to do something else with his life around 2010, Vasquez was a
battle rapper who performed under the stage name Prime. He had enough success to pay the
bills for a while, touring nationally and appearing on MTV's "Direct Effect" and HBO's "Blaze
Battle."
For old people like me who are unclear on the concept (begging the pardon of the rest of
you), battle rapping involves performers trading insults in rhyme put to music.
"Then, imagine you have a crowd around you," Vasquez explained. "And now people are
cheering you on, and the insults are getting more vicious and intricate, and it becomes a
sporting match. Right? So, in that arena, you're getting heralded for how well you can insult
the person in front of you while rhyming and improvising all as this stream of consciousness
is coming out."
I suggested a battle rap might occasionally be just the antidote to the drudgery of a
council meeting, but Vasquez wasn't amused.
The problem with battle rapping, as 40th Ward voters were reminded ad nauseam during the
runoff campaign, is that the genre relies heavily on crude insults invoking disrespectful
terms for women and LGBTQ individuals.
"The issue is toxic masculinity plagues everything," said Vasquez, who obliquely fronted
an apology for his past verbal misdeeds early in the campaign -- and more directly when hit
with a barrage of negative mailers detailing a greatest hits of his transgressions.
A lesser candidate would have been toast at that point, but Vasquez had girded himself in
advance through his door-to-door organizing.
By then, enough 40th Ward residents knew who Vasquez really was -- the son of Guatemalan
immigrants, a city kid from the neighborhoods who had become a family guy with two young kids
and a late-discovered talent for politics -- that they couldn't be scared off.
Vasquez, who lives in Edgewater, was introduced to politics when he felt the Bern in 2014
and volunteered for Bernie Sanders presidential campaign. A left-leaning community group,
Reclaim Chicago, then recruited Vasquez to expand upon his organizing talents -- and taught
him how to build a classic grassroots campaign.
The result is a new Latino alderman in a ward where fewer than one-fifth of the voters are
Latino. And a Democratic Socialist representing a ward previously ruled by Emanuel's floor
leader.
"I'm not trying to plant a flag," Vasquez said. "I'm trying to make sure that people can
live here and not be forced out."
"Vasquez, who lives in Edgewater, was introduced to politics when he felt the Bern in 2014
and volunteered for Bernie Sanders presidential campaign. A left-leaning community group,
Reclaim Chicago, then recruited Vasquez to expand upon his organizing talents -- and taught
him how to build a classic grassroots campaign."
I like the centrists like Krugman and liberals here like EMike who dismiss Bernie as a
cult of personality. No he's spurring local organizing which doesn't revolve around him.
Will Bernie as president build walls around big cities like Chicago, build iron Curtains, to
keep the rich inside these cities where all their wealth is taxed away every year, and they
are prevented from moving to the towns outside Chicago city limits?
"... In fact Airbus 320 series never had the same issue as it was properly designed from scratch and not like Max 8 retrofitted to carry bigger engines by that changing distribution of balance of the Aircraft and hence requiring steeper ascending angle and faster speed (for the same wing design) and hence by design more prone to stalling while in takeoff phase. ..."
"... So what is the same in B737 Max and A320 was response of AI software to sensor failures and specific external conditions of flight. In both cases such scenarios were never trained in simulators. ..."
Thanks for the report but I may add that AI auto pilot systems on Airbus are not same or
similar to MCAS as they are all integrated in autopilot on A320 series while on B737 Max 8
they are completely separate from one another not communicating at all.
In fact Airbus 320 series never had the same issue as it was properly designed from
scratch and not like Max 8 retrofitted to carry bigger engines by that changing distribution
of balance of the Aircraft and hence requiring steeper ascending angle and faster speed (for
the same wing design) and hence by design more prone to stalling while in takeoff phase.
The problem with A320 crash over Atlantic was failure of one or two of two sensors and
while in cruise phase of flight autopilot AI software response was just inappropriate in fact
detrimental as pilots were blinded disoriented during night over the ocean trying to figure
out where they are as conflicting data was coming in.
It seems by some accounts they trusted
autopilot decisions and suggestions and simply descended, hit into ocean almost
horizontally.
So what is the same in B737 Max and A320 was response of AI software to sensor failures
and specific external conditions of flight. In both cases such scenarios were never trained
in simulators.
"... Evidence has mounted implicating in both crashes an automated anti-stall system, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which was installed by Boeing in response to the new plane's tendency to pitch upward and go into a potentially fatal stall. On a whole number of fronts -- design, marketing, certification and pilot training -- information from the black boxes of the two planes points to a lack of concern for the safety of passengers and crew on the part of both Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration, reaching the level of criminality. ..."
"... Despite the presence on the plane of two angle-of-attack sensors, which signal a potential stall and trigger the automated downward pitch of the plane's nose, MCAS relied on data from only one of the sensors. This means the standard redundancy feature built into commercial jets to avert disasters resulting from a faulty sensor was lacking. Boeing's main rival to the 737 Max, the European-built Airbus A320neo, for example, uses data from three sensors to manage a system similar to MCAS. ..."
"... Pilot certification for a commercial plane typically requires hundreds of hours of training, both in simulators and in actual flights. Boeing itself is now mandating at least 21 days of training on new Max planes. ..."
"... There is no innocent explanation for these obvious safety issues. They point to reckless and arguably criminally negligent behavior on the part of Boeing executives, who rushed the new plane into service and marketed it against the Airbus A320neo on the basis of its cost-saving features. ..."
"... This is highlighted by a press release the day of the Ethiopian Airlines crash in which Boeing stated that "for the past several months and in aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610," the company "has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX." ..."
"... In other words, both Boeing and the FAA were aware, possibly even before the October 2018 Lion Air crash and certainly afterward, that a system critical to the safe operation of the aircraft needed to be fixed, and still allowed the plane to continue flying. The wording also suggests that the plane shouldn't have been certified for flight in the first place. ..."
"... This was aided and abetted by the Trump administration, which shielded Boeing as long as it could by not ordering the FAA to ground the plane immediately after the Ethiopian Airlines crash. There were no doubt immense concerns that such a move would cut into Boeing's multibillion-dollar profits and affect its stock price, which has nearly tripled since the election of Trump in November 2016, accounting for more than 30 percent of the increase in the Dow Jones index since then. ..."
"... The relationship between Trump and Muilenburg is only a symptom of the much broader collusion between the airline industry and the US government. Starting in 2005 and expanded during the Obama administration, the FAA introduced the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program, which allows the agency to appoint as "designees" airplane manufacturers' employees to certify their own company's aircraft on behalf of the government. ..."
"... This is the logical end of the deregulation of the airline industry as a whole that was spearheaded by the Democratic Carter administration, which passed the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978. With the help of liberal icon Edward Kennedy, the legislation disbanded the Civil Aeronautics Board, which up to that point treated interstate airlines as a regulated public utility, setting routes, schedules and fares. ..."
It is nearly a month since the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, which slammed into
the ground only six minutes after takeoff from Addis Ababa airport, killing all 157 people on
board. That disaster came less than five months after the fatal crash of Lion Air Flight 610
only 13 minutes after takeoff from Jakarta airport, killing all 189 passengers and crew
members.
Both crashes involved the same airplane, the Boeing 737 Max 8, and both followed wild
up-and-down oscillations which the pilots were unable to control.
In the weeks since these disasters, there have been no calls within the media or political
establishment for Boeing executives to be criminally prosecuted for what were evidently
entirely avoidable tragedies that killed a total of 346 people. This speaks to the corrupt
relationship between the US government and the aerospace giant -- the biggest US exporter and
second-largest defense contractor -- as well as the company's critical role in the stock market
surge and the ever-expanding fortunes of major Wall Street investors.
Black box recordings and simulations show that in the 60 seconds the pilots had to respond
to the emergency, faulty software forced the Lion Air flight into a nose dive 24 separate
times, as the pilots fought to regain control of the aircraft before plunging into the ocean at
more than 500 miles per hour.
Evidence has mounted implicating in both crashes an automated anti-stall system, the
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which was installed by Boeing in
response to the new plane's tendency to pitch upward and go into a potentially fatal stall. On
a whole number of fronts -- design, marketing, certification and pilot training -- information
from the black boxes of the two planes points to a lack of concern for the safety of passengers
and crew on the part of both Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration, reaching the level
of criminality.
The most recent revelations concerning the March 10 Ethiopian Airlines crash, based on
preliminary findings from the official investigation, show that the pilots correctly followed
the emergency procedures outlined by Boeing and disengaged the automated flight control system.
Nevertheless, the nose of the plane continued to point downward. This strongly suggests a
fundamental and perhaps fatal flaw in the design of the aircraft. Numerous questions have been
raised about the design and certification process of the 737 Max 8 and MCAS,
including:
Despite the presence on the plane of two angle-of-attack sensors, which signal a
potential stall and trigger the automated downward pitch of the plane's nose, MCAS relied on
data from only one of the sensors. This means the standard redundancy feature built into
commercial jets to avert disasters resulting from a faulty sensor was lacking. Boeing's main
rival to the 737 Max, the European-built Airbus A320neo, for example, uses data from three
sensors to manage a system similar to MCAS.
Boeing Vice President Mike Sinnett admitted last
November that cockpit warning lights alerting pilots of a faulty angle-of-attack sensor were
only optional features on the Max 8. The MCAS system was absent from pilot manuals and flight
simulators, including for the well-known flight training program X-Plane 11, which came out in
2018, one year after the first commercial flight of the 737 Max 8. Pilot training for the 737
Max 8, which has different hardware and software than earlier 737s, was a single one-hour
computer course.
Pilot certification for a commercial plane typically requires hundreds of
hours of training, both in simulators and in actual flights. Boeing itself is now mandating at
least 21 days of training on new Max planes.
There is no innocent explanation for these obvious safety issues. They point to reckless and
arguably criminally negligent behavior on the part of Boeing executives, who rushed the new
plane into service and marketed it against the Airbus A320neo on the basis of its cost-saving
features.
Threatened with a loss of market share and profits to its chief competitor, Boeing
reduced costs by claiming that no significant training on the new Max 8 model, with the money
and time that entails, was necessary for pilots with previous 737 experience.
Such imperatives of the capitalist market inevitably downgrade safety considerations. This
is highlighted by a press release the day of the Ethiopian Airlines crash in which Boeing
stated that "for the past several months and in aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610," the company
"has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX."
In other words, both Boeing and the FAA were aware, possibly even before the October 2018
Lion Air crash and certainly afterward, that a system critical to the safe operation of the
aircraft needed to be fixed, and still allowed the plane to continue flying. The wording also
suggests that the plane shouldn't have been certified for flight in the first place.
This was aided and abetted by the Trump administration, which shielded Boeing as long as it
could by not ordering the FAA to ground the plane immediately after the Ethiopian Airlines
crash. There were no doubt immense concerns that such a move would cut into Boeing's
multibillion-dollar profits and affect its stock price, which has nearly tripled since the
election of Trump in November 2016, accounting for more than 30 percent of the increase in the
Dow Jones index since then.
Trump himself received a call from Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg two days after the Ethiopian
Airlines crash, during which Muilenburg reportedly continued to uphold the Max 8's safety. The
FAA finally grounded the plane on March 13, after every other country in the world had done
so.
The relationship between Trump and Muilenburg is only a symptom of the much broader
collusion between the airline industry and the US government. Starting in 2005 and expanded
during the Obama administration, the FAA introduced the Organization Designation Authorization
(ODA) program, which allows the agency to appoint as "designees" airplane manufacturers'
employees to certify their own company's aircraft on behalf of the government.
As a result, there was virtually no federal oversight on the development of the 737 Max 8.
FAA Acting Administrator Dan Elwell told Congress, "As a result of regular meetings between the
FAA and Boeing teams, the FAA determined in February 2012 that the [Max 8] project qualified
[a] project eligible for management by the Boeing ODA." This extended to the MCAS system as
well.
This is the logical end of the deregulation of the airline industry as a whole that was
spearheaded by the Democratic Carter administration, which passed the Airline Deregulation Act
in 1978. With the help of liberal icon Edward Kennedy, the legislation disbanded the Civil
Aeronautics Board, which up to that point treated interstate airlines as a regulated public
utility, setting routes, schedules and fares.
In a rational world, the ongoing Senate hearings and Department of Justice investigations
would have already brought criminal charges against Muilenburg, Sinnett, Elwell and all those
involved in overseeing the production, certification and sale of the 737 Max 8. This would
include the executives at Boeing and all those who have helped to deregulate the industry at
the expense of human lives.
Under capitalism, however, Boeing will get little more than a slap on the wrist. Experts
estimate the company will likely be fined at most $800 million, less than one percent of the
$90 billion Boeing expects in sales from the Max 8 in the coming years. As in Hurricane
Katrina, the Wall Street crash in 2008, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 and Hurricanes
Harvey and Maria in 2017, the brunt of this disaster will be borne by the working class.
The Boeing 737 Max 8 disasters point to the inherent incompatibility between safe,
comfortable and affordable air transport and private ownership of the airline industry, as well
as the division of the world economy between rival nation-states. These catastrophes were
driven by both the greed of Boeing executives and big investors and the intensifying trade
conflict between the United States and Europe.
The technological advances that make it possible for travelers to move between any two
points in the world in a single day must be freed from the constraints of giant corporations
and the capitalist system as a whole. Major airlines and aerospace companies must be
expropriated on an international scale and transformed into publicly owned and democratically
controlled utilities, as part of the establishment of a planned economy based on social need,
not private profit.
Too many hooray, we are the USSA, America is the best cheerleaders, have no idea of the
gravity of the situation they will face, when the dollar and by extension the Petrodollar
implodes.
The rejection of the USSA has already started, but the average Yank hasn't noticed. When
Ethiopia, can reject a direct request from Uncle Scam and send the Black-Boxes to Europe,
because the USSA cannot be trusted, says it all. It is the little things we miss, things that
seem small and insignificant, that actually reveals a lot and the Ethiopian rejection was
one.
The world has simply had enough of USSA diktats and subsidising them. The USSA is merely
4% of the worlds population, that consumes 24.8% of the worlds resources and this situation
is totally untenable. A nation of exceptionalists. 5%? Yes. The rest? lol
A technical issue that Boeing flagged in a safety warning after the deadly 737 MAX 8 crash
in Indonesia could happen to any other aircraft, and it's "not unlikely" that the manufacturer
knew about it, aviation experts told RT. Earlier this week, Boeing issued a safety update
to pilots flying its newest 737 MAX airliner, warning of a possible fault in a sensor that
could send the aircraft into a violent nosedive.
That sensor measures air flow over a plane's wings, but its failure can lead to an
aerodynamic stall.
International aviation experts told RT that a problem of this kind could doom aircraft of
any type. The tragedy that happened to Lion Air's Boeing 737 MAX is not the first of its kind
to involve a faulty
"Pitot tube" – a critical air-speed sensor that measures the flow velocity
– explained Elmar Giemulla, a leading German expert in air and traffic law.
"This is not unusual in the way it happened before," he noted, mentioning incidents
similar to the Lion Air crash. Back in 1996, a Boeing 757 operated by Turkey's Birgenair
stalled and crashed in the Caribbean because of a blocked pitot tube. Likewise, erroneous
air-speed indications, coupled with pilot errors, led to the crash of an Air France Airbus A330
over the Atlantic in 2009.
While the problem is not entirely new, it is unclear how Boeing had tackled it, according to
Giemulla. "It is not very unlikely" that Boeing knew about the problem, he said, warning
that "more than 200 planes are concerned and this could happen tomorrow again."
There is so much experience with [using Pitot tubes] that it surprises me very much
that this could happen to a newly developed plane.
However, the expert doubted that there has been any cover-up of the issue, instead
suggesting that "obviously gross negligence" had been involved.
A 737 MAX 8 servicing Lion Air flight 610 last week ploughed into the waters of the Java Sea
shortly after take-off from Jakarta, killing all 189 people on board. Investigators say there
is a possibility that inaccurate readings fed into the MAX's computer could have sent the plane
into a sudden descent.
If markets were truly free and there was real capitalism then airlines would be looking at
the new and excellent Russian MC-21 which does what Boeing was trying to do with the 737 Max.
The MC-21 will safely handle passengers in the 140 to 160 passengers and is a mid range plane
that can go as far as 4,000 miles.
Instead – Boeing lobbies the corrupt U.S. AIPAC Congress to keep a Boeing
monopoly of death traps like the 737 Max allowing some Airbus sales. They also blocked a nice
Bombardier mid range jet from Canada.
I've flown in the Bombardier in South America– it is a fine aircraft.
"... "Sadly, these two entirely preventable airline crashes demonstrate that the FAA is ill-equipped to oversee the aerospace industry and will downplay serious hazards and safety risks to the public rather than sound the alarm about safety concerns, problems, issues and hazards that pose substantial, probable, and/or foreseeable risks to human life," attorneys for Stumo said in the lawsuit. ..."
"... "Boeing, and the regulators that enabled it, must be held accountable for their reckless actions." The chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee said this week that whistleblowers have come forward to report that FAA safety inspectors, including those involved with approvals for the 737 Max, lacked proper training and certifications. ..."
"... But legal experts have said the second disaster could prove even more damaging for the company. That's because plaintiffs will argue the manufacturer was put on notice by the earlier tragedy that there was something dangerously wrong with its planes that should have been fixed. ..."
The parents of Samya Stumo, 24, alleged Boeing was "blinded by its greed" and rushed the 737
Max 8 to market with the "knowledge and tacit approval" of the FAA, while hiding defects in its
automated flight-control system. The suit also cites a similar flaw in the
Lion Air flight of a 737 Max 8 jet that crashed into the Java Sea on October 29 , killing
189.
The complaint alleges that decisions by Boeing leaders contributed to the crash and
"demonstrate Boeing's conscious disregard for the lives of others," including designing an
aircraft with a flight-control system that is "susceptible to catastrophic failure" in the
event of a single defective sensor made by Rosemount Aerospace.
'Ill-equipped'
"Sadly, these two entirely preventable airline crashes demonstrate that the FAA is
ill-equipped to oversee the aerospace industry and will downplay serious hazards and safety
risks to the public rather than sound the alarm about safety concerns, problems, issues and
hazards that pose substantial, probable, and/or foreseeable risks to human life," attorneys for
Stumo said in the lawsuit.
"Boeing, and the regulators that enabled it, must be held
accountable for their reckless actions." The chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee said
this week that whistleblowers have come forward to report that FAA safety inspectors, including
those involved with approvals for the 737 Max, lacked proper training and certifications.
Senator Roger Wicker, a Mississippi Republican, said those claims prompted him to investigate
potential connections between training and certification shortcomings and the FAA's evaluation
of the airliner.
The Senate panel's probe is the latest in a string of investigations by US
officials and lawmakers into how the FAA cleared the 737 Max as safe to fly. The Transportation
Department's inspector general is reviewing the FAA's process for approving the airworthiness
of new jets and aiding a Justice Department criminal probe.
Criminal probe
A grand jury convened by US prosecutors last month subpoenaed a former Boeing engineer
demanding he provide testimony and documents related to the 737 Max.
FAA Acting Administrator Dan Elwell has said the agency "welcomes external review of our
systems, processes and recommendations." Boeing faces the prospect of substantial payouts to
the families of passengers if it's found responsible for both the Ethiopia Air and Lion Air
crashes.
But legal experts have said the second disaster could prove even more damaging for the
company. That's because plaintiffs will argue the manufacturer was put on notice by the earlier
tragedy that there was something dangerously wrong with its planes that should have been
fixed.
The company failed itself by replacing engineers with Wall Street accountants.... typical
US corporation destroyed from withing by asset strippers, chiselers, deregulators... the
complete gamut of "free enterprise" vampires leaving the US economy in shambles.
Agree with that, theres been a serious drive to focus on bean-counting and bringing in
"mainstream" business leadership from companies like GE/Toyota/3m (think outsourcing/stock
buybacks/automate/layoff type)
Its one of the few companies that has a real hard time getting rid of skilled labor,
because building an aircraft is an incredibly huge undertaking, with lots of hand fitting and
a wide array of technical skills, so getting rid of the labor hasnt worked to this point.
But they're trying hard to get inline with the typical "modern" business model, and it
hasnt been great for morale.
Boeing has been working on a fix to the anti-stall software for some time now. However,
Reuters today reported that regulators including EASA knew that the MAX's trim control was
confusing.
"... No. Possibly Boeing & the FAA will solve the immediate issue, but they have destroyed Trust. ..."
"... It has emerged on the 737MAX that larger LEAP-1B engines were unsuited to the airframe and there is no way now to alter the airframe to balance the aircraft. ..."
"... Boeing failed to provide training or training material to pilots or even advise them the existence of MCAS. There was a complex two step process required of pilots in ET302 and JT610 crashes and their QRH handbook did not explain this: ..."
No. Possibly
Boeing & the FAA will solve the immediate issue, but they have
destroyed Trust.
Other brands of
aircraft like Airbus with AF447 established trust after their A330
aircraft plunged into the Atlantic in a mysterious accident.
With Airbus
everyone saw transparency & integrity in how their accidents were
investigated. How Boeing & FAA approached accident investigation
destroyed public Trust.
By direct
contrast in the mysterious disappearance of MH370, Boeing
contributed nothing to the search effort and tried to blame the
pilot or hijackers.
With the 737MAX
in Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes Boeing again tried to blame
pilots, poor training, poor maintenance and then when mechanical
defect was proven, Boeing tried to downplay how serious the issue
was and gave false assurances after Lion Air that the plane was
still safe. ET302 proved otherwise.
It is no longer
possible to trust the aircraft's certification. It is no longer
possible to trust that safety was the overriding principle in
design of the Boeing 737 MAX nor several other Boeing designs for
that matter.
The Public have
yet to realize that the Boeing 777 is an all electric design where
in certain scenarios like electrical fire in the avionics bay, an
MEC override vent opens allowing cabin air pressure to push out
smoke. This silences the cabin depressurization alarms.
As an
electrical failure worsens, in that scenario another system called
ELMS turns off electrical power to the Air Cycle Machine which
pumps pressurized air into the cabin. The result of ELMS cutting
power means the override vent fails to close again and no new
pressurized air maintains pressure in the cabin. Pilots get no
warning.
An incident in
2007 is cited as AD 2007–07–05 by the FAA in which part but not
all of this scenario played out in a B777 at altitude.
MH370 may have
been the incident in which the full scenario played out, but of
course Boeing is not keen for MH370 to be found and unlike Airbus
which funded the search for AF447, Boeing contributed nothing to
finding MH370.
It has emerged
on the 737MAX that larger LEAP-1B engines were unsuited to the
airframe and there is no way now to alter the airframe to balance
the aircraft.
It also emerged
that the choice to fit engines to this airframe have origins in a
commercial decision to please Southwest Airlines and cancel the
Boeing 757.
Boeing failed
to provide training or training material to pilots or even advise
them the existence of MCAS. There was a complex two step process
required of pilots in ET302 and JT610 crashes and their QRH
handbook did not explain this:
The MAX is
an aerodynamically unbalanced aircraft vulnerable to any sort of
disruption, ranging from electrical failure, out of phase
generator, faulty AOA sensor, faulty PCU failure alert, digital
encoding error in the DFDAU.
Jason Eaton
Former Service Manager
Studied at University of
Life
Lives in Sydney,
Australia
564k answer views
50.7k
this month
Answered Mar 24, 2019
·
No I wouldn't.
I'm not a pilot or an aerospace technician but I am a mechanical
engineer, so I know a little bit about physics and stuff.
The 737–8
is carrying engines it was never designed for, that cause it to
become inherently unstable. So unstable in fact, that it can't be
controlled by humans and instead relies on computer aided control
to maintain the correct attitude, particularly during ascent and
descent.
The MCAS system
is, effectively, a band aid to fix a problem brought about by poor
design philosophy. Boeing should have designed a new airframe that
complements the new engines, instead of ruining a perfectly good
aircraft by bolting on power units it's not designed to carry, and
then trying to solve the resulting instability with software. And
if that isn't bad enough, the system relies on data from just the
one sensor which if it doesn't agree with, it'll force the
aircraft nose down regardless of the pilots' better judgement.
That might be
ok for the Eurofighter Typhoon but it's definitely not ok for fare
paying passengers on a commercial jetliner.
So, no. I won't
be flying on a 737–8 until it's been redesigned to fly safely. You
know, like a properly designed aeroplane should.
4.8k
Views
·
View 36 Upvoters
"... Under the circumstances, Boeing's best option was to just take the hit for a few years and accept that it was going to have to start selling 737s at a discount price while it designed a whole new airplane. That would, of course, be time-consuming and expensive, and during the interim, it would probably lose a bunch of narrow-body sales to Airbus. ..."
"... As late as February 2011, Boeing chair and CEO James McNerney was sticking to the plan to design a totally new aircraft. ..."
"... Committing to putting a new engine that didn't fit on the plane was the corporate version of the Fyre Festival's "let's just do it and be legends, man" moment, and it unsurprisingly wound up leading to a slew of engineering and regulatory problems. ..."
"... The problem is that an airplane is a big, complicated network of interconnected parts. To get the engine under the 737 wing, engineers had to mount the engine nacelle higher and more forward on the plane. But moving the engine nacelle (and a related change to the nose of the plane) changed the aerodynamics of the plane, such that the plane did not handle properly at a high angle of attack ..."
"... But note that the underlying problem isn't really software; it's with the effort to use software to get around a whole host of other problems. ..."
"... Looking back, Boeing probably wishes it had just stuck with the "build a new plane" plan and toughed out a few years of rough sales, rather than ending up in the current situation. Right now the company is, in effect, trying to patch things up piecemeal -- a software update here, a new warning light there, etc. -- in hopes of persuading global regulatory agencies to let its planes fly again. ..."
"... That said, on March 27, FAA officials faced the Senate Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Aviation and Space at a hearing called by subcommittee Chair Ted Cruz (R-TX). Regulators committed at the hearing to revamp the way they certify new planes , in light of the flaws that were revealed in the previous certification process. ..."
"... a central element of this story is the credibility of the FAA's process ..."
Claiming responsibility was part of an attempt to get the planes approved to fly again.
Boeing was trying to say that it now understands why the planes crashes -- flawed software --
and has a plan in place to replace it with new software that will eliminate the problem and
persuade regulators to get the planes off the ground. But then Friday morning, the company
announced that it had found a second,
unrelated software flaw that it also needs to fix and will somewhat delay the process of
getting the planes cleared to fly again.
All of which, of course, raises the question of why such flawed systems were allowed to fly
in the first place.
And that story begins nine years ago when Boeing was faced with a major threat to its bottom
line, spurring the airline to rush a series of kludges through the certification process --
with an underresourced Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) seemingly all too eager to help an
American company threatened by a foreign competitor, rather than to ask tough questions about
the project.
The specifics of what happened in the regulatory system are still emerging (and despite
executives' assurances, we don't even really know what happened on the flights yet). But the
big picture is coming into view: A major employer faced a major financial threat, and
short-term politics and greed won out over the integrity of the regulatory system. It's a
scandal. The A320neo was trouble for Boeing
Jet fuel is a major cost for airlines. With labor costs largely driven by collective
bargaining agreements and regulations that require minimum ratios of flight attendants per
passenger, fuel is the cost center airlines have the most capacity to do something about.
Consequently, improving fuel efficiency has emerged as one of the major bases of competition
between airline manufacturers.
If you roll back to 2010, it began to look like Boeing had a real problem in this
regard.
Airbus was coming out with an updated version of the
A320 family that it called the A320neo , with "neo" meaning "new engine option." The new
engines were going to be more fuel-efficient, with a larger diameter than previous A320
engines, that could nonetheless be mounted on what was basically the same airframe. This was a
nontrivial engineering undertaking both in designing the new engines and in figuring out how to
make them work with the old airframe, but even though it cost a bunch of money, it basically
worked. And it raised the question of whether Boeing would respond.
Initial word was that it wouldn't. As CBS Moneywatch's Brett
Snyder wrote in December 2010 , the basic problem was that you couldn't slap the new
generation of more efficient, larger-diameter engines onto the 737:
One of the issues for Boeing is that it takes more work to put new engines on the 737 than
on the A320. The 737 is lower to the ground than the A320, and the new engines have a
larger diameter . So while both manufacturers would have to do work, the Boeing guys
would have more work to do to jack the airplane up. That will cost more while reducing
commonality with the current fleet. As we know from last week, reduced commonality means
higher costs for the airlines as well.
Under the circumstances, Boeing's best option was to just take the hit for a few years and
accept that it was going to have to start selling 737s at a discount price while it designed a
whole new airplane. That would, of course, be time-consuming and expensive, and during the
interim, it would probably lose a bunch of narrow-body sales to Airbus.
The original version of the 737 first flew in 1967, and a decades-old decision about how
much height to leave between the wing and the runway left them boxed out of 21st-century engine
technology -- and there was simply nothing to be done about it.
Unless there was.
Boeing decided to put on the too-big engines anyway
As late as February 2011, Boeing chair and CEO James McNerney was sticking to the plan to
design a totally new aircraft.
"We're not done evaluating this whole situation yet," he
said on an analyst call , "but our current bias is to move to a newer airplane, an all-new
airplane, at the end of the decade, beginning of the next decade. It's our judgment that our
customers will wait for us."
It's not entirely clear what happened, but, reading between the lines, it seems that in
talking to its customers Boeing reached the conclusion that airlines would not wait for them.
Some critical mass of carriers (American Airlines seems to have been particularly influential)
was credible enough in its threat to switch to Airbus equipment that Boeing decided it needed
to offer 737 buyers a Boeing solution sooner rather than later.
Committing to putting a new engine that didn't fit on the plane was the corporate version of
the Fyre Festival's "let's
just do it and be legends, man" moment, and it unsurprisingly wound up leading to a slew of
engineering and regulatory problems.
New engines on an old plane
As the industry trade publication Leeham News and Analysis explained earlier in March,
Boeing engineers had been
working on the concept that became the 737 Max even back when the company's plan was still
not to build it. In a March 2011 interview with Aircraft Technology, Mike Bair, then the head of 737 product
development, said that reengineering was possible. "There's been fairly extensive engineering work on it," he said. "We figured out a way to
get a big enough engine under the wing."
The problem is that an airplane is a big, complicated network of interconnected parts. To
get the engine under the 737 wing, engineers had to mount the engine nacelle higher and more
forward on the plane. But moving the engine nacelle (and a related change to the nose of the
plane) changed the aerodynamics of the plane, such that the plane did not handle properly at a
high angle of attack.
That, in turn, led to the creation of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
(MCAS). It fixed the angle-of-attack problem in most situations, but it created new problems in
other situations when it made it difficult for pilots to directly control the plane without
being overridden by the MCAS.
On Wednesday, Boeing rolled out a software patch that it says corrects the problem, and it
hopes to persuade the FAA to agree.
But note that the underlying problem isn't really software; it's with the effort to use
software to get around a whole host of other problems.
1of x: BEST analysis of what really is happening on the #Boeing737Max
issue from my brother in law @davekammeyer , who's a pilot,
software engineer & deep thinker. Bottom line don't blame software that's the band aid
for many other engineering and economic forces in effect.
Recall, after all, that the whole point of the 737 Max project was to be able to say that
the new plane was the same as the old plane. From an engineering perspective, the preferred
solution was to actually build a new plane. But for business reasons, Boeing didn't want a "new
plane" that would require a lengthy certification process and extensive (and expensive) new
pilot training for its customers. The demand was for a plane that was simultaneously new and
not new.
But because the new engines wouldn't fit under the old wings, the new plane wound up having
different aerodynamic properties than the old plane. And because the aerodynamics were
different, the flight control systems were also different. But treating the whole thing as a
fundamentally different plane would have undermined the whole point. So the FAA and Boeing
agreed to sort of fudge it.
The new planes are pretty different
As far as we can tell, the 737 Max is a perfectly airworthy plane in the sense that
error-free piloting allows it to be operated safely.
But pilots of planes that didn't crash kept noticing the same basic pattern of behavior that
is suspected to have been behind the two crashes, according to a Dallas Morning News review of
voluntary aircraft incident reports to a NASA database:
The disclosures found by the News reference problems with an autopilot system, and they
all occurred during the ascent after takeoff. Many mentioned the plane suddenly nosing down.
While records show these flights occurred in October and November, the airlines the pilots
were flying for is redacted from the database.
These pilots all safely disabled the MCAS and kept their planes in the air. But one of the
pilots reported to the
database that it was "unconscionable that a manufacturer, the FAA, and the airlines would
have pilots flying an airplane without adequately training, or even providing available
resources and sufficient documentation to understand the highly complex systems that
differentiate this aircraft from prior models."
The training piece is important because a key selling feature of the 737 Max was the idea
that since it wasn't really a new plane, pilots didn't really need to be retrained for the new
equipment. As the New York Times reported, "For many new airplane models, pilots train for
hours on giant, multimillion-dollar machines, on-the-ground versions of cockpits that mimic the
flying experience and teach them new features" while the experienced 737 Max pilots were
allowed light refresher courses that you could do on an iPad.
That let Boeing get the planes into customers' hands quickly and cheaply, but evidently at
the cost of increasing the possibility of pilots not really knowing how to handle the planes,
with dire consequences for everyone involved.
The FAA put a lot of faith in Boeing
In a blockbuster March 17 report for the Seattle Times, the newspaper's aerospace reporter
Dominic Gates details the extent to which
the FAA delegated crucial evaluations of the 737's safety to Boeing itself . The
delegation, Gates explains, is in part a story of a years-long process during which the FAA,
"citing lack of funding and resources, has over the years delegated increasing authority to
Boeing to take on more of the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes."
But there are indications of failures that were specific to the 737 Max timeline. In
particular, Gates reports that "as certification proceeded, managers prodded them to speed the
process" and that "when time was too short for FAA technical staff to complete a review,
sometimes managers either signed off on the documents themselves or delegated their review back
to Boeing."
Most of all, decisions about what could and could not be delegated were being made by
managers concerned about the timeline, rather than by the agency's technical experts.
It's not entirely clear at this point why the FAA was so determined to get the 737 cleared
quickly (there will be more investigations), but if you recall the political circumstances of
this period in Barack Obama's presidency, you can quickly get a general sense of the issue.
Boeing is not just a big company with a significant lobbying presence in Washington; it's a
major manufacturing company with a strong global export presence and a source of many
good-paying union jobs. In short, it was exactly the kind of company the powers that be were
eager to promote -- with the Obama White House, for example, proudly going to bat for the
Export-Import Bank as a key way to sustain America's aerospace industry.
A story about overweening regulators delaying an iconic American company's product launch
and costing good jobs compared to the European competition would have looked very bad. And the
fact that the whole purpose of the plane was to be more fuel-efficient only made getting it off
the ground a bigger priority. But the incentives really were reasonably aligned, and Boeing has
only caused problems for itself by cutting corners.
Boeing is now in a bad situation
One emblem of the whole situation is that as the 737 Max engineering team piled kludge on
top of kludge, they came up with a cockpit
warning light that would alert the pilots if the plane's two angle-of-attack sensors
disagreed.
But then, as
Jon Ostrower reported for the Air Current , Boeing's team decided to make the warning light
an optional add-on, like how car companies will upcharge you for a moon roof.
The
light cost $80,000 extra per plane and neither Lion Air nor Ethiopian chose to buy it,
perhaps figuring that Boeing would not sell a plane (nor would the FAA allow it to) that was
not basically safe to fly. In the wake of the crashes, Boeing has decided to revisit this
decision and make the light standard on all aircraft.
This, fundamentally, is one reason the FAA has become comfortable working so closely with
Boeing on safety regulations: The nature of the airline industry is such that there's no real
money to be made selling airplanes that have a poor safety track record. One could even imagine
sketching out a utopian libertarian argument to the effect that there's no real need for a
government role in certifying new airplanes at all, precisely because there's no reason to
think it's profitable to make unsafe ones.
The real world, of course, is quite a bit different from that, and different individuals and
institutions face particular pressures that can lead them to take actions that don't
collectively make sense. Looking back, Boeing probably wishes it had just stuck with the
"build a new plane" plan and toughed out a few years of rough sales, rather than ending up in
the current situation. Right now the company is, in effect, trying to patch things up piecemeal
-- a software update here, a new warning light there, etc. -- in hopes of persuading global
regulatory agencies to let its planes fly again.
But even once that's done, Boeing faces the task of convincing airlines to actually buy its
planes. An
informative David Ljunggren article for Reuters reminds us that a somewhat comparable
situation arose in 1965 when three then-new Boeing 727 jetliners crashed.
There wasn't really anything unsound about the 727 planes, but many pilots didn't fully
understand how to operate the new flaps -- arguably a parallel to the MCAS situation with the
737 Max -- which spurred some additional training and changes to the operation manual.
Passengers avoided the planes for months, but eventually came back as there were no more
crashes, and the 727 went on to fly safely for decades. Boeing hopes to have a similar happy
ending to this saga, but so far it seems to be a long way from that point. And the immediate
future likely involves more tough questions.
A political scandal on slow burn
The 737 Max was briefly a topic of political controversy in the United States as foreign
regulators grounded the planes, but President Donald Trump -- after speaking personally to
Boeing's CEO -- declined to follow. Many members of Congress (from both parties) called on him
to reconsider, which he rather quickly did, pushing the whole topic off Washington's front
burner.
But Trump is generally friendly to Boeing (he even has a former Boeing executive, Patrick
Shanahan, serving as acting
defense secretary, despite an ongoing ethics inquiry into charges that Shanahan unfairly
favors his former employer), and Republicans are generally averse to harsh regulatory
crackdowns. The most important decisions in the mix appear to have been made back during the
Obama administration, so it's also difficult for Democrats to go after this issue. Meanwhile,
Washington has been embroiled in wrangling over special counsel Robert Mueller's investigation,
and a new health care battlefield opened up as well.
That said, on March 27, FAA officials faced the Senate Commerce Committee's Subcommittee
on Aviation and Space at a hearing called by subcommittee Chair Ted Cruz (R-TX). Regulators
committed at the hearing to revamp the way they certify new
planes , in light of the flaws that were revealed in the previous certification
process.
The questions at stake, however, are now much bigger than one subcommittee. Billions of
dollars are on the line for Boeing, the airlines that fly 737s, and the workers who build the
planes. And since a central element of this story is the credibility of the FAA's
process -- in the eyes of the American people and of foreign regulatory agencies -- it
almost certainly won't get sorted out without more involvement from the actual decision-makers
in the US government.
Ralph Nader, the noted consumer rights advocate, called for a recall and consumer boycott of the
Boeing
jet grounded by regulators across the globe after two deadly crashes.
His niece, 24-year-old Samya
Stumo, was among the 157 victims of an Ethiopian Airlines flight crash last month, less than six months after a
flight on the same aircraft, the Boeing 737 Max 8, crashed in Indonesia.
"Those planes should never fly again," said Nader, speaking by phone at a news conference after Stumo's family
filed a lawsuit against Chicago-based Boeing, one of its suppliers and Ethiopian Airlines. The family also filed a
claim against the
Federal Aviation Administration
.
Stumo's family's lawsuit is one of several filed by relatives of passengers killed in the Ethiopian Airlines and
Lion Air crashes. All those families have "such huge holes" because of the aircraft's problems, said Nadia Milleron,
Stumo's mother, who said she had met others who lost loved ones in Ethiopia.
"As someone who's lost the dearest person in my life, I want her death not to be in vain. I don't want anybody
else to die," she said at the news conference in Chicago.
"Those in charge of creating and selling this plane did not treat Samya as they would their own daughters," said
Milleron, who was visibly emotional as she spoke about her daughter.
"This could have been prevented, and that's what makes me cry," she said.
Nader's book "Unsafe at Any Speed"
helped bring about a series of auto safety laws
, including the creation the federal agency that became the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which oversees the auto industry. He later turned his attention to
various consumer protection efforts related to food, drug and workplace safety and clean air and water.
On Thursday, he took aim at Boeing, blaming the crashes on design problems that he argued were the result of the
company's focus on getting the plane on the market quickly to compete with its rival manufacturer Airbus.
He also criticized the relationship between Boeing and the federal agency tasked with overseeing aviation industry
safety.
"If we don't end the cozy relationship between the patsy FAA and the Boeing company, 5,000 of these fatally flawed
planes will be in the air all over the world with millions of passengers," Nader said.
Boeing said Thursday it is reviewing a preliminary report on last month's crash from Ethiopian authorities that
said the same anti-stall system that came under scrutiny in the Lion Air crash was activated on the Ethiopian
Airlines flight.
Most accidents are the result of a chain of events, but when that system is activated in error, it adds to "what
is already a high-workload environment," Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg
said in
a video
released by the company on Thursday.
"It's our responsibility to eliminate this risk. We own it, and we know how to do it," he said.
Boeing said it is still working with the FAA and regulatory agencies to develop and certify a software update
designed to keep the system from being activated unintentionally, along with additional training for pilots.
Nader said he doesn't think the software fix is enough to make the plane safe since it can't predict all potential
problems with a plane that is "prone to stall."
While Boeing has worked to show it is taking steps to address safety concerns, the FAA is planning changes to its
oversight of airplane development, which delegates some authority for certifying new aircraft to their manufacturers,
the Associated
Press reported
.
"... [We] can now reveal how it's possible the aircraft can crash despite using the Cut-Out switches. To verify, we ran it all in a simulator together with MentourPilot Youtube channel over the last days. ..."
"... Nowhere is it described the trim could be impossible to move if the Cut-Out switches were cut at the slightest miss-trim at the speeds flown. And there is no warning on when to move the Cut-Out switches, the checklist says "Cut, then trim manually." This is not the whole truth . ..."
"... The high speed of 340kts indicated airspeed and the trim at 2.3 units causes the Stabilator manual trim to jam, one can't move it by hand. The crew is busy trying to hand trim the next two minutes but no trim change is achieved. ..."
"... It's easy to say "Why didn't they trim then?". Because they are going down at 20 degrees nose down (which is a lot, a normal landing approach is 3°) and at 400kts. Then you just pull for all you have. And the aircraft is not reacting to the largest Control Column displacement since takeoff. This makes them pull even harder, the aircraft is unresponsive and they are fighting for theirs and all the passenger lives. ..."
"... Moreover their description of the MCAS was incomplete . It is only now known that the MCAS trims the stabilizer at a speeed of 0.27 units (degrees) per second while the pilots electric trim moves the stabilizer at only 0.18 units per second: ..."
"... If MCAS keeps tripping, and if pilots do not shut off electric trim entirely, the result is what Tajer describes as a two-steps-back, one-step-forward scenario, with MCAS maintaining an edge. ..."
"... "The MCAS knows but one speed, which is 0.27, which is the most-aggressive speed," Tajer says. "If you look at the balance sheet on it, MCAS is winning, and you are losing." ..."
"... That additional problem pertains to software affecting flaps and other flight-control hardware and is therefore classified as critical to flight safety, said two officials with knowledge of the investigation. ..."
"... This is not about sensor failure. It is about the profit of cheap parts and greed. The insiders at Boeing tipped off the Big Boys that they needed more than the gizmos installed on export versions if they were going to survive. ..."
"... Engineering Manufacturing company with a sales division works alright. But a Sales Company with a manufacturing subsidiary does not, as we see. Boeing is typical for end-stage Imperial Corporations - all show, no go, and get the money quick... ..."
"... A mistake is one or two errors. This was one horrible string of deliberate corner cutting, about 7-8 totally disastrous decisions by the management, that could have only led to deaths of people uninformed enough to purchase the travel risk from this plane supplier. ..."
< to include the new system into training material for the pilots which Boeing, for
commercial reasons, did not do.>
After the Lion Air crash the Federal Aviation Administration
issued an Airworthiness
Directive 2018-23-51 which adviced 737 MAX pilots how to handle an MCAS failure.
The FAA told 737 MAX pilots to use the Stabilizer Trim Cutoff switches to interupt the
power supply for the system's actuator, a motor driven jackscrew in the back of the airplane.
The pilots should then use the manual trim wheels in the cockpit, which move the jackscrew
and stabilizer via steel cables, to righten the aircraft.
On March 10 a 737 MAX flown by Ethiopian Airline crashed shortly after take off. 157
people died. Radar data and debris found showed that the cause was likely a similar MCAS
failure as had happened on the Indonesian Lion Air flight.
All 737 MAX planes were grounded with the U.S. being the last country to order it.
Some U.S. pilots, as well as some commentators here, publicly blamed the darker skin
pilots for not using the simple procedure the FAA had put out: "Why didn't they just flip the
switches? Stupid undertrained third-world dudes."
The preliminary report clearly showed that the Ethiopian Airlines pilots who were
commanding Flight ET 302/10 March have followed the Boeing recommended and FAA approved
emergency procedures to handle the most difficult emergency situation created on the
airplane. Despite their hard work and full compliance with the emergency procedures, it was
very unfortunate that they could not recover the airplane from the persistence of nose
diving.
The procedure Boeing and the FAA advised to use was insufficient to bring the aircraft
back under control. It was in fact impossible to recover the plane. The possibility of this
to happen was discussed in pilot fora and on specialized websites for some time.
The MCAS system moves the front of the stablizer up to turn the nose of the airplane down.
The plane then decends very fast. The aerodynamic forces (the "wind") pushing against the
stabilizer gets so strong that a manual counter-trim becomes impossible.
With the 737MAX cutout switches, MCAS runaway is stopped by throwing both switches, losing
electric trim altogether. In this case, the flight crew must rely on manual trim via
turning the trim wheel/crank. As discussed above, the manual crank can bind up , making
flying much more difficult.
Bjorn Fehrm, a senior engineeer and pilot now writing at Leeham News , came to a
similar
conclusion :
[We] can now reveal how it's possible the aircraft can crash despite using the Cut-Out
switches. To verify, we ran it all in a simulator together with MentourPilot Youtube
channel over the last days.
...
At a miss-trimmed Stabilator, you either have to re-engage Electric trim or off-load the
Stabilator jackscrew by stick forward, creating a nose-down bunt maneuver, followed by
trim.
Stick forward to trim was not an option for ET302, they were at 1,000ft above ground.
According to The Wall Street Journal, the ET302 crew re-engaged electrical trim to save the
situation, to get the nose up. It was their only chance. But too late. The aggressive MCAS
kicked in and worsened the situation before they could counter it.
On the FAA's Airworthiness Directive Fehrm writes:
Nowhere is it described the trim could be impossible to move if the Cut-Out switches were
cut at the slightest miss-trim at the speeds flown. And there is no warning on when to move
the Cut-Out switches, the checklist says "Cut, then trim manually." This is not the whole
truth .
An detailed analysis of the flight recorder data as documented in the preliminary crash
report confirms
the conclusions :
The high speed of 340kts indicated airspeed and the trim at 2.3 units causes the Stabilator
manual trim to jam, one can't move it by hand. The crew is busy trying to hand trim the
next two minutes but no trim change is achieved.
The pilots then do the only thing possible. They reengage the electric stabilizer trim to
righten the aircraft.
But the aggressive MCAS, trimming with a speed 50% higher than the pilot and for a full
nine seconds, kicks in at 8 with a force they didn't expect. Speed is now at 375kts and
MCAS was never designed to trim at these Speed/Altitude combinations. Dynamic pressures,
which governs how the aircraft reacts to control surface movements, is now almost double it
was when last MCAS trimmed (Dynamic pressure increases with Speed squared).
The Pilots are thrown off their seats, hitting the cockpit roof. Look at the Pitch
Attitude Disp trace and the Accel Vert trace. These are on the way to Zero G and we can see
how PF loses stick pull in the process (Ctrl Column Pos L). He can barely hold on to the
Yoke, let alone pull or trim against.
His reduced pull increases the pitch down further, which increases the speed even more.
At 05.45.30 the Pilots have hit the seats again (Accel Vert trace and Ctrl Columns force
trace) and can start pulling in a desperate last move. But it's too late. Despite them
creating the largest Control Column movement ever, pitch down attitude is only marginally
affected.
The pilots and their passengers lose the fight:
It's easy to say "Why didn't they trim then?". Because they are going down at 20 degrees
nose down (which is a lot, a normal landing approach is 3°) and at 400kts. Then you
just pull for all you have. And the aircraft is not reacting to the largest Control Column
displacement since takeoff. This makes them pull even harder, the aircraft is unresponsive
and they are fighting for theirs and all the passenger lives.
A diligent safety anlysis would have predicted this outcome. Neither Boeing nor the FAA
seems to have done such after the first 737 MAX crashed. They provided an Airworthiness
Directive with procedures that were insufficiant to correct the system induce
misbehavior.
Moreover their description of the MCAS
was incomplete . It is only now known that the MCAS trims the stabilizer at a speeed of
0.27 units (degrees) per second while the pilots electric trim moves the stabilizer at only
0.18 units per second:
"It's like a Tasmanian devil in there," says Dennis Tajer, a 737 pilot and communications
chair for Allied Pilots Association, which represents American Airlines' pilots.
... If MCAS keeps tripping, and if pilots do not shut off electric trim entirely, the result is
what Tajer describes as a two-steps-back, one-step-forward scenario, with MCAS maintaining
an edge.
"The MCAS knows but one speed, which is 0.27, which is the most-aggressive speed," Tajer
says. "If you look at the balance sheet on it, MCAS is winning, and you are losing."
The insufficient advice to pilots given after the first crash only adds to the long list
of criminal mistakes Boeing made and which the FAA allowed to pass.
Boeing confirmed to The Washington Post that it had found a second software problem that
the Federal Aviation Administration has ordered fixed -- separate from the anti-stall
system that is under investigation in the two crashes and is involved in the worldwide
grounding of the aircraft.
That additional problem pertains to software affecting flaps and other flight-control
hardware and is therefore classified as critical to flight safety, said two officials with
knowledge of the investigation.
The criminals at Boeing again offer no explanation and play down the issue:
In a statement, Boeing called the additional problem "relatively minor" but did not offer
details of how it affects the plane's flight-control system. "We are taking steps to
thoroughly address this relatively minor issue and already have the solution in work to do
that," it said.
What other 'features' were secretly implemented into the 737 MAX without sufficiant
analysis about their side effects and consequences?
---
Previous Moon of Alabama posts on the 737 MAX crashes:
"... The Pilots are thrown off their seats, hitting the cockpit roof
..."
I should think that at that point in the narrative, one of the flight crew must either
have fallen unconscious or ended up too injured to be able to do anything, let alone fight a
rogue MCAS system.
I presume the pilots would still have their seatbelts on, unless the forces generated by
the constant battle to stabilise the aircraft while fighting the MCAS system were too strong
and broke the seatbelts or dislocated the seats themselves.
As for other "features" that were secretly placed into the 737 MAX jets that Boeing
"neglected" to tell FAA or its clients about, what about the "features" that should have been
made compulsory but which Boeing decided were optional at the clients' own expense?
As a layman, my main question at this stage is: "Who is going to prison and for how long?" Everyone involved in the decision to sell those flying death traps should be tried for
manslaughter at the least. The guilty ones should serve prison sentences appropriate for
criminals who caused hundreds of people to die for their own profit.
How long a sentence does a poor man get, who kills a well-off tourist for the money in his
wallet - or even for his shoes?
Now multiply that by several hundred - adding on, of course, extra years to allow for the
Boeing executives' privileged lives, top-flight education, and (above all) the generous
sufficiency they already enjoy.
In China such people are routinely shot, which seems the right course. In the USA, while
poor people are executed all the time, apparently the wealthy and privileged get a free
pass.
Is a direct result of Boing monopoly - they are division of the military.
And why did european agency roll-over?
Will this warrant cancellation of orders?
Oh, and the people at the FAA need to be tried in a criminal court too. Not only were they
criminally negligent - they did it while being generously remunerated by the taxpayer. Perhaps a few years as galley slaves would be appropriate punishment - to teach them not
to be lazy.
This cheap seat Boeing export death trap was doomed from the beginning. Once these
planes nose 'up' it is heading to a crash. Any engineer with a basic understanding of aero
dynamic/physics knows this. This is not about sensor failure. It is about the profit of cheap
parts and greed. The insiders at Boeing tipped off the Big Boys that they needed more than
the gizmos installed on export versions if they were going to survive.
Tom @3 makes note the Chinese have a great quality control program. Boeing execs will up
their kickback slop to US politicians and the final report will say, 'well accidents will
happen'.
You can be sure that if this was Airbus, and two were crashed in the USA, that there would be
hearings, threats, congressional investigations, lawsuits, calls for criminal investigations,
Wall Street shorting the company, ...and on and on until the company would be disbanded.
Criminal, well yes but so what! Peons do not matter, right.
Engineering Manufacturing company with a sales division works alright. But a Sales Company
with a manufacturing subsidiary does not, as we see.
Boeing is typical for end-stage Imperial Corporations - all show, no go, and get the money
quick...
Sorta like GE's BWR's and Fukushima, fake it on the cheap and run with the money to
retirement.
The Pilots are thrown off their seats, hitting the cockpit roof ..."
Posted by: Jen | Apr 5, 2019 6:27:26 AM | 1
My interpretation is the same as yours. It's an incident report which is supposed to be
bland statements of fact - neither overstated nor understated. If the report says the pilots
hit the roof then that's what happened (airliner cockpits don't have cathedral ceilings so
only inches clearance when standing erect).
OTOH I find it hard to believe that the pilots would unbuckle before they had achieved cruise
status and given passengers the OK to do the same.
Seat belts can break but not under the relatively mild stresses generated by violent flight
maneuvers of an intact aircraft.
When I purchase an airline ticket I purchase the risk profile of the airline and the risk
profile of the plane manufacturer, because either can kill me.
A mistake is one or two errors. This was one horrible string of deliberate corner cutting,
about 7-8 totally disastrous decisions by the management, that could have only led to deaths
of people uninformed enough to purchase the travel risk from this plane supplier.
Uninformed just like I was before I recently saw some old investigative footage about
Boeing's disregard for elementary quality in the earlier 737 hull manufacturing and the
company's treatment of the whistleblowers trying to help the company by exposing such wrong
doing: "Just put a coat of paint on it".
Intentionally (spin) or unintentionally, there is too much talk about detail such as
software, pilot capability and decisions, training and the lack of it and so on. This only
hides the big picture of an utter disregard for the value of human life, traded off for
management bonuses and stock holder dividends. It is a complete reversal of the original
engineering-focused Boeing which made Boeing an icon that it used to be. Perhaps, somewhere
in the Washington lobbying swamp the dividing line between the engineering for killing people
and the engineering for transporting people became too blurred. As the profit strategy, on
MIC business overcharge, on airliner business underdeliver, and ruthlessly so on both:
rip-off money from the tax-payers and lives from the travellers.
Please convince me that this is not a symptom of the rot of the whole society, when an
icon such as Boeing sinks deep into nastiest morally debased profiteering. I posit that the
society which so easily kills people using bombs, rockets and drones cannot make good quality
products any more. This is because killing and destroying is just too easy compared with
creating something good . Without the good will of the people in a society to morally
rebalance, the societal endeavours for creation can never compete against the endeavours for
destruction. In other words, US had become too much about destruction to be still capable of
creation.
Finally, there would be one way to get back on the right track - life-in-jail for both
Boeing and FAA involved. It is ultimately ironic that in the highly criticised China the
shitbags would probably be put in front of a firing squad for corruption. In US, they will
receive bonuses and continue on to the next killing enterprise. Until they finally launch
nuclear tipped missiles against the creation oriented foreign competitors. Do they still know
of any other way to win?
Touching and informative press conference with the Stumo family (Ralph Nader's grandniece,
Samyo Stumo, was killed on the 737 MAX crash in Ethiopia) and two law firms that filed a
lawsuit against Boeing and others. At @ 28 min one lawyer displays an anonymous email from a
737 MAX pilot detailing how the MCAS system can thwart a pilot's ability to recover control
of the jet. This email was posted to a pilots' forum/aviation network after the Lion Air
crash in Indonesia last October.
@Steve...if you say it, then it's true. Of course, if you knew more about it, then you would
say something else.
But real expert Gundersen says differently. I worked with some of the GE engineers, and I
know what they said.
You are 100% incorrect about the diesels, the problem included primary, ultimate heat sink
loss due to the elevation of the pumps, and the pressure vessels we know to be unsafe.
GE BWR's designed in the US by US GE engineers, some of whom quit rather than sign off on
the design..."fuze was lit for Fukushima in 1965" >see fairewinds, amigo.
@SteveK9 12
As far as I understand, the main Fukushima problem was the concrete reactor encasing design
which did not cater for the possibility of excessive hydrogen release from the reactor. It
worked well when not in trouble, but in an accident situation (who would have expected an
accident) the concrete encasing without a release valve became a pressure cooker filled with
flammable hydrogen. What a surprise that it went boom!?
What you write here about the water cooling system generators you probably believe in but
it resembles the pilot blaming spin of Boeing. The truth has a nasty tendency to end up owned
by those with most money.
I always remember how our old friend pharaoh Ramses paid hundreds of stone masons to go
around Egypt and chisel out the achievements of all the previous pharaohs and chisel in his.
Then even several thousands of years later, when the archeologists finally learned to read
hieroglyphs, they only had propaganda and spin left to read. Thus nothing less than the son
of the supreme Egyptian deity the sun god Ra, the propaganda paying Ramses became the
greatest pharaoh of all time.
"As a layman, my main question at this stage is: 'Who is going to prison and for how
long?'"
The first to go should obviously be the individuals in charge of the FAA. These people, I
imagine, were appointed by Obama. When we look at the regulatory system in the US bear in
mind that the current irresponsibility arose in a long descent-since the days of Nixon I
suspect-into neo-liberal corporate capture.
Just recently the deceits practised in the fake science which allowed the licensing of Round
Up were revealed. The entire system is rotten and nowhere is it more corrupt than in the
United States.
" They reengage the electric stabilizer trim to righten the aircraft"
That's the problem. While the plane may have remained unstable due to the lack of rapid
response of the manual trim control and difficulties turning.the wheel at high speed low
altitude flight,the planes altitude was still increasing. They should have either returned to
the airport or continued ascent in the hope they could restore trim at high altitude and low
air pressure.
Altitude immediately plummeted when they rengaged the MCAS and the plane was not
recoverable at that point.
Such mistakes should be made in flight simulators . Hence it's lack of training at fault
here, and the blame for that is still on Boeing.
Not sure even the flight simulator training will solve this mess
TBH
This whole business is sickening and infuriating. What is especially infuriating is that the
FAA is extremely onerous in enforcement of ancient regulations with respect to general
aviation. The owner of a small plane is actually prohibited from casually upgrading any of
the antiquated instruments, even radios, on his Made in 1975 private plane, and must stick
with what was originally certified by the manufacturer as originally constructed--unless he
is willing to expend huge amounts of money to find an updated, certified (e.g., "safe")
upgraded component from someone willing to go the lengthy and expensive process of having the
FAA certify that product, then have a certified mechanic install the certified part and
certify it was done according to the precise procedures established. In effect, the FAA
actively discourages safety improvements of the general aviation fleet by unthinking
resistance to technological change.
Unless you're Boeing.
Having experience with the "other" FAA, this is what's especially dumbfounding to me.
While there may be some justification in permitting a trusted manufacturer to establish and
certify as safe minor details, anything involving the actual flight characteristics of the
plane should NEVER be delegated, and doubly so with respect to commercial airliners. And how
could any regulator be anything but incredulous if a manufacturer says "Well, we've decided
to make this commercial airliner INHERENTLY UNSTABLE, but we have a whole box of bandaids
which should do a bang-up job of keeping it in the air!" WTF!! "Fail-safe" isn't actually a
fix or a mechanism, the term is supposed to describe a design philosophy, in which if there
is a failure, the resulting condition is still safe (well, at least not less safe). Ditto
redundancy, which is why it is unheard-of that such an apparently vital bandaid relied on
only one sensor.
It's one thing to build a fighter that is inherently unstable (although even that is
perhaps questionable), but an airliner filled with passengers? Ludicrous. And the FAA and
Boeing both know it, and knew it from the start. In a just world heads would literally roll,
but sadly, nothing real is likely to happen.
I already thought that the whole setup had faulty logic. If the plane could be adequately
controlled by pilots, "manually", then extra training would be cheaper than introducing an
automatic system. If the plane could not be adequately controlled by the pilots, "switching
to manual" is futile.
I have a minor experience with "automatic control" when the chip of my car went wrong. In
old, old times one has to add a bit of extra gas to start the car engine, and as a result one
could flood the engine, then wait a few minutes for the gasoline to evaporate and try again.
In contemporary cars you do not press gas at all when you start, and the chip regulates how
much gasoline should be injected to the engine based on its temperature. Then after 10 years
of happy use the chip "noticed" that the engine is cold when it is actually hot. So I am
driving on a windy narrow road and the car accelerates going 40 mph without pressing the gas
(65 kmh), 15 mhp above the legal speed limit, and did I mention that the road had curves?
Frankly, it happened few times before that, but on a straight road you just get the feel of
cruise control. Anyway, brakes remedied the situation, luckily, they could overcome the
engine and the chip was replaced for mere 800 dollars.
Here it seems that Boeing designers entered the kludge road and kept compensating for this
or that and lost the total picture. Isn't it suspicious that the automatic trim was so
aggressive? I also do not understand at all what "manual" means, seem impossible that actual
muscle force of the pilot was applied to the tail? Should there be an emergence procedure in
which a cabin steward under voice control of the captain adjusts the tail with a crank, or
perhaps something like a capstan that could be moved by the entire cabin crew? That would be
a true manual system.
My conclusion is that once you rely on automatic solutions because the crew cannot do it
in some situations, you must crank up the reliability to something "average million years
without failure or more". It is not a ship that can drop anchors, giving a few days to figure
out the problem etc. (although this is something that should be avoided too). Boeing setup
was something that should flunk students in Industrial Engineering (they have courses on
control systems). For example, an internal device with a gyroscope could track the speed and
its three-dimensional angle, so if one of external sensors malfunction the system can
automatically decide which reading makes more sense. External sensor measure speed in respect
to air which is important too, but if the plane approaches the ground, that should be noted
to,. With few gismos you could get sufficient redundancy with some "voting scheme" or a
"decision tree".
Just use logic for a moment. Boeing: We're presenting this new (redesigned) plane for
certification, and it comes with it's very own MCRASH system. FAA: MCRASH system...what's
that? Boeing: Well, the plane has a pronounced tendency to go into stalls and fall out of the
sky. FAA: That's an interesting feature. Are pilots going to be able to handle these
aggravated power-on stalls (the worst kind, incidentally)? Boeing: Oh, no. There's no way
pilots would be able to detect the condition and react quickly enough to save the plane, so
we've devised an automated system that is faster than a human can react to save the day. We
present MCRASH.
From annals of idiocy in design. Some time in the 1st decade of this century the Polish state
rail road decided to embrace modernity and introduced automatic ticketing system. It would
fabulously till the end of that year when it shut down. Apparently, there was a "sanity
check" disallowing tickets to have arrival before the departure, someone forgot about the
pesky case of arrival after New Year following departure in December, and the system could
not cope with a wave of "illegal requests". Luckily, because the system did not operate that
long prior to collapse, there were still people who could manually write the tickets until
the bug was removed.
would -> work, I must say that the setup not allowing to correct the post after it is made
is also an example of a "suboptimal" design, many sites give you 10-15 minutes with a
permission to edit or delete.
would -> work, I must say that the setup not allowing to correct the post after it is
made is also an example of a "suboptimal" design, many sites give you 10-15 minutes with a
permission to edit or delete.
B hosts Moon of Alabama on Typepad. Typepad costs $15/month, including hosting and support
(best value in web hosting for a busy weblog). Typepad apparently doesn't have a post-comment
grace period editing option or B would have added it.
I used to be an advocate of MoA moving over to WordPress (I'm a full time software
architect/designer who builds WordPress driven web application and a pro video player).
There's lots of nice bells and whistles which could be added including comment editing and a
much more attractive and innovative design.
Having seen the endless security issues and silly site breaking updates which Matt
Mullenweg and Automattic have pushed out over the last four years, B would be wise to stay
put on Typepad. Typepad is clunky, it's a bit ugly but it works reliably and is inexpensive.
Maintaining and updating a WordPress site costs either lots of man hours or lots of money
(good IT help is not cheap).
terrorist lieberal , Apr 5, 2019 11:37:47 AM |
link
Tom @ 5,
Obviously you know no one will ever be prosecuted or lose anything. This country is in the
hands of the rich and powerful, just note how the great Obama couldn't jail one crooked
banker and they all got to keep everything they stole at the expense of millions and millions
of people, lives ruined, and they live the high life as some exceptional people, yeah right,
God Bless America, home of the biggest terrorist organization the world has known.
terrorist lieberal , Apr 5, 2019 11:39:09 AM |
link
thank you b! who is going to be held accountable? i say no one...
@13 donkeytale.. that sounds about right... i imagine it's happening in any industry where
money is involved in the usa - which is basically every industry.. get rid of the mechanisms
for protecting people and just make sure to protect the moneyed interests..
capitalism devoid of morals and ethics is just peachy..
Thanks for the comprehensive account of what happened. I really hope this will result in a
hefty judicial price tag for the cynicals and greedies at Boeing.
You can be sure that if this was Airbus, and two were crashed in the USA, that there
would be hearings, threats, congressional investigations, lawsuits, calls for criminal
investigations, Wall Street shorting the company, ...and on and on until the company would be
disbanded.
There were two Boeing MAX crashes outside of the U.S. and there ARE now hearings, threats,
congressional investigations, lawsuits and even a criminal investigation. Boeing's stock
price fell by some 10% since the second crash.
-
@Hoarsewhisperer @14
It's an incident report which is supposed to be bland statements of fact - neither
overstated nor understated. If the report says the pilots hit the roof then that's what
happened (airliner cockpits don't have cathedral ceilings so only inches clearance when
standing erect).
The phrase "the Pilots are thrown off their seats, hitting the cockpit roof" is not from
the incident report but from an interpretation at the Leeham News site. It is not meant
literally.
It is based on a suddden change on g-force in the plane which goes from around 1g to 0g
when MCAS again kicks in. This has the effect that the pilots are suddenly weightless and no
longer have power to pull the yoke back.
Source and effect of this are visible in the diagram.
-
Do airline pilots wear seatbelts on take off. I take it there would be some rules and
regulations on this. I have always taken it for granted the pilots would be wearing seatbelt
on take off and landing, also if expecting turbulence during a flight.
Impossible to control anything if you're getting tossed around.
Unless the EU and other governing bodies divorce themselves from our seemingly privatized
FAA, expect more of this. Unless, of course, ALL flight safety orgs, globally, are equally
corrupted.
I have no idea if global corruption is the case/or worse, but there is now pretty strong
evidence that the US FAA is not the unassailable leader in certification protocols that the
whole planet has depended upon - up to now.
Hmmm.... Proper retribution. Load Boeing's Board of Directors, senior engineers that signed
off on the entire MAX project, senior accountants, any others tied to the entire boondoggle,
all FAA "regulators" who approved boondoggle, and all others who helped cause the fatalities
into several MAX airplanes designed to fail just as the ill-fated jets did manned by the
Boeing pilots who approved the faulty design and force them to takeoff with flight paths over
water. Yes, proper retribution for the crime. Cruel and unusual objections? No. Proper
retribution.
The entire Neoliberal philosophy must suffer a similar fate along with its promoters and
their Neocon allies. The Class War has always been deadly. It's high time elites began taking
casualties. Too radical? Take a good look at the world and the circumstances of those
besieged by Neoliberals and Neocons and try to argue against.
That is a true statement, but with so many things going wrong – you need to
understand that it is a basic instinct of pilots to keep engine power up so you can climb and
get out of trouble.
Very basic: Power = Good and No-Power = Bad.
So they should have reduced power and done a slight nose down to unload the jack screw and
re-trimmed manually. The problem was they had no altitude to work with, just 1000 ft or
so.
So the end story is that not only did the pilot do well, but the low-hour co-pilot was
also surprising competent. It was team work all the way.
So the bottom line is that our Western system has become so corrupt that it is no longer
even safe to fly. And this is just the beginning. It is all downhill from now on. More gender
studies and who needs engineers anyway?
Boeing Max 8 was a flying design mistake.
Boeing, You Ain't no Airbus!
You can' t just slap some heavier bulkiet engines on a tinny single body crap that barely
flew straight at the first time and expect everything to be right, slapping some hiden
software autocorrections on just in case.. and sell this crap all over the world. Enjoy the
torrent of lawsuits now!
You ain't no European aircraft maker. They tend to think 2 to 3 design steps ahead in to the
future.
You guys at the US cant even barrely ellect a pres. who is right in the head.
Apologies to everyone for the thread hijack, but nuclear power nonsense annoys me.
@Walter 18
Gundersen is a very well-known anti-nuke fanatic and a liar. His qualifications are BS. At
this point I think you and I can leave it and either of us can read more if we are so
inclined.
@Kiza 20
Hydrogen release was an effect from the overheating and meltdown, caused by the lack of
emergency cooling. There were no hydrogen recombiners present in these reactors, although
they had been installed in every BWR in the US long before.
As I mentioned the reactor nearest the quake suffered no damage, because its emergency
generators continued to operate, as they were not flooded. I forgot the plant name ... you
could look it up ... it actually served as a shelter during the flood. As a consequence there
was no release of hydrogen there (this happens when the zirconium cladding on the fuel reacts
with water at high temperature to release hydrogen).
I'm not an expert in reactor design (although I have a PhD in Chemical Physics). I reached
my own conclusions a very long time ago, and am not really interested in digging up evidence
or providing explanations. There is a mountain of information out there if one wants to look
... and I don't mean Greenpeace (although the founder, Patrick Moore is currently a supporter
of nuclear power).
Oh and btw, about United States aviation related products leading the race in global
aviation...
Struggling to produce an effective design for an airframe for the Martian atmosphere
(planet Mars) back in the earlier decade, using the top of the line comercial aviation
simulation products with aircraft design options bundled in, as a way of researching a NASA
info web campaign about flying vehicles on Mars, managed after much trying to produce a
somehow reliable generic airframe for that very thin atmosphere and low gravity environments,
which it would generaly resemble a mix of U2's and Predator drones frames (twice large than a
U2 wing span) but with major tail wings modifications and you would get adequate performance
if you flew it inside the enormous Martian cannyons which have a higher atmosphere pessure
than rest of Martian surface. Mil air force drones were generally non existant as information
back then. The software was the only product FAA approved a license for actual comercial
aviation simulation training hours for training of real pilots...End of story, this design
came third ...and the actual algorithms in the software decided that an actual UFO shaped
craft would be behaving much better in Martian wind/atmosphere... We incorporated the
solution of small rockets for generating initial lift for take off and emergency
altitude.
FAA and the leading edge researchers decided that the ALIENS WOULD WIN!
I was almost sure that even Nasa people (which names was on the program approval credits)
used same software without noticing anything strange before the Aliens stole the win...
So the jack screw that manually controls the stabilizer did not work due to high speed. Isn't
that what hydraulics are for?
After all, Slim Pickens managed to kick that bombay door open in Strangelove
Hoarse, I also was confused by the reasoning in the Seattle paper. But then again, I
learned all I know about the affect of air flowing over a surface in flight by sticking my
hand out the car window as a kid.
To avoid such crashes, training is needed more professionally and, in addition, the worn-out
parts of the planes should be removed and replaced with new ones. In the vast majority of
aircraft, due to high costs, little importance is given to worn parts, which causes people to
fall and get dead.
Scotch Bingeington , Apr 5, 2019 4:44:34 PM |
link
@ Meshpal | 38
More gender studies and who needs engineers anyway?
I think you're barking up the wrong tree there. I wholeheartedly agree with the second
(sarcastic) bit, no doubt about that. But the guy who had overall responsibility for the 737
MAX desaster holds a "degree" in "Business Administration". James McNerney, B.A. from Yale,
MBA from Harvard, member of Delta Kappa Epsilon - Chairman, President and CEO of The Boeing
Company 2005-2016. I have a strong feeling that gender studies wouldn't exactly be his cup of
tea. Just an ordinary, boring, utterly predictable, Pavlovian, run-of-the-mill business
tosser. He thought he could do it all, and so off he went, again and again. From British
United Provident Association (healthcare) to G.D. Searle (pharmaceuticals) to Procter &
Gamble to McKinsey to General Electric to 3M. And what the heck, let's add Boeing into the
mix with a pay of 30 million USD in 2014 alone. What a spec-taaaa-cular career!
Easy to anticipate a consumer boycott of this plane. I wouldn't buy a ticket on a Max 8
flight, and began double-checking the airliner after the crash last October.
In horizontal flight the stabilizer exerts a moderate amount of downward force to keep the
tail level (so as to balance the torques on the airplane). When the infographic says "a small
downward force pushes the nose down" it is merely saying the downward force on the tail was
now less than that required to keep the plane level, so the tail rose and the nose fell.
With respect for your PhD in Chemistry Physics, you are obviously not an engineer. In most
societies, it is around the third year of study that engineers learn about redundancy and
contingency planning. Therefore, not thinking trough all the possible disaster scenarios when
designing life-critical contraptions is simply criminal: Fukushima nuclear power plants.
Perhaps Boeing should have hired a couple of engineering interns to tell them that they
must not:
1) slap unsuitable new engines on an obsolete old air frame,
2) try to fix a serious hardware problem using software,
3) override pilots with their lives on the line by the decisions of some software cretin paid
by the hour with no skin in the game,
4) hang lives of 180 people on a single sensor unavailable for replacement on an airport in
Timbuktu,
5) play the no-training-needed tune when the structure of the product was substantially
changed and operator training was essential and so on.
The engineers are blue collar workers, the more so the closer they are to the assembly
floor. They have no decision power, they do what they are told. Yet, it is a society in deep
moral crisis when the engineers keep silent whilst virtually all basic tenants of the proper
design are broken by the profiteers managing them. Doing all the wrong things and expecting
the right result? No, not really, just grab the money and run. Après nous le
déluge.
BTW, I heard from a Lockheed lobbyist that Lockheed would never do something like this.
They only rip off the US tax payers for godzillion of dollars whilst making the best killing
machines that money can buy.
God,,, What humans will do to save little pieces of paper loosely called money. This is
criminal. The entire board should be charged with murder or at least manslaughter. But it
won't happen. Corpgov will step in to save them as they're to big to jail.
It is my understanding, and please correct me if I'm wrong, that the only thing the pilots
could have done was to realize -- by a pure miracle -- that the captain's AoA sensor has
failed and switch to the first officer's flight computer, which was connected to another,
working AoA sensor. Of course, if Boeing had installed their "mismatching AoA data" indicator
as a standard feature, the pilots wouldn't really need a miracle.
Boeing is slowing the production rate of 737 Max by 20%. Another chicken has come home to
roost. To safely fly the aircraft with passengers, a new flight control system is required
with multiple sensors including gyroscopes plus triple redundant electronics. Not just two
position sensors as proposed by Boeing which is the pilot flipping a coin in the chaotic 40
seconds to do the right thing while the plane is trying to kill you. Pilot and co-pilot
training on flight simulators is also required. If the FAA approves anything less, sooner or
later, another 737 Max will crash. Similarly, the Trump Administration is turning over pork
inspection to the slaughter houses. A million Chinese pigs were culled to attempt to stop the
spread of African Swine Fever but the deadly pig disease continues to spread through Asia.
One day soon the contagion will be fatal to humans. Climate change is here. The forever wars
continue. The bottom line is that public safety which is the basic function of government is
collapsing. Oligarchs are getting rich on the bodies of the dead.
@38 Meshpal "Zerohedge has an article that says the pilots should have reduced engine power."
From the report: "At 05:39:42, Level Change mode was engaged. The selected altitude was
32000 ft. Shortly after the mode change, the selected airspeed was set to 238 kt."
Then a minute later: "From 05:40:42 to 05:43:11 (about two and a half minutes), the
stabilizer position gradually moved in the AND direction from 2.3 units to 2.1 units. During
this time, aft force was applied to the control columns which remained aft of neutral
position. The left indicated airspeed increased from approximately 305 kt to approximately
340 kt (VMO). The right indicated airspeed was approximately 20-25 kt higher than the
left."
Note that the pilots were getting conflicting airspeed readings (the difference would
eventually grow to around 50 kt).
There is nothing in the report that suggests that either of the pilots opened the
throttles, and by the time the "overspeed clacker" started its warning the pilots had rather
more pressing problems to deal with.
I don't quite understand why this isn't addressed in the report: the pilots set the speed
to 238 kt, and if they then opened the throttles the report should have said so (it doesn't).
But if they didn't touch the throttle then what accounts for the speed being at 305 kt
(rather than 238 kt) when the plane started its first dive?
There is a mountain of information out there if one wants to look ... and I don't mean
Greenpeace (although the founder, Patrick Moore is currently a supporter of nuclear power).
Patrick Moore Did Not Found Greenpeace
Patrick Moore frequently portrays himself as a founder or co-founder of Greenpeace, and
many news outlets have repeated this characterization. Although Mr. Moore played a
significant role in Greenpeace Canada for several years, he did not found Greenpeace. Phil
Cote, Irving Stowe, and Jim Bohlen founded Greenpeace in 1970. Patrick Moore applied for a
berth on the Phyllis Cormack in March, 1971 after the organization had already been in
existence for a year.
Thanks for confirming that the retribution I prescribe @36 is right and proper as is what
must follow. Only one quibble with your comment, the death trap MAXs should never, ever
again be certified as airworthy as they clearly are not .
> I forgot the plant name ... you could look it up
@SteveK9 | Apr 5, 2019 3:26:36 PM | 40
It was all the same. Fukushima Dai-Ichi (Number One) was the Nuclear Power Plant
consisting of 6 "Reactor Buildings"
#1 was relatively small, US-designed US-built one. It had passive residual cooling -
gravity-powered water flow from the tank.
#2 was larger reactor in the same Mark-1 containment, US-designed and US-buit. The
residual cooling though could not be gravity-driven. It required the pump (or maybe there was
a way to set temperature-driven convection, if valves could be put right - i heard it but did
not dig into it)
Obviously, USA does not care about tsunami-driven floods: USA has enough soil to build
NPPs away from sea shores.
#3 and #4 were those larger reactors in more modern containment, US-designed but build by
Japanese companies. Japanese did know what tsunami is, but they dared not to deviate from USA
designs until they make succesfulyl working verbatim coopies.
#5 and #6 were Japanese-built after they got experience with #3 and #4 and proived they
can do verbatim copies. Those latter blocks were altered: for #1 to #4 shore ground was
removed to almost ocean sea levelm as close to the shorelines earth was considered wet and
unreliable, but #5 and #6 were instead moved away from the sea enough to earth be stable even
on elevation.
When the wave came, blocks #1 to $4 were flooded (with their electric circuits probably
located in basements a la Americana, thus immediately got short-circuited with salted sea
water), and diesels were located immediately at water edge with all the consequences for the
communications. Blocks #5 and #6, located away from the sea shopre and on elevated grounds,
and their diesels located near them, were not reached by the tsunami.
P.S. but people still repeat old propaganda about Chernobyl being sabotaged by suicidal
operating crew, what do you want... When people read MSM they do not care much what exactly
happened, so they just swallow it without labour of critical acclaim. If much later they
suddenly grow interested in some issues - their "point of view" is already long internalized,
so they do search relentlessly now - but for ideas supporting their pre-formed cognitive
bias.
P.P.S. I agree though that hi-jacking Boeing-related thread for in-depth discussion of NP
issues would be not proper to do.
"THE BOEING 737 MAX MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO FLY AGAIN." {Emphasis original]
The discussion here resembles that being conducted by Boeing to exonerate itself. The MAX
was purposely designed to be unsafe. Nader puts it thusly:
" The overriding problem is the basic unstable design of the 737 Max. An aircraft
has to be stall proof not stall prone . An aircraft manufacturer like Boeing,
notwithstanding its past safety record, is not entitled to more aircraft disasters that are
preventable by following long-established aeronautical engineering practices and
standards." [My Emphasis]
Trying to fix something so fundamentally broken that people with priceless lives are
jeopardized if the fix(es) fail is so utterly immoral words fail to detail just how deep that
immorality is. It's not just Righteous Indignation or even Righteous Indignation on
Steroids--it goes well beyond that to the utterly dysfunctional immorality of placing profit
over the safety of something money cannot buy or replace-- PEOPLE'S LIVES .
You know that I and others agree as well with your strong sentiments.
It will be interesting to see how this plays out as a telltale of empire's demise or
resilience.
It is not just the 737 Max that I would stay off. Think about the profit mentality that
built/allowed the Max to go forward and extrapolate that to the replacement parts for all the
other Boeing planes. Do people not understand that the same mentality of profit over safety
that brought down the 737 Max is putting other, considered more reliable, Boeing planes at
risk....for a few pennies more
Americans are brainwashed into believing that profit belongs between them and good health
care so it could be described as a slippery slope to write of 99% of humans not valuing their
lives very highly......because brainwashed by TV is my observation
There are people in Boeing that need to see the inside of a prison cell forever.
I remember in 2008 during the recession depression seeing an idiot at the beach wearing a
Goldman Sachs t shirt. I looked at the idiot in disbelief saying nothing. The next time I see
an idiot in SC/Georgia I will not be holding my tongue. "Relentlessly focused on safety" my
ass. The crapification continues.
And the "AoA Disagree" indicator is not even a physical light indicator, as I initially
thought, but a purely software
feature for the primary flight display ! Unbelievable! 346 people had to die because
someone decided to charge an exorbitant fee for a few lines of code that basically consist of
two conditionals, a timer variable, and a bitmap blit call.
'It looks like the 55 year old 737 air-frame design, which is very low to the ground when
compared to more modern designs, is incompatible with the bigger engines required for fuel
efficiency.
Being very low to the ground, Boeing was forced to put the engines out in front, which
upset the airplane's balance, making the plane essentially unstable. To counter the
instability they added the 'MCAS?' control system.
This solution violates a fundamental tenant of design for safety-critical systems. The
tenant of 'fail-safe'. If something goes wrong the system is supposed to fail in a manner
that preserves safety. For the 737 Max, when the this stability control system fails, the
plane is fundamentally unstable. For this system it is not 'fail-safe'. It is
'fail-crash'.'
This is pretty much in agreement with (Posted by: karlof1 | Apr 5, 2019 8:39:49 PM |
58).
I fully agree with the sentiment that this plane should never fly again. I can't imagine
any thinking person volunteering to get on to such a fundamentally flawed aircraft.
That is a true statement, but with so many things going wrong – you need to
understand that it is a basic instinct of pilots to keep engine power up so you can climb
and get out of trouble.
Very basic: Power = Good and No-Power = Bad.
This is what I've heard for as long as I've been reading about airplanes. A search turned
up some "sayings" popular with pilots.
It's best to keep the pointed end going forward as much as possible.
The only time you have too much fuel is when you're on fire.
Speed is life, altitude is life insurance. No one has ever collided with the sky.
If you're gonna fly low, do not fly slow! ASW pilots know this only too well.
I've just visited a West Australian newspaper - the one where the brand spanking new
Aviation Editor spoke of stupid pilots and unbearably wonderful Boeing. They have a new essay
about the Report, but 1) the jackass troll for Boeing has been given a minder in the form of
a co-author, and 2) the article plays it straight this time.
Boeing admits 737 software was factor in crashes
The Ethiopian crew performed all of the procedures provided by Boeing but was unable
to control the aircraft.
The problems of the B737 Max are not a disaster for Boeing, but for the over 300
fatalities.
They lost no shareholder value or return, they lost their lives.
They are also certainly not represented by expensive top lawyers like Boeing itself, who can
then mitigate, delay or even completely avert the consequences of Boeing's decisions.
They, the people (who had confidence in American technology/products), crashed on the ground,
burned or plunged into the sea without ever having had the slightest chance of averting the
disaster.
Interesting story you linked on the Boeing KC-46. The Air Force pilots won't fly it
because the loose tools and debris they found in the planes raised doubts about the planes
manufacturing integrity. The crisis was/is one degree (of four graduated degrees of
seriousness) away from shutting down the production line completely.
What's key is how Boeing proceeded to address the problem: by taking employee time away
from production in order to perform final inspection, i.e. quality control. Which makes it
clear where the original quality control was lost, by being absorbed into production, to make
more product per employee hour.
And this is just one, visible part of the process, where we can observe concrete examples
of inadequate QC.
Commenters here who point to these plane crashes as a failure in the integrity of Boeing
itself are exactly correct. The flawed plane built by the flawed company was an inevitable
fruit of the poisoned tree.
And I agree that one would be mad to trust anything bearing Boeing's name ever again. One
would be wise also to look for similar poisoned trees in all fields, and thread one's way
cautiously though this perilous, neoliberalized world.
So the jack screw that manually controls the stabilizer did not work due to high speed.
Isn't that what hydraulics are for?
By design.
The screw is designed to work within certain criteria.
1.Load,caused by thick or thin air pressure depending on altitude, on the moving part.
2. Speed, which again increases the load depending on the planes speed through the air, on
the moving part.
The speed and altitude are known from the panes onboard sensors.
Great load will possibly damage or break away the moving part, leading to an
uncontrollable crash.
Hence use of the jack screw adjustment, by the hydraulic system, will only be available
within its design envelope of load and speed.
We had already been told that in the
Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 crash which killed all 157 people on board, the 4-month old 737 MAX
8's anti-stall software reengaged itself four times in 6 minutes as the pilots struggled to
straighten the plane post-takeoff. In the end, the anti-stall software won and pushed the plane
nose-down towards the earth. Now, Ethiopia -finally?!- released its report in the March 10 crash:
Minister of Transport Dagmawit Moges said that the crew of the Ethiopian Airlines flight
from Addis Ababa to Nairobi on 10 March "performed all the procedures repeatedly provided by the
manufacturer but were not able to control the aircraft." As result, investigations have
concluded that Boeing should be required to review the so-called manoeuvring characteristics
augmentation system on its 737 Max aircraft before the jets are permitted to fly again, she
said.
The results of the preliminary investigation led by Ethiopia's Accident Investigation
Bureau and supported by European investigators were presented by Ms Moges at a press conference
in Addis Ababa on Thursday morning.
Ethiopia is being kind to Boeing. However, though the anti-stall software played a big role in
what happened, Boeing's assertion (hope?!) that a software fix is all that is needed to get the
737MAX's back in the air around the globe rests on very shaky ground (no pun intended whatsoever).
737 MAX 8. The angle-of- attack (AOA) sensor is the lower device below the cockpit
windshield on both sides of the fuselage. (Mike Siegel/The Seattle Times)
The Seattle Times did an article on March 26 that explains a lot more than all other articles on
the topic combined. The paper of course resides in Boeing's backyard, but can that be the reason we
haven't seen the article quoted all over?
If the assertions in the article are correct, it would appear that
a software fix is the
least of Boeing's problems. For one thing, it needs to address serious hardware, not software,
issues with its planes. For another, the company better hire a thousand of the world's best lawyers
for all the lawsuits that will be filed against it.
Its cost-cutting endeavors may well be responsible for killing a combined 346 people in the
October 29 Lion Air crash and the Ethiopian Airlines one. Get a class-action suit filed in the US
and Boeing could be fighting for survival.
Boeing has long embraced the power of redundancy to protect its jets and their passengers
from a range of potential disruptions, from electrical faults to lightning strikes. The company
typically uses two or even three separate components as fail-safes for crucial tasks to reduce
the possibility of a disastrous failure. Its most advanced planes, for instance, have
three
flight computers that function independently, with each computer containing three different
processors manufactured by different companies
. So even some of the people who have
worked on Boeing's new 737 MAX airplane were baffled to learn that the company had designed
an
automated safety system that abandoned the principles of component redundancy, ultimately
entrusting the automated decision-making to just one sensor -- a type of sensor that was known to
fail.
That one paragraph alone is so potentially damaging it's hard to fathom why everyone's still
discussing a software glitch.
Boeing's rival, Airbus, has typically depended on three such sensors.
"A single
point of failure is an absolute no-no,"
said one former Boeing engineer who worked on
the MAX, who requested anonymity to speak frankly about the program in an interview with The
Seattle Times. "That is just a huge system engineering oversight. To just have missed it, I
can't imagine how." Boeing's design made the flight crew the fail-safe backup to the safety
system known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS. The Times has
interviewed eight people in recent days who were involved in developing the MAX, which remains
grounded around the globe in the wake of two crashes that killed a total of 346 people.
The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) was already a late addition
that Boeing had not planned for initially.
They wanted a plane that was so like older ones
that no training would be needed, but did put a much heavier engine in it, which was why MCAS was
needed. As I wrote earlier today,
they cut corners until there was no corner left.
On hardware, on software, on pilot training (simulator), everything was done to be cheaper than
Airbus.
The angle-of-attack (AOA) sensor of the 737 MAX is the bottom piece of equipment below just
below the cockpit windshield. (Mike Siegel / The Seattle Times)
A faulty reading from an angle-of-attack sensor (AOA) -- used to assess whether the plane
is angled up so much that it is at risk of stalling -- is now suspected in the October crash of a
737 MAX in Indonesia, with data suggesting that MCAS pushed the aircraft's nose toward Earth to
avoid a stall that wasn't happening. Investigators have said another crash in Ethiopia this
month has parallels to the first.
Boeing has been working to rejigger its MAX software in recent months, and that includes
a plan to have MCAS consider input from both of the plane's angle-of-attack sensors, according
to officials familiar with the new design. "Our proposed software update incorporates additional
limits and safeguards to the system and reduces crew workload," Boeing said in a statement. But
one
problem with two-point redundancies is that if one sensor goes haywire, the plane may not be
able to automatically determine which of the two readings is correct
, so Boeing has
indicated that the MCAS safety system will not function when the sensors record substantial
disagreement.
The underlying idea is so basic and simple it hurts: safety come in groups of three:
three
flight computers that function independently, with each computer containing three different
processors manufactured by different companies
, and three sensors. The logic behind this
is so overwhelming it's hard to see how anyone but a sociopathic accountant can even ponder
ditching it.
And then here come the clinchers:
Some observers, including the former Boeing engineer, think the safest option would be
for Boeing to have
a third sensor to help ferret out an erroneous reading, much like the
three-sensor systems on the airplanes at rival Airbus. Adding that option, however, could
require a physical retrofit of the MAX.
See? It's not a software issue. It's hardware, and in all likelihood not just computer hardware
either.
Clincher no. 2:
Andrew Kornecki, a former professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University who has
studied redundancy systems in Airbus and Boeing planes, said operating
the automated
system with one or two sensors would be fine if all the pilots were sufficiently trained in how
to assess and handle the plane in the event of a problem.
But, he said, if he were
designing the system from scratch, he would emphasize the training while also building the plane
with three sensors.
The professor is not 100% honest, I would think. There is zero reason to opt for a two-sensor
system, and 1001 reasons not to. It's all just about cost being more important than people. That
last bit explains why Boeing went there against better judgment:
[..] Boeing had been exploring the construction of an all-new airplane earlier this
decade. But
after American Airlines began discussing orders for a new plane from Airbus
in 2011, Boeing abruptly changed course
, settling on the faster alternative of
modifying its popular 737 into a new MAX model. Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing engineer who worked
on designing the interfaces on the MAX's flight deck, said managers mandated that any
differences from the previous 737 had to be small enough that they wouldn't trigger the need for
pilots to undergo new simulator training.
That left the team working on an old architecture and layers of different design
philosophies that had piled on over the years, all to serve an international pilot community
that was increasingly expecting automation. "It's become such a kludge, that we started to
speculate and wonder whether it was safe to do the MAX," Ludtke said. Ludtke didn't work
directly on the MCAS, but he worked with those who did. He said that
if the group had
built the MCAS in a way that would depend on two sensors, and would shut the system off if one
fails, he thinks the company would have needed to install an alert in the cockpit to make the
pilots aware that the safety system was off.
There you go: A two-sensor system is fundamentally unsound, and it's therefore bonkers to even
discuss, let alone contemplate it.
And if that happens, Ludtke said, the pilots would potentially need training on the new
alert and the underlying system. That could mean simulator time, which was off the table. "The
decision path they made with MCAS is probably the wrong one," Ludtke said. "It shows how the
airplane is a bridge too far."
Kudos to the Seattle Times for their research. And yeah, we get it, at over 5000 orders
for the plane, which costs $121 million each, there's big money involved. Here's hoping that Boeing
will find out in the courts just how much.
The preliminary report contains flight data recorder information indicating the airplane had an
erroneous angle of attack sensor input that activated the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation
System (MCAS) function during the flight, as it had during the Lion Air 610 flight.
To
ensure unintended MCAS activation will not occur again, Boeing has developed and is planning to
release a software update to MCAS and an associated comprehensive pilot training and supplementary
education program for the 737 MAX.
As previously announced, the update adds additional layers of protection and will prevent
erroneous data from causing MCAS activation. Flight crews will always have the ability to override
MCAS and manually control the airplane.
Boeing continues to work with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and other
regulatory agencies worldwide on the development and certification of the software update and
training program.
Boeing also is continuing to work closely with the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) as technical advisors in support of the AIB investigation. As a party providing technical
assistance under the direction of investigating authorities, Boeing is prevented by international
protocol and NTSB regulations from disclosing any information relating to the investigation. In
accordance with international protocol, information about the investigation is provided only by
investigating authorities in charge.
* * *
Update (1100ET)
: Ethiopian investigators have called on Boeing to carry
out a full review of the anti-stall system on its 737 Max aircraft after finding pilots of a plane
that crashed near Addis Ababa last month had followed the stipulated emergency procedures but were
unable to save the aircraft.
Key highlights from the report make it very clear this is Boeing's problem...
*ALTITUDE, AIRSPEED READINGS FROM 737 WERE ERRONEOUS ON ONE SIDE
*ETHIOPIAN ANGLE OF ATTACK SENSORS DIFFERED BY 59.2 DEGREES
*AUTOMATIC NOSE-DOWN COMMANDS SHOW ANTI-STALL SYSTEM ACTIVATED
*ETHIOPIAN REPORT: NOSE DOWN PITCH EVENTUALLY REACHED 40 DEGREES
*CAPTAIN REQUESTED COPILOT `PITCH UP WITH HIM': REPORT
As The FT reports,
Ethiopian minister of transport Dagmawit Moges called on the
embattled aircraft manufacturer to
carry out a full review of the anti-stall system on its
737 Max aircraft before they are allowed to fly again
, after finding that the
pilots were not to blame
for the crash last month.
Boeing stock is higher somehow on the back of all this??
A lawsuit against Boeing Co was filed in U.S. federal court on Thursday in what appeared to
be the first suit over a March 10 Ethiopian Airlines 737 MAX crash that killed 157
people.
The lawsuit was filed in Chicago federal court by the family of Jackson Musoni, a
citizen of Rwanda, and alleges that Boeing, which manufactures the 737 MAX, had defectively
designed the automated flight control system.
Boeing said it could not comment on the lawsuit.
"Boeing ... is working with the authorities to evaluate new information as it becomes
available," it said, adding all inquiries about the ongoing accident investigation must be
directed to the investigating authorities.
The 737 MAX planes were grounded worldwide following the Ethiopian Airlines disaster, which
came five months after a Lion Air crash in Indonesia that killed 189 people.
Boeing said on Wednesday it had reprogrammed software on its 737 MAX to prevent erroneous
data from triggering an anti-stall system that is facing mounting scrutiny in the wake of two
deadly nose-down crashes in the past five months.
The planemaker said the anti-stall system, which is believed to have repeatedly forced the
nose lower in at least one of the accidents, in Indonesia last October, would only do so once
per event after sensing a problem, giving pilots more control.
The crash of Boeing's passenger jet in Ethiopia raised the chances that families of the
victims, even non-U.S. residents, will be able to sue in U.S. courts, where payouts are much
larger than in other countries, some legal experts have said.
Wednesday's complaint was filed by Musoni's three minor children, who are Dutch citizens
residing in Belgium.
The lawsuit says Boeing failed to warn the public, airlines and pilots of the airplane's
allegedly erroneous sensors, causing the aircraft to dive automatically and uncontrollably.
Ethiopian officials and some analysts have said the Ethiopian Airlines jet behaved in a
similar pattern as the 737 MAX involved in October's Lion Air disaster. The investigation into
the March crash, which is being led by the Ethiopian Transport Ministry, is still at an early
stage.
Thought it hasn't been publicly released yet, a preliminary report on the circumstances that caused
flight ET302 to plunge out of the sky just minutes after takeoff was completed earlier this week,
and some of the details have leaked to Reuters and the Wall Street Journal. And for Boeing
shareholders, the findings aren't pretty.
Appearing to contradict Boeing's insistence that
procedures for deactivating its MCAS anti-stall software were widely disseminated, and that pilots
at airlines around the world had been trained on these procedures,
WSJ
reported that the pilots of ET302 successfully switched off MCAS as they struggled to right
the plane after the software had automatically tipped its nose down. As they struggled to right the
plane, the pilots ended up reactivating the software, while trying a few other steps from their
training, before the plane began its final plunge toward a field outside Addis Ababa, where the
ensuing crash killed all 157 people on board.
Though the pilots deviated from Boeing's emergency checklist as they tried to right the plane,
investigators surmised that they gave up on the procedures after they failed to right the plane.
But when MCAS reengaged, whether intentionally, or on accident, it pushed the nose of the plane
lower once again.
The pilots on Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 initially reacted to the emergency by shutting
off power to electric motors driven by the automated system, these people said, but then appear
to have re-engaged the system to cope with a persistent steep nose-down angle.
It wasn't
immediately clear why the pilots turned the automated system back on
instead of
continuing to follow Boeing's standard emergency checklist,
but government and industry
officials said the likely reason would have been because manual controls to raise the nose
didn't achieve the desired results.
After first cranking a manual wheel in the cockpit that controls the same movable surfaces on
the plane's tail that MCAS had affected, the pilots turned electric power back on, one of these
people said. They began to use electric switches to try to raise the plane's nose, according to
these people. But the electric power also reactivated MCAS, allowing it to continue its strong
downward commands, the people said.
Reuters
, which was also the recipient of leaks from investigators, offered a slightly different
version of events. It reported that MCAS was reengaged four times as pilots scrambled to right the
plane,
and that investigators were looking into the possibility that the software might
have reengaged without prompting from the pilots.
After the Lion Air crash that killed 189 people back in October, Boeing and the FAA published a
bulletin reminding pilots to follow the emergency procedures to deactivate the software if a faulty
sensor - like the one that is believed to have contributed to the Lion Air crash - feeds erroneous
data to the system.
The data show the pilots maneuvered the plane back upward twice before deactivating the
software. But between the two reports, one detail is made abundantly clear.
The software's
reengagement is what doomed everybody aboard. That is an unequivocally bad look for Boeing, which
has been deflecting questions about the software's bugs, and gaps in the dissemination of its
training materials, while working on an update that the company says will make the software less
reliant on automated systems.
The aviation industry has been trying to make the human pilots
obsolete, just as in so many industries. But they all do their,
these days, their R & D on the job. Recall the Amazon Robot that
went berserk recently. The idea is to rid all industry of people
progressively so that they can end up not needing people at all.
They'll end up with nothing. Some how they think that if they take
people out then profits will be assured, which is actually
psychotic. They have had remote auto pilot for 7 decades now. They
can bring down any aircraft at will, and do so regularly. They can
shut down or affect engines remotely, or alter the actions as is
imbedded into just about all new machinery, other than knives,
forks and spoons. Yet they still need consumers and workers to
create hedged exchange to profit from. That is the dilemma
industry owners are facing, that without pesky people they are
doomed as much as the doom they are creating for even their own
off spring = psychosis.
The 757 and 767 are a more obvious airframe to build upon, as a response to the Airbus the
new 737MAX design was very poorly thought out, it's airframe vs. engine placement and thrust.
Having trained on Boeing 767-300ERs myself a pilot becomes very in tune with it's quirks and
it does have them, speed bugs and so on.
When you watch certain aircraft taking off in routine operations, unreasonable angles of
attack V-speed, now many pilots will engage 1 autopilots minutes after take off while flaps
are partially extended still(it stabalizes a positive rate of climb), this is so that the
aircraft is more efficient, cost effective and reaches it's crusie altitude and destination
on time.
The 767 has 3 autopilot computers, 2 of them receive data as to angle of attack and speed
when the stall warning activates as the stick shakes, the autopilots are off, period, no more
input from the computers other than warnings - these too can often lead to confusion and
sometimes with fatal results.
Sometimes you will re-engage one after you've corrected the airspeed (nose down) and stall
to regain and maintain a efficient airflow lift. Although in some cases the pitot tubes
malfunction to due ice, so trusting what the machine was telling the pilots can be fatal.
[In 737MAX] The pilot simply cannot take full control the aircraft when he needs to do so.
Hence the pilots in the 737MAX cases scrambling to work through the problem by checklist, if
you're doing this something is going wrong and will be wrong.
Ever notice the difference between a soft smooth landing and a 'rough one' that shakes
passengers - note these are totally normal landings, the computer assisted ones in clear blue
skies and calm winds are not.
That's the pilots on a VFR or visual landing which the computer usually tries to interfere
with, if a hybrid semi-assisted landing, especially on an ILS glideslope in bad weather.
A pilot should know these skills but many now do not. They have to rely on the input from
the computers and Boeing tried unsuccessfully to introduce this new MCAS system seamlessly,
when you've got 3 autopilots why is only 1 receiving the flight data of angle of attack and
v-speed?!
There was a prominent no-show among the 200 regulators, pilots and airline managers that
Boeing Co.
invited to preview a crucial software update for the 737 Max this week, said people familiar with
the matter: European safety officials.
The planemaker is sending a team across the Atlantic to brief the European Union Aviation Safety Agency on the
proposed changes after two of the jetliners plunged to the ground within five months, said one of the people, who
asked not to be identified because the discussions are private. Representatives of EASA didn't return requests for
comment.
Intentional or not, EASA's snub points to the delicate politics Boeing faces in convincing regulators the Max
is safe as the company seeks to restore confidence in its best-selling jet, which has been grounded for more than
two weeks. The reputation of U.S. regulators has taken a hit in the scrutiny of the 737 Max's approval process,
and foreign agencies are less likely to rubber-stamp aircraft certifications simply because they have been cleared
by the Federal Aviation Administration.
EASA is expected to play an influential role in determining how long and complicated the review of the Max will
be, while safety officials from China to Canada have vowed to conduct their own rigorous analysis.
"EASA's determination should be important for the rest of the world, given its sophistication and perceived
independence," Seth Seifman, analyst with JPMorgan Chase & Co., said in a note to clients.
A spokesman for the FAA declined to comment.
'Productive' Sessions
"We had productive information sessions this week and continue to work closely with our customers and
regulators on software and training updates for the 737 Max," Boeing spokesman Paul Bergman said by email.
As of late Friday, the Chicago-based planemaker was still finishing up paperwork needed to certify a software
upgrade and revised pilot training for the 737 Max. One prominent pilots union criticized the proposed training as
insufficient.
The software changes, intended to prevent stall-prevention software from engaging in normal flight, have been
in the works since the system pointed a Lion Air jet's nose downward about two dozen times before pilots lost
control Oct. 29. That accident killed 189 people, while 157 died when an Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max 8 crashed
March 10.
While certifying the software upgrade is the first step toward returning the Max to flight, it doesn't assure
the grounding will be speedily lifted by the FAA or its counterparts around the world. The EU, China and Canada
all grounded the 737 Max more quickly than the FAA in the wake of the Ethiopian crash.
Software Changes
The break between FAA and overseas authorities on the initial decision to ground the plane, combined with
worldwide public furor and a U.S. criminal probe of the Max certification, "all make it hard for us to see how
foreign regulators can avoid coming back with their own questions and doing some of their own due diligence,"
Seifman said in his report.
Crash investigators suspect that a damaged or malfunctioning sensor triggered anti-stall technology in the
Ethiopian Airlines plane, Bloomberg
reported
Friday. Investigators think that caused the plane's nose to point downward, and the pilots struggled
to counteract the software-based system, according to people familiar with the crash probe. That scenario would be
similar to the crash that brought down the Lion Air flight last year in Indonesia.
Boeing is planning software revisions that restrict the number of times the Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System, or MCAS, kicks in to a single interaction. The update is also designed so that MCAS can't
command the horizontal stabilizer to push a plane's nose down with more force than what pilots can counter by
pulling back on the steering column.
The enhancements appeared to work as billed, said pilots who viewed demonstrations of the upgrades by company
test pilots in flight simulators at the event March 27 in Renton, Washington.
"We were confident flying the aircraft in its present state," said Roddy Guthrie,
American Airlines Group Inc.
's 737 fleet captain, who was at the Boeing briefings. The improvements "were
needed. They've put some checks and balances in the system now that will make the system much better."
Simulator Demonstrations
Still, Boeing representatives faced caustic comments from some at the Wednesday session, said one of the people
familiar with the discussions. As Boeing test pilots demonstrated old and new versions of MCAS, attendees were
especially interested in re-enacting the sequence of events leading to the Lion Air crash, the person said. Pilots
also demonstrated how the 737 Max would behave if an angle-of-attack vane was sheared off by, say, a bird strike.
One pilot group walked away from the event feeling that Boeing needs to do more work on a new 30-minute iPad
course, followed by a test, that is intended to help pilots of the older generation of 737 planes prepare for the
Max. The newest version of Boeing's workhorse single-aisle jet debuted less than two years ago.
Pilots who saw the preliminary version of the training "characterized it as nice for an elementary level of
understanding, but pilots will definitely need a more textured and layered instructional piece," said Dennis Tajer,
spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association, which represents pilots at American. "That was the hands-down
consensus."
"... Boeing compromised on sound engineering with the 737 Max . Recall the origins of the problem: Boeing was at risk of losing big orders to a more fuel-efficient Airbus model. Rather than sacrifice market share, Boeing put more fuel-efficient, larger engines on the existing 737 frames. The placement of the engine created a new safety risk, that under some circumstances, the plane could "nose up" at such a steep angle as to put it in a stall. The solution was to install software called MCAS which would force the nose down if the "angle of attack" became too acute. ..."
"... Merriam-Webster defines kludge -- sometimes spelled kluge -- as "a haphazard or makeshift solution to a problem and especially to a computer or programming problem." Oxford defines it as, in computing, "A machine, system, or program that has been badly put together, especially a clumsy but temporarily effective solution to a particular fault or problem." ..."
"... In the case of the 737 Max, it's the combination of how two separate problems interacted -- a plane whose design introduced aerodynamics issues and what now appears to have been a poorly designed anti-stall system -- that seems to be drawing many to turn to Granholm's term. The problems were compounded in many ways, including by the fact that pilots were not told of or trained for the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) before the Lion Air crash, which killed all 189 on board. ..."
"... "My concern is that Boeing may have developed the MCAS software as a profit-driven kludge to mitigate the Max 8's degraded flight characteristics due to the engine relocation required to maintain ground clearance," commented Philip Wheelock on a New York Times story about the plane's certification process this week. "Not convinced that software is an acceptable solution for an older design that has been pushed to its inherent aeronautical design limits." ..."
"... "Indeed, it seems the 737 MAX was a kludge to an existing design, and that MCAS was a kludge on top of that," said a commenter on Hackaday . ..."
"... Boeing has long embraced the power of redundancy to protect its jets and their passengers from a range of potential disruptions, from electrical faults to lightning strikes. The company typically uses two or even three separate components as fail-safes for crucial tasks to reduce the possibility of a disastrous failure. So even some of the people who have worked on Boeing's new 737 MAX airplane were baffled to learn that the company had designed an automated safety system that abandoned the principles of component redundancy, ultimately entrusting the automated decision-making to just one sensor -- a type of sensor that was known to fail. ..."
"... That no one who wrote the MCAS software for the 737 MAX seems to have even raised the issue of using multiple inputs, including the opposite angle of attack sensor, in the computer's determination of an impending stall is mind-blowing. ..."
"... As a lifetime member of the software development fraternity, I don't know what toxic combination of inexperience, hubris, or lack of cultural understanding led to this. But I do know that it's indicative of a much deeper and much more troubling problem. The people who wrote the code for the original MCAS system were obviously terribly far out of their league and did not know it. How can we possibly think they can implement a software fix, much less give us any comfort whatsoever that the rest of the flight management software, which is ultimately in ultimate control of the aircraft, has any fidelity at all? ..."
"... And we're giving short shrift to how Boeing compounded the problem, for instance, by making it an upcharge to have the 737 Max have a light showing that its angle of attack sensors disagreed (the planes did have two, but bizarrely, only one would be giving data to the MCAS system on any day), or hiding the fact that there was a new safety automated safety system in two paragraphs after page 700 in the flight manual. ..."
"... It's about an airplane manufacturer that put engines on an airframe they weren't designed for, having to add a flight control override to guard against said airplane's new tendency to nose up, and then adding insult to injury by driving that system with a single sensor when two are available. Oh – and charging airlines extra for the privilege of their pilots being told when one of those sensors is providing bad data. ..."
"... Officials investigating the fatal crash of a Boeing Co. BA 0.06% 737 MAX in Ethiopia have reached a preliminary conclusion that a suspect flight-control feature automatically activated before the plane nose-dived into the ground, according to people briefed on the matter, the first findings based on data retrieved from the flight's black boxes. ..."
"... Boeing is doubling down on its mistakes . The lesson of the Tylenol poisoning is that if a company has a safety problem, even if it isn't its fault, it needs to do everything it can to rectify the defects and protect customers. If there is any doubt, the company needs to err of the side of safety. ..."
"... Here, unlike with Johnson & Johnson, the failings that led to 737 Max groundings all originated with Boeing. Yet rather than own the problems and go overboard on fixing them to restore confidence in the plane and in Boeing, Boeing is acting as if all it has to put in place are merely adequate measures. ..."
"... [Former Boeing engineer Mr. [Rick] Ludtke [who worked on 737 MAX cockpit features] recalled midlevel managers telling subordinates that Boeing had committed to pay the airline $1 million per plane if its design ended up requiring pilots to spend additional simulator time. "We had never, ever seen commitments like that before," he said. ..."
"... I hope the pilots in our readership speak up, but as a mere mortal, I've very uncomfortable with pilots being put in a position of overriding a system in emergency conditions when they haven't even test driven it. When I learn software, reading a manual is useless save for learning what the program's capabilities are. In order to be able to use it, I have to spend time with it, hands on. Computer professionals tell me the same thing. It doesn't seem likely that pilots are all that different. ..."
"... Boeing does not seem to comprehend that it is gambling with its future. What if international flight regulators use the Max 737 as a bloody flag and refuse to accept FAA certifications of Boeing planes, or US origin equipment generally? Do you think for a nanosecond that the European and Chinese regulators wouldn't use disregarding the FAA as a way to advance their interests? Europe would clearly give preference to Airbus, and the Chinese could use Boeing to punish the US for going after Huawei. ..."
"... And yet we do not see anyone suggesting the obvious solution to this problem; eliminating the 737 MAX type of aircraft altogether. ..."
"... I don't think that Boeing can afford to drop the 737 MAX. This aircraft was in response to the Airbus as they did not have any new aircraft designs on the boards to take it on. So they modified a 1970s design as a profitable stopgap solution. ..."
"... Boeing were designing a follow-on to the 737, but panicked when the A320Neo came and went for the MAX instead as they could deliver it much quicker and cheaper than a new aircraft. ..."
"... If its true that they are another example of a once great engineering company enslaved to the quarterly results, then it may well be that all work on the replacement stopped when they put their engineers to work on the MAX line. If that's the case, then they really are screwed. Ten years is an absolute minimum to get a brand new aircraft delivered to customers from a standing start. ..."
"... The newer versions of the 737 have nearly twice the max takeoff weight of the original, but with the same landing gear and nearly the same wing area. ..."
"... Airbus probably can't produce enough Neo to make up for the shortfall, but they essentially own the Bombardier C-Series now (ironically, made in Mobile, Alabama and relabelled the Airbus 220) which could prove an excellent investment by Airbus. ..."
"... Regarding the FAA I have read in Spanish press that Daniel Elwell declared in the congress (translated from Spanish) that "I can't believe that airline companies tried to save a few thousand dollars on a feature that increases safety". This is a bad try to shift blame from Boeing to airline companies and if anything will reduce (eliminate) the international confidence on FAA regulations. ..."
"... Managers telling this to engineers before a plane is designed is one thing. Telling it to them after the plane been designed but while its user interface is being designed is outrageous. ..."
"... And I think the plane actually has two (one on each side) , but for some reason, their inputs weren't combined. There's a slight subtlety that the air flow is 3 dimensional, so when the plane is turning, and particularly turning+climbing, the readings of the two might vary slightly – but that's for the software to sort out. They reportedly didn't hook both of them up to both flight computers – why is an interesting question. There's probably a practical reason, but ..."
"... What the folks at Boeing may not realise is that the more they double-down on this bizarre tactic of using spin-doctoring as a crisis management tool aimed at an audience that is rapidly losing trust in the company ( and frankly may no longer believe anything coming out of the corporate communications department at Boeing), the harder it's going to be to reverse course by coming out and saying "we screwed up and will do whatever it takes to fix this". This debacle has all the makings of a large scale cover up and the continued mala fide attempts to deflect focus away from taking ownership of and accountability for this crisis will only result in continued assault on an already battered reputation. ..."
"... As an aside, the malaise at the FAA has been much documented on these pages and elsewhere recently, from the egregious abdication of its regulatory responsibilities to Boeing to having a top position go unfilled for over a year, my question to US readers is whether a comparable level of capture by corporate interests has similarly defanged the FDA? ..."
Boeing compromised on sound engineering with the 737 Max . Recall the origins of the problem: Boeing was at risk of losing
big orders to a more fuel-efficient Airbus model. Rather than sacrifice market share, Boeing put more fuel-efficient, larger engines
on the existing 737 frames. The placement of the engine created a new safety risk, that under some circumstances, the plane could
"nose up" at such a steep angle as to put it in a stall. The solution was to install software called MCAS which would force the nose
down if the "angle of attack" became too acute.
Merriam-Webster defines kludge -- sometimes
spelled
kluge -- as "a haphazard or makeshift solution to a problem and especially to a computer or
programming problem." Oxford defines it as,
in computing, "A machine, system, or program that has been badly put together, especially a clumsy but temporarily effective solution
to a particular fault or problem."
In the case of the 737 Max, it's the combination of how two separate problems interacted -- a plane whose design introduced
aerodynamics issues and what now appears to have been a poorly designed anti-stall system -- that seems to be drawing many to
turn to Granholm's term. The problems
were compounded in many ways,
including by the fact that pilots were not told of or trained for the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) before
the Lion Air crash, which killed all 189 on board.
"My concern is that Boeing may have developed the MCAS software as a profit-driven kludge to mitigate the Max 8's degraded
flight characteristics due to the engine relocation required to maintain ground clearance,"
commented Philip Wheelock on
a New York Times
story about the plane's certification process this week. "Not convinced that software is an acceptable solution for an older
design that has been pushed to its inherent aeronautical design limits."
"Indeed, it seems the 737 MAX was a kludge to an existing design, and that MCAS was a kludge on top of that," said
a commenter
on Hackaday .
Lambert found more damning takes, which he featured in Water Cooler yesterday. First
from the Seattle Times :
Boeing has long embraced the power of redundancy to protect its jets and their passengers from a range of potential disruptions,
from electrical faults to lightning strikes. The company typically uses two or even three separate components as fail-safes for
crucial tasks to reduce the possibility of a disastrous failure. So even some of the people who have worked on Boeing's new 737
MAX airplane were baffled to learn that the company had designed an automated safety system that abandoned the principles of component
redundancy, ultimately entrusting the automated decision-making to just one sensor -- a type of sensor that was known to fail.
Boeing's rival, Airbus, has typically depended on three such sensors. "A single point of failure is an absolute no-no," said one
former Boeing engineer who worked on the MAX, who requested anonymity to speak frankly about the program in an interview with
The Seattle Times. "That is just a huge system engineering oversight. To just have missed it, I can't imagine how."
And the second, from software developer Greg Travis who happens also to be a pilot and aircraft owner:
That no one who wrote the MCAS software for the 737 MAX seems to have even raised the issue of using multiple inputs, including
the opposite angle of attack sensor, in the computer's determination of an impending stall is mind-blowing.
As a lifetime member of the software development fraternity, I don't know what toxic combination of inexperience, hubris,
or lack of cultural understanding led to this. But I do know that it's indicative of a much deeper and much more troubling problem.
The people who wrote the code for the original MCAS system were obviously terribly far out of their league and did not know it.
How can we possibly think they can implement a software fix, much less give us any comfort whatsoever that the rest of the flight
management software, which is ultimately in ultimate control of the aircraft, has any fidelity at all?
Ouch.
And we're giving short shrift to how Boeing compounded the problem, for instance, by making it an upcharge to have the 737
Max have a light showing that its angle of attack sensors disagreed (the planes did have two, but bizarrely, only one would be giving
data to the MCAS system on any day), or hiding the fact that there was a new safety automated safety system in two paragraphs after
page 700 in the flight manual. As Wall Street Journal reader Erich Greenbaum said in comments on an older article,
How Boeing's 737 MAX Failed :
No – this isn't about "planes that fly by themselves." It's about an airplane manufacturer that put engines on an airframe
they weren't designed for, having to add a flight control override to guard against said airplane's new tendency to nose up, and
then adding insult to injury by driving that system with a single sensor when two are available. Oh – and charging airlines extra
for the privilege of their pilots being told when one of those sensors is providing bad data.
The 737 Max has gotten a bad name not just for itself but also for the airlines that were big buyers. Southwest had taken the
most 737 Max deliveries, and American was second. I happened to be looking at American for flights last night. This is what I got
when I went to aa.com:
I came back to the page later to make sure I hadn't hit the 737 Max message randomly, by loading the page just when that image came
up in a cycle .and that doesn't appear to be the case. I landed on the 737 Max splash a second time.
This result suggests that American has gotten so many customer queries about the 737 Max that it felt it had to make providing
information about it a priority. If you click through, the next page explains how all 737 Max planes have been grounded, that American
is using other equipment to fly on routes previously scheduled for those planes, but it has still had to cancel 90 flights a day.
Officials investigating the fatal crash of a Boeing Co. BA 0.06% 737 MAX in Ethiopia have reached a preliminary conclusion
that a suspect flight-control feature automatically activated before the plane nose-dived into the ground, according to people
briefed on the matter, the first findings based on data retrieved from the flight's black boxes.
The emerging consensus among investigators, one of these people said, was relayed during a high-level briefing at the Federal
Aviation Administration on Thursday, and is the strongest indication yet that the same automated system, called MCAS, misfired
in both the Ethiopian Airlines flight earlier this month and a Lion Air flight in Indonesia, which crashed less than five months
earlier. The two crashes claimed 346 lives.
Boeing is doubling down on its mistakes . The lesson of the Tylenol poisoning is that if a company has a safety problem, even
if it isn't its fault, it needs to do everything it can to rectify the defects and protect customers. If there is any doubt, the
company needs to err of the side of safety.
Here, unlike with Johnson & Johnson, the failings that led to 737 Max groundings all originated with Boeing. Yet rather than
own the problems and go overboard on fixing them to restore confidence in the plane and in Boeing, Boeing is acting as if all it
has to put in place are merely adequate measures.
Reuters, which has a bias towards understatement, has an atypically pointed farming Boeing's refusal to recommend pilot simulator
training for the MCAS:
Boeing Co said it will submit by the end of this week a training package that 737 MAX pilots are required to take before a
worldwide ban can be lifted, proposing as it did before two deadly crashes that those pilots do not need time on flight simulators
to safely operate the aircraft.
In making that assessment, the world's largest planemaker is doubling down on a strategy it promoted to American Airlines Group
Inc and other customers years ago. Boeing told airlines their pilots could switch from the older 737NG to the new MAX without
costly flight simulator training and without compromising on safety, three former Boeing employees said.
The company had promised Southwest Airlines Co. , the plane's biggest customer, to keep pilot training to a minimum so the
new jet could seamlessly slot into the carrier's fleet of older 737s, according to regulators and industry officials.
[Former Boeing engineer Mr. [Rick] Ludtke [who worked on 737 MAX cockpit features] recalled midlevel managers telling subordinates
that Boeing had committed to pay the airline $1 million per plane if its design ended up requiring pilots to spend additional
simulator time. "We had never, ever seen commitments like that before," he said.
I've never flown Southwest and now I will make sure never to use them.
I hope the pilots in our readership speak up, but as a mere mortal, I've very uncomfortable with pilots being put in a position
of overriding a system in emergency conditions when they haven't even test driven it. When I learn software, reading a manual is
useless save for learning what the program's capabilities are. In order to be able to use it, I have to spend time with it, hands
on. Computer professionals tell me the same thing. It doesn't seem likely that pilots are all that different.
In other words, Boeing's refusal to recommend simulator training looks to be influenced by avoiding triggering a $31 million penalty
payment to Southwest. This is an insane back-assward sense of priorities. Boeing had over $10 billion in profits in 2018. A $31 million
payment isn't material and would almost certainly be lower after tax.
Boeing does not seem to comprehend that it is gambling with its future. What if international flight regulators use the Max
737 as a bloody flag and refuse to accept FAA certifications of Boeing planes, or US origin equipment generally? Do you think for
a nanosecond that the European and Chinese regulators wouldn't use disregarding the FAA as a way to advance their interests? Europe
would clearly give preference to Airbus, and the Chinese could use Boeing to punish the US for going after Huawei.
Boeing's comeuppance is long overdue. The company's decision to break its union, outsource, and move to Chicago as a device for
shedding seasoned employees was a clear statement of its plan to compromise engineering in the name of profit. Something like the
Max 737 train wreck was bound to happen.
And yet we do not see anyone suggesting the obvious solution to this problem; eliminating the 737 MAX type of aircraft
altogether.
The crashes of the early de Havilland Comet commercial jet aircraft all but destroyed English commercial jet production. Boeing
should suffer a similar fate as de Havilland. Indeed, since the Comet crashes were the result of a previously unsuspected design
flaw, and Boeing's problems are self inflicted, Boeing should suffer a more drastic punishment.
I don't think that Boeing can afford to drop the 737 MAX. This aircraft was in response to the Airbus as they did not have
any new aircraft designs on the boards to take it on. So they modified a 1970s design as a profitable stopgap solution.
If they dump the 737 MAX then they have nothing good to go for years. In that space of time Airbus would move in and take over
many of Boeing's markets and there would be new aircraft from Russia and China coming online as well.
I do not think that it would destroy Boeing as the US government would bail it out first, but it would be a colossal setback.
I doubt that they would end up on this list-
I understand that it can take up to ten years to develop a new aircraft, but the basic design of the 737 has been around since
the Jefferson Airplane's "White Rabbit" (!). Given that Airbus, like Avis, was going to be trying harder for more market share,
was it totally beyond Boeing's capacity to develop a follow-on for the 737 over the past, say, 20 years?
Boeing were designing a follow-on to the 737, but panicked when the A320Neo came and went for the MAX instead as they could
deliver it much quicker and cheaper than a new aircraft. What I don't know is if they are still working on a replacement
or if they shelved the plans entirely.
If its true that they are another example of a once great engineering company enslaved to the quarterly results, then it
may well be that all work on the replacement stopped when they put their engineers to work on the MAX line. If that's the case,
then they really are screwed. Ten years is an absolute minimum to get a brand new aircraft delivered to customers from a standing
start.
The 737 was designed to be low to the ground because it was to serve small airports where the passengers had to climb stairs
to enter (which I remember doing at Burbank and Ontario years ago) The 737 Max is what you would get if the 757 and 737 had a
child. The newer versions of the 737 have nearly twice the max takeoff weight of the original, but with the same landing gear
and nearly the same wing area.
Perhaps a shorter version of the 757 would have been the correct move, but Southwest would have screamed bloody murder.
The problem for airlines is the need to have more energy efficient aircraft for both cost and environment pressure reasons.
The 737 max is a response to the airbus 321neo, but as I understand it, Airbus does not have the capacity to takeover cancelled
orders for the 737 max.
Do airlines stick with older 737 or brazen it out with Boeing that the max problems have been resolved? And passengers. I imagine
they will fall into the brackets I will never fly on a 737 max, or I trust Boeing/airline, or a fatalistic if my number is up,
my number is up'.
I regularly fly with Norwegian in Europe. However I for one will never fly a max and will now prefer SAS with the 321neo. As
for Ryanair, that has max on order, if they take delivery, bye bye them.
Maybe the new Russian and Chinese versions can be an option? Or will Trump sanction any airline brave enough to order them
instead of Boeing?
Airbus probably can't produce enough Neo to make up for the shortfall, but they essentially own the
Bombardier C-Series now (ironically, made in Mobile, Alabama
and relabelled the Airbus 220) which could prove an excellent investment by Airbus.
There are four other potential competitors –
the Sukhoi Superjet (which is a little
smaller so may not be a direct replacement),
The French have a significant input to the Sukhoi, while Bombardier were involved with the Comac. None of those are direct
replacements (they are generally smaller and shorter range), but they might suit many airlines who need aircraft quickly but won't
touch the Max.
None of the above can match the Boeing or Airbus for state of the art engineering, but they are cheaper to buy, so they may
well now be more attractive to budget airlines and third world airlines. The big one to look out for is Ryanair – they've long
been Boeings biggest customer outside the US and have stuck with 737's consistently.
They will do their usual tactic of demanding huge discounts every time Boeing look weak, and no doubt they will do the same
now. But they may decide to look elsewhere (especially as they don't really need the longer range as they operate exclusively
in Europe). If they opt for something like the A220 or the Irkut, then that will be an enormous blow to Boeing, because others
will follow Ryanairs lead.
PK, you said that the Sukhoi Superjet had significant French input. Does that mean physical components as well? If so, I would
be surprised after the Mistral amphibious assault ships fiasco. On this topic, I saw this week how the French were taking out
German components out of joint French-German weapons systems and replacing them with French ones as the Germans are wary about
arming countries like Saudi Arabia and so have a say in these joint systems much to the disgust of the French, hence the swap-out
so the French can continue to sell these systems.
I was thinking of the engines , which are a joint
project between a French and Russian company. Ironically, the core of the engine for the Sukhoi is the M88, the engine the French
developed for the Rafaele fighter. The French are exceptionally good at using military research to help their commercial companies,
and vice versa.
The French are also very ruthless (i.e. immoral) when it comes to export sales. This is why they usually only partner with
the British, as they know the British share their rather loose definition of ethical policy in weapons sales. And they insist
on Frenchifying their systems as much as they can so there is nobody to interfere with sales.
Kludge translates in spanish into "chapuza" and in my view expresses very well the "solution" that Boeing brougth to the 737
Max.
Regarding the FAA I have read in Spanish press that Daniel Elwell declared in the congress (translated from Spanish) that
"I can't believe that airline companies tried to save a few thousand dollars on a feature that increases safety". This is a bad
try to shift blame from Boeing to airline companies and if anything will reduce (eliminate) the international confidence on FAA
regulations.
Boeing is doubling down on its mistakes. The lesson of the Tylenol poisoning is that if a company has a safety problem,
even if it isn't its fault , it needs to do everything it can to rectify the defects and protect customers. If there is any
doubt, the company needs to err of the side of safety.
And that might, precisely the difference between the Tylenol and the 737 MAX affairs. Boeing knows it is their fault and the
blame feeling prevents them to act as rationally as Johnson&Johnson did.
The Reuters article also says the following, which seems incredibly damning:
At Boeing's factory in Renton, Washington, managers told engineers working on the MAX, including its anti-stall system known
as MCAS, their designs could not trigger Level C or D training designations from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration,
the three former Boeing employees and a senior industry executive with knowledge of MAX development told Reuters. Otherwise,
pilots would have to spend time in simulators before flying the new planes.
Managers telling this to engineers before a plane is designed is one thing. Telling it to them after the plane been designed
but while its user interface is being designed is outrageous.
Certainly a relatively delicate sensor with external moving parts is a super obvious point of failure that any engineer would
flag down instantly.
And I think the plane actually has two (one on each side) , but for some reason, their inputs weren't combined. There's
a slight subtlety that the air flow is 3 dimensional, so when the plane is turning, and particularly turning+climbing, the readings
of the two might vary slightly – but that's for the software to sort out. They reportedly didn't hook both of them up to both
flight computers – why is an interesting question. There's probably a practical reason, but
Sometimes in industry what happens is you are updating a system or product, you don't want to re-certify your electronics (to
make schedule or cost) , but you used all the input capacity on your logic systems/comms/wiring and still need more. So you have
to "get creative" squeezing functionality into your legacy electronics. I really hope it wasn't something like that.
ISTR that there was a crash in South America a few years back because both artificial horizons were getting info from a single
pitot tube that had been taped over when the plane was being washed. The thing is, there was a switch in the cockpit to select
whether the dual instruments were both using the left pitot, both the right one, or one on each. Using two sensors is not a new
idea.
As a business owner who also happens to be a pilot and aircraft owner, I've been following this fiasco with great care. While
not widely reported, Boeing submitted a software update to the FAA back in January. They're still dragging their feet and as a
consequence, folks needlessly died the EA crash. To those who would say, "Nope, this is all on Boeing and the FAA for letting
them run roughshod over the regulations!", let me share a bit of news with you to help you grok what dealing with the FAA is like.
Did you know AVGAS (aviation gasoline, e.g. the fuel used in the entire piston-powered fleet) still has lead in it? This, decades
after MOGAS (motor vehicle gasoline, e.g. what we buy for our automobiles) was banned from using tetraethyl lead (TEL) as an antiknock
compound!
Yet there's a drop in replacement available. Drop in meaning, refiners like Shell, Mobile, et al can begin mixing and distributing
it using existing pipelines and trucks without so much as having to first clean the equipment or change anything whatsoever. So
why isn't it used? It's because the FAA has been dragging their feet on approval. Put another way, the FAA would rather people
continue being adversely affected by lead in the environment than fast tracking this.
Source? I know the owner of the company, and stand up guy if ever there was on, plus I've got friends who have flown with this
fuel – extensively to help with testing. Bottom line? It works!
And while there's speculation this has to do with big oil not wanting to pay the patent holder and thus lobbying the FAA to
obstruct permission, I'm not going down that rabbit hole. Suffice to say this stuff has been available for years and the patent
clock is running down so you figure it out. Me? I do believe it's all about the Benjamins and am greatly saddened we're still
damaging the environment when a replacement fuel is available we could begin using by next week! I kid you not.
Just to confirm, my town is on the Colonial pipeline that runs up the east coast and one of the local terminal's operators
told me that they do add the lead for avgas here at the distribution facility. Switching to a different octane booster would be
quite possible.
On the other hand I'm not sure the limited amount of leaded gas used by prop planes should be considered that big an environmental
hazard (perhaps as someone who hangs around airports you feel differently).
–I'm guessing that sort of safety practice wasn't inculcated into the software engineers in the same way that it was for old
school aerospace engineers. Software is often a poorly documented, partially tested black box.
Trim systems have been a part of airplanes from the earliest experiments with powered flight. They can be as simple as a bungee
cord pulling on a stick, or as complex as multiple computers interacting in a *fly-by-wire* scenario. Pilots have to demonstrate
more than awareness of these systems; they must demonstrate competency in their operation and oversight.They have been trained
in how to identify, override, and compensate for malfunctions in any misbehaving flight control system in the aircraft for which
they receive authorization. One big unknown here (in my mind) is whether a malfunctioning trim system would (or should) have been
obvious to the flight crew. Another other big question is whether means of deactivation (not speaking of *override*) of the system
was the same as in the previous 737 variants. Typically; this might involve pulling a labeled circuit breaker to remove power,
and then manually adjusting a trim wheel on the console; or near the flight controls.
"an aircraft is a mechanical device; any component of which can fail" which I remember but increasingly; a COMPLEX electrical-mechanical
device .with input from multiple people's minds and hands
The history of aircraft design and flight testing is full of unanticipated complications; frequently addressed by tweaks to
details of structure and/or operational limits. The goal is to cover all possible permutations of problematic interactions of
aircraft; environment, and human beings. There is a great deal of precedence in this topic.
What the folks at Boeing may not realise is that the more they double-down on this bizarre tactic of using spin-doctoring
as a crisis management tool aimed at an audience that is rapidly losing trust in the company ( and frankly may no longer believe
anything coming out of the corporate communications department at Boeing), the harder it's going to be to reverse course by coming
out and saying "we screwed up and will do whatever it takes to fix this". This debacle has all the makings of a large scale cover
up and the continued mala fide attempts to deflect focus away from taking ownership of and accountability for this crisis will
only result in continued assault on an already battered reputation.
As an aside, the malaise at the FAA has been much documented on these pages and elsewhere recently, from the egregious
abdication of its regulatory responsibilities to Boeing to having a top position go unfilled for over a year, my question to US
readers is whether a comparable level of capture by corporate interests has similarly defanged the FDA? I only ask because
I see a lot of supplements and other medicinal products sold here in South Africa with the "Approved by the US FDA" seal of approval
and wonder whether deferring to US regulators by international regulatory bodies is still a good idea under the current climate.
The following statistical categories might generate interesting numbers.
#1: Total flight operations of all 737 types since introduction. (wheels up to wheels down)
#2: Same for Max variant in question.
#3: Difficulty reports filed for all 737 (flight related)
#4: Difficulty reports filed for Max (flight related)
Flight simulators are expensive and scheduling will likely be backed up, given the large number of existing and planned 737
Max aircraft. It's an important problem to fix, but not with the current workaround, which seems to be to use a tablet computer
instead.
One would think a tablet computer would be a poor platform for a computer game, let alone to simulate flying a commercial aircraft
with new s/w or h/w, the flight conditions under which they fail, and how to respond to them. All a tablet computer could simulate
is turning the pages in the flight manual.
Your note should be a useful reminder to the current generation of executives at Johnson & Johnson.
They and their peers at other companies seem to have discarded the crisis management gold standard established by J & J during
the Tylenol scare. It is cheaper, it seems, and provides fewer avenues of attack for the tort bar, to substitute scripts provided
by the apology industry, which can trace its origins to that same Tylenol scare.
"... All this is ignoring the real issue with complex aircraft today. To save money airlines pushed to eliminate the Flight Engineer. ..."
"... As the MCAS system has such authority to cause the plane to crash, a system like this should be quadruple-redundant to prevent a single source of bad data from causing a catastrophic loss of life. ..."
All this is ignoring the real issue with complex aircraft today. To save money airlines
pushed to eliminate the Flight Engineer.
The one time this scenario was avoided was when a jump seat pilot saw what was going on.
Both the captain and the co pilot had tunnel vision just trying to fly the damn plane. It's a
myth modern aircraft are less complex the older generation aircraft that required a Flight
Engineer. The computers work fine when everything is ok or the issue is straight forward but
when complexity enters during an emergency its far more complex than any old piston or early
jet aircraft.
None of these crashes would have occurred if a flight engineer was onboard. They have the
big picture on the air-frame and train to know that air frame backwards an forwards. The
pilots fly the aircraft while the flight engineer operates the systems.
Ask any qualified pilot these questions. You will get the same answer as above.
As the MCAS system has such authority to cause the plane to crash, a system like this
should be quadruple-redundant to prevent a single source of bad data from causing a
catastrophic loss of life.
This is compounded by the fact the pilots were unable to easily override the system and
unable to know _why_ they could not control the plane when MCAS malfunctioned.
There should be outrage that this was allowed to go into production.
These aircraft would be impossible to fly without automation. You would need at least 3 or
4 pilots and 15 engineers to keep on top of everything. There are hundreds of systems running
in the background. Airbus A series for example have anywhere between 80 to 120 million lines
of code depending on the type and configuration. Pilot's these days are computer terminal
operators. Errors are unavoidable in software until they fail.
The trick is simulation ,
clearly Boeing did not simulate any of this , this aircraft should not have been
certified.
The solution is less reliance on automation, at least not until AI is actually able to
intervene when sensors and software malfunction, and ESPECIALLY not with aircraft, for God's
sake.
One H1b to anotherH1b, "I thought you were supposed to fix those 297 stubbed out error
conditions on the MCAS stall sensor?" "No, I fixed the stubbed out error conditions on the
SQUALL sensor!"
"It's right there on the assignment schedule."
"What's the matter can't you read English?"
( The H-1B is a visa in the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act,
section 101(a)(15)(H) that allows U.S. employers to temporarily employ foreign workers in
specialty occupations. )
I got out of the coding business when they started putting these MFturkeys in charge!
This tragedy is as much about government corruption (FAA approvals) as it is about a POS
company, it's shitbag execs, or third world pilots for that matter.
Without cross limiting; where 2 or more inputs cross reference each other and limit output
if the variation exceeds a predetermined setpoint; Boeing employed a control system with a
single point failure.
Analogous to a cars cruise control speeding up if the speedometer failed and registered
zero mph.
I read that the Operator's Manual for this aircraft is 1400 pages. Is that possible? And
if so, is this MCAS system info just hidden on page 419 like in a financial document? 1400
pages is almost as long as the cautions in a new drug advertisement. And I'm sure the
technical translations for Indonesian and Ethiopian pilots are perfectly done and readily
understood.
That is why commercial pilots get paid high wages to do their jobs and know the aircraft
they are flying. They just don't walk into a new aircraft cold turkey. This issue is covered
in the manual and it is an issue that any pilot would note as a big deal. In 1965/66 the
well-loved 727 had 4 crashes because pilots didn't know the aircraft. This is the same
thing.
As the MCAS system has such authority to cause the plane to crash, a system like this
should be quadruple-redundant to prevent a single source of bad data from causing a
catastrophic loss of life.
This is compounded by the fact the pilots were unable to easily override the system and
unable to know _why_ they could not control the plane when MCAS malfunctioned.
There should be outrage that this was allowed to go into production.
The FAA had the final call on this and they failed to do their job. The MCAS was never
designed to mask the airflow issues created by hanging over sized engines on an airframe
designed for smaller nacelles. These bigger engines had to be mounted higher and more forward
creating airflow disruption over the wing during critical climb out conditions. This bird
should never have flown! It was flawed from the get go and the FAA let it slide. Now hundreds
of people are dead!
If the US government doesn't intervene, all would be very easy lawsuits to win. But I
suspect there will be political pressure placed to limit the liability of Boeing or a deal
struck to have US taxpayers bail them out.
I do not believe this story or any other story of how the Boeing 737 crashed. On a private
jet the engines are set in the tail. If the angle of attack is high, little to no air will
flow into the engines as the wings block sufficient air movement thus stalling. Hondajet has
improved this by placing the engines on the wing. The engines of a Boeing 737 are placed in
front of the wing, thus there should be very little effect to the airflow, unless of course
the angle of attack is approaching a very large attack angle of over 70 degrees.
With power settings reduced to lower fuel consumption aka costs, it doesn't really make a
damn where the engines are mounted.
Fed-up with being Sick and Tired , 33 minutes ago
link
The question is thus begged: did this NEW Anti-Stall System replace one that had caused
issues in the past? WAS THIS NEW SYSTEM needed? Are pilots not trained to invoke changes to
NOSE ATTITUDE when stall indicators, in the past, were alarmed?
The "let's assassinate some peps" system, through which remote control access and false
data injection into a so called "closed" system exists. The public are done being played as
fools, Boeing. How much did you sell the encryption keys for access into that closed system
to 3rd parties? Why did that northern Scandinavian country spend millions removing this very
system from their purchased Boeing planes? Was it because they knew? The CEO of Lion Air
knows also.
This makes a big assumption, that being the AOA was faulty and MCAS came on for no reason.
That's a big assumption and probably very wrong. MCAS comes on in stalls or high bank turns
which we know the ethiopian pilot executed a high bank turn. The likely scenario is that the
inexperienced third world pilot with his 0 hours of training on the Max miscalculated the
weight of the plane on takeoff and stalled it in a turn right after he put the gear up and
took the flaps off. MCAS came on as it was supposed to do, and would be the right thing to do
to save the plane. If he had taken his hands off the yoke and gone to have a pee, all those
people would still be alive as the computer, which is much smarter than the third world
pilot, would have flown the plane. Not understanding his plane, the 28 year old pilot fought
the MCAS at 1000 feet and bought the farm. The next shoe to drop will be the more interesting
one. They have already released the innuendo, next to come will be the hard facts. Let's
see.
The only winners in this will be the lawyers. My Dad frequently told me that lawyers were
bleached souls in tan suits. I didn't understand at the time but I do now.
We know that's not exactly what happened because Trump called them out with his double
meaning "737 killers" talking about CA death penalty and this obvious deep state distraction
murder.
Surely this will mean the plane has to be 're-certified' after maybe modifications like
additional sensors, software updates and extra pilot training have been factored in.
Increasingly looking like there will be no 'quick fix', and admitting MCAS was at fault is
going to open Boeing up to tons of lawsuits, not to mention cancelled orders. They'll need to
drop the 737 MAX name too I would guess, it's too tarnished now.
I'm very surprised that a responsible company like Boeing would put out such a bad system.
The program should have used readings from both sensors to ensure accuracy, and the cockpit
warning mechanism should not have been optional equipment given the critical nature of the
system.
"... The stall-prevention system on the Boeing Co. 737 Max jet automatically switched on before the crash in Ethiopia this month, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing preliminary findings from data on the aircraft's black boxes. ..."
The stall-prevention system on the Boeing Co. 737 Max jet automatically switched on before
the crash in Ethiopia this month, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing preliminary findings
from data on the aircraft's black boxes.
The conclusion was relayed at a briefing at the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration on
Thursday and is the strongest indication yet that the same system malfunctioned in both the
Ethiopian Airlines flight and the
Lion Air disaster in Indonesia in October, the newspaper said.
"... The MCAS system is poorly engineered and the design should never have been certified in the first place. But the issue is even worse. The certification that was given relied on false data. ..."
"... The first MCAS design, on which the safety analysis and certification was based, allowed for a maximum trim movement by MCAS of 0.6 degree of a maximum of 5 degree. Flight tests proved that to be too little to achieve the desired effects and the maximum movement was changed to 2.5 degree. ..."
"... No safety analysis for the much greater movement was conducted. The FAA and foreign regulators were not informed of it. Their certification of the 737 MAX was based on misleading data. ..."
"... But even those certifications were only conditional. They required from Boeing to include relevant training material that explained the MCAS trim system and its potential problems to the pilots. ..."
"... The original certification for the 737 MAX was issued by the U.S. regulator FAA. The European regulator EASA based its certification on the one the FAA provided but it added several of its own requirements. There is now documentary evidence that Boeing neglected to fulfill at least one of those requirements. ..."
"... The FAA is as regulator far too cozy with lobbyists and aircraft manufacturers. It outsources too much of the certification testing to the manufacturers. It should not have allowed Boeing to install a MCAS that depended on a sole sensor. ..."
"... "It's become such a kludge, that we started to speculate and wonder whether it was safe to do the MAX," Ludtke said. ..."
"... MCAS was not the only change that made the 737 MAX a 'kludge'. The design errors were inexcusable . Boeing did not inform the regulators when it quadrupled the maximum effect the MCAS system could have. These changes had side effects that were not properly analyzed. Failure of the system was hazardous and extremely difficult to handle . Indicators lights showing that the system may have failed, a safety feature, were sold as extras . ..."
"... It will take quite long to certify the changes Boeing announced for the 737 MAX. Lawsuits were filed against the company. Orders were canceled . The company is under criminal investigation. The commercial damage to Boeing will likely be larger than currently estimated. It comes on top of a recent WTO ruling that Boeing illegally received billions of dollars in subsidies and will need to compensate its competition. ..."
"... The development and production of the 787 Dreamliner, announced in 2003, was outsourced all over the world. That led to years of delays and billions in development cost overruns. In 2010 Airbus announced the A-320 NEO as a better alternative to the 737 NG. Boeing was still busy to get the 787 into the air. It had neither the engineering capacity nor the money to counter the NEO with a brand new plane. It hastily revamped the 737, a design from the 1960s, into the 737 MAX. It promised to airlines that the new plane would not require to retrain their pilots. MCAS was specifically designed to allow for that. It was a huge mistake. ..."
"... Boeing once was an engineering company with an attached sales department. It 2001, when it moved its headquarter to Chicago , it became a dealership with an attached engineering wing. The philosophical difference is profound. It is time for the company to find back to its roots. ..."
For commercial reasons Boeing wanted the new 737 version to handle like the old ones. But
changes in the new version required an additional system to handle certain flight situations.
The development of that system and the safety analysis of its implications were rushed
through. Pilots were not informed of it and not trained to counter its failure.
The added 'maneuver characteristics augmentation system' (MCAS) depended on only one sensor.
When the sensor provided false data MCAS engaged and pointed the planes towards the ground.
Manual trim using the plane's trim wheel was required to regain flight stability. The pilots
were not aware of that. The regulators who certified the plane as safe
were unaware of the extend of the problem:
The MCAS system is poorly engineered and the design should never have been certified in the
first place. But the issue is even worse. The certification that was given relied on false
data.
The first MCAS design, on which the safety analysis and certification was based, allowed
for a maximum trim movement by MCAS of 0.6 degree of a maximum of 5 degree. Flight tests
proved that to be too little to achieve the desired effects and the maximum movement was
changed to 2.5 degree.
No safety analysis for the much greater movement was conducted. The FAA and foreign
regulators were not informed of it. Their certification of the 737 MAX was based on misleading
data.
But even those certifications were only conditional. They required from Boeing to include
relevant training material that explained the MCAS trim system and its potential problems to
the pilots.
The original certification for the 737 MAX was issued by the U.S. regulator FAA. The
European regulator EASA based its certification on the one the FAA provided but it added
several of its own requirements. There is now documentary evidence that Boeing neglected to
fulfill at least one of those requirements.
Page 15 of the Explanatory Note discusses "Longitudinal trim at Vmo". Vmo is the maximum
operational speed. The trim sets the nose of the plane up or down, independent of other pilot
input. Too high up and the plane with lose lift and stall, too low down and the plane will hit
terrain.
A failure of the MCAS system could trim the nose down. As a countermeasure the pilots would
have to switch the trim system off. They would then manually trim the plane back into a level
flight. This was a concern. The EASA note says:
Subsequent to flight testing, the FAA-TAD expressed concern with compliance to the reference
regulation based on an interpretation of the intent behind "trim". The main issue being that
longitudinal trim cannot be achieved throughout the flight envelope using thumb switch trim
only.
EASA considered the need to use manual trim "unusual". But it allowed it to pass because the
required training material would "clearly explain" the issue:
The need to use the trim wheel is considered unusual, as it is only required for manual
flight in those corners of the envelope.
The increased safety provided by the Boeing design limits on the thumb switches (for
out-of-trim dive characteristics) provides a compensating factor for the inability to use the
thumb switches throughout the entire flight envelope. Furthermore, the additional crew
procedures and training material will clearly explain to pilots the situations where use of
the trim wheel may be needed due to lack of trim authority with the wheel mounted
switches.
While the EASA was convinced (by Boeing?) that those situations would be discussed in
"additional crew procedures and training material", Boeing did not include it in the training
materials for the airlines that bought the planes:
Those situations, however, were not listed in the flight manual, according to a copy from
American Airlines seen by Reuters.
Without the additional procedures and training material the 737 MAX would not have been
certified. By providing the plane without the required training material Boeing essentially
handed incomplete planes to its customers.
The FAA is as regulator
far too cozy with lobbyists and aircraft manufacturers. It outsources too much of the
certification testing to the manufacturers. It should not have allowed Boeing to install a MCAS
that depended on a sole sensor.
But the bigger culprit here is clearly Boeing. The plane was developed in a rush
. Even its own engineers
doubted that it was safe:
Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing engineer who worked on designing the interfaces on the MAX's
flight deck, said managers mandated that any differences from the previous 737 had to be
small enough that they wouldn't trigger the need for pilots to undergo new simulator
training.
That left the team working on an old architecture and layers of different design
philosophies that had piled on over the years, all to serve an international pilot community
that was increasingly expecting automation.
"It's become such a kludge, that we started to speculate and wonder whether it was safe to
do the MAX," Ludtke said.
MCAS was
not the only change that made the 737 MAX a 'kludge'. The design errors were
inexcusable . Boeing did not inform the regulators when it quadrupled the maximum effect
the MCAS system could have. These changes
had side effects that were not properly analyzed. Failure of the system was hazardous and
extremely difficult
to handle . Indicators lights showing that the system may have failed, a safety feature,
were sold as
extras .
And today we learned that Boeing did not even provide its customers with the "clear
explanations" the certifications required it to deliver.
These were not 'mistakes' by some lowly technicians. These were breaches of legal
requirements and of trust.
It will take quite long to certify the
changes Boeing announced for the 737 MAX. Lawsuits
were filed against the company. Orders were
canceled . The company is under criminal investigation. The commercial damage to Boeing
will likely be larger than currently estimated. It comes on top of
a recent WTO ruling that Boeing illegally received billions of dollars in subsidies and
will need to compensate its competition.
All these are consequences of bad management decisions.
The development and production of the 787 Dreamliner, announced in 2003, was outsourced all
over the world. That led to years of delays and
billions in development cost overruns. In 2010 Airbus announced the A-320 NEO as a better
alternative to the 737 NG. Boeing was still busy to get the 787 into the air. It had neither
the engineering capacity nor the money to counter the NEO with a brand new plane. It hastily
revamped the 737, a design from the 1960s, into the 737 MAX. It promised to airlines that the
new plane would not require to retrain their pilots. MCAS was specifically designed to allow
for that. It was a huge mistake.
Boeing once was an engineering company with an attached sales department. It 2001, when it
moved its headquarter
to Chicago , it became a dealership with an attached engineering wing. The philosophical
difference is profound. It is time for the company to find back to its roots.
Posted by b on March 29, 2019 at 09:29 AM |
Permalink
The recent Ethiopian Airlines crash led to the grounding of Boeing's 737 MAX planes across
much of the globe. But as new details emerge about the cause of the model's second crash within
five months, questions are being raised about how the plane's safety was approved in the first
place. John Yang talks to Jeff Wise, a pilot and author of a book about MH370, the flight that
vanished in 2014.
$80,000 for a safety warning light! It should have been standard. How could they justify
charging $80,000 for a warning light? It's like Ford charging $800 for Brake Fluid warning
light, they would never have gotten away with that!
With the 737 Max still grounded after last week's deadly Ethiopian Airlines crash, the focus
turns to Boeing. The company offered a warning system that -- for a price -- might have helped
prevent the crashes. Kris Van Cleave reports.
$80 thousand for a warning light??? Unbelievable.... How much money can an indicator light
cost? Software for detecting sensor malfunction should've been there in the first place....
For such a critical sensor, those safety systems should've been built into the systems in a
$120 million dollar plane in the first place.
Why charge more for safety? It should be included by default. Then they kept saying it was
safe for flight but excluded a crucial piece. It's all for profit... smh. 🧐 they are
trying to deflect blame on the airline. Those planes should have never been sold in the first
place.
Actually they should be charged with manslaughter for both plans ! Enough playing games
with just a public court hearing then a fine ! Some Big People need to be held accountable by
full law ! Jail time !
I would bet that the actual labor and materials are less than $2000. The engineering had
already been completed as it is an option. Why then would safety be optional? Criminal greed,
or a low value placed on human lives. Whomever is responsible has no moral or social compass
and should be punished. Not with a fine but a lengthy prison term in Leavenworth.
if we can have recalls for cars, why cant we have the same for aircraft and force those
chaps to install foolproof sensors in triplicate, complete with warning inidicators at no
additional cost to the airlines!
"... Profit before people. Computer says no! Failsafe failed. No manual over ride. Sorry folks. Say Your prayers. The problem maybe rebranded. Best case scenario. Impeccable flying from technical progress made. ..."
"... Totally unnecessary crash that was caused by cutting corners and greed. ..."
Ethiopian Airlines is one of the best known safe reputation. Of course Indonesian Airlines
is the best too. The crash was very similar after take off and dive into the ground. Boing is
just protecting itself for its market.
Boeing needs to be sued for $2 billion for each victim of the Lion Air and Ethiopian
Airlines plus $300 billion in punitive damages, and jail time for some executives ~ they
knowingly put up unsafe planes. In its early days, the 737 also had several
cashes.
Obviously Boeing knew about the shortcomings of their design in earlier stages and instead
of fixing their design they chose to use a software to fix it without informing the airlines
or giving pilots adequate training in order to save costs.
Profit before people. Computer says no! Failsafe failed. No manual over ride. Sorry folks.
Say Your prayers. The problem maybe rebranded. Best case scenario. Impeccable flying from
technical progress made.
Boeing must be lobbying really hard and it's a shame that a respectable entity like
Washington Post is helping the narrative to shift the blame to pilots who are now dead. If
it's a Boeing, I'll have second thoughts.
1. Boeing wanted a new plane with larger enginers but without spending money on a new
fuselage. 2. Sold their planes to customers saying that Max type is same as the NG and that
no cost is involved for retraining pilots. 3. Make the MCAS system so that the new and plane
and old plane feel theoretically same to the pilot. 4. Not tell pilots about MCAS or hide
critical details about the system. 5. 300+ people dead. I hope the Boeing management can
sleep well knowing they have blood on their hands.
Sounds like they created a dangerously unstable craft that requires a computer system to
keep from stalling. Even if pilot turns off plane may have already got in situation hard to
recover from manually especially near ground. Two planes found this out.
At the root of almost every problem today is 'cost cutting' for short term profits to
satisfy roaming vulture capitalist greed. Why is the FAA 'under funded'? Why is it 'too
expensive' to give pilots the sim time they need even after hundeds of people are
dead??
Engines too far forward wings too swept back computer and pilot can't find center of
balance and it piledrives into earth, its not a mystery. If I wanted to take a perfectly good
737 and turn it into an unflyable plane, well they did it.
Just fix the auto pilot issue. Also, what in all of God's green earth? Pilots only learned
about flying this new model with just textual information? No simulation? No wounder pilots
of both airlines were confound by the conflicting warnings blaring at them in the
cockpit.
Ha ha ha there is no money for the faa, but the government had enough money to go on a
bombing run around the world. So now who is responsible ? Boeing faa or other aviation
authorities like the icao or others ? Who is going to be jailed for this mass murdering?
Since they have accepted it so the faa chief should be put behind bars for lying about the
inspection and the certificate !!!!!!
FAA rep is a clown! It is not FAA fault and Boeing was under pressure. If one of your family
was in one of those crashes, you would never shill for those corporate murders.
He is a clown! It is not FAA fault and Boeing was under pressure. If one of your family
was in one of those crashes, you would never shill for those corporate murders.
Ex FAA employees have come out and say FAA doesn't have the expertise and have to rely on
Boeing for aspects of the certifications, why? because dumb Americans buy politicians ever
selling lower taxes. Hey dudes, u gotta spend money to hire good people duh! something gotta
give. Cheap government, cheap results. U deserve what u paid for America.
The MCAS system was not revealed to the first receivers of the Max 8's, nor was it in the
Manuals. Boeing thought it would quietly do it's job in the background, but they were wrong.
After the first accident from Lion Air, out of Indonesia, then all airliners were informed of
this. The pilots in Ethiopia may or may not have been aware of this, and if they were they
lacked insufficient training on how to deal with this problem. The MCAS system works to bring
the nose of the plane down so it can fly at a level flight. MCAS get's it's information from
AOA sensors that send info to the plane as to what angle the plane is flying at. Pilots have
reported that the AOA sensors are faulty and sending "wrong information" and "activating" the
MCAS system when it shouldn't have, causing the planes nose to point downward, and causing
the plane to go into a nose dive, and this is what happened. Basically the MCAS was needed
because Boeing redesigned the engines, that were bigger, and were mounted differently -- more
forward and up on the wing, throwing off the center of gravity of the new 737 Max 8.The old
737 does not have this problem. AOA sensors, stands for Angle of Attack, to make sure air
flow is right both over and under the wings, to make the plane aerodynamic. According to
reports from pilots, you can "disengage" the MCAS SYSTEM, buy pulling back on the yoke, and
this will do it. At the same time there are wheels by the throttle that you turn manually, to
trim the planes stabilizer manually by yourself. This was done many times by well trained
American pilots, who averted crashes with this jet. So, proper training and awareness could
have saved a lot of lives. Let's not forget these MAX 8 jets have been flying for a couple
years, with thousands of flights in North America and developed countries with "no"
accidents, and pilots say the plane flies beautifully. They say it's a very smooth flying
aircraft, and a pleasure to pilot. So, who's responsible for this -- well it's Boeing, for
non disclosure of the MCAS system, and what to do, if it functions in error, and how to
manually disengage the system. In my opinion, all pilots should know how to manually take a
plane from takeoff, and land it smoothly with no automation, or computers to help them --
just like in the old days. Over the last 20 years, there have been so very few major aircraft
go down. I'm all for automation, but I fully support proper pilot training should some of
this automation fail -- like faulty sensors. It's completely crazy to rely on robots or
Artificial Intelligence ( AI ) to fly planes, if you don't understand how the computers work,
and how they fly the plane, and in the event of a failure of the computer, you can then shut
it off, and have "no problem" , and take control of the aircraft yourself,- "manually" with a
lot of confidence. I SHOULD ADD - this MCAS system and it's AOA sensors, should all be
mandatory on a plane, and not be sold as extras, same as brakes on a car. You don't play
around with peoples lives, to make a few extra dollars, selling "options." These features
"must be standard equipment", on all these aircraft sold, PERIOD. This is why I'm "very
against" self driving cars'. Can you imagine all the accidents that will happen from "faulty
sensors." WOW , it will be a nightmare. Faulty sensors could be caused by snow, ice, extreme
heat or cold. Are we getting so lazy that we need to have Artificial Intelligence driving our
cars. No thanks for me, I'll drive my own car, and hope that people will rebel against this
idea, and the makers of these cars, won't sell any of them, and thus, taking them off the
market.This Boeing Max 8 should send a good example, of things to come if we allow driverless
cars. Not for me, and I hope the general public will agree with this.
Terrorists aren't needed to bring down airliners and frighten the public. Boeing and a
failed Trump policy, that won't staff FAA department with a permanent and qualified leader,
are managing the same thing through their fashionable neglect and arrogance.
Just look at the investigation of sinking and tilting Mellilium Tower in sanfransico.
Building concrete Foundation and glasses are cracking and investigators are still studying
what caused the two glass windows to crack. Similar investigation is going on how these two
Boeing max crashed.
Deadly strategie from Boeing for quick profits and market shares . Airliners are built to
be operated for at least a couple of decades Boeing was providing worldwidely flying coffins
made by mixing new technologies (leap engine ) with cheap and old technologies (1/2 century
old airframe).A new well designed aircraft is stable, well-balanced without extra software's
help.
Trump nominated his personal pilot to head up the FAA. After 2 years, they still have an
"acting" director. Tim Boeing shows up at Mar-a-lago every weekend. What could possibly go
wrong?
This been a long time coming. Who cut the FAA? BOTH PARTIES DID! The system is gonna fall
apart because too much damage has been done. Just keep paying people peanuts and have them
try to do a skilled job. My cousin quit the airline industry because they don't want people
to be able to pay for the education needed for these jobs. Like who program these
systems.
Looks like I'll be getting that 🚲 sooner than later. I won't be traveling by plane
for a few Give it time for all the smoke to clear and heads to roll😳
"... "It's a very, very serious investigation into basically, was there fraud by Boeing in the certification of the 737 MAX 8 ?" Arthur Rosenberg, an aviation attorney who is representing six families whose relatives died in the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air crashes, explained. ..."
"... Rosenberg expects the criminal probe to question whether Boeing fully disclosed to the FAA the engineering of the 737 Max 8's MCAS flight control system, called MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), during the plane's certification process. The flight control system was designed to prevent the plane from stalling. ..."
"... Unfortunately for Boeing and the passengers its crashed aircraft were carrying, the MCAS system was very poorly implemented. ..."
"... The single sensor was the result of regulatory capture, not to say gaming; see below. ..."
"... Black box data retrieved after the Lion Air crash indicates that a single faulty sensor -- a vane on the outside of the fuselage that measures the plane's "angle of attack," the angle between the airflow and the wing -- triggered MCAS multiple times during the deadly flight, initiating a tug of war as the system repeatedly pushed the nose of the plane down and the pilots wrestled with the controls to pull it back up, before the final crash. ..."
"... Regulatory Capture : Commercial aircraft need to be certified by the FAA before launch. The Washington Post labels today's process "self-certification": ..."
"... In practice, one Boeing engineer would conduct a test of a particular system on the Max 8, while another Boeing engineer would act as the FAA's representative , signing on behalf of the U.S. government that the technology complied with federal safety regulations, people familiar with the process said. ..."
"... (Note that a 10-year-old process would have begun in the Obama administration, so the regulatory process is bipartisan.) I understand that " safety culture " is real and strong, but imagine the same role-playing concept applied to finance: One bankers plays the banker, and the other banker plays Bill Black, and after a time they switch roles . Clearly a system that will work until it doesn't. More: ..."
"... The process was occurring during a period when the Transportation Department's Office of Inspector General was warning the FAA that its oversight of manufacturers' work was insufficient. ..."
"... The FAA, citing lack of funding and resources, has over the years delegated increasing authority to Boeing to take on more of the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes. ..."
"... Alert readers will note the similarity to the Neoliberal Playbook , where government systems are sabotaged in order to privatize them, but in this case regulatory capture seems to have happened "by littles," rather than out of open, ideological conviction (as with the UKs's NHS, or our Post Office, our Veteran's Administration, etc.). ..."
"... Several FAA technical experts said in interviews that as certification proceeded, managers prodded them to speed the process. Development of the MAX was lagging nine months behind the rival Airbus A320neo. Time was of the essence for Boeing . ..."
"... In this atmosphere, the System Safety Analysis on MCAS, just one piece of the mountain of documents needed for certification, was delegated to Boeing . ..."
"... It should be clear at this point that the central claims of Muilenburg's letter are false. ..."
"... The self-certification debacle that allowed MCAS to be released happened on Muilenburg's watch and is already causing Boeing immense reputational damage, and a criminal case, not to mention the civil cases that are surely coming, will only increase that damage. Mr. Market, the Beltway, and even Trump, if his trade deals are affected, will all soon be bellowing for a sacrificial victim. Muilenburg should recognize the inevitable and gracefully resign. Given his letter, it looks unlikely that he will do the right thing. ..."
"... Beyond that ultimate problem is the ultimate regulatory problem: regulatory capture of the FAA by the airline companies. As a result, the FAA represents "its customers" the airplane makers, not the public users and customers. This is like the banks capturing the Fed, the Justice Dept. and Treasury to promote their own interests by claiming that "self-regulation" works. Self-regulation is the polite word for fraudulent self-indulgence. ..."
"... I would be surprised if the European Airbus competitors do not mount a campaign to block the 737-Max's from landing, and insisting that Boeing buy them back. This gives Airbus a few years to grab the market for these planes. ..."
"... This probably will throw Trump's China trade fight into turmoil, as China was the first country to ground the 737-Max's and is unlikely to permit their recovery without a "real" federal safety oversight program. Maybe Europe, China and other countries henceforth will each demand that their own public agencies certify the plane, so as to represent users and stakeholders, not only stockholders. ..."
"... The moral: Neoliberalism Kills. ..."
"... Rule #2 of Neoliberalism: Go die. ..."
"... > "Maybe Europe, China and other countries henceforth will each demand that their own public agencies certify the plane." ..."
"... As if the 737 MAX were the chlorinated chicken of aircraft. ..."
"... "This gives Airbus a few years to grab the market for these planes." ..."
"... Regulatory capture is rampant throughout the economy. Boeing self-certification being delegated by the FAA is not unlike the situation with electric transmission utilities. ..."
"... that is subject to both FERC and NERC regulation. ..."
"... In hindsight Boeing would have perhaps been better off to leave off the MCAS altogether and depend on pilot retraining to cover the altered handling. ..."
"... Reports I've read indicates that Boeing ignored even the clearly inadequate certification. "Documentation provided to the FAA claims that the MCAS system can only adjust the horizontal tail on the plane by 0.6 degrees out of a maximum of five-degrees of nose-down movement. But that limit was later increased to 2.5-degrees of nose-down movement. Boeing didn't communicate the change from 0.6-degrees to 2.5-degrees until after Lion Air." ..."
"... Boeing could also be liable for damages due to 737 groundings and due to delays in delivery of contracted planes. ..."
"... The analogy has been made between this the 737 MAX story and the Tylenol story. J&J got out in front of the problem and saved the product (and their company). Boeing's problem is of that order, and Muilenberg -- that letter! -- seems incapable of understanding that; insular, arrogant. One more reason to fire the dude toot sweet. If he comes out of his next review with a raise -- Everything Is Like CalPERS™ -- consider shorting Boeing ..."
"... Allowing this to happen seems the ultimate in short term thinking by Boeing. US manufacturers have always had an advantage over competitors because the FAA was held in such high regard worldwide that it was the de facto world safety regulatory body – every country followed its lead. But this chipping away of its authority has led to a near fatal loss of faith, and will no doubt lead to European and Asian regulatory authorities being strengthened. And no doubt commercial realities will mean they will look much more closely at US manufactured aircraft if there is some benefit to their own manufacturers. ..."
"... The Times thinks Boeing is too big to fail. Without a blockbuster Max, I don't see how Boeing maintains its current status in the industry. ..."
"... I also think they have been completely afflicted by the defense contractor mentality. ..."
"... Yes, the famous McDonnell-Douglas reverse takeover , where financial engineers inserted their sucking mandibles into an actual ..."
"... Note that Muilenberg came up through the defense side of the company not the commercial aircraft side. He may simply not have been equipped to understand FAA regulation at any deep level, hence the rot that finally surfaced. ..."
"... The tragedy is that corporate media in pursuit of profits will keep us up to date but will never mention the 6 or 8 minutes of terror for the 346 souls aboard the two flights. They will cover the criminal negligence trial if there are ever indictments. But, the news reports never will say that neoliberalism, deregulation, and privatization are the root causes of the deaths. ..."
"... Boeing also clearly did not know its customers . It should be engineering for the sort of pilots who are going to be hired by Lion Air, or any rapidly expanding airline in what we used to all the Third World. Hegemony, it seems, makes you insular and provincial. ..."
"... "The FAA, citing lack of funding and resource": I don't suppose I'll survive to see any arm of government not blame lack of funds for its boneheaded or corrupt incompetence. ..."
"... That's how I feel. The tech doc department at Boeing sounds like a horrible place to work; MBAs or their goons telling you all the time to do stuff you know is wrong. It's not surprising people were willing to talk to the Seattle Times; I bet there are more people. (Hey, Seattle Times! How about people testing the 737 MAX in simulators (assuming this is done)). ..."
"... Interestingly, and maybe relevant to the problem of confusion for the pilots, is that Boeing has had another automatic trim-modifier operating on its 737s for some time, the speed-trim system (STS): ..."
"... This system also modifies the stabilizer position during manual flight. Like MCAS, it was brought in to improve stability under certain flight conditions (the reasons for which are far beyond my knowledge). There is an indication that the pilots on the flight before the Lion Air crash misinterpreted MCAS actions for STS behavior. ..."
"... authority would revert to the pilot ..."
"... How many years ago did Wall Street take over the fortunes of the company? Why did they move their headquarters from their birthplace of Seattle to Chicago? Why did they start assembling planes in South Carolina and China? Was it to improve aviation safety? Or, to allow the profiteering parasites to feed off the carcass of the company? ..."
"... President Trump, here's a reelection tip: "Today I am declaring that all American registered aircraft flying in American airspace must be maintained in the U.S." ..."
"... Amazingly, Trump seems to have done OK on this. First, he didn't cave to Muilenberg's (insane, goofy, tone-deaf) request to keep the 737 flying; then he frames the issue as complexity (correct, IMNSHO), and then he manages to nominate a Delta CEO as head of the FAA . ..."
"... we're seeing signs that a crapification process has begun on the safety side in this industry. (It has been proceeding for years on the service/amenities side.) ..."
"... Considering the fact that all these 737s are grounded as no airline trust them to not kill a plane load of passengers and crew, this is a really big deal. Putting aside the technical and regulatory issues, the fact is that the rest of the world no longer trusts the US in modern aviation so what we have here is a trust issue which is an even bigger deal. ..."
"... Loss or at least wobbliness of imperial hegemony, like. It's not just the aircraft, it's US standards-setting bodies, methods, "safety culture," even -- dare we say it -- English as the language of aviation. French is no longer the language of diplomacy, after all, though it had a good run. ..."
"... Because markets. Neoliberalism puts everything up for sale. Including regulation. Oversimplifying absurdly: And so you end up with the profit-driven manufacturer buying the regulator, its produce killing people, and the manufacturer canceling its future profits. That's what the Bearded One would call a contradiction.* ..."
"... know your customer ..."
"... Like you, I am a retired software engineer, so I have followed an aviation blog discussion of this issue quite closely since it emerged as a probable software and system design failure. As the blog is open to all, its signal-to-noise ratio is pretty low, but it seems not too difficult for any technically-minded person to separate the wheat from the chaff. My current understanding, which I believe others here are in a position to correct, if necessary: ..."
"... this story is really fascinating and seems to be true a sign of the times. ..."
"... The Post's article on the FAA and Regulatory Capture is incomplete. The process for the FAA (and probably MANY government agencies) started under Reagan, did not revert to safety under Clinton (make government smaller and all that), and then accelerated under Bush II in 2005 (not a bi-partisan time). In particular, big changes to the FAA were made in 2005 that were executive in nature and did not require Congressional approval. CF: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/delegating-aircraft-safety-assessments-to-boeing-is-nothing-new-for-the-faa/ ..."
At some point in the future, I'd like to do failure matrix for the pathways to misfortune (
example of such a matrix here ) that precipitated
two deadly Boeing 737 MAX crashes on take-off in five months , but I don't feel that I have enough information yet. (I'm not
unsympathathetic to the view
that the wholesale 737 MAX grounding was premature on technical grounds , but then trade and even geopolitical factors enter
in, given that Boeing is a "national champion.") We do not yet have results from the cockpit voice and flight data recorders of either
aircraft, for example. But what we do know is sufficiently disturbing -- a criminal investigation into Boeing had already been initiated
after the Lion Air crash, but before the Ethiopian Airlines crash -- that I think it's worthwhile doing a play-by-play on the causes
of the crashes, so far as we can know them.
About that criminal investigation
:
According to the Wall Street Journal, a Washington D.C. grand jury issued a March 11 subpoena requesting emails, correspondence,
and other messages from at least one person involved in the development of the aircraft.
"It's a very, very serious investigation into basically, was there fraud by Boeing in the certification of the 737
MAX 8 ?" Arthur Rosenberg, an aviation attorney who is representing six families whose relatives died in the Ethiopian Airlines
and Lion Air crashes, explained.
"Nobody knows the answer to that yet," Rosenberg cautioned, adding that he had not yet seen the Justice Department's subpoena
and therefore could not know its full scope.
Rosenberg expects the criminal probe to question whether Boeing fully disclosed to the FAA the engineering of the 737 Max
8's MCAS flight control system, called MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), during the plane's certification
process. The flight control system was designed to prevent the plane from stalling.
A possible criminal investigation during an aircraft accident investigation is highly unusual . While airline accidents
have at times raised criminal issues, such as after the 1996 crash of a ValuJet plane in the Florida Everglades, such cases are
the exception.
Safety is at the core of who we are at Boeing, and ensuring safe and reliable travel on our airplanes is an enduring value
and our absolute commitment to everyone. This overarching focus on safety spans and binds together our entire global aerospace
industry and communities. We're united with our airline customers, international regulators and government authorities in our
efforts to support the most recent investigation, understand the facts of what happened and help prevent future tragedies. Based
on facts from the Lion Air Flight 610 accident and emerging data as it becomes available from the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302
accident, we're taking actions to fully ensure the safety of the 737 MAX. We also understand and regret the challenges for our
customers and the flying public caused by the fleet's grounding.
Boeing has been in the business of aviation safety for more than 100 years, and we'll continue providing the best products,
training and support to our global airline customers and pilots. This is an ongoing and relentless commitment to make safe
airplanes even safer .
Soon we'll release a software update and related pilot training for the 737 MAX that will address concerns discovered in the
aftermath of the Lion Air Flight 610 accident.
Fine words. Are they true? Can Boeing's "commitment to everyone to ensure " safe and reliable travel" really be said to be "absolute"?
That's a high bar. Let's see!
I've taken the structure that follows from
a tweetstorm by Trevor Sumner (apparently derived from
a Facebook post by his brother-law,
Dave Kammeyer ). However, I've added topic headings, changed others,
and helpfully numbered them all, so you can correct, enhance, or rearrange topics easily in comments (or even suggest new topics).
Let me also caveat that this is an enormous amount of material, and time presses, so this will not be as rich in links as I would
normally like it to be. Also note that the level of abstraction for each topic varies significantly: From "The Biosphere" all the
way to "Pilot Training." A proper failure matrix would sort that out.
* * *
(1) The Biosphere : The 737 MAX story beings with a customer requirement for increased fuel efficiency. This is, at bottom,
a carbon issue (and hence a greenhouse gas issue , especially as the demand for air travel increases, especially in Asia). New
biosphere-driven customer demands will continue to emerge as climate change increases and intensifies, and hence the continued 737
MAX-like debacles should be expected, all else being equal. From
CAPA – Centre for Aviation :
The main expected impacts of climate change on aviation result from changes in temperature, precipitation (rain and snow),
storm patterns, sea level and wind patterns. In addition, climate change is expected to lead to increased drought, impacts on
the supply of water and energy, and changes in wildlife patterns and biodiversity. Consequences for aviation include reduced aircraft
performance, changing demand patterns, potential damage to infrastructure, loss of capacity and schedule disruption.
All of these factors will affect aircraft design, manufacturing, maintenance, and use, stressing the system.
(2) Choice of Airframe :
The Air Current
describes the competitive environment that led Boeing to upgrade the 737 to the 737 MAX, instead of building a new plane:
Boeing wanted to replace the 737. The plan had even earned the endorsement of its now-retired chief executive. We're gonna
do a new airplane," Jim McNerney
said in February of that same year. "We're not done evaluating this whole situation yet, but our current bias is to not re-engine,
is to move to an all-new airplane at the end of the decade." History went in a different direction. Airbus, riding its
same decades-long incremental strategy and chipping away at Boeing's market supremacy, had made no secret of its plans to
put new engines on the A320. But its own re-engineered jet somehow managed to take Boeing by surprise. Airbus and American forced
Boeing's hand. It had to put new engines on the 737 to stay even with its rival .
Why? The earlier butchered launch of the 787:
Boeing justified the decision thusly: There were huge and excruciatingly painful near-term obstacles on its way to a new single-aisle
airplane. In the summer of 2011, the 787 Dreamliner wasn't yet done after billions invested and years of delays. More than 800
airplanes later here in 2019, each 787 costs less to build than sell, but it's
still running a $23 billion production
cost deficit. .
The 737 Max was Boeing's ticket to holding the line on its position "both market and financial" in the near term. Abandoning
the 737 would've meant walking away from its golden goose that helped finance the astronomical costs of the 787 and the development
of the 777X.
So, we might think of Boeing as a runner who's tripped and fallen: The initial stumble, followed by loss of balance, was the 787;
with the 737 MAX, Boeing hit the surface of the track.
(3) Aerodynamic Issues : The
Air Current
also describes the aerodynamic issues created by the decision to re-engine the 737:
Every airplane development is a series of compromises, but to deliver the 737 Max with its promised fuel efficiency, Boeing
had to fit 12 gallons into a 10 gallon jug. Its bigger engines made for creative solutions as it found a way to mount the larger
CFM International turbines under the notoriously low-slung jetliner. It lengthened the nose landing gear by eight inches, cleaned
up the aerodynamics of the tail cone, added new winglets, fly-by-wire spoilers and big displays for the next generation of pilots.
It pushed technology, as it had done time and time again with ever-increasing costs, to deliver a product that made its jets more-efficient
and less-costly to fly.
In the case of the 737 Max, with its nose pointed high in the air, the larger engines "generating their own lift" nudged it
even higher. The risk Boeing found through analysis and later flight testing was that under certain high-speed conditions both
in wind-up turns and wings-level flight, that upward nudge created a greater risk of stalling.
Its solution was MCAS , the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System control law that would allow for both generations
of 737 to behave the same way. MCAS would automatically trim the horizontal stabilizer to bring the nose down, activated with
Angle of Attack data. It's now at the center of the Lion Air investigation and stalking the periphery of the Ethiopian crash.
(4) Systems Engineering : Amazingly, there is what in a less buttoned-down world that commercial aviation would be called a Boeing
737 fan site, which describes the MCAS system in more technical terms
:
MCAS was introduced to counteract the pitch up effect of the LEAP-1B engines at high AoA [Angle of Attack]. The engines were
both larger and relocated slightly up and forward from the previous NG CFM56-7 engines to accomodate their larger diameter. This
new location and size of the nacelle causes it to produce lift at high AoA; as the nacelle is ahead of the CofG [Center of Gravity]
this causes a pitch-up effect which could in turn further increase the AoA and send the aircraft closer towards the stall. MCAS
was therefore introduced to give an automatic nose down stabilizer input during steep turns with elevated load factors (high AoA)
and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall.
Unfortunately for Boeing and the passengers its crashed aircraft were carrying, the MCAS system was very poorly implemented.Reading between the lines (I've helpfully labeled the pain points):
Boeing have been working on a software modification to MCAS since the Lion Air accident. Unfortunately although originally
due for release in January it has still not been released due to both engineering challenges and differences of opinion among
some federal and company safety experts over how extensive the changes should be.
Apparently there have been discussions about potentially adding [A] enhanced pilot training and possibly mandatory [B] cockpit
alerts to the package. There also has been consideration of more-sweeping design changes that would prevent [C] faulty signals
from a single sensor from touching off the automated stall-prevention system.
[A] Pilot training was originally not considered necessary, because MCAS was supposed to give 737 MAX the same flight
characteristics as earlier 737s; that's why pilots weren't told about it. (This also kept the price low.) [B] Such alerts exist now,
as part of an optional package, which Lion did not buy. [C] The single sensor was the result of regulatory capture, not to say
gaming; see below.
(The MCAS system is currently the system fingered as the cause of both the Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes; we won't know for sure
until the forensics are complete. Here, however, is
the scenario for an MCAS-induced crash :
Black box data retrieved after the Lion Air crash indicates that a single faulty sensor -- a vane on the outside of the
fuselage that measures the plane's "angle of attack," the angle between the airflow and the wing -- triggered MCAS multiple times
during the deadly flight, initiating a tug of war as the system repeatedly pushed the nose of the plane down and the pilots wrestled
with the controls to pull it back up, before the final crash.
(5) Regulatory Capture : Commercial aircraft need to be certified by the FAA before launch. The
Washington Post labels today's process "self-certification":
The FAA's publication of pilot training requirements for the Max 8 in the fall of 2017 was among the final steps in a multiyear
approval process carried out under the agency's now 10-year-old policy of entrusting Boeing and other aviation manufacturers to
certify that their own systems comply with U.S. air safety regulations.
In practice, one Boeing engineer would conduct a test of a particular system on the Max 8, while another Boeing engineer
would act as the FAA's representative , signing on behalf of the U.S. government that the technology complied with federal safety
regulations, people familiar with the process said.
(Note that a 10-year-old process would have begun in the Obama administration, so the regulatory process is bipartisan.) I
understand that " safety culture " is real and strong, but imagine the same
role-playing concept applied to finance: One bankers plays the banker, and the other banker plays Bill Black, and after a time they
switch roles . Clearly a system that will work until it doesn't. More:
The process was occurring during a period when the Transportation Department's Office of Inspector General was warning
the FAA that its oversight of manufacturers' work was insufficient.
Four years after self-certification began, fires aboard Boeing's 787 Dreamliner jets led to the grounding of the fleet and
a wave of questions about whether self-certification had affected the FAA's oversight.
Why "self-certification"? Investigative reporting from
the Seattle Times -- the article is worth reading in full -- explains:
The FAA, citing lack of funding and resources, has over the years delegated increasing authority to Boeing to take on more
of the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes.
Alert readers will note the similarity to
the Neoliberal Playbook , where government systems are sabotaged in order to privatize them, but in this case regulatory capture
seems to have happened "by littles," rather than out of open, ideological conviction (as with the UKs's NHS, or our Post Office,
our Veteran's Administration, etc.).
(6) Transfer of Authority to Boeing : In the case of the 737 Max, regulatory capture was so great that certification authority
was transferred to Boeing. In order to be certified, a "System Safety Analysis" for MCAS had to be performed.
The Seattle Times :
The safety analysis:
Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the
plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther
than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of
the system repeatedly pushing the airplane's nose downward. Assessed a failure of the system as one level below "catastrophic."
But even that "hazardous" danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor --
and yet that's how it was designed.
So who certified MCAS? Boeing self-certified it. Once again
The Seattle Times :
Several FAA technical experts said in interviews that as certification proceeded, managers prodded them to speed the process.
Development of the MAX was lagging nine months behind the rival Airbus A320neo. Time was of the essence for Boeing .
"There wasn't a complete and proper review of the documents," the former engineer added. "Review was rushed to reach certain
certification dates."
In this atmosphere, the System Safety Analysis on MCAS, just one piece of the mountain of documents needed for certification,
was delegated to Boeing .
(I'm skipping a lengthy discussion of even more technical detail for MCAS, which includes discrepancies between what Boeing self-certified,
and what the FAA thought that it had certified, along with the MCAS system acting like a ratchet, so it didn't reset itself, meaning
that each time it kicked in, the nose was pitched down even lower. Yikes. Again, the article is worth reading in full; if you've
ever done tech doc, you'll want to scream and run.)
(7) Political Economy : This tweet is especially interesting, because even I know that
Muddy Waters Research is a famous short seller:
What's the
result? Two $BA planes have been grounded:
787 and Max. Last FAA grounding of a type of plane was 1979. In the case of the Max, FAA outsourced more than planned bc BA was
9 months behind Airbus 320neo 3/4 2 replies 4 retweets 19 likes
This is a great example of real short-termism by a corporate. It's clearly in
$BA LT interest to have robust cert system,
but those chickens come home to roost years later, allowing mgmt to meet ST expectations. BTW, semi-annual reporting would do
NOTHING to fix this mentality. 4
And here we are! There are a myriad of other details, but many of them will only prove out once the black boxes are examined and
the forensics are complete.
* * *
It should be clear at this point that the central claims of Muilenburg's letter are false. I understand that commercial
aviation is a business, but if that is so, then Muilenburg's claim that Boeing's commitment to safety is "absolute" cannot possibly
be true; indeed, the choice to re-engine the 737 had nothing to do with safety. Self-certification makes Boeing "a judge in its own
cause," and that clearly contradicts Muilenburg's absurd claim that "safety" -- as opposed to profit -- "is at the core of who we
are."
The self-certification debacle that allowed MCAS to be released happened on Muilenburg's watch and is already causing Boeing
immense reputational damage, and a criminal case, not to mention the civil cases that are surely coming, will only increase that
damage. Mr. Market, the Beltway, and even Trump, if his trade deals are affected, will all soon be bellowing for a sacrificial victim.
Muilenburg should recognize the inevitable and gracefully resign. Given his letter, it looks unlikely that he will do the right thing.
IIRC, one of the big constraints that was leveled was the need to keep the 737, regardless of version, into the same height
relative to all other generations of the 737, whereas Airbus kept their height a lot higher than the 737.
If you look at many 737's over the years, some of the engine's nacelles were flat at the bottom to accommodate larger engine.
Why? Boeing kept the height the same in order to maintain built-in stairs that, with virtually all airports having adjustable
jetways, was basically redundant.
When you compare an A320xeo against a B737, you'll find that the Airbus rides higher when it comes to the jetways.
It seems to me that the Boeing 737-Max with the heavier, larger fuel-saving engines is so unbalanced (tilting over and then
crashing if not "overridden" by a computer compensation) that it never should have been authorized in the first place.
When Boeing decided to add a much larger engine, it should have kept the airplane in balance by (1) shifting it forward or
backward so that the weight did not tip the plane, and (2) created a larger landing-gear base so that the large engines wouldn't
scrape the ground.
The problem was that Boeing tried to keep using the old chassis with the larger engines under the wings – rather than changing
the wings, moving them forward or aft, and expanding the plane to permit a more appropriate landing gear.
The computer system has been blamed for not being a "smart enough" workaround to tell the plane not to plunge down when it
already is quite close to the ground – with no perception of altitude, not to mention double-checking on the wind speed from both
sensors.
Beyond that ultimate problem is the ultimate regulatory problem: regulatory capture of the FAA by the airline companies.
As a result, the FAA represents "its customers" the airplane makers, not the public users and customers. This is like the banks
capturing the Fed, the Justice Dept. and Treasury to promote their own interests by claiming that "self-regulation" works. Self-regulation
is the polite word for fraudulent self-indulgence.
I would be surprised if the European Airbus competitors do not mount a campaign to block the 737-Max's from landing, and
insisting that Boeing buy them back. This gives Airbus a few years to grab the market for these planes.
This probably will throw Trump's China trade fight into turmoil, as China was the first country to ground the 737-Max's
and is unlikely to permit their recovery without a "real" federal safety oversight program. Maybe Europe, China and other countries
henceforth will each demand that their own public agencies certify the plane, so as to represent users and stakeholders, not only
stockholders.
> "Maybe Europe, China and other countries henceforth will each demand that their own public agencies certify the plane."
As if the 737 MAX were the chlorinated chicken of aircraft.
* * *
I'm not sure about redesigning the wing and the landing gear. That might be tantamount to designing a new plane. (I do know
that the landing gear is so low because the first 737s needed to accommodate airports without jetways, and so there may be other
facets of the design that also depend on those original requirements that might have to be changed.)
Regulatory capture is rampant throughout the economy. Boeing self-certification being delegated by the FAA is not unlike
the situation with electric transmission utilities.
After the 2003 northeast & Canada blackout, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005. It directed FERC to create an "electric
reliability organization". Previously there were voluntary organizations set up after the 1966 blackout to establish operating
standards in the industry. One of them was the North American Electric Reliability Council which morphed into the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) in 2006.
NERC is headquartered in Atlanta and employs hundreds of people. The standards setting generally takes place in NERC Committees
and Subcommittees and sometimes from FERC itself. These are typically packed with industry people, with a patina of diversity
that includes some governmental types and large industrial consumers. Let it suffice to say the electric transmission industry
itself largely sets the rules how it operates.
Now consider the article in yesterday's NYT "
How PG&E Ignored
California Fire Risks in Favor of Profits ". The transmission circuit featured in the article (the Caribou-Palermo line) that
caused the destruction of Paradise is a transmission line that is subject to both FERC and NERC regulation. As described
in the article the circuit had many previous failures and was well beyond its design life.
However, both FERC and NERC have a laser focus on "market players" (think Enron or JP Morgan) and system operations (e.g.,
prevent collapses like the blackout of 2003). AFIK, neither FERC or NERC have prescriptive standards for routine maintenance or
inspection and replacement (i.e., very expensive capital replacement that was not done on the Caribou-Palermo line), these are
left to the discretion of the transmission owner. While substantive information about electric reliability is maintained by industry
trade groups and submitted to FERC, what is available to the public is generally useless and subjected to scrubbing and polishing
(often under the guise of Critical Energy Infrastructure Information).
We can see how self-policing work, can't we??? Rent-seeking market players can arbitrage markets, inflating prices consumers
pay and make billions in profits, while California burns.
The neglectful rot in California is endemic in the industry as a whole.
That Seattle Times investigative story is indeed very good and a rare instance of newspaper writers troubling to carefully
and cogently explain a technical issue.
In hindsight Boeing would have perhaps been better off to leave off the MCAS altogether and depend on pilot retraining
to cover the altered handling.
One reason they may not have was that crash several years ago of a commuter plane in upstate NY where the plane started to
stall and the confused pilot pulled up on the controls rather than making the airplane dive to regain speed. Still one has to
believe that no automation is better than badly designed or malfunctioning automation.
"depend on pilot retraining to cover the altered handling"
IANAP, but maybe the problem is that "nose up" situations can go south very quickly. For those with the stomach for it, there
are videos on youtube of the 747 freighter that went nose up at Bagram a few years ago (perhaps due to loose cargo shifting backwards
on takeoff). It was over very quickly.
Yes, I was impressed with it. Unfortunately the investigation precludes Boeing from responding as they did indicate they would
have had something to say about it otherwise. But the analysis looks pretty cut and dried:
Boeing underestimated the risk rating for the sensor, excluding the possibility of a catastrophic failure as occurred in
the two incidents to date;
Boeing also failed to implement the redundancy that would have been required even for their lower risk rating;
Manual correction by the pilot as a possible risk mitigation was constrained by the fact that pilots weren't trained on
the new system due to commercial factors.
Fixing any one of those three issues would have averted the disasters, although #3 is pretty precarious as you're relying on
manual pilot actions to correct what is a clear systems defect at that point.
It sounds like #1 was partly because they failed to account for all the scenarios, like repeat activation raising the risk
profile in certain circumstances. This is very easy to do and a robust review process is your best defense. So we could add the
tight timelines and rushed process as a contributing factor for #1, and probably the others as well.
People who work on accident investigation would probably agree on 2 things:
(o) Accidents are invariably a confluence of a myriad of factors that all happened to line up on one day. There is never
a single cause of an accident.
(o) A minor change to some part of the system would have prevented the accident.
So while there is much to be profitably learned by investigating everything here, an effective "fix" may be surprisingly (or
suspiciously) small in scope. There will be much clamoring for the whole plane to be resigned or scrapped, for better or worse.
The Colgan crash, whose pilot, Renfrew, was chatting with the co-pilot below the allowed altitude? And who had apparently lied
about his background, and had a pay-to-play pilot's license?
I think the Air France Airbus 447 also had a high-altitude stall (due to a faulty air speed sensor) and needed its nose pushed
down, not up (which the copilots didn't realize).
Also, very informative article / OP, thanks for posting.
MCAS was added to change the behavior of the plane from to tend to stall as speed increases. That is stall and crash, because
such a high speed stall makes polit recovery very, very difficult.
In addition the MCAS driven amount of elevator change was initially 0.6 to 2.5, which indicates the 0.6 increment was found
to be too low.
According to a detailed FAA briefing to legislators, Boeing will change the MCAS software to give the system input from
both angle-of-attack sensors.
It will also limit how much MCAS can move the horizontal tail in response to an erroneous signal. And when activated, the
system will kick in only for one cycle, rather than multiple times.
Boeing also plans to update pilot training requirements and flight crew manuals to include MCAS.
–Seattle Times
So apparently the greater elevator setting is not so necessary that they are not willing to reduce it. Also the max power setting
would normally be on take off when the pilots are required to manually fly the plane.
Yes, that was an excellent Seattle times piece. Surprising to see that kind of truth-telling and, especially, *clarity* in
an MSM piece these days. So what's the angle?
Reports I've read indicates that Boeing ignored even the clearly inadequate certification. "Documentation provided to the
FAA claims that the MCAS system can only adjust the horizontal tail on the plane by 0.6 degrees out of a maximum of five-degrees
of nose-down movement. But that limit was later increased to 2.5-degrees of nose-down movement. Boeing didn't communicate the
change from 0.6-degrees to 2.5-degrees until after Lion Air."
Apparently this was done after simulations showed that 0.6 degrees was inadequate and the new 2.5 degree setting was not extensively
tested before the planes were rolled out. IANAL, but this may be a serious problem for Boeing. Boeing could also be liable
for damages due to 737 groundings and due to delays in delivery of contracted planes.
Big question is how 737 issues will affect 777X rollout, due at the end of the year. If 777X certification is called into question,
this may cause further delays and put it at a further disadvantage against A350.
The 777 has been a great plane. Let's all pray the MBAs didn't fuck it up, too.
If I were Boeing, I'd have a team looking into the 777 certification process right now. And I'd set up a whistleblower line
(so the Seattle Times doesn't get to the story first).
The analogy has been made between this the 737 MAX story and the Tylenol story. J&J got out in front of the problem and
saved the product (and their company). Boeing's problem is of that order, and Muilenberg -- that letter! -- seems incapable of
understanding that; insular, arrogant. One more reason to fire the dude toot sweet. If he comes out of his next review with a
raise -- Everything Is Like CalPERS™ -- consider shorting Boeing
Thanks, Lambert, for post and comments. I don't know if this angle has been covered or explored: the relatively new way that
Boeing now "manufactures" "tests" and "assembles" parts of its planes. I had dinner with new acquaintance, Boeing engineer for
decades (I live near a plant in WA state). For the last few years, this engineer is stationed half year in Russia annually to
oversee assembly there. In this newish, more profitable manufacturing system for Boeing, the parts come in from around the world
with sketchy quality control, are then assembled by Russian workers this engineer (and other Boeing employees sent from States)
supposedly oversees. But the engineer doesn't speak Russian and has too little access to translators .Needless to say, this engineer
is planning an exit as soon as possible. Having grown up in WA state for 60 years with neighbors/friends who were Boeing engineers,
assemblers, line workers, etc it makes me heart sick to see the current decimation of talent, rigor and wages with additional
far-flung assembly factories (Russia with few translators?! who knew?). Might these manufacturing/assemblying "improvements" also
be a contributing factor in these terrifying woes for Boeing?
Thanks for this Lambert, fantastically informative and interesting post.
Self regulation only works when liability is transferred with it – over example, in construction whereby certification by the
engineers or architects designing the building are also taking on liability in the event something goes wrong. It seems unlikely
that this is the situation with Boeing.
Allowing this to happen seems the ultimate in short term thinking by Boeing. US manufacturers have always had an advantage
over competitors because the FAA was held in such high regard worldwide that it was the de facto world safety regulatory
body – every country followed its lead. But this chipping away of its authority has led to a near fatal loss of faith, and will
no doubt lead to European and Asian regulatory authorities being strengthened. And no doubt commercial realities will mean they
will look much more closely at US manufactured aircraft if there is some benefit to their own manufacturers.
Airbus will no doubt try to take advantage – just as Boeing (with some justification) tried to focus attention on the Air France
Airbus loss which was attributed at least in part to excessive automation. China is pushing hard with its new Comac aircraft,
but they seem to be poorly regarded worldwide (only Chinese airlines are buying). The Canadians have missed their chance with
the Bombadier C-series.
The more I read of this the more baffling it is. What was there stopping Boeing from just highlighting the changes and installing
an easy manual override instead of this hidden change with effectively no way to permanently do so? Especially when in crisis
mode? One could make a case of no extra training needed so long as the pilot knows about it and can easily turn it off.
I didn't see this before I posted my response. A more concise statement of my thoughts. This plus more robust redundant sensors.
Penny wise and pound foolish.
The Times thinks Boeing is too big to fail. Without a blockbuster Max, I don't see how Boeing maintains its current status
in the industry.
I am leaning towards thinking the kludgy design of the 727 Max could have been rolled out with no major problems if Boeing
had been up front about design changes, made a robust and conservative MCAS, fully at the command of the pilot, and provided ample
training for the new aircraft.
They still could have saved billions on the airframe. They would have had to acknowledge the significant modifications to the
airlines with the attendant training and other costs and delays. They would have lost some sales. They still would have been far
ahead of Airbus and light years ahead of where they are now.
I also think they have been completely afflicted by the defense contractor mentality.
Note that Muilenberg came up through the defense side of the company not the commercial aircraft side. He may simply not
have been equipped to understand FAA regulation at any deep level, hence the rot that finally surfaced.
The 737 Max crashes and Brexit are the chickens coming home to roost. NC is a treasure for your coverage of both.
Clearly upper management in Chicago only knows short term finance. Boeing stuck with old fashion hydraulic controls in the
737 but faced with an unacceptable flight characteristics of the larger more efficient engines added a fly-by-wire system to compensate
for it.
The criminal charges are that besides being a faulty design (it relies on one fragile exposed sensor that if out of position
keeps triggering dives until switched off) but Boeing hid it and self-certified that it was safe. Adding a discrepancy warning
and position indicator for the two independent flight sensors to the cockpit video display is an extra cost feature.
Neither of the planes that crashed had the added safety display. All are cost saving measures. Finally, if a faulty sensor
triggers dives, the pilot at the controls is busy with both hands on the yoke forcing the airplane to stay in the air with stall
and proximity warnings are sounding. The second pilot also must realize what's going on, immediately turn off the electricity
to the screw jack motor and manually turn the stabilizer trim wheel to neutral.
You can't learn this on an iPad. Both pilots should practice it together in a Flight Simulator. If the co-pilot was experienced,
unlike the one in the Ethiopian crash; just maybe, they could have survived the repeated attempts by the airplane to dive into
the ground on takeoff.
The tragedy is that corporate media in pursuit of profits will keep us up to date but will never mention the 6 or 8 minutes
of terror for the 346 souls aboard the two flights. They will cover the criminal negligence trial if there are ever indictments.
But, the news reports never will say that neoliberalism, deregulation, and privatization are the root causes of the deaths.
> if a faulty sensor triggers dives, the pilot at the controls is busy with both hands on the yoke forcing the airplane
to stay in the air with stall and proximity warnings are sounding. The second pilot also must realize what's going on, immediately
turn off the electricity to the screw jack motor and manually turn the stabilizer trim wheel to neutral. You can't learn this
on an iPad. Both pilots should practice it together in a Flight Simulator. If the co-pilot was experienced, unlike the one
in the Ethiopian crash; just maybe, they could have survived the repeated attempts by the airplane to dive into the ground
on takeoff.
That's what I mean by horrid UI/UX. Might as well as both pilots to pat their heads and rub their tummies in synch. And since
the two pilots have to both understand what's going on, we've multiplied the chances for failure.
Boeing also clearly did not know its customers . It should be engineering for the sort of pilots who are going to be hired
by Lion Air, or any rapidly expanding airline in what we used to all the Third World. Hegemony, it seems, makes you insular and
provincial.
Added cost, "mandatory" safety feature. Does not seem to square with the [soon to be former?] CEO's apology-industry written
claim to be committed to absolute safety.
"The FAA, citing lack of funding and resource": I don't suppose I'll survive to see any arm of government not blame
lack of funds for its boneheaded or corrupt incompetence.
But the bigger picture: suppose the FAA is to do its job properly. From where is it going to recruit its staff?
Smaller picture: it doesn't really matter whether the cocked-up MCAS killed all those people or not. Even if it's innocent
of the charge, the account of its development and application is a horror story.
Bigger picture: what other horrors have been hidden by Boeing?
> the account of its development and application is a horror story.
That's how I feel. The tech doc department at Boeing sounds like a horrible place to work; MBAs or their goons telling
you all the time to do stuff you know is wrong. It's not surprising people were willing to talk to the Seattle Times; I bet there
are more people. (Hey, Seattle Times! How about people testing the 737 MAX in simulators (assuming this is done)).
Sounds like the MBAs in Chicago have been busy planting land mines everywhere. Somebody stepped on this one; there are others.
The unfortunate pilots were made test pilots; the unsuspecting passengers: Guinea pigs. Lab rats. And paid for the privilege.
Some others may share this opinion. Change one little thing? Chaos Theory Rules. Same with weather/climate; folks. That rant is
for later.
Boeing stuck with old fashion hydraulic controls in the 737 but faced with an unacceptable flight characteristics of the
larger more efficient engines added a fly-by-wire system to compensate for it.
Interestingly, and maybe relevant to the problem of confusion for the pilots, is that Boeing has had another automatic
trim-modifier operating on its 737s for some time, the speed-trim system (STS):
This system also modifies the stabilizer position during manual flight. Like MCAS, it was brought in to improve stability
under certain flight conditions (the reasons for which are far beyond my knowledge). There is an indication that the pilots on
the flight before the Lion Air crash misinterpreted MCAS actions for STS behavior.
At what point does "crapification" become insufficient to describe Boeing's product and process here? At what point do we have
to speak of " ford-pintofication"?
OK, I'm told to resubmit my crib re: "Boeing options" from the ZeroHedge "tweetstorm" by Trevot Sumner, and include a link
got it:
Economic problem. Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light, which lets
pilots know that this problem was happening. Both 737MAXes that crashed were delivered without this option. No 737MAX with
this option has ever crashed
Ooops! "Options package"? Wait, a "package" that in the interim corrects a potentially catastrophic mfg. defect and airlines
have to pay for it? Whoa, here's your late capitalism in play.
> Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light
This is one of the details I could not get to (and we don't 100% know this is an issue until the forensics are done. Right
now, we have narrative. Truly excellent narrative to be sure -- if only we thought of government the same way as pilots think
of their aircraft! -- but narrative nonetheless).
Let me see if I have this right. Pilots, chime in!
"Authority" is one of the big words in this discussion; MCAS takes authority away from the pilot (and can do in such a drastic
fashion as to crash the plane). Worse, the default case is that it can do so on the basis of a single sensor reading. In a design
appropriate to the consequences for failure (i.e., a different design from that described in the "System Safety Analysis" that
Boeing self-certified) MCAS would take readings from two sensors, and if they disagreed, authority would revert to the pilot
. That's a general principle at Boeing, and so it's reasonable for pilots to assume that they retain authority of MCAS has not
told them they don't have it any more.
Hence, the disagree light, which tells the pilots to take back authority because the sensors are confused. However, I think
there are UI/UX issues with that, given that the 737 cockpit is extremely noisy and pilots have a lot to do on take-off. So a
light might not be the answer. (The light also strikes me as a kludge; first, MCAS feels to me like a kludge, in that we're making
the aircraft flyable only through software.* Fine for fighter jets, which can be inherently unstable, but perhaps not so fine
for commercial aircraft? Then we have a second kludge, a light to tell us that the first kludge has kicked in. I dunno.)
NOTE * However, it's also true that automation affects flight characteristics all the time. So I'm not sure how savage to make
this indictment.
The AOA indication is Service Bulletin 737-31-1650 (there may be others) and is on the both Pilot Flight Displays (PFDs). Pilots
would likely abort a takeoff if they saw the indication come on before getting airborne.
"Boeing has been in the business of aviation safety for more than 100 years, "
How many years ago did Wall Street take over the fortunes of the company? Why did they move their headquarters from their
birthplace of Seattle to Chicago? Why did they start assembling planes in South Carolina and China? Was it to improve aviation
safety? Or, to allow the profiteering parasites to feed off the carcass of the company?
I want to fly on Boeing planes put together by well paid members of the Seattle Machinists Union, not low wage peons. Let's
not even mention the maintenance of American aircraft in China and El Salvador.
President Trump, here's a reelection tip: "Today I am declaring that all American registered aircraft flying in American
airspace must be maintained in the U.S."
> "Today I am declaring that all American registered aircraft flying in American airspace must be maintained in the U.S."
Amazingly, Trump seems to have done OK on this. First, he didn't cave to Muilenberg's (insane, goofy, tone-deaf) request
to keep the 737 flying; then he frames the issue as complexity (correct, IMNSHO), and then he manages to
nominate a Delta CEO as head of the FAA .
And your suggestion is very good one. I wonder if he could do that by executive order? And I wonder how many grey-beards would
come off the golf courses to help out? I bet a lot.
The aircraft is NOT CRAP!!! However. It should have been flown A WHOLE LOT MORE before receiving certification.
*Real* test pilots should have their a–es on the line ; operating for a lot more hours at *the edge of the envelope*, as it
is known. Stability should be by design; not software*patch*. Patch this!
What portion of its' MCAS system flight testing was in computer simulation? Like the so-called Doppler Radar; which *magically*
predicts what the future will bring; while the experts pitch it as fact? And make life-or-death decisions on the theoretical data???
Rush to market; markets rule. We can die.
Agreed, but I think we're seeing signs that a crapification process has begun on the safety side in this industry. (It
has been proceeding for years on the service/amenities side.)
Didn't say it was. The headline reads "Boeing Crapification," not "737 Crapification."
That said, the 737 clearly has issues, as Boeing itself knew, since if they'd had their druthers, they would have launched
a new plane to replace it. See point #2.
> What portion of its' MCAS system flight testing was in computer simulation?
That is a very good question. If I understand the aerodynamics issues aright, MCAS would be most likely to kick in at takeoff,
which raises a host of UI/UX issues because the pilots are very busy at that time. So was MCAS not tested in the simulators? If
so, how on earth was a scenario that included sensor failure not included? It may be that there are more issues with Boeing's
engineering process than the documentation issues raised by the Seattle Times, though those are bad enough.
I say the 737-whatever is a flying Turd, and always has been. It has a bad wing design which means it has to fly nose up compared
to other models( I always remember that when going to the restroom while going somewhere on one). And because of its poor design
it has to takeoff and land at higher speeds. So when flying into someplace like Mexico City it can be quite a harrowing experience,
and the smell of cooking brakes is relatively normal.
Boeing never should have let go of the 757. Now that was a good plane that was simply ahead of its time.
Considering the fact that all these 737s are grounded as no airline trust them to not kill a plane load of passengers and
crew, this is a really big deal. Putting aside the technical and regulatory issues, the fact is that the rest of the world no
longer trusts the US in modern aviation so what we have here is a trust issue which is an even bigger deal.
We now know that the FAA does not audit the work done for these aircraft but the airlines themselves do it. It cannot be just
Boeing but the other aircraft manufacturers as well. Other countries are going to be asking some very hard questions before forking
over their billions to a US aircraft manufacturer in future. Worse is when Ethiopia refused to hand over the black boxes to the
US but gave them instead to a third party.
That was saying that based on how you treated the whole crash, we do not trust you to do the job right and not to change some
of the results. It has been done before, ironically enough by France who the Ethiopians gave the black boxes to. And when you
lose trust, it takes a very long time to gain it back again – if ever. But will the changes be made to do so? I would guess no.
But if the discount foreign airlines had just trained their pilots and paid for the non-crashintothegroundat500mph upgrade,
all of this could have been avoided.
> we have here is a trust issue which is an even bigger deal
Loss or at least wobbliness of imperial hegemony, like. It's not just the aircraft, it's US standards-setting bodies, methods,
"safety culture," even -- dare we say it -- English as the language of aviation. French is no longer the language of diplomacy,
after all, though it had a good run.
Because markets. Neoliberalism puts everything up for sale. Including regulation. Oversimplifying absurdly: And so you
end up with the profit-driven manufacturer buying the regulator, its produce killing people, and the manufacturer canceling its
future profits. That's what the Bearded One would call a contradiction.*
NOTE * There ought to be a way to reframe contradiction in terms of Net Present Value which would not be what we think it is,
under that model.
I wish it were as complete as it should be! There are a ton of horrid details about sensors, the UI/UX for the MCAS system,
737 cockpit design, decisions by the marketing department, and training and maintenance for Asian airlines that I just couldn't
get to. (Although most of those presume that the forensics have already been done.) But I felt that dollying back for the big
picture was important to. Point #1 is important, in that all the factors that drove the 737 decision making are not only still
in place, they're intensifying, so we had better adjust our systems (assuming Boeing remains a going concern -- defenestrating
Muilenberg would be an excellent way to show we accept the seriousness of customer and international concern).
Bloomberg is reporting that : "The Indonesia safety committee report said the plane had had multiple failures on previous flights
and hadn't been properly repaired."
And the day before when the same plane had the problem that killed everyone the next day: "The so-called dead-head pilot on
the earlier flight from Bali to Jakarta told the crew to cut power to the motor driving the nose down, according to the people
familiar, part of a checklist that all pilots are required to memorize."
There's an enormous expansion of air travel in Asia. The lower end -- not flag -- carriers like Lion Air and also Air Asia
are in that business to be cheap ; they're driven by expansion and known to be run by cowboys.
That said, know your customer . I would translate this into an opportunity for Boeing to sell these airlines a service
package for training their ground operations. But it seems that cutting costs is the only thing the MBAs in Chicago understand.
Pilots, pipe up!
Pilot training and requirements are in the hands of the country, not Boeing. If the story that the copilot of the Ethiopian
Airlines plane had only 200 hours of experience that is astounding.
In the US that requirement is 1500 hours. In addition most US airlines would require more than that. And then they slot 'beginning'
pilots for flights in good (better) weather as high minimums pilot.
"sell these airlines a service package" That won't help an airline that is in the business to be cheap. The Indonesia airplane
was repeatedly reported for problems in prior days/flights that was never fixed.
and this quote makes an interesting follow-on to the thread yesterday with 737 Pilot (which Lambert linked to in the first
paragraph here):
"The combination of factors required to bring down a plane in these circumstances suggests other issues may also have occurred
in the Ethiopia crash, said Jeffrey Guzzetti, who also directed accident investigations at FAA and is now a consultant.
"It's simply implausible that this MCAS deficiency by itself can down a modern jetliner with a trained crew," Guzzetti said."
Setting aside Mr Guzzetti's background (dismissing his claim here as tendentious right off the bat would strike me as uncharitable),
and without wishing to exculpate anyone, it does lend some credence to the idea that Ethiopia Airlines may have some contributory
negligence here, staffing the flight with such an inexperienced first officer.
Setting aside Mr Guzzetti's background (dismissing his claim here as tendentious right off the bat would strike me as uncharitable),
and without wishing to exculpate anyone, it does lend some credence to the idea that Ethiopia Airlines may have some contributory
negligence here, staffing the flight with such an inexperienced first officer.
One can often point to inexperience, incompetence, stupidity, incompetence or just bad luck when some disaster happens, but
Boeing counted on perfect performance from flight crews to successfully work with a workaround needed for other workarounds that
needed perfect performance to not catastrophically fail. I know enough about complexity that you cannot depend on perfection because
something will always fail.
Your excellent summary lacks some MCAS details that are not widely reported by the general-audience press.
Like you, I am a retired software engineer, so I have followed an aviation blog discussion of this issue quite closely
since it emerged as a probable software and system design failure. As the blog is open to all, its signal-to-noise ratio is pretty
low, but it seems not too difficult for any technically-minded person to separate the wheat from the chaff. My current understanding,
which I believe others here are in a position to correct, if necessary:
A. The requirement for MCAS apparently emerged very late in the MAX's development, when it became clear that the upper cowling
around the larger engines, being moved up and forward with respect to earlier 737 versions, adds nose-up force as the angle of
attack (AoA) approaches the upper limits of the MAX's operating envelope because at such angles, the cowling itself generates
lift beyond that of the wing.
B. As perceived by a pilot flying manually (not on autopilot), this added nose-up force makes it easier to pull back on the
control column ("stick"), increasing the AoA further. This is like a car running off the asphalt onto a muddy shoulder: the steering
wheel wants to turn the wrong way (toward the ditch) rather than the right way (back on the road).
C. An FAA regulation prohibits certification of an aircraft that presents the pilot with changing stick forces near stall that
nudge the pilot toward the wrong reaction, 14 CFR 25.203(a)
, IIRC (unfortunately, I can't find the original blog citation).
D. MCAS was put in place to satisfy this certification requirement -- not to automagically correct stalls without pilot action.
E. Other means of meeting this requirement exist, ranging from an airframe redesign that avoids the extra nose-up effect of
the larger repositioned engines down to a "stick pusher" that increases the force a pilot would need to pull the stick back further
in this situation.
F. Any of the other options would negate one or both of the MAX's chief selling points: little cost or schedule impact to Boeing
(in a rush to meet the Airbus 320 NEO challenge) and to its customers ("No new flight crew training necessary, because to the
pilot, the MAX feels just like its 737 predecessors.") That is, all the other options introduce new hardware to a completed design
and the more fundamental changes could require new type certification.
G. The easiest fix was pure software: at high indicated AoA, under manual control, and with flaps up, automatically rotate
the horizontal stabilizer a little bit nose-down, which increases the pressure needed to pull the stick back (nose-up). No need
to tell the pilot about this in training or real time, since it's just to make MAX feel like any other 737.
H. The design presented for certification described a single small rotation. Testing showed this was insufficient to provide
the tactile feedback necessary for certification in all cases, so the software fix was obvious: if the trigger conditions still
hold after a 5 sec. pause, do it again.
I. Apparently nobody asked at that point, "What if the AoA indication is stuck high?" We're under schedule and cost pressure,
so who wants to complexify things by (1) adding additional sanity-checking to the aircraft's AoA computations or (2) limiting
how many times we add a little bit of nose-down.
J. When these details combine with a consistently erroneous AoA reading, MCAS can -- if not repeatedly countermanded or disabled
and manually reversed -- eventually rotate the horizontal stabilizer to its maximum nose-down position, where it was found in
both recent incidents, IIRC.
Even if the pilots figure out that's what's happening amid a cacophony of seemingly contradictory instrument readings and warnings
(stick-shaker, trim wheel clacking, alarm chimes, and synthesized voices), the pilots still have to (1) cut power to the electrical
trim systems and (2) restore the required trim, which may then require as many as 50 manual turns of a trim wheel. If you're near
the ground, time is short
A minority of commenting pilots assert that any competently trained cockpit crew should be able to identify MCAS misbehavior
quickly and power off automatic trim per the same checklist that was prescribed for "runaway automatic trim" on every 737 variant,
MAX included. Most seem to agree that with aircraft control difficulties, multiple alarms, and disagreement among the pilot's
and first officer's airspeed and AoA readings almost from the moment of takeoff (not yet officially confirmed), an MCAS-commanded
runaway trim event may feel very different from the runaway trim flavors for which pilots have had simulator training, making
problem identification difficult even given knowledge of the earlier Lion Air incident.
I imagine most software developers and engineers have seen cost/schedule pressures lead to short cuts. If their life was at
stake, I doubt that many would think self-certification that such a project complies with all relevant safety requirements is
a good idea.
Thank you for that. And just 'wow'. I don't really know anything about aircraft/flying but this story is really fascinating
and seems to be true a sign of the times. I guess we'll know what the current 'temperature' is out there when the fallout
(civil liability, criminal liability, plane orders cancelled/ returned, etc) manifests. If Boeing skates, we'll know we've got
a long way to go.
The Post's article on the FAA and Regulatory Capture is incomplete. The process for the FAA (and probably MANY government
agencies) started under Reagan, did not revert to safety under Clinton (make government smaller and all that), and then accelerated
under Bush II in 2005 (not a bi-partisan time). In particular, big changes to the FAA were made in 2005 that were executive in
nature and did not require Congressional approval. CF:
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/delegating-aircraft-safety-assessments-to-boeing-is-nothing-new-for-the-faa/
Yes, but. Part of what we are seeing in this case is a rush to judgement based on less than full evidence and analysis, and
so prejudices and ideological positions (which I share actually) are plainly to be seen (and perhaps worth analyzing). "Crapification,"
says the headline.
Yet, I cannot say that I disagree with BA's business decisions as such in a highly competitive environment as regards the tradeoffs
in the development of the MAX and there is a certain absurdity in the idea that Boeing would knowingly take a high reputational
risk, in an industry where failure is front page news (contrast banking or pharma failures).
I have no reason to believe that an FAA fully in charge of all aspects of certification would have prevented these crashes,
as banking and drug regulators have not kept us safe either. What seems worthy of note is that neither the airlines that buy the
product nor the foreign aviation regulators nor pilots' associations do their own testing and certification, in an area where
more redundancy would be good. Nor is there any kind of private third party watchdog testing, like a Moody's or S&P, evaluating
potentially toxic products and services for a price.
Finally, I suppose we have to ask ourselves why the price of the stock is holding up fairly well even as the news flow on these
tragedies is helping the short sellers. Lest we forget that Boeing is the 5th largest defense contractor in the US.
Is engine throttle automated in the flight regime where these accidents occurred? Or are the pilots controlling power? Is the
lag in thrust response interacting with the MCAS in an unanticipated way? Aerodynamic lift of nacelles is mentioned several times;
there is another lift factor relating to the thrust angle; which is not necessarily aligned with the fuselage axis in flight.
Departure procedures often require speed limits and altitude changes; so it is likely multiple power demand levels get set through
takeoff and climb until cruise altitude is reached. Does Autopilot/Flight Director integrate with MCAS; or are they independent
systems? Even without touching flight controls; power changes affect pitch forces. I am wondering if consequences of manual power
changes on an otherwise automated departure were adequately investigated in the certification of the MCAS. Please excuse my ignorance
of these details.
Regulatory elements that have been getting attention include the use of *standard* weights for passengers; IIRC, 170 lbs for
US (and possibly ICAO) passengers comes to mind . Many aircraft accidents have an element of disregard for proper weight distribution,
either accidental, or negligent. For instance: Tail-heavy bad! Intentional loading outside of subsequently approved C.G. and/or
max weight limits is a common, if not ubiquitous part of determining certification limits.There is a safety factor in the certificated
limits; but banking on this; using estimates; is proven risky or disastrous when actual weights, and distribution thereof, is
uncertain. Cargo with false weight values could also occur. One might find incentive to claim lower weights than actual to save
on freight charges. How many 170 lb passengers do you know? I am not familiar with scales being used to check aircraft weight
and balance before takeoff; only calculations; based on formulas and charts.
Scales ARE USED during certain maintenance procedures; for airworthiness certificates; and following certain modifications.
Here is an interesting article by a professional pilot blogger Patrick Smith. He calls the 737, "the Frankenplane", and traces
its history all the way back to the 707 in 1959. According to Smith, "We wonder if the 737 MAX even needed to exist in the first
place. Somewhere deep down, maybe the heart of this whole fiasco is Boeing's determination to keep the 737 line going, variant
after variant, seemingly forever. I'm not saying this is the reason for what happened in Indonesia or Ethiopia, but the whole
737 program just seems misguided and unnecessary. Instead of starting from scratch with a new airframe, they took what was essentially
conceived as a regional jet in the mid-1960s, and have pushed and pushed and pushed the thing -- bigger and bigger engines, fancier
avionics and more seats -- into roles it was never intended for. The "Frankenplane," I call it.
See the article here .
As a pilot myslef, I feel the airlines have a lot to answer for as well. Their constant "dumbing down" of pilots, which comes
from making pilots work long hours for low pay, results in pilots not being the best of the best. And training is a cost to airlines.
Training doesn't result in revenue. Better to have the pilots actually flying, hence Boeing selling this new version of the 737
as not requiring further training. But, training and practice is everything in flying. Flying a plane is actually a relatively
easy skill to acquire. Most people can learn to fly a trainer in 5 hours or so. Most people solo (fly the plane without an instructor)
with only 10-20 hours of instruction. It takes a lot longer to learn how to drive a car for most people (45 hours is the average).
So it really isn't that difficult .until something goes WRONG. That is when the training kicks in. An often quoted flying truism,
is that flying is "99% boredom and 1% stark terror". What happened with these two crashes is that you had some inexperienced pilots
who were not fully trained on the systems (a lot of that blame goes to Boeing). When things start going wrong, information overload
can easily occur if you have not been properly trained, even with two pilots.
Thanks for that correction. We can expect a deluge of blame-the-other-guy PR from the aircraft manufacturer and certification
agencies. Billions are on the line for Boeing if a cascade of judgments it made materially contributed to these crashes. The usual
strategic corporate bankruptcy might follow. I presume Boeing is considered much TBTF by the USG.
Great job summarizing and connecting dots Lambert. I might add one more bullet point though. Items #5 and #6 were aided, abetted
and perhaps somewhat necessitated by 'ye ole NeoLiberal playbook' you spoke of, but more specifically, the current regulatory
FAA/Boeing milieu is attributable to years of budget cuts and strategically applied austerity. The old Grover Norquist, ' not
destroyed, but small and weak enough to be drowned in a shallow bath' saw. Exact same thing we've witnessed with other formally
effective regulators like the EPA, the SEC or the IRS.
I remember having a conversation with an FAA maintenance inspector, an old timer, about ten years ago. He looked to be upwards
of seventy, and he told me he was eight years beyond eligibility for a full retirement. He informed me that a few years back he
was supervising a team of ten people that was now down to two. Their positions had been cut outright or eliminated after they
resigned or transferred when the remaining positions were made miserable by the increased workload and bureaucratic headaches.
The inspector said he had not retired yet because he knew he would not be replaced and he felt the work was important. I asked
him if his department was atypical and he said it was not. Same thing, across the board, with the exception of the executive level
desk jobs in DC and Oklahoma City. Readers can draw their own conclusions but when it comes to funding Federal regulators, I believe
you should never attribute anything to incompetence that you could attribute to malice.
No doubt Neo-Liberal ideologues in high places pushing the corrosive "customer/client" model of regulating along with the requisite
deference and obsequious to industry played a large role as well.
I understand the published materials to boil down to this possible scenario:
To remain competitive and profitable, Boeing needed to improve the fuel efficiency and flight characteristics of a mainstay
medium-haul aircraft. Instead of designing a new aircraft, it modified an existing airframe. Among other changes, it added more
powerful engines, new lift and control surfaces, and enhanced computerized controls.
The modified Max aircraft **did not** fly like the earlier version. That meant Boeing would have to disclose information about
those changes. It would need to train pilots in them, in how to integrate new protocols into existing ones, and in what to do
if the enhanced computer controls malfunctioned, requiring the pilot to regain manual control.
These steps could have increased cost and time to market, might have involved new certifications, and might have reduced sales.
Boeing appears to have relied on enhanced computer flight controls to avoid them.
The newly enhanced computerized controls meant that the computer would do more of the actual flying – the part that was different
from the pre-Max version – and the pilot less. It gave the pilot the virtual – but not real – experience of flying the older aircraft,
obviating the need, in Boeing's judgment, for additional disclosures and training. That worked except when it didn't. (See, driverless
car development.)
One possible failure mode derives from the Max's reliance on a single sensor to detect its angle of attack, the aircraft's
nose-up or nose-down deviation from level flight. Reliance on a single sensor would make it harder to detect and correct a fault.
(Boeing's version of commitment to "absolute" safety.)
In these two crashes, the sensor may have given a faulty reading, indicating that the aircraft's nose was higher than it should
have been for that stage of flight, an attitude that risked a stall. The programmed response was to drop the nose and increase
power. A normal reaction to a real stall, this response can become catastrophic when unexpected or when the pilot cannot correct
it.
In both crashes, it appears that the pilot did attempt to correct the computer's error. Doing so, however, reset the automated
control, leading the computer to reread the faulty sensor to mean "stall." It again dropped the nose and increased speed. The
pilot recorrected the error in what would become a deadly loop, a tug of war that ended in a powered dive into the ground.
What is interesting is what comes next. The FAA was drowned in the bath tub along with the EPA, FDA, SEC, etc. It doesn't have
the money or staff to recertify the 737 Max. An incompetent Administration that is interested only in extracting resources is
in charge. It is clear that Boeing hid the changes to save money and time. Adding a warning indicator that the flight sensors
are not in the correct position to the pilot's display, including it in the preflight checklist, plus flight training would have
prevented the Indonesian crash. But these changes would have raised questions on the adequacy of the new flight critical system
and may have delayed certification overseas. It is easy to overlook problems if your paycheck is at risk. The Boeing managers
who pushed this through deserve jail time for manslaughter.
Canada said it will recertify the 737 Max before it flies in their airspace. China won't recertify the Max until the Trump
Trade War is over. Also, a delay boosts their replacement airliner. If Chicago and DC paper this over like the 2008 Great Recession;
the final nails will have been hammered into the coffin of the hegemon. Trust is gone
The Other Recent Deadly Boeing Crash No One Is Talking About
(nymag.com)
65 Posted by EditorDavid on Saturday March 23, 2019 @01:34PM from the
searching-for-answers dept. New York magazine's Intelligencer remembers last month's
crash of a Boeing 767 carrying cargo for Amazon and the U.S. Postal Service -- and shares a
new theory that its cause wasn't a suicidal pilot or an autopilot malfunction:
In online pilot discussion forums, a third idea has been gaining adherents: that the
pilots succumbed to a phenomenon called somatogravic illusion, in which lateral acceleration
due to engine thrust
creates the sensation that one is tipping backward in one's seat .
The effect is particularly strong when a plane is lightly loaded, as it would be at the
end of a long flight when the fuel tanks are mostly empty, and in conditions of poor
visibility, as Atlas Air 3591 was as it worked its way through bands of bad weather. The idea
is that perhaps one of the pilots accidentally or in response to wind shear set the engines
to full power, and then believed that the plane had become dangerously nose-high and so
pushed forward on the controls.
This would cause a low-g sensation that might have been so disorienting that by the
time the plane came barreling out of the bottom of the clouds there wasn't enough time to
pull out of the dive.
It has been speculated that this might have been the cause of another bizarre and
officially unsolved accident from three years ago: Flydubai Flight 981, which crashed 2016 in
Rostov-on-Don, Russia....
While it's still too early to draw any kind of conclusions about Atlas Air 3591, the
possibility exists that a firm conclusion will never be drawn -- and if it is, the cause
could turn out not to be a design flaw or software malfunction that can be rectified, but a
basic shortcoming in human perception and psychology that cannot be fixed as long as humans
are entrusted with the control of airplanes.
Yes, commercial pilots are taught to "fly their instruments". General aviation pilots may
enjoy more "seat-of-the-pants" flying, but even they are taught to trust instruments over
human perceptions, which are easily fooled, as even simple demos will show.
I used to work for an aircraft instrument maker, and our user interfaces, everything the
pilot interacts with, got more care and attention than the rest of the instrument. Of course
we had to display nothing but totally accurate data, and do so promptly, but we also had to
do so in ways that were obvious and clear, so the pilot can take in the most important
information with a quick glance.
The pilot's standard "scan" is perhaps the most-trained skill. To look at everything on
the instrument panels and outside the windows often enough to not miss anything, yet slow
enough to take in all vital information.
When things get hectic, the pilot still does this scan, interrupting it as needed to
deal with situations, but still doing it. Because, as the saying goes, "trouble often comes
in threes": Stopping everything to handle an initial situation may mask what's really going
on, and lead to a cascade of failures.
With ever more data being aimed at the pilot, there is a distinct risk of information
overload, especially when tired, or during tense but otherwise normal situations, such as
take-off, landing, or flying through turbulence. This overload often encourages the pilot to
rely more on signals from the body, which need less conscious processing, rather than focus
on all that data.
Here, again, is where commercial pilots receive extra training, but perhaps not often
enough. This is one of the factors that keep commercial pilot mandatory retirement ages so
low: The risk of overload increases with age, even when all other factors match those of a
younger person.
Plus, staying in peak training for decades is fatiguing, and relatively few can do so
"naturally". Which is one of the reasons we're running out of commercial aircraft
pilots.
It may seem counter-intuitive, but this overload risk is often handled by adding more
automation, more automatic systems to "help" the pilot. So much so that actually manually
"driving" a commercial aircraft, with hands on the controls, is an increasingly rare part of
a normal flight.
Our instruments also tried to take pilot fatigue into account, saving our brightest and
loudest alarms only for the most desperate situations, to punch-through that overload to help
ensure prompt and correct reactions.
One product I worked on was a TAWS (Terrain Awareness and Warning System) instrument,
which basically stayed quiet unless there was a risk of the pilot flying into the ground, to
help prevent "CFIT" accidents (Controlled Flight Into the Ground). It has special modes for
take-off and landing, though our instrument was designed to actually *avoid* making the pilot
depend on it's display: Useful for information as part of the scan, but not to be used to
navigate the aircraft. Our main function was to provide visual and audible alerts only when
needed.
I believe 100% of US commercial aircraft (and perhaps now even biz-jets) are required to
have TAWS on-board and active. Any TAWS-equipped plane approaching the ground outside of an
approved approach path for a know airport will give the pilot "Terrain ahead. Pull up! Pull
up!" alerts until the hazard no longer exists.
Unfortunately, if a stall is also immanent, the pilot will simultaneously receive an alert
to push the nose down. And increase power. And other things as well. An overload of alerts,
which a skilled and calm pilot will respond to with the most correct action. But which can
overload a stressed or tired pilot, or one with the beginnings of a cold or flu.
The thing is, every alert can be silenced, to reduce the confusion and distractions.
But an overloaded pilot can forget even this simple aid to keeping full awareness and
control.
This is a big part of why pilots are so often blamed for crashes: Because, for whatever
reason, they failed to take the appropriate action demanded by the situation.
As a former aircraft instrument developer, I was always well aware of my instruments'
contribution to the pilot's mental load. Our teams agonized over tiny changes to font
selection and sizes and colors and contrast. And how many button presses were needed to
accomplish a function. And how easy it was to switch modes or silence an alert. Which is why
we had a massive alpha test system that got even the earliest versions of our instruments in
front of pilots with experimental aircraft and ratings. (Experimental aircraft and the pilots
who fly them are rare and precious things to instrument developers, even when we owned and
operated our own corporate test aircraft.)
Fortunately, our efforts paid off, and pilots (and the FAA) loved our instruments. Some of
our design innovations were adopted into instrument regulations by the FAA, so all
manufacturers had to build to our standard. But always hovering over our success was the fear
of news of the crash of a plane flying our instruments. And the fear that information
overload from our instruments would be shown to be a contributing factor.
Which is why part of our required reading was any and all reports (mainly NTSB and NASA)
that even mention pilot overload. Even a decade after leaving that industry, I still read
these reports.
``...the cause could turn out not to be a design flaw or software malfunction that can
be rectified, but a basic shortcoming in human perception and psychology that cannot be
fixed as long as humans are entrusted with the control of airplanes.''
On the other hand, we have two recent examples of what can happen when a flight computer
is given control of the plane and it is unable to avoid doing something stupid like -- as the
old euphemism goes -- `make inadvertent contact with the terrain'.
Until we know more about how this was supposed work and exactly why it
didn't , I think I'll trust the human with his hands on the controls more than the flight
computer.
(Thankfully, the occasions for my needing to fly are few and far between.)
If you look at it and you are headed down (and you have good airspeed), you don't need to
keep trying to nose down - regardless of what your senses are telling you.
What about looking at how the altimeter is changing?
The artificial horizon gives you a lot of information when your sense of direction is
playing tricks on you (in the clouds and feeling like you are going up,down, rolling,
etc.)
The people who died in last Sunday's plane crash were not just killed by Boeing. Their deaths stemmed from an ideology that puts
business interests above human life.
... ... ...
Boeing is not just a lobbying juggernaut that donates prodigiously to politicians all over the country; it's also a company in
which numerous
members
of Congress
are personally invested, and it cultivates
mutually
beneficial
financial relationships with
top
officials
. Meanwhile, as William McGee of Consumer Reports
told
Amy Goodman
, these issues are rooted in the FAA's lax, business-friendly oversight of the very industry it's meant to
regulate, a case of
regulatory
capture
that stretches back long before this administration.
Whatever the black box from the Ethiopian Airlines flight reveals, the lives put at risk by
lax
regulations
are not apolitical tragedies; they are caused by an administration that time and again has shown itself to be
callous and indifferent to the lives of the people it claims to fight for, whether Puerto Ricans left to
fend
for themselves
in the wake of natural disaster, or federal workers used as
bargaining
chips
in a game of political brinkmanship.
But more than that, they are victims of an ideology that tells us the greatest insult to human life is not the death and misery
that comes from unchecked greed, but efforts to democratically control it through public institutions. The real problems aren't
unsafe products, pollution, dangerous chemicals, and the like, we're told, but "red tape" and the taxes used to fund the bodies
regulating them. Meanwhile, activists like Nader have long been
painted
as
"
wacky
"
extremists in the pursuit of some quixotic ideological crusade simply for trying to do things like prevent people from
dying
in cars without seat belts
.
When social-democratic policies are enacted, wealthy people take less home after taxes, and businesses are inconvenienced by
regulations meant to secure the common good. But when neoliberal policies are put in place, people and their families go hungry,
they lose their homes, they get injured on the job, they get sick, and, sometimes, they die. The public should be enraged by the
actions of governments like Trump's and Trudeau's; but we should also be angry at a political narrative that tells us trying to
stop such tragedies is "ideological" instead of common sense. We owe it to the crash victims to create no more of them.
On May 12, 2010, the New York Times ran an article by economics editor Catherine Rampell
titled "The New Poor: In Job Market Shift, Some Workers Are Left Behind"that focused on the
largely middle-aged unemployed who will probably never work again. For example, 52 year old
administrative assistant Cynthia Norton has been working part-time at Walmart while sending
resumes everywhere but nobody gets back to her. She is part of a much bigger picture:
Ms. Norton is one of 1.7 million Americans who were employed in clerical and
administrative positions when the recession began, but were no longer working in that
occupation by the end of last year. There have also been outsize job losses in other
occupation categories that seem unlikely to be revived during the economic recovery. The
number of printing machine operators, for example, was nearly halved from the fourth quarter
of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2009. The number of people employed as travel agents fell by
40 percent.
But Ms. Rampell finds the silver lining in this dark cloud:
This "creative destruction" in the job market can benefit the economy.
Pruning relatively less-efficient employees like clerks and travel agents, whose work can be
done more cheaply by computers or workers abroad, makes American businesses more efficient.
Year over year, productivity growth was at its highest level in over 50 years last quarter,
pushing corporate profits to record highs and helping the economy grow.
The term "creative destruction" might ring a bell. It was coined by Werner Sombart in his
1913 book "War and Capitalism". When he was young, Sombart considered himself a Marxist. His
notion of creative destruction was obviously drawn from Karl Marx, who, according to some, saw
capitalism in terms of the business cycle. With busts following booms, like night follows day,
a new round of capital accumulation can begin. This interpretation is particularly associated
with Volume Two of Capital that examines this process in great detail. Looking at this
material, some Marxists like Eduard Bernstein drew the conclusion that capitalism is an
infinitely self-sustaining system.
By 1913, Sombart had dumped the Marxist commitment to social revolution but still retained
the idea that there was a basis in Karl Marx for upholding the need for "creative destruction",
a view buttressed by an overly positive interpretation of this passage in the Communist
Manifesto:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of
production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of
society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary,
the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing
of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty
and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.
By the 1930s, Sombart had adapted himself fairly well to the Nazi system although he was not
gung-ho like Martin Heidegger or Carl Schmitt. The wiki on Sombart notes:
In 1934 he published Deutscher Sozialismus where he claimed a "new spirit" was beginning
to "rule mankind". The age of capitalism and proletarian socialism was over and with "German
socialism" (National-Socialism) taking over.
But despite this, he remained critical. In 1938 he wrote an anthropology text that found
fault with the Nazi system and many of his Jewish students remained fond of him.
I suspect, however, that Rampell is familiar with Joseph Schumpeter's use of the term rather
than Sombart since Schumpeter was an economist, her chosen discipline. In 1942, he wrote a book
titled Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy that, like Sombart, retained much of Karl Marx's methodology but without the
political imperative to destroy the system that utilized "creative destruction". He wrote:
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development
from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of
industrial mutation–if I may use that biological term–that incessantly
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one,
incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact
about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got
to live in. . . .
The wiki on Schumpeter claims that this theory is wedded to Nikolai Kondratiev's "long wave"
hypothesis that rests on the idea that there are 50 year cycles in which capitalism grows,
decays and enters a crisis until a new round of capital accumulation opens up. Not only was the
idea attractive to Schumpeter, it was a key part of Ernest Mandel's economic theories. Unlike
Schumpeter, Mandel was on the lookout for social agencies that could break the cycle and put
development on a new footing, one based on human need rather than private profit.
Returning to Rampell's article, there is one dimension entirely missing. She assumes that
"creative destruction" will operate once again in order to foster a new upswing in the
capitalist business cycle. But how exactly will that manifest itself? All the signs point to a
general decline in business activity unless there is some kind of technological breakthrough
equivalent to the computer revolution that fueled growth for decades. Does anybody believe that
"green manufacturing" will play the same role? I don't myself.
One thing does occur to me. Sombart's book was written in 1913, one year before WWI and was
even titled eerily enough "War and Capitalism". One wonders if the Great War would be seen as
part and parcel of "creative destruction". War, after all, does have a knack for clearing the
playing field with even more finality than layoffs. Schumpeter wrote his in 1942, one year into
WWII. My guess is that he did not theorize war as the ultimate (and necessary?) instrument of
creative destruction but history will record that WWII did introduce a whole rafter of new
technology, including aluminum, radar, nuclear power, etc., while bombing old modes of
production into oblivion. What a great opportunity it was for capitalism to rebuild Japan,
especially after firebombing and atomic bombs did their lovely work.
In my view, there's something disgusting about this "creative destruction" business
especially when it is articulated by a young, pro-capitalist Princeton graduate like Catherine
Rampell who wrote for Slate, the Village Voice and other such b-list publications before
crawling her way up into an editorial job at the NYT. She clearly has learned how to cater her
reporting to the ideological needs of the newspaper of record, growing more and more
reactionary as the crisis of capitalism deepens.
hen United Airlines flight 1462 made an unexpected landing in Chicago last month, it was not due to mechanical issues, weather
conditions, or flight logistics, but a battle over legroom in the aisles. As one passenger
tried
to
recline her seat and another used a $20 device called a
Knee
Defender
to prevent the occupant ahead of him from leaning back, the battle over personal space descended into a scuffle. The
pilot opted to make an additional stop to remove the unruly passengers.
Flight 1462 hasn't been alone. Not just the random dispute of irate travelers, similar flights have been diverted because of the
airlines' frenzied drive to wring as much money out of customers as possible. Airlines are increasingly cramming more passengers
onto each flight, termed "densification," and regularly overbooking flights. Any aspect of a flight that was once provided free
of charge -- from a checked bag to a complementary drink to using a credit card to pay for a ticket -- can now be charged ŕ la
carte.
So relentless has this nickel and diming been that when
news
reports
claimed the discount airline Ryan Air was about to start charging for in-flight bathroom use, many people took them
seriously. But the story wasn't true -- it was all a ploy for free press from a company unwilling to pay for advertising,
help
disabled
passengers, or
provide
ice
for drinks.
Such frugality is only one of the problems wrought by airline deregulation. If the greatest benefit of deregulation has been that
more people can afford to fly, it has come at the cost of increased tumult within the industry and
reduced
pay
for workers.
Before the airlines were deregulated under President Jimmy Carter, the Civil Aeronautics Bureau (CAB) maintained flight pricing
structures, airport gate access, and flight paths. There were rules that stipulated which airlines could compete in which market
and what prices they could charge. Loosening restrictions meant abandoning the CAB and its pricing structures, and allowing an
unmediated flow of competition.
With fewer restrictions, upstart fly-by-night airlines could compete against major airlines like American/US Airways, United,
Delta, Alaskan, and Hawaiian Airways. Such competition, conservative and
liberal
advocates
claimed, would bring down flight costs, providing more savings and convenience to the customer.
But allowing this level of competition also unleashed chaos. While the discount airlines would win over passengers for a time by
offering flights half as expensive, the major airlines would respond by slashing their prices in an attempt to drive the upstarts
out of business.
By drastically reducing ticket costs, the major airlines would take on an unsustainable amount of debt that, combined with the
loss of business to the new entrants, would lead to layoffs or bankruptcy. Pension funds were then raided and labor contracts
voided to pay for the price wars. With each airline company collapse, thousands of employees were laid off, decimating union
membership.
To compete, the legacy airlines also
drove down
the
salaries of their pilots, and cut benefits and vacation time. Besides a reduction in compensation, a two-tiered pay system has
been set up with decent pay for incumbent pilots and markedly low wages for new entrants.
Starting
salaries
for pilots are now as low as $15,000 a year, even as CEO pay rises inexorably.
Remarking
on
a career in which he had seen his pay cut in half and his pension eliminated, captain Sully Sullenberger told the BBC in 2009
that he did not know "a single professional pilot who wants his or her children to follow in their footsteps."
While unions were still strong in the industry, they were constantly embroiled in bitter labor disputes. Between the voided
contracts and the hemorrhaging membership caused by regular bankruptcy, they were left fighting to maintain wage standards in an
unnecessarily competitive industry.
The only way discount airlines could offer such low prices was by paying their workers less, using less experienced pilots and
sometimes non-unionized labor, offering fewer frills, and running spartan operations that only serviced a handful of routes with
a single type of jet liner (thus simplifying pilot and mechanic training). Instead of a single union representing
employees across the industry -- typified by the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), which represented a majority of pilots --
some discount airlines maintained relationships with offshoot unions with smaller membership rolls and less leverage.
The discount airlines also depended on secondary, class-B airports that charged less in landing fees. But those discounts
eventually disappeared when the secondary airports no longer needed to cut their fees to attract business.
To maintain their dominance over the market, the major airlines shifted from a direct city-to-city flight standard to the
hub-and-spoke system of today. The hub-and-spoke setup allowed large centralized airports like Dallas-Ft. Worth and Atlanta to be
ruled by a single company that determines which flights can use which terminals and at what cost.
While the hub-and-spoke system has some benefits, it's largely inefficient, dependent as it is on multi-stage connecting flights.
Combined with the need to cut costs, it would also cause longer airport delays as planes were left waiting on the tarmac to make
sure all passengers from connecting flights made it aboard. A single delay in a connecting flight could throw passengers'
itineraries askew, leaving them stuck in a random airport overnight.
The major airlines used other tricks to keep out nascent airlines. They paid off travel agents and travel reservation sites to
give preference to their particular airline. They introduced frequent flier miles to maintain brand allegiance.
Upstart discount airlines like
Southwest
were
able to survive the vicious price wars by leaning on quality of service and direct flights, but most did not. The list of
companies that were liquidated, temporarily or permanently, as a result is impressively long considering what it takes to start
an airline: America West, PanAm, TransWorld, Western, Piedmont, Frontier, Northwest, National, Texas International, People
Express, ValuJet, Air Florida, Eastern, Braniff, Skytrain, Pacific Southwest, Western Pacific, and many more.
Once bankrupt, the major airlines then bought the upstarts, creating an effective oligopoly. So much for competition.
Already on a spending spree during the heady years of the 1990s dot-com boom, buying up failed companies only saddled major
airlines with more debt. While most people assume that the airlines had to be bailed out in 2001 because of the decrease in
traffic after the September 11 attacks, it was also because the airlines
were
insolvent
from previous financial problems, largely as a result of the price wars.
The actions of the major airlines may seem ruthless, but they were largely protecting their position in a deregulated industry
that allowed the discount airlines to undercut labor standards just to offer cheaper prices to customers. They were defending
themselves from disruption.
Considering the skill, education, and investment needed to maintain a safe and reliable airline, it is not exactly a business
that needs to be disrupted. Running an airline is labor intensive, and it only turns a profit at random intervals. There's little
money to be skimmed off.
With profit margins so thin, tickets on a half-empty flight have to cost twice as much as a fully booked one. Which is why, for a
time, smaller cities that weren't necessarily travel hubs bore the brunt of deregulation. Routes that weren't fully booked
experienced skyrocketing flight costs, which, for small-town travelers, was a huge disincentive to fly.
The bilking of transportation costs to and from smaller cities after a run of chaotic competition is eerily similar to what
happened during the railway mania of the 1800s. Investors rushed to build rail lines everywhere and anywhere while money was
flush. But once cash became tight, the rail industry used their monopoly power to charge exorbitant prices for anybody trying to
ship in and out of smaller towns like Cincinnati. Such predatory pricing is what led to transportation regulation in the first
place.
Since the 2001 airline bailout, things have calmed down a bit. It no longer costs $600 to fly from New York to Pittsburgh. Fewer
discount airlines are entering the market, and the handful that are still in operation work with the major airlines on various
routes (e.g. "flight provided by Frontier"). The price wars have settled to a quiet struggle played out on online travel
registration websites like Kayak.com and Hipmunk.com, which have wholly replaced the job of travel agents.
But for airlines, the lower revenue from cheaper tickets has to be made up somewhere, and convenience may be the easiest element
to remove. Airlines are pushing petty indignities on passengers and flight attendants by way of a million miscellaneous charges.
Half the time, the discounts saved by cheaper tickets from deregulation are recouped in add-on fees. Eventually airlines may just
offer extra-saver flights devoid of the most basic accommodations and simply force passengers who can't afford first-class seats
to be stacked in the cargo hold like cord wood.
So what's the alternative? The airline industry is close to being a natural monopoly, there's little reason to foster
competition. Indeed, the industry would benefit from nationalization or a well-regulated public option. At the very least, more
regulation is necessary.
Without subsidization and some rules about flight costs, there is little incentive for the airline industry to provide affordable
flights to locations that aren't fully booked. The irony is that we already subsidize airline travel. It just occurs through
bailouts and bankruptcies after each airline has fought tooth and nail for market dominance. Public funds wind up paying for a
wasteful, inefficient system characterized by irrational, destructive competition.
Through regulation or more aggressive means, it's quite possible to ensure good wages and working conditions and safe,
affordable, reliable service -- all without blackout dates, three layovers, or all-out battles for legroom.
He has long been a vocal critic of the Federal Aviation Administration, saying the agency
lacks the resources and willpower to aggressively police airlines and manufacturers.
Mr. Nader said Boeing may be exposed to civil and possibly criminal liability. After the
first fatal crash in October -- a Lion Air flight that crashed into the Java Sea minutes after
takeoff -- company officials "were put on notice about the problem" with an automated
stall-prevention system that can misfire and override pilot commands by repeatedly pushing down
an aircraft's nose, he said.
The Justice and Transportation Departments are
scrutinizing Boeing's dealings with the FAA over safety certifications, people familiar
with the matter have said.
... ... ...
Mr. Nader has expressed his concerns to lawmakers and former regulators, and called for
congressional hearings. Before
the U.S. grounded the planes last week, he championed the idea of a sweeping boycott of all
versions of 737 MAX aircraft. He also has stressed the importance of having Mr. Muilenburg,
Boeing's CEO, testify on Capitol Hill about safety issues with the fleet.
Criticizing Boeing's original design of the automated flight-control feature, dubbed MCAS,
Mr. Nader said it reflected a misguided view driven by engineering overconfidence and called it
"the arrogance of the algorithms."
RALPH NADER : Boeing is used to getting its way with the patsy FAA . And this time, however,
it's in really hot water. If it continues to dig its heels in, it's going to expose itself and
its executives to potential criminal prosecution, because they are now on notice, with two
crashes -- Indonesia and Ethiopia. There's probably a lot more to come out in terms of the
technical dissent, in the, what was called, "heated discussions" about the plane software
between the FAA , the pilots' union, Boeing. And you can't suppress technical dissent forever.
And Senators Markey and Blumenthal are calling for the release of all the relevant information.
And while that happens, the planes must be grounded. You see, they're on notice now. This is
the future of passenger business for Boeing. They've got orders for over 3,000 planes from all
over the world. They've produced and delivered about 350. Southwest is the leading owner and
operator of these planes. It's digging its heels in, and so is American Airlines, I believe,
and Air Canada. And Boeing is not going to get away with this, because this is not some old
DC-9 about to be phased out. This is their future strategic plan. And they better own up. 2013,
they grounded the 787 because of battery fires, and they had about 50 or 60 of those planes.
So, there's plenty of precedent.
And the most important thing that people can do is: Do not fly this plane, the 737 MAX 8 and
9. Ask the airline, when you book the flight, whether it's that plane. The airline should not
dare charge you for reservation changes. And I'm calling for a boycott of that plane. If
several hundred thousand air passengers boycott that plane and there are more and more empty
seats, that will do more to bring Boeing around than the patsy FAA and a rather serene
Congress, which, by the way, gets all kinds of freebies from the airlines that ordinary people
don't get. We've sent a survey last year, twice, to every member of Congress, asking them to
disclose all these freebies. We didn't get one answer. And that helps account for, over the
years, the total reluctance of members of Congress even to do such things as deal with seat
size, restroom space and other conveniences, never mind just the safety of the aircraft. So,
this is important for consumers. Just don't fly 737 MAX 8 or 9. Make sure that you're informed
about it. And for up-to-date information, you can go to FlyersRights.org . That's run by Paul Hudson, who lost his
daughter in the Pan Am 103, 30 years ago, and has been a stalwart member of the FAA Advisory
Committee. And that's where you get up-to-date information, FlyersRights.org .
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Well, we're also joined by William McGee, who's the aviation adviser
for Consumer Reports . Could you give us your perspective on what's happened here? And
also, could you expand on what Ralph Nader was talking about, about the use of artificial
intelligence in these new planes?
WILLIAM McGEE: Sure, absolutely, Juan. You know, there are so many unanswered questions
here, but many of them are focused on the time period between the first crash in late October
with Lion Air and the crash on Sunday with Ethiopian. Again, for perspective here, as Ralph
noted, we're not talking about old aircraft. This is an airplane that's only been in service
since 2017. This is the Boeing 737 MAX 8, a recent derivative of the 737. Now, in that time
period, the aircraft that crashed in October was 2 months old; the one that crashed on Sunday
was 4 months old. This is really unprecedented in all the years that I've been in this
industry. We don't see brand-new airplanes crash on takeoff like this under similar
circumstances.
... ... ...
WILLIAM McGEE: Absolutely. And, you know, this goes back many years. Ralph mentioned that
the FAA is known throughout the industry, even among some of its own employees and to airline
employees, as the "tombstone agency." And that phrase comes from the fact that the FAA has
shown time and time again that it is reluctant to act unless there's a tragedy and,
unfortunately, unless there are fatalities. Now, we have seen this as recently as last year,
when, you may recall, over Philadelphia, a Southwest 737 had a major engine malfunction that
punctured a hole in the fuselage and killed a woman who was nearly sucked out of the aircraft.
Well, what wasn't as well reported was that two years prior, that same engine type and that
same airline, Southwest, same aircraft type, 737, also had an uncontained engine failure. But
in 2016, there were no injuries, and there were no fatalities. Instead of the FAA stepping in
and saying, "We need to, you know, have all of these engine blades inspected on this engine
type, on all the carriers that are operating it," the FAA asked the industry, "What would you
like to do? How long would you like to take to look at this?" And the industry dragged its
heels, not surprisingly, and said, "We need more time." Two years later, in 2018, there was a
fatality. And then, two days after that, last April 2018, two days after that woman was killed,
the FAA issued what's called an AD, an airworthiness directive. That's what should have been
issued in 2016, where that death wouldn't have happened. So, we have seen this time and
again.
And you mentioned Attention All Passengers , my book. Much of the book, about a third
of it, is devoted to the issue of the FAA oversight of airline maintenance. We could easily
talk about it for two or three more days. But the bottom line is that the entire model of how
the airline industry works in the United States has been changed dramatically in the last 15
years or so. All airlines in the United States -- without question, all of them -- in 2019,
outsource some or most or just about all of their maintenance, what they call heavy
maintenance. Much of it is done outside of the United States -- El Salvador, Mexico, Brazil,
China, Singapore. Again, we're talking about U.S. airlines. And although the FAA , on paper,
says there is one standard for maintenance of U.S. airlines, the reality is there isn't. There
are waivers given all the time, so that when work is done outside the United States, there are
waivers so that there are no security background checks, there are no alcohol and drug
screening programs put in place. And, in fact, many -- in some cases, most -- of the
technicians cannot even be called mechanics, because they're not licensed. They're not licensed
as they're required to be in the U.S. So, basically, you have two sets of rules. You have one
that's for in-house airline employees and another for the outsourced facilities. And this all
leads back to the FAA . I have sat in a room with FAA senior officials and asked them about
this, and they say that they don't think it's a problem. It is a problem.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And what impact --
WILLIAM McGEE: I've spoken to --
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: What impact have the mergers, of the constant mergers of airlines,
had, so we basically have a handful of U.S. airlines now, on all of this?
WILLIAM McGEE: Oh, no question. We have an oligopoly now. And, you know, even just going
back as far as 2001, you know, there were four or five major carriers that we don't have
anymore: America West, Continental, US Airways, TWA . You know, so what we have now is
effectively an oligopoly. And this is unprecedented in the history of the aviation industry
here in the United States. And so, you know, even when -- Ralph was talking about boycotts,
and, you know, it's an excellent idea. But it's more challenging now than it would have been a
few years ago. You know, there might have been more pressure on Southwest and American 10 or 15
years ago, when consumers had more choices. Now it's getting harder and harder for consumers to
express their displeasure. We saw this after the Dr. Dao incident, where that passenger was
dragged off United. In the long term, it didn't really affect United's bookings. It would have
in another time, but so many people are locked in, particularly outside New York, Washington,
Los Angeles. They're locked in, where they don't have a lot of choice on carriers.
AMY GOODMAN : Ralph Nader, I wanted to get your response both to this news that they were
working on a fix -- they know there's a software glitch, that somehow, when on automatic pilot,
when the plane is taking off, it takes this precipitous dive, and the way to deal with it is to
take it off automatic and put it on manual. Now, AP has been doing a deep dive into the
database of pilots complaining over and over again about this problem and saying they have to
quickly switch to manual to prevent the plane from nosediving into the ground. And this latest
news from The Wall Street Journal that while they're talking about this glitch being
fixed in the next five weeks or so, that five weeks were lost in January because of the
government shutdown.
RALPH NADER : Well, that's what Paul Hudson wrote in his press release at Flyers
Rights. The focus has got to be on inaccurate or nonexisting information in Boeing's training
manuals and inadequate flight training requirements. They sold this plane on the basis, among
other things, of having larger engines. It's supposed to be 10 percent more fuel-efficient. But
they sold it on the grounds that "You don't have to really train your pilots, airlines. This is
really just a small modification of the reliable 737 that's all over the world." The question
really comes down to cost cutting. They tantalize the airlines by saying, "This isn't really a
new plane. It's very easy to fly, if you can fly a 737." And that turned out to be quite
false...
The Pentagon's inspector general has formally opened an investigation into a watchdog
group's allegations that acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan has used his office to
promote his former employer, Boeing Co.
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington filed an ethics complaint with the
Pentagon's inspector general a week ago, alleging that Shanahan has appeared to make statements
promoting Boeing and disparaging competitors, such as Lockheed Martin.
Shanahan, who was traveling with President Donald Trump to Ohio on Wednesday, spent more
than 30 years at Boeing, leading programs for commercial planes and missile defense systems. He
has been serving as acting Pentagon chief since the beginning of the year, after James Mattis
stepped down.
The probe comes as Boeing struggles to deal with a public firestorm over two deadly crashes
of the Boeing 737 Max 8 jetliner within the last five months. And it focuses attention on
whether Trump will nominate Shanahan as his formal pick for defense chief, rather than letting
him languish as an acting leader of a major federal agency.
Dwrena Allen, spokeswoman for the inspector general, said Shanahan has been informed of the
investigation. And, in a statement, Pentagon spokesman Tom Crosson said Shanahan welcomes the
review.
"Acting Secretary Shanahan has at all times remained committed to upholding his ethics
agreement filed with the DoD," said Crosson. "This agreement ensures any matters pertaining to
Boeing are handled by appropriate officials within the Pentagon to eliminate any perceived or
actual conflict of interest issue(s) with Boeing."
During a Senate hearing last week, Shanahan was asked by U.S. Sen. Richard Blumenthal,
D-Conn., about the 737 Max issue. Shanahan said he had not spoken to anyone in the
administration about it and had not been briefed on it. Asked whether he favored an
investigation into the matter, Shanahan said it was for regulators to investigate.
On Wednesday, Blumenthal said that scrutiny of Shanahan's Boeing ties is necessary. "In
fact, it's overdue. Boeing is a behemoth 800-pound gorilla -- raising possible questions of
undue influence at DOD, FAA and elsewhere," said Blumenthal.
Shanahan signed an ethics agreement in June 2017, when he was being nominated for the job of
deputy defense secretary, a job he held during Mattis' tenure. It outlined the steps he would
take to avoid "any actual or apparent conflict of interest," and said he would not participate
in any matter involving Boeing.
The CREW ethics complaint, based to a large part on published reports, including one by
Politico in January, said Shanahan has made comments praising Boeing in meetings about
government contracts, raising concerns about "whether Shanahan, intentionally or not, is
putting his finger on the scale when it comes to Pentagon priorities."
One example raised by the complaint is the Pentagon's decision to request funding for
Boeing 15EX fighter jets in the 2020 proposed budget. The Pentagon is requesting about $1
billion to buy eight of the aircraft.
Shanahan, 56, joined Boeing in 1986, rose through its ranks and is credited with rescuing
a troubled Dreamliner 787 program. He also led the company's missile defense and military
helicopter programs.
Trump has seemed attracted to Shanahan partially for his work on one of the president's
pet projects -- creating a Space Force. He also has publicly lauded Shanahan's former employer,
Boeing, builder of many of the military's most prominent aircraft, including the Apache and
Chinook helicopters, the C-17 cargo plane and the B-52 bomber, as well as the iconic
presidential aircraft, Air Force One.
This is only the third time in history that the Pentagon has been led by an acting chief,
and Shanahan has served in that capacity for longer than any of the others.
Presidents typically take pains to ensure the Pentagon is being run by a Senate-confirmed
official, given the grave responsibilities that include sending young Americans into battle,
ensuring the military is ready for extreme emergencies like nuclear war and managing overseas
alliances that are central to U.S. security.
3 hours ago Why did Trump
appoint a former Boeing executive and industry lobbyist to the the Secretary of Defense to
replace General Mattis? What in Shananhan's background makes him qualified to lead our nation's
military forces? 3 hours ago WITHOUT A DOUBT HE DID., ALSO INVESTIGATE NIKKI HALEY'S APPOINTED
ON BOEING'S BOARD TO REPLACE SHANAHAN. FOLLOW THE HOEING KICKBACKS(MONEY), TO DONALD TRUMP'S
FAMILY. 3 hours ago
Shanahan probably helped Boeing on the promise of a later payback just like Ms. Nikki Haley did
while Gov of SC where Boeing built a new plant on her watch. She helped big time to keep the
Unions out of the new Boeing plant and now Boeing is going to put her on their board of
directors. Nothing like a bit of an obvious payoff. 2 hours ago Reminds me of the Bush Jr days in
the White House. During the Gulf War (#2) Vice President #$%$ Cheney awarded oil company
Halliburton (Cheney was CEO before accepting the VP job) to deliver meals for the troops. The
contract was ?No Bid.? Why was an oil company delivering food to troops with a no bid contract?
After Cheney?s Job was over being VP he went back to being CEO at Halliburton and moved
Halliburton?s headquarters to Dubai. What an American! 2 hours ago Now we understand why Boeing
& the FAA hesitated to ground those planes for few days despite many countries who did
grounded those plane which is a precedent for a country to ground & NOT wait for the
manufacturer. ONLY after Canada grounded those planes Boeing & the FAA & that's because
Canada IS a the #1 flight partner of the US ! 4 hours ago Years ago there was a Boeing
procurement scandal and Trump does love the swamp he claims to hate.
he crash of the Ethiopian Max-8 Flight 409 on March 10, 2019, resulted in the grounding of
all the Boeing 737 Max series aircraft – even the last hold-out, the United States,
belatedly grounded them when President Trump acted and overruled the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) that opposed any halt to flights.
In the United States, the FAA certifies aircraft as airworthy, puts out bulletins and
advisories on problems and fixes and often is the "go to" agency for many aviation flight
authorities around the world.
The 737 Max series is a new version of the venerable 737, equipped with new engines and
other modifications that have impacted the aircraft's performance in good ways and bad.
Almost every expert today puts the blame for both flight disasters on faulty software that
took over running the plane's flight control system. Many have pointed to Boeing's alleged lack
of transparency in telling pilots what to do if the software malfunctioned. In addition, there
had been at least eight pilot-reported flight control incidents prior to the first Lion Air
crash.
Experienced pilots
Three of the pilots on the two doomed planes each had more than 8,000 hours flying
experience – quite a lot – and the pilots of the Ethiopian airlines had additional
information on the plane's flight characteristics and what to do in an emergency.
While we are still awaiting a final report on last year's Lion Air crash, we do have a quite
informative initial report, although it lacks hard findings. In the Ethiopian case, we only
have flight track information from ground radar and some incomplete reporting on what the
pilots were saying to ground control. More will become available as the flight recorders are
analyzed.
Yet despite this, we can understand some of what happened and clearly it is more than a
single software glitch. This may help explain why Boeing did not meet its proposed deadline of
January for installing updated software. Now in March Boeing says the replacement software will
be available in April. But even if it is, there are more issues involving both hardware and
software.
The software which so far has received virtually all the attention is called MCAS, for
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. MCAS was added to the Max-8 series because
new, heavier and larger engines replaced the old engines and as a result, the updated Max
planes had a strong tendency to pitch nose up.
The new engine, CFM Leap-1B, was selected by Boeing because it was much more fuel efficient
than the older models, one of the big reasons customers want the 737 Max.
The new engines forced re-engineering of parts of the 737.
Fitting the new engines meant moving them forward and lengthening the front landing gear to
keep the engines from scraping on the ground. In turn, this changed the plane's center of
gravity and also altered the air flow on the wings.
MCAS was a band-aid to fix the pitch up problem caused by the relocated and heavier new
engines. MCAS is designed to push the nose down and prevent the aircraft from going into a
stall. MCAS was intended to deal only with a specific flight risk.
1. MCAS operates by receiving information from a special sensor that measures the flying
angle of the plane and takes over the flight controls if the angle is too great – meaning
the aircraft could stall. A stall happens when a plane has too low an airspeed and not enough
lift and the plane will literally fall out of the air.
There are two sensors that measure the angle of attack or nose-up condition of the Boeing
737 Max, one that provides data to the pilot and another that provides data to the copilot. The
sensors are known as Angle of Attack Sensors, or AoA.
In the Lion Air aircraft, the pilot's AoA sensor had been found to be faulty on an earlier
flight as reported by the pilot. That AoA sensor was replaced and tested by aircraft
maintenance before the fatal flight.
The pilot gets no console or other warnings that his AoA sensor might be faulty. The pilot
can ask his copilot what reading he is getting and see if there is a difference. That is
exactly what happened on the Lion Air flight.
It would appear that the MCAS software is driven by information from the pilot's sensor. If
the sensor itself is not at fault, there could still be wiring and connection problems that
could feed bad information to MCAS. These conditions cannot be determined in flight.
If it is true that MCAS relies on information from only one sensor, that could be a design
error. Modern aircraft are famous for built-in flight system redundancy, but apparently not in
the case of MCAS. In addition, the pilot cannot manually change the MCAS choice of sensor.
2. No one has yet explained why the pilot's stick shaker was running on from the start of
the flight and never stopped. The stick shaker is a motor with an unbalanced flywheel that is
attached to the pilot's control stick, and another is attached to the co-pilot's stick. The
stick shaker is supposed to warn the pilot of a potential stall. But why was it on nearly the
whole time? And why was the co-pilot's stick shaker not on?
3. The pilots are supposed to be able to shut down MCAS, which only operates when the
aircraft is manually operated, by switching the electronic trim control to off. The trim
control is what MCAS uses to change the nose pitch of the 737 Max. But in the Lion Air case, we
know the pilots turned off the electronic trim control. But MCAS kept adjusting the trim nose
down, against the pilots' wishes. Or possibly something else was driving the trim control nose
down, such as a shorted circuit or bad wiring.
4. The pilots also tried turning the aircraft's autopilot on, according to the report. MCAS
is only supposed to work when the autopilot is off, that is only when the plane is operated
under manual pilot control. The autopilot should have disabled MCAS but apparently it did not
– in fact, the Lion Air autopilot would not turn on. There is no explanation for this.
Was the autopilot locked out by MCAS? Or was there some other software or hardware foul up?
5. Pilots also had a very difficult time handling the aircraft stick, meaning that the
flight control stick required a great deal of force to operate, especially when the pilots
were, repeatedly, trying to recover the plane that was headed nose down, gaining speed and
losing altitude. Stick force "feel" in 737s is artificial and is controlled by a couple of
pitot tube sensors at the rear of the aircraft above the horizontal stabilizer.
There have been repeated
problems on older 737s with the planes forward and rear pitot tubes, due partly to icing
conditions and to pitot tube heater problems which are supposed to remove ice. Some pitot tubes
have failed because of fouling. Pitot tubes detect aircraft speed and they do this by comparing
the force of incoming air on the pitot tubes to what are called static ports located elsewhere
on the plane. Accidents have been attributed to faulty or fouled pitot tubes.
It is not clear how the flight speed information from the pitot tubes is integrated into the
MCAS if it is. But speed information is fed into the flight computer and if it is faulty it
could create ambiguities in the MCAS and the flight computer.
6. Would better pilot training have helped pilots avoid disaster? Boeing has been criticized
for not initially providing information about MCAS to Max pilots, and only later issuing a
bulletin on how to deal with some MCAS anomalies. Boeing also apparently did not offer any
additional pilot training, leaving pilots to find their way through a morass of complex
problems made worse by possible hardware and software faults.
As it is, it appears the Lion Air pilots acted in the best way they could but were unable to
overcome the instability of the aircraft as it headed nose down to disintegrate in the ocean.
We don't yet know how the Ethiopian Airline pilots performed, but they had the advantage of
advisories from Boeing and the FAA. Still, the same final result.
What is clear is that there is more than one single cause for the two aircraft crashes. And
we know that other planes experienced control problems but recovered. These disasters suggest
there was a complex of problems that caused the two disasters.
Boeing's engineers need to assess the entire flight control system, the electronics and
mechanics, before a satisfactory solution is at hand.
"... The United States held out to the last. Trump personally requested to ground the flagship aircraft of the American company only late evening yesterday, when Canada joined the interdiction. ..."
Today, Russia, following Europe and America, banned the flights of Boeing 737 MAX. Dozens of
countries have stopped using this aircraft after the Sunday crash in Ethiopia.
The United States held out to the last. Trump personally requested to ground the flagship
aircraft of the American company only late evening yesterday, when Canada joined the
interdiction.
737 is out of date considering the modern bigger fuel efficient engines don't fit
it.They're just applying band aid to fix it's short coming. Airbus A320 has no problems with
these new engines as it sits higher.
40 countries banned these aircraft from their airspace..... Comparable to the vicious,
aggressive, malign, thoughtless, selfish and self aggrandising SANCTIONS the US regime and
its vassals slap on innocent countries in attempts to impoverish or/and change their
governments!!!!!!!!!
But this is self inflicted!!!!!! I hope the US regime can see the irony in this!!!!
Boeing should thank China for being the first to ground it's entire fleet, if one of the
96 planes that China operated, god forbid, had gone down, Boeing is done, 3-strikes you're
out
Something is wrong with these planes and it is a good thing that they're being grounded
world-wide until the problem is fixed. It is prudent both from the side of Rosaviatsiya and
the FAA to not permit these planes to fly in the meanwhile to prevent further potential
tragedies. However this is no reason to simply write off the huge fleet of Boeing 737 MAX
planes in service world-wide. Right now engineers at Boeing are working on the problem and
then those planes will be retrofitted asap. Personally I have no particular concerns flying
in a Boeing 737 MAX once the problem is fixed.
The Boeing Company BA recently won a $250 million contract to offer weapon system
integration for the Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) Cruise Missile. Work related to the deal is
scheduled to be completed by Dec 31, 2024.
The contract was awarded by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida. Per the terms of the deal, this aerospace giant will provide aircraft and missile
carriage equipment development and modification, engineering, testing, software development,
training, facilities and support necessary to fully integrate the LRSO Cruise Missile on the
B-52H bomber platform.
Attributes of LRSO
The LRSO is a nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile, under development. It is set to
replace the current AGM-86 air launched cruise missile (ALCM). LRSO, might be up to about 50%
longer than Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) and still be
suitable for internal carriage by the B-2 and B-52.
Our View
AGM-86 ALCM has been serving the U.S. Air Force quite efficiently. However, with
increasingly sophisticated air defense systems developed by America's nemeses, especially
Russia, demand for a new stealth nuclear-armed cruise missile capable of either destroying
these defenses or penetrating them has been increasing consistently. In this scenario, the LRSO
comes as the most credible stealthy and low-yield option available to the United States
(according to Strategic Studies Quarterly Report).
Boeing's B-52, which has been the U.S. Air Force's one of the most preferred bombers, is
completely dependent on long-range cruise missiles and cannot continue in the nuclear mission
beyond 2030 without LRSO. As B-52 is expected to play a primary role in the U.S. nuclear
mission for at least next decade and ALCM is already well beyond its originally planned end of
life, we may expect more contracts similar to the latest one to usher in from the Pentagon in
the coming days. This, in turn, should prove conducive to Boeing.
Price Performance
In a year's time, shares of Boeing have gained about 16.5% against the industry's 2.2%
decline.
In the latest blow to both Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration, the WSJ reported
overnight that Federal prosecutors and Department of Transportation officials are scrutinizing
the development of Boeing 737 MAX jetliners and in particular its anti-stall (MCAS) system,
inquiries described as "unusual" and which come amid probes of regulators' safety approvals of
the new plane.
The Seattle Times separately reported that Boeing's safety analysis of a new flight control
system on 737 MAX jets had several crucial flaws.
According to
the WSJ , a "grand jury in Washington, D.C., issued a broad subpoena dated March 11 - a day
after the Ethiopian Airlines crash a week ago - to at least one person involved in the 737
MAX's development, seeking related documents, including correspondence, emails and other
messages." The subpoena, with a prosecutor from the Justice Department's criminal division
listed as a contact, sought documents to be handed over later this month.
It wasn't immediately clear if the Justice Department's probe is related to scrutiny of the
FAA by the DOT inspector general's office, reported earlier Sunday by The Wall Street Journal
and that focuses on a safety system that has been implicated in the Oct. 29 Lion Air crash that
killed 189 people, according to a government official briefed on its status. Aviation
authorities are looking into whether the anti-stall system may have played a role in last
week's Ethiopian Airlines crash, which killed all 157 people on board . The WSJ sources add
that the inspector general's inquiry focuses on ensuring relevant documents and computer files
are retained.
The Justice Department probe involves a prosecutor in the fraud section of the department's
criminal division, a unit that has brought cases against well-known manufacturers over safety
issues, including Takata Corp.
The news comes at a sensitive time for both the FAA, which was among the last regulators to
ground the 737 Max following a broad global response (led by China) and for Boeing, whose stock
has tumbled in the aftermath of the latest crash, and as the WSJ notes, "it is highly unusual
for federal prosecutors to investigate details of regulatory approval of commercial aircraft
designs, or to use a criminal probe to delve into dealings between the FAA and the largest
aircraft manufacturer the agency oversees."
Probes of airliner programs or alleged lapses in federal safety oversight typically are
handled as civil cases, often by the DOT inspector general. The inspector general, however,
does have authority to make criminal referrals to federal prosecutors and has its own special
agents.
Ironically, over the years, U.S. aviation companies and airline officials have been sharply
critical of foreign governments, including France, South Korea and others, for conducting
criminal probes of some plane makers, their executives and in some cases, even individual
pilots, after high-profile or fatal crashes. The FAA's current enforcement policy stresses
enhanced cooperation with domestic airlines and manufacturers -- featuring voluntary sharing of
important safety data -- instead of seeking fines or imposing other punishment.
News of the U.S. government scrutiny comes shortly after Ethiopia's transport minister,
Dagmawit Moges, said there were "clear similarities" between the two crashes. U.S. officials
cautioned that it was too early to draw conclusions because data from the black boxes of the
Ethiopian Airlines plane still need to be analyzed. The two crashes - which may be linked to
the same structural defect on the airliner - have sparked the biggest crisis Boeing has faced
in about two decades, threatening sales of a plane model that has been the aircraft giant's
most stable revenue source and potentially making it more time consuming and difficult to get
future aircraft designs certified as safe to fly.
The FAA said Sunday that the 737 MAX, which entered service in 2017, was approved to carry
passengers as part of the agency's "standard certification process," including design
analyses; ground and flight tests; maintenance requirements; and cooperation with other civil
aviation authorities. Agency officials in the past have declined to comment on various
decisions regarding specific systems. Sunday's statement said the agency's "certification
processes are well established and have consistently produced safe aircraft."
Earlier, a Boeing spokesman said: "The 737 MAX was certified in accordance with the
identical FAA requirements and processes that have governed certification of all previous new
airplanes and derivatives. The FAA considered the final configuration and operating parameters
of MCAS during MAX certification, and concluded that it met all certification and regulatory
requirements."
Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg said in a statement Sunday the company continues to
support the Ethiopian investigation, "and is working with the authorities to evaluate new
information as it becomes available." Muilenburg added: "As part of our standard practice
following any accident, we examine our aircraft design and operation, and when appropriate,
institute product updates to further improve safety."
Governments world-wide have grounded the MAX, an updated version of the decades-old 737,
while investigators and engineers seek clues.
And so, as 737 Max scrutiny grows and as Boeing and the FAA now seek to deflect increased
government attention to one another - Boeing stock is once again tumbling, and is down 3% in
premarket trading...
"I think it is unconscionable that a manufacturer, the FAA, and the airlines would have pilots flying an airplane without adequately
training or ever providing available resources and sufficient documentation to understand the highly complex systems that differentiate
this aircraft from prior models... The flight manual is inadequate and almost criminally insufficient." ANONYMOUS AIRLINE PILOT
Air cashes are always combination of human factor and airliner design problems plus weather condition and other transient factors.
The Ethiopian pilot was young (29) but he has 8000 hours of experience.
Notable quotes:
"... Economic problem that the 737 engines used too much fuel, so they decided to install more efficient engines with bigger fans and make the 737MAX. ..."
"... Airframe problem . They wanted to use the 737 airframe for economic reasons, but needed more ground clearance with bigger engines.The 737 design can't be practically modified to have taller main landing gear. The solution was to mount them higher & more forward. ..."
And for those who are not particular fans of tweetstorms, here it is recapped:
BEST analysis of what really is happening on the #Boeing737Max issue from my brother in law @davekammeyer, who's a pilot, software
engineer & deep thinker. Bottom line don't blame software that's the band aid for many other engineering and economic forces in effect.
Some people are calling the 737MAX tragedies a #software failure. Here's my response: It's not a software problem. It was an
Economic problem that the 737 engines used too much fuel, so they decided to install more efficient engines with
bigger fans and make the 737MAX.
Airframe problem. They wanted to use the 737 airframe for economic reasons, but needed more ground clearance with
bigger engines.The 737 design can't be practically modified to have taller main landing gear. The solution was to mount them higher
& more forward.
Aerodynamic problem. The airframe with the engines mounted differently did not have adequately stable handling at high
AoA to be certifiable. Boeing decided to create the MCAS system to electronically correct for the aircraft's handling deficiencies.
During the course of developing the MCAS, there was a:
Systems engineering problem. Boeing wanted the simplest possible fix that fit their existing systems architecture,
so that it required minimal engineering rework, and minimal new training for pilots and maintenance crews.
The easiest way to do this was to add some features to the existing Elevator Feel Shift system. Like the #EFS system, the #MCAS
relies on non-redundant sensors to decide how much trim to add. Unlike the EFS system, MCAS can make huge nose down trim changes.
On both ill-fated flights, there was a:
Sensor problem. The AoA vane on the 737MAX appears to not be very reliable and gave wildly wrong readings. On #LionAir,
this was compounded by a
Maintenance practices problem. The previous crew had experienced the same problem and didn't record the problem in
the maintenance logbook. This was compounded by a...
Pilot training problem. On LionAir, pilots were never even told about the MCAS, and by the time of the Ethiopian flight,
there was an emergency AD issued, but no one had done sim training on this failure. This was compounded by an..
Economic problem. Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light, which
lets pilots know that this problem was happening. Both 737MAXes that crashed were delivered without this option. No 737MAX with
this option has ever crashed.
All of this was compounded by a:
Pilot expertise problem. If the pilots had correctly and quickly identified the problem and run the stab trim runaway
checklist, they would not have crashed.
Nowhere in here is there a software problem. The computers & software performed their jobs according to spec without error. The
specification was just shitty. Now the quickest way for Boeing to solve this mess is to call up the software guys to come up with
another band-aid.
I'm a software engineer, and we're sometimes called on to fix the deficiencies of mechanical or aero or electrical engineering,
because the metal has already been cut or the molds have already been made or the chip has already been fabed, and so that problem
can't be solved.
But the software can always be pushed to the update server or reflashed. When the software band-aid comes off in a 500mph wind,
it's tempting to just blame the band-aid.
Aerodynamic problem. The airframe with the engines mounted differently did not have adequately stable handling at high AoA
to be certifiable.
Notice how none of these 'critics' ever describe what this AoA range or angle actually is?
It'll be because the AoA angle in question is already outside of the standard 737 Type certificate and Flight Manual's delineated
flight envelope. i.e. 'Trevor' and Co., are talking crap!
So they also smear the sensor!
Except Trevor and Co claim there's no redundancy , which is absolutely not the case, and he's being thoroughly dishonest about
it, i.e.
Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light, which lets pilots know that this
problem was happening. Both 737MAXes that crashed were delivered without this option. No 737MAX with this option has ever crashed.
NOTE: "DISAGREE"
So what is the first AoA sensor DISAGREEING WITH?
Yes, that's right! The first AoA sensor is being CONTINUOUSLY CROSS-CHECKED IN REAL-TIME to see if the readings from the MCAS
AoA sensor, actually always agrees with the readings from the jet's OTHER EXISTING AOA SENSORS.
i.e. THERE IS MCAS AOA SENSOR REDUNDANCY - WITHOUT ADDING ANOTHER VANE!
Well of course there ******* is! Otherwise it could not be certified! And would not be!
And nor would the airlines EVER take delivery of a jet with just one AoA sensor!!!
And this is why the option is not being taken up! This extra redundancy option is itself, ALREADY REDUNDANT!
Do you think everyone is as stupid as you TREVOR SUMNER? Maybe you actually do, but no, they sure aren't.
Cross-checking all sensors is standard and required system safety practice. There is usually AT LEAST THREE SENSORS (so why
add a fourth, when they are extremely reliable actually?) and if one sensor's data does not agree with the other two's data, then
the system decides (in real time, on the fly) to stop using the signal from the deemed dodgy sensor, and will to ONLY use just
the data from the two that do agree, and are deemed to be good, until the faulty one is removed and checked or replaced.
And the jet's systems will usually even send a message to the maintenance people at destination to replace the faulty sensor
and will even check the sensor is in stock, and where, and auto-arrange shipping of the part to the right location for the repairs
(if it's not immediately available - it is after all a line-replaceable item ).
TREVOR SUMNER IS LYING.
You can pull the wool over other people's eyes dipshit, but I'm not one of the dumb sheep who will worship your little mounds
of steaming fresh bullcrap. And any accident investigator will figure out that you're a completely ignorant ******** artist in
about 5 seconds flat.
This is who Trevor Sumner 'CEO' of "Perch Experience" really is:
Working in software for over 35 years, and all I've done for the last 20 has been to compensate for chip, design, and systems
defects that occur upstream of software. The trend in all industries is to do less rigorous design and have the software guys
fix it.
As last man in the game of hot potato, it's always software's job to paper over - everything. Since software is the lens through
which the customer sees the system, we ares always asked to make lens corrections.
" Economic problem. Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light, which lets pilots
know that this problem was happening. Both 737MAXes that crashed were delivered without this option. No 737MAX with this option
has ever crashed."
*** REGULATORY PROBLEM****
The lack of US regulation means that Boeing is ALLOWED TO SELL a plane with a KNOWN DEFECT *AND* a SUITABLE SAFETY WARNING
SYSTEM -- WITHOUT THE WARNING SYSTEM . Cash-strapped customers of course forego the extra expense.
IF the plane had had the warning system, the little light would have come on, and the plane would't have left the runway without
a shiny new, working sensor installed. But because the FAA doesn't give a **** about little brown people who BUY our products,
Boeing was allowed to sell defective merchandise without the safety kit in order to Make More Sales. This little oversight may
now have PERMANENTLY ruined the ability of one of America's few remaining manufacturing businesses to export its product. Dumbfucks.
What's that about Capitalism being self-correcting?
I
don't like flying.
I consider it unnatural, unhealthy and fraught with peril. But I do it all
the time. For me, it's either fly or take an ox cart.
In fact, I've been flying since I was six years old – from New York to Paris on a lumbering Boeing
Stratocruiser, a converted, double-decker WWII B-29 heavy bomber. I even had a sleeping berth. So much
for progress.
Lots can go wrong in the air.
Modern aircraft have thousands of obscure parts. If
any one of them malfunctions, the aircraft can be crippled or crash. Add pilot error, dangerous
weather, air traffic control mistakes, mountains where they are not supposed to be, air to air
collisions, sabotage and hijacking.
I vividly recall flying over the snow-capped Alps in the late 1940's aboard an old Italian
three-motor airliner with its port engine burning, and the Italian crew panicking and crossing
themselves.
Some years ago, I was on my way to Egypt when we were hijacked by a demented Ethiopian. A three day
ordeal ensued that included a return flight to New York City from Germany, with the gunman threatening
to crash the A-310 jumbo jet into Wall Street – a grim precursor of 9/11. My father, Henry Margolis,
got off a British Comet airliner just before it blew up due to faulty windows.
Which brings me to the current Boeing crisis.
After a brand new Boeing 737
Max crashed in Indonesia it seemed highly likely that there was a major problem in its new, invisible
autopilot system, known as MCAS. All 737 Max's flying around the world should have been grounded as a
precaution. But America's aviation authority, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), allowed the
Max to keep flying.
The FAA is half regulator and half aviation business promoter, a clear
conflict of interest.
The crash of a new Ethiopian 737 Max outside Addis Ababa under very similar circumstances to the
Lion Air accident set off alarm bells around the globe. Scores of airlines rightly grounded their new
Max's. But the US and Canada did not. The FAA continued to insist the aircraft was sound. The problem,
it was hinted between the lines, was incompetent third world pilots.
It now appears that America's would-be emperor, Pilot-in–Chief Donald Trump, may have pressed the
FAA to keep the 737 Max's in the air. Canada, always shy when it comes to disagreeing with Washington,
kept the 737 Max's flying until there was a lot of evidence linking the Indonesia and Ethiopian
crashes.
Trump finally ordered the suspect aircraft grounded. But doing so was not his business. That's the
job of the FAA. But Trump, as usual, wanted to hog the limelight.
By now, the 737 Max ban is just about universal.
Interestingly, Ethiopia refused to hand over the crashed 737's black boxes (actually they are red)
to the FAA, as is normal with US-built aircraft. Instead, Addis Ababa sent the data boxes for analysis
to BEA, France's well-regarded aviation accident investigator. Clearly, Ethiopia lacks confidence in
the veracity and impartiality of the FAA and the White House.
Today, Trump professes vivid interest in Boeing's well-being. Last May, however, Trump cancelled an
Iranian order to Boeing for $20 billion in airliners which had originally been signed under the Obama
administration. Israel's fingerprints were all over this cancellation. Iran desperately needs new
aircraft to replace its fleet of decaying, 1960's passenger aircraft that have become flying coffins.
Boeing (I am a shareholder) will recover from this disaster unless the 737 Max's center of
gravity is dangerously unstable.
The mystery autopilot system will be reconfigured and pilots
properly trained to use it. Air France had a similar problem when it introduced the new A320. But
Boeing, not third world pilots, is at fault.
There's another key factor.
I've been writing for decades that passenger
aircraft should return to the three-man crew they had 40-50 years ago. The position of flight engineer
was supposedly eliminated by cockpit automation. Today, aircraft are so electronically complex they
need a specialist on board who can deal with problems. Pilots should not be expected to be masters of
computer technology.
A third crew member is essential when things go wrong. But
employing one costs money. It seems rock-bottom fares remain more important than safety.
As all of us watch, shocked by the human consequences of two crashes of Boeing 737 Max jets in just five
months, it's hard not to wonder, why did Boeing resist efforts to ground the jets? And what about Southwest
Airlines and American Airlines, two U.S. carriers that
continued to fly them
until President Trump announced
the
planes were to be grounded
-- reversing an earlier decision by the Federal Aviation Administration?
Moments like these are a trial by fire for leaders. It is
not yet clear
why the
second jet, an Ethiopian Airlines flight, crashed on Sunday, March 10. Regulators have been split, with those
in Asia and Europe moving relatively quickly to ground 737 Max 8 jets, while in the U.S. the
FAA
maintained
its "review shows no systematic performance issues and provides no basis to order grounding the
aircraft." Politicians weighed in, and Dennis Muilenburg, CEO of Boeing,
called President Trump to reassure him
about the safety of the company's planes following a
presidential tweet
complaining that airplanes were becoming too complex: "I don't want Albert Einstein to
be my pilot," Trump wrote. By Wednesday, March 13, the New York Times
reported
more than 40 countries
had grounded the jets.
All this confusion does no one any good -- not the investors in the companies involved, not employees, and
not passengers.
We could have avoided much of the turmoil had the company's leaders done a better job of framing the
situation. Leaders have one crucial task at the start of a disaster in the making, and that is to use the art
of framing to describe the nature of the problem the organization is facing. Frames shape the way we think
about problems (and also opportunities). They tell us what category of problem we are dealing with, and because
they identify a type of problem, they also contain the seeds of action and response.
During the
Tylenol poisoning
crisis in 1982
, Johnson & Johnson's CEO at the time, James E. Burke, famously declared that it was a public
health problem. That framing set in motion all the activities we now associate with J&J's
gold-standard reaction
to a crisis
in which human lives are at stake: recalling all bottles of Tylenol capsules --
against
the advice of the FDA; designing new tamper-resistant packaging; and delivering the newly packaged capsules in
a period of six weeks. And when a second outbreak of poisoning occurred four years after the first, Burke went
on national TV to declare that J&J would only offer Tylenol in caplets, which could not be pulled apart and
resealed without consumers knowing about it. He publicly admitted he wished he had made that decision in the
first place.
Burke could have described the nature of the Tylenol poisoning in many different ways: as an assault on the
company, as a problem somewhere in the process of getting Tylenol from J&J factories to retail stores, as the
actions of a lone killer.
And each of these framings would have led to a different set of actions. If Burke had called the poisoning
an assault, he would have set off a costly and hard-to-win war against unknown outsiders trying to bring J&J
down. If it was a process problem, there would have followed a painstaking review of the supply chain of
Tylenol and possible flaws in the system. And if the work of a killer? Well, we all know how generalities like
that can lead to inaction on the ground, and a blaming of systems far removed from the company and its
responsibilities.
Boeing CEO Muilenburg is reported to have
insisted
to the president
and others that the aircraft are safe. We
heard about
the training that is designed to help pilots identify and override the automatic controls on
the plane if those controls are mistakenly guiding its nose down. So Muilenburg's frame appears to be:
This
is a technical problem that we can correct with pilot training.
It's a common enough frame for a product malfunction, but we still don't know if the similarity in the two
crashes is a coincidence or the sign of a systematic problem that needs to be corrected. Moreover, the frame
seems to miss the point that hundreds of human lives have been lost, that more may be at risk, and that
regulators in many countries have grounded the planes. Regulators' actions reflect a frame of "prioritizing
human safety," which seems to better reflect the high levels of uncertainty and risk that Boeing is asking us
to accept.
So what could Boeing have said? A better frame would be:
This is a technical problem that we do not
fully understand. In light of that uncertainty, we recommend grounding the 737 Max 8s and 9s until we can be
sure we know what is causing these crashes, and can satisfy ourselves and all of the global regulators that the
plane is safe to fly again.
That framing leads to a much clearer path of action, and acknowledges a partnership with regulators who are
charged to protect human lives. And it would have been better for all concerned if Boeing had come to that
conclusion before the president apparently did.
The main point here for leaders is you need to do the hard thinking first. You need to decide what kind of
problem you are facing, and you need to describe it in clear language that will help the people who have to
execute inside the company, as well as those who are judging it from the outside, understand how the company is
thinking about the kind the problem they face. Framing is a tool to be used consciously. Done well, it can make
an enormous difference in inspiring responsible action and trust in the judgment and values of the company,
even if, as in the case of J&J, the problem turns out to not be totally solved, and needs to be addressed
again.
Flawed Safety Analysis, Failed Oversight - Why Two 737 MAX Planes Crashedbjd
, Mar 17, 2019 12:55:20 PM |
link
Two accidents of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft led to a loss of 338 lives. Planes of that
type are now grounded world wide. We earlier
explained in detail why the incidents happened. New reports confirm that take.
For commercial reasons Boeing wanted the new 737 version to handle like the old ones. But
changes in the new version required an additional system to handle certain flight situations.
The development of that system and the safety analysis of its implications were rushed
through. Pilots were not informed of it and not trained to counter its failure.
Boeing now hopes that a software update, planned for April, will allow its grounded 737
MAX airplanes back to the flight line. For several reasons that is unlikely to happen.
On Thursday Captain C.B. Sully Sullenberger, who successfully landed a plane on the Hudson
river after a bird strike disabled both engines, spoke out against Boeing's patch
up attempt:
It has been obvious since the Lion Air crash that a redesign of the 737 MAX 8 has been
urgently needed, yet has still not been done, and the announced proposed fixes do not go
far enough .
The public will not trust Boeing's, or the Federal Aviation Administration's assurances if
Sullenberger sticks to his view.
Another reason that Boeing's update will not suffice is a detailed bombshell
report researched mostly before last Sunday's crash but just now published by the
Seattle Times . It summarizes:
[T]he original safety analysis that Boeing delivered to the FAA for a new flight control
system on the MAX -- a report used to certify the plane as safe to fly -- had several
crucial flaws.
...
Current and former engineers directly involved with the evaluations or familiar with the
document shared details of Boeing's "System Safety Analysis" of MCAS, which The Seattle
Times confirmed.
The safety analysis:
Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel
the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes
later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther
than was stated in the initial safety analysis document .
Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded,
thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane's nose
downward.
Assessed a failure of the system as one level below "catastrophic." But even that
"hazardous" danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input
from a single sensor -- and yet that's how it was designed.
The 737 MAX maneuver characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) depends on the input of a
vane on the side of the airplane.
Angle-of-attack sensor
The vane measure the angle between the airflow and the wing. It thereby detects if the
nose of airplane points up or down. It can easily be damaged by a ramp accident or due to a
bird strike. The MCAS system depends on the input of only one of these sensors.
The corrections MCAS applies to the trim of the airplane are too large for a busy pilot to
counter. (A detailed explanation of the system and the accidents is provided by a
professional pilot in two videos here and here .) That the system, as designed,
engages repeatedly can lead to situations that are extremely difficult to handle.
The Seattle Times also reports that managers at the FAA pushed their safety
engineers to delegate more certification tasks to Boeing itself. Boeing was eager to get the
new version of the 737 out of the door to catch up with Airbus's A-320 NEO. Shortcuts were
taken to rush the safety analysis through.
The MCAS system is poorly engineered and the design should never have been certified in
the first place. But the issue is even worse. The certification that was given relied on
false data.
The first MCAS design, on which the safety analysis and certification was based, allowed
for a maximum trim movement by MCAS of 0.6 degree of a maximum of 5 degree. Flight tests
proved that to be too little to achieve the desired effects and the maximum movement was
changed to 2.5 degree. A safety analysis for the new value was not conducted.
"The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that's what the foreign
regulatory authorities thought, too," said an FAA engineer. "It makes a difference in your
assessment of the hazard involved."
...
"None of the engineers were aware of a higher limit," said a second current FAA engineer.
Boeing and the U.S. government
have a special relation . All administrations, independent of which party rules, give it
extraordinary support. That leads to regulatory capture. The FAA is under constant political
pressure to relent to Boeing's demands:
For Boeing's 102-year history, dating to the start of the First World War, the company and
the country have relied upon one another, together creating hundreds of thousands of jobs,
outfitting the United States with top military aircraft and supplying planes worldwide to
allow the growth of passenger air travel and to boost U.S. exports.
...
"Whenever the government is seeking to enhance exports, usually you're going to find that
Boeing is heavily involved in whatever initiative they're carrying out," said Andrew
Hunter, a defense industry expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
"That was true in the Obama administration, and it's true in the Trump administration."
...
"The risk is obviously that when agencies that are regulatory in nature work closely with a
company over a long period of time, the concern is that it could undermine its
independence," Hunter said.
After the accident last Sunday Boeing
used its political connections to prevent the grounding of the 737 MAX. Only after all
other countries prohibited further flights did the U.S. join in. It was the president, not
the FAA, who announced the decision.
The new reports about the outsourcing of FAA safety analyses to Boeing itself, and of the
inappropriate certification process, add to the impression that the FAA can no longer be
trusted. Even if it certifies Boeing's patch-up solution for the MCAS problem other
regulators will disagree.
That then will become a severe political problem. Trump's trade negotiations with China
depend on the Chinese willingness to buy a large number of Boeing planes. If the Chinese
regulators, who were the first to ground the MAX, do not accept the solution Boeing provides,
those trade negotiations will go nowhere.
It is clear than that Boeing will have to provide a better solution. The U.S. government
will have to strengthen its aviation regulator and will have to protect it from political
pressure. Should either not happen Boeing's role in the international airline business will
be severely damaged.
Posted by b on March 17, 2019 at 12:26 PM |
Permalink The FAA wasn't keeping Boeing in check, Boeing was keeping the FAA in
check.
Banks failing, Boeing failing, lives lost, lives wrecked, who cares
Regulatory Capture indeed. Neoliberal Capitalism. The Market knows best.
Externalities. What's our stocks doing.
Well feed Boeing to the market then.
Instead we all know what will happen: next week Trump will announce a special
aid package for poor Boeing, to help it improve its manufacturing and certification
processes.
So if the sensors are failing. Who makes the sensors, and who installs the sensors?
Also, how hard is it to place an over-ride to get the MCAS out of the picture during
take-off?
That is not the whole of it. In the past, many countries have accepted that certification by
the FAA was a good enough reason to accept the plane as fit to use. If it turns out (or is
realised)that the FAA is really Boeing under an alias an awful lot of certifications are
going to be suspect.
Excellent follow-up report, b! Thanks very much! Clearly an excellent case of putting Profit
over People. And the current situation guarantees that Profit over People will continue to
win, which as psychohistorian alludes to points to a 100% morally dysfunctional system that
must be replaced. Ultimately, that means the Outlaw Nature of the USA must be eliminated for
that's where the source of the dysfunction lies. The result is essentially as David Korten
outlined in When Corporations Rule the World . And as myself and others have argued,
changing the directions within Corporate Charters--to support humanity and the environment
first and foremost prior to shareholder consideration-- must occur for the
dysfunctional system to be altered.
A few other people may have a say as to if and when the 737Max will fly again:
- Passengers : Who is going to want to get on a clearly defective airplane that was
not properly certified.
- Air Lines : Will open themselves up to massive law-suits if they fly this plane
again with out ensuring that it is properly certified. Any accident would be fatal for the
air-line.
- Lawyers : The litany of failures that led to the deaths of 350 people will expose
Boeing (and possibly the FAA) to massive legal jeopardy.
The MCAS is there to prevent stalls caused by a large angle of attack (AOA) to become
unrecoverable. Unlike the 737 NG, the 737 Max 8 (with MCAS turned off) will naturally pitch
up, instead of down, when it stalls due to high AOA.
This is due to the fact that, despite the advertising, the aerodynamic characteristics of
the Max are quite different from the NG. The large nacelles at the front of the wings provide
lift at high speeds, performing like (unintended) canards. As they are placed forward the
centre of mass, they add a pitch up moment. These "canards" are poorly designed, in the
aerodynamic sense, because they should stall at a lower AOA than the wings. If that were so,
the plane would tend to pitch down right before the stall (instead of up), making the stall
more easily recoverable. The MCAS has been put there to fake the stable flight recovery
characteristics of the 737 NG, that the MAX does not naturally enjoy.
b.s analysis is excellent from a technical and scientific point of view. But it suggests
that Boeing has always benefitted from regulatory capture when for decades Boeing did not
need regulatory capture because it built superb aircraft with double and triple redundancy
mechanisms on all key systems. The 747 is still flying fifty years later and has had
remarkably few accidents.
What few people seem to understand and what "psycohistorian" is always alluding to is that
a revolution occurred when investment banking took over industry and almost everything else
in the 1980s and 1990s. After 1997 Wall Street began to run Boeing, not the engineers that
had always run the company (the exception being Bill Allen, its most brilliant CEO, who
trained as a lawyer). Rather than regulatory capture Boeing's problem has been Wall Street
capture under the guise of creating shareholder value.
In 1987 Wall Street first came banging on Boeing's door in the considerable shape of
takeover artist and Texan mafia redneck T. Boone Pickens. Though his attempt was rebuffed
Boeing felt forced into accepting the Wall Street shock doctrine to avoid another more
powerful takeover attempt (GE under Jack Welch). Plans for new planes were frozen, R&D
spending was slashed and 50,000 workers were laid off. Management consultants and MBAs
flooded the place and so many new systems were in operation that staff could hardly remember
what the acronyms stood for - WCC, the five S's. JIT, DBT's and AIWs to name just a few
– all with the aim of cutting costs and employee numbers. So great was the employee
cull that the whole place came to a juddering halt and no planes were built for several weeks
in 1997 at a cost of $2.6 billion.
Wall Street loves what it calls M&Es (Mergers and Acquisitions) because it makes a
hefty profit off each deal and it is a good way to achieve rapid earnings growth. So on Wall
Street orders Boeing bought the ailing McDonnell Douglas (makers of the ill-fated DC10) in
1997 to gain income from MDD's miltary contracts. MDD boss Harry Stonecipher, who effectively
took over Boeing, had been a Jack Welch (Mr Shareholder Value ) disciple for twenty years and
had helped Jack eviscerate employee numbers and turn GE from an engineering company to a vast
conglomerate with its own massive financial services arm. Just check out the parlous state of
GE now!
But Boeing's commercial aircraft division was still not producing the expected results for
the Street. Wall Street advisors decided that there was something unique in Boeing's culture
that resisted the imposition of the new culture, and that the ties between management and
staff were so deep and ingrained that only a physical separation could offer the distance and
the anonymity necessary to "shake the company up". So it was decided to move HQ to Chicago,
which boasted a well-developed financial sector where Condit and Stonecipher might find the
sort of contacts befitting a company that was fast becoming a finance-driven business
(Muellerleile, 2009). Employees in Seattle were stunned and morale sank to an all-time
low.
Whereas previous CEOS had lived in modest middle class homes and travelled on Boeing
commercial planes, Stonecipher and Condit treated themselves to luxury houses and corporate
jets. The separation was complete. Now, twenty years up the line, the results of such greed
and criminality are plain for all to see.
Strawman Hogwash makes your reply stydebris. The moral dysfunction of placing profit over
people existed well before the rise of computers and its connective hardware. Indeed, it
existed well before the formation of the Abrahamic religions, which we all recognize today as
the Zero-sum Monopoly Game.
morning dove @17--
Hmm... how do you differ from mourning dove @16?
We've had both discussions--reformation versus total transformation--off and on here over
the past several years. Yes, Congress is part of the problem; however, it's been proven
through historical experience that the Congressional problem can be overcome. IMO, to have
any meaningful chance to implement either requires an evolution in the Public's Moral Compass
accompanied by a collective Epiphany that the Public has a Moral Duty to act.
I think there is still more to come out. That the fix for the stall problem was so severe it
is likely the flight instability problem MCAS was designed to fix is worse than boeing has
stated. On one of the flights that crashed the sensor had been replaced, thinking that fixed
the nose down problem from the previous flight so problem likely to be more than just faulty
sensor input. AOA sensor input is added to density altitude and airspeed input to determine
if the aircraft is at risk of stall.
Boeing's bandaid after the Lion Air crash was for the pilots to first get the aircraft under
control using the electric trim button on the yoke, and only when the plane was under
control, switch off power to the electric trim motor. Boeing instructions on what pilots
should do to recover from MCAS fault was also bullshit perhaps only usable if the aircraft
had plenty of altitude. In the Ethiopia incident, MCAS tried to dive the aircraft into the
ground very shortly after take off and the erratic vertical speed shows the pilots were using
Boing instructions to recover control.
Boeing have lied about the severity or onset of the stall problem, they lied about MCAS, and
even their bandaid patch after Lion Air was bullshit.
Outstanding reporting. The world has turned upside down. It is clear that the corruption of
neoliberal capitalism is so bad it kills people. To meet the goal of less than one million
chance of a catastrophic crash a third sensor must be added to the flight control system.
Rather than punching a new hole in the fuselage perhaps a gyroscope or a satellite-based
system to detect aircraft's flight position in real time plus the fixes listed in the Seattle
Times report. Note the Air France Airbus crash in the Atlantic Equatorial Thunderstorm was
due a cascade of disasters; input of bad data to the flight radar, icing of the three speed
sensors that dumped control of the plane to the pilots, a cherry co-pilot who panicked, and
lack of redundant flight controls so the other pilot did not realize the aircraft was
stalling. The certification of the 737 Max was criminal. Boeing will have to stop production
until a real fix is certified by China and the EU nations. They are in position to get what
they want from Washington DC or the last manufacturing industry left in the USA is dead. Yes,
the trade wars are over; unless the ideologues are so crazy, they start a real war with
China. Corporate control of the USA government must end to address the ongoing corruption,
the endless wars, and climate change.
One of several things I admire about our host at MoA is that he seems to have an unerring
instinct for what is important. (Churchill really admired this talent in people and searched
it out.). I found MoA as a result of the Skripal nonsense and have followed it with pleasure
since - so over a year now.
Now I don't know one end of an aircraft from the other but this thread about the 737 Max
has been very informative. I have also followed the story elsewhere.
What MSM is writing is also relevant and I was amazed to read in the London Sunday Times
today an article about the affair which probably the best bit of journalism I have seen in a
Murdoch title for many a year. It is measured and sensible. You won't learn more from it than
you will read here - but to see the subject treated by the Times with the kind of respect
which was standard 20 years ago - instead of the usual lazy, slanted, uniniquistive re-hash
from the agencies that they churn out nowadays - confirms my view that our host is right in
regarding this as a very big story indeed and the Times thinks this too.
One of several things I admire about our host at MoA is that he seems to have an unerring
instinct for what is important. (Churchill really admired this talent in people and searched
it out.). I found MoA as a result of the Skripal nonsense and have followed it with pleasure
since - so over a year now.
Now I don't know one end of an aircraft from the other but this thread about the 737 Max
has been very informative. I have also followed the story elsewhere.
What MSM is writing is also relevant and I was amazed to read in the London Sunday Times
today an article about the affair which probably the best bit of journalism I have seen in a
Murdoch title for many a year. It is measured and sensible. You won't learn more from it than
you will read here - but to see the subject treated by the Times with the kind of respect
which was standard 20 years ago - instead of the usual lazy, slanted, uniniquistive re-hash
from the agencies that they churn out nowadays - confirms my view that our host is right in
regarding this as a very big story indeed and the Times thinks this too.
Management at Southwest Airlines told its pilots that Boeing did not include any description
of MCAS in the flight manual because a pilot "should never see the operation of MCAS" in normal
flying.
But in the extreme circumstances where it does activate, when the angle of attack hits the
range of 10 to 12 degrees, the system rotates the horizontal tail so as to pitch the nose down.
And if the high angle of attack persists, the system repeats the command every 10 seconds.
Fehrm said Boeing must have added this system on the MAX because when the angle of attack is
high this model is less stable compared to prior 737 variants. That's because the MAX has
bigger, heavier engines that are also cantilevered further forward on the wing to provide more
ground clearance. That changes the center of gravity.
The scenario feared in the Lion Air case is that the AOA sensor sent false signals that
fooled the computer into thinking the plane was in a dangerous stall position, and so MCAS was
triggered.
What happened next is crucial.
Any pilot's natural reaction when a plane's nose begins to tilt down uncommanded is to
pull back on the yoke and raise the nose. In normal flight mode, that would work, because
pulling back on the yoke triggers breakout switches that stop any automatic tail movement
tending to move the nose of the plane down.
But with the MCAS activated, said Fehrm, those breakout switches wouldn't work. MCAS
assumes the yoke is already aggressively pulled back and won't allow further pullback to
counter its action, which is to hold the nose down.
In spite of what this dude assumes without proof, Boeing screwed this up. The question is
where. It can be software, it can be sensors.it can be a lack of redundancy or It can be all of these
things. Or, it could be an inherently unstable platform which it seems, according to all my
buddies that are pilots on the MAX, it is not. When they're handflying, they say it flies fine.
But it did come with a system MCAS that was not fully explained because, in the new world of
aircraft design, ",there's just stuff you can't do anything about so why know all a bout it"
line of thinking. AND IT DOES TRIM THE AIRCRAFT FOR REASONS NOT APPARENT TO THE PILOT AND IT
DOES IT IN A SINGLE CHANNEL FASHION. ie. No dual system votes on wether it's doing the right
thing for the phase of flight and no evidence to the pilot that it's doing it.
The problem is ending up with an aircraft that puts you in a full nose down or full nose up
stabilizer trim position before you know it's happened making recovery difficult when close to
the ground.
Wether it's due to a faulty angle of attack vane/sensor telling the trim motor to operate
when it shouldn't or a badly designed software program that creates wrong outputs due to
wrongly analyzing data inputs, there should be a dual system to alert the conflict before it
gets out of hand.
These problems can be addressed. Lawsuits will be filed and won against Boeing and the MAX
will fly again.
BTW if you're arguing that the 757 should have been redesigned and improved instead of
trying to make the 737 do the 757 job, I'm with you since
it was the best jet I ever flew.
B787 Captain, KMOUT 2 hours ago
even this is flawed. A320 has triple sensors so that
an erroneous channel can be recognised and ignored and the appropriate protections retained.
All that happens in the Boeing fix is that if two are different MCAS is cut out and the
aircraft becomes aerodynamically unstable contrary to certification requirements. No thanks
never thought I would say this but I would rather fly an Airbus...
4 hours ago Looks like all the deaths were due to Boeing's
relentless quest for additional profits then. We need to examine corporate cultures that put
profit ahead of safety and eliminate those companies that do so. Start with Boeing. No 737MaX
flights for me even after they add the software patch....**** Boeing.
4 hours ago
On an earnings call in April 2017, Boeing's CEO Muilenburg was asked how deregulation
early in Trump's term affected the company.
Muilenburg replied that "the administration has been very engaged across government
agencies and with industry to find ideas and ways and opportunities to simplify and
streamline.
" Things like FAA certification processes is one place that we're seeing some solid
progress," he said. "That's helping us more efficiently work through certification on some of
our new model aircraft, such as the Max, as it's going through flight test and entering into
service ."
Unfortunate
4 hours ago Looks to me that Boeing might be baked and done,
unless government sweeps it under rug, are there any honest and moral ppl working at these big
corporations, I doubt it, my daughter work at ad agency it was about liberal politics all day
long and use of F word until could take anymore and left. CEOs are not setting the example for
their staff any more just about their stock options and million dollar salaries and to hell
with everything else.
3 hours ago Suppose you're a software engineer. Top management
comes and says we have to stabilize this new configuration of the 737 via dynamic flight
controls, because it has an instability due to the change in engine placement. Your choices
are
(1) don't do it and try to transfer to a different project or look for a new job at a new
company, or
(2) do it as well as you can, or does it include
(3) go to the press and make a stink about it and say they shouldn't be making this change
at all.
Well if you do (3), you won't be able to prove your case, you'll just ruin your career and
maybe someone less competent will be tasked with that job you were assigned. They'll say you're
a kook. But maybe it will get them to really fix the problem just to make sure you aren't
right. I don't know.
So don't say there are no ethical people in those companies. There are some very ethical and
world-class people there, and apparently a few bad managers. Also, every so often there will be
accidents and tragedies despite people doing a uniformly great job.
3 hours ago Your right lower level guys for most part are
honest, but how do all these dishonest guys get be in charge?
3 hours ago There;s a reason it's called climbing the greasy
pole!
Tom Enders just couldn't resist the swipe at the competition. It was June 2011, and the chief executive officer of
Airbus SE was on a stage at the Paris air show after the planemaker
won in a matter of days an unprecedented 600 orders for its upgraded A320neo airliner, while
Boeing Co. stood on the sidelines.
"If our colleagues in Seattle still maintain we're only catching up with their 737, I must ask myself what these guys are smoking,"
Enders blurted out, to the general amusement of the audience, while Boeing representatives at the back of the room looked on.
Boeing had wavered on its decision whether to follow Airbus's lead and re-engine the 737 or go with an all-new aircraft. Customers
were willing to wait for "something more revolutionary," as Jim Albaugh, at the time Boeing's head of commercial aircraft, said then.
But the European manufacturer's blow-out success with the A320neo, essentially a re-engined version of its popular narrow-body
family, would soon force Boeing's hand.
As the A320neo became the fastest-selling plane in civil aviation history as Airbus picked off loyal Boeing customers like
American Airlines Group Inc. , the U.S. company ditched the
pursuit of an all-new jet and responded in July 2011 with its own redesign, the 737 Max.
"The program was launched in a panic," said Sash Tusa, an analyst at
Agency Partners , an equity research firm in London. "What
frightened Boeing most of all was losing their biggest and most important customer. American Airlines was the catalyst."
It turned out that Chicago-based Boeing wasn't too late to the party in the end: While the Max didn't quite replicate the neo's
order book, it did become the company's fastest seller as airlines scrambled to cut their fuel bills with new engines that promised
savings of 20 percent or more. All told, the Max raked in about 5,000 orders, keeping the playing field fairly level in the global
duopoly between Airbus and Boeing.
Close Scrutiny
Now the 737 Max is grounded globally, after two almost factory-fresh jets crashed in rapid succession. As a result, the repercussions
of Boeing's response to Airbus's incursion are under the microscope. Getting particular scrutiny are the use of more powerful, fuel-saving
engines and automated tools to help pilots control the aircraft.
After the grounding, Boeing said that it "continues to have full confidence in the safety of the 737 Max, and that it was supporting
the decision to idle the jets "out of an abundance of caution." The company declined to comment beyond its public statements.
In late October, a plane operated by Lion Air went down
minutes after taking off in Jakarta, killing all 189 people on board. Then on March 10, another 737 Max crashed, this time in Ethiopia
en route to Kenya. Again, none of the 157 people on board survived the impact.
There are other similarities that alarmed airlines and regulators and stirred public opinion, leading to the grounding of the
737 Max fleet of more than 350 planes. According to the Federal
Aviation Administration , "the track of the Ethiopian Airlines
flight was very close and behaved very similar to the Lion Air flight."
After decades of steadily declining aircraft accidents, the question of how two identical new planes could simply fall out of
the sky minutes after takeoff has led to intense scrutiny of the 737 Max's systems. Adding to the chorus in the wake of the crash
was President Donald Trump, who lamented the complexities of modern aviation, suggesting that people in the cockpit needed to be
more like nuclear physicists than pilots to command a jet packed with automated systems.
"Airplanes are becoming far too complex to fly. Pilots are no longer needed, but rather computer scientists from MIT," the president
said in the first of a pair of tweets on March 12, darkly warning that "complexity creates danger."
Analog Machine
Automation plays a limited role in the 737 Max. That's because the aircraft still has essential analog design and layout features
dating back to the 1960s, when it was conceived. It's a far older concept than the A320, which came to market at the end of the 1980s
and boasted innovations like fly-by-wire controls, which manipulate surfaces such as flaps and horizontal tail stabilizers with electrical
impulses and transducers rather than heavier hydraulic links.
Upgrading the 737 to create the Max came with its own set of issues. For example, the 737 sits considerably lower to the ground,
so fitting the bigger new engines under the wings was a structural challenge (even with the squished underbelly of the engine casing).
In response, Boeing raised the front landing gear by a few inches, but this and the size of the engines can change the plane's center
of gravity and its lift in certain maneuvers.
Boeing's technical wizardry for the 138- to 230-seat Max was a piece of software known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation
System, or MCAS. It intervenes automatically when a single sensor indicates the aircraft may be approaching a stall. Some pilots
complained, though, that training on the new system wasn't sufficient and properly documented.
"The benefits of automation are great, but it requires a different level of discipline and training,'' said Thomas Anthony, director
of the Aviation Safety and Security Program at the University of Southern California. Pilots must make a conscious effort to monitor
the plane's behavior. And reliance on automation means they will take back control only in the worst situations, he said.
Errant Sensor
With the Lion Air crash, data from the recovered flight recorders points to a battle in the cockpit between the software and the
pilots who struggled in vain to keep control. The data showed that an errant sensor signaled the plane was in danger of stalling
and prompted the MCAS to compensate by repeatedly initiating a dive. The pilots counteracted by flipping a switch several times to
raise the nose manually, which temporarily disabled MCAS. The cycle repeated itself more than two dozen times before the plane entered
its final deadly dive, according to the flight data.
With the flight and cockpit voice recorders of the Ethiopian plane now in France for analysis, the interaction between the MCAS
system and the pilots will again be under close scrutiny, probably rekindling the broader debate about who or what is in control
of the cockpit.
That man-versus-machine conundrum has been central to civil aviation for years. Automation has without doubt made commercial flying
much safer, as planemakers added systems to help pilots set engine thrust, navigate with greater precision and even override human
error in the cockpit.
For example, automation on modern aircraft keeps pilots within a so-called flight envelope to avoid erratic maneuvers that might
destabilize the aircraft. Analyses of flight data show that planes have more stable landings in stormy, low-visibility conditions
when automation is in charge than on clear days when they land by sight.
Sully's Miracle Landing
The most daring descent in recent memory, Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger's landing of US Airways Flight 1549 in the Hudson River
in early 2009, is Exhibit A of how an interconnected cockpit worked hand-in-hand with an experienced pilot. Automatic pitch trim
and rudder coordination assisted manual inputs and kept the Airbus A320 steady on its smooth glide into the icy water. The drama
showed that automation can play a crucial support function, provided a pilot is fully trained and the aircraft properly maintained.
"Some people are saying modern aircraft such as the 737 Max are too complex," said Dave Wallsworth, a
British Airways captain on the Airbus A380 double-decker.
"I disagree. The A380 is a far more complex aircraft and we fly it very safely every day. Pilots are capable of understanding aircraft
systems so long as the manuals contain the information we need."
Airbus traditionally has pushed the envelope on automation and a more modern cockpit layout, with larger screens and steering
by joystick rather than a central yoke, turning pilots into something akin to systems operators. Boeing's philosophy, on the other
hand, has been to leave more authority in the hands of pilots, though newer designs also include some computerized limits. Like Airbus
planes, the latest aircraft from Seattle -- where Boeing makes most of its jetliners -- are equipped with sophisticated autopilots,
fly-by-wire controls or systems to set speed during landings.
"The big automation steps came in the 1980s with the entry into service of the A320 and the whole fly-by-wire ethos," said John
Strickland, an independent aviation analyst. "I don't think automation per se is a problem, we see it in wide-scale use in the industry,
and as long as it is designed to work hand-in-hand with pilots and pilots understand how to use it, it shouldn't be an issue."
Erratic Movements
But the counter-argument is that increasingly complex systems have led computers to take over, and that many pilots may have forgotten
how to manually command a jet -- particularly in a moment of crisis. That criticism was leveled at Airbus, for example, after the
mid-Atlantic crash of Air France Flight 447 in 2009 that killed all 228 people on board. Analysis of the flight recorders showed
the crew was confused by stall warnings and unreliable speed readings, leading to erratic maneuvers that ended in catastrophe.
>
"I grew up on steam gauges and analog, and the modern generation on digital and automation," said Jon Weaks, president of the
Southwest Airlines Pilots Association and a Boeing 737
captain for the Dallas-based airline. "No matter what you grew up on, you have to fly the plane. If the automation is doing something
you don't want it to do or that you don't understand, you have to disconnect it and fly the plane."
A 2013 report by the FAA found more than 60 percent of 26 accidents over a decade involved pilots making errors after automated
systems abruptly shut down or behaved in unexpected ways. And the 2016 inspector general's report at the FAA noted that as the use
of automation increases, "pilots have fewer opportunities to use manual flying skills."
"As a result, the opportunities air carrier pilots have during live operations to maintain proficiency in manual flight are limited
and are likely to diminish," the report found.
The grounding of the 737 Max fleet has left Boeing in crisis. The company couldn't get through with its message that the plane
was safe to fly, as the group of regulators and airlines idling the jet kept expanding. The 737 program is Boeing's cash cow, accounting
for a third of its profit, and Boeing's stock dropped sharply in the days after the disaster.
Get in Line
The Max gave Boeing a relatively cheap path back into the narrow-body game that it was at risk of losing to the Airbus neo. At
the time, Boeing had to make a quick decision, as it was still burdened financially by the 787 Dreamliner wide-body that was over
budget and behind schedule.
Both manufacturers have said they won't come out with an all-new single-aisle model until well into the next decade, preferring
to wait for further technological advancements before committing to massive spending. The success of both the neo and the Max bought
the companies that extra time, with orders books stretching years into the future.
Half a century after it was launched almost as an afterthought, the 737 program has become the lifeblood of Boeing that helps
finance the rest of the corporation -- the biggest U.S. exporter. It's the one aircraft that Boeing cannot afford to give up.
"The Max was the right decision for the time," said Richard Aboulafia, an aviation analyst with the consultancy
Teal Group . "Yes, there may be an issue with MCAS needing
a software patch. Yes, there may need to be some additional training. But these are not issues that cause people to change to the
other guys' jet. The other guys have a waiting line, and when you get to the back of that line, you burn more fuel."
-- With assistance by Alan Levin, Benjamin D Katz, Margaret Newkirk, Michael Sasso, and Mary Schlangenstein
Conventional wisdom is that it is too early to speculate why in the past six months two
Boeing 737 Max 8 planes have gone down shortly after take off, so if all that follows is wrong
you will know it very quickly. Last night I predicted that the first withdrawals of the plane
would happen within two days, and this morning China withdrew it. So far, so good. (Indonesia
followed a few hours ago).
Why should I stick my neck out with further predictions? First, because we must speculate
the moment something goes wrong. It is natural, right and proper to note errors and try to
correct them.(The authorities are always against "wild" speculation, and I would be in
agreement with that if they had an a prior definition of wildness). Second, because putting
forward hypotheses may help others test them (if they are not already doing so). Third, because
if the hypotheses turn out to be wrong, it will indicate an error in reasoning, and will be an
example worth studying in psychology, so often dourly drawn to human fallibility. Charmingly,
an error in my reasoning might even illuminate an error that a pilot might make, if poorly
trained, sleep-deprived and inattentive.
I think the problem is that the Boeing anti-stall patch MCAS is poorly configured for pilot
use: it is not intuitive, and opaque in its consequences.
By the way of full disclosure, I have held my opinion since the first Lion Air crash in
October, and ran it past a test pilot who, while not responsible for a single word here, did
not argue against it. He suggested that MCAS characteristics should have been in a special
directive and drawn to the attention of pilots.
I am normally a fan of Boeing. I have flown Boeing more than any other plane, and that might
make me loyal to the brand. Even more powerfully, I thought they were correct to carry on with
the joystick yoke, and that AirBus was wrong to drop it, simply because the position of the
joystick is something visible to pilot and co-pilot, whereas the Airbus side stick does not
show you at a glance how high the nose of the plane is pointing.
Pilots are bright people, but they must never be set a badly configured test item with tight
time limits and potentially fatal outcomes.
The Air France 447 crash had several ingredients, but one was that the pilots of the Airbus
A330-203 took too long to work out they were in a stall. In fact, that realization only hit
them very shortly before they hit the ocean. Whatever the limitations of the crew (sleep
deprived captain, uncertain co-pilot) they were blinded by a frozen Pitot air speed indicator,
and an inability to set the right angle of attack for their airspeed.
For the industry, the first step was to fit better air speed indicators which were less
likely to ice up. However, it was clear that better stall warning and protection was
required.
Boeing had a problem with fitting larger and heavier engines to their tried and trusted 737
configuration, meaning that the engines had to be higher on the wing and a little forwards, and
that made the 737 Max have different performance characteristics, which in turn led to the need
for an anti-stall patch to be put into the control systems.
It is said that generals always fight the last war. Safety officials correct the last
problem, as they must. However, sometimes a safety system has unintended consequences.
The key of the matter is that pilots fly normal 737s every day, and have internalized a
mental model of how that plane operates. Pilots probably actually read manuals, and safety
directives, and practice for rare events. However, I bet that what they know best is how a
plane actually operates most of the time. (I am adjusting to a new car, same manufacturer and
model as the last one, but the 9 years of habit are still often stronger than the manual-led
actions required by the new configuration). When they fly a 737 Max there is a bit of software
in the system which detects stall conditions and corrects them automatically. The pilots should
know that, they should adjust to that, they should know that they must switch off that system
if it seems to be getting in the way, but all that may be steps too far, when something so
important is so opaque.
What is interesting is that in emergencies people rely on their most validated mental
models: residents fleeing a burning building tend to go out their usual exits, not even the
nearest or safest exit. Pilots are used to pulling the nose up and pushing it down, to adding
power and to easing back on it, and when a system takes over some of those decisions, they need
to know about it.
After Lion Air I believed that pilots had been warned about the system, but had not paid
sufficient attention to its admittedly complicated characteristics, but now it is claimed that
the system was not in the training manual anyway. It was deemed a safety system that pilots did
not need to know about.
This farrago has an unintended consequence, in that it may be a warning about artificial
intelligence. Boeing may have rated the correction factor as too simple to merit human
attention, something required mainly to correct a small difference in pitch characteristics
unlikely to be encountered in most commercial flying, which is kept as smooth as possible for
passenger comfort.
It would be terrible if an apparently small change in automated safety systems designed to
avoid a stall turned out have given us a rogue plane, killing us to make us safe.
Pilots are used to pulling the nose up and pushing it down, to adding power and to
easing back on it, and when a system takes over some of those decisions, they need to know
about it.
I have read that Boeing kept MCAS out of the limelight as otherwise the 737 MAX would need
to be certified as a new plane and airlines would need to do $$$ pilot retraining, making
their product less competitive.
Interesting response from a "by-stander", who compares a sophisticated aircraft with a new
model car !!!
As an experienced captain on 737s (not the MAX) I say, let the investigation begin; and
let us not have by-standers giving their penny worth. A normal 737 . is there also an
abnormal 747 or 777 or 787, or a 737 ??
Pilots carry the can . but, are the most respected profession in the world. What ever
happened, let the investigation decide the outcome, and not the "un-trained" (is there such a
term !!!!).
If one takes a look at the (released to date) information about the Lion Air crash –
"unreliable airspeeds" (the airspeed indicator is providing erroneous information during a
critical phase of flight (like climb out after take-off)) could have been the cause of that
aircraft crash – not AI.
A simple explanation – the airspeed indicator is "unreliable", as one moment the
indication is under-speed, then overspeed, followed by under-speed, and so it goes; like a
yoyo going up and down; the indicated speed is erroneous and the pilots cannot rely on what
is presented on the airspeed indicator. Pilots, according to the Boeing Training Manual, are
trained to handle unreliable airspeeds – the key is to fly the plane based solely on
pitch attitude and thrust (there are memory items for unreliable airspeed occurrences, along
with the reference items in aircraft's Quick Reference Handbook – the QRH (Boeing term)
is the pilots "bible" for any issues and problems when the aircraft is in the air !! ).
The point of the above paragraph is to enlighten the 'un-trained' as to not speculate too
soon with ideas and a "hypothesis" of what may have happened, until the knowledgeable ones
– the aircraft manufacturer (probably being the most knowledgable), the country's
aviation authority, the engine manufacturer, and (dear I say) the FAA (the Yanks just cannot
help themselves delving into other countries' affairs; when for 9/11 not one minutes was
spent by anyone (FAA, Boeing, no one) investigating the so-called crashes of four aircraft
– on one day, within one and a half hours of each other, and in the most protected
airspace in the world (got the hint !!) – I have digressed, though for reason .. have
completed their investigations.
I can assure you that no pilot wants to crash a plane we (pilots) all want to live to 100,
and beyond.
Humans make mistakes, but technology needs humans to correct technology's mistakes. Boeing
build reliable and trustworthy aircraft; pilots undertake their duties in a safe and
controlled manner (according to training and aircraft manufacturer stipulated standards); but
errors happen – and the investigator is there to establish what happened, so that these
do not happen again. Unfortunately, it is just possible that the cause of the first MAX
accident is the same as the second. But, let the knowledgable ones determine that fact
– and let me, and us, not speculate.
AI in the MAX hhmmmmm – let Boeing release that information, before we start
speculating again (on AI – is an auto pilot AI; the B737 I fly has two auto pilots; is
that double AI ??).
To the rest of the travelling public – airline travel remains, and has been, the
safest form of transport for decades. I am confident that the status quo will remain.
Time will reveal the answers to these two accidents, when the time is right – when
the investigators (for both) have concluded their deliberations.
My guess is, the majority of people will have forgotten these two MAX events (but, for
those who have lost loved ones), as some other crisis/event will have occurred in their lives
and/or in the world.
@Captain 737 I respect your analysis especially coming from a seasoned 737 captain. I
have over 5,000 flying hours in single and twin-engine, conventional and jet, all military. I
have not flown since 1974 so the advances in auto-pilot technology are beyond my
comprehension. My question to you is simple–I think. If the aircraft took off in VFR
conditions I assume the pilots knew the pitch attitude all during the takeoff phase. Is there
no way to manually overpower the auto-pilot once the pilots knew the pitch attitude was
dangerously high or low?
If this is a made in china airplane, the empire would mobilize the whole world to ground the
entire fleet. The diatribes, lies, cruel sick jokes, lawsuits, etc, etc, would fly to the
heavens.
But NO, this is an empire plane. Designed, built and (tested?) in the heart of the empire.
And despite the fact that more than 300 people had died, IT IS STILL SAFE to fly!
Quite a short and to-the-point article, although the link to "artificial intelligence" is
tenuous at best.
What is sold as Artificial Intelligence nowadays is massive statistical processing in a
black box (aka as "Neural Network Processing"), it's not intelligent.
The most surprising fact is that it works so well.
Neural Networks won't be in high-assurance software soon. No-one knows what they really do
once configured (although there are efforts underway to
attack that problem ). They are impossible to really test or design to specification.
Will someone underwrite that a system incorporating them does work? Hardly. You may find them
in consumer electronics, research, "self driving cars" that never really self-drive without
surprises and possibly
bleeding edge military gear looking for customers or meant to explode messily anyway.
But not in cockpits. (At least I hope).
Check out this slideshow about the ACAS-X
Next Generation Collision Airborne Collision Avoidance System. It has no neural network in
sight, in fact if I understand correctly it doesn't even have complex decision software
in-cockpit: it's all decision tables precomputed from a high-level, understandable
description (aka. code, apparently in Julia) to assure safe outcome in a fully testable and
simulatable approach.
In this accident, we may have a problem with the system, as opposed to with the software.
While the software may work correctly and to specification (and completely unintelligently)
the system composed of software + human + physical machinery will interact in interesting,
unforeseen, untested ways, leading to disaster. In fact the (unintelligent software + human)
part may disturbingly behave like those Neural Networks that are being sold as AI.
@Anatoly Karlin I'm guessing that it would require a change in the TCDS and possibly a
different type rating, which would be anathema for sales.
I'm a little airplane person, not a big airplane person (and the 737 is a Big Airplane
even in its smallest configuration) but I know there have been several instances where
aircraft had changes that required that pilots of the type have a whole different type
rating, even though the changes seemed minor. I'm guessing airlines are training averse and
don't want to take crews off revenue service beyond what is statutorily required. The margins
in airline flying are apparently much leaner now than in the glory days.
I never approved of allowing fly by wire in commercial airliners, I never even really
liked the idea of FADEC engine control (supervisory DEC was fine) because a classical
advantage of gas turbines (and diesels) was that they could run in an absolutely electrically
dead environment once lit. Indeed, the J-58 (JT11-D in P&W parlance) had no electrical
system to speak of beyond the instrumentation: it started by mechanical shaft drive and
ignited by triethyl borane chemical injection. The Sled could make it home on needle-ball and
alcohol compass, and at least once it did. Total electrical failure in any FBW aircraft means
losing the airplane. Is the slight gain in efficiency worth it? I'm told the cables, pulleys,
fairleads and turnbuckles add 200 pounds to a medium size airliner, the FBW stuff weighs 80
or so.
The jet transports we studied in A&P school had a pitot head and static port on either
side of the flight deck and the captain and F/O had inputs from different ones, though IIRC
the altimeter and airspeed were electrically driven from sensors at the pitot head or inboard
of it. I have a 727 drum-pointer (why are three pointer altimeters even legal anymore??)
altimeter and it has no aneroids, just a couple of PCBs full of TTL logic and op amps and a
DB style connector on the back. Do crews not cross check airspeed and altitude or is there no
indicator to flag them when the two show something different?
Also, not being a jet pilot myself, my understanding is that anyone with T-38 experience
is forever after thinking in terms of AOA and not airspeed per se, because that airplane has
to be flown by AOA in the pattern, and classically a lot of airline pilots had flown Talons.
Is there no AOA indicator in the 737? Flying in the pattern/ILS would make airspeed pretty
dependent on aircraft weight, and on a transport that can change a lot with fuel burn, do
they precisely calculate current weight from a totalizer and notate speeds needed? (I presume
airliners don't vary weight other than fuel burn, not being customarily in the business of
throwing stuff out of the airplane, although they used to fly jumpers out of a chartered 727
at the parachute meet in Quincy)
Many problems in the world arise because many computing people reckon themselves very clever
when they are merely rather clever. And often they combine what cleverness they have with a
blindness about humans and their ways. I shouldn't be at all surprised if programmers at
Boeing decided that they always knew better than pilots and doomed the planes accordingly.
I saw recently an expression that made me grin: "midwits". It describes rather well many
IT types of my acquaintance.
@fish And that's the problem, as Mr. Kief also points out. The individuals at the
decision making level (let's call them "executives") don't or can't think that far ahead, at
least when the corporation they run is concerneed.
@dearieme One corollary is that the Midwits take such joy in their cleverness that they
assume their wit has value in and of itself. This is most evident when they design clever
solutions to invented problems. Billions of dollars of venture capital have been set on fire
in that way, when technical and financial midwittery combine.
@Andrei Martyanov It's almost nitpicking. But – James Thompson says it above: The
MCAS in this Boing model 737 MAX 8 is used to cover up a basic construction flaw. This has
undoubtedly worked for quite some time – but it came with a risk. And this risk might
turn out to have caused numerous deaths. In this case, if it will turn out, that the MACS
system didn't do what it was supposed to do and thus caused numerous deaths – will this
then be looked upon as a problem of the application of artificial intelligence? Yes, but
not only . It was a combination of a poorly built (constructed) airliner and software,
which might not have been able to compensate for this flawed construction under all
conditions.
It's cheaper to compensate via software – and this might (might) turn out to be a
rather irresponsible way to save money. But as I said: Even in this case, the technical
problem would have to be looked upon as twofold: Poor construction plus insufficient
software compensation. I'd even tend to say, that poor construction would then be the main
(=basic) fault. With the zeitgeisty (and cheap!) software-"solution" for this poor
construction a close second.
@Captain 737 Curiously, this is "Captain 737″'s first and only comment here.
It's almost as if Boeing hired a high-priced PR firm whose offerings include pseudonymous
online "messaging" to "shape opposition perceptions" etc. Note the over-obvious handle. (Just
like globalist shills like to pretend to be regular blue-collar guys in small fly-over
towns.)
By their words shalt ye know them.
PREDICTION: In 3-4 years, we will "discover" a long paper trail of engineers warning early
on about the risk of hastily kludging a half-assed anti-stall patch MCAS onto a system that
had undergone years of testing and refinement WITHOUT the patch.
Only somebody PAID not to see the problem could fail to perceive that this means that as
so altered, the ENTIRE SYSTEM goes back to being technically immature.
@Dieter Kief What "basic construction flaw" are we discussing here? The 737 airframe is
pretty well established and has a good record-there have been incidents but most have been
well dealt with.
@Anonymous I've read today, that in the aviation world there is a consensus, that what
James Thompson says in his article is right:
"Boeing had a problem with fitting larger and heavier engines to their tried and trusted 737
configuration, meaning that the engines had to be higher on the wing and a little forwards,
and that made the 737 Max have different performance characteristics, which in turn led to
the need for an anti-stall patch to be put into the control systems."
– A German engineer wrote in a comment in the Berlin daily Die weLT, this
construction flaw makes the 737 MAX 8 something like a flying traktor . He concluded,
that Boing proved, that you can make a tractor fly, alright. But proper engineering would
have looked otherwise – and would for sure had come at a higher cost.
(The different performance charactersitics mentioned by James Thompson is an
extraordinarily nice way to express, that the 737 MAX 8 is a tad more likely to stall, just
because of the very design-changes, the bigger turbines made necessary. And this is a rather
nasty thing to say about an airplane, that a new design made it more likely to stall!
).
The 737 family is the best selling commercial airliner series in history with more than
10,000 units produced. However, this airplane in its various configurations has had many
crashes since it first entered service in 1968.
"... To implement a security relevant automatism that depends on only one sensor is extremely bad design. To have a flight control automatism engaged even when the pilot flies manually is also a bad choice. But the real criminality was that Boeing hid the feature. ..."
"... The Ethiopian Airlines plane that crashed went down in a similar flight profile as the Indonesian plane. It is highly likely that MCAS is the cause of both incidents. While the pilots of the Ethiopian plane were aware of the MCAS system they might have had too little time to turn it off. The flight recorders have been recovered and will tell the full story. ..."
"... The FAA certifies all new planes and their documentation. I was for some time marginally involved in Airbus certification issues. It is an extremely detailed process that has to be followed by the letter. Hundreds of people are full time engaged for years to certify a modern jet. Every tiny screw and even the smallest design details of the hardware and software have to be documented and certified. ..."
"... How or why did the FAA agree to accept the 737 MAX with the badly designed MCAS? How could the FAA allow that MCAS was left out of the documentation? What steps were taken after the Indonesian flight crashed into the sea? ..."
"... That the marketing department has more say than the engineers who design and test the hardware and the software in passenger jets tells us a great deal about the Potemkin-style workplace culture that prevails in Boeing and similar large US corporations. The surface sheen is more important than the substance. The marketing brochures and manuals are no different from mainstream news media in the level of BS they spew. ..."
"... The Indonesian pilots did not have the time to figure out and realise that something else was controlling the plane's flight, much less deactivate what is effectively a second autopiloting system. ..."
"... B is right. This is a criminal act of deception and fraud thats cost hundreds their lives. Boeing executives responsible should be prosecuted and then jailed. ..."
"... while all the technical discussion around how to fly a plane is truly interesting, what's really at issue here is corporate and institutional betrayal of trust. ..."
"... The corporate aspect is Boeing, obviously. The institutional aspect is FAA, which used to lead the world in trust when it came to life and death matters. ..."
"... But now, in what Bloomberg, even while trying to support FAA, has no choice but to report as a "stunning rebuff" to FAA's integrity, countries around the world are grounding this flawed plane. Germany, among others, has closed its airspace to the 737. ..."
"... "Should anyone be flying 737MAXes before the black box data has been evaluated?" ..."
"... Before, the civilian airliners were falling out of the sky because of an immature technology, that is because of the learning curve. Now that the technology involved is fully mature the airliners are falling out of the sky for profit taking. ..."
"... Is it really so hard to connect the secrecy about MCAS and why it was needed in the first place? The lawyers will have a ball of the decade with this: the defendant created a secret software solution to turn a Lego airplane into a real airplane, made the software dependent on a single sensor, and made it difficult to switch the software off. ..."
"... I cannot believe that Boeing shares dropped only 7.5%, this is a statement of how untouchable Boeing is and how protected it will be by the Corrupt. ..."
Boeing, The FAA, And Why Two 737 MAX Planes Crashedpsychohistorian , Mar 12, 2019 4:55:32 PM |
link
On Sunday an Ethiopian Airlines flight crashed, killing all on board. Five month earlier
an Indonesian Lion Air jet crashed near Jakarta. All crew and passengers died. Both airplanes
were Boeing 737-8 MAX. Both incidents happened shortly after take off.
Boeing 737 MAX aircraft are now grounded
about everywhere except in the United States. That this move follows only now is sad.
After the first crash it was already obvious that the plane is not safe to fly.
The Boeing 737 and the Airbus 320 types are single aisle planes with some 150 seats. Both
are bread and butter planes sold by the hundreds with a good profit. In 2010 Airbus decided
to offer its A-320 with a New Engine Option (NEO) which uses less fuel. To counter the Airbus
move Boeing had to follow up. The 737 would also get new engines for a more efficient flight
and longer range. The new engines on the 737 MAX are bigger and needed to be placed a bit
different than on the older version. That again changed the flight characteristics of the
plane by giving it a nose up attitude.
The new flight characteristic of the 737 MAX would have require a retraining of the
pilots. But Boeing's marketing people had told
their customers all along that the 737 MAX would not require extensive new training. Instead
of expensive simulator training for the new type experienced 737 pilots would only have to
read some documentation about the changes between the old and the new versions.
To make that viable Boeing's engineers had to use a little trick. They added a 'maneuver
characteristics augmentation system' (MCAS) that pitches the nose of the plane down if a
sensor detects a too high angle of attack (AoA) that might lead to a stall. That made the
flight characteristic of the new 737 version similar to the old one.
But the engineers screwed up.
The 737 MAX has two flight control computers. Each is connected to only one of the two
angle of attack sensors. During a flight only one of two computer runs the MCAS control. If
it detects a too high angle of attack it trims the horizontal stabilizer down for some 10
seconds. It then waits for 5 seconds and reads the sensor again. If the sensor continues to
show a too high angle of attack it again trims the stabilizer to pitch the plane's nose
done.
MCSA is independent of the autopilot. It is even active in manual flight. There is a
procedure to deactivate it but it takes some time.
One of the angle of attack sensors on the Indonesian flight was faulty. Unfortunately it
was the one connected to the computer that ran the MCAS on that flight. Shortly after take
off the sensor signaled a too high angle of attack even as the plane was flying in a normal
climb. The MCAS engaged and put the planes nose down. The pilots reacted by disabling the
autopilot and pulling the control stick back. The MCAS engaged again pitching the plane
further down. The pilots again pulled the stick. This happened some 12 times in a row before
the plane crashed into the sea.
To implement a security relevant automatism that depends on only one sensor is
extremely bad design. To have a flight control automatism engaged even when the pilot flies
manually is also a bad choice. But the real criminality was that Boeing hid the
feature.
Neither the airlines that bought the planes nor the pilots who flew it were told about
MCAS. They did not know that it exists. They were not aware of an automatic system that
controlled the stabilizer even when the autopilot was off. They had no idea how it could be
deactivated.
Nine days after the Indonesian Lion Air Flight 610 ended in a deadly crash, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA)
issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive.
The 737 MAX pilots were aghast. The APA pilot union
sent a letter to its members:
"This is the first description you, as 737 pilots, have seen. It is not in the AA 737
Flight Manual Part 2, nor is there a description in the Boeing FCOM (flight crew operations
manual)," says the letter from the pilots' union safety committee. "Awareness is the key
with all safety issues."
The Ethiopian Airlines plane that crashed went down in a similar flight profile as the
Indonesian plane. It is highly likely that MCAS is the cause of both incidents. While the
pilots of the Ethiopian plane were aware of the MCAS system they might have had too little
time to turn it off. The flight recorders have been recovered and will tell the full
story.
Boeing has sold nearly 5,000 of the 737 MAX. So far some 380 have been delivered. Most of
these are now grounded. Some family members of people who died on the Indonesian flight are
suing Boeing. Others will follow. But Boeing is not the only one who is at fault.
The FAA certifies all new planes and their documentation. I was for some time
marginally involved in Airbus certification issues. It is an extremely detailed process that
has to be followed by the letter. Hundreds of people are full time engaged for years to
certify a modern jet. Every tiny screw and even the smallest design details of the hardware
and software have to be documented and certified.
How or why did the FAA agree to accept the 737 MAX with the badly designed MCAS? How
could the FAA allow that MCAS was left out of the documentation? What steps were taken after
the Indonesian flight crashed into the sea?
Up to now the FAA was a highly regarded certification agency. Other countries followed its
judgment and accepted the certifications the FAA issued. That most of the world now grounded
the 737 MAX while it still flies in the States is a sign that this view is changing. The
FAA's certifications of Boeing airplanes are now in doubt.
Today Boeing's share price dropped some 7.5%. I doubt that it is enough to reflect the
liability issues at hand. Every airline that now had to ground its planes will ask for
compensation. More than 330 people died and their families deserve redress. Orders for 737
MAX will be canceled as passengers will avoid that type.
Boeing will fix the MCAS problem by using more sensors or by otherwise changing the
procedures. But the bigger issue for the U.S. aircraft industry might be the damage done to
the FAA's reputation. If the FAA is internationally seen as a lobbying agency for the U.S.
airline industry it will no longer be trusted and the industry will suffer from it. It will
have to run future certification processes through a jungle of foreign agencies.
Congress should take up the FAA issue and ask why it failed.
Posted by b on March 12, 2019 at 04:39 PM |
Permalink
Comments
next page " @ b who wrote
"
But the engineers screwed up.
"
I call BS on this pointing of fingers at the wrong folk
Engineers get paid to build things that accountants influence. The West is a world in
which the accountants have more sway than engineers.
It is all about the money b and to lead folks in some other direction is not like what I
think of you.
The elite that own global private finance and everything else killed those people in the
planes because they set the standards that the accountants follow and then force the
engineers to operate within
"Congress should take up the FAA issue and ask why it failed."
If there had been any chance of that happening, the planes would probably still be flying and
dead passengers alive.
This, if you are right and I suspect that you are, is symptomatic of an empire dying of
corruption. It is no accident that both the new secretary of defence and the neo-con cult
itself were born of Boeing. A fact memorialised in the UK where the Blairites rally in the
Henry Jackson society.
Last night I wrote on a previous thread:
Over the space of a few months 2 almost new Boeing 737 MAX aircraft have crashed. Rather than
going to the expense of designing an entirely new fuselage and normal length landing gear for
its larger and much more powerful 737 MAX engines Boeing stuck with the now ancient 737
fuselage design that sits only 17 inches from the ground – necessitating changes to the
positioning of the engines on the wing, which together with the vast increase in power,
created aerodynamic instability in the design that Boeing tried to correct with software,
while not alerting pilots to the changes.
Through the 1980s and early 1990s Boeing executives had largely resisted pressure from Wall
Street to cut staff numbers, move plant to non-union states and outsource. The 777 was the
last real Boeing, though significant outsourcing did take place – but under the strict
control and guidance of Boeing engineers. After the "reverse" takeover of MacDonnell Douglas
in 1997 the MDD neoliberal culture swamped Boeing and its HQ was moved from the firm's home
near Seattle to Chicago so executives could hobnob with speculators. Wall Street had taken
down another giant.
The story I have most interest in, at the moment, is the state of the power blackout in
Venezuela and whether this was a cyber attack by the United States. If it was, it is, in my
opinion, a weapon of mass destruction and a very major war crime. The story seems to be
fading from the news so I'm hoping b. will be able to gather more information about it.
I don't know if this is true by my sister who was an engineer working on military jets said
that she'd heard that because of various design requirements, the 737-MAX was inherently
unstable but stability was provided by the fly-by-wire system. In military jets, this feature
provides greater maneuverability and survivability but has no place on civilian aircraft as
the outcome of a system failure would be catastrophic with the pilots being unable to do
anything about it. Anyone heard anything similar?
b - thanks for addressing this.. subservient canada is also flying them
still..) canada is going the same way as the usa-faa - into a ditch long term... it is
really sad for the people who have died and for the fact that as @1 psychohistorian notes -
the decisions are being put in the hands of the wrong people...
Gotta agree with psychohistorian @1, that the engineers aren't totally responsible.
Deregulation pukes at FAA, bean counters at Boeing and their managers who approved it all are
morally culpable. Airline executives aren't immune either, although many will likely plead
ignorance.
If the US were a sane country, a Congressional investigation would follow, but it's not, and
Congress is going to be more concerned with Boeing's bottom line than in public safety or the
integrity of the FAA. That's probably why the planes haven't been grounded in the US.
Congress is much more likely to impede investigation and accountability.
You omit important facts: the pilots know by heart how to quickly cut off electronic control
of the stabilizers and fly manually. The pilots on the preceding lion air flight had had the
same problem, and immediately solved it. The defective sensor should have been immediately
replaced, and would have in the United States. On the next flight, the pilots (the copilot
being quite unexperienced) spent 10 minutes not doing what they were trained to do in an
emergency where the stabilizers are out of control: disable them.
When some flight crews get it right, but others don't, it's not a design flaw but a
problem with the flight crews.
Through the history of Boeing senior executives lived in modest middle-class houses. They
traveled on Boeing aircraft to get pilot's responses. But when Phil Condit (Wall Street's
man) took over he immediately bought private jets and started living the lifestyle. The
difference between productive capitalism and financial capitalism.
the broken dreams documentary above spells it out very clearly the documentary is from
2014.
it even has undercover folks in the boeing factory saying they would not fly on one.
if you fly you should watch that old al jazeera investigation.
the company does not pay tax and
the head of boeing paid himself 100s of millions of dollars
But the bigger issue for the U.S. aircraft industry might be the damage done to the FAA's
reputation.
I'd counter this by asking "what reputation?"
I've known for years how it took take a "smoking hole" for the FAA to get off the can and
actually do something about a problem with an airplane or airline. But things evolve, and
here we have TWO such smoking holes and the FAA still allows it to fly. I'm not trying to
pick on the current FAA leader, for the man is utterly typical of the people who are allowed
to gain his position. From his wiki:
But the bigger issue for the U.S. aircraft industry might be the damage done to the FAA's
reputation.
Elwell joined Airlines for America (A4A) in 2013[3] where he was the Senior Vice
President for Safety, Security, and Operations. Elwell left this role in 2015.
(Skipping to the A4A wiki:) Airlines for America
Officially, the A4A has announced five "core elements" of a national airline policy include
reducing taxes on the industry, reducing regulation , increased access to foreign
markets, making the industry more attractive for investors , and improving the air
traffic control system.
I suspect that grounding the 737-MAX would contradict the goal of "making the industry
more attractive for investors".
About an hour ago I sent out an all-points email suggesting my family members avoid
boarding a 737 MAX until the facts are better known and solutions are in place. The FAA may
not care about them taking risks, but I sure do.
"Boeing is among the largest global aircraft manufacturers; it is the fifth-largest
defense contractor in the world based on 2017 revenue, and is the largest exporter in the
United States by dollar value".
I agree with Psychohistorian @ 1 in less forthright terms: the engineers did not "screw up".
On the contrary they most likely did what they could with the money and the time deadline
they were given to carry out what essentially was a patch-up job that would make Boeing look
good, save money and maintain its stock in sharemarkets.
Probably the entire process, in which the engineers played a small part - and that part in
which they had no input into whoever was making the decisions - was a disaster from start to
finish. The engineers should have been consulted at an early stage in the re-design of the
aircraft's flight and safety features. Only when the appropriate re-design has been tested,
changed where necessary and given the thumbs-up by relevant pilots' unions and other
organisations with regard to passenger safety can the marketing department go ahead and
advise airlines who buy the redesigned planes what training their pilots need.
That the marketing department has more say than the engineers who design and test the
hardware and the software in passenger jets tells us a great deal about the Potemkin-style
workplace culture that prevails in Boeing and similar large US corporations. The surface
sheen is more important than the substance. The marketing brochures and manuals are no
different from mainstream news media in the level of BS they spew.
One can think of other organisations where the administration has more power in the
corporate decision-making process and eats up more of the corporate budget while the people
who do the actual work are increasingly ignored in boardrooms and their share of the budget
correspondingly decreases. Hospitals and schools come to mind.
Boeing got taken over Wall Street, which means cheapest solution to anything. Engineers
are stuck with what they are given. What part of that do you still not understand.
A mitigating factor to the flightcrew is the take-off to 10,000ft is the busiest time. There
is enough going on without having to deal with runaway stab. This is especially true for new
crew to a new aircraft. Rode in many cockpits before 9.11.01 when company employees were
allowed and the standing rule was no conversations below 10,000 and keep you eyes open for
traffic. I also include my Maintenance brethren in that equation. Spent 30 years as a
Avionics Tech. on both military and commercial aircraft so I am not really fond of giving flightcrew a break but I
might this time.
Why is Boeing suffering from this design problem and not A320neo is that 737's wings are
much lower to the ground than the A320. Unfortunately, more fuel-efficient engines require a
larger air inlet, so the newer generation engines are much larger than the previously
installed V2500 or CFM56 (anyone can verify that - the older engines are much, much smaller
than the newer ones).
When Airbus introduced the Pratt & Whitney GTF on its A320s
(calling it the neo - new engine option), it led to an increase (high single digits %)
increase in fuel efficiency. Boeing had to respond to that. If they wanted to increase the
height of the wings of the 737 from the ground, they would have had to redesign the fuselage
which would have cost billions (and which they should have done, in hindsight). Instead, they
listened to the investors and the bean counters as you have called them here and they jiggled
the position of the wings a bit and introduced the new automatic stabiliser.
The people at Boeing are good or at least the engineers are. Imagine how many times this
problem would have been brought up by someone for him/her to be shut down. It's not like they
were not aware of the issue, but they were unwilling to let their bottom line suffer.
Instead, they were okay with carrying the risk of killing hundreds of people.
Agree with both of your comments. It looks like the 55 year old 737 air-frame design,
which is very low to the ground when compared to more modern designs, is incompatible with
the bigger engines required for fuel efficiency.
Being very low to the ground, Boeing was forced to put the engines out in front, which
upset the airplane's balance, making the plane essentially unstable. To counter the
instability they added the 'MCAS?' control system.
This solution violates a fundamental tenant of design for safety-critical systems. The
tenant of 'fail-safe'. If something goes wrong the system is supposed to fail in a manner
that preserves safety. For the 737 Max, when the this stability control system fails, the
plane is fundamentally unstable. For this system it is not 'fail-safe'. It is
'fail-crash'.
Why would Boeing do this? Because Bombardier was building a clean sheet design, that would
eat the 737's lunch. Boeing (and Airbus) were desperate to do something quick to minimize the
20% fuel burn advantage of the C-series. The more modern Airbus 320 air frame allowed it to
re-engine their plane. Boeing's did not. But Boeing went ahead anyway and built an
fundamentally unstable airplane, because the alternative was to walk away from their most
important market.
To me, this looks like it could be catastrophic for Boeing. It reminds me of G.M.'s
'Corvair' moment (Unsafe at any speed), from the 1960s.
Steven @ 13: The Indonesian Lion Air jet still crashed with all onboard dying, even after the
pilots did as you said. B's post explains why: the MCAS system has to be deactivated
separately as it is still active when autopilot is off and the pilots are flying
manually. The Indonesian pilots did not have the time to figure out and realise that
something else was controlling the plane's flight, much less deactivate what is effectively a
second autopiloting system.
how is this for reassuring? press release from boeing today... this info is from someone
else, and i haven't verified it..
"For the past several months and in the aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610, Boeing has been
developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already
safe aircraft even safer."
"Boeing got taken over Wall Street, which means cheapest solution to anything. Engineers are
stuck with what they are given. What part of that do you still not understand."
Why they colluded with and indeed implemented what they knew to be - and now proven to be
- a mass killing system. What do you not understand here?
There is much more behind the covering up of this "design flaw" from the start. The
concept that, in this day and age, sensors used in the aviation field and close to brand new
are defective is a stretch of the imagination. The current effort by Boeing to do a software
upgrade, I suspect, is cover for something more damaging.
How easy is it these days to access the MAX's operation and flight control computers? Can
it be done via WI-fi or Bluetooth from the airfield? We are well aware that in the newer
heavies Seattle can take basic control via satellite.
You clowns don't understand what you're telling me I'm "getting wrong." MCAS ISN'T part of
the autopilot, and I never said it was.
737 pilots have to be able to do about 10 procedures in their sleep. One is when the
electrical control of the horizontal stabilizers doesn't work; Aa few steps but basically
pull a breaker and revert to manual control only, no power assist.
The crew on the previous flight did this and flew on with zero problem.
It's outrageous that lionair didn't find out why emergency procedures had had to be used
and fix them before they let the airplane fly again.
If airlines do not adhere to Minimal safety standards, it's not Boeing's fault if it's
planes crash.
"This is the first description you, as 737 pilots, have seen. It is not in the AA 737
Flight Manual Part 2, nor is there a description in the Boeing FCOM (flight crew operations
manual)," says the letter from the pilots' union safety committee. "Awareness is the key
with all safety issues."
Well it's good to know that Canada is still allowing this death trap to fly, I couldn't bare
the thought that Boeing might lose more stock value merely because of a defective product
that kills! Seriously though, the silence from the Canadian media on this subject is
deafening. CBC news didn't even cover the banning of these planes in the rest of the world
until an hour ago and even then they seemed more concerned about the impact on Boeing then
the you know 300 people killed because of this flawed plane. Eventually (before Friday) I
think Canada will be forced to ground it's fleet of 737-8s. With the current corruption
scandal, Trudeau is too weak right now to stand up in Question period and claim the 737-8s
are safe to fly. Even Trump is getting in on the action and blaming Boeing for the accidents.
FAA may end up being the biggest loser from this situations with a huge hit to its'
trustworthiness, I remember when the FAA would issue emergency maintenance/inspection orders
after any crash suspected to be caused by maintenance issues and ground entire fleets of
aircraft if two planes crashed within 2 years. You know, the FAAs behaviour now reminds me of
the old Soviet joke, "our planes never crash, their just indefinitely delayed"
These people did not die they were murdered. Long ago, I had worked with Boeing on a computer
project and I had the highest respect for the company and engineers. Facts and reality were
paramount for Boeing. Things started a slow downhill slope when that TWA flight that was
accidentally shot down by a missile. I noticed how uncomfortable the engineers were to talk
about it – just a short comment that the fuel tank was not the cause. When politics and
management go away from reality and facts, it is just a matter of time. But for the life of
me I do not understand how Boeing can come to this:
Fault 1: As B says, it should never have been designed like this.
Fault 2: Don't tell the pilots about MCSA.
Fault 3: Real time flight tracking altitude data show wild swings – red light ignored.
No need to wait for a plane to crash.
Fault 4: Lion Air Flight 610 crash showed that this MCSA system is at fault and nothing much
was done. The murder of 189 people.
Fault 5: Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409 murdering an additional 157 people.
Fault 6: FAA says everything is ok.
Especially the Ethiopian Flight 409 crash should never have happened. This issue became
well known to engineers and flight crews world wide after Lion Air. A good question is: was
the disable MCSA switch now a memory item or a check list item for the flight crew? Or did
Boeing want to wait for the final report of Lion Air?
I noticed that the Ethiopian pilot was not western, but looks like from Indian decent. I
would not doubt his abilities, but rather say that he would follow the rules more than a
western pilot. Western pilots would network and study this thing on their own and would not
wait for Boeing. They would have penciled this into their flight deck routine - just to be
safe.
One can always find a benefit in the sanctions, albeit coincidental.
Iran avoided a lot of damage from Boeing. They had ordered 140 of 737's. All got canceled.
Congratulations.
@40 Alpi57
Iran always has the option of buying the Irkut MC-21 which in my opinion is the best
narrowbody plane that anyone can buy now. Fully redesigned body with significantly higher
composite percentage and comes with the best engine in the world for narrowbodies - the
P&W GTF. And Russia will be happy.
Before you guys and gals bash b, hop over to Zerohedge citing Dallas Morning News revealing
FAA database Pilots on Boeing 737Max complained for months...Manual inadequate ...criminally
insufficient .just for starters.
I was a big fan of the 6-part BBC doco series Black Box from the 1990s. The main conclusion
drawn was that the industry is way too fond of blaming as many mishaps as possible on Pilot
Error, and way too slow to react to telltale signs that a particular aircraft model might
have a fatal flaw. There was a tendency to ignore FAA edicts for inspection of a suspected
design weakness. Two cases that come to mind were incorrectly locked DC 9 cargo doors ripping
off with a big chunk of the plane plus half a dozen occupied seats, and a tendency of 727s to
nose-dive into the "surface" at Mach 0.99.
I'll be very surprised if any part of b's analysis, conclusions and predictions turns out
to incorrect.
Lights in Venezuela on.
US Boeing stocks down.
More evidence for the Lockheed f-16 downing. Reports it was a dogfight between an old MiG-21
(with modernised radar and missiles) that brought the modern US Lockheed f-16 down and maybe
not from a launch of MiGs modern bvr missile.
The problem with a "new" airplane is the Western Content. Over a certain percentage, the
US basically controls the situation. Another issue is servicing the things. If an airplane is
sitting in Podunk Airport with a broken widget, the airline wants it fixed right now! Some
planes like the 737 have been around for decades and there are probably parts for it - even
at Podunk. A new plane will probably be grounded until a new part is transported in - a
process which will take many hours even in the best of circumstances. Advantage to the 737
and other 'legacy' airplanes.
Just saw an interesting headline at Reuters - I'd suppose it is some friendly advice from
Wall Street disguised as "news".
Change "watchdog" to "lapdog" and that would be about right. It seems to me a sensible
proposal, for if Boeing must take a beating out of this, the company ought to at least adopt
a pose of "really caring" and "doing the right thing". Try for the brownie points.
@ Zachary Smith who wrote
"
It seems to me a sensible proposal, for if Boeing must take a beating out of this, the
company ought to at least adopt a pose of "really caring" and "doing the right thing".
"
China is coming to teach the West morals which are currently ranked below profit and
ongoing private control of global finance
The Ethiopian airlines flight was an international flight, so the pilots will have been
certified to international standards. I don't know the details of international standards for
type training, but you are basically saying that the fault is not with Boeing, it is with the
type training of international pilot crews. Can you elaborate and does this mean that we are
equally in danger regardless of the aircraft model and that it is just coincidence that both
these crew failures were on 737 Max models?
The evidences and recognizably legitimate information (there is always a lot of
through-the-hat blather-yap from internet-"engineers") suggests thrust angle, not structure
or CG destabilization. "larger" engines are not necessarily significantly heavier, but,
today, and if more efficient, will be larger diameter for more fan, for more thrust (which in
jet and fan engines is more power). Larger diameter nacelles will require modification of
placement, higher, lower, larger weight will require modification of placement, forward,
backward. Clearance restrictions may require modification of engine thrust-line angle,
relative to fuselage, and fuselage-fit control surface lines (which include flight surfaces).
Thrust changes with thrust changes, which means thrust-angle change will change thrust-effect
at differing thrust amounts: Take-off and climb thrusts are near maximums, wherefore angular
component will be near max then (cruise maximums are less, or less effective, or radical, for
altitude air thinning).
What this means is that if larger engines on a 737 MAX, for larger bulk are slightly
angled for clearance,the angling may have little effect except in specific instances and
attitudes, such as take-off and climb. It sounds as if Boeing angled thrust slightly for
engine fitting, and assumed a computer control fix could handle the off-line thrust component
effect during the short duration times it was sufficient to effect flight characteristics,
which, if the thrust-angling was up, would add a nose-up tail-down thrust rotation component,
greater at greater power. to compensate which the software would add nose-down control
surface counteraction, as incident described.
What it sounds like the pilot in the first, non-crash, case most likely did, that saved
the aircraft, was not 'disable' an automatic system he had no information about, for it being
not intended for disablement, but was reduce power, reducing the off-line thrust effect, so
the auto system backed off. In the other incidents, especially if the airports were
get-em-high-fast airports (to 'leave' the noise at the airport) the pilots would incline to
not reduce power, and would be more likely to get into a war with the too automated
auto-system, the way Tesla drivers can do with their over-automated systems.
All auto-control "AI" systems need human-override options built in, so that human-robot
stand-offs to impact cannot occur. The real culprits in stand-off accident situations are the
techie-guppies who think robotic control can always do everything better, and fail to think
of the situation where the "right" response is wrong.
Lion Air's engineers had previously identified and tried to fix issues with the jet that
crashed in October 2018.
The day before the jet took off from Jakarta airport and crashed, killing all 189 onboard,
one of its Angle of Attack sensors had been replaced by engineers in Denpasar. Unfortunately
the source I checked (see link below) doesn't say if this replacement AoA sensor was the one
linked to the computer running the MCAS on the flight.
Delta once initiated a fuel saving measure whereby aircraft were insufficiently topped off
with fuel to prevent pilots from wasting fuel. Once this information began to leak, the
measure was ended.
Thanks for Bean Counters! I so much wanted to use Bean Counters in my rant but thought I
should stick to their standard appellation....
Bean Counters need to be taken seriously because they are not going to go away in any form
of social organization and represent where the rubber meets the road when it comes to social
decision making/risk management
Bean Counters (along with their bosses) need to be required to place morals as a higher
value than profit and forced to operate with maximum public transparency and input; then, all
will be good.
Thank you for the accurate information. The basic problem seems to be that the
low-consumption engines protrude too far. A well-designed, reliable aircraft becomes a faulty
design. To try to solve this using software is a precarious approach. The FAA should have
rejected this in principle. But because to design an aircraft completely from scratch
naturally takes longer and would have given the competitor Airbus time to take over the to
much market share, this 'solution' was accepted. This type of corruption will cost the u.s. a
lot.
But first let's wait for Tronald's tweet, which will certainly be aired by tomorrow at the
latest, in which he states that the 737 Max is a great, great aircraft - if not the best
ever...
There is no doubt that both Boeing and FAA are to blame, but we pay the Government to ensure
safety. Businesses have always chased profit, some more ruthlessly than others. But when
the real corruption sets in then the Government regulator works for the businesses at the
expense of the public . Regarding FAA reputation, there was a time when US was the leader
in aviation, military as well as commercial. This means that the best experts were in US and
thus FAA had the best and the most knowledgeable people. It is similar with FDA, all
countries in the World used to follow the touchstone drug approvals by FDA. Now the
"Federal" in any US acronym has become a synonym for "Corruption" (FBI
anyone?).
The expertise does not matter any more, only greasing of the hands does. In the old times,
anyone from FAA whose signature was on this planes approval to fly would get a life sentence
in jail. But 330 people dead is less than a days worth of US global victims - business as
usual for US. It is just that these victims are getting much more publicity than the silent
victims. We will be lucky if anyone influential from FAA even resigns let alone goes to jail.
There will be many more dead before the World understands this new reality.
Would you fly on any Boeing plane designed or delivered after the company was taken over
by the Wall Street wizards in the 90s?
Re the engineers - they agreed to build an out of balance aircraft (thrust vs weight and
drag) and to try and rectify this with software. What we will do for money. Both the bean
counters and engineers are at fault, perhaps the beancounters and shiney butts more so as
they did not inform buyers and pilots of the faults.
Posted by: fast freddy | Mar 12, 2019 8:26:15 PM | 52
(Fuel 'economy')
QANTAS once decreed that pilots rely on brakes and treat reverse thrust as emergency-only
procedure, until a 747 skidded off the end of a runway with the nose-wheel inside the cabin
and bruised engines = lots of down-time + very large repair bill.
Not just Delta; Ryanair did the same, at least until there was a major storm in Spain
(Valencia, I think) and all flights had to be rerouted to other airports. That was fine, with
dozens of planes flying around waiting for a window to land, until the handful of Ryanair
planes that had been rerouted to Madrid and other places called for emergency landings,
because they didn't have enough fuel to fly for even 30 minutes longer than planned
flights.
I'm still amazed that the EU regulators and EU fucking commission didn't downright dismantle
such a bloody greedy and downright criminal company. That they basically did nothing is proof
enough, imho, of the insane level of capitalism-worship and of corruption going on in
Brussels (of course it's even worse in Washington DC, but that's basically a given).
the toronto star is carrying this story
Headline:
"Ottawa exempts Boeing 737 Max jets from standards meant to minimize passenger injuries"
"Air Canada and WestJet are flying the Boeing 737 Max aircraft exempt from regulatory
standards meant to limit passenger injuries in the event of an accident, the Star has
learned."
B is right. This is a criminal act of deception and fraud thats cost hundreds their lives.
Boeing executives responsible should be prosecuted and then jailed.
Instead the safety agency regulating them will cover it up, backed by the criminal
congress.
We see similar crimes against humanity being committed in many other areas. FDA, CDC, EPA,
FCC , USDA, etc covering up for Big Agra, Big Pharma, Big Telecom with dangerous products
like vaccines, glyphosate,4G/5G, GMO foods, gene edited livestock, etc. Safety standards are
lax and inadequate, safety testing is minimal and in some cases fraudulent or completely
lacking. Defects and adverse effects are covered up. A revolving door between these agencies
and the industry they cover presents significant conflict of interest. These industries
finance congressional members campaigns. Public safety is sacrificed for the greater good
(profits and personal gain). Whistleblowers are muzzled, attacked or ridiculed as the MSM are
their lap dogs.
That said, the airline industry has had a remarkable safety record over the last 30 years if
you can overlook their failure to have adequate locks on cockpit doors in 2001. However, the
lack of competition and increasing corruption and continuing moral decay we see in society ,
government and industry has obviously taken its toll on the industry. This is inexcusable.
Heads should roll (dont hold your breath).
Congress flies on these aircraft to and fro from Washington to their districts. It is to
their interests to have these Boeing 737 permanently grounded.
Re: 59 Bevin, "Ottawa exempts Boeing 737 Max jets from standards meant to minimize passenger
injuries"
- what this means is that Washington called Ottawa and ordered little Justin that he had
to allow the 737 8's to fly and Justin said yes sir! However, someone at the Transportation
Safety Board of Canada, told Justin that the threat these plane pose to travellers was so
obvious that they couldn't just ignore it and that they would instead have to issue a waiver
to show that they have done due diligence - apparently this person or someone else within the
department then called the Star in order to leak the information and embarrass Justin into
reversing his decision. I imagine tomorrow at 4:00pm during the question hour, Justin will
get raked through the coals over his - Justin's whole defense of his actions during the Lavin
scandal has been "I needed to protect Canadian jobs", I imagine the NDP or Conservatives will
then retort something along the lines of "you'll break the law to protect Jobs, why won't you
obey the law to protect Canadian lives!", I should point out that 8 Canadians were killed in
the most recent crash in Ethiopia
Steven is correct. Totally correct. I suspect that he is an airline pilot, as am I. Everybody
else is wrong at least in part and most between 50% and 100%(The description of the cause of
the QANTAS hull loss).
Pilots MUST know all about aircraft systems operation. It is crazy for Boeing to have
functions not in the AFM.
The system in question is not operative with autopilot engaged. In manual flight if at any
time one gets an uncommanded stab trim movement one should immediately disable electrical
trim(One switch, half a second, no "procedure" required. In manual flight if the trim wheel
moves and you hadn't touched the trim switches you have uncommanded trim. Immediately disable
electrical trim.
There is procedure for reestablishment of electrical trim, that does take time. The defeat
of the runaway trim does not take time. B737 has provision for manual trim(but it's very
slow.
I grew up reading Boeing's weekly employee newspaper. Times have changed too much since then.
Moving the headquarters from Seattle to Chicago and a second 787 assembly line in South
Carolina to bust their unions are proof that Boeing is a multinational corporation superior
to national governments. The company is the Empire's armorer for profit. It is criminal to
design an unstable passenger airplane that must be controlled by fly by wire sensors and
computers to stay in the air. The problem is the aircraft industry duopoly and deregulation.
Airbus has lost at least three aircraft to problems with the pilot computer interface. I was
shocked when NBC put this first last night. I though it would be silenced. I blame Trump
Derangement Syndrome. His trade wars and dissing have ticked off the world. When China
grounded the 737 Max 8 everybody followed to show what they really think about the North
American Empire. This could be devastating to the last manufacturing industry left in the
USA.
Boeing in my view took a cynical decision. That is, there would only be a few crashes within
a set period. Thus the insurance companies would pick up the tab for their profits. However
the loss of two planes so close together could destroy the company. The aforesaid insurance
companies will not pay a single dime if they can stick corporate murder charges onto Boeing.
This smells of the Ford Pinto scandal where Ford knew that there was a problem with the
fuel system if the car was rear-ended ( the vehicle burst into flames ) but it was cheaper to
pay the compensation than fix the problem.
B is missing the point that fitting new engines caused airplane to take off close to stalling
horizontal speeds and angles at very low altitude and more steeply ascending to flight
altitude and that has left little time for pilots to react. That is very dangerous as much
weaker tail wind may confuse pilots and sensors. To remedy that without recertification AI
software was installed to react faster and overriding actions of pilot who was assumed not be
aware of situation at the moment he had to immediately react at the latest.
Lack of sensor redundancy is also criminal as determination of sensor malfunction is
critical for pilot. That is AI application correcting "human" physical mental deficiencies and that is deadly
trap.
If it goes to court, interesting case will be, whose error was that as MCAS system acted
correctly against pilot based on faulty sensor causing pilot to make mistake recovering from
correct but suicidal software actions.
People must be warned of cultish trust in technology and AI which is ultimate guilty party
together with greed that killed those people.
There are unlimited dollars for any intervention they choose, publicly allocated or not.
There is a reason 21 trillion in pentagon spending is unaccounted for. This does not count
dark money from illicit means used to fund covert operations.
The fact its public just means Trump wants congress to sanction it, which they will.
Seized Venezuela assets will serve as collateral for future reimbursement.
@65 acementhead - "It is crazy for Boeing to have functions not in the AFM"
No, it's criminal. And while all the technical discussion around how to fly a plane is truly interesting,
what's really at issue here is corporate and institutional betrayal of trust.
The corporate aspect is Boeing, obviously. The institutional aspect is FAA, which used to
lead the world in trust when it came to life and death matters.
But now, in what Bloomberg, even while trying to support FAA, has no choice but to report
as a "stunning rebuff" to FAA's integrity, countries around the world are grounding this
flawed plane. Germany, among others, has closed its airspace to the 737.
This situation has only a little to do with how to fly a plane. It has vastly more to do
with the face of capitalism we see leering at us as our families live their last few moments,
on the way to the ground. It has to do with how the corporate spin departments will attempt
to cover up and evade responsibility for these crimes.
And it has to do with how the global consumer market will start to book its flights based
not on price or time or seat location but on make of plane.
And despite your claim that "Everybody else is wrong at least in part..." , I doubt
very much that most of the commenters here are wrong in their appreciation of the
situation.
I don't think Boeing made a decision, they had little choice (stockholders were first, the
jobs were essential to the politicians, and market share would become competitive if Boeing
dropped out), it was the pressure of the system that charted their course.
Capitalism is
about competition in a just, fairly well managed government regulated environment. In order
for capitalism not to over step the bounds of competitive capitalism; government must remain
present, to prevent foul play and to deny all hints of monopoly power...
Capitalism without
an honest government becomes organized crime or, worse, it degenerates to allow private
enterprise and special interest to dictate how the rule making and military arms of
government should be used, against domestic and foreign competition. . Economic Zionism is
what I call this last degenerative stage.
Defensively EZ teaches the winner to completely and totally destroy the
infrastructure, the resources and the people (including competitive personnel with the brains
to develop competition) of those who refuse to conform or those who insist on competing;
offensively , EZ teaches the winner to take all and to take-over, own and keep the
goodies taken from those destroyed, and in the matter of profit making and wealth
keeping EZ teaches only winners are allowed to produce-and -profit everyone else is to be
made to feed the monopoly that eliminated competition produced. The residual of eliminated,
decimated competitive opposition = monopoly power
It is the king of the mountain monopoly that produces the wealth and power and feeds the
corruption that makes the rich richer.
I think this case makes clear, privatization of government responsibility nearly always
turns sour . The Government should take over and keep the operation of all of the
Airlines strictly in government hands (privatization is proven to be problematic). When I
grew up all of the airlines were so tightly regulated they were part of the government; the
airlines were investors and operators following government rules and regulations. pricing was
based on point to point fixed in price and terms (and the same for all airlines) and that was
a time when aircraft design was not so accurate, meals were served and jets were nearly not
existent but still there were very few accidents. Same for the Trucking Industry and the
railroad.. Why should roads be government obligations, but rail, trucks and planes be
privately owned?
I am not a communist or a socialist, I just know that private influence will always find a
way to wrongly influence public sector employees when private interest wants something from
government.
For a number issues/reasons, I quit flying in 2007, vowing never to set foot in an aircraft
again. Trains or ships, okay.
So far so good; the 737 Max just firms my rsolve...
The aircraft did not undergo piece by piece certification or type certification . It
underwent supplemental type certification that shortens the investigative process.
This is a potential disaster for Boeing. The stock is falling and it'll go into free fall
if decision is made to ground this aircraft. FAA will also face a legal tsunami. If this is
the reason they didn't ground the planes yet; it's going to look really damning when the find
themselves in court later.
This is shaping up to be unnecessarily messy for the industry.
Yesterday's Oz edition of PBS Newshour went over most of the topics touched on in b's posting
but stopped short of finger-pointing although it insinuated that Boeing had blundered.
Today's edition posed a question I was going to pose here...
"Should anyone be flying 737MAXes before the black box data has been evaluated?"
The answer, delivered by a female ex-Inspector General (of precisely what I didn't hear) is
"No. Absolutely not!"
@35 steven... i will take that as a compliment, referring to me as a clown.. i have high
regard for clowns, although i don't think there is anything funny about the topic at hand..
innocent people dying and it being based on a corporation that might be negligent in it's
responsibility to it's passengers, is something we will have to wait and find out about.. i
am definitely not thinking it is pilot error here, as you suggest.. i saw what the canadian
airpilot association said - essentially they don't believe Canada should be flying them
either, as i read it..
@43 karlof1.. as i pointed out in the link @7 - the fact canada allows them to continue to
be flown makes no sense to me..poor judgment call is what it looks like to me.. the canuck
gov't and etc are living in the shadows of what b has described about the FAA.. a lot of
credibility is on the line here as i see it..
i apologize for not reading all the comments, as i was out most of the day and just got
back..
"...fitting new engines caused airplane to take off close to stalling horizontal speeds
and angles at very low altitude and more steeply ascending to flight altitude and that has
left little time for pilots to react. That is very dangerous as much weaker tail wind may
confuse pilots and sensors. ..."
This is absolute garbage. Nothing but a "word salad" it has nothing to do with
reality.
The Ethiopian crash is due to a useless pilot. A different crew, on the same plane, the
day before had the same problem. They handled it correctly, which is EASY, and completed the
day's flying without problem. Third world airlines have HUGE numbers of absolutely
incompetent pilots.
Anyone interested in the operational aspects of this should go to an aviation site. PPRUNE
has some good discussion of this event. There are a few idiots posting but very few. Most
people there are very knowledgeable. I had a look at Airliners.net mostly rubbish.
Kalen 69
Installing the new engines changed the angle of thrust.
In a balanced aircraft, engine thrust is pushing centrally on wight and drag.
If the thrust is below center of weight, it will nose up while accelerating. If thrust is
below center of drag, the aircraft will be trying to nose up while cruising.
The original aircraft was most likely balanced, with thrust centered to weight and drag.
Mounting new engines lower means the aircraft will tend to nose up when accelerating, and
nose up during cruise. Relying on sensors and software to keep an unstable aircraft stable is
not a good thing. To not notify pilots of this problem is worse than not a good thing.
@ acementhead with insistence that the pilot was at error.
Without the black box data you are sticking your **ck out a long way. I find it interesting that in both your comments you are insistent that the pilot was the
problem. You wrote in your first comment
"
Pilots MUST know all about aircraft systems operation. It is crazy for Boeing to have
functions not in the AFM.
"
The 2nd sentence is your only criticism of Boeing but then you spend the rest of the comment
describing what the pilot should have done.....before black box data says what
happened.
When a relative asked me recently why did the new Ethiopian plane crash, I generated a
sound-bite like explanation. Before, the civilian airliners were falling out of the sky
because of an immature technology, that is because of the learning curve. Now that the
technology involved is fully mature the airliners are falling out of the sky for profit
taking.
The scariest thing is that 737MAX model was a botched Boeing reaction to the market change
towards budget flight. If the plane manufacturer and the approval authority were prepared to
cut corners so badly to remain "market competitive", one can only imagine the compromises
that budget airlines are making to sell cheap whilst increasing profits. Some airlines must
be treating planes worst than buses are treated by the bus companies.
US citizens entrust their wallets to the private bank, The Federal=Corrupt Reserve, which
prints money and gives it to the most exceptional among the exceptional (did you think that
there was no hierarchy within the exceptionality?). We entrust our heads to the
Federal=Corrupt Aviation Administration whose bureaucrats work for the porky revolving door
consulting jobs that come after a stint in the Corrupt.
As Aussies would say: using software to solve a hardware problem is like putting lipstick on
a pig. More than 300 people dead are a terrible testament to this wisdom.
Yet, it is fascinating that you are blaming the engineers and some others are asking in
the comments for whistleblowers in Boeing and FAA.
Well, if I were an engineer at Boeing I would probably have resigned if asked to do this
design monstrosity of putting unfitting engines on a differently designed plane - creating a
Lego airplane, but I never had a home mortgage over my head. Regarding whistleblowing, we all
know how suicidal it is, why do supposedly intelligent people expect other to be so dumb to
commit one? Before you expect others to self-sacrifice ask yourself if you would do so in
their shoes.
It seems that the U.S. now wants to manipulate the investigation of the Ethiopian Airlines
crash. WSJ
U.S., Ethiopia Maneuver Over Crashed Plane's Black BoxesWashington wants NTSB to download data from recorders, while African nation's officials
prefer U.K. experts.
U.S. air-safety investigators on Tuesday engaged in intense behind-the-scenes discussions
with their Ethiopian counterparts regarding where the black-box recorders found amid the
wreckage of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 will be downloaded, according to people familiar
with the matter.
Kiza 85 "Before you expect others to self-sacrifice ask yourself if you would do so in their
shoes."
"Self sacrifice" ... Most of my life I have been self employed, but for a few years when I
was young and then as I got older and ill health slowed me down, I have worked for
others.
If told to do a job that I believed was destined to fail, I would pull out. What you call
self sacrifice simply comes down to money, and as I put in an earlier comment "what we do for
money" Engineers that put this schumozzel together were simply putting in the hours to
received their pay check at the end of the week with no thought as to the people hurt or
killed when this bodge job failed. The fault is equally with engineers who sell their souls
for money and the bean counters who did not inform purchasers or pilots.
What you wrote is asinine garbage, my friend. Everybody except for bribed FAA dumped B737 Max
8 until notice. It is simply too dangerous to fly.
It is you who are trolling for Boeing, the problem was discovered five months ago never
fixed, blamed pilots despite previous complaints. Now FAA admitted that fact by demanding
software fix in April or they will ground the fleet. PILOT ERROR????? Of course not and they
know it.
Not only worldwide airlines dumped this model so far but also they closed the airspace for
them in EU, China, HK etc.,because the plane is dangerous and may require recertification of
plane and pilots since Boeing lied about it and its flight parameters,p the trust was broken,
they were cheating with deadly consequences was revealed. Expect hundreds of lawsuits, as
American were also onboard.
Interestingly that anti-stalling software cannot be disabled on the ground only in flight
in manual mode only after it was engaged exactly for reasons I mentioned about near-stalling
dangerous flight parameters.
US Boeing are very much competing with France airbus and also the coming Chinese Russian
airliner.
The US is very much batting for the home team (as the mad monk told the Australian
Broadcasting Commission to do so).
Is it really so hard to connect the secrecy about MCAS and why it was needed in the first
place? The lawyers will have a ball of the decade with this: the defendant created a secret
software solution to turn a Lego airplane into a real airplane, made the software dependent
on a single sensor, and made it difficult to switch the software off.
The networked Western pilots learned how to compensate for the faulty design, but
non-networked foreign pilots never got in on the flying tricks needed for this new plane
because it was never been in their training. Also, the critical sensor may not be available
on an airport in Ethiopia or Indonesia or .....
I cannot believe that Boeing shares dropped only 7.5%, this is a statement of how
untouchable Boeing is and how protected it will be by the Corrupt.
"... What is killing the Army is exactly the same disease that is killing the American economy and has killed American politics,
and it is spreading internationally. That disease is the promotion or election of officials, be they Generals, CEO's or Congressmen
who have a variant of narcissistic personality disorder. ..."
"... Such folk self select for high office because they will do anything to get ahead without the slightest qualm, and that includes
lying, cheating, character assassination, backstabbing and outrageous flattery of their seniors. They mimic whatever behaviors they
need to exhibit to get ahead, but they don't "own' those behaviours. ..."
"... Isn't the medal quest a game tailor made for narcissists? ..."
"The idea has been allowed to take hold in the army that general officers are a race apart, not subject to the norms of ordinary
life and that nothing should limit their ambition, not even common sense. " It seems quite clear from this and other articles, that
the ROE are about covering General officers backsides, and nothing else.
What is killing the Army is exactly the same disease that is killing the American economy and has killed American politics,
and it is spreading internationally. That disease is the promotion or election of officials, be they Generals, CEO's or Congressmen
who have a variant of narcissistic personality disorder.
People so affected may be intelligent and hard working, but they cannot empathise with anyone. Normal human emotions, shame, love,
fear, embarrasssment, etc. are a mystery to them.
Such folk self select for high office because they will do anything to get ahead without the slightest qualm, and that includes
lying, cheating, character assassination, backstabbing and outrageous flattery of their seniors. They mimic whatever behaviors they
need to exhibit to get ahead, but they don't "own' those behaviours.
At the core of them, there is a gaping hole where empathy for their fellow humans should be. Furthermore, since only a narcissist
can or will work for a more senior narcissist, once the infestation starts it multiplies and filters up and down through the organisation.
Based on what I've read about the levels of frustration, lack of morale and junior officer turnover, I believe, it may be safe to
say that Petreaus and McChrystal are afflicted this way and most probably many officers below them and elsewhere in the Defence Forces
as well.
Since McChrystal no doubt thinks of his troops as no more than a pack of valuable hunting dogs, why would he possibly consider
muzzling them with restrictive rules of engagement to be a problem? "I mean it's not as if we actually have to succeed in doing good
in this god forsaken country, it's not as if the troops have to care about what is happening, I just need to construct the illusion
of success in Afghanistan sufficient to get my next promotion. Why can't the troops see things that way as well?" If you wish to
read about an extreme example of this type of behaviour look no further than the case of Capt. Holly Graf, whose narcissistic abilities
allowed her to rise to command of a Navy cruiser. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holly_Graf
To put it another way, the disease that permitted Goldman Sachs to sell bonds to investors while at the same time secretly betting
that the value of said bonds would fall is one and the same as that affecting the Army. The absolute give away, which I have not
yet heard of in the Army, is the mistreatment of subordinates. Of course the reason for the infestation of these folk in senior management
is our well meaning efforts to end discrimination. Unfortunately discrimination on grounds of character is now forbidden, and solid
evidence of good character provided by peers and subordinates is the only way to avoid promoting narcissists. To put it another way,
there are people I was at school and university with who were rotten then and are rotten now, but today such evidence is inadmissible
in promotion decisions. If you want a depiction of a Narcissist in high office, look no further than Australias current Prime Minister:
"The third example highlights Rudd's nascent contempt for most of the people who work for him and occurred days after his stunning
election win. Staff who had gathered for a briefing on their responsibilities were told their Great Leader would address them.
They were all on a high after the victory, but their excitement soon turned to dismay. They didn't get a version of the true believers
speech; instead, Rudd had one clear message: if any of their bosses stuffed up, it would be on their heads. They were the ones
who would pay the price. He told them they would be given their lines every day and their job was to ensure they and their bosses
stuck to the script. They were not to put a foot out of line. Or else. No mistakes or deviations would be tolerated. Thank you
and good night. Oh and the f-word, which Rudd loves dropping almost as much as the c-word, featured prominently in his little
lecture. Old hands who had worked for previous Labor administrations didn't hang around for very long after that. One referred
to him not by name but as "the megalomaniac from Queensland"."
Thank you all for your comments. I think I need to expand a few thing s alittle further.
Narcissism is not "Self Love", narcissism is a love of "reflected" love from others. Narcissus fell in love with his reflection
in the pool. While Narcissism is an essential part of all our personalities in the NPD disorder the demand for constant narcissistic
stimulation from other people consumes all other desires.
Now many people who suffer from this condition sublimate this need through hard work and apply great intelligence to it as
well. However there is a huge cost because of the character defects Narcissism causes - chief of which is an inability to empathise
with normal human beings.
There has been serious discussion in management theory that NPD sufferers can be valuable sometimes as managers can make ruthless
but necessary business decisions. However that cynical observation has to be balanced against the damage and loss of staff and
morale such a manager inevitably causes.
A classic example of Narcissistic behaviour was provided recently by the Chairman of an Airline, that for a whole year had
ruthlessly worked to lower wages and employment conditions for its workers. At Christmas time she gave some Forty senior managers
each a $600 bottle of wine (Penfold Grange Hermitage). Can anyone not imagine the multiple negative effects of such a gesture
on the ordinary airline staff?
It is too big a task to catalogue the everyday examples of people with this condition. The movie stars and celebrities for
example whose private lives, as seems normal with Narcissists, are a smoking wreck. Tiger Woods is a classic case.
However when we start talking about elected officials, or would be elected officials like Sarah Palin, we can see the serious
implications. Australias Prime Minister Kevin Rudd for example has micromanaged a series of massive policy failures at home and
now craves his narcissistic sublimation by impressing foreign dignitaries on every available occasion, earning him the nickname
"Kevin 747" for his propensity to jet off overseas to speak at the U.N., confer with President Obama, etc. His bad, narcissistic,
style of decision making has cost the nation a lot of money.
In the case of President Obama, what can we say about some one caught making an off the cuff remark about "The Special Olympics"
or who was caught ogling a girl who was not much older than his own daughters? Do we see a pattern here?
I have a sneaking suspicion that some of the "Suicidal Statecraft" that destroy nations is a by product of narcissistic leadership
- for example "The Habsburg Provocation" to "The honour Of France" that started the Franco - Prussian war.
At the General Officer Level, what can one say about Patton? A brilliant charismatic leader and strategist? What does the incident
of the shell shocked soldier say? McArthur? Petreaus? The supposedly sleepless McChrystal? I don't know.
By way of contrats, and Col. Lang will take me to task on this, I was struck on reading Gen. Schwarzkopfs autobiography, by
his apparent high degree of empathy with the average soldiers, even if he appeared far more uncompromising with the officer corps.
I also was struck by his solution to logistical squabbling between Corps commanders in the lead up to Gulf war One - a field promotion
of his logistics Chief from a Two Star to a Three Star General. Such a solution would be anathema to a narcissist.
I am amazed at a discussion of narcissistic personality disorder that to this point, at least, has not mentioned today's poster
child for this disorder -- Sarah Palin.
It would seem that narcissism is rooted in the notion of individualism, in that it expresses a love for the self over the group.
Interestingly and ironically, wasn't it the Catholic Church that championed individualism in the post dark ages era, as a mechanism/method
to disassemble the collectivist mentality of Germanic tribalism -- while at the same time replacing it with their own hierarchical
social/religious authority structure.
I think what Walrus says is essentially true, but would be better said by including the social context by which narcissism
or the cult-ification of individualism could be seen as generating its own kind of social order, or social hierarchy based upon
meritocracy, or the illusion of merit when equated with raw power.
Or perhaps in better words, individualism or narcissism must be seen in the context of being its own hierarchical social structure,
with its own construct of social (not individual) values that are internalized an acted upon by its participants.
And maybe, this why the "effects" of narcissism are so widespread and endemic in all of our institutions.
At least in the civilian world, there is an aspect to this personality trait that is not emphasized in Walrus' comment. A few
-- not all -- of those with a narcissistic personality traits are brilliant. Megalomania is one of the pathways to creativity,
albeit it usually ends w/ some kind of tragedy.
You can bring these people down, imo, and beat them at their own game but expect career sacrifice and do not expect fanfare.
And I would never under estimate their extreme talent.
Can't say about the military world nor do I want to know. But it sure seems to be that General Bragg at Chattanooga fulfilled
a lot of Dr. Dixon's categories in the article mentioned by S.Henning.
I don't understand all this hoopla about the greatness of Confederate Generals. Seems to be painting with too broad a stroke.
Foote does a magnificent job debunking the myth as he continually details the shortcomings of various Confederate Generals. Where
was Joe Johnston when Pembleton was suffering in the beleaguered city? Why isn't Ft. Bragg named Ft. Longstreet?
Re: SST wardrobe malfunction- seems it's just too much to ask that these seals, statuary, etc. be left as they are by prudish
pols (John Ashcroft, anyone?)
Personally, my idea would be if a change simply must be wrought, let's go in the other direction & have Virtus' appearance
match the one on the 1776 VA four dollar note:
Rules of Engagement are simply the manifestation of tasking a bureaucracy, whose only purpose is to killing the enemy, to construct
a puppet popular secular colonial government. It can't be done. "Winning Hearts and Minds", all over again.
There must be something that draws people to power who never learn from the past. On the 35th anniversary of the fall of Saigon,
there have been news stories that comment on the Vietnamese culture and their resistance to foreign Invaders. Yet, not one has
mentioned the real hard nosed fundamentalist culture that has defeated every invader and has never been conquered, the Afghans.
Well put. I didn't know about Holly Graf, and found her story interesting.The Wikipedia article about her included this:
Captain Graf's awards include a Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service Medal and Meritorious Service Medal
with one bronze service star.
I'm not military, but that's some fairly heavy heroic hardware, especially for a seaman, no? Isn't the medal quest a game
tailor made for narcissists?
The leadership conundrum is a crucial issue. It also brings to mind Norman Dixon's Psychology of Military Incompetence (1975),
which I used to recommend to officers working under me in situations that reflected the problem. There is a good summary of this
book at the following link:
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2004/v30n2/book_review.html
Unfortunately I think that narcissism has always been the flip side of leadership. Most of us don't need the fawning adulation
of our peers. And most of us have enough self-awareness to preclude us from exuding the self-confidence necessary for selection
as a leader.
Narcissism and the accompanying tendency to put self-interest above public interest is why the founding fathers instituted
a system of checks and balances. Unfortunately, leaders find ways to circumvent or disable checks on their authority over time.
HOW DO THESE MENTALLY ILL PEOPLE GET THEIR JOBS????
Oh. Wait. Never mind. The Americam People are the victims here...that's right.
I forgot that for a minute and in forgetting that it seemed for a second like the American People might get the behavior out
of politicians that they consistently reward at the ballot box. How silly of me.
We have had to witness this plethora of Narcissism being carried to the extreme ever since 911. Instead of holding accountable
those responsible for failing to do their duties, the Narcissists in both our Congress and White House decided to create 'more'
Narcissistic 'castles in the sand' with their DHS, TSA, NORTHCOM, etc.. I can understand to a point DOD deciding to create NORTHCOM,
but I had always thought that was what NORAD was for. Alas, no NORAD accountability, heaven forbid. Let's create more $$$ sank-holes
like TSA, and America's very own version of an internal NKVD force known as DHS (as what many of my fellow Americans refer to
DHS as).
While the Narcissists in our White House and Congress eat their crumpets and drink their tea, everyday people who do show signs
of human life inside them (i.e. emotions, moral instincts,etc.) continue to be downtrodden by these bands of Narcissists who have
in effect altered the food chain. Accountability and responsibility are not in their Narcissist dictionaries.
Our moral instincts are not logically consistent. A recent classic experiment shows that people would, without hesitation, hypothetically
choose to flip a switch causing a speeding train to ploy into one person rather than into a group of people. But if the only way
to stop the train was to shove the fat man next to them into its path they wouldn't do it even though doing so would produce one
death rather than many.
It seems probable that in a combat situation a person of normal instincts would even more strongly favor the guy next to him
and and tend to kill more freely to protect him even though in an insurgency situation the ultimate success would seem to rest
on generating s little hatred among the populace as possible by killing as few bystanders as possible. Hence both the restrictive
rules of engagement and the sickening taste they leave in the mouth of those required to act to risk a buddy for a bunch of strangers.
You can reach restrictive rules of engagement by either route: a deep empathic understanding of the human emotions of the insurgent
population OR by an ant farm view which simply assigns no value to human life and emotions -- your own side or the others -- but
simply sees ROE as the best means to success.
An intriguing thesis and one with which I'm sure many would agree.
To keep it from turning into a never-ending and unresolvable debate, Walrus' argument would be strengthened significantly were
he to describe the behavior and measurement techniques to be used to assess 'moral character' and the criterion to be used to
determine the validity of the assessment results.
"... That 93% of all personnel that are employed by the CIA are paper pushers in Langley and just 7% are in the field, of which I read sometime ago, has a ring of truth to me. ..."
Anyone remember Mullah Omar, the deceased leader of the Taliban? The U.S. military and intelligence services claimed over and
over again that he was hiding in Pakistan. Bette Dam
finds (pdf) that he wasn't:
After 2001, Mullah Omar never stepped foot in Pakistan, instead opting to hide in his native land -- and for eight years,
lived just a few miles from a major U.S. Forward Operating Base that housed thousands of soldiers.
In late 2001, after the U.S. invasion, Mullah Omar resigned as leader of the Taliban and the movement officially surrendered
to Hamid Karzai who promised them reconciliation. The U.S. did not like that and launched a vengeful campaign against all former
Taliban member. Eighteen years later the U.S. is suing for peace.
Mullah Omar lived quietly, meditated and studied religious text. Allah remarked on his death:
On April 23, 2013, Mullah Omar passed away. That day, Jabbar Omari told me, the hot, dry lands of southern Afghanistan experienced
something he'd never seen before: a hail storm. I assumed it was hagiographic bluster, but later I found a U.S. army publication
referring to that day: "More than 80 Task Force Falcon helicopters were damaged when a sudden unprecedented hailstorm hit
Kandahar Airfield April 23, where nearly half of the brigade's helicopters were parked."
The fact that Mullah Omar's death was suppressed for two years even from high-level official sources, indicates to me that the
theory bin Laden died in 2001 is very plausible. We even have a similar progression of statements regarding their respective health,
doubts of whether they were alive at the respective time, etc.
Of course, both terror leaders were kept "alive" for geopolitical reasons. Once ISIS (and later Russia/China) took over as
a serious threat in the corporate media narrative, they no longer had to cling to those old phantoms.
The story on Omar is astonishing, but to me not surprising. If the US spends billions on finding one guy, and at the end of the
day, he is literally just down the road, it shows how incompetent and useless our intelligence gathering has become.
That 93% of all personnel that are employed by the CIA are paper pushers in Langley and just 7% are in the field, of which
I read sometime ago, has a ring of truth to me.
Stupidity has a firm grip on our rulers, and they are getting, not only us but many others, killed for absolutely no reason.
And the dunces called the American voter, keep re-electing them. It leaves me breathless.
My story is about required processes...Need to add DHCP entries
to the DHCP server. Here is the process. Receive request. Write 5 page document (no
exaggeration) detailing who submitted the request, why the request was submitted, what the
solution would be, the detailed steps of the solution including spreadsheet showing how
each field would be completed and backup procedures. Produce second document to include pre
execution test plan, and post execution test plan in minute detail. Submit to CAB board for
review, submit to higher level advisory board for review; attend CAB meeting for formal
approval; attend additional approval board meeting if data center is in freeze; attend post
implementation board for lessons learned...Lesson learned: now I know where our tax dollars
go...
I think that the most ominous part of this article is where it is mentions that the
Government gave a £13.8m (US $17.4) contract for ferry services between Ramsgate and
Ostend in Belgium but that this company has no ships or any experience whatsoever in running
a Channel service. In fact, it only came into existence about two years ago well after the
Brexit referendum. A quick check shows that this company was awarded the contract without
prior publication of a call for competition because of the "extreme urgency brought about by
events unforeseeable for the contracting authority" ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seaborne_Freight
). Yeah, right! With 85 days left until Brexit, the Government has to really start getting
its ducks lined up and making some tough calls. It may not be so but decisions like this make
you wonder if this is a case of mates being taken care of by someone in Government and that
this will be the trend after Brexit kicks in.
That has always been the hallmark of this administration (to use the term very loosely),
look at the 'help to buy scheme' and how it was a direct subsidy to the building industry's
owners.
The minister in charge, grayling, is a serial incompetent and genuine z grade genetic
landfill. In a reasonably sane world he wouldn't be put in charge of running a bath.
Brexit will just be a means to an end for the venal morons presiding over it. A way to
continue austerity, rip the remaining copper out of the public realm e.g.privatise the NHS
(even further) and put scotland back in its box.
"... Apparently misunderstood by some critics on its release, it is a powerful and intrinsically human anti-war film. It is not a happy film, but it is totally absorbing and thought provoking. ..."
"The Sand
Pebbles" was a throughly enjoyable movie. The setting was exotic and the story engaging. Though
it starred Steve McQueen, who did an excellent job, its strength was the ensemble acting with a
very talented cast including Richard Crenna, Richard Attenborough, Mako and Candice Bergen. The
story was nicely involved and, though it portrayed the sailor's prejudices, did not feel
condescending toward the Chinese as many war-type movies do. The men were caught up in the
turbulent times and many of the conflicts portrayed seem to come more from troubled psyches. It
is not Ramboish macho crap. I found the portrayals of the people and times entertaining. I had
read the book so maybe I read more into the movie than others seeing it cold. It was a very
good movie and well worth a watch.
The Sand Pebbles - a powerful and human anti-war film
fernies 11
October 2000 `
The Sand Pebbles' has been one of my favourite films since I first saw it on
television in 1976. The widescreen version does justice not just to the sweeping panoramas of
the quite breathtaking Chinese scenery, but also to the sweeping events and themes of the
story. It is in every way a `big' film, dealing with political and military intervention (clear
parallels with Vietnam at the time of release), nationalism, racism, and the horrors of war.
Yet for all its heavy themes, it is most successful in the depiction of its very human
characters. These characters are not just the means of conveying the `messages' of the film, or
fodder for the gripping and well-staged action scenes. They are individuals in their own right,
involved in something far greater than their own destinies. Some are unpleasant and ignorant
while others are honourable but lost in the sea of historic events surrounding them. Some, like
Jake Holman (Steve McQueen), demand sympathy and respect as they struggle to come to terms with
their personal challenges brought to the fore by these historically significant and politically
dangerous events.
Inevitably there are slow and confusing passages as the political implications are
expounded, but these are more than compensated for by our emotional engagement as we become
involved in the stories of the people caught up in the political fall-out. Robert Wise's
direction is strong and emotionally charged, complemented perfectly by Jerry Goldsmith's
wonderfully haunting and ominous music. Steve McQueen gives what was probably the performance
of his career (receiving his only Academy Award nomination), and he is supported by a wonderful
cast including Richard Attenborough, Richard Crenna, Candice Bergen (aged just 19), and
especially Mako. But it is really McQueen's film. His very presence lifts scenes and he manages
to convey authenticity and gain the sympathy of the viewer with consummate ease. Apparently
misunderstood by some critics on its release, it is a powerful and intrinsically human anti-war
film. It is not a happy film, but it is totally absorbing and thought provoking.
0 out of 5 stars with a tip of the hat to
predecessors like "Golden Boy" and and Kipling's military tales By Jeffrey A. Beard on December
20, 2016 Ahead of it's time--feels contemporary in it portrayal of the morals and mores of
peacetime barracks life, with a tip of the hat to predecessors like "Golden Boy" and and
Kipling's military tales; still poignant and pointed after all these years. 3 1/2 stars
From Here to Eternity has long been one of my favorite movies. I cannot resist watching
its reruns on television. Recently, I decided to read book, the 802-page hardcover
volume.
Everyone knows that a book is always better than the movie, and that was the case here
– but not by much. The casting for the movie was superb. You cannot read about Pvt.
Prewitt in the book without seeing in your mind's eye Montgomery Clift; Sgt. Warden, without
seeing Burt Lancaster; or Maggio, without seeing Frank Sinatra. The book reminds me of a
string of short stories, mainly focusing on Prewitt and Warden during their assignment at
Schofield Barracks in Hawaii shortly before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Prewitt is
an outstanding welterweight (147 lbs) prizefighter who refuses to fight for the company's
boxing team. Also, he is a gifted bugler who was once assigned to duty at Arlington National
Cemetery. Prewitt's company commander, who is also in charge of the boxing team, orders the
NCOs to give Prewitt "the treatment", i.e., all of the tough, dirty jobs, until he agrees to
join the boxing team. Warden, the company's first sergeant, sympathizes with Prewitt but has
no authority to override the orders of the company commander.
Most of the stories in the book were covered in the movie, with the exception of the one
involving a group of homosexuals in the Honolulu area, and one involves a suicide by a member
of the company boxing team. A few details of some of the other stories were revised slightly
in the movie, but not to any significant level.
The author's writing style is interesting in many respects. For example, there is
extensive discussion about psychology, philosophy, religion, and morality with respect to the
persons and events that are the subject of the book. These comments give added meaning to the
events in the book – and also account for its substantial length. On the other hand,
such intellectual discussion is totally out of character coming from persons who had minimal
education, and virtually no contact with liberal arts. The author seems to be cognizant of
this disconnect when he mentions that a particular character or characters "read a lot of
books." There is even one character that mysteriously shows up as a prisoner in the stockade,
apparently for the purpose of abetting this type of discussion. He disappears from the book
by walking out of the stockade in a successful escape. His purpose in the narrative appears
to have been completed when he painted the philosophical setting of life in the stockade.
The author frequently uses poor grammar and spelling in an apparent effort to present a
realistic speech pattern of the day-to-day language of the minimally educated soldiers. In
addition to being inconsistent with the high level discussions of psychology and philosophy,
it is a technique that doesn't work well.
All told, it is an excellent book that captures the atmosphere of an overseas military
post. You feel like you were there.
"From Here to Eternity" is, together with
Sword of Honour (Penguin Modern Classics) , one of the greatest books ever written about
peacetime soldiering or soldiers not actually engaged in combat. While Waugh captures the
absurdity, tedium and frustration inherent in being a junior officer marooned in military
backwaters, in "From Here to Eternity" Jones is almost unmatched in describing in-barracks
military life from a soldiers point of view. My only reservations are the author's
occasionally excessive digressions to allow Malloy in particular to expound on what are the
authors thinly-veiled views on politics and class, and that Jones shares with Mailer's
The Naked and the Dead an inability to create an officer that is anything other than a
caricature (Jones does a - slightly - better job in The
Thin Red Line . While as individuals Jones' officers are one-dimensional, their
collective introspection and emphasis on sports and the relatively trivial or routine at the
expense of preparing seriously for war is accurate enough. The real strength of "From Here to
Eternity" is Jones' ability to vividly illustrate the life of a soldier in peacetime,
complete with the indignity, absurdity and coarseness that is often inherent in military life
when not sustained by an immediate objective or sense of purpose. If there is a book that
does a better job of portraying garrison life I am yet to find it.
The Greatest Generation" on the 75th Anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor
I read this book as a part of wanting to accomplish The Modern Library's 100 Best Novels.
It is also a preface to watching the film which is on the list of 1001 Films To See Before
You Die (visit beforewediefilms-dot-com for the blog I write with my wife). It was
opportunistic to finish this book this week as we are marking the 75th anniversary of the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
From Here To Eternity is the first novel James Jones wrote, and he had set out to complete
a novel that captured the essence of his life and those of his fellow soldiers in the
peacetime army. It examines several characters who wander about trying to make sense of life,
relationships, money, art, hobbies, work, brotherhood, and the pecking order while living the
regimented military life. While the narrative mainly focuses on a young recruit named
Prewitt, it also weaves through other stories of people who surround Prew in a somewhat
inconsistent manner. The book is funny, touching, bold, and in many ways an extraordinary
view into the pre-WWII lives of "the greatest generation."
I read this book over several months and had to put it down a few times. I am an avid
reader and read voraciously, but the first half of the book was so dry that it seemed to be
almost a catalogue of non-things happening. It wasn't until the halfway mark that the strings
dangling off of the characters interactions began getting tied up in actual events, and it
was at this point that my fascination with the characters and Jones' incredible building of
so many characters as actual three-dimensional people began to take shape. It turns out that
for the entirety of the time that I was bored, Jones expertly characterized hundreds of
people for their true calling and individual moments of truth. When they were put into
situations where they had to face a bad marriage, adultery, a broken heart, loss, death,
being out of control of things, regimented systems, interpersonal conflict, and a hundred
other challenges, it became immediately clear that Jones was putting the meat on the bones of
these incredibly strong and true people to face what life was about to throw at them. The
result was incredible for me, and while at times I was wishing the book wasn't so needlessly
long, by the end I was wishing there was more.
Jones' prose is very interesting in the novel, as it switches between the pedestrian and
(albeit, realistically) vulgar to some paragraphs that were truly memorable. The simple
playing of TAPS by Prewitt danced the narrative camera from person to person and created this
gorgeous symphony of experience that was a beautiful four or five pages if I remember
correctly. Another was a night where one soldier was sleeping with another man's wife, but
the horror of the betrayal is stripped away with Jones' writing to reveal the beauty of truly
feeling free, and contented, and in love.
I read Open Road's "Restored" edition, which I only understand to include a lot more that
the author wanted to include in the original but was asked to remove (some sexual language
and vulgarity), and some portions that were almost completely censored because of obscenity
laws (including entire chunks focused on homosexuality in the army and civilian life). I have
never read the original, but what I read here felt true and real, and I am happy to have
experienced Jones' preferred text my first time through.
A truly excellent book, well deserving of the National Book Award.
I feel like an idiot. I'm 65 years and just discovered James Jones. This book is excellent
in so many ways. I hated for it to end but instead of wallowing in self pity, I immediately
read the other two in the trilogy, "The Thin Red Line" and "Whistle" and then his WWII. I
will give each of those five stars as well. These plus "The Naked and the Dead" by Norman
Mailer are simply fantastic.
I read "From Here to Eternity" in the Kindle edition but purchased all three as used
hardcover editions. These are books you will want to keep as real paper books.
I doubt very much whether I have anything new or important to say about From Here to
Eternity. It's a great book, but its greatness was well known long before I was born, let
alone before I got around to reading it. Anyway, here goes...
As an author James Jones is brutally honest. He's also what every tortured high school
English student probably begged God for at one point in their life: an author who does not
use symbolism (or anyway, he claimed as much in an interview with some Paris based book
reviewer back in the 50's). There are several advantages to this, technique, at least when
the author put as much care into it as Jones did here. I feel he provides a vast insight into
the human psyche in a host of situations. The shifting narrator helps there as well. Jones
also does a wonderful job transporting the reader to wherever his characters are whether its
a military base, a field exercise, or the stockade. Of course the downside to all the vast
amount of introspection and exhaustive detail is that it makes for a looonng book, and there
are even a few points where it drags for me. Moreover, since Jones pulls no punches it can be
a dark book in places (in particular I had hard time with the portrayal of one character in a
protracted drunken stupor because I've seen someone do the same thing in real life, and its
extremely unpleasant), and there were other spots where it dragged for me. Finally, there are
a couple of portrayals I'm not sure I agree with. The sequence of thoughts portrayed in the
suicide scene is (I'm positive) impossible since it was a suicide by gunshot and the bullet
would move faster than any sensation or thought it could have caused. Also, I have to
question the idea that all senior officers of the era were worthless (its not that Jones ever
implies that the officers he writes of represent the whole army, but clearly every senior
officer he describes is a disgrace to his uniform, in fact the only decent officer he
portrays at all is an ROTC replacement Lieutenant). On the other hand if the book wasn't
intelligently (and sympathetically) written with very deep characters, I would not have even
been able to tell whether Jones was portraying good or bad officers, so this is still a
relatively minor criticism. In any case, if you want a detailed, unbridled, unvarnished look
at the life of enlisted men in the US on the eve of WWII, I don't see how you could do much
better than this novel. For me personally, I'm very glad to have had such a peak at the time
and place. My Grandfather was about 4 years younger than Jones and also spent time on Oahu
during WWII. He was an MP around 1943 (at which point Jones would have been somewhere on
Guadalcanal or New Georgia). My Grandfather also died when I was just 6 years old, which was,
of course, before I ever got to ask him what his time in the army was like (or could have
begun to comprehend even if I had asked). So to me this book transcended literature alone, it
put me in touch with a little piece of my own family that I never thought I'd get to know.
For that I owe Jones a huge debt of gratitude. He showed me a part of my own family's past I
never thought I'd get to see. Of course for most people, it won't hold that kind of meaning,
it will just be a novel. But even then its a very good one, though also a long one. I highly
recommend the whole trilogy" From Here to Eternity, The Thin Red Line, and Whistle. Of the
three, I think From Here to Eternity is the best. The Thin Red Line is great as well,
probably the best way anyone will ever come to understand combat without either being there
themselves and suffering PTSD as both Jones and the characters he portrayed did or at least
becoming a psychologist and tending to soldiers suffering from PTSD, and Whistle is also a
very strong work, although possibly the toughest read of all because it is so tragic. From
Here to Eternity was the last project of a literary agent who had previously worked with
Faulkner and Hemingway. Since it was Jones's debut, it may also have been his greatest work.
I've never read anyone else like James Jones, and there may not be anyone else like James
Jones.
A must read for anyone interested in a novel with epic scope, issues of
power/leadership/control, the "breaking" of men, war, and struggles for freedom and dignity.
I was also surprised at how well he writes women! It's not often I have very fond and vivid
memories of reading a book, but this was one long, languid dream. Will definitely be
rereading. Psychologically, it reminded me very much of the black & white Sean Connery
prison film "The Hill", which I also recommend.
This favorite book of my youth was bought as a present for a young relative. I think it is
an important piece of literature that everyone should read and I am quite happy to pass it on
to another generation. Its development of characters and portrayal of human nature is the
equal of Steinbeck's "The Grapes of Wrath".
From Here to Eternity is James Jones' masterfully envisioned tale of soldiers and their
lovers on the eve of 1941's Pearl Harbor invasion. The rest of the world is already at war,
and the neutral United States has begun a peacetime draft as the prospect of war seems
inevitable. Despite this impending calamity, the soldiers of Schofield Barracks go on about
their daily lives as if nothing had or ever will change: they spend their days routinely and
begrudgingly performing their military duties and their nights drinking and whoring, while
rarely examining their existences for any greater meaning.
At the center is Private Robert E. Lee Prewitt who has just requested a transfer out of
the Regimental Bugle Corps, where he had a soft existence, and into an infantry company,
where he will perform "straight duty," soldiering as any other man of the ranks. He
immediately incurs the wrath of his commanding officer, Captain Dana "Dynamite" Holmes, when
he refuses to join the company boxing team, preferring to think of himself as retired from
boxing after blinding another man in a sparring match. Holmes needs Prewitt to box if he
wants to field a championship team, and his superior, Lieutenant Colonel Jake Delbert soon
makes clear that such a victory would likely earn him a long sought promotion. The conflict
thus established, the characters hurtle unwittingly towards America's humiliation at Pearl
Harbor and their own mortal humiliations.
Even Prewitt in his self-righteous suffering is guilty of pride--there are no innocents in
this book as in life. Jones draws the Army as a microcosm of society: men and women at odds
with their surroundings as they search for meaning. Ultimately, all the characters efforts
are in vain; even as they struggle mightily against one another, the reader knows that on
December 7th their lives will all be smashed as trivial and meaningless by a calamity far
greater than any of them.
I read once that Hemingway said that James Jones was the best writer of his generation. I
don't know if this is true, but for years I have had this book on my "list" to read. I have
finally gotten around to it and am thoroughly enjoying it. I've read a lot of war stories
over the years but this is much more than a war story. Jones' insights into human nature are
penetrating and revealing, and his writing has retained its power and freshness over the
years.
If you love the movie and are interested in war narratives, as I am, this novel is a must
read. But by itself it's overlong and tedious. The movie has a strong, driven narrative. The
novel is a big baggy monster, with long tedious discussions of semi philosophical nonsense.
Think Moby Dick without substance. Some things I found especially interesting. Hints of Catch
22. There's an Indian chief, a crazy officer or three, and and heaps of Heller irony but
without the laughter. Anger. Everyone is angry with themselves, with the army, with sex, with
their lovers, with poverty and with depression America. Sex. There's a strong gay theme. This
is true of The Thin Red Line, too, but here it's more cynical. Army life. If you've ever been
in uniform, this will strike you as genuine, much more so than The Naked and the Dead or any
other novel which comes to mind. To be sure, there's a good deal of exaggeration, but mood
and details ring true.
July 16, 2000 Format: Hardcover | Verified Purchase
A viable candidate for the "Great American Novel"
If a contemporary reader is looking for one novel that captures with unerring precision
the nature of the military and society in World War II, look no further than "Guard of
Honor." The setting is authentic, and the characters are drawn with abundant sympathy and an
utter lack of remorse. The issues, the personalities, the key incident -- all reflect
Cozzens' skill deep insight into human nature and the nature of military bureaucracies, the
latter resulting from his service on the Air Corps staff during the war. I cannot recommend
this novel highly enough.
Five Stars
One of the best novels about WWII that I've read. Impressive in its knowledge of how
organizations actually function.
Unlike many war books, which focus on either the glory or horror of battle, or both,
Cozzens looks at troubles on the home front during World War II. His setting is a Florida
airbase, and the action centers around the arrival of black pilots who are being trained as
part of an experiment in integrating the cockpit. A few whites support the effort, a few more
oppose it, but most characters are more concerned with their own self interest than with
larger moral issues. The common desire to win the war doesn't eliminate social problems at
home, nor does it trump human pettiness. Cozzens weaves together several interlocking
stories, and while the final fabric lacks the exquisite integration that a truly great writer
might achieve, it all manages to hold together in the end. Likewise his prose, while
occasionally capable of taking flight, is generally adequate but workmanlike. This book is
well worth reading, but go into it expecting a very good novel, not a towering classic of
WWII literature.
This is surely a masterful novel, though I would caution against depicting this as strictly
a World War II epic. Anyone who thinks this has only nostalgic value is mistaken. It is
classic in every way.
Gripping and mesmerizing at once, with moments of astounding resonance
for today. "20/20" covered (01/09)last night the salaries of employees high and low, the way
they are valued, with the result being according to their "usefulness." In this war yarn,
various ranked individuals maneuver to avoid blame and scandal, etc. and it plays out
according to their usefulness to command figures; in other words war or peace, it remains the
same.
Whenever the plot movement lags and minor things intrude, Cozzens' palette of
description never fails to amaze. Reading this work, I now realize where "Sgt. Bilko,"
"Hogans Heroes," and "MASH," derived their inspiration from.
The human comedy known as "life"
survives within "Guard Of Honor's" pages in sweeping form. Makes no difference whether on
base or in a large corporation, the class mentality survives. Which leaves us with the
question to success, whether it will be determined by genetics or usefulness. Base life is
much like a city within a city and Cozzens' succeeds in his entertaining military back drop
to the human struggle. Cozzens makes it clear that the bullets and shells we avoid are not on
the battlefield alone, no?
A customer on March 19, 1999
Fighting a war without bullets
Guard of Honor is a book about fighting a war in which not a single bullet is fired in
anger. Readers looking for blood and glory will find it here only in the refracted light of
the home front. But, this book IS about blood and glory; as well as boredom, loneliness,
stupidity, comradeship, insanity, bureaucracy, death and many other things associated with
the armed forces.
Cozzens decision to place his novel in Florida during World War II actually allows him to
analyze the military culture in the minutest detail without the adrenaline distraction that
actual combat would produce. It's a risky choice, but it works brilliantly.
The story contains a bewildering number of characters but is centered around two generous and
kind men: Colonel Ross and Captain Hicks. Ross represents the command structure trying to
hold an unwieldy organization together through the insanity of war. Hicks is the common man
thrown into the same situation. How their lives play out is the heart of the book.
If you want explosions and gore, this book is not for you. If you want to know how the
military lives, thinks and breathes read this book and cherish its portrait of a world very
different from civilian life.
Two separate reviews of The Fourth Star , a new book by David Cloud and Greg
Jaffee, touch on a theme that has fascinated me since I wrote a dissertation on the
subject.
"The Fourth Star" paints wonderfully dramatic portraits of the four senior officers
highlighted here, but at its heart it's a story about bureaucracy. As an institution, the
United States Army has much more in common with, say, a giant corporation like General Motors
than with a professional sports team like the New York Giants. You can't cut players who
don't perform, and it's hard to fire your head coach. Like General Motors, the Army changes
very slowly, and once it does, it's hard to turn it around again.
Actually, it's arguably easier to "cut" bad soldiers than bad football players nowadays,
since the latter often have huge signing bonuses and hold teams hostage in a salary cap era.
But, otherwise, Filkins is right. While the military is relatively efficient, it's not only a
bureaucracy but the very thing bureaucracy was modeled after. Which makes it amusing when
conservatives simultaneously rant about the inefficiency of bureaucracy while extolling the
virtues of military efficiency. (The military, along with their brethren in the intelligence
community and foreign service, does tend to be more motivated and obedient to orders from above
than your average bureaucracy.)
One of the most trenchant discussions of these wrong "lessons learned" post-Vietnam is
General David Petraeus' PhD dissertation , which the
review of The Fourth Star mentions tangentially. While Petraeus might have
"irritated many of his fellow officers on his way up," he also identified an important
bureaucratic reality, noting it in his dissertation: any serving officer who writes a PhD
dissertation critical of the US Army as an institution and publishes it as a book
will not rise to the ranks of the general officer corps. Petraeus, of course, heeded his own
advice, as his dissertation remained safely tucked away in the Princeton library (until the
age of scanning and posting to the Internet; h/t to Paula Broadwell for sharing the link). He
was able to continue his upward trajectory, unlike such recent soldier-scholars as Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John Nagl ,
whose Oxford DPhil became Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife , arguably a
self-inflicted career wound as an Army officer because of its coherent, incisive critique of
the Army's failures as a learning organization.
Brigadier General
H.R. McMaster , however, is the exception that proves the rule, because it was only
the
patronage of General Petraeus that made him a general officer after twice being passed
over for promotion from colonel to brigadier general. McMaster's Dereliction of Duty
was the oft-cited, seldom-read mantra of senior officers in the last decade and appeared to
be part of the hold-up for his advancement. Further compounding the delay, his successful
counterinsurgency campaign as the commander of an armored cavalry regiment in Tall Afar made
his conventionally-minded brigade commander peers look bad (or at least that's one
interpretation of how it was viewed within the Army).
How a bureaucracy without lateral entry promotes and selects its leaders is a vital issue
with implications measured in decades, dollars, and lives. I look forward to reading how
Cloud and Jaffe capture this dynamic in the US Army today.
One could argue McMaster exemplifies, rather than serving as an exception, to the rule.
Generally, being passed over -- let alone twice -- for promotion pretty much indicates that
you're done. Certainly as a prospective general officer. Conversely -- and I don't claim to
have any inside scoop here -- Nagl certainly seemed to be an officer on a fast track who left
the Army voluntarily to 1) so his family could settle down and 2) to take advantage of a flood
of opportunities to apply his expertise in the think tank arena. It seemingly proved a wise
choice, as he soon wound up as president of CNAS.
"... In fact, "Intelligence" is simply another word for "information" and in ages gone by the term was used in that way by authorities like Clausewitz or Jomini. ..."
"... Like any labor of scholarship involving the study of human beings by human beings, the work is nearly always conducted with incomplete and ambiguous information as a basis for the analysis. ..."
"Were we right or were we wrong?" This
was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet's central question in his 2004 talk to the faculty
and students of his alma mater, Georgetown University. What he was talking about, of course, was the
critical political issue of whether or not the Intelligence Community (IC) of which he was the titular head
"got it right" in telling the American people and their government that Iraq was a clear danger to the
United States, as opposed to being a threat to regional states, and if that danger was substantial enough
to serve as a justifiable basis for war, invasion and occupation. In Tenet's address there was much of
self-protection and an implicit warning that neither he nor the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would
accept to be "scapegoated" in a search for the roots of misadventure in Iraq. His words establish a claim
to blamelessness for the CIA and the larger Intelligence Community in the decisions leading up to the Iraq
campaign and a related claim to have done as well as could fairly have been expected. In other words, he
wished to be thought innocent in this matter. Is that reasonable? Is it fair to expect American citizens
and officials to believe that the Intelligence Community did its work well in helping the government of the
United States to make sound decisions about Iraq? This is an important question, because if they did not,
then why were their judgments so flawed in spite of the incredible amounts of taxpayer money lavished on
the agencies of the IC? Why should so much money have been lavished on these agencies if they could do no
better?
In spite of the importance of this
question, impatience with the performance of the intelligence people ought to be somewhat dependent on the
outcome of a national debate as to what should be expected of the process labeled "intelligence." Reporters
sometimes ask rhetorically if decisions should really be made on the basis of intelligence. At first
hearing questions like this seem to be both naďve and nonsensical since it is obvious that information is
the stuff that decisions must be founded on. Nevertheless, decipherment of these statements leads to an
understanding that those who say things like this think that "intelligence" is a form of thinking both
esoteric and obscure, a dark art, separate and distinct from the normal way of knowing things and subject
to acceptance or rejection by special rules of perception. In other words, they think that it is something
like astrology, to be judged by its own "rules."
In fact, "Intelligence" is simply
another word for "information" and in ages gone by the term was used in that way by authorities like
Clausewitz or Jomini. There is nothing mystical or mysterious about the process by which information or
"intelligence" is collected, collated, analyzed and disseminated. "Intelligence" is scholarship conducted
in the service of the state. The great bulk of the information used as data in this scholarship comes out
of the huge archival files of the major agencies supplemented by daily "feedings" of; diplomatic chit-chat,
aerial and satellite reconnaissance, intercepts of communications and hopefully the products of espionage
(clandestine HUMINT). Like any labor of scholarship involving the study of human beings by human beings,
the work is nearly always conducted with incomplete and ambiguous information as a basis for the analysis.
This natural phenomenon is aggravated
by the desire of the studied group to hide something, usually, that which is under study. When George Tenet
said before his Georgetown audience that "We never get things altogether right in the Intelligence
business, nor altogether wrong," he was correct but his statement was irrelevant to a discussion of the
utility of the intelligence process since the quality of the analytic product depends on many variables,
among them; good information and the quality of the minds brought to bear on the imperfect information. It
is both trite and a truism that "intelligence is an art and not a science." What this means is that human
beings may succeed or they may fail in making judgments based on less than complete data and that the
skill, intelligence and experience of those involved is the most important factor in determining the
outcome. To say that "Intelligence" is a flawed process is simply meaningless in a discussion of the
effectiveness of the state in making decisions. If the "Intelligence Community" as it now exists were
abolished, some other group would have to assume the burden of performing the same functions for the
benefit of the state. What would they be called? Perhaps it might be, "The Agency for Special Planning?"
The issue of the effectiveness and
efficiency of the existing Intelligence Community is a separate but linked question from that of knowing
whether or not the elected or appointed officials of the Bush Administration may have intruded themselves
inappropriately into the deliberations of the Intelligence Community in a way that led to distortions in
the estimates of Iraq's significance that were presented to the president and the Congress. It is widely
believed now that this occurred but that is not the subject of this essay.
The question under examination here is
simple. Premise: "The Intelligence Community produced poor quality intelligence on Iraq." Therefore, one
asks – Are there imbedded structural defects in the present United States Intelligence Community that
contributed either directly or indirectly to the production of estimates that were unsound and which failed
the nation? And, moreover, are there characteristics in the present intelligence community of the United
States which now prevent and will prevent it from "reforming" itself? It is clear that the inability of the
Intelligence Community to forecast or estimate Iraq's true condition was a major failure. Why did this
happen, and how can the defects in the "community" be repaired? What "limits" are there in the psychology
and structure of the government that may prevent "repair" of the system?
ORDER IT NOW
The author's conclusion after a working
lifetime of studying the flaws in the system from within the community and from the evidence of continuing
contacts with old colleagues and new friends in the intelligence agencies is that there are a multitude of
problems in the intelligence forces of the United states and that most of them have grown up over a very
long time, are now "built into" the system and are unlikely to be resolved without outside intervention by
the Congress of the United States. It is impossible to consider them all but a few of the most important
are so intractable as to be worth discussing here:
-Leadership. There is a natural
tendency in the general public to believe that the upper levels of the Intelligence Community are filled
with learned, avuncular and sensitive people somehow reminiscent of "George Smiley," the wonderful British
spy and spymaster whose presence fills the earlier novels of John Le Carre. The character, "Smiley" is
wise, sadly pessimistic, a profound student of mankind and devoted to his "people." He has a deeply
empathic nature, is widely read, speaks several languages and is so dedicated to his craft and its ethic
that he fears nothing and will take any risk either to protect his own "people" or to "launch" operations
that, if they fail may destroy him. What a marvelous conception this man is!
There are people like that in the
leadership of US Intelligence. There are a few, but there once were many more and they are fewer all the
time. In fact, the "system" works in such a way that people like "Smiley" are feared and distrusted by the
bureaucratic politicians who really run the intelligence agencies. What are really to be found in the upper
echelons of the "community" are either people who early in their government service became specialized in
the generalized management of organizations (often after early substantive analytic work) or others who
were "staff " of some kind, (budgetary planners, lawyers. liaison staff, etc.) The Directors of the various
agencies are naturally attracted to such people because they are focused on the administrative functions of
the agencies and the protection of their ultimate superior, the Director. This makes them a kind of
"insurance policy " for the directors of the agencies.
The old veterans of the intelligence
trade often make a distinction between "real intelligence officers" and "managers." "Real intelligence
officers" are those who are known to be qualified and capable of the difficult work of analysis and field
collection of information and who are known to have the moral character required to stand up to the
pressure that is present in every political administration to make the "reality" presented by the
"Intelligence Community" conform to the " reality" envisioned by the policy of the administration in power.
The "managers" are essentially courtiers grouped about the throne of whichever baron of the Intelligence
Community they may serve. The "managers" functions center on liaison with the other barons, lobbying the
Congress for money and "protection" of the boss (the Director of their agency). Such people as the
"managers" are easily recognized by the directors of the agencies as very valuable to their career survival
in the stylized "dance" conducted around Washington by the various parts of the United States Government
but they are not well suited to leading "real intelligence officers" to feats of brilliant analysis or
imaginative collection operations because they are always in a "defensive crouch" fearing that the "real
intelligence officers" will cause trouble for them or "the boss" through disagreement with the "picture"
desired by the administration of the day or in Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations (espionage) gone bad
which result in publicity that could be damaging to the "managers'" careers. Incredibly, these are the
people who tend to be promoted to "line" command "at the top" in the collection, and analytic functions of
the agencies over the heads of the "real intelligence officers."
This pattern of rule by the
"managerial" class is now so well established in the intelligence agencies that it is simply expected that
senior jobs which control large parts of the agencies in the analytic and HUMINT collection fields will be
held by "managers" as opposed to "real intelligence officers." This tendency is so firmly rooted now that
the author has often heard very senior "real intelligence officers" described as "just an analyst," or
"just an operator" in the context of a selection board picking someone for a high level leadership job in
the very field in which the "real intelligence officer" is an authority respected throughout the
government.
This tendency is perpetuated and
reinforced by a process of "mirror-imaging" in personnel selections in which the ever-growing number of
"managers" who are in senior leadership position simply select others like them in the next generation for
the top jobs. This results in a leadership cadre in the Intelligence Community which is more and more
hostile to the risks demanded as the price of real success in collection and analysis and more and more
favorable to the self indulgence of a focus on the "turf battles and budget wars" endemic to Washington and
at the same time less and less driven by the desire to do good intelligence work. The personnel management
disaster described above is ultimately the responsibility of the directors of the agencies that make up the
Intelligence Community. If they wanted to have a different focus in their agencies, there would be a
different focus. There have been many fine and devoted heads of the various American intelligence agencies,
but all too often the directors themselves are members of the "managerial class" within the Intelligence
Community or simply politically selected party functionaries. All too often directors see themselves as
"travelers" on a journey to yet further heights within the government and therefore not "decisively
committed" to the work of their people. For many directors, the "managerial class" within their agencies is
a natural ally in controlling the "wilder impulses" of the "real intelligence officers" in the
organization.
ORDER IT NOW
-Risk Aversion. One of the most trite
and tedious of the many things said in the national media and in the U.S. Congress about the failures of
the Intelligence Community in Iraq and with regard to so many issues is that "HUMINT (espionage in this
context) must be improved!" Repetition of this thought has become obligatory in any "serious" discussion of
security issues but in fact, no one has done much to improve US espionage capabilities. This would be
amusing in its inanity if the underlying phenomenon were not so serious. In fact, the media and the
Congress are largely responsible for creating the operating environment in which the wreck of once
formidable American espionage capabilities became inevitable. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the
public and its representatives convinced themselves that the intelligence services were somehow the enemies
of the American people. The FBI COINTELPRO program aimed at Director Hoover's personal list of enemies and
the Nixon Administration's meditations (the Houston Plan) on the possibility of effectively combining all
U.S. counterintelligence groups into one force contributed to that idea. The Houston Plan was never
approved or implemented but the concept itself was enough to "trigger" demand for congressional
investigations into the "misdeeds" of U.S. counterintelligence groups.
Rather inevitably the "witch hunt"
spread to include U.S. clandestine intelligence. The "Church Committee" in the US Senate resulted. Up until
that time it was generally believed in the population of the United States that the intelligence services
were filled with honorable people trying to protect the country, but the spirit of that age disagreed and a
barrage of "literature" and films spread the idea that career intelligence officers were amoral
opportunists animated by a kind of nihilistic sadism. "The Three Days of the Condor," "The Bourne
Identity," and similar rubbish which portrayed a universe unfamiliar to anyone who had ever worked in
intelligence filled people's heads with the idea that the clandestine services were to be tolerated but
only just barely tolerated and that they must be closely watched and restricted. American espionage
capabilities began to decline from that time and the process has not yet been reversed.
A mass of regulations were enacted in
those and following years which tied the hands of the clandestine services so effectively that they have
never recovered. Several categories of people were placed "off limits" as possibilities for recruitment as
foreign agents (for example, reporters, professors, employees of American companies) without regard for the
fact that these very people have inherent access to people and information often needed to carry out
effective intelligence work. The rationale seemed to be that some kinds of people needed to be "protected"
from the "dirty" business of espionage. The same kind of "thinking" has caused the clandestine services to
rely far too much on "liaison" relationships with foreign intelligence services as a substitute for
conducting American run espionage against difficult targets. The reason? Disclosure of foreign operations
does not entail the career risk for the "managers" that the failure of an American operation would bring.
The creation of this kind of operating
environment served as a powerful "enabling" mechanism for the not so gradual assumption of power in the
intelligence agencies by the "managerial class." In an atmosphere dominated by fear of violation of
legislated restrictions on behavior and the use of clandestine funds, it was only natural that the
directors of the agencies would look to those who had little interest in driving forward the limits of
accomplishment and every interest in "limiting the damage" and "preventing surprises" for themselves and
"the boss." This has resulted in a degree of control over operations by lawyers and financial officers that
is suffocating to the ability of skilled operatives to mount the kind of potentially rewarding but risky
operations that would be needed, for example, to penetrate "Al-Qa'ida." Clandestine operations are
inherently dangerous. It follows that if they are evaluated by people who "know the cost of everything but
the value of nothing," they will inevitably be disapproved before execution if the risks are considerable.
Those in Congress who wrote the rules used as excuses to disapprove these operations will then "bleat"
pitifully about the need for "better HUMINT" the next time a disaster occurs.
Analysis by Committee. Much the same
phenomena exist on the analytic "side" of the intelligence business. Brilliant people from the best schools
"sign up" for a career in intelligence work from a sense of patriotism, intellectual curiosity, and a
desire to "make a difference" in the world. What typically happens to them after that is that they are
"eaten alive" by bureaucracies utterly controlled by the "managerial" mentality. Young analysts are called
on to write papers that demand a fresh look, hard work and an undying devotion to the truth. The draft
papers they write are not their property and these papers should not be subject to the vanities of "pride
of authorship" so common in other works of scholarship, but neither should they be treated with a lack of
respect for the views of the analysts and the creativity that the authors bring to the task. Too often, the
"editing by committee" system that prevails results in papers that are not only irrelevant to the security
needs of the nation but are actually misleading because of their lack of intellectual honesty.
In the "managerial" world, nothing
matters so much as "staying in step" with the consensus in the various agencies of the intelligence world
as well as making sure that analysis does not deny the political leadership of the country an intellectual
"platform" from which they can proclaim their vision of the future. The "mere" belief of the analysts
counts for little in the judgment of the "managers" when weighed against the career destroying effect of
disapproval or disfavor from on high.
As a result analysis is "ironed out"
in a "layer cake" system of committees at ever-higher layers of bureaucracy. These committees are made up
of supervisors at the appropriate layer and they "take care" to insure that the interests of the various
parties within an agency are protected in the text that goes forward to the next higher layer and that
untoward results are avoided. When this process is ended, what is typically produced is a stereotypical
example of the "lowest common denominator," not something on which the country should "hang its hat" in
making decisions affecting the national fate, and certainly. Such papers are inevitably reflective of the
kind of "group think" that grows up in any highly integrated and hierarchical bureaucracy that controls the
career long expectations of its inhabitants. In other words, an individual analyst has no chance whatever
of having his or her views expressed at the national level unless a large and self-serving group of
careerists approve them and find them not to be threatening to their collective view of what serves the
group's perceived best interest in terms of its relations with the rest of the intelligence community and
the sitting government.
ORDER IT NOW
The rule of the "managerial class" in
the intelligence community ensures the permanence of this "system." The ruling group will reproduce itself
through "mirror imaging"
ad infinitum
and will be maintained in position through the perceived
self-interest of the kind of people who typically become directors of the major intelligence agencies. This
is not to say that there have not been brave, courageous and creative directors of the major intelligence
agencies. The author has had the honor of serving under several. It was a pleasure and they know who they
are, but the sad truth, known to all who have served for extended periods in intelligence is that most
directors are part of the problem. The truth is that intelligence is an art best practiced by gifted
eccentrics, people widely and deeply educated, favored by nature and training with intuition beyond the
average and who care more for the truth than anything else. Such people consistently will follow their
"nose" and their instincts on a trail of information like bloodhounds until they arrive at a truth that
matters to the people of the United States. In the espionage field of endeavor, the function of managers is
to be "enablers," to make workable the environment in which gifted case officers can break through the
manifold barriers that will enable the penetration of groups that threaten the lives of our people. What
must be avoided is the selection of managers who instinctively feel that their function is to "hold back"
the operators and analysts in order to preserve "peace" within the bureaucracy.
Domination of the Intelligence
Function by the Executive Branch: All the intelligence agencies are parts of the Executive Branch. The CIA
is a separate organization within the Executive Branch and directly subordinated to the president. The
Defense Intelligence Agency is part of the Defense Department as is the National Security Agency. The State
Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is obviously part of that department. All these groups
are deeply imbedded within these "ministries" of government in a constitutional system which ensures that
the authority of the political party that controls the white House will control the intelligence agencies
as well. This means that the temptation that will always be presented to politicians to attempt to shape"
both information collection and the analysis of that information to their taste is likely to be
overwhelming.
In most American administrations, the
most senior authorities (generally elected) are wise enough to know that without sound and objective
judgments from the intelligence agencies, the information upon which they base decisions is worthless. The
reason one creates separate information gathering and analysis systems under the rubric of "intelligence"
is that there is an inherent "conflict of interest" in any system that allows policy decision makers to be
the same people who judge what the reality is upon which such decisions are based. Decision makers can
always choose to decide policy questions based on their own view of the world, but it is intuitively
obvious that this is not the best way to insure good decisions. For this reasons the most senior
authorities generally restrain their subordinates on the policy side of government and prevent excessive
interference with the process of judging information.
The danger is that the wisdom of that
attitude is not universally appreciated and in some government past, present or future, policy officials
may choose to drive the intelligence people supporting their deliberations towards judgments unsupported by
convincing and dependable evidence. If one doubts the seriousness of the possible consequences of such a
"cattle drive" one need only consider such historical examples of misadventure as the US strategic
obsession with the likelihood of a Japanese first strike on the Philippines in 1941. This led the US
Government to focus attention of its analytic force in that direction so firmly that Japanese preparations
for an attack in Hawaii were completely missed. Another example would be the obsession with the
"inevitability" of victory that influenced intelligence to "miss" completely enemy preparations for the Tet
Offensive of 1968 in spite of the mass of information available that indicated something really "big" on
the way. In both cases the results of policy or strategic thinking having been allowed to "intrude" on
analysis were simply catastrophic. Strong leadership by "real intelligence officers" can help to prevent
such disasters. The "dissent" taken by the State Department in the October 2002 NIE on Iraq may well have
been an example of the survival of such leadership.
How can this be prevented? This
problem exists across the world in every country where serious foreign policy and military issues must be
considered and decisions on policy and strategy made on the basis of a systematic consideration of
available data. In every country there is the problem of trying to insure that the judgments of the
information or intelligence people are untainted by external pressures. There have been various methods and
structures adopted to deal with this danger to the national security. In some places external "think tanks"
are used to "test" the result of internal analysis. In others countries, reliance is placed on the
competitive analysis of two or more intelligence agencies, often one military and the other civilian.
In Israel, within the Directorate of
Military Intelligence there exists something called the "Devil's Advocate" a name borrowed from the process
of canonization within the Catholic Church in which a cleric is appointed to oppose the sainthood of one
who has been presented for consideration for that honor. In the Israeli "Devil's Advocate" section, the
officers so employed have the job of opposing the analysis accepted by the government and of preventing the
acceptance of institutional "group think" as the basis for decisions. For the senior Israeli officers who
serve in the "Devil's Advocate" section it is understood that opposition to the judgments of the rest of
the intelligence community will have a career price and that the officers who do this work should look
forward to a fruitful life in retirement from the army soon after their service in this job. Nevertheless,
they perform a vital; perhaps "priceless" is not too strong a word, service for their country. None of
these devices seem altogether suitable for the United States as a "safeguard" against overwhelming pressure
to bring their analysis into conformity with policy. The sheer scale of the institutions involved in
American life dictate modification of the methods used in smaller governments. Some approach that combines
the better features of these institutional "fixes" would probably be appropriate.
Can the "Intelligence Community" change
itself to eliminate the problems discussed above?
It cannot.
The United States "Intelligence
Community" is a "mature bureaucracy," a group of institutions that have reached a stable equilibrium in
their internal politics and in their relationships
I guess Lang is talking about what he refers to as the "Borg". His biggest problem is that he is one of
them, as this long disinformation article shows.
How can you even pretend there were "intelligence
failures" after these guys murdered the Kennedy's and pulled off the 9/11 new Pearl Harbor.
As usual, Lang is just laying a smoke screen for his war criminal Masonic brothers.
Of course Iran is a danger to the USA.
In 1953 there was the CIA coup, that ended democratic Iran, and brought the USA puppet shah in power.
In 1979 Muslim clerics had the audacity to send the puppet away, and put themselves in power.
Since then they, with success, resisted the USA yoke.
Right now Assad is a danger to the USA, he's still alive, and, with help of Russia, and some help of
Erdogan, in power.
Both regimes undermine USA prestige in the world.
Fascinating stuff, thanks. One of the best articles I've read on Unz, in fact, and that's saying quite a
lot because there's been a lot of great stuff here over the past few years.
Mr. Lang hasn't appreciated my pending questions about his first two columns here at Unz Review, but I have
a couple more, one substantive, the other editorial.
1. What does Mr. Lang specifically advocate, if
anything?
He urges Congress to revamp a bureaucracy. But he says that when Congress addressed that bureaucracy in
the mid-1970s as part of the post-Vietnam "'witch hunt'" it "tied the hands of the clandestine services so
effectively that they have never recovered." (He seems to see himself as one of those so bound. But that's
not made clear in the context of anything between 1968 (Tet) and the circa 2002 warmongering against Iraq.)
So if a Congressman during a hearing were to ask Mr. Lang how his work had been hampered before he
retired, and for his specific recommendations going forward, what would he say?
This is an interesting critique of the current state of the intelligence community. The author's contention
that the system has devolved into a bureaucratic muddle under the thrall of the executive branch seems
accurate but:
The disregard for the Church Committee and pining for the days of the gifted operator being
free from pesky managerial control seems misplaced. I know most Americans have a limited sense of history
and memory but, for example, look at the blowback from the Mossadegh coup, the bad intelligence we received
from Gehlen about the Soviets, MK ULTRA, Robert Parry's revelation that members of the intelligence
community interfered with Carter's attempt to negotiate the release of the hostages held by the mullahs.
There are many more such examples. I am not so sure that the "good ol days" were that great. Also, is it
even true that the Executive branch is in control(does the tail wag the dog)?
Interesting analysis – apparently reflecting imperial institutions bureaucratized to the point of
calcification, like an alzheimers brain. I wonder if by extension the senior ranks of the military in
general have become inhabited by risk-averse careerists? Can this explain at least partly its lack of
success in warmaking since Vietnam?
Lang is what we draft soldiers use to call "Lifers"; people who define their life by their love of guns and
bombs etc. Reading him daily over the years brings to mind Kissinger's denigration of military men's
intelligence or Hitler's comment that Generals don't understand economics. Not intelligence in the sense of
IQ ( I have learned a lot from him; smarter than me no doubt). Rather intelligence in the sense of not
being able to see reality through the lens of their love of shoot 'em up bang bang.
For example, he really would have us believe that there is something wrong with "Intelligence". They make
mistakes. Not the reality that they provide the rational for the wars he is so proud to have been a part
of. He is proud of his killing deeds in Vietnam, which was largely the result of what: failed intelligence
in the Gulf of Tonkin? He is proud of the role he played in the killing Kaddafi's baby daughter. Was this
the result of failed intelligence about terrorism? Come on Pat your are like the Robert Duval character in
Apocalypse Now who "loved the smell of Napalm in the morning." Intelligence has not failed the likes of
you. It provides the rational for you to do what is you live to do – killing. You spent your adult life
killing or being responsible for killing people whose only crime was to be sitting on oil.
When you were doing your killing in Vietnaum, draftees like me were saying "hell no I won't go". There was
a saying at the time: "What if someone gave a war and no one showed up". If people like you would stop
showing up we would not have troops stationed in 125 countries in the world today. Guys like you show up
because you love the shit and you could care less about the accuracy of Intelligence. Intelligence is the
opium of the people. It gives them a reason to pay people like you to act out your childhood fantasies
about war.
Repectually!
@ heros-
thank you, saved me a bunch of snarking at the author
.
as for the article itself, I rarely don't finish articles and comment on them, but the sophistry is so wide
and deep, it was impossible to finish
.
the author -as does the korporate/lapdog media- makes a number of presumptions which are not supported by
current reality (which is -in fact- the reason for their role as gatekeepers) firstly, AS IF we had a
system which makes decisions based on facts, the greatest good for the greatest number, and -you know-
reality
we do not
.
what we have imposed upon us, is a PURPOSEFULLY corrupted and broken system which is used by the 1% to
enforce their will all the 'fact finding', 'research', etc, etc, etc, is so much window dressing and
bullshit to justify doing what they want to do and has NOTHING to do with what eggheads, pontificators,
pundits, academics, etc have researched, experimented on, or theorized
.
repeat: it is ALL bullshit to make the insane decisions FOR the 1% seem like the only choice we have
Oh Americans! One thing about brits that I like is tbat they never hesitated talking about their empire or
imperial interests. But all americans seem to have have blinkers (set by their imperial hubris or genuine
belief that their country stands for the good) even supposedly intellectuals cannot escape it. Taleb calls
them intellectual yet idiot, l suppose Lang is one of them.
The intelligence community, while apparently giving useful tactical-level information
sometimes
, is
now, from what I seen, just a propaganda tool. Look at the Skripal farce. The IC of the "five eyes"
confirmed Russia was behind trying to kill the Skripals by smearing his door handle with nerve agent (so
ludicrous it's like something out of
A Fish Called Wanda
). Or Russian collusion and the Steele
dossier and golden showers. Or Clapper as head of the NGA in 2003 claiming they had satellite photographic
proof Saddam was moving WMD's. Or Assad's "chemical attacks on his own people". What's worse is that the IC
hucksters (not IC, per se, just those pitching the wares) no longer even bother putting on an elaborate dog
and pony show, show & tell, and holding vials of inert anthrax at the U.N. Pretty soon we won't even need
the IC middleman, though I'm sure the six-figure contractors, who now make up the bulk of the IC, will
still be collecting the big bucks for "protecting America".
What is truth?," asked an exasperated Pontus Pilate after being badgered by a certain (((group))) to
take action and put a certain innocent God-man to death. Somethings never change.
Mr. Lang created a false dichotomy which basically is reduced to No True Scotsman
fallacy written from the position of the true Scotsman. There are no true Scotsmen.
Things are much simpler. It all comes down to integrity which is a question of morality. Mr. George Slam
Dunk Tenet produced what he was asked to produce. There was a war to be had and he had to do his job and
show that he was a team player and he did it. This was not an issue of bad intelligence or that somebody
made a mistake. If anybody had integrity there in CIA he would refuse and be ready to resign. I haven't
heard of anybody resigning or being fired prior to war in 2003. The additional dimension was a fear of
physical threat. Mr. George Slam Dunk Tenet had attacks of anxiety fearing that he or his family would be
hit while driving around Washington DC on business or with his family. Was it because there was something
wrong with Mr. Tenet psychologically or was the idea planted in his mind by somebody who had enough
credibility to make Mr. Tenet believe it? If the latter it shows that in Washington DC thing are done not
differently than in some third wold capitol.
From the TV adaptation of Smiley's People, spoken by George Smiley as portrayed by Alec Guinness (49:30):
In my time, Peter Guillam, I've seen Whitehall shirts go up and come down again. I've listened to all the
excellent arguments for doing nothing and reaped the consequent frightful harvest. I've watched people hop
up and down and call it progress. I've seen good men go to the wall and the idiots get promoted with
dazzling regularity. All I'm left with is me. And the thirty odds years of Cold War without the option.
Oh, SUCH nonsense. What hope is there of a sensible attempt to alter the disastrous course Western foreign
policy is taking if anyone can read a stunning piece of analysis like that and come up with such a reply?
The author has a valid point regarding "groupthink" in the intelligence services but his descriptions of
the alternatives don't seem to hold much water. It's not like even it its glory days American HUMINT was
anywhere near up to, say, Soviet standards.
as for the article itself, I rarely don't finish articles and comment on them, but the sophistry is so
wide and deep, it was impossible to finish
But nevertheless you feel entitled to judge an author
whose article you haven't even read? At what point did you decide it was sophistry pure and simple?
The purpose of the Iraq war was to reunite Iran and Iraq as a bulwark against Israel. The goal was
achieved. The resurgent Iran we are seeing today is the fruit of the Iraq war.
Watch what is happening
rather than what the talking heads are saying. And keep your friends close and enemies closer.
If you listen closely you can hear the knashing of teeth in Israel that big brother stopped re-arranging
the chess pieces in the M.E. after he installed a Iran allied shia (Nouri Al-Maliki) as leader of Iraq.
. Intelligence Pact
It seems that, as Blitzer contends, Washington and Tel Aviv made a deliberate effort in the mid-1950s to
put an end to these covert operations against one another. Most observers assign responsibility for this to
top CIA official James Angleton .. Sharing information on Arab countries may have been one example of this.
Another may have been assistance in getting nuclear weapons for Israel. According to Seymour Hersh,
"sources close to" Angleton told former New York Times reporter Tad Szulc that the CIA helped the Israelis
obtain technical nuclear information in the late 1950s. "This fits in with something I had been told by a
high-level CIA official," Seymour Hersh added in 1978, "that Angleton, then in charge of CIA liaison with
Israeli intelligence, gave the Israelis similar technical information in the mid-1960s." [19] During this
period, enriched uranium was vanishing from an American atomic energy company with close ties to the
Israeli government. [20] ..
A similar pattern of cooperation between US and Israeli intelligence agencies exists in the area of
military procurement. "Israelis were caught in the Pentagon with unauthorized documents," one US official
told former Congressman Paul Findley, "sometimes scooping up the contents of 'inboxes' on desk tops." This
official recalled that a number of Israelis were very quietly asked to leave the US as a result of such
activities; no formal charges were ever filed against them. Several US officials told Findley that the
Israelis would submit orders for military items they were not supposed to have or even to know about --
using top-secret code numbers and sometimes precise specifications. Presumably they obtained the
information from friendly executive branch contacts, but no official efforts were undertaken to discover
the sources of the leaks. [22] ..
@leander
.
1. it appears you are guilty of the 'sin' you accuse me of: my post SAID why I thought it was sophistry (as
well as in agreement with heros analysis) in short, because IT DENIES OBVIOUS REALITY
the author prattles on AS IF 'intelligence'/information that is gleaned by spooks or WHOEVER, actually
matters in what decisions our 1% superiors make on our 99% behalf (but NOT for our 99% benefit)
.
2. don't be such an authoritarian tool: FORGET about what the 1% SAY is what guides their decisions, etc,
LOOK AT WHO BENEFITS, you scared, shorn, sheeple again, in short, as they EXPLICITLY STATED in the
bulldozing run up to the eye-rack-eee war part 1, they 'fixed the intelligence' around the ALREADY MADE
DECISION TO ATTACK for the greedy reasons of Empire, NOT because sad damn who's sane was our
hitler-of-the-month ™
*snort*
it is difficult to take such propaganda victims as yourself seriously; you are stuck on the superficial
layer of what Empire presents as 'reality', and don't see (or even GUESS) that there is a man behind the
curtain pulling the levers to bedazzle you
.
bread and circuses, kampers, bread and circuses
hee hee hee
ho ho ho
ha ha ha
ak ak ak
Pity the English. They have been slaves of a racist-supremacist, foreign sect ever since Cromwell let the
sect back in the country. Time for Americans to again free themselves from the "city of london" sect.
The
goy and the golem: James Angleton and the rise of Israel
.. "Angleton was was a leading architect of America's strategic relationship with Israel that endures
and dominates the region to this day," Jefferson Morley writes in The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA
Spymaster James Jesus Angleton. More than any other man, the longtime chief of U.S. counterintelligence
made possible Israel's shift "from an embattled settler state into a strategic ally of the world's greatest
superpower."
Angleton did so chiefly by burying any effort in the U.S. intelligence establishment to question
Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1960s. "Angleton's loyalty to Israel betrayed U.S. policy on
an epic scale," Morley writes. "Instead of supporting U.S. nuclear security policy, he ignored it." ..
My first contact with CIA was while visiting the remote Mojave Airport in California in the early 1980s
during a motorcycle trip to Death Valley. While there I noticed numerous Boeing 707 airline sized planes
parked off a faraway field in the distance. There must have been at least twenty five or thirty of these
airline size planes just sitting in isolation from the rest of the planes at the airport.
At first, I
thought the planes were merely being mothballed (stored) there until I saw one of them start to move.
Curious, I remember asking one of the workers at the airport about who owned the large planes and was told
that no one really knew but it was referred to as the "spook airline" because the planes and their use were
shrouded in absolute secrecy. Nobody knew who piloted the planeseither because their pilots arrived at the
airport either in smaller executive size planes or in vans that went without stopping directly up to the
planes after entering the airport property.
it was only later that I discovered these planes belonged to Air America, the "the CIA airline" and were
apparently used to ferry large numbers of mostly mercenary soldiers to areas the CIA was interested in at
the time. I also learned that the Mojave Airport was only one of several other similar such bases of Air
America operation. A friend described laughingly described Air America as the "Coup Airline" because of the
CIA's propensity for the overthrowing of unfriendly governments.
About this same time, I also started reading more and more articles about the fact that our elected
representatives, even at the highest levels, didn't actually fully know what the CIA was up to because of
the CIA's so-called, ultra secret "black budgets" which allowed it to operate without any sort of control
from our elected representatives below the Presidental level who claimed they didn't want to know about
these "black" activities out of fear of getting blamed once the activities arising out of them became
known.
I also started reading about rumors that parts of the CIA had become essentially self-funding using
illicit activities like drug running and arms sales to avoid any sort of even marginal budget control by
even the President of the US. The CIA's own airline would, of course, provide the ideal transportation
vehicle to facilitate such activities.
Essentially this meant that a significant part of the CIA had been allowed to essentially go rogue
without any sort of real supervision whatsoever. Unfortunately, The Mossad, would have been more than happy
to step in and provide this oversight using friendly Zionists already embedded within the agency.
There are those who now claim that parts of the CIA are hotbeds of Israeli controlled spying activities
operating specifically within its unsupervised "black budgets".
State department leader Dean Acheson warned this would happen in the mid-1940′s when plans started being
made to turn the wartime OSS into the CIA. I have always thought his opinion might have been formed by his
secret wartime access to the Venona Transcripts which extensively detailed how intelligence agencies in
both the US and the UK had become hotbeds of Communist spying activities. (Sort of like the Israelis and
the CIA today. )
Read about Acheson's very prescient criticism here
I would earnestly recommend that you go to the Colonel's site, SST, and read, from the beginning long ago,
his articles analysing the defects of Western foreign policy and what leads to those defects. You will find
there the most powerful and informed thinking on this subject that there is.
I myself don't really belong
here because I'm a tooth and nail Deplorable as well as a foreigner. But so what? We both know that what
our respective elites are doing is wrong. We both know that there has to be some other way. If we don't
seek out balanced and considered analysis then we might as well run off and join those many dissidents for
whom dissidence is merely a hobby, or those many others for whom it merely offers occasion for dispute.
So, these inner problem's within every major intel agency can be basically summed up in just four
word's ..Beware the jews within.
Now back to my soon to be finished one page book that will sum up
everything false we were told or taught regarding WWII in all it's many areas .."The Complete Untold Truth
about, WWII" .
"Them Germans was Correct!" The End.
Best one page book length expose' one can obtain in the vast search for real fact based Truth, of which
international jewry so hate's for one to learn of eh.
Get rid of the intelligence agencies.
If Jewsa needs info about a region, country, even itself, ask Russia, China. Answers will be intelligent,
diplomatic, accurate, and relevant.
Billions saved can go to help, real help not bombs, countries
destroyed for Israel and impoverished by Goldman Sachs, Monsanto, ilk.
I asked at what precise part of his piece you smelt sophistry. Maybe I have lost my ability in reading
comprehension of your language. Could well be? Apparent from being more generally not too fond of
sloganeering.
a number of presumptions which are not supported by current reality
Just look at how during the reign of Chabad Rabbi Dov Zakiem appointed as Head of Pentagon $$$ controls
etc What began as a mention to tv reporters a day prior to 9/11 event's of somehow pentagon cannot account
for a Missing $2.3-TRILLION!!! Has as of last date I read any new revelations of that missing cash, morphed
into almost $9.5-TRILLION missing!!! And that last amount was like several month's ago.
What a
Cohencidence eh? And just think what new and worse swindle scams Israel and it's mossad wonderkins can
come up with to do next with so large an amount of Black Budget ready cash available?
Yes Yes I know that several hasbara clown's and tribal member's will say no such stolen cash ever goes
to 100% innocent Israel and it's equally innocent jewry aka "The World's Biggest and Only Victim's that
ever matter".
But daily now another 10,000 folks in America awaken to fact that research proves beyond all doubt that
virtually Every evil and bad and immoral and unethical type issue or event since 3,500 yr's ago has More
jewdeo fingerprint's all over it than any other cause period.
And once red pilled and awakened to such real truth's .None are able to return to their former asleep
position even if they wished to No amount of jewish hasbara propagandas will ever be able to undo real
truth once that cats been let out of the bag so to speak.
Mossad/Israel state moto:.."By Deception(lies!) You Shall Cause War's" .Indeed they do eh.
The author is right as far as he goes but he ignores the CIA/Wall Street complex that was established by
Allen Dulles – that complex is at the very core of the US Deep State.
That complex is held together from the top; notice that only the very connected are put in charge of the
CIA and connected means very tied into Wall Street.
The CIA, in spite of their low period in the 1970′s, has been very effective in controlling the US media.
Note how the Brennan secret team created a trap that the democrats walked right into.
And note how they have the FBI taking the fall while the CIA continues to operate in the shadows.
I like the author; he brings some sanity but he is still a creature of US supremacism.
He doesn't like me; he has blocked me from commenting at his site.
But I still hope he speaks out as far as he goes.
It is helpful to learn the point of view of the knightly orders, which, as in the middle ages, constitute a
parasitic class indoctrinated to see nothing but the stylized ethical set pieces proper to their order.
Here are a few things Lang cannot acknowledge without jeopardizing his identity:
Impunity. Doesn't show up in the list of CIA flaws, but it's staring him in the face, right there in
black and white: the Central Intelligence Agency Act, the Rogers/Huston get-out-of-jail-free card, the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act, the operational files exemption, the political questions doctrine,
and lots of secret law and regulations. Under municipal law (strictly speaking, it doesn't meet minimal
legal standards, it's administrative red tape,) CIA can get away with anything. So they are institutionally
criminal. This is a sore point, frantically repressed. Even vague recollections of old movies are enough to
trigger the traditional posturing of honor-based chivalric cultures.
Operations. Beltway courtiers are constrained to discuss CIA's intelligence function in isolation from
its overwhelmingly dominant, and inherently criminal, clandestine operations function. In reality, all
analysts are paid to do is complain about NCS crime. Then when their next criminal racket gets caught, NCS
trots out some analysts to say, 'We at CIA warned about this.' CIA operations includes gun-running,
drug-dealing, human trafficking and pedophile blackmail, murder, torture, coercive interference, and
aggression by armed bands and irregulars. Intelligence is not CIA's business.
Rule of law. Lang, in the context of the USG going to war, writes, "If the "Intelligence Community" as
it now exists were abolished, some other group would have to assume the burden of performing the same
functions." Right. That other group would be the duly constituted authority under US supreme law, the UN
Security Council, which the intelligence community devoted most of their efforts to subverting with foreign
corrupt practices and fabricated war propaganda. It's not like CIA got stuck with this job, they usurped
it.
Having had my comments deleted and been blocked several times on SST, I can tell anyone who would listen to
not listen to your advice and waste hours poring over that myopic blog. Myopic, because anytime someone
writes an interesting comment that contradicts any of Lang's masonic beliefs, Lang gets nasty. Even
TwistedGenius has had to dance around a snarling Lang because he crossed some secret line.
Sure, Lang was
right about a lot of things from 2003-2007. But he was also often wrong and no one ever dared to call him
on it.
Once again, I will point out Lang's complete failure to deviate from the narrative on things like all
these gun-grabbing "mass shootings". As I recall Lang was even very wishy washy about the second amendment,
offering to sell his guns in a government gun grab. So he lies to us about about what his masonic brethren
are up to on this front.
But of course the biggest void in his analysis is the JQ. He attends barmitzfa's, purim, and who knows
what other kind of cabal rituals. He cannot deal with the JQ because he is borg, and he knows what kind of
punishment would await him. And angry jews crying for blood revenge aren't any where near as bad as when
the masonic brotherhood turns on you.
Agree but I think it is much more than a smoke Screen and preparation for war.
The 527 paid slave drivers and their bureaucrats and military (called the USA) has become a permanent false
flag operation. The 9/11 advisory explained:
1. slave drivers have been ordered to spy on slaves,
2. slave drivers have been ordered to silence all slave protests and objections,
3. slave drivers have been ordered to study the slaves like rats in cage,
4. slave drivers have been ordered to deprive the slaves until production is sufficient to satisfy the
Pharaohs.
5. slave drivers have been ordered to keep the USA dark, slaves are not allowed to know or learn anything
they don't pay for.
6. Slaves are expected to listen to Pharaoh produced, media distributed propaganda at least 12 hours per
day.
Americans now live in fear of the Bastards from the Dark Side Kingdom of Lies.
The problem is how to save America from the USA. The USA is milking our cattle, selling our eggs,
fencing us in with costly schooling and licenses to be eligible to get work, spying on our thoughts,
destroying our earning platforms, price and ticket gating our access to information, bottling and selling
to us, our once free water and air, and generally putting Americans at risk to attack from the global
outside and famine blight from the inside.
"... Imagine working at HP and having to listen to Carly Fiorina bulldoze you...she is like a blow-torch...here are 4 minutes of Carly and Ralph Nader (if you can take it): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vC4JDwoRHtk ..."
"... My husband has been a software architect for 30 years at the same company. Never before has he seen the sheer unadulterated panic in the executives. All indices are down and they are planning for the worst. Quality is being sacrificed for " just get some relatively functional piece of shit out the door we can sell". He is fighting because he has always produced a stellar product and refuses to have shit tied to his name ( 90% of competitor benchmarks fail against his projects). They can't afford to lay him off, but the first time in my life I see my husband want to quit... ..."
"... HP basically makes computer equipment (PCs, servers, Printers) and software. Part of the problem is that computer hardware has been commodized. Since PCs are cheap and frequent replacements are need, People just by the cheapest models, expecting to toss it in a couple of years and by a newer model (aka the Flat screen TV model). So there is no justification to use quality components. Same is become true with the Server market. Businesses have switched to virtualization and/or cloud systems. So instead of taking a boat load of time to rebuild a crashed server, the VM is just moved to another host. ..."
"... I hung an older sign next to the one saying Information Technology. Somehow MIS-Information Technology seemed appropriate.) ..."
"... Then I got to my first duty assignment. It was about five months after the first moon landing, and the aerospace industry was facing cuts in government aerospace spending. I picked up a copy of an engineering journal in the base library and found an article about job cuts. There was a cartoon with two janitors, buckets at their feet and mops in their hands, standing before a blackboard filled with equations. Once was saying to the other, pointing to one section, "you can see where he made his mistake right here...". It represented two engineers who had been reduced to menial labor after losing their jobs. ..."
"... So while I resent all the H1Bs coming into the US - I worked with several for the last four years of my IT career, and was not at all impressed - and despise the politicians who allow it, I know that it is not the first time American STEM grads have been put out of jobs en masse. In some ways that old saying applies: the more things change, the more they stay the same ..."
"... Just like Amazon, HP will supposedly make billions in profit analyzing things in the cloud that nobody looks at and has no use to the real economy, but it makes good fodder for Power Point presentations. I am amazed how much daily productivity goes into creating fancy charts for meetings that are meaningless to the actual business of the company. ..."
"... 'Computers' cost as much - if not more time than they save, at least in corporate settings. Used to be you'd work up 3 budget projections - expected, worst case and best case, you'd have a meeting, hash it out and decide in a week. Now you have endless alternatives, endless 'tweaking' and changes and decisions take forever, with outrageous amounts of time spent on endless 'analysis' and presentations. ..."
"... A recent lay off here turned out to be quite embarrassing for Parmalat there was nobody left that knew how to properly run the place they had to rehire many ex employees as consultants-at a costly premium ..."
"... HP is laying off 80,000 workers or almost a third of its workforce, converting its long-term human capital into short-term gains for rich shareholders at an alarming rate. The reason that product quality has declined is due to the planned obsolescence that spurs needless consumerism, which is necessary to prop up our debt-backed monetary system and the capitalist-owned economy that sits on top of it. ..."
"... The world is heading for massive deflation. Computers have hit the 14 nano-meter lithography zone, the cost to go from 14nm to say 5nm is very high, and the net benefit to computing power is very low, but lets say we go from 14nm to 5nm over the next 4 years. Going from 5nm to 1nm is not going to net a large boost in computing power and the cost to shrink things down and re-tool will be very high for such an insignificant gain in performance. ..."
"... Another classic "Let's rape all we can and bail with my golden parachute" corporate leaders setting themselves up. Pile on the string of non-IT CEOs that have been leading the company to ruin. To them it is nothing more than a contest of being even worse than their predecessor. Just look at the billions each has lost before their exit. Compaq, a cluster. Palm Pilot, a dead product they paid millions for and then buried. And many others. ..."
"... Let's not beat around the bush, they're outsourcing, firing Americans and hiring cheap labor elsewhere: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-15/hewlett-packard-to-cut-up-to-30-000-more-jobs-in-restructuring It's also shifting employees to low-cost areas, and hopes to have 60 percent of its workers located in cheaper countries by 2018, Nefkens said. ..."
"... Carly Fiorina: (LOL, leading a tech company with a degree in medieval history and philosophy) While at ATT she was groomed from the Affirmative Action plan. ..."
"... It is very straightforward. Replace 45,000 US workers with 100,000 offshore workers and you still save millions of USD ! Use the "savings" to buy back stock, then borrow more $$ at ZIRP to buy more stock back. ..."
"... If you look on a site like LinkedIN, it will always say 'We're hiring!'. YES, HP is hiring.....but not YOU, they want Ganesh Balasubramaniamawapbapalooboopawapbamboomtuttifrutti, so that they can work him as modern day slave labor for ultra cheap. We can thank idiot 'leaders' like Meg Pasty Faced Whitman and Bill 'Forced Vaccinations' Gates for lobbying Congress for decades, against the rights of American workers. ..."
"... An era of leadership in computer technology has died, and there is no grave marker, not even a funeral ceremony or eulogy ... Hewlett-Packard, COMPAQ, Digital Equipment Corp, UNIVAC, Sperry-Rand, Data General, Tektronix, ZILOG, Advanced Micro Devices, Sun Microsystems, etc, etc, etc. So much change in so short a time, leaves your mind dizzy. ..."
yeah thanks Carly ... HP made bullet-proof products that would last forever..... I still buy HP workstation notebooks, especially
now when I can get them for $100 on ebay .... I sold HP products in the 1990s .... we had HP laserjet IIs that companies would
run day & night .... virtually no maintenance ... when PCL5 came around then we had LJ IIIs .... and still companies would call
for LJ I's, .... 100 pounds of invincible Printing ! .
This kind of product has no place in the World of Planned-Obsolesence .... I'm currently running an 8510w, 8530w, 2530p, Dell
6420 quad i7, hp printers hp scanners, hp pavilion desktops, .... all for less than what a Laserjet II would have cost in 1994,
Total.
Not My Real Name
I still have my HP 15C scientific calculator I bought in 1983 to get me through college for my engineering degree. There is
nothing better than a hand held calculator that uses Reverse Polish Notation!
BigJim
HP used to make fantastic products. I remember getting their RPN calculators back in th 80's; built like tanks. Then they decided
to "add value" by removing more and more material from their consumer/"prosumer" products until they became unspeakably flimsy.
They stopped holding things together with proper fastenings and starting hot melting/gluing it together, so if it died you had
to cut it open to have any chance of fixing it.
I still have one of their Laserjet 4100 printers. I expect it to outlast anything they currently produce, and it must be going
on 16+ years old now.
Fuck you, HP. You started selling shit and now you're eating through your seed corn. I just wish the "leaders" who did this
to you had to pay some kind of penalty greater than getting $25M in a severance package.
Automatic Choke
+100. The path of HP is everything that is wrong about modern business models. I still have a 5MP laserjet (one of the first),
still works great. Also have a number of 42S calculators.....my day-to-day workhorse and several spares. I don't think the present
HP could even dream of making these products today.
nope-1004
How well will I profit, as a salesman, if I sell you something that works? How valuable are you, as a customer in my database,
if you never come back? Confucious say "Buy another one, and if you can't afford it, f'n finance it!" It's the growing trend.
Look at appliances. Nothing works anymore.
hey big brother.... if you are curious, there is a damn good android emulator of the HP42S available (Free42). really it is
so good that it made me relax about accumulating more spares. still not quite the same as a real calculator. (the 42S, by the
way, is the modernization/simplification of the classic HP41, the real hardcord very-programmable, reconfigurable, hackable unit
with all the plug-in-modules that came out in the early 80s.)
Miss Expectations
Imagine working at HP and having to listen to Carly Fiorina bulldoze you...she is like a blow-torch...here are 4 minutes
of Carly and Ralph Nader (if you can take it): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vC4JDwoRHtk
Miffed Microbiologist
My husband has been a software architect for 30 years at the same company. Never before has he seen the sheer unadulterated
panic in the executives. All indices are down and they are planning for the worst. Quality is being sacrificed for " just get
some relatively functional piece of shit out the door we can sell". He is fighting because he has always produced a stellar product
and refuses to have shit tied to his name ( 90% of competitor benchmarks fail against his projects). They can't afford to lay
him off, but the first time in my life I see my husband want to quit...
unplugged
I've been an engineer for 31 years - our managements's unspoken motto at the place I'm at (large company) is: "release it now,
we'll put in the quality later". I try to put in as much as possible before the product is shoved out the door without killing
myself doing it.
AGuy
Do they even make test equipment anymore?
HP test and measurement was spun off many years ago as Agilent. The electronics part of Agilent was spun off as keysight late
last year.
HP basically makes computer equipment (PCs, servers, Printers) and software. Part of the problem is that computer hardware
has been commodized. Since PCs are cheap and frequent replacements are need, People just by the cheapest models, expecting to
toss it in a couple of years and by a newer model (aka the Flat screen TV model). So there is no justification to use quality
components. Same is become true with the Server market. Businesses have switched to virtualization and/or cloud systems. So instead
of taking a boat load of time to rebuild a crashed server, the VM is just moved to another host.
HP has also adopted the Computer Associates business model (aka Borg). HP buys up new tech companies and sits on the tech and
never improves it. It decays and gets replaced with a system from a competitor. It also has a habit of buying outdated tech companies
that never generate the revenues HP thinks it will.
BullyBearish
When Carly was CEO of HP, she instituted a draconian "pay for performance" plan. She ended up leaving with over $146 Million
because she was smart enough not to specify "what type" of performance.
GeezerGeek
Regarding your statement "All those engineers choosing to pursue other opportunities", we need to realize that tech in general
has been very susceptible to the vagaries of government actions. Now the employment problems are due to things like globalization
and H1B programs. Some 50 years ago tech - meaning science and engineering - was hit hard as the US space program wound down.
Permit me this retrospective:
I graduated from a quite good school with a BS in Physics in 1968. My timing was not all that great, since that was when they
stopped granting draft deferments for graduate school. I joined the Air Force, but as an enlisted airman, not an officer. Following
basic training, I was sent to learn to operate PCAM operations. That's Punched Card Accounting Machines. Collators. Sorters. Interpreters.
Key punches. I was in a class with nine other enlistees. One had just gotten a Masters degree in something. Eight of us had a
BS in one thing or another, but all what would now be called STEM fields. The least educated only had an Associate degree. We
all enlisted simply to avoid being drafted into the Marines. (Not that there's anything wrong with the Marines, but all of us
proclaimed an allergy to energetic lead projectiles and acted accordingly. Going to Canada, as many did, pretty much ensured never
getting a job in STEM fields later in life.) So thanks to government action (fighting in VietNam, in this case) a significant
portion of educated Americans found themselves diverted from chosen career paths. (In my case, it worked out fine. I learned to
program, etc., and spent a total of over 40 years in what is now called IT. I think it was called EDP when I started the trek.
Somewhere along the line it became (where I worked) Management Information Systems. MIS. And finally the department became simply
Information Technology. I hung an older sign next to the one saying Information Technology. Somehow MIS-Information Technology
seemed appropriate.)
Then I got to my first duty assignment. It was about five months after the first moon landing, and the aerospace industry
was facing cuts in government aerospace spending. I picked up a copy of an engineering journal in the base library and found an
article about job cuts. There was a cartoon with two janitors, buckets at their feet and mops in their hands, standing before
a blackboard filled with equations. Once was saying to the other, pointing to one section, "you can see where he made his mistake
right here...". It represented two engineers who had been reduced to menial labor after losing their jobs.
So while I resent all the H1Bs coming into the US - I worked with several for the last four years of my IT career, and
was not at all impressed - and despise the politicians who allow it, I know that it is not the first time American STEM grads
have been put out of jobs en masse. In some ways that old saying applies: the more things change, the more they stay the same.
If you made it this far, thanks for your patience.
adr
Just like Amazon, HP will supposedly make billions in profit analyzing things in the cloud that nobody looks at and has
no use to the real economy, but it makes good fodder for Power Point presentations. I am amazed how much daily productivity goes
into creating fancy charts for meetings that are meaningless to the actual business of the company.
IT'S ALL BULLSHIT!!!!!
I designed more products in one year for the small company I work for than a $15 billion corporation did throughout their entire
design department employing hundreds of people. That is because 90% of their workday is spent preparing crap for meetings and
they never really get anything meaningful done.
It took me one week to design a product and send it out for production branded for the company I work for, but it took six
months to get the same type of product passed through the multi billion dollar corporation we license for. Because it had to pass
through layer after layer of bullshit and through every level of management before it could be signed off. Then a month later
somebody would change their mind in middle management and the product would need to be changed and go through the cycle all over
again.
Their own bag department made six bags last year, I designed 16. Funny how I out produce a department of six people whose only
job is to make bags, yet I only get paid the salary of one.
Maybe I'm just an imbecile for working hard.
Bear
You also have to add all the wasted time of employees having to sit through those presentations and the even more wasted time
on Ashley Madison
cynicalskeptic
'Computers' cost as much - if not more time than they save, at least in corporate settings. Used to be you'd work up 3
budget projections - expected, worst case and best case, you'd have a meeting, hash it out and decide in a week. Now you have
endless alternatives, endless 'tweaking' and changes and decisions take forever, with outrageous amounts of time spent on endless
'analysis' and presentations.
EVERY VP now has an 'Administrative Assistant' whose primary job is to develop PowerPoint presentations for the endless meetings
that take up time - without any decisions ever being made.
Computers stop people from thinking. In ages past when you used a slide rule you had to know the order of magnitude of the
end result. Now people make a mistake and come up with a ridiculous number and take it at face value because 'the computer' produced
it.
Any exec worht anythign knew what a given line in their department or the total should be +or a small amount. I can't count
the number of times budgets and analyses were WRONG because someone left off a few lines on a spreadsheet total.
Yes computer modeling for advanced tech and engineering is a help, CAD/CAM is great and many other applications in the tech/scientific
world are a great help but letting computers loose in corporate and finance has produced endless waste AND - worsde - thigns like
HFT (e.g. 'better' more effective ways to manipulate and cheat markets.
khnum
A recent lay off here turned out to be quite embarrassing for Parmalat there was nobody left that knew how to properly
run the place they had to rehire many ex employees as consultants-at a costly premium
Anopheles
Consultants don't come at that much of a premium becaue the company doesn't have to pay benefits, vacation, sick days, or payroll
taxes, etc. Plus it's really easy and cheap to get rid of consultants.
arrowrod
Obviously, you haven't worked as a consultant. You get paid by the hour. To clean up a mess. 100 hours a week are not uncommon.
(What?, is it possible to work 100 hours a week? Yes, it is, but only for about 3 months.)
RaceToTheBottom
HP Executives are trying hard to bring the company back to its roots: The ability to fit into one garage...
PrimalScream
ALL THAT Meg Whitman needs to do ... is to FIRE EVERYBODY !! Then have all the products made in China, process all the sales
orders in Hong Kong, and sub-contract the accounting and tax paperwork to India. Then HP can use all the profits for stock buybacks,
except of course for Meg's salary ... which will keep rising astronomically!
Herdee
That's where education gets you in America.The Government sold out America's manufacturing base to Communist China who holds
the debt of the USA.Who would ever guess that right-wing neo-cons(neo-nazis) running the government would sell out to communists
just to get the money for war? Very weird.
Really20
"Communist"? The Chinese government, like that of the US, never believed in worker ownership of businesses and never believed
that the commerical banking system (whether owned by the state, or private corporations which act like a state) should not control
money. Both countries believe in centralization of power among a few shareholders, who take the fruits of working people's labor
while contributing nothing of value themselves (money being but a token that represents a claim on real capital, not capital itself.)
Management and investors ought to be separate from each other; management should be chosen by workers by universal equal vote,
while a complementary investor board should be chosen by investors much as corporate boards are now. Both of these boards should
be legally independent but bound organizations; the management board should run the business while the investor board should negotiate
with the management board on the terms of equity issuance. No more buybacks, no more layoffs or early retirements, unless workers
as a whole see a need for it to maintain the company.
The purpose of investors is to serve the real economy, not the other way round; and in turn, the purpose of the real economy
is to serve humanity, not the other way around. Humans should stop being slaves to perpetual growth.
Really20
HP is laying off 80,000 workers or almost a third of its workforce, converting its long-term human capital into short-term
gains for rich shareholders at an alarming rate. The reason that product quality has declined is due to the planned obsolescence
that spurs needless consumerism, which is necessary to prop up our debt-backed monetary system and the capitalist-owned economy
that sits on top of it.
NoWayJose
HP - that company that sells computers and printers made in China and ink cartridges made in Thailand?
Dominus Ludificatio
Another company going down the drain because their focus is short term returns with crappy products.They will also bring down
any company they buy as well.
Barnaby
HP is microcosm of what Carly will do to the US: carve it like a pumpkin and leave the shell out to bake in the sun for a few
weeks. But she'll make sure and poison the seeds too! Don't want anything growing out of that pesky Palm division...
Dre4dwolf
The world is heading for massive deflation. Computers have hit the 14 nano-meter lithography zone, the cost to go from
14nm to say 5nm is very high, and the net benefit to computing power is very low, but lets say we go from 14nm to 5nm over the
next 4 years. Going from 5nm to 1nm is not going to net a large boost in computing power and the cost to shrink things down and
re-tool will be very high for such an insignificant gain in performance.
What does that mean
Computers (atleast non-quantum ones) have hit the point where about 80-90% of the potential for the current science has
been tap'd
This means that the consumer is not going to be put in the position where they will have to upgrade to faster systems for
atleast another 7-8 years.... (because the new computer wont be that much faster than their existing one).
If no one is upgrading the only IT sectors of the economy that stand to make any money are software companies (Microsoft,
Apple, and other small software developers), most software has not caught up with hardware yet.
We are obviously heading for massive deflation, consumer spending levels as a % are probably around where they were in
the late 70s - mid 80s, this is a very deflationary environment that is being compounded by a high debt burden (most of everyones
income is going to service their debts), that signals monetary tightening is going on... people simply don't have enough discretionary
income to spend on new toys.
All that to me screams SELL consumer electronics stocks because profits are GOING TO DECLINE , SALES ARE GOING TO DECLINE.
There is no way , no amount of buy backs will float the stocks of corporations like HP/Dell/IBM etc... it is inevitable that these
stocks will be worth 30% less over the next 5 - 8 years
But what do I know? maybe I am missing something.
In anycase a lot of pressure is being put on HP to do all it can at any cost to boost the stock valuations, because so much
of its stock is institution owned, they will strip the wallpaper off the walls and sell it to a recycling plant if it would give
them more money to boost stock valuations. That to me signals that most of the people pressuring the board of HP to boost the
stock, want them to gut the company as much as they can to boost it some trivial % points so that the majority of shares can be
dumped onto muppets.
To me it pretty much also signals something is terribly wrong at HP and no one is talking about it.
PoasterToaster
Other than die shrinks there really hasn't been a lot going on in the CPU world since Intel abandoned its Netburst architecture
and went back to its (Israeli created) Pentium 3 style pipeline. After that they gave up on increasing speed and resorted to selling
more cores. Now that wall has been hit, they have been selling "green" and "efficient" nonsense in place of increasing power.
x86 just needs to go, but a lot is invested in it not the least of which is that 1-2 punch of forced, contrived obsolesence
carried out in a joint operation with Microsoft. 15 years ago you could watch videos with no problem on your old machine using
Windows XP. Fast forward to now and their chief bragging point is still "multitasking" and the ability to process datastreams
like video. It's a joke.
The future is not in the current CPU paradigm of instructions per second; it will be in terms of variables per second. It will
be more along the lines of what GPU manufacturers are creating with their thousands of "engines" or "processing units" per chip,
rather than the 4, 6 or 12 core monsters that Intel is pushing. They have nearly given up on their roadmap to push out to 128
cores as it is. x86 just doesn't work with all that.
Dojidog
Another classic "Let's rape all we can and bail with my golden parachute" corporate leaders setting themselves up. Pile
on the string of non-IT CEOs that have been leading the company to ruin. To them it is nothing more than a contest of being even
worse than their predecessor. Just look at the billions each has lost before their exit. Compaq, a cluster. Palm Pilot, a dead
product they paid millions for and then buried. And many others.
Think the split is going to help? Think again. Rather than taking the opportunity to fix their problems, they have just duplicated
and perpetuated them into two separate entities.
HP is a company that is mired in a morass of unmanageable business processes and patchwork of antiquated applications all interconnected
to the point they are petrified to try and uncouple them.
Just look at their stock price since January. The insiders know. Want to fix HP? All it would take is a savvy IT based leader
with a boatload of common sense. What makes money at HP? Their printers and ink. Not thinking they can provide enterprise solutions
to others when they can't even get their own house in order.
Carly Fiorina: (LOL, leading a tech company with a degree in medieval history and philosophy) While at ATT she was groomed
from the Affirmative Action plan.
Alma Mater: Stanford University (B.A. in medieval history and philosophy); University of Maryland (MBA); Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
Patricia Russo: (Lucent) (Dedree in Political Science). Another lady elevated through the AA plan, Russo got her bachelor's
degree from Georgetown University in political science and history in 1973. She finished the advanced management program at Harvard
Business School in 1989
Both ladies steered their corporations to failure.
Clowns on Acid
It is very straightforward. Replace 45,000 US workers with 100,000 offshore workers and you still save millions of USD
! Use the "savings" to buy back stock, then borrow more $$ at ZIRP to buy more stock back.
You guys don't know nuthin'.
homiegot
HP: one of the worst places you could work. Souless.
Pancho de Villa
Ladies and Gentlemen! Integrity has left the Building!
space junk
I worked there for a while and it was total garbage. There are still some great folks around, but they are getting paid less
and less, and having to work longer hours for less pay while reporting to God knows who, often a foreigner with crappy engrish
skills, yes likely another 'diversity hire'. People with DEEP knowledge, decades and decades, have either gotten unfairly fired
or demoted, made to quit, or if they are lucky, taken some early retirement and GTFO (along with their expertise - whoopsie! who
knew? unintended consequences are a bitch aren't they? )....
If you look on a site like LinkedIN, it will always say 'We're hiring!'. YES, HP is hiring.....but not YOU, they want Ganesh
Balasubramaniamawapbapalooboopawapbamboomtuttifrutti, so that they can work him as modern day slave labor for ultra cheap. We
can thank idiot 'leaders' like Meg Pasty Faced Whitman and Bill 'Forced Vaccinations' Gates for lobbying Congress for decades,
against the rights of American workers.
Remember that Meg 'Pasty Faced' Whitman is the person who came up with the idea of a 'lights out' datacenter....that's right,
it's the concept of putting all of your computers in a building, in racks, in the dark, and maybe hiring an intern to come in
once a month and keep them going. This is what she actually believed. Along with her other statement to the HP workforce which
says basically that the future of HP is one of total automation.....TRANSLATION: If you are a smart admin, engineer, project manager,
architect, sw tester, etc.....we (HP management) think you are an IDIOT and can be replaced by a robot, a foreigner, or any other
cheap worker.
Race to the bottom is like they say a space ship approaching a black hole......after a while the laws of physics and common
sense, just don't apply anymore.
InnVestuhrr
An era of leadership in computer technology has died, and there is no grave marker, not even a funeral ceremony or eulogy
... Hewlett-Packard, COMPAQ, Digital Equipment Corp, UNIVAC, Sperry-Rand, Data General, Tektronix, ZILOG, Advanced Micro Devices,
Sun Microsystems, etc, etc, etc. So much change in so short a time, leaves your mind dizzy.
The story is probably more complex and Regisr is as close to yellow press as one can get but
discarding 36K smartphones in one year is something that smells incompetence. BTW Lumia 83 can be
upgraded to Windows 10 so this was not a problem.
Bonkers
buy-up by bungling billionairess
By
Kieren McCarthy in San Francisco
28 Aug 2017 at
18:48
SHARE
▼
The New York Police Department will scrap 36,000 smartphones, thanks to a
monumental purchasing cock-up by a billionaire's daughter.
The city spent millions on the phones back in October 2016 as part of its drive to bring the
police force into the 21st century. And the woman behind the purchase – Deputy
Commissioner for Information Technology, Jessica Tisch – praised them for their ability
to quickly send 911 alerts to officers close to an incident.
There was only one problem: Tisch chose Windows-based Lumia 830 and Lumia 640 XL phones, and
Microsoft
officially ended
support
for Windows 8.1 in July.
Even though those two models are eligible to be upgraded to Windows 10 Mobile, the NYPD will
need to redesign more than a dozen custom apps it created to run on Windows 8.1. And every
phone will need to be manually updated to the new operating system. In addition, Microsoft is
only promising to support upgraded Windows 10 phones through to June 2019.
In other words, the phones are effectively obsolete and so,
according to the
New York Post
, the police department has decided to scrap them altogether and go with
iPhones instead.
That decision has not come as a huge surprise: even when the purchasing decision was made,
Windows-based phones held just three percent of the market. In fact, back in 2016 when the
program was launched, pretty much everyone applauded the idea of giving cops smartphones but
were baffled as to why anyone would go with Windows phones over Android or iOS.
Tsk, tsk,
Tisch
Well, according to department sources quoted by the New York Post, the procurement disaster
was all down to Ms Tisch – who, it turns out, is the daughter of former Loews CEO and
billionaire James S Tisch.
"She drove the whole process," one unhappy cop told the paper, name-checking Jessica.
"Nobody purchases 36,000 phones based on the judgment of one person," he complained. "I don't
care if you're Jesus fucking Christ, you get a panel of experts."
Which is a fair point, since we have no hesitation in saying that even an expert panel of
one would have concluded that Windows phones were a turn in the wrong direction for a huge
police department.
According to other sources, the reason Tisch plumbed for the Lumia was because the NYPD was
using Microsoft software on its video surveillance system – a system that Tisch has
closely associated herself with and, back in 2012, demonstrated and boasted about to the press,
raising
eyebrows
.
You can see how an inexperienced IT manager might think that it made sense to go with
Microsoft all the way. But then that is also why anyone who carries out IT procurement into an
area they are not expert on gets a team of people to review all the possibilities before they
spend huge sums of money.
"She was in charge. It was her project, no question about that," another department source
told the Post.
So why has the notoriously tight-lipped NYPD decided to dump on one of its own? It may be
that Ms Tisch put a few noses out of joint with her smartphone plan, first announced in
2014.
At the time, then-police commissioner Bill Bratton specifically identified Tisch as being
the driving force for the plan and joked: "She's a terror if she doesn't get her way, so I
usually let her get her way. So she's certainly getting her way with this technology."
Oh dear.
We have asked the NYPD for confirmation and comment on the decision to scrap the phones.
We'll get back if and when they respond.
When data
disappeared, everyone knew exactly where to point the finger
By
Simon Sharwood, APAC Editor
25 Aug 2017 at 07:02
SHARE ▼
The Register
's weekly reader-contributed tales of workplace woe.
This week, meet "Craig," who shared a story of working for a small IT services company that
hired a new "team leader".
Craig used italics because after meeting his new boss he quickly surmised the title "was an
entire contradiction, as he was neither."
One fine day, Craig was given the job of sorting out an email issue at a small family owned
legal firm. Craig knew the client well: he'd previously fixed their jammed printers, added new
users to the company domain and lots of other mundane stuff.
On this occasion things were a bit more urgent as one of the senior partners had email
issues and there was a whiff of data loss in the air. Enter the new team leader, who dispatched
Craig to the client with thundered instructions to "JUST GO AND FIX IT!"
Upon arrival, Craig liaised with "Dianne", a worker at the law firm who helped him when he
visited.
With Dianne's help Craig quickly figured out that senior partner's .PST file was corrupted.
Craig tried his usual tricks but they didn't work, in part because "Outlook was throwing a
hissy fit at every opportunity." So he called back to base to consult a colleague, but the
phone was answered by the new team leader who insisted on taking control of the situation.
At this point, Craig put the call on speaker so that Dianne could hear it.
Both were treated to the new boss suggesting use of a .PST repair tool, which Craig had
already tried.
"I don't care, run it again," was the response, so Craig obeyed and duly reported it had not
worked.
"Delete the account and recreate it" was the next instruction, which again was hardly news
to Craig and again didn't work.
So the boss got extreme and told Craig to "delete Outlook and Office from the registry."
Craig didn't like that idea and told the team leader so, while shaking his head at Dianne,
making lots of bad-idea motions and telling his boss he felt this was not a sensible course of
action.
"Just fucking do what I tell you" was the reply. Which got Dianne smiling as she now
appreciated Craig's situation and realised the boss had no idea he was on speaker.
Craig protested that this was a dangerous course of action likely to create further problems
in an already-unstable system and endanger the client's data.
To which the team leader responded that Craig was a lowly functionary and should do what he
was told by his betters.
So Craig did as he was told, deleting any registry entry that mentioned Outlook while
watching Dianne start to take notes about the incident.
Of course the glorious leader's idea didn't work and Craig was soon able to show Dianne that
the partner's emails had gone, in all probability forever. Which is a bad look anywhere but
even worse at a law firm.
Dianne was furious.
Craig was calm. He whipped out a third-party .PST repair tool he favoured, applied it to the
backup of the partner's file he'd made just in case things went pear-shaped, and recovered just
about all of the at-risk emails.
"Dianne hailed me as a hero," Craig recalls. And not long afterwards he was vindicated when
the client sent his employer a letter saying that they'd be fired if the new team leader ever
had anything to do with their IT again.
Said leader was gone two months later after other clients complained about his skills and
service ethic.
"I was glad to see the back of him because he was an utter dickhead," Craig told us in his
email to On-Call.
Has your boss ever asked you to do something dangerous?
Write to share your story
and it might be
your anonymised name getting readers chuckling in a future edition of On-Call. ®
"... As to your point on Bernie vs. "small Bernies" , I agree totally. This political system has developed corruption to the "point of know return" (my Kansas religion in summary), and cannot be changed incrementally, despite the strongest wishes of the peaceful and partial "Left" that has no unity and has too many bought "leaders" to be effective. A system that has made legitimate opposition illegal has made illegitimate opposition necessary. This, and the sudden turn of events that can occur during crises, will rule our future. ..."
I'm not sure if the fact that this makes sense to me means I'm a genius or I'm totally off
the deep end . but if anyone has time to kill this is interesting and at times funny and informative,
Slavoj Žižek – A plea for bureaucratic socialism (June 2017)
zizek was described in the most recent harpers as the "marxist philosopher gadly from slovenia."
the specific nature of this description i found amusing, as if harpers needed to differentiate
zizek from the "marxist philosopher gadly from albania".
amusing & hopeful, as i ponder a world of public discourse which includes so many "marxist
philosopher gadflies" that this sort of description would become commonplace.
To be honest, "socialism" was always understood to be the preparation for a LESS bureaucratic
society, with some calling that communism, some naming it anarchism, the rest not thinking about
it much.
The bureaucratic period was a transition, with the bureaus acting to inform the public of their
rights and responsibilities, and protecting those rights during a period when capitalist and reactionary
nationalist ideologies would still be prevalent among the populations. It would be a setup of
new assumptions, the new unquestionables, that government was to protect, like capitalism is protected
now. The problem is not the bureaus, but the power they give the the fearless leaders. Responsabilisation,
s'il vous plait.
Žižek is provocative, in presentation a 60s radical a la Jerry Rubin, and loves to overstate
his cases, so whatever he writes is sure to be "funny". The little communism in him is affected
by his understanding of Slovenia's bad economic performance during the late stage of Titoism,
and with a little German/US/English/Vatican help, that was quickly, if bloodily, settled.
The point he is making in the talk is that there can be no revolution without being able to
ensure that the water system, schools, hospitals, etc. function as people expect. He is criticizing
the notion that fundamental change can be achieved merely by putting lots of people in the streets,
that the larger the size of the protests, the closer we are to fundamental change.
And of course he is absolutely right. Here in the U.S., the vast majority of my left-ish friends
have one of two mindsets. Either:
a) everything depends on electing Bernie, or the next Bernie, or some better Bernie; or
b) that view is incredibly naive; what we need to do is organize all the time (even when elections
are far off!) and we need to get a lot of little Bernies elected.
The faith in democracy is touching, I guess. But the notion that having (some) politicians
on our side is the extent of our strategy is a sign of how far away we are. How many accountants,
bankers, engineers, etc. do we have on our side compared to how many we would need? Do we have
any? I've been ranting of late that the other side has literally millions of economists on their
side and we have, what, maybe 1000? Who mostly don't agree with each other? But you can probably
run a society without economists. You can't without engineers.
His talking points do come under some criticism in the comments from that web page (ignore
the comments on his nervous tics – the medium is NOT the message), but he is absolutely right
that we must replace the administrative roles under capitalism with a similarly effective system
under socialism. My point is that this must be accompanied by a maniacal attempt at restructuring
the administrative function, placing it under watch 24/7/365 (sorry, CIA haters, but we will have
to use that role to watch the fox-house) even to the point of immediate recall and ankle-bracelets.
Any bureaucratic position must be controlled as if a drug gang offered to help you fight off another
drug gang, and had taken over your living room. How to do that without debilitating the system
itself is the question anarchists repeat, and socialists answer very weakly.
As to your point on Bernie vs. "small Bernies" , I agree totally. This political system
has developed corruption to the "point of know return" (my Kansas religion in summary), and cannot
be changed incrementally, despite the strongest wishes of the peaceful and partial "Left" that
has no unity and has too many bought "leaders" to be effective. A system that has made legitimate
opposition illegal has made illegitimate opposition necessary. This, and the sudden turn of events
that can occur during crises, will rule our future.
My gut feeling is that uprisings of a local or at most regional level will occur. They will
be brutally put down, and maybe something will grow from that, or we are headed for a King or
Queen. But the growth of opposition will be from the bottom, not the liberal-ish and reformist
"Left" as it is now. If not that, then nothing.
"... The schools teach a combination of staff process and sophomore-level college courses in government and international relations. No one is taught how to be a commander in combat. One Army lieutenant colonel recently wrote me that he got angry when he figured out that nothing he needs to know to command would be taught to him in any Army school. ..."
"... The promotion system reinforces professional ignorance. ..."
It was tragic that the career of General David Petraeus was brought down by a mere affair. It should
have ended several years earlier as a consequence of his failure as our commander in Afghanistan.
Petraeus, like every other theater commander in that war except Stanley McChrystal, could have been
replaced by a concrete block and nothing would have changed. They all kept doing the same things
while expecting a different result.
Thomas Ricks's recent book The Generals has reintroduced into the defense debate a vital
factor the press and politicians collude in ignoring: military incompetence. It was a major theme
of the Military Reform Movement of the 1970s and '80s. During those years, a friend of mine who was
an aide to a Marine Corps commandant asked his boss how many Marine generals, of whom there were
then 60-some, could competently fight a battle. The commandant came up with six. And the Marine Corps
is the best of our services.
Military incompetence does not begin at the rank of brigadier general. An old French proverb says
that the problem with the generals is that we select them from among the colonels. Nonetheless, military
competence-the ability to see quickly what to do in a military situation and make it happen-is more
rare at the general officer level. A curious aspect of our promotion system is that the higher the
rank, the smaller the percentage of our competent officers.
Why is military incompetence so widespread at the higher levels of America's armed forces? Speaking
from my own observations over almost 40 years, I can identify two factors. First, nowhere does our
vast, multi-billion dollar military-education system teach military judgment. Second, above the rank
of Army, Marine Corps, or Air Force captain, military ability plays essentially no role in determining
who gets promoted. (It has been so long since our Navy fought another navy that, apart from the aviators,
military competence does not seem to be a consideration at any level.)
Almost never do our military schools, academies, and colleges put students in situations where
they have to think through how to fight a battle or a campaign, then get critiqued not on their answer
but the way they think. Nor does American military training offer much free play, where the enemy
can do whatever he wants and critique draws out why one side won and the other lost. Instead, training
exercises are scripted as if we are training an opera company. The schools teach a combination
of staff process and sophomore-level college courses in government and international relations. No
one is taught how to be a commander in combat. One Army lieutenant colonel recently wrote me that
he got angry when he figured out that nothing he needs to know to command would be taught to him
in any Army school.
The promotion system reinforces professional ignorance. Above the company grades, military
ability does not count in determining who gets promoted. At the rank of major, officers are supposed
to accept that the "real world" is the internal world of budget and promotion politics, not war.
Those who "don't get it" have ever smaller chances of making general. This represents corruption
of the worst kind, corruption of institutional purpose. Its result is generals and admirals who are
in effect Soviet industrial managers in ever worse-looking suits. They know little and care less
about their intended product, military victory. Their expertise is in acquiring resources and playing
the military courtier.
"... Now think about it a minute. These are the people to whom we have given the authority to make life and death, godlike, decisions, over thousands of their subordinates and millions of people in less fortunate foreign lands. As you will see toward the end of this article, their manifest failings have had some rather serious consequences-that could have been much worse-in an episode in Korea in the 1960s that is revealed in full here for the first time. ..."
What with all the glorification of our "heroes" in uniform, a glorification that seems to grow
in inverse proportion to the real need for them, a person could begin to feel afraid to utter aloud
the sort of jokes that people used to make. For instance, you might feel the need to look over your
shoulder before you repeat the old George Carlin observation that "military intelligence" is an oxymoron.
The growing military hype and the sort of military intelligence with which I became all too familiar
in my two years of service, 1966-1968, came together on this Veterans Day weekend. The picture of
the U.S. Navy's finest engaged in the Sisyphean task of
mopping dew off the basketball court that had been laid on the deck of the USS Yorktown said
it all. That was in coastal South Carolina on Friday night, November 9, in what was to have been
a big military advertisement to kick off the weekend. The same fiasco played itself out on the
deck of the USS Bataan in Jacksonville, Florida, except that the college basketball players there
put themselves in harm's way for an entire half, attempting to play on the virtual skating rink that
the very predictable condensation had made of the surface.
... ... ...
Now think about it a minute. These are the people to whom we have given the authority to make
life and death, godlike, decisions, over thousands of their subordinates and millions of people in
less fortunate foreign lands. As you will see toward the end of this article, their manifest failings
have had some rather serious consequences-that could have been much worse-in an episode in Korea
in the 1960s that is revealed in full here for the first time.
... ... ...
Before we were to do our one dry run we had a planning meeting, presided over by the lieutenant
colonel from Eighth Army Headquarters in charge of the operation, at which the action plan was handed
out. Right off the bat we noticed a problem. Each of the teams was identified with a number. We were
team four. Each of the islands was also assigned a number, one through four, and they were called
"sites." Our team four was to go to site one, team three was to go to site two, and so on.
We wanted badly to suggest that it might be a better idea to match up the sites and the team designations,
so that team one went to site one, etc., but we were told that we would have an opportunity to make
suggestions for the final action plan after we had done our dry run, so we held our fire.
... ... ...
"We're implementing the action plan," said he, or words to that effect. "Move out immediately."
Patting myself on the back for the decision I had made, and in a state of rather high excitement,
I pulled out the phone number of the contact in the Kimpo engineer battalion to make sure that there
would be boats for us when we got to our destination.
It's a good thing the phone worked-the military phones were something of a hit-or-miss thing at
that time in Korea-considering his response. "We haven't had any move-out order," he responded to
me.
I immediately got back on the phone to the Eighth Army lieutenant to ask him what was up.
"Hold that first order," he said. "We've decided to give it a little more time."
Now I was thinking that it was an especially good thing that I had not taken the "immediately"
part of his move-out order too literally, and I was really glad I had gotten that boatman's phone
number. Considering the weather conditions, "high and dry" doesn't precisely describe the position
we would have found ourselves in at the evacuation site without the boats and without even a need
for them, but it comes close.
Having heard many reports of predicted river flooding on the news where the levels expected are
based upon levels already recorded upstream, I inquired of the lieutenant as to the basis on which
the final decision would be made. I remember his response as though it were yesterday:
"Colonel 'Geronimo' is down looking at the river."
As it turned out, no one drowned because some would-be rescue helicopter had landed at Site 3
instead of the correct Site 2 because he had received an emergency radio call from Ground 3, and
we never suffered from the lack of manpower that the Korean Army might have provided at our site.
None of the islands flooded that day-or that year-and the "hold" on that first call from the Eighth
Army lieutenant continued into perpetuity.
"... There's a long-standing tension in organizations between innovation and bureaucracy. Excessive layers of management and byzantine processes often shoulder the blame when a promising idea fails to make it to market or a nimble start-up thwarts a mature competitor. ..."
"... In capitalism the inherent maladies of bureaucracies serve to discourage lower echelons and keep them in their place without directly associating the blame for hierarchal authoritarianism with top executives. That is to say that bureaucratic dysfunction plays a key role in the essential function of the petite bourgeoisie to maintain the bourgeois capitalist system. OTOH, bureaucratic dysfunction plays a similar key role in all hierarchal authoritarian systems. ..."
RC AKA Darryl, Ron -> Tom aka Rusty...
Reply
Thursday, April 06, 2017 at 07:54
AM
[In his "Little Red Book" the machinations
of self-serving bureaucrats was one of Chainman Mao's biggest pet peeves. ]
There's a long-standing tension in organizations between innovation and bureaucracy. Excessive
layers of management and byzantine processes often shoulder the blame when a promising idea fails
to make it to market or a nimble start-up thwarts a mature competitor.
That tension can be traced back at least 340 years, to an inadvertent collaboration between
two government officials in France. In 1665, with the French economy in turmoil, King Louis XIV
appointed Jean-Baptiste Colbert as his comptroller general of finance. Colbert prosecuted corrupt
officials and reorganized commerce and industry according to the economic principles known as
mercantilism. To assure the populace that the government would act fairly in monetary disputes,
he demanded that officials abide by certain rules and apply them uniformly to everyone.
Then, in 1751, Jean Claude Marie Vincent de Gournay became France's administrator of commerce.
Gournay was outraged by what Colbert had put in place and railed against the multitude of government
regulations he believed were suppressing business activity. To describe a government run by insensitive
creators and enforcers of rules, who neither understood nor cared about the consequences of their
actions, he coined the term bureaucratie. Translation: "government by desks."
*
[There are democratic solutions to the dilemma posed by bureaucracies, but there are no republican
solutions for it. Important to note, that both the little "d" in democratic and the little "r"
in republican are profoundly significant to solving the dilemma of bureaucracy, or not.
Mao's brand of communism was too paranoid, paternal, and hierarchal to work any better than
a common ordinary garden variety republic. It seemed like Mao actually wanted to be more democratic
in governing and in the work place but could not really bring himself to do it as he was a neurotically
compulsive micromanager just as any dictator would need to be.
In capitalism the inherent maladies of bureaucracies serve to discourage lower echelons
and keep them in their place without directly associating the blame for hierarchal authoritarianism
with top executives. That is to say that bureaucratic dysfunction plays a key role in the essential
function of the petite bourgeoisie to maintain the bourgeois capitalist system. OTOH, bureaucratic
dysfunction plays a similar key role in all hierarchal authoritarian systems.
"Never ascribe to bad faith what can be explained by incompetence."
Yuri Orlov wrote an
interesting post
about organizational incompetence. To quote the paper he bases his post on:
Functional stupidity is organizationally-supported lack of reflexivity, substantive reasoning,
and justification. It entails a
refusal to use intellectual resources outside a narrow and
"safe" terrain
. It can provide a sense of certainty that allows organizations to function
smoothly. This can save the organization and its members from the frictions provoked by doubt
and reflection. Functional stupidity contributes to maintaining and strengthening organizational
order. It can also motivate people, help them to cultivate their careers, and subordinate them
to socially acceptable forms of management and leadership. Such positive outcomes can further
reinforce functional stupidity.
But clearly the destructive effects of US foreign policy are often deliberately malevolent. Orlov
also has a
post about that
:
By Anglo-imperialists I mean the combination of Britain and the United States. The latter took
over for the former as it failed, turning it into a protectorate. Now the latter is failing
too, and there are no new up-and-coming Anglo-imperialists to take over for it. But throughout
this process their common playbook had remained the same: pseudoliberal pseudocapitalism for
the insiders and military domination and economic exploitation for everyone else. Much more
specifically,
their playbook always called for a certain strategem to be executed whenever
their plans to dominate and exploit any given country finally fail.
On their way out, they
do what they can to compromise and weaken the entity they leave behind, by inflicting a permanently
oozing and festering political wound. "
Poison all the wells
" is the last thing on their
pre-departure checklist.
"... For one thing, many vested interests don't want the Democratic party to change. Most of the money it raises ends up in the pockets of political consultants, pollsters, strategists, lawyers, advertising consultants and advertisers themselves, many of whom have become rich off the current arrangement. They naturally want to keep it. ..."
"... For another, the Democratic party apparatus is ingrown and entrenched. Like any old bureaucracy, it only knows how to do what it has done for years. Its state and quadrennial national conventions are opportunities for insiders to meet old friends and for aspiring politicians to make contacts among the rich and powerful. Insiders and the rich aren't going to happily relinquish their power and perquisites, and hand them to outsiders and the non-rich. ..."
"... I have been a Democrat for 50 years – I have even served in two Democratic administrations in Washington, including a stint in the cabinet and have run for the Democratic nomination for governor in one state – yet I have never voted for the chair or vice-chair of my state Democratic party. That means I, too, have had absolutely no say over who the chair of the Democratic National Committee will be. To tell you the truth, I haven't cared. And that's part of the problem. ..."
"... Finally, the party chairmanship has become a part-time sinecure for politicians on their way up or down, not a full-time position for a professional organizer. In 2011, Tim Kaine (who subsequently became Hillary Clinton's running mate in the 2016 election) left the chairmanship to run, successfully, for the Senate from Virginia. ..."
"... The chair then went to Debbie Wasserman-Schultz, a Florida congresswoman who had co-chaired Clinton's bid for the Democratic nomination for president in 2008. This generated allegations in the 2016 race that the Democratic National Committee was siding with Clinton against Bernie Sanders – allegations substantiated by leaks of emails from the DNC. ..."
"... So what we now have is a Democratic party that has been repudiated at the polls, headed by a Democratic National Committee that has become irrelevant at best, run part-time by a series of insider politicians. It has no deep or broad-based grass-roots, no capacity for mobilizing vast numbers of people to take any action other than donate money, no visibility between elections, no ongoing activism. ..."
For one thing, many vested interests don't want the Democratic party to change. Most of the
money it raises ends up in the pockets of political consultants, pollsters, strategists, lawyers,
advertising consultants and advertisers themselves, many of whom have become rich off the current
arrangement. They naturally want to keep it.
For another, the Democratic party apparatus is ingrown and entrenched. Like any old bureaucracy,
it only knows how to do what it has done for years. Its state and quadrennial national conventions
are opportunities for insiders to meet old friends and for aspiring politicians to make contacts
among the rich and powerful. Insiders and the rich aren't going to happily relinquish their power
and perquisites, and hand them to outsiders and the non-rich.
Most Americans who call themselves Democrats never hear from the Democratic party except when
it asks for money, typically through mass mailings and recorded telephone calls in the months leading
up to an election. The vast majority of Democrats don't know the name of the chair of the Democratic
National Committee or of their state committee. Almost no registered
Democrats have any idea
how to go about electing their state Democratic chair or vice-chair, and, hence, almost none have
any influence over whom the next chair of the Democratic National Committee may be.
I have been a Democrat for 50 years – I have even served in two Democratic administrations
in Washington, including a stint in the cabinet and have run for the Democratic nomination for governor
in one state – yet I have never voted for the chair or vice-chair of my state Democratic party. That
means I, too, have had absolutely no say over who the chair of the Democratic National Committee
will be. To tell you the truth, I haven't cared. And that's part of the problem.
Nor, for that matter, has Barack Obama cared. He basically ignored the Democratic National Committee
during his presidency, starting his own organization called Organizing for America. It was originally
intended to marshal grass-roots support for the major initiatives he sought to achieve during his
presidency, but morphed into a fund-raising machine of its own.
Finally, the party chairmanship has become a part-time sinecure for politicians on their way
up or down, not a full-time position for a professional organizer. In 2011, Tim Kaine (who subsequently
became Hillary Clinton's running mate in the 2016 election) left the chairmanship to run, successfully,
for the Senate from Virginia.
The chair then went to Debbie Wasserman-Schultz, a Florida congresswoman who had co-chaired
Clinton's bid for the Democratic nomination for president in 2008. This generated allegations in
the 2016 race that the Democratic National Committee was siding with Clinton against Bernie Sanders
– allegations substantiated by leaks of emails from the DNC.
So what we now have is a Democratic party that has been repudiated at the polls, headed by
a Democratic National Committee that has become irrelevant at best, run part-time by a series of
insider politicians. It has no deep or broad-based grass-roots, no capacity for mobilizing vast numbers
of people to take any action other than donate money, no visibility between elections, no ongoing
activism.
In a knowledge economy, companies with the best talent win. And finding, nurturing, and developing that talent should be one
of the most important tasks in a corporation. So why does human resources do such a bad job -- and how can we fix it?
From:Issue 97| August 2005
| Page 40 | By: Keith H. Hammonds | Illustrations by: Gary Baseman
Because let's face it: After close to 20 years of hopeful rhetoric about becoming "strategic partners" with a "seat at the table"
where the business decisions that matter are made, most human-resources professionals aren't nearly there. They have no seat, and
the table is locked inside a conference room to which they have no key. HR people are, for most practical
purposes, neither strategic nor leaders.
I don't care for Las Vegas. And if it's not clear already, I don't like HR, either, which is why I'm here. The human-resources
trade long ago proved itself, at best, a necessary evil -- and at worst, a dark bureaucratic force that blindly enforces nonsensical
rules, resists creativity, and impedes constructive change. HR is the corporate function with the greatest potential --
the key driver, in theory, of business performance -- and also the one that most consistently underdelivers. And I am here to find
out why.
Why are annual performance appraisals so time-consuming -- and so routinely useless? Why is HR so often a henchman for the chief
financial officer, finding ever-more ingenious ways to cut benefits and hack at payroll? Why do its communications -- when we can
understand them at all -- so often flout reality? Why are so many people processes duplicative and wasteful, creating a forest of
paperwork for every minor transaction? And why does HR insist on sameness as a proxy for equity?
It's no wonder that we hate HR. In a 2005 survey by consultancy Hay Group, just 40% of employees commended their companies for
retaining high-quality workers. Just 41% agreed that performance evaluations were fair. Only 58% rated their job training as favorable.
Most said they had few opportunities for advancement -- and that they didn't know, in any case, what was required to move up. Most
telling, only about half of workers below the manager level believed their companies took a genuine interest in their well-being.
None of this is explained immediately in Vegas. These HR folks, from employers across the nation, are neither evil courtiers
nor thoughtless automatons. They are mostly smart, engaging people who seem genuinely interested in doing their jobs better. They
speak convincingly about employee development and cultural transformation. And, over drinks, they spin some pretty funny yarns of
employee weirdness. (Like the one about the guy who threatened to sue his wife's company for "enabling" her affair with a coworker.
Then there was the mentally disabled worker and the hooker -- well, no, never mind. . . .)
But then the facade cracks. It happens at an afternoon presentation called "From Technicians to Consultants: How to Transform
Your HR Staff into Strategic Business Partners." The speaker, Julie Muckler, is senior vice president of human resources at Wells
Fargo Home Mortgage. She is an enthusiastic woman with a broad smile and 20 years of experience at companies such as Johnson & Johnson
and General Tire. She has degrees in consumer economics and human resources and organizational development.
And I have no idea what she's talking about. There is mention of "internal action learning" and "being more planful in my approach."
PowerPoint slides outline Wells Fargo Home Mortgage's initiatives in performance management, organization design, and horizontal-solutions
teams. Muckler describes leveraging internal resources and involving external resources -- and she leaves her audience dazed. That
evening, even the human-resources pros confide they didn't understand much of it, either.
This, friends, is the trouble with HR. In a knowledge economy, companies that have the best talent win. We all know that. Human
resources execs should be making the most of our, well, human resources -- finding the best hires, nurturing the stars, fostering
a productive work environment -- just as IT runs the computers and finance minds the capital. HR should be joined to business strategy
at the hip.
Instead, most HR organizations have ghettoized themselves literally to the brink of obsolescence.
They are competent at the administrivia of pay, benefits, and retirement, but companies increasingly are farming those functions
out to contractors who can handle such routine tasks at lower expense. What's left is the more important strategic
role of raising the reputational and intellectual capital of the company -- but HR is, it turns out, uniquely unsuited for that.
Here's why.
1. HR people aren't the sharpest tacks in the box. We'll be blunt: If you are an ambitious young thing newly
graduated from a top college or B-school with your eye on a rewarding career in business, your first instinct is not to join the
human-resources dance. (At the University of Michigan's Ross School of Business, which arguably boasts the nation's top faculty
for organizational issues, just 1.2% of 2004 grads did so.) Says a management professor at one leading school: "The best and the
brightest don't go into HR."
Who does? Intelligent people, sometimes -- but not businesspeople. "HR doesn't tend to hire a lot of independent thinkers or
people who stand up as moral compasses," says Garold L. Markle, a longtime human-resources executive at Exxon and Shell Offshore
who now runs his own consultancy. Some are exiles from the corporate mainstream: They've fared poorly in meatier roles -- but not
poorly enough to be fired. For them, and for their employers, HR represents a relatively low-risk parking spot.
Others enter the field by choice and with the best of intentions, but for the wrong reasons. They like working with people, and
they want to be helpful -- noble motives that thoroughly tick off some HR thinkers. "When people have come to me and said, 'I want
to work with people,' I say, 'Good, go be a social worker,' " says Arnold Kanarick, who has headed human resources at the Limited
and, until recently, at Bear Stearns. "HR isn't about being a do-gooder. It's about how do you get the best and brightest people
and raise the value of the firm."
The really scary news is that the gulf between capabilities and job requirements appears to be widening. As business and legal
demands on the function intensify, staffers' educational qualifications haven't kept pace. In fact, according to a survey by the
Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM), a considerably smaller proportion of HR professionals today have some education beyond
a bachelor's degree than in 1990.
And here's one more slice of telling SHRM data: When HR professionals were asked about the worth of various academic courses
toward a "successful career in HR," 83% said that classes in interpersonal communications skills had "extremely high value." Employment
law and business ethics followed, at 71% and 66%, respectively. Where was change management? At 35%. Strategic management? 32%.
Finance? Um, that was just 2%.
The truth? Most human-resources managers aren't particularly interested in, or equipped for, doing business. And in a business,
that's sort of a problem. As guardians of a company's talent, HR has to understand how people serve corporate objectives. Instead,
"business acumen is the single biggest factor that HR professionals in the U.S. lack today," says Anthony J. Rucci, executive vice
president at Cardinal Health Inc., a big health-care supply distributor.
Rucci is consistently mentioned by academics, consultants, and other HR leaders as an executive who actually does know business.
At Baxter International, he ran both HR and corporate strategy. Before that, at Sears, he led a study of results at 800 stores over
five years to assess the connection between employee commitment, customer loyalty, and profitability.
As far as Rucci is concerned, there are three questions that any decent HR person in the world should be able to answer. First,
who is your company's core customer? "Have you talked to one lately? Do you know what challenges they face?" Second, who is the
competition? "What do they do well and not well?" And most important, who are we? "What is a realistic assessment of what we do
well and not so well vis a vis the customer and the competition?"
Does your HR pro know the answers?
2. HR pursues efficiency in lieu of value. Why? Because it's easier -- and easier to measure. Dave Ulrich,
a professor at the University of Michigan, recalls meeting with the chairman and top HR people from a big bank. "The training person
said that 80% of employees have done at least 40 hours in classes. The chairman said, 'Congratulations.' I said, 'You're talking
about the activities you're doing. The question is, What are you delivering?' "
That sort of stuff drives Ulrich nuts. Over 20 years, he has become the HR trade's best-known guru (see "The Once and Future
Consultant," page 48) and a leading proponent of the push to take on more-strategic roles within corporations. But human-resources
managers, he acknowledges, typically undermine that effort by investing more importance in activities than in outcomes. "You're
only effective if you add value," Ulrich says. "That means you're not measured by what you do but by what you deliver." By that,
he refers not just to the value delivered to employees and line managers, but the benefits that accrue to investors and customers,
as well.
So here's a true story: A talented young marketing exec accepts a job offer with Time Warner out of business school. She interviews
for openings in several departments -- then is told by HR that only one is interested in her. In fact, she learns later, they all
had been. She had been railroaded into the job, under the supervision of a widely reviled manager, because no one inside the company
would take it.
You make the call: Did HR do its job? On the one hand, it filled the empty slot. "It did what was organizationally expedient,"
says the woman now. "Getting someone who wouldn't kick and scream about this role probably made sense to them. But I just felt angry."
She left Time Warner after just a year. (A Time Warner spokesperson declined to comment on the incident.)
Part of the problem is that Time Warner's metrics likely will never catch the real cost of its HR department's action. Human
resources can readily provide the number of people it hired, the percentage of performance evaluations completed, and the extent
to which employees are satisfied or not with their benefits. But only rarely does it link any of those metrics to business performance.
John W. Boudreau, a professor at the University of Southern California's Center for Effective Organizations, likens the failing
to shortcomings of the finance function before DuPont figured out how to calculate return on investment in 1912. In HR, he says,
"we don't have anywhere near that kind of logical sophistication in the way of people or talent. So the decisions that get made
about that resource are far less sophisticated, reliable, and consistent."
Cardinal Health's Rucci is trying to fix that. Cardinal regularly asks its employees 12 questions designed to measure engagement.
Among them: Do they understand the company's strategy? Do they see the connection between that and their jobs? Are they proud to
tell people where they work? Rucci correlates the results to those of a survey of 2,000 customers, as well as monthly sales data
and brand-awareness scores.
"So I don't know if our HR processes are having an impact" per se, Rucci says. "But I know absolutely that employee-engagement
scores have an impact on our business," accounting for between 1% and 10% of earnings, depending on the business and the employee's
role. "Cardinal may not anytime soon get invited by the Conference Board to explain our world-class best practices in any area of
HR -- and I couldn't care less. The real question is, Is the business effective and successful?"
3. HR isn't working for you. Want to know why you go through that asinine performance appraisal every year,
really? Markle, who admits to having administered countless numbers of them over the years, is pleased to confirm your suspicions.
Companies, he says "are doing it to protect themselves against their own employees," he says. "They put a piece of paper between
you and employees, so if you ever have a confrontation, you can go to the file and say, 'Here, I've documented this problem.' "
There's a good reason for this defensive stance, of course. In the last two generations, government has created an immense thicket
of labor regulations. Equal Employment Opportunity; Fair Labor Standards; Occupational Safety and Health; Family and Medical Leave;
and the ever-popular ERISA. These are complex, serious issues requiring technical expertise, and HR has to apply reasonable caution.
But "it's easy to get sucked down into that," says Mark Royal, a senior consultant with Hay Group. "There's a tension created
by HR's role as protector of corporate assets -- making sure it doesn't run afoul of the rules. That puts you in the position of
saying no a lot, of playing the bad cop. You have to step out of that, see the broad possibilities, and take a more open-minded
approach. You need to understand where the exceptions to broad policies can be made."
Typically, HR people can't, or won't. Instead, they pursue standardization and uniformity in the face of a workforce that is
heterogeneous and complex. A manager at a large capital leasing company complains that corporate HR is trying to eliminate most
vice-president titles there -- even though veeps are a dime a dozen in the finance industry. Why? Because in the company's commercial
business, vice president is a rank reserved for the top officers. In its drive for bureaucratic "fairness," HR is actually threatening
the reputation, and so the effectiveness, of the company's finance professionals.
The urge for one-size-fits-all, says one professor who studies the field, "is partly about compliance, but mostly because it's
just easier." Bureaucrats everywhere abhor exceptions -- not just because they open up the company to charges of bias but because
they require more than rote solutions. They're time-consuming and expensive to manage. Make one exception, HR fears, and the floodgates
will open.
There's a contradiction here, of course: Making exceptions should be exactly what human resources does, all the time -- not because
it's nice for employees, but because it drives the business. Employers keep their best people by acknowledging and rewarding their
distinctive performance, not by treating them the same as everyone else. "If I'm running a business, I can tell you who's really
helping to drive the business forward," says Dennis Ackley, an employee communication consultant. "HR should have the same view.
We should send the message that we value our high-performing employees and we're focused on rewarding and retaining them."
Instead, human-resources departments benchmark salaries, function by function and job by job, against industry standards, keeping
pay -- even that of the stars -- within a narrow band determined by competitors. They bounce performance appraisals back to managers
who rate their employees too highly, unwilling to acknowledge accomplishments that would merit much more than the 4% companywide
increase.
Human resources, in other words, forfeits long-term value for short-term cost efficiency. A simple test: Who does your company's
vice president of human resources report to? If it's the CFO -- and chances are good it is -- then HR is headed in the wrong direction.
"That's a model that cannot work," says one top HR exec who has been there. "A financial person is concerned with taking money out
of the organization. HR should be concerned with putting investments in."
4. The corner office doesn't get HR (and vice versa). I'm at another rockin' party: a few dozen midlevel human-resources
managers at a hotel restaurant in Mahwah, New Jersey. It is not glam in any way. (I've got to get a better travel agent.) But it
is telling, in a hopeful way. Hunter Douglas, a $2.1 billion manufacturer of window coverings, has brought its HR staff here from
across the United States to celebrate their accomplishments.
The company's top brass is on hand. Marvin B. Hopkins, president and CEO of North American operations, lays on the praise: "I
feel fantastic about your achievements," he says. "Our business is about people. Hiring, training, and empathizing with employees
is extremely important. When someone is fired or leaves, we've failed in some way. People have to feel they have a place at the
company, a sense of ownership."
So, yeah, it's corporate-speak in a drab exurban office park. But you know what? The human-resources managers from Tupelo and
Dallas are totally pumped up. They've been flown into headquarters, they've had their picture taken with the boss, and they're seeing
Mamma Mia on Broadway that afternoon on the company's dime.
Can your HR department say it has the ear of top management? Probably not. "Sometimes," says Ulrich, "line managers just have
this legacy of HR in their minds, and they can't get rid of it. I felt really badly for one HR guy. The chairman wanted someone
to plan company picnics and manage the union, and every time this guy tried to be strategic, he got shot down."
Say what? Execs don't think HR matters? What about all that happy talk about employees being their most important asset? Well,
that turns out to have been a small misunderstanding. In the 1990s, a group of British academics examined the relationship between
what companies (among them, the UK units of Hewlett-Packard and Citibank) said about their human assets and how they actually behaved.
The results were, perhaps, inevitable.
In their rhetoric, human-resources organizations embraced the language of a "soft" approach, speaking of training, development,
and commitment. But "the underlying principle was invariably restricted to the improvements of bottom-line performance," the authors
wrote in the resulting book, Strategic Human Resource Management (Oxford University Press, 1999).
"Even if the rhetoric of HRM is soft, the reality is almost always 'hard,' with the interests of the organization prevailing
over those of the individual."
In the best of worlds, says London Business School professor Lynda Gratton, one of the study's authors, "the reality should be
some combination of hard and soft." That's what's going on at Hunter Douglas. Human resources can address the needs of employees
because it has proven its business mettle -- and vice versa. Betty Lou Smith, the company's vice president of corporate HR, began
investigating the connection between employee turnover and product quality. Divisions with the highest turnover rates, she found,
were also those with damaged-goods rates of 5% or higher. And extraordinarily, 70% of employees were leaving the company within
six months of being hired.
Smith's staffers learned that new employees were leaving for a variety of reasons: They didn't feel respected, they didn't have
input in decisions, but mostly, they felt a lack of connection when they were first hired. "We gave them a 10-minute orientation,
then they were out on the floor," Smith says. She addressed the weakness by creating a mentoring program that matched new hires
with experienced workers. The latter were suspicious at first, but eventually, the mentor positions (with spiffy shirts and caps)
came to be seen as prestigious. The six-month turnover rate dropped dramatically, to 16%. Attendance and productivity -- and the
damaged-goods rate -- improved.
"We don't wait to hear from top management," Smith says. "You can't just sit in the corner and look at benefits. We have to know
what the issues in our business are. HR has to step up and assume responsibility, not wait for management to knock on our door."
But most HR people do.
H unter Douglas gives us a glimmer of hope -- of the possibility that HR can be done right. And surely, even within
ineffective human-resources organizations, there are great individual HR managers -- trustworthy, caring people with their ears
to the ground, who are sensitive to cultural nuance yet also understand the business and how people fit in. Professionals who move
voluntarily into HR from line positions can prove especially adroit, bringing a profit-and-loss sensibility and strong management
skills.
At Yahoo, Libby Sartain, chief people officer, is building a group that may prove to be the truly effective human-resources department
that employees and executives imagine. In this, Sartain enjoys two advantages. First, she arrived with a reputation as a creative
maverick, won in her 13 years running HR at Southwest Airlines. And second, she had license from the top to do whatever it took
to create a world-class organization.
Sartain doesn't just have a "seat at the table" at Yahoo; she actually helped build the table, instituting a weekly operations
meeting that she coordinates with COO Dan Rosensweig. Talent is always at the top of the agenda -- and at the end of each meeting,
the executive team mulls individual development decisions on key staffers.
That meeting, Sartain says, "sends a strong message to everyone at Yahoo that we can't do anything without HR." It also signals
to HR staffers that they're responsible for more than shuffling papers and getting in the way. "We view human resources as the caretaker
of the largest investment of the company," Sartain says. "If you're not nurturing that investment and watching it grow, you're not
doing your job."
Yahoo, say some experts and peers at other organizations, is among a few companies -- among them Cardinal Health, Procter & Gamble,
Pitney Bowes, Goldman Sachs, and General Electric -- that truly are bringing human resources into the realm of business strategy.
But they are indeed the few. USC professor Edward E. Lawler III says that last year HR professionals reported spending 23% of their
time "being a strategic business partner" -- no more than they reported in 1995. And line managers, he found, said HR is far less
involved in strategy than HR thinks it is. "Despite great huffing and puffing about strategy," Lawler says, "there's still a long
way to go." (Indeed. When I asked one midlevel HR person exactly how she was involved in business strategy for her division, she
excitedly described organizing a monthly lunch for her vice president with employees.)
What's driving the strategy disconnect? London Business School's Gratton spends a lot of time training human-resources professionals
to create more impact. She sees two problems: Many HR people, she says, bring strong technical expertise to the party but no "point
of view about the future and how organizations are going to change." And second, "it's very difficult to align HR strategy to business
strategy, because business strategy changes very fast, and it's hard to fiddle around with a compensation strategy or benefits to
keep up." More than simply understanding strategy, Gratton says, truly effective executives "need to be operating out of a set of
principles and personal values." And few actually do.
In the meantime, economic natural selection is, in a way, taking care of the problem for us. Some 94% of large employers surveyed
this year by Hewitt Associates reported they were outsourcing at least one human-resources activity. By 2008, according to the survey,
many plan to expand outsourcing to include activities such as learning and development, payroll, recruiting, health and welfare,
and global mobility.
Which is to say, they will farm out pretty much everything HR does. The happy rhetoric from the HR world says this is all for
the best: Outsourcing the administrative minutiae, after all, would allow human-resources professionals to focus on more important
stuff that's central to the business. You know, being strategic partners.
The problem, if you're an HR person, is this: The tasks companies are outsourcing -- the administrivia -- tend to be what you're
good at. And what's left isn't exactly your strong suit. Human resources is crippled by what Jay Jamrog, executive director of the
Human Resource Institute, calls "educated incapacity: You're smart, and you know the way you're working today isn't going to hold
10 years from now. But you can't move to that level. You're stuck."
That's where human resources is today. Stuck. "This is a unique organization in the company," says USC's Boudreau. "It discovers
things about the business through the lens of people and talent. That's an opportunity for competitive advantage." In most companies,
that opportunity is utterly wasted.
And that's why I don't like HR.
Keith H. Hammonds is Fast Company's deputy editor.
"... I think the key difference between successful politicians and business people is patience. When you look at the careers of successful politicians, you can often see many years of pure relentless grind going into a few years of glory in a senior position. Endless committee meetings, rubber chicken dinners, being nice to people you loath, the inevitable humiliation of losing elections. Most business leaders simply lose patience after a few years after they go into politics. ..."
"... "The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it." ..."
"... Neoclassical economics hid the work of the Classical Economists and the difference between "earned" and "unearned" income. ..."
"... Once you hide this it is easy to make it look as though the interests of business and the wealthy are the same. ..."
"... There should not really be any tax on "earned" income, all tax should fall on "unearned" income to subside the productive side of the economy with low cost housing and services. ..."
"... "The Labour and time of the poor is in civilised countries sacrificed to the maintaining of the rich in ease and luxury. The Landlord is maintained in idleness and luxury by the labour of his tenants. The moneyed man is supported by his extractions from the industrious merchant and the needy who are obliged to support him in ease by a return for the use of his money. But every savage has the full fruits of his own labours; there are no landlords, no usurers and no tax gatherers." ..."
"... Adam Smith saw landlords, usurers (bankers) and Government taxes as equally parasitic, all raising the cost of doing business. ..."
"... "…who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it." Adam Smith just described the modern Republican Party and movement Conservatives. ..."
"... The children of the US elite were the storm troopers of this ideology and they headed out from their elite US universities to bring this new ideology to developing nations. ..."
"... "The Chicago Boys" headed out from the University of Chicago to bring the new way to South American nations and "The Berkley Mafia" headed out from the University of Berkeley, California to bring the new way to Indonesia ..."
"... Any means were deemed acceptable to implement the one true solution and the new ideology, e.g. torture, terror, death squads, snatching people off the streets and making them disappear permanently. Any left wing resistance had to be quashed by whatever means necessary ..."
"... Their revolutions always massively increased inequality, a few at the top became fabulously wealthy and extreme and widespread poverty became prevalent at the bottom. Mixing with the people at the top, the elite US storm troopers deemed their revolutions a huge success. This ideology was ready to roll out across the world. ..."
"... Under this new ideology, the UK dream is to emulate the idle, rich rentier with a BTL portfolio, living off "unearned" income extracted from the "earned" income of generation rent, whilst doing as little as possible and enjoying a life of luxury and leisure. ..."
"... Obfuscating the relationship between free markets and the role of government is coming to an end. So much failure and misdirection cannot hide forever. The cognitive dissonance set up in society is unsustainable- people don't like to feel or experience crazy. ..."
"... Markets are stronger and healthier when backed by functioning government. Defining what good government is and demanding it is required today. That is the revolutionary force, finally turning back the negative campaign against government and demanding good government- fighting for it. ..."
"... "Enoch Powell…once remarked that all political lives end in failure. It is also true of most business leaders." But that is also what they say about love. No good end can come of it. ..."
"... This bit of convenient fiction caught my eye: "Political leaders must also manage for the entire population rather than the narrow interest of investors." ..."
"... Perhaps political leaders should do this but, as has been recently shown, there is no basis in reality that this is any kind of requirement (as in "must"). ..."
"... Perhaps his use of "must" in this case is talking about the intrinsic requirement. In other words, even if they are managing negatively for some and positively for others, they are managing for all. ..."
Electorates believe that business leaders are qualified for and likely to
be effective in politics. Yet, with some notable exceptions, business people
have rarely had successful political careers.
The assumption is that corporate vision, leadership skills, administrative
skills and a proven record of wealth creation will translate into political
success. It presupposes personal qualities such drive, ambition and ruthlessness.
The allure is also grounded in the romantic belief that outsiders can fix all
that is wrong with the political process. The faith is misplaced.
First, the required skills are different.
Successful business leaders generally serve a technical apprenticeship in
the business, industry or a related profession giving them familiarity with
the firm's activities. Political success requires party fealty, calculating
partisanship, managing coalitions and networking. It requires a capacity to
engage in the retail electoral process, such as inspirational public speaking
and an easy familiarity with voters in a wide variety of settings. It requires
formidable powers of fund raising to finance campaigns. Where individuals shift
from business to politics in mid or later life, he or she is at a significant
disadvantage to career political operatives who have had years to build the
necessary relationships and organisation to support political aspirations.
Second, the scope of the task is different. A nation is typically larger
than a business. The range of issues is broader, encompassing economics, finance,
welfare, health, social policy as well as defence and international relations.
Few chief executives will, during a single day, have to consider budgetary or
economic issues, health policy, gender matters, privacy concerns, manage involvement
in a foreign conflict in between meeting and greeting a range of visitors varying
from schoolchildren to foreign dignitaries as well as attending to party political
matters.
Political leaders must also manage for the entire population rather than
the narrow interest of investors. They must take into account the effect of
decisions on a wide range of constituencies including many implacably opposed
to their positions.
Third, business objectives, such as profit maximisation, are narrow, well
defined and constant. Political objectives are amorphous and ideological. The
emphasis is on living standards, security and social justice. Priorities between
conflicting objectives shift constantly. The benefits of decisions by governments
in infrastructure, education and welfare are frequently difficult to measure
and frequently will not emerge for a long time.
Business decisions rarely focus on the societal impact. Firms can reduce
workforce, shift production overseas, seek subsidies or legally minimise taxes.
Politicians must deal with the side effects of individual profit maximisation
decisions such as closed factories, reduced employment, welfare and retraining
costs, security implications as well as social breakdown and inequality or exclusion.
Fourth, the operating environment is different. Businesses usually operate
within relatively defined product-market structures. In contrast, governments
operate in a complex environment shaped by domestic and foreign factors, many
of which they do not control or influence. Government actions require co-operation
across different layers of government or countries. Businesses can withdraw
from certain activities, while government do not have the same option.
Fifth, within boundaries set by laws and regulations, business leaders enjoy
great freedom and power to implement their policies. Boards of directors and
shareholders exercise limited control, usually setting broad financial parameters.
They do not intervene in individual decisions. Most important government actions
require legislative or parliamentary support. Unlike commercial operations,
government face restrictions, such as separation of powers, restraints on executive
or governmental action and international obligations.
Business leaders have unrivalled authority over their organisation based
on threats (termination) or rewards (remuneration or promotion). Political leaders
cannot fire legislators. They face significant barriers in rewarding or replacing
public servants. Policy implementation requires negotiations and consensus.
It requires overcoming opposition from opposing politicians, factions within
one's own party, supporters, funders and the bureaucracy. It requires overcoming
passively resistance from legislators and public servants who can simply outlast
the current incumbent, whose tenure is likely to be shorter than their own.
The lack of clear goals, unrivalled authority and multiple and shifting power
centres means that political power is more limited than assumed Many Presidents
of the United States, regarded as the most powerful position on earth, have
found that they had little ability to implement their agendas.
Sixth, unless they choose to be, business leaders are rarely public figures
outside business circles. Politicians cannot avoid constant public attention.
Modern political debate and discourse has become increasingly tabloid in tone,
with unprecedented levels of invective and ridicule. There is no separation
of the public and the personal. Business leaders frequently find the focus on
personal matters as well as the tone of criticism discomforting.
There are commonalities. Both fields attract a particular type of individual.
In addition, paraphrasing John Ruskin, successful political and business leaders
not only know what must be done but actually do what must be done and do it
when it must be done. A further commonality is the ultimate fate of leaders
generally. Enoch Powell, himself a long-serving Member of the British Parliament,
once remarked that all political lives end in failure. It is also true of most
business leaders.
I think the key difference between successful politicians and business
people is patience. When you look at the careers of successful politicians,
you can often see many years of pure relentless grind going into a few years
of glory in a senior position. Endless committee meetings, rubber chicken
dinners, being nice to people you loath, the inevitable humiliation of losing
elections. Most business leaders simply lose patience after a few years
after they go into politics.
Much the same seems to apply to military leaders, although off the top
of my head I can think of more successful examples of the latter than of
business people (Eisenhower and De Gaulle come to mind). Berlusconi comes
to mind as a 'successful' politician and businessman, but then Italy does
seem to be an outlier in some respects.
One key difference I think between 'good' politicians and 'good' businesspeople
is in making decisions. Good businesspeople are decisive. Good politicians
never make a decision until they absolutely have to.
This is clearly a consequence of 'The government is like a household'
misinformation campaign, which I think is really conceptualized as 'government
is like a small business.' So why not get a businessman to run the thing?
Interesting point. It also comes out of 30+ years of demonization of
government as being less well run than business, when IMHO the problems
of government are 1. the result of scale (think of how well run GM and Citigroup
were in the mid 200s…and both are better now that they have downsized and
shaped up) and 2. inevitable given that you do not want government employees
making stuff as they go, i.e., overruling the legislature and courts. The
latter point is that some rigidity is part of how government works, and
it's necessary to protect citizens.
Adam Smith on the businessmen you shouldn't trust:
"The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes
from this order ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and
ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined,
not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention.
It comes from an order of men whose interest is never exactly the same with
that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to
oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both
deceived and oppressed it."
What they knew in the 18th century, we have forgotten today, but nothing
has changed.
Neoclassical economics hid the work of the Classical Economists and the
difference between "earned" and "unearned" income.
Once you hide this it is easy to make it look as though the interests
of business and the wealthy are the same.
We lowered taxes on the wealthy to remove free and subsidised services
for those at the bottom. These costs now have to be covered by business through wages. All known and thoroughly studied in the 18th and 19th Centuries, they
even came up with solutions.
There should not really be any tax on "earned" income, all tax should
fall on "unearned" income to subside the productive side of the economy
with low cost housing and services.
This allows lower wages and an internationally competitive economy.
Adam Smith:
"The Labour and time of the poor is in civilised countries sacrificed
to the maintaining of the rich in ease and luxury. The Landlord is maintained
in idleness and luxury by the labour of his tenants. The moneyed man is
supported by his extractions from the industrious merchant and the needy
who are obliged to support him in ease by a return for the use of his money.
But every savage has the full fruits of his own labours; there are no landlords,
no usurers and no tax gatherers."
Adam Smith saw landlords, usurers (bankers) and Government taxes as equally
parasitic, all raising the cost of doing business.
He sees the lazy people at the top living off "unearned" income from
their land and capital.
He sees the trickle up of Capitalism:
1) Those with excess capital collect rent and interest.
2) Those with insufficient capital pay rent and interest.
He differentiates between "earned" and "unearned" income.
The UK dream is to emulate the idle, rich rentier with a BTL portfolio,
living off "unearned" income extracted from the "earned" income of generation
rent, whilst doing as little as possible and enjoying a life of luxury and
leisure.
"…who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public,
and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed
it." Adam Smith just described the modern Republican Party and movement Conservatives.
We have seen left wing revolutions before; we are now dealing with a
right wing revolution.
Left wing revolutions usually involve much violence and eventually lead
to tyranny, as any means are deemed acceptable to implement the one true
solution and the new ideology. Pol Pot was the most extreme example where
he decided to return to year zero by wiping out the bourgeoisie in Cambodia.
When the dust has settled the revolution just leads to a new elite who maintain
their ideology with force and brutality.
When Francis Fukuyama talked of the end of history, a new year zero was
envisaged, this one based on a right wing ideology. A right wing revolution
that could take place globally and was not confined to individual nations
like left wing revolutions.
Its theories had already been tested in South America and Indonesia where
extreme brutality was employed to implement their one true solution and
the new ideology. The children of the US elite were the storm troopers of
this ideology and they headed out from their elite US universities to bring
this new ideology to developing nations.
"The Chicago Boys" headed out from
the University of Chicago to bring the new way to South American nations
and "The Berkley Mafia" headed out from the University of Berkeley, California
to bring the new way to Indonesia.
Any means were deemed acceptable to implement the one true solution and
the new ideology, e.g. torture, terror, death squads, snatching people off
the streets and making them disappear permanently. Any left wing resistance
had to be quashed by whatever means necessary.
Their revolutions always massively increased inequality, a few at the
top became fabulously wealthy and extreme and widespread poverty became
prevalent at the bottom. Mixing with the people at the top, the elite US
storm troopers deemed their revolutions a huge success. This ideology was
ready to roll out across the world.
Under this new ideology, the UK dream is to emulate the idle, rich rentier
with a BTL portfolio, living off "unearned" income extracted from the "earned"
income of generation rent, whilst doing as little as possible and enjoying
a life of luxury and leisure.
Obfuscating the relationship between free markets and the role of government
is coming to an end. So much failure and misdirection cannot hide forever.
The cognitive dissonance set up in society is unsustainable- people don't
like to feel or experience crazy.
Markets are stronger and healthier when backed by functioning government.
Defining what good government is and demanding it is required today. That
is the revolutionary force, finally turning back the negative campaign against
government and demanding good government- fighting for it.
Fighting fraud and corruption follows these same lines. Reading about
the various forms of fraud and corruption here at NC daily provides the
framework to address the problem. The real work begins convincing fellow
citizens to not accept the criminality- the new normal. It is sometimes
distressing seeing the reaction of fellow citizens to these crimes not as
outrage, but more along the lines of begrudging admiration for the criminals.
The subtile conditioning of the population to accept criminality needs a
countervailing force.
Modern mass media projects a false picture of the world. The meme they
push is that violence and corruption are so pervasive in the world, vast
resources must be expended addressing the problem, and when these efforts
fail, settle for apathy and avoidance. The creation of the Businessman/Politician
is the perfect vehicle to move this agenda forward.
Politics controlling and driving business decisions must be reestablished,
not the other way around- business driving politics and society. That truly
is the distinction between authoritarianism and democracy. Small authoritarians
are tolerable in society- large ones not so much.
Bang on. Especially being a political leader in a democracy is too tough
and I am surprised that people want the job given the landmine they have
to navigate and the compromises you have to make on a daily basis. Similarity
is closest when you compare a benevolent dictator and a successful businessman,
something like how Lee Kuan Yew ran Singapore.
"Enoch Powell…once remarked that all political lives end in failure.
It is also true of most business leaders." But that is also what they say
about love. No good end can come of it.
There is a mistaken assumption here that business people are responsible
for their own or their organization's success. Or even that they're qualified
as business people. The higher up the business ladder you go, the more it
is other people making the important decisions, even deciding what you think,
do and say.
In this way it's similar to politics. It's likely that neither the successful
business person nor the politician is qualified for their roles, that nobody
can be. Also their roles are essentially to be authorities, and likewise
nobody is truly qualified nor has the justification or legitimacy for authority.
This bit of convenient fiction caught my eye: "Political leaders must also manage for the entire population rather
than the narrow interest of investors."
Perhaps political leaders should do this but, as has been recently shown,
there is no basis in reality that this is any kind of requirement (as in
"must").
Perhaps his use of "must" in this case is talking about the intrinsic
requirement. In other words, even if they are managing negatively for some
and positively for others, they are managing for all.
This term "Normalized Deviance" reminds me Dixon's study of military
incompetence which deepened the traditional observation that peacetime armies and
wartime armies prefer (and promote) very different types of officers. Actually it
is sycophants and "yes men" who are promoted at peace time, especially "kiss up,
kick down" type.
They gradually pervert the organization and when war strikes commit blunders.
The same process occurs within three letter agencies, which degenerate into
propaganda arms of White House. Some observers claim that this process started at
full force in CIA under Bush I and State Department under Clinton.
"... As for Michael Morell, as with many other successful CIA careerists, his strongest suit seemed to be pleasing his boss and not antagonizing the White House. If past is precedent, his loyalty will be to Petraeus, not necessarily to the truth. ..."
"... Wall Street Journal ..."
"... At the Center of the Storm, ..."
"... President's Daily Brief ..."
"... Wall Street Journal ..."
"... Wall Street Journal ..."
"... apologia pro vita sua ..."
"... Washington Post ..."
"... The first is from a recently retired Senior Intelligence Service officer. ..."
"... The second comment (on the remarks above) is from Larry C Johnson, former CIA intelligence officer. ..."
"... Comment from Mary McCarthy, former Senior Intelligence Service officer and White House official. ..."
"... A schizophrenic 'Team B' element was infiltrated into the original integrity of the CIA, (billed as 'Team A'), as and soon after Bush served as Director, 1976. He is, after all, who made the CIA what it is today, who presided at the ceremony of the cornerstone for the (second) Headquarters Building and so recognized by namesake on the bronze plaque by the front door. ..."
"... The corroborating correlation I most notice is that nine-eleven is the commemorative founding date of the CIA, 1947. ..."
Exclusive:
The gross manipulation of CIA analysis under George W. Bush pushed
a new generation of "yes men" into the agency's top ranks. Now one of those aspiring bureaucrats
will be Gen. David Petraeus's right-hand man, writes ex-CIA analyst Ray McGovern. (Also, at end of
article, see special comments from several CIA insiders.)
As Gen. David Petraeus prepares to take the helm at CIA in September, he can expect unswerving
loyalty from his likely deputy, Michael Morell, who has been acting director since July when Leon
Panetta left to become Secretary of Defense.
Like many senior CIA officials in recent years, Morell's record is checkered, at best. He held
key jobs in intelligence analysis over the past decade as the CIA often served as a handmaiden to
the war propagandists.
As for Michael Morell, as with many other successful CIA careerists, his strongest suit seemed
to be pleasing his boss and not antagonizing the White House. If past is precedent, his loyalty will
be to Petraeus, not necessarily to the truth.
Forgive me if my thinking about loyalty to the facts seems "obsolete" or "quaint" or
if it seems unfair to expect CIA analysts to put their careers on the line when politicians and ideologues
are misleading the nation to war but those were the principles that analysts of my generation tried
to uphold.
The recent tendency at CIA to give politicians what they want to hear rather than the
hard truth is not healthy for the Republic that we were all sworn to serve.
And, if Petraeus's own past is precedent, loyalty to the four-star general will not always
be synonymous with loyalty to the truth.
Burnishing an Image
However, you will get no indication of this troubling reality from the flattering, but thin, feature
about Michael Morell, "Mr. Insider Will Guide Petraeus at the CIA," by Siobhan Gorman in the
Wall Street Journal
on Aug. 26.
Gorman is normally a solid reporter; but either she did not perform due diligence and let herself
be snookered, or her editors stepped in to ensure her story was consonant with the image Petraeus
and the Establishment wish to create for Morell.
Before her "rare" interview with Morell, Gorman should have taken a close look at former CIA Director
George Tenet's memoir,
At the Center of the Storm,
to learn what Tenet says about Morell's
record during the last decade's dark days of misleading and dishonest intelligence.
In Tenet's personal account of the CIA's failures around 9/11 and the Iraq War, Morell Tenet's
former executive assistant is generally treated kindly, but Tenet puts Morell at the center of two
key fiascoes: he "coordinated the CIA review" of Secretary of State Colin Powell's infamous Feb.
5, 2003 address to the United Nations and he served as the regular CIA briefer to President George
W. Bush.
Putting Access Before Honesty
So, Morell was there as Bush blew off early CIA warnings about the possibility of al-Qaeda leader
Osama bin Laden being "determined to strike in the US" and while Bush and his neoconservative inner
circle were concocting intelligence to justify invading Iraq.
Tenet credits Morell with suggesting to analysts that they prepare a report on the terrorist threat,
which became the
President's Daily Brief
that was handed to Bush on Aug. 6, 2001, at his
ranch in Crawford, Texas. Bush brushed aside the warning with a reported comment to the CIA briefer,
"all right, you've covered your ass," and went off fishing.
Though Tenet said Morell got along well with Bush, it appears the President didn't pay much heed
to any CIA information coming from Morell, at least not anything that went against what Bush wanted
to hear nor did Morell seem to risk offending the President by pushing these contrary points.
After the Aug. 6
PDB
was delivered, Tenet wrote that he needed to follow it up, and did
so with a trip to Crawford 11 days later, when Tenet remembers Bush driving him around in a pickup
truck as Tenet made "small talk about the flora and fauna."
Morell also was the CIA briefer with Bush in Florida on the morning of 9/11 when news arrived
about the attacks on New York City's Twin Towers. Later, Bush told Morell "that if we [the CIA] learned
anything definitive about the attack, he wanted to be the first to know," Tenet wrote, adding:
"Wiry, youthful looking, and extremely bright, Mike speaks in staccato-like bursts that get to
the bottom line very quickly. He and George Bush had hit it off almost immediately. In a crisis like
this, Mike was the perfect guy for us to have by the commander-in-chief's side."
However, it appears Morell was not willing to risk his rapport with Bush by challenging the President's
desire to pivot from retaliatory strikes against Afghanistan to a full-scale invasion of Iraq based
on false and misleading intelligence.
Tenet also described Morell's role in organizing the review of the "intelligence" that went into
Powell's speech, which let slip the dogs of war by presenting a thoroughly deceptive account of the
Iraqi threat, what Powell later called a "blot" on his record.
Though the CIA embraced many of Powell's misleading assertions, Tenet recounted one exchange in
which Morell stood up to John Hannah, an aide to Vice President Dick Cheney, regarding Iraq's alleged
efforts to obtain yellowcake uranium from Niger.
"Hannah asked Mike Morell, who was coordinating the review of the speech for CIA, why the Niger
uranium story wasn't in the latest draft," Tenet wrote. "'Because we don't believe it,' Mike told
him. 'I thought you did,' Hannah said. After much wrangling and precious time lost in explaining
our doubts, Hannah understood why we believed it was inappropriate for Colin to use the Niger material
in his speech."
Despite that one pushback, the CIA analysts mostly bent to pressures coming from the White House
for an alarmist treatment of allegations about the "weapons of mass destruction," which turned out
not to be in Iraq.
Of the CIA's finished intelligence product, it was reportedly the
PDB
delivered by Morell
that most exaggerated the danger.
Not Mistaken, Dishonest
It is sad to have to recall that this was not "erroneous," but rather fraudulent intelligence.
Announcing on June 5, 2008, the bipartisan conclusions from a five-year study by the Senate Intelligence
Committee, Sen. Jay Rockefeller described the intelligence conjured up to "justify" war on Iraq as
"uncorroborated, contradicted, or even non-existent."
Rockefeller's comments call to mind what Tenet told his British counterpart, Sir Richard Dearlove,
on July 20, 2002, after former Prime Minister Tony Blair sent Dearlove to the CIA to get the latest
scoop on how the U.S. planned to "justify" the attack on Iraq.
According to the official British minutes of a cabinet-level planning session chaired by Blair
on July 23, 2002, at 10 Downing Street, Tenet made clear to Dearlove that "the intelligence and facts
were being fixed around the policy" to bring "regime change" to Iraq.
Could it be that Tenet would let the British in on this dirty little secret and keep George W.
Bush's personal briefer, Michael Morell, in the dark? Seems unlikely.
But even if Morell were not fully informed about the high-level scheme for war, would he have
been with his prized relationship with the President the most appropriate senior official to "coordinate
the CIA review" of Powell's speech?
The 'Sinister Nexus'
In the
Wall Street Journal
feature, reporter Gorman was assured of something else about
Morell's role in preparing the intelligence on Iraq. According to Gorman, "His [Morell's] team didn't
handle the analysis that erroneously concluded the Iraqi government had weapons of mass destruction."
I guess that depends on your definition of "team."
But what about alleged ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda, the second bogus issue used to "justify"
attacking Iraq? There Morell seemed to be on better ground, telling Gorman that his "team" had concluded
that there had been earlier contacts between Iraqi intelligence and al-Qaeda, but there were no links
to al-Qaeda operations at the time.
Still, Morell didn't seem to have pressed this point very hard while coordinating the CIA's review
of Powell's UN speech. If Morell had, one has to wonder why Powell was fed, and swallowed, the line
about a "sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network?"
ABC's Brian Ross shot down that canard just hours after Powell spoke. Citing a BBC report from
London, Ross noted that British intelligence had concluded there was no evidence to support the theory
that al-Qaeda and Iraq were working together.
Virtually all intelligence analysts with no axes to grind, after sifting through thousands of
reports, had long since come to that same conclusion.
Tenet and McLaughlin were also co-liars-in-chief regarding those mobile biological weapons factories,
a yarn spun by the infamous source called "Curveball." In his memoir, Tenet doesn't describe Morell's
role in promoting, or at least acquiescing in depicting, the charlatan "Curveball" as a reliable
intelligence source for a key portion of Powell's speech.
And, if you think it's unfair to expect CIA bureaucrats to risk their careers by challenging the
political desires of the White House, it's worth noting the one major exception to the CIA's
sorry record during George W. Bush's presidency and how honest CIA analysts helped prevent another
unnecessary war.
After former chief of State Department intelligence Tom Fingar was put in charge of National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs), a thoroughly professional NIE in late 2007 concluded unanimously and "with high
confidence" that Iran had stopped working on a nuclear weapon in mid-2003.
President Bush's own memoir leaves no doubt that this Estimate played a huge role in spiking White
House plans for war on Iran. It's a pity that the Estimate on Iran should be an exception to the
rule.
Much to Be Humble About
Yet, in the
Wall Street Journal
feature, Michael Morell lectures Gorman on the basics
and the limits of intelligence analysis.
"We end up having bits of information that have a multitude of possible explanations," said Morell.
"You've got to be really humble about the business we're in."
Well, yes indeed. The WSJ also ran a sidebar with a list of the following CIA failures and Morell's
facile potions for cures:
–2001, Sept. 11 attacks: A failure of both intelligence collection and analysis. Lesson: A need
to better penetrate U.S. adversaries.
–2003, Iraq weapons of mass destruction: Analysts erroneously concluded Iraq had WMDs. Lesson:
Analysts must describe confidence levels in conclusions, consider alternate explanations.
–2009, Bombing of CIA base in Khost, Afghanistan: Doubts about the asset-turned-suicide-bomber
didn't get to the right people. Lesson: Share information with the people who most need it.
–The WMD not in Iraq? How about promoting and rewarding honest analysts; no "fixing" allowed.
Face down White House pressure. We used to do it all the time. We used to have career protection
for doing it.
–On the tragedy at Khost? Well, how about some basic training in tradecraft, including rudimentary
security precautions.
And speaking of rudimentary security precautions: Morell bragged to Gorman that he had recently
flown to Kabul to brief Petraeus, carrying a blue briefing book emblazoned with the CIA seal and
detailing the CIA's every critical program, organization and operation.
"It was the most highly classified guide that I've ever seen in my life" was Petraeus's wow-response.
The appropriate reaction, in my professional view, would have been to fire Morell on the spot
for recklessness. He should know better. They down aircraft, blow up motorcades and shoot people
in Afghanistan, you know. Is it really such a great idea to carry a briefing book with the CIA's
most sensitive secrets into that environment?
Moreover, bragging about this cavalier approach to protecting sensitive documents sends shivers
down the backs of foreign intelligence officers, adding to their reluctance to share delicate information
with us.
Loosening Leashes on Dogs of War
There is ironic serendipity in the fact that the
WSJ
feature on Morell appeared on Aug.
26, exactly nine years after the fraudulent speech given by Vice President Dick Cheney before the
Veterans of Foreign Wars in Nashville.
And just four days before the nation's bookstores host
In My Time
, Cheney's
apologia
pro vita sua
. (The advance promotion includes his personal warning that the book will have "heads
exploding" all over Washington.)
There are huge lessons in what happened and what did not happen immediately after Cheney's Aug.
26, 2002, thinly disguised call for an attack on Iraq, and how those who recognized the lies could
not summon enough courage to try to stop the juggernaut toward war.
The Fawning Corporate Media and the cowering careerists at CIA were among the main culprits. But
there were others who, if they have a conscience and are honest with themselves, may still be finding
it difficult to look in the mirror nine years later.
In his August 2002 speech, Cheney launched the virulent propaganda campaign for an aggressive
war against Iraq, telling the audience in Nashville:
"Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There
is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us."
This was no innocent mistake by the Vice President; it was a bald-faced lie, a falsehood that
opened the gates to a hellish conflict that has ripped apart Iraq, bringing untold death and destruction.
Nine years later it is well worth recalling this lie on behalf of the 4,500 U.S. troops killed
in Iraq, the many more wounded, the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis killed, and the five million
displaced from their homes.
Let it be widely understood that on Aug. 26, 2002, Dick Cheney set the meretricious terms of reference
for war.
Hear No Evil, Speak No Truth
Sitting on the same stage that evening was former CENTCOM commander Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni,
who was being honored at the VFW convention. Zinni later said he was shocked to hear Cheney's depiction
of intelligence (Iraq has WMD and is amassing them to use against us) that did not square with what
he knew.
Although Zinni had retired two years before, his role as consultant had enabled him to stay up
to date on key intelligence findings.
"There was no solid proof that Saddam had WMD. … I heard a case being made to go to war," Zinni
told
Meet the Press
three and a half years later
.
Zinni is normally a straight shooter with a good bit of courage. And so, the question lingers:
why did he not go public when he first heard Cheney's lie?
What seems operative here, I fear, is an all-too-familiar conundrum at senior levels where people
have been conditioned not to rock the boat, not to risk their standing within the Washington Establishment.
Almost always, the results are bad. I would bet a tidy sum that Zinni regrets having let his reaction
be shaped, as it apparently was, by a misguided kind of professional courtesy and/or slavish adherence
to classification restrictions.
After all, he was one of the very few credible senior officials who might have prevented a war
of aggression, which the Nuremberg Tribunals after World War II branded the "supreme international
crime."
Zinni was not the only one taken aback by Cheney's words. Then-CIA Director George Tenet said
Cheney's speech took him completely by surprise.
In his memoir, Tenet wrote, "I had the impression that the president wasn't any more aware than
we were of what his number-two was going to say to the VFW until he said it." But like Br'er Fox,
Tenet didn't say nothing.
Tenet claims he didn't even check it all out with either Cheney or Bush after Cheney's speech.
Yet, could Cheney's twisting of the data not have been anticipated? Indeed, weren't Tenet and his
CIA in on the determination to make a case for war?
In a way, that conclusion is a no-brainer. As mentioned above, just five weeks before Cheney's
speech, Tenet himself had explained to his British counterpart that the President had decided to
make war on Iraq for regime change and "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."
Cheney simply was unveiling the war rationale to the public. Several weeks later, when Senate
Intelligence Committee Chair Bob Graham insisted on a National Intelligence Estimate before any vote
in Congress, Tenet told his folks to prepare one that dovetailed with Cheney's unsupported rhetoric.
Sadly, my former colleagues did. And where was Michael Morell in this process? Clearly, he did
nothing to destroy his career or put himself too much on the outs at the White House.
The Sales Job
When Bush's senior advisers came back to town after Labor Day 2002, the next five weeks were devoted
to selling the war, a major "new product" that, as then-White House chief of staff Andy Card explained,
one shouldn't introduce in the month of August.
Card, too, apparently had no idea that Cheney would jump the gun as "fixer-in-chief." At that
point, the Tenets, McLaughlins and Morells of this world fell right into line.
After assuring themselves that Tenet was a reliable salesman, Cheney and then-Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld allowed him to play a supporting role in advertising bogus claims about aluminum
tubes for uranium enrichment and mobile trailers for manufacturing biological warfare agents.
The hyped and bogus intelligence succeeded in scaring Congress into voting for war on Oct. 10
and 11, 2002.
In my view, it strains credulity to think that Michael Morell was unaware of the fraudulent nature
of this campaign. Yet, like all too many others, he mostly kept quiet, and he got promoted. That's
how it works in Washington these days.
This kind of malleability regarding twisting facts to support war has worked well for Petraeus,
too.
Today, there is little chance Petraeus can be unaware of Morell's pedigree. Given Petraeus's own
experience in climbing the career ladder, the general may even harbor an admiration for Morell's
extraordinary willingness to please.
The two will make a fine pair for Official Washington, though not for those "quaint" folks who
put a high premium on integrity.
As for Dick Cheney who was once given the well-deserved sobriquet "Vice President for Torture"
in a
Washington Post
editorial, I just wish he would disappear so he would stop bringing
out the worst in everyone.
I found my own feelings mirrored in a plaintive comment from a good friend who prays a lot. She
said, "I keep praying for Dick Cheney, especially when he goes into the hospital. But he always
comes out again."
Ray McGovern works with Tell the Word, a publishing arm of the ecumenical Church of the
Saviour in inner-city Washington. He was a
PDB
briefer of Vice President George H.W. Bush
and the Secretaries of State and Defense during President Ronald Reagan's first term, and earlier
in his career chaired National Intelligence Estimates. He serves on the Steering Group of Veteran
Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS)
.
Note: I sent a draft of the above article to former colleagues, intelligence officers who served
in CIA more recently than I and left after clocking many years at very senior levels. The comments
I received from them turned out to be so germane and incisive that I include them below for those
wanting a better feel for what really goes on.
The first is from a recently retired Senior Intelligence Service officer.
Ray:
You make a good case that Morell isn't going to be the objective, unpoliticized deputy that Petraeus
is going to need. He may be what Petraeus wants, but not what he needs to do a good job.
You make the case that, like McLaughlin, he's going to give the veneer of an analyst's integrity
to decision making without any of the burdens (integrity, nonpoliticization, tradecraft, etc.) that
make the analyst imprimatur meaningful. Like McLaughlin, he seems eager to play handmaiden to a predetermined
agenda.
In fact, the case you make, correctly, is that Morell is the quintessential intelligence community
bureaucrat who has survived and prospered by subscribing to a particular worldview and steering clear
of the alternatives declared off-limits by the U.S. right wing.
A couple of more specific comments:
–Your use of the word "loyalty": Morell will be loyal to his boss i.e., he will not upset him
the way McLaughlin was loyal to Tenet. That ignores, of course, that the deputy's job is to protect
his boss from himself and from his own biases.
McLaughlin's "loyalty" to Tenet wound up screwing Tenet, and Morell's "loyalty" to Petraeus is
going to do the same. A man like Petraeus shows up with HUGE blind spots, and Morell rather than
help him see into those blind spots almost certainly will reinforce them.
Your use of the word "loyalty" conveys that it's a virus that will harm Petraeus. And that's what
it is.
The "winds blowing from the White House" requires a little elaboration. Just as Panetta was captured,
so has this White House been via the person of CIA veteran John Brennan on site. Brennan, of course,
is the fellow who could not get confirmed as director because of his well known past history, so
he's running things from the White House.
I personally would say Morell, like McLaughlin, knows and accepts that the operations people and
their rightwing allies in the Admin, at the Pentagon, and in the Congress (and there are many!) set
the direction the wind blows; Morell will always urge his boss to tack accordingly.
In fact, the parallels with McLaughlin are strong, an analysis directorate fellow of modest capabilities,
desperate for acceptance by the operations people and the rightwing downtown, jettisoning tradecraft
and going with the flow.
The Gorman piece in the
WSJ
was disgraceful cooptation in action. The fact that she could
list his many failures as "lessons learned" was amazing. It's as if the rightwing were signaling
to Petreaus not to judge Morell by his repeated failures and repeated inaction; judge him by our
right-wing love for him.
On the many failures, I don't have first-hand knowledge of Morell's role in the historic intelligence
cook-job of WMD and the fateful State of the Union lies about yellow cake; all I know is that Alan
Foley was the designated representative in that coordination.
But your sourcing of Tenet on that is compelling, and I think your sanity-check on Morell's performance
is fair.
–Words like "wow-response" are also fair, and effective. The "wow" factor is used to shock
and awe people to squeeze them into the tiny space in which conformity is expected and challenges
rejected.
For me, particularly with a weak Administration with no policy bearings like this one, the problem
is that operations are done for operations' sake sans policy, sans review.
I'm reading Joby Warrick's book, and his worship of targeters is somewhat jarring when there's
no discussion of the number of innocent people killed and no discussion of why this is an "intelligence"
vice military mission. We know why, but his readers don't making such worship rather cynical.
You're probably right that it "strains credulity" that Morell didn't know how fraudulent the whole
National Intelligence Estimate on WMD in Iraq was. I just don't know, however, whether he was able
intellectually to see what was going on.
He was so close to power and so close to their mindset and so eager to stay in their good graces
that he may have believed all the horse manure.
Wrapped up as he was, he may not have fully appreciated the thing was especially because key elements
of the intelligence community funneling info to him were also true-believers, as were those in charge
of community analysis.
Who could ever have been giving Morell an alternative view? The most senior people were all true-believers.
It was very much frowned upon to ask real questions.
So how could a man of Morell's background and capabilities ask them? If you preferred not to say
outright that Morell was guilty of fraud, you could be somewhat more charitable and put it this way:
He was surrounded by true-believers and didn't have the fortitude or candlepower, or even perceived
space, to question the bogus intelligence he was involved in validating.
Not a good harbinger for the future.
The second comment (on the remarks above) is from Larry C Johnson, former CIA intelligence
officer.
Your observations provide important context. The lies that paved the road to war in Iraq are being
revived this week as part of the 10-year anniversary of 9/11.
We have not learned a damned thing. Meanwhile, Iraq remains a deadly place for the various Iraq
factions and our actions have completely disrupted the balance of power in the Middle East. Of course,
neither the media nor the majority of the pundits want to focus on that.
And a brief but important point made by first commenter in reaction:
And cranking up for Iran?
Comment from Mary McCarthy, former Senior Intelligence Service officer and White House official.
You asked if I knew Morell and what he is like. I do; you nailed it.
The only moment of discomfort is when you use Tenet as a compass point for the actual truth. Because,
of course, Tenet often has his own version of the facts.
Nancy Abler,
August 29, 2011 at 11:08 am
My comment is actually a question. What political person or group was most instrumental in
changing the inherent integrity of the CIA to a politically obeisant CIA? And when?
J. C. Murphy
August 29, 2011 at 5:51 pm
There is a daily compilation of news articles that appears on one of the
DoD websites. I won't mention the name, but many of you are probably
familiar with it. It's not classified information. I am a
“non-combatant”, but I view it my duty to know what is actually going
on. When you wear the 'chicken', that's kind of obligatory. Since I kind
of assume that it's a “cooked” reading list, I check it out every day
at lunch-time. Then, I go home in the evening and read what they say
about the same stories on Alternet, TruthOut, TruthDig, CrooksandLiars,
TheDailyBail, WhatReallyHappened, TheRealNews, etc.
When I read Gorman's article, I almost fell out of my chair.
Especially the part about the “Blue Book”, a hard copy of every
significant intelligence initiative we have. And I swear to God, the
first thing that went through my mind was, “I can't wait to hear what
Ray McGovern has to say about this”. I hope that blue book had a close
encounter with the nearest 'industrial strength' shredder. Better yet,
the biohazardous waste incinerator at the nearest U.S. Military health
facility.
Ray, you're the best. Godspeed-
Ethan Allen
August 29, 2011 at 6:31 pm
Though I have taken issue with Mr. McGovern on several occasions, this
take on the professional veracity of Michael Morell reflects an improved
awareness of honest candor and informed opinion. The concurrence of Mary
McCarthy and "the retired Senior Intelligence Officer" mentioned are
reassuring endorsements.
I found this excerpt to be a particularly interesting observation:
"Almost always, the results are bad. I would bet a tidy sum that Zinni
regrets having let his reaction be shaped, as it apparently was, by a
misguided kind of professional courtesy and/or slavish adherence to
classification restrictions."
It is this very "..slavish adherence to classification restrictions."
that seems to continue to plague many of those who continue to be paid,
even in ostensible retirement, with public largess; but none-the-less
hold such nefarious pledges to secrecy in higher regard than their oath
to the Constitution and the people it is designed to support and protect.
Meremark
August 29, 2011 at 7:47 pm
–
Ray, good man, my two senses:
Saying, "The hyped and bogus intelligence
[
foisted by media-mania in 'only' 5 weeks after Labor Day, 2002
]
succeeded in scaring Congress into voting for war on Oct. 10 and 11,
2002," does shortchange, bypass, and omit quite a bunch of conducts of
equal or more importance (than 'hype and bogosity') that SCARED Congress
to fear, panic, and comply at being commanded
orders
to
self-destructively rubberstamp plans prepared for military invasion of
Iraq.
On first reading I mistook the year and thought the statement said
'between Labor Day and mid-October 2001' falsified intelligence scared
Congress to make blind endorsement (of the PATRIOT Act) for Bush Admin
'throw-weight' - which truly happened then, (false claims fooled
Congress), but such a brief description (as I misread it) applied to
those dates in 2001, the year before, would be ignoring the scaring (and
scarring) effect of the anthrax letters mailed to Congress.
Anyway, it is all of-a-piece according to my estimation. Bush losing
(to Clinton) in 1992 begat (Bush's) vendetta viciousness which begat a
militaristic making of foreign policy which begat (Bush conceiving and
appointing) a panel the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) to hop
on a hype of Defense Quadrennial Review which begat a seeded "new Pearl
Harbor" bearing for compartmentalized planners to steer toward in unison,
and in parallel, which begat installing proxy Bush Junior as 'cover'
misdirection overshadowing surreptitious operations which begat the
inside-job obtaining in nine-eleven op which begat paralytic
mortification of Congress which begat Patriot Act passage which begat
destabilizing and off-balancing Middle East incusions which begat
stovepipes (of 'war reporters') for massmedia distribution of the hype
and bogosity scheduled to come "after August", 2002, which begat
Executive war-crimes powers rubberstamped by Congress which begat oil
confiscation from devastating Iraq and decapitating the House of Hussein
… "to get him back," vengefully, "to finish the job" (and incidentally
silence a partner confided privy in years-earlier crimes against
humanity). (
Three men can keep a secret, if two are dead
– Ben
Franklin) In result: rule the world and control all its petroleum. or the
other way 'round.
If any segment of that plan in operation, 1993-2003, had failed then
EVERYthing planned to follow on from the juncture (of the failure) would
have NONE of it have happened. Most critically, if Junior had not been
made Cover-Up Controller (POTUS) then nine-eleven op would not have
happened. (Or if nine-eleven op had failed or been exposed truly, then
taking over Iraq (oil production) would not have happened.
Overall, my first comment is to the point that Congress's going along
(obedience) for ceding war-power Authority, by its Oct. 2002 demented
actions, was a longer psychological breaking-down procedure than only a
6-week public relations saturation-campaign of 'bad intelligence.'
My second point is to crack your optimistic rose-colored glasses, Ray,
through which you see the institution (of a 'secret' intelligence
community, namely the CIA) as an intrinsic 'good' or good 'thing'
permanently, and, transiently, the human-natured agents of the
institution as individually good or bad cases, assets, apples … and if
all the bad apples were taken or kept out of the institutional barrel,
the provided fruits of such a cultivated institution would be good
(natured) without doubt. I claim that the Tenets and McLaughlins and
Morells and all the 'bad' apple-shining agents you may care to name, if
they were to be cast out and departed from the intelligence community,
what remained - in its very precept and principles, its conceived
raison d'etre
- was and evermore is inHERently 'bad' or a 'bad' thing
… malevolent, malignant, a malady, undemocratic, anti-American.
Not only is the institution of the CIA with its elite secrets and
secret elites unjustified, true Justice should would and could (obviate),
sanction, and sentence condemnation on its immoral purpose, motives, and
practice. I kinda got this view (I share) of 'it' (discounting ordinary
citizens' sensibility as unable to handle the truths of a certain
privileged
secret
illicit and irrighteous 'license-to-kill') from
Harry Truman; (versus Allen Dulles).
Put
all
surveillance apertures, including orbiting-satellite
views, including visual and every spectrum scanned, on the internet … as
public money provides. Thus, then, all the malevolent agents and reagents
in the world are objectively the
seen
, not the
subjectively-serving
seers
.
Ray, you can't make supremacism right in the CIA and USG by removing
its wrongs in a process of elimination to reach its core value. You can't
domesticate an antisocial tiger by changing or cleansing its stripes.
One small note to end on for your consideration, Ray, regarding your
uncertainty whether the President is riding the tiger or the tiger is
riding the President, ("… Obama flip-flops on intelligence issues ???").
Consider the findings of investigation into Obama's biographic lineage,
childhood, formative rearing, and deliverance achieved. Evidence
(strongly and strangely suppressed) appears for conviction that he is but
one specimen (the most prominent) of the MK-ULTRA human(life)
experimentation, 1951-2011, making and made a (Legendary) 'manchurian
candidate.' Made in USA branded brain.
Evidenced in the original, although behind a subscription-required
paywall yet soon a published book, appears here:
http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/
A schizophrenic 'Team B' element was infiltrated into the original
integrity of the CIA, (billed as 'Team A'), as and soon after Bush served
as Director, 1976. He is, after all, who made the CIA what it is today,
who presided at the ceremony of the cornerstone for the (second)
Headquarters Building and so recognized by namesake on the bronze plaque
by the front door.
The corroborating correlation I most notice is that nine-eleven is
the commemorative founding date of the CIA, 1947.
"... "Most of my colleagues are dishonest career politicians who revel in the power and special-interest money that's lavished upon them." ..."
"... "My main job is to keep my job, to get reelected. It takes precedence over everything." ..."
"... "Fundraising is so time consuming I seldom read any bills I vote on. Like many of my colleagues, I don't know how the legislation will be implemented, or what it'll cost." ..."
"... " Voters are incredibly ignorant and know little about our form of government and how it works." ..."
"... "It's far easier than you think to manipulate a nation of naive, self-absorbed sheep who crave instant gratification." ..."
"... "We spend money we don't have and blithely mortgage the future with a wink and a nod. Screw the next generation." ..."
"... Best line in the God Father. "Their Saps, They fight for other people". Sounds like pop talking. God damn right that's Pop talking. Come here you. ..."
"... The only function of a bureaucracy is to perpetuate the bureaucracy. ..."
"... Trump is getting so much attention because the citizenry doesn't know how the govt was designed to work, and is looking for a "leader" to fix things up. ..."
"... The power lies in Congress, by design, appropriately so, as it most closely represents the will of the People. And therein lies the eleventh-hour problem. ..."
"... This book will be exposed as a hoax. It is doubtless a compilation of quotes from multiple Congrees-critters over the years. I doubt any of these assholes would risk exposure in this manner. They don't have the guts. ..."
A shockingly frank new book from an anonymous
Democratic congressman turns yet another set of conspiracy theories into consirpacy
facts as he spills the beans on the ugly reality behind the scenes in Washington. While little will
surprise any regular readers, the selected quotes offered by
"The Confessions Of Congressman X" book cover sheet read like they were ripped from
the script of House of Cards... and yet are oh so believable...
A devastating inside look at the dark side of Congress as revealed by one of its own!
No wonder Congressman X wants to remain anonymous for fear of retribution. His admissions
are deeply disturbing...
"Most of my colleagues are dishonest career politicians who revel in the power and special-interest
money that's lavished upon them."
"My main job is to keep my job, to get reelected. It takes precedence over everything."
"Fundraising is so time consuming I seldom read any bills I vote on. Like many of my colleagues,
I don't know how the legislation will be implemented, or what it'll cost."
The book also takes shots at voters as disconnected idiots who let Congress abuse its power through
sheer incompetence...
" Voters are incredibly ignorant and know little about our form of government and how it
works."
"It's far easier than you think to manipulate a nation of naive, self-absorbed sheep who
crave instant gratification."
And,
as The Daily Mail so elqouently notes, the take-away message is one of resigned depression about
how Congress sacrifices America's future on the altar of its collective ego...
"We spend money we don't have and blithely mortgage the future with a wink and a nod. Screw
the next generation."
"It's about getting credit now, lookin' good for the upcoming election."
Simply put, it's everything that is enraging Americans about their government's dysfunction and
why Trump is getting so much attention.
The shining city on a hill is chock full of assholes like this. They've run out of other people's
money for this purpose so bad, generations to come are screwed. Unless of course they are all
stamped away and their bullshit repudiated.
Trump is getting so much attention because the citizenry doesn't know how the govt was
designed to work, and is looking for a "leader" to fix things up.
I've been pecking away for years that the attention must be on Congress. No takers here at
ZH either, for the most part.
Again... a finally corrupt and defunct Congress is what must be dealt with post haste, and
a "Trump" or any other will not be the answer to changing the trajectory.
The power lies in Congress, by design, appropriately so, as it most closely represents
the will of the People. And therein lies the eleventh-hour problem.
I've said it time and again. Just today I posted "our entire system is based on subjective
financial asset valuations to support the needs of today with no consideration of tomorrow". Politicians
and their money grubbing corporate assholes thought of future generations don't transcend beyond
their own line of sight. We do not have a government or system for the people. We have a government
who's sole purpose is to enrich themselves at the expense of everyone else. Burn the fucker down
This book will be exposed as a hoax. It is doubtless a compilation of quotes from multiple
Congrees-critters over the years. I doubt any of these assholes would risk exposure in this manner.
They don't have the guts.
I have an alternate theory of the firm, namely that large firms exist to protect
mediocrity - from the lunatics and conmen on one hand, and disruptive innovators on the other.
An entrepreneur, my former partner Jude Wanniski liked to say, is a fellow who walks into your
office wearing a propeller beanie and carrying a perpetual-motion machine convinced that he's
going to be a trillionaire. Ex ante it's hard to tell the loonies from the real thing. For every
Thomas Edison there are a hundred candidates for commitment to state mental health facilities.
Most people don't like disruption. They want to acquire a skill, work reasonable hours,
secure reasonable pay, watch television in the evening and play golf or whatever on the
weekends. They don't look deeply into the matters that concern them and are content to do what
other people in their position do. If they are diligent, reliable, well-mannered and polite,
they are just the sort of folk that the human relations types at corporations prefer. Without a
way to socialize, train and employ such people the world would come to a halt, because they make
up the vast majority. And that is the great contribution of corporations to social welfare: they
find ways to make mediocre people useful.
By training, supervising and deploying the great mediocre mass, corporations earn the trust
of consumers who are equally mediocre. Consumers want reliable and predictable products that do
not challenge their tastes, habits, and skills. Corporations spend most of their research and
development funds ascertaining these tastes and habits and designing products that conform to
them.
If they do their job properly, they prevent the supply chain from substituting anti-freeze
for corn syrup or talcum for milk power. Unfortunately, corporations also do a good job of
extirpating the sort of people who get bored with such products and attempt to do something new.
Those people often become entrepreneurs and attempt to challenge the system.
Such challenges are not always beneficial. During the 1990s, the dot.com bubble proceeded on
the unstated premise that the future of the US economy lay in downloading music and watching
pornography. Innovation chased youth culture down the wrong rabbit hole.
Corporations do not innovate well, and economies die without innovation. Disruptive
entrepreneurs destroy corporations who have done their job of cultivating mediocrity a bit too
long, and create new corporations that, in turn, will cultivate their own sort of mediocrity.
Sometimes this goes haywire, as the US financial industry did during the 2000s. Left to its
own devices, the financial industry created the sort of product that mediocre customers thought
they wanted, namely AAA-rated securities. No-one needs imagination to own AAA's. Unfortunately,
the financial engineers put the financial equivalent of anti-freeze into the corn syrup and
poisoned the financial system. In the mediocre culture of corporations, advancement is
attained by making your numbers and hoping that when a suppurating mass of toxic waste finally
explodes it will do so on someone else's watch, long after you have been promoted.
Mediocrity can under special circumstances become a Petri dish for the incubation of some
dangerous problems. The advent of financial engineering introduced a predator into the system
against which mediocrity had no natural defenses. In the financial industry, at least, the
mediocre became corrupt: millions of homeowners lied on mortgage applications, and tens of
thousands of bank employees encouraged or at least countenanced the lies, both serious crimes
under American law.
You should not assume that inefficiency of bureaucracies extends to the area when their vital
interests are breached. They will fight tooth and nail with those who they consider dangerous
for their interests.
DHS is no different than the Cheka was in Bolshevik Russia and the Stasi in Bolshevik
East Germany -- and run by the same tribe.
PlasmaBurns:
We need to start putting the constitution in every email, that way the Government will
actually start reading it...
furballbear:
Julia Davis' story is completely true and she even made a documentary about it titled Top
Priority: The Terror Within which shows that the United State's "war on terror" is a scam.
Support Julia Davis by purchasing her documentary and support the US Constitution by
demanding that the USA PATRIOT Act be repealed.
furballbear:
No the whole intent is to make money. That's why it's finally become clear to even the
average American that the 'War on Terror' is nothing more than a money grab.
Brave whistleblowers like Julia Davis and Edward Snowden need to keep speaking up so that
we can finally repeal the ridiculous USA PATRIOT Act.
Funk Obama
our very own government perpetrates many of these attacks. To make money, amend laws,
create new ones, and take away our civil liberties. That's all true, but the most sinister
of it all has to do with occultism. This many sound ridiculous to many of you, but those
that are truly in power of this planet are spirit worshipers that practice HUMAN SACRIFICE.
The whole intent is to kill people.
Ken Anderson
It occurs to me that the NSA keeps Americans safe in much the same way as the Gestapo
kept Germans safe in the 1930s and 1940s. Is this really what we want?
Main point -- March sees the business firm as one complex organization that
in organizational behavior resembles a political system because it has conflict
systems and power struggles.
As the Modern Business firm is a large complex institution that makes decisions
within a market economy. It is inadequate to just view the firm economically
as an entrepreneur or politically in just the area of economic policies, so
March proposes that the business firm should be seen as a political system and
this would help to explain both the economic theories of the firm and the problems
of political systems.
In order for us to view the business firm as a political system, we must
first understand what is entailed in a political system (it is basically a conflict
system) and what are the theories of resolving these conflicts.
Conflict systems
What is a conflict system?
Conflict systems can be used to describe the behavior of individuals in a
learning experiment, the interaction between parties in a legislative setting
or the internal dynamics of a small group when solving a problem. Basically
it can be used in describing the behavior of small groups when they are setting
agendas, normally two characteristics will occur.
Using the example of the business firm:
There are consistent basic units-The executives at the bottom
level of the power rank are independent decision-makers who will prefer
one state of the company to the other possibilities that exist.
There is conflict-conflict will arise in the firm when the executives'
demands can not be met by the system and they do not accept any other alternative
offered by the firm.
Some features of the conflict system
The elementary unit of one study can be the conflict system of another.
The individual can be treated as the system in some cases and as the
elementary unit in other cases.
Small groups can be considered as both elementary units and systems.
Theories of Conflict resolution
There are two theories of conflict resolution, the theories of political
coalition states that in order to resolve conflict; a superordinate goal is
imposed to which conflict can then be mediated. The second theory being theories
of the business firm, conflict can be resolved using a process which avoids
comparing usefulness when making decisions.
A) The imputation of a superordinate goal
Any conflict system that is observed is seen to be acting according to what
is detailed by the superordinate goal, a superordinate goal can be imputed if:
There is an assumption of an existing joint preference ordering for
the system at any moment in time. For example in the firm, a superordinate
goal can be set if there is a mutual consensus among the employees, unity
in preference for the system at any one time.
It is assumed that the system will choose the most preferred alternative
behavior.
For example a tree would seek to be exposed to the sun as much as possible
pending certain conditions that limits its goal but it is actually trying to
resolve the conflict of maximizing it total exposure to the sun as that is a
scarce resource.
Effective use of an imputed superordinate goal demand that the goal has to
be constant and it has to be a meaningful goal. This imposition of a superordinate
goal helps in making decisions about the allocation of scarce resources.
B) The description of a conflict resolution process
Any system that " behaves" can be said to be acting under a superordinate
goal but it is also having a conflict resolution process. Therefore 2 conditions
are needed in describing a theory for conflict resolution.
The end decision is based on a simple premise.
It can be assumed that there is joint consensus for elementary decisions.
But for the process of conflict resolution to be successful, the basic decision
process has to be treated as basic units and there must be analytic procedures
to explain the model, so that the theory can make meaningful predictions.
Studies of the Firm as an economic conflict System
The firm is treated as a part of a larger conflict system with the objective
of maximizing long term profits where given a fixed set of prices the firm will
set the lowest cost factor for the highest output. The economic theory of the
firm is joint preference ordering which is profit maximization. Such a theory
has poor predictive qualities, so profit maximization is replaced by a more
general function. For the economist their definition of the firm implied that
the firm represents a conflict system, in terms of superordinate goals, to be
vulnerable to useful classification. Economic theories of the firm are useful
only in constructing macro –economic theories of the firm but they are not useful
in the micro description of the firm. To explain the firm's decision making
behavior as just profit maximizing would be simply too general an approach.
March goes on to give a critic of the economic theory of the business firm,
(which he says is not a true reflection of the firms behavior in the actual
setting.)
Studies of political conflict systems
In this theory, there are various groups with different interests therefore
they make different demands on the system. The allocation of resources therefore
is dependent on the coalition of interest groups and their control over the
system. In these political systems there is an emphasis on "power, internal
struggle and expediency: a de-emphasis of order, cooperation and problem solving."
and process oriented conflict resolution method is used.
The Firm as A Political Coalition
In describing the process of conflict resolution, we assume that the firm
is a political coalition, with the executive of the firm as the main actor.
Nothing is set yet, no goals are given and the table is open for bargaining.
Assuming that there is also a set of potential participants who will pay
the price required participating in the firm. They can be customers, employees,
suppliers etc. They demand something from the firm and this will sway the results
of the negotiation being made between the political broker and the firm, for
it could strengthen or weaken the bargaining power of the broker. The demands
do have a certain consistency. Consistency of the pairs of demands depends on
external conditions, of which some pairs are complementary to the goals of the
political broker and this is the marginal "cost" of any participant to the coalition.
At the same time several assumptions are made.
The level of demands moves in responds to experience
The attention given to the demands depends on the perception of the
problems.
The coalitions of participants also have a certain " value " which is
of use to the environment involved.
Using the example of the government coalition, where in democracy the party
with more than 50% power will be able to do anything but not the party without
that 50% support. In the same way in alternative
business coalition, different participants are allocated different marginal
value for different coalition.
March sees the executive as the lead actor whose goal is to maximize his
own gains from the firm, so he needs to find a coalition that will best support
his goals. But his problem is how to find one coalition that has complementary
goals with his, so that he would incur a low " marginal cost" and the coalition
must be powerful enough to help him succeed in his goal. That is the " marginal
value " of the coalition. This whole description of the firms behavior for March
resembles more of a political coalition than it is being described in economic
sense, especially in the following 4 ways.
The focus of attention is on the people who are actually the organizers
of the coalition like stockholders. Their demands would be a form of constrains
on the lead actors and would help determine future coalitions.
This theory focuses on the short run solutions to the problems faced
by the coalition.
The theory places an importance on policy demands and payments rather
than trying to meet demands.
The importance of institutional constrains on the problems of the coalition
are stressed.
The theory of the business firm as a political coalition is empirically supported
and has face validity, as it is more in line with the observed attitudes of
business decision making.
From March's vivid description of the firm as a political coalition, it shows
that he is out to show that the firm's behavior resembles more of an organization
than what the economist would describe the firm as, an entrepreneur.
Introduction of Computer.
With the introduction of the Computer program model, a new dimension to the
process description models of conflict systems is added. These models may not
best describe the business firm as a political coalition but they allow us to
explore the possibility of seeing the business firm as a political coalition.
The computer models being process descriptive are a natural form of theory in
this particular area and their introduction makes it possible to study the business
firm's behavior as a political coalition even further.
What are the implications for the study of Political Conflict Systems?
The business firm can be viewed as a political conflict system; it serves
as a test for which we can see how being in a non-political setting had
modified the political.
The computer programs models used in the analysis of political systems
within the business firms were a success showing how computer language can
be used for the treatment of political conflict systems generally.
In theory the similarity between the political business coalition and
the political government coalition implies that the behavior models of the
firm could be useful as a form of comparison with the models of governmental
decision making
The behavior of the firm when making decisions as a coalition suggests that
it is a form of political coalition and this contributes to the development
of the theory of the firm as well as to the theory of politics.
Crozier's book can be seen as a response to both the rational approach to
organizations and to the human relations approach. Crozier argues that organizations
act as the site for conflict and politics and argues against what he argues
is a simplistic Weberian account of organizations and efficient and largely
rational spaces. Instead, he seems them as sites for negotiation of complex
power relations. Crozier explains that:
The classic rationalists did not consider the members of an organization
as human beings, but just as cogs in the machine. For them, workers were
only hands. The human relations approach has shown how incomplete this rationale
was. It has also made it possible to consider workers as creatures of feeling,
who are moved by the impact of the so-called rational decisions taken above
then, and will react to them. A human being, however, does not have only
a hand a heart. He also had a head, which means that he is free to play
his own game (p. 149).
The first half of his book focuses on two settings in which he has done extensive
research and which he reports a long serise of detailed examples of the nature
of work and management. His two examples are each located in France: "The Clerical
Agency" and "The Industrial Monopoly". Crozier chose these examples not only
because he was French, but also because he claims that socially and culturally
France has developed in such a way that it created organizations that closely
resembled the Weberian notion of an ideal bureaucracy.
His book essentially argues that bureaucracies
are often dysfunctional and his analysis aims to unpack conflicts
and power struggles to understand why this is.
His theory is based on the observation that in situations where almost every
outcome has been decided in advance according to a set of impersonal and predefined
rules and regulations, the only way in which people
are able to gain some control over their lives is to exploit 'zones of uncertainty'
where the outcomes are not already known.
Attacking both the rationalists and the human relations school for ignoring
the role that such power struggles play in the shaping
of an organization he argues that organizational
relations are in fact a series of strategic games where the individuals attempt
either to exploit any areas of discretion for their own ends, or to prevent
others from gaining an advantage.
The result of this is that goals are subverted and the organization becomes
locked into a series of inward looking power struggles.
Thus, paradoxically, the result of attempting to
design an efficient organization that runs on rational and impersonal lines
is to create a situation where the opposite to is true.
Finally, Crozier argues that bureaucratic systems are characterized by the
existence of a set of vicious circles that find their source in centralization
and impersonality:
The development of impersonal rules: In an attempt to be rational
and egalitarian, bureaucracies attempt to come up with a set of abstract
impersonal rules to cover all possible events. Crozier gives the example
of the concurs (competitive examinations) which mean that, one the exams
are passed, promotion become simply a matter of seniority and avoiding damaging
conflicts. The result, he argues, is that hierarchical relationships decline
in importance or disappear completely which means that higher level in the
bureaucracy have effectively lost the power to govern the lower levels.
The centralization of decisions: If one wishes to maintain the
impersonal nature of decision making, it is necessary to ensure that decision
are made at a level where those who make them are protected from the influence
of those who are affected by them. The effect
of this is that problems are resolved by people who have no direct knowledge
of the problems they are called upon to solve, and so, priority
is given to the resolution of internal political problems instead. In this
case, the power to influence events over which one has direct experience
is lost and it is passed to some impartial central body.
The isolation of strata and group pressure within strata: The
suppression of the possibility of exercising discretion among superiors
and the removal of opportunities for bargaining from subordinates results
in an organization that consists of a series of isolated strata. The notional
equality within the strata becomes the only defence for the individual against
demands form other parts of the organization and allows groups some degree
of control over their own domain. The result
is very strong per group pressure to conform to the norms of the strata
regardless of individual beliefs or the wider goals of the organization.
The development of parallel power relationships: It is impossible
to account for every eventuality, even by the constant addition of impersonal
rules and the progressive centralization of decision making;
consequently, individuals or groups that control
the remaining zones of uncertainty, wield a considerable amount of power.
This can lead to the creation of parallel power structures that give certain
groups or individuals in certain situations, disproportionate power in an
otherwise regulated and egalitarian organization.
Once again, this can lead to decisions being made based on factors
separate from the overall goals of the organization.
In "The Bureaucratic Phenomenon" Michel Croier demonstrates that bureaucratic
institutions need to be understood in terms of the cultural context in which
they operate. The originality of the study lies in its association of two widely
different approaches: the theory of decision-making in large organizations and
the cultural analysis of social patterns of action.
The book opens with a detailed examination of two forms of French public
service. These studies show that professional training and distortions alone
cannot ex plain the rise of routine behavior and dysfunctional "vicious circles."
The role of various bureaucratic systems appears to depend on the pattern of
power relation ships between groups and individuals. Croier's findings lead
him to the view that bureaucratic structures form
a necessary protection against the risks inherent in collective action.
Since systems of protection are built around basic cultural traits, the author
presents a French bureaucratic model based on centralization, strata isolation,
and individual sparkle-one that that can be contrasted with an American, Russian,
or Japanese model. He points out how the same patterns can be found in several
areas of French life: education, industrial relations, politics, business, and
the colonial policy. Bureaucracy, Croier concludes,
is not a modern disease resulting from organizational progress but rather a
bulwark against development. --[??? innovation
-- NNB]
The breakdown of the traditional bureaucratic system in modern France offers
hope for new and fruitful forms of action.
Michel Croier was the founder and director of the Centre de Sociologie des
Organisations and senior research fellow of the Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique. He is currently a member of the Academie des Sciences Morales
et Politiques. He is the author or co-author of numerous books including The
Stalled Society, The Crisis of Democracy, and The Trouble with America. Erhard
Friedberg is professor of sociology and director of the Master of Public Affairs
at Sciences Po in Paris. He is the author of numerous books including Actors
and Systems (with Michel Croier) and Local Orders--Dynamics of Organized Action.
Crozier's book can be seen as a response to both the rational approach to
organizations and to the human relations approach. Crozier argues that organizations
act as the site for conflict and politics and argues against what he argues
is a simplistic Weberian account of organizations and efficient and largely
rational spaces. Instead, he seems them as sites for negotiation of complex
power relations. Crozier explains that:
The classic rationalists did not consider the members of an organization
as human beings, but just as cogs in the machine. For them, workers were
only hands. The human relations approach has shown how incomplete this rationale
was. It has also made it possible to consider workers as creatures of feeling,
who are moved by the impact of the so-called rational decisions taken above
then, and will react to them. A human being, however, does not have only
a hand a heart. He also had a head, which means that he is free to play
his own game (p. 149).
The first half of his book focuses on two settings in which he has done extensive
research and which he reports a long serise of detailed examples of the nature
of work and management. His two examples are each located in France: "The Clerical
Agency" and "The Industrial Monopoly". Crozier chose these examples not only
because he was French, but also because he claims that socially and culturally
France has developed in such a way that it created organizations that closely
resembled the Weberian notion of an ideal bureaucracy.
His book essentially argues that bureaucracies are often dysfunctional and
his analysis aims to unpack conflicts and power struggles to understand why
this is.
His theory is based on the observation that in situations where almost every
outcome has been decided in advance according to a set of impersonal and predefined
rules and regulations, the only way in which people are able to gain some control
over their lives is to exploit 'zones of uncertainty' where the outcomes are
not already known.
Attacking both the rationalists and the human relations school for ignoring
the role that such power struggles play in the shaping of an organization he
argues that organizational relations are in fact a series of strategic games
where the individuals attempt either to exploit any areas of discretion for
their own ends, or to prevent others from gaining an advantage.
The result of this is that goals are subverted and the organization becomes
locked into a series of inward looking power struggles. Thus, paradoxically,
the result of attempting to design an efficient organization that runs on rational
and impersonal lines is to create a situation where the opposite to is true.
Finally, Crozier argues that bureaucratic systems are characterized by the
existence of a set of vicious circles that find their source in centralization
and impersonality:
The development of impersonal rules: In an attempt to be rational
and egalitarian, bureaucracies attempt to come up with a set of abstract
impersonal rules to cover all possible events. Crozier gives the example
of the concurs (competitive examinations) which mean that, one the exams
are passed, promotion become simply a matter of seniority and avoiding damaging
conflicts. The result, he argues, is that hierarchical relationships decline
in importance or disappear completely which means that higher level in the
bureaucracy have effectively lost the power to govern the lower levels.
The centralization of decisions: If one wishes to maintain the
impersonal nature of decision making, it is necessary to ensure that decision
are made at a level where those who make them are protected from the influence
of those who are affected by them. The effect of this is that problems are
resolved by people who have no direct knowledge of the problems they are
called upon to solve, and so, priority is given to the resolution of internal
political problems instead. In this case, the power to influence events
over which one has direct experience is lost and it is passed to some impartial
central body.
The isolation of strata and group pressure within strata: The
suppression of the possibility of exercising discretion among superiors
and the removal of opportunities for bargaining from subordinates results
in an organization that consists of a series of isolated strata. The notional
equality within the strata becomes the only defence for the individual against
demands form other parts of the organization and allows groups some degree
of control over their own domain. The result is very strong per group pressure
to conform to the norms of the strata regardless of individual beliefs or
the wider goals of the organization.
The development of parallel power relationships: It is impossible
to account for every eventuality, even by the constant addition of impersonal
rules and the progressive centralization of decision making; consequently,
individuals or groups that control the remaining zones of uncertainty, wield
a considerable amount of power. This can lead to the creation of parallel
power structures that give certain groups or individuals in certain situations,
disproportionate power in an otherwise regulated and egalitarian organization.
Once again, this can lead to decisions being made based on factors separate
from the overall goals of the organization.
In " The Bureaucratic Phenomenon " the French Sociologist,
Michel Crozier set out to re-examine Weber's concept of the efficient ideal
bureaucracy in the light of the way that bureaucratic organizations had actually
developed and constructed a theory of bureaucratic dysfunction based on an analysis
of case studies.
The core of his theory stems from the observation that in situations where
almost every outcome has been decided in advance,
the only way for people to gain control over their lives is to exploit any remaining
'zones of uncertainty'. He argues that organizational relations
become little more than strategic games that attempt to exploit such zones,
either for their own ends, or to prevent others from gaining an advantage.
The result is that the organization becomes locked into a series of inward looking
power struggles - so called 'vicious circles' - that prevent it learning from
its errors.
Thus, in order to be rational and egalitarian, bureaucracies attempt to come
up with a set of impersonal rules to cover every event. The first result of
this is that, because the outcome of such decisions are predetermined, hierarchical
relationships become less important and the senior levels lose the power to
govern.
Secondly, in order to maintain the impersonal nature of decision making,
decisions cannot must be made by the people who might be affected. The
result of this is that most problems are resolved by people who have no direct
knowledge of them.
Thirdly, the elimination of opportunities for
bargaining and negotiation creates an organization consisting of a series of
isolated strata. The result is peer
group pressure to conform to the norms of the strata regardless
of individual beliefs or the wider goals of the organization.
Finally, individuals or groups that gain control
the zones of uncertainty wield disproportionate power in an otherwise regulated
and egalitarian organization. This leads to the creation of parallel
power structures, which in turn results in decisions being made based on factors
unrelated to those of the organization as a whole.
There's no question Research In Motion is in the midst of a major transitional
period. The company is planning to launch a brand new product line based on
a brand new operating system within the next 12 months, and even though the
first device born out of RIM's new QNX OS was impressive in some ways, it was
incomplete. There still is a chance for RIM to deliver some really interesting
competitive products, but time is quickly running out, as we have written time
and time again. The thing is, RIM has always been a company controlled by two
people - Jim Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis. For all the things that have worked,
they have missed the boat countless times and we're now seeing the results.
We have received an open letter to Mike and Jim from a high-level RIM employee
(whose identity we have verified), and in an amazingly honest and passionate
plea, this letter gives fascinating insights into what RIM must fix, and fast.
RIM did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Read the open letter
in its entirety after the break.
P.S. If you're an employee of RIM and want to send us your thoughts and feelings
on the company, you can send them to us via email or leave a comment below.
I have lost confidence.
While I hide it at work, my passion has been sapped. I know I am not alone
- the sentiment is widespread and it includes people within your own teams.
Mike and Jim, please take the time to really absorb and digest the content
of this letter because it reflects the feeling across a huge percentage of your
employee base. You have many smart employees, many that have great ideas for
the future, but unfortunately the culture at RIM does not allow us to speak
openly without having to worry about the career-limiting effects.
Before I get into the meat of the matter, I will say I am not part of a large
group of bitter employees wishing to embarrass us. Rather, I believe these points
need to be heard and I desperately want RIM to regain its position as a successful
industry leader. Our carriers, distributors, alliance partners, enterprise customers,
and our loyal end users all want the same thing… for BlackBerry to once again
be leading the pack.
We are in the middle of major "transition" and things have never been more
chaotic. Almost every project is falling further and further behind schedule
at a time when we absolutely must deliver great, solid products on time. We
urge you to make bold decisions about our organisational structure, about our
culture and most importantly our products.
While we anxiously wait to see the details of the streamlining plan, here
are some suggestions:
1) Focus on the End User experience
Let's obsess about what is best for the end user. We often make product decisions
based on strategic alignment, partner requests or even legal advice - the end
user doesn't care. We simply have to admit that Apple is nailing this and it
is one of the reasons they have people lining up overnight at stores around
the world, and products sold out for months. These people aren't hypnotized
zombies, they simply love beautifully designed products that are user centric
and work how they are supposed to work. Android has a major weakness - it will
always lack the simplicity and elegance that comes with end-to-end device software,
middleware and hardware control. We really have a great opportunity to build
something new and "uniquely BlackBerry" with the QNX platform.
Let's start an internal innovation revival with teams focused on what users
will love instead of chasing "feature parity" and feature differentiation for
no good reason (Adobe Flash being a major example). When was the last time we
pushed out a significant new experience or feature that wasn't already on other
platforms?
Rather than constantly mocking iPhone and Android, we should encourage key
decision makers across the board to use these products as their primary device
for a week or so at a time - yes, on Exchange! This way we can understand why
our users are switching and get inspiration as to how we can build our next-gen
products even better! It's incomprehensible that our top software engineers
and executives aren't using or deeply familiar with our competitor's products.
I'm going to say what everyone is thinking… We need some heavy hitters at
RIM when it comes to software management. Teams still aren't talking together
properly, no one is making or can make critical decisions, all the while everyone
is working crazy hours and still far behind. We are demotivated. Just look at
who our major competitors are: Apple, Google & Microsoft. These are three of
the biggest and most talented software companies on the planet. Then take a
look at our software leadership teams in terms of what they have delivered and
their past experience prior to RIM… It says everything.
3) Cut projects to the bone.
There is a serious need to consolidate our focus to just a handful of projects.
Period.
We need to be disciplined here. We can't afford any more initiatives based
on carrier requests to squeeze out slightly more volume. Again, back to point
#1, focus on the end users. They are the ones making both consumer & enterprise
purchase decisions.
Strategy is often in the things you decide not to do.
On that note, we simply must stop shipping incomplete products that aren't
ready for the end user. It is hurting our brand tremendously. It takes guts
to not allow a product to launch that may be 90% ready with a quarter end in
sight, but it will pay off in the long term.
Look at Apple in 1997 for tips here. I really want you to watch this video
because it has never been more relevant. It is our friend Steve Jobs in 97 and
it may as well be you speaking to RIM employees and partners today. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3LEXae1j6EY
4) Developers, not Carriers can now make or break us
We urgently need to invest like we never have before in becoming developer
friendly. The return will be worth every cent. There is no polite way to say
this, but it's true - BlackBerry smartphone apps suck. Even PlayBook, with all
its glorious power, looks like a Fisher Price toy with its Adobe AIR/Flash apps.
Developing for BlackBerry is painful, and despite what you've been told,
things haven't really changed that much since Jamie Murai's letter. Our SDK
/ development platform is like a rundown 1990′s Ford Explorer. Then there's
Apple, which has a shiny new BMW M3… just such a pleasure to drive. Developers
want and need quality tools.
If we create great tools, we will see great work. Offer shit tools and we
shouldn't be surprised when we see shit apps.
The truth is, no one in RIM dares to tell management how bad our tools still
are. Even our closest dev partners do their best to say it politely, but they
will never bite the hand that feeds them. The solution? Recruit serious talent,
buy SDK/API specialist companies, throw a truckload of money at it… Let's do
whatever it takes, and quickly!
5) Need for serious marketing punch to create end user desire
25 million iPad users don't care that it doesn't have Flash or true multitasking,
so why make that a focus in our campaigns? I'll answer that for you: it's because
that's all that differentiates our products and its lazy marketing. I've never
seen someone buy product B because it has something product A doesn't have.
People buy product B because they want and lust after product B.
Also an important note regarding our marketing: a product's technical superiority
does not equal desire, and therefore sales… How many Linux laptops are getting
sold? How did Betamax go? My mother wants an iPad and iPhone because it is simple
and appeals to her. Powerful multitasking doesn't.
BlackBerry Messenger has been our standout, yet we wasted our marketing on
strange stories from a barber shop to a horse wrangler. I promise you, this
did nothing to help us in the mind of the average consumer.
We need an inventive and engaging campaign that focuses on what we are about.
People buy into a brand / product not just because of features, but because
of what it stands for and what it delivers to them. People don't buy "what you
do," people buy "why you do it." Take 3 minutes to watch the this video starting
from the 2min mark: http://youtu.be/qp0HIF3SfI4
6) No Accountability – Canadians are too nice
RIM has a lot of people who underperform but still stay in their roles. No
one is accountable. Where is the guy responsible for the 9530 software? Still
with us, still running some important software initiative. We will never achieve
excellence with this culture. Just because someone may have been a loyal RIM
employee for 7 years, it doesn't mean they are the best Manager / Director /
VP for that role. It's time to change the culture to deliver or move on and
get out. We have far too many people in critical roles that fit this description.
I can hear the cheers of my fellow employees now.
7) The press and analysts are pissing you off. Don't snap. Now is the
time for humility with a dash of paranoia.
The public's questions about dual-CEOs are warranted. The partnership is
not broken, but on the ground level, it is not efficient. Maybe we need our
Eric Schmidt reign period.
Yes, four years ago we beat Microsoft when everyone said Windows Mobile with
Direct Push in Exchange would kill us. It didn't… in fact we grew stronger.
However, overconfidence clouds good decision-making. We missed not boldly
reacting to the threat of iPhone when we saw it in January over four years ago.
We laughed and said they are trying to put a computer on a phone, that it won't
work. We should have made the QNX-like transition then. We are now 3-4 years
too late. That is the painful truth… it was a major strategic oversight and
we know who is responsible.
Jim, in referring to our current transition recently said: "No other technology
company other than Apple has successfully transitioned their platform. It's
almost never done, and it's way harder than you realize. This transition is
where tech companies go to die."
To avoid this death, perhaps it is time to seriously consider a new, fresh
thinking, experienced CEO. There is no shame in no longer being a CEO. Mike,
you could focus on innovation. Jim, you could focus on our carriers/customers…
They are our lifeblood.
8) Democratise. Engage and interact with your employees - please!
Reach out to all employees asking them on how we can make RIM better. Encourage
input from ground-level teams-without repercussions-to seek out honest feedback
and really absorb it.
Lastly, we're all reading the news and many are extremely nervous, especially
when we see people get fired. We need an injection of confidence: share your
strategy and ask us for support. The headhunters have already started circling
and we are at risk of losing our best people.
Now would be a great time to internally re-brand and re-energize the workplace.
For example, rename the company to just "BlackBerry" to signify our new focus
on one QNX product line. We should also address issues surrounding making RIM
an enjoyable workplace. Some of our offices feel like Soviet-era government
workplaces.
The timing is perfect to seriously evaluate at our position and make these
major changes. We can do it!
BGR published
an open letter to Research In Motion yesterday from an anonymous high-level
RIM executive who begged for senior management to take notice of all of the
issues within RIM. The exec explained how the company should make some changes
to focus on the talent and potential within RIM, and also to focus on end users
instead of carriers. After we published the article,
RIM responded. It wasn't pretty, and it really didn't address a single point
that was made by the original plea. It wasn't just RIM that responded, however
- we received dozens of emails from current and former RIM employees detailing
their stories, and essentially all agreeing with the open letter that was published
on BGR. Among the correspondence were several new "open letters" written by
RIM employees, and the BGR team has gone through them at length. There were
nearly a dozen gems amid the emails we received, and while we may address various
highlights in the coming weeks, we can't publish them all at this time. We thank
each and every person who took the time to email us with their thoughts, but
there were two in particular that stood out from the crowd. One is from a former
RIM employee and the other is from a current employee, and both sources have
been vetted. The full, unedited letters can be read after the break.
Letter 1
This letter brilliantly articulated just about everything I've thought
and/or heard relating to the company in the last two years.
I was an employee at RIM for a year and a half. I worked in the legal and
business affairs departments, and despite having originally thought I'd landed
the jackpot job-wise, it took no time for me to begin planning my exodus.
My first week started with a complete change in my title and duties without
anyone telling me, and when I dared ask what was happening, the director (my
boss) and her BFF the OD business partner ganged up on me and threatened to
let me go, setting the tone for the remainder of my time there.
Over a year an a half, the four of us in the same position dwindled to just
me and yet I was responsible for getting all four jobs done for the better part
of a year, since this is how long it took the department to hire other entry-level
people. Two individuals who had less education and experience (not to mention
drive or intelligence) than me were promoted several times while my boss continued
to tell me up and down that I had reached my ceiling at RIM due to my lack of
education (two degrees!) and experience (5 years!)–as an administrative assistant.
Rather than attempt to fight this system I figured I could transfer departments,
only the company policy requires the supervisor to act as a liaison and reference
for internal applicants. The insanely high turnover rate meant the department
head wouldn't let anyone go, in addition to refusing to promote from within
(pets excepted). People were pitted against each other and an incredibly tense
and hostile work environment was fostered. People around the office started
referring to the office politics as "Survivor: RIM
edition." And we all remember the great movement to make recycling
physically impossible across the entire company because one person let
some confidential information slip.
Then, as I was saving up to return to school and make a better life for myself,
I received a series of nasty emails from HR letting me know that since my boss
had failed to log my vacation time a year earlier on SAP (despite my insistence
on her doing it at three different times), I would have two full paycheques
deducted to "pay back" the company for what was being portrayed as my mistake.
I never received an apology and almost had to drop out of school due to the
loss of a full month's pay. On my last day my boss deliberately avoided me at
all cost. The best part is that I recently heard that my boss just got promoted
to the VP of the business affairs department.
I write this not to rant about my discouraging situation (it was a few years
ago), but rather to relate that my experiences seem (even now as I maintain
contact with many work friends) to be the rule rather than the exception across
the company. Individuals who have fresh ways of thinking and who try to do things
in new ways are not only reprimanded, but demoted (did I not mention I was also
demoted at one point for asking too many questions?). Passive-aggression fills
the halls where collegial interaction should thrive. The amount of red tape
required to get just about anything done is exhausting, slowing progress and
removing all incentive for employees at any level to innovate. Success cannot
be borne of a 2005 status quo when the world looks a lot different now than
it did even 12 months ago.
Despite what I endured at the company, I continue to support RIM as I love
its products and sincerely wish it the best. Perhaps if it can take the recommendations
from the employee's open letter to heart, change will be ignited sooner rather
than later, and employees and consumers alike will gain as RIM refines its most
crucial relationships.
Letter 2
Inside RIM there is a small-ish (maybe 200-300) group of employees who's
only focus is keeping the BlackBerry services (Email, Browsing, BBM, the network,
etc) running for our customers. We're a 24/7/365 organization, maintaining 10′s
of thousands of servers, network devices, services and basically anything that
keeps devices working with our service. Keeping this massive service running
smoothly, and keeping visible downtime to a minimum is a monumental task, made
worse by the poor management decisions we deal with every day.
If I could have time with Mike and Jim to talk about the problems I see,
I would happily reinforce what your executive said, and add a few things:
No longer "In Motion": The operations teams are full of extremely
skilled and talented individuals who are excessively good at what they do
- they were hired for that reason. We have pulled in resources from many
of the best companies, from literally around the world. Many come with years
of experience in the industry, and a lot of 'been there, done that' knowledge
that is invaluable. However, each one of us has been handcuffed by overdone,
poorly planned and every more poorly executed process. It can take weeks
of time to make small changes, and months to make major ones. Whenever
something goes wrong (incident, problems, even non-customer impacting) a
lengthy and involved process of finger pointing starts, and without fail,
a new process is born. And, sadly, since the announcement came out
about the financial problems and layoffs, it's become worse. Many of the
managers are saying we need to rely more heavily now than ever on process.
To those of us who need to deal with this process, which consumes days of
work generating documents that no one will read, it's an obvious case of
CYA on the managers part. If they say 'but we followed the process!', they
seem to hope their heads won't be on the line. We are no longer a company
that is innovative and energetic, we are drowning in paperwork. RIM
needs to capitalize on the resources they have - hundreds of very smart,
dedicated and driven individuals that can solve problems without needing
a flowchart or document. We need to get out of this process paralysis, and
back "In Motion".
AT&T: Internally, there's a large joke that we should be called
"RIM-T&T". A lot of our senior leadership has come from there,
and they come in with ideas from an old, stodgy, process driven industry.
Having worked in a telecom like position in the past, I know how much paperwork
and process they love - AT&T (and Bell, and other carriers) are dealing
with a century of regulation, knowledge and process. Maybe they have some
great best practices, but you don't see 'new and innovative' happening a
lot at AT&T. It also opens up a lot of questions about business directions
when many senior leaders came from one of our carrier partners. RIM is not
AT&T. RIM is not Microsoft. RIM is not Google. RIM is not Palm. RIM is RIM,
and needs a RIM created focus, RIM ideas, and RIM leadership.
Poor leadership: My small team of people has over 75 projects
assigned to us right now. Why? Because leaders are afraid to say no. And
we're not the only ones - if you polled the various teams around operations,
you'd probably find each and every team / individual has a list that is
completely unattainable. But, no one is putting a foot down to say "ok,
enough". No one wants to upset someone above them by saying "no, we don't
have the time" or "no, that's not valuable" or "no, you clearly don't understand
what it is we do around here". Instead, there is (again) a lot of CYA and
placating going on. Add to this a lot of process, and you have a workforce
that is unable to deliver things quickly, properly, or with any degree of
pride in their work.
Morale: Being swamped by process, led by poor leaders, and buried
in too many projects understandably leaves all of us feeling hopeless. When
there isn't a light at the end of the tunnel, but you are still expected
to work 12 hours a day (and only paid for 8), it becomes difficult to stay
focused on what needs to happen to make things better. Then, throw in notice
of layoffs without any discussion internally, defer promised raises, and
cut out expenses that may have been used to bolster morale (staff social
events, travel, professional conference attendance), and you have a large
workforce of people who are disillusioned about their future. And we're
supposed to be working harder to make the company strong right now.
Guts: As the other writer said, there are far too many people
sitting back and letting others do their work, and nothing happens to them.
Everyone knows who these under performers are, but no one does anything
about it. Having spoken very directly about this matter with a number of
managers, the common thread is that it's more work to try and get rid of
them than to simply put up with them. A combination of laziness and poor
OD processes is causing RIM to rot from the inside. We are actually happy
to see layoffs here (assuming they don't target us), because we're hoping
the right people are pulled out and that will open room for us to work properly,
or even replace them with someone skilled and who wants to work hard.
Products: If you walk around and talk to RIM employees (in operations,
I'm sure the development teams are better) about the products we make, you'll
find most of us a) don't know anything about our new products, b) don't
like our current products and c) pine for the old products. There is so
much secrecy in the company, no one knows anything about new things until
we see it on the news. That means we're not able to tell our friends and
family anything about new things, and that reflects badly on RIM. The current
products are slow and underpowered. It's generally acknowledged that our
devices are inferior to other devices, and indeed, many people have personal
devices from our competitors. Our old devices, when we were leading, are
snappy, nice to use and highly functional. We need to get back to that.
Bells and whistles are nice, but when reading email on the device is difficult,
I don't care if I can play podcasts. Internally, the feedback we can provide
is ignored or filed as a 'bug' and then ignored. RIM has a big set of internal
testers, but ignores their feedback to their own detriment.
Sales channels: I heard someone telling this story around the
office. Their sister went in to a local carrier store to buy a new BlackBerry,
replacing an Android phone they didn't like. They walked in with $400 in
hand and wanted a BlackBerry, and walked out with an iPhone. When the sister
asked the carrier sales rep for a BlackBerry, they talked her out
of a BlackBerry by telling her how bad they are, then offered her an iPhone
for $39. How could the sister resist, after having the Blackberry trashed
(slow, useless, hard to use), and then a price like that for a competing
product dangled in front of her? When our only avenue to selling our devices
is through a 'neutral' 3rd party, and is just as happy to sell someone a
competitors product as ours, we are at their mercy.
Marketing: My friends love to poke me and make fun of our ads.
Sure, BlackBerry seems to be sponsoring a lot of concerts and baseball games,
but looking at my circle of friends and family, no one cares about that.
Our marketing is boring, our ads are plain, and completely uninteresting.
The whole campaign around the Playbook seems to be "IT DOES FLASH!
LOOK!" … but honestly, my mother doesn't know or care about that. She wants
to know 'can I play Angry Birds?".
If I could only tell Mike, Jim and the rest of the C*O crowd one thing, it
would be this: stop keeping the incredible pool of smart, talented and capable
people handcuffed by poorly thought through process. It's destroying the company,
and destroying those of us that have to manage it. Being able to move quickly
and innovate is what will save the company, and that goes completely opposite
all our process.
The Last but not LeastTechnology is dominated by
two types of people: those who understand what they do not manage and those who manage what they do not understand ~Archibald Putt.
Ph.D
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Did a software developer cross the line in helping a trader make illegal profits through 'spoofing'? A Chicago jury will decide.3 hours ago ( Edited ) This Kammeyer fella is being cute. All redesign of an aircraft is an economic dilemma not a problem. A million things must be considered before launching such a process.
4 hours ago
NYT foreign correspondent Dexter Filkins (via SWJ ):
Ethan Allen
August 29, 2011 at 6:31 pm
Though I have taken issue with Mr. McGovern on several occasions, this
take on the professional veracity of Michael Morell reflects an improved
awareness of honest candor and informed opinion. The concurrence of Mary
McCarthy and "the retired Senior Intelligence Officer" mentioned are
reassuring endorsements.
Meremark
August 29, 2011 at 7:47 pm
–
