This interview with Marty Feldstein covers
its share of controversial topics. The
interview is fairly long, so if you want to
pick and choose the section headers are: The
Art of Monetary Policy, Time Consistency in
Fiscal Policy, Social Security Reform,
European Social Insurance, European Union,
The Return of Saving, The Economics of
Health and Health Care, Executive
Compensation, Supply-Side Economics, Tax
Reform Panel, and The NBER:
THE ART OF MONETARY POLICY
Region: In recent
articles reviewing the tenures of Alan
Greenspan at the Fed and Otmar Issing
[former chief economist of the European
Central Bank], you observed that
monetary policy is as much an art as a
science, that judgment must supplement
forecasting models and policy rules.
Given that, what is your
judgment on the current course of
monetary policy? I know you're not an
advocate of strict inflation targeting,
but then what should be done to
anchor inflation expectations, either
through explicit policy measures or
improved communications?
Feldstein: The
rhetoric that has worked for the last
20-plus years since Paul Volcker took
over was an emphasis on "price
stability." That didn't come with a
precise number, but I think he defined
price stability-and Greenspan used
similar language-as meaning that price
changes should be so low that people
ignore them. And "price stability"
actually has, in many ways, a better
ring than "2 percent inflation." Why 2
percent inflation? Why not 3 percent
inflation? Why not zero? I think what
the public wants is price stability.
They don't want to have prices rising.
In practice, because of imperfections in
measurement and because of concerns
about deflation, you end up with a
number globally now around 2 percent,
and that strikes me as quite plausible.
The financial markets may like
something reasonably precise, like 1, 2,
3 percent as measured. I say "as
measured" because of the statistical
bias in the numbers so that true
inflation is lower than the measured
number. The man on the street doesn't
want to be concerned about small numbers
and/or about "core" inflation versus
"regular" inflation. He wants price
stability; he wants the purchasing power
of the money that he has to stay the
same. And so that's what the Fed's
message to him ought to be.
Region: How can that
best be communicated?
Feldstein: I think
it was successfully communicated during
the Volcker and Greenspan eras. And
Volcker started with much higher
inflation rates, so it was the more
difficult sell. By the time he left, the
inflation rate was down to about 4
percent as headline inflation is
conventionally measured, and Greenspan
took it down to roughly 2 percent and
then it overshot a little bit on the low
side.
So I think it got communicated that
the problems of inflation we lived with
in the '70s were history and that the
Fed was committed to not letting that
happen again. It was done without
putting a precise number on it, but by
reacting to increases in inflation. The
public looks at how the Fed responds,
not just at what they say. It's easy to
say, "I believe in price stability." But
if you don't do something, then no
matter what number you put out there,
they're not going to believe it.
TIME CONSISTENCY IN FISCAL
POLICY
Region: Economists
have devoted a lot of attention to time
consistency in monetary policy. Some
suggest that time consistency in fiscal
policy would also be a good idea. Given
your research on public finance, do you
think there's wisdom in such a stance?
And given your experience in Washington,
do you think it's pragmatic?
Feldstein: When I
look at the current fiscal situation, in
contrast to what we experienced in the
'80s when the fiscal deficits were
larger and rising, and debt-to-GDP
ratios were rising, we're currently at a
relatively comfortable level. The
federal deficit-to-GDP ratio this year
will be under 3 percent, probably low
enough that the debt-to-GDP ratio will
actually come down.
The problems are not that very far
into the future, though, with increases
in Social Security and Medicare costs
relative to the tax revenue that comes
in. The markets seem to be ignoring
that, which is a puzzle, but there's
nothing about long-term interest rates
that suggests that the markets are
afraid that Social Security and Medicare
are really going to create large fiscal
deficits. Now maybe they're right. And
maybe the political process will raise
taxes or cut benefits. What has to be
done is to reform those programs. I
wouldn't set my goal in terms of the
fiscal deficit. I'd set it in terms of
limiting the tax levels that are going
to be needed to support them.
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
Region: For nearly
40 years, you've been a powerful
advocate for reform of the Social
Security system, especially for personal
retirement accounts.
Feldstein: Right.
Region: But a case
could be made that the system is largely
unchanged from when it was first
created. Are you discouraged by the lack
of progress that's been made, or
heartened by the incremental changes?
Feldstein: There've
been no good incremental changes. There
have been incremental changes, but
they've gone the wrong way until about
10 years ago. Since then there have been
changes, particularly getting rid of the
distortions in retirement incentives by
raising the benefits if you work longer,
reducing the benefits if you retire
earlier. So the distortions in
retirement behavior that affect the
European economies are no longer present
in the United States.
But the reforms of Social Security
and the movement to personal retirement
accounts are happening around the world
now, and the United States is really a
laggard. And it's not just some of the
developing countries, like Chile and
Mexico. It's Australia and even Sweden
that have moved to mixed systems with an
investment-based component. So I'm
encouraged that at some point the United
States is going to move in that
direction.
If you'd asked me two years ago, I
would have said we have a president
who's committed to this and sees this as
his major domestic legacy, and therefore
I think he's going to get it. I can't
say that now. I can say the first half
of that, but not the second half. The
Democrats have been completely unwilling
to come and discuss the subject. It
doesn't look like anything the
administration can do will get them to
negotiate about it. There aren't enough
Republicans to do it. And it shouldn't
be done on a partisan basis. The
administration tried, by setting up a
bipartisan commission with Pat Moynihan
as one of its leaders, to come up with a
way of getting to that mixed system. But
they've not been able, and since
Moynihan died there's been no leadership
on that side of the aisle.
EUROPEAN SOCIAL INSURANCE
Region: You've
referred to several European countries.
I would think that the demographics of
Europe would be even less amenable to a
favorable future for government pension
programs. What is your sense of Europe's
future relative to social insurance for
the elderly?
Feldstein: You're
right. Their demographics are worse. We
would see the tax rate required to
support the U.S. Social Security pension
system rise to about 20 percent from the
current 12 percent if we wanted to
maintain the same benefit rules on a
pure pay-as-you-go basis. Europeans are
already up there. They have much higher
replacement rates. They have earlier
retirement. And for them it's going to
get even worse.
But as I said, we've seen
Sweden-which I think of as sort of the
leading edge of welfare states-backing
off the traditional pure pay-as-you-go
system and moving to this kind of mixed
system. Britain has very much a mixed
system. It's not exactly the same
structure, but it's very much a modest
pay-as-you-go part plus an
investment-based part.
So, I think at some point it will
happen here. I don't know exactly what
the formula will have to be to cause
that to occur, but I think it will
happen. Israel, another country with a
tradition of very strong social welfare
programs, has made this transition so
that new people entering the labor force
contribute to a mixed system.
EUROPEAN UNION
Region: Another
question about Europe, if I may. In
1997, you wrote that "on balance, a
European monetary union would be an
economic liability." What is your
judgment of where the EMU stands today,
particularly since the recent reforms of
the Stability and Growth Pact?
Feldstein: Well, I
think it is a liability. I think that
the one-size-fits-all monetary policy is
seen as not working either for the
countries that have weak demand and
ought to have a more stimulative policy
or, on the other hand, for those that
are discovering they're becoming less
competitive because their domestic
prices are rising and they can't adjust
monetary policy. I wrote a piece on the
Stability Pact issue before the recent
reforms, but even before the reforms,
they weren't paying any attention to the
Pact. The basic problem is there's no
market feedback to discipline a country
that doesn't have its own exchange rate
or its own interest rate to warn them
against fiscal deficits.
Normally, a European country that
started running large fiscal deficits
would see that the increased risk of
their bonds would push up the interest
rate they had to pay, there would be a
flight from the currency and they would
see that that translates into inflation.
So they would have a lot of
market-driven warning signals. All that
is gone now. There's a 30-basis-point
difference between Italian and German
long-term interest rates because the
market doesn't believe that it can
discipline the Italians. If the Italians
run a large fiscal deficit, it's
effectively a European fiscal deficit.
It's not a specifically Italian one.
THE RETURN OF SAVING
Region: In a recent
Foreign Affairs article, you
argue that the downward trend in savings
by U.S. households will likely soon
reverse, and that that could cause some
near-term disruption. Could you explain
that prediction, and tell us how that
ties in with your recent op-ed in the
Wall Street Journal calling
for, I think your term was, a
"competitive dollar abroad."
Feldstein: Right,
strong dollar at home, a competitive
dollar globally. Well, the brief history
of our savings rate is that from a
relatively low level it has been falling
ever since the early '90s. This is
household saving, not national saving.
Household saving was coming down from
around 7 percent of disposable income,
and by 2003 it had gotten to 2 1/2
percent of disposable income-a
remarkably low number.
That was not surprising since
people's wealth had increased quite
substantially, both because the stock
market-despite the fall in 2000-was up
substantially and because home values
were up. So people felt they didn't have
to save by reducing consumption. They
just looked at their 401(k)s and IRAs,
and at a time when asset prices were
going up, the wealth effect dominated.
The fall in the savings rate is a
reflection of the fact that we used to
have defined benefit pension plans and
we now have defined contribution plans,
plus the IRAs. All of that put the
increase in stock market value into the
individuals' hands rather than into the
companies' hands as it would have under
defined benefit plans.
Then saving fell very sharply in the
next two years, 2003 to 2005, about as
much as it had fallen over the last
decade and a half. It went from 2 1/2
percent to minus 1 1/2 percent. It's not
entirely clear what caused that. There
was a spurt in home prices, so there was
a sharp wealth effect. But the main
thing that drove it, I believe, was
mortgage refinancing. Mortgage
refinancing gave people a chance not
only to cut their monthly payments but
also to take out cash and use it to buy
things. Not all of it went into
purchases. Some of it went into paying
off other debt. Some of it went into
financial assets. But I suspect that
enough of it went into buying things to
drive the savings rate from plus 2 1/2
to minus 1 1/2 percent.
Well, that process of mortgage
refinancing is reversing now, and with
mortgage rates significantly higher, a
full percentage point higher than they
were a year ago, there isn't the
incentive for people to refinance. So I
think we will see a return to higher
savings rates. Whether it'll be 2 1/2
percent or it'll be higher than that, I
don't know, but I think there'll be a
natural turnaround in the savings rate.
If that happens relatively quickly,
it will cause a significant slowdown in
aggregate demand in this country. Of
course, many people are saying that we
need to improve our trade imbalance, and
in order to improve our trade imbalance,
we have to save more. I think this is
where the saving will come from. It will
not come from reductions in fiscal
deficits, which are already relatively
low. Nor will it come from increases in
business savings, which are quite
strong.
But to convert the rise of savings to
an improvement in our trade balance, the
dollar has to be more competitive. If we
simply have an increase in our savings
rate and nothing changes in the exchange
rate, then we will have, depending on
how much the savings rate goes up, a
slowdown or a downturn in aggregate
activity. We need to translate those
extra resources, that extra saving, into
an increase in exports and a reduction
in imports so that the total demand for
U.S. goods and services remains on
track, and the economy continues to
expand. And that's the way the market
ought to work: When the savings rate
goes up, the exchange rate becomes more
competitive, and Americans consume more
American-made products and services. So
that's the case for a more competitive
dollar.
In the [Wall Street Journal]
article, I said the government during
the Clinton and Bush years has been
sending out a confusing message by
saying that the United States believes
in a "strong dollar." Now what exactly
does that mean? It seems to me what it
ought to mean is we believe in a dollar
that is strong at home, meaning that we
believe in low inflation. We believe in
protecting the value of the dollar when
the consumer goes to shop.
Region: Which is why
you distinguish between "strong" and
"competitive"?
Feldstein: Right. At
home versus globally. If we want the
dollar to stay strong relative to the
euro and Chinese renminbi and Japanese
yen, then when the savings rate goes up,
we're going to have a serious problem.
So I think somehow the message has to
get out that the government isn't just
concerned with the renminbi, which is
the only currency they seem to talk
about, but is concerned with making the
dollar competitive against all
currencies.
Region: If I'm not
mistaken, you moved markets a bit when
people might have presumed that a
competitive dollar meant a weak dollar.
You were quoted by the Financial
Times as estimating that a 30
percent to 40 percent devaluation might
be needed to help narrow the trade
deficit. Does it surprise you that you
can move markets in that way, that
you're that influential?
Feldstein: I don't
know that I moved markets, and I never
made a personal forecast of what it
would do. I have said that in the '80s,
when the dollar moved and the current
account deficit was relatively
smaller-it was 4 1/2 percent of GDP then
as opposed to 6 1/2 percent of GDP
now-it moved almost 40 percent in two
years.
Some of my colleagues who have done
detailed analytic calculations would say
that's the kind of number that it might
take now. That would not get us back to
balance, but just get the current
account deficit down to something like 2
or 3 percent of GDP, which would be
consistent with our external debt-to-GDP
ratio not rising. So I've quoted those
numbers, but I've never said those were
my forecasts. But these numbers are from
smart people who've put a lot of effort
into trying to estimate that.
ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND
HEALTH CARE
Region: A change of
subject. Some of your first academic
papers were on the economics of health
care, in the United Kingdom in
particular. More recently, you wrote a
paper about health care economics that
was subtitled "What Have We Learned?
What Have I Learned?" How do you answer
those questions?
Feldstein: The first
paper I ever published was about health
care in Britain. I was a graduate
student in Britain at the time, and I
said what they needed to do was to
introduce some economic thinking.
Remember, it's a state-run system. You
need some cost-benefit analysis. Look at
the costs of doing things, look at the
benefits.
Over the last several decades in this
country, where of course it's much more
of a decentralized and market-driven
health care system than in the United
Kingdom, the combination of insurance
companies and employers has driven home
the message that a doctor, in deciding
what to do when a patient presents, is
no longer to ask, "What are all of the
things I could possibly do to help my
patient?" but rather, "What is the
cost-effective thing to do? Where do I
draw the line?"
So what do I think I've learned, and
we've learned? I think I've learned that
preferences were left out of all this,
that it was treated like an engineering
problem. Maybe preferences ought to be
in engineering problems as well, but in
any case, health care should reflect
individual differences in preferences.
In that article, I emphasized that
people have different preferences when
it comes to health. Of course, everybody
wants to be healthy. We all know that
smoking is bad for your health. We all
know that being overweight is bad for
your health. We all know that exercise
is good for your health. But many people
enjoy smoking and they enjoy eating and
they'd rather not exercise. And they're
aware of the consequences. So it's a
trade-off of preferences. And it may
well be that when I go to see the
doctor, in answering questions of how
much I want to spend, I may differ from
other people. Not because I have a
higher income, but because I have
different preferences about this. And
somehow the system ought to reflect
this. It ought to reflect the fact that
individuals have different tastes for
health versus other things and that a
one-size-fits-all kind of health care is
a mistake.
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Region: You sit on
the boards of three major corporations:
AIG (American International Group), Eli
Lilly and HCA (Hospital Corporation of
America). I guess my segue here is
health and insurance. What is your view
of current debates over executive
compensation and corporate governance?
Are additional restrictions needed, or
should there be some loosening of
government oversight of corporations?
Feldstein: I think
the recent SEC, NYSE and accounting
rules have strengthened the role of the
board in a good way. I think boards are
working harder and treating themselves
as more independent of management. I
don't think there was a big problem
before. To me, the most basic aspect of
corporate governance is whether the
outside directors meet alone and do that
on a regular basis. Not much happens
during those meetings, but you have the
meeting so you have a chance to say,
without management present, "Well, how
do you think management is doing? And
what message should we give management
that would make things better?"
A board doesn't run a company, but it
can provide useful feedback to
management. That aspect of board
independence I think is a useful thing.
And when management is failing, a good
independent board will force a change of
management or even sell the company.
Region: Does recent
controversy about stock options reflect
a problem with the economics of
executive compensation and incentive
structures?
Feldstein: I guess
in the boards that I've served on I've
never felt that excess compensation was
a serious problem. There was a recent
NBER paper explaining why there's been
this n-fold increase in executive
compensation for the top companies.
Well, lo and behold, the top companies
are n-fold larger than they were 20
years ago, and so if you think about the
compensation in proportion to the size
of the business, in part because of
mergers, in part because of just growth
and the big ones growing more than
others, that gives you an explanation of
what's going on.
SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS
Region: In the
mid-1980s, you pointed out that
"supply-side economics" was really just
a return to basic ideas about creating
capacity and removing government
impediments. But as used in current
parlance, the term seems to have a lot
to do with the elasticity of taxable
income. What's your rough estimate of
that elasticity, and what does that
imply about current tax policy?
Feldstein: Let me
back up first to the '80s and then talk
about taxes. I wrote a piece back then
called "The Retreat from Keynesian
Economics." In it I said that the broad
outlines of the Keynesian economics that
had come to dominate policy were an
attitude that output depended on demand,
that high savings were a bad thing, that
a big government was necessary for
stabilization, for maintaining aggregate
demand, and could do more than that,
could manage the economy in all kinds of
ways.
By the time I wrote that piece
[Summer 1981], there was beginning to be
a retreat from all of those ideas. We
came to understand that what really
drove output in the long run, even in
the medium run, was not demand, but was
capacity and that a large part of that
was saving and investment. So contrary
to this earlier view, we were going back
to earlier ideas.
At that time, people-particularly in
the press-were looking for the new
vision. Who was going to be the new
Keynes? Where was this New Great Idea
going to come from? And I said, "No new
Keynes; no New Great Idea. Keynesianism
was a passing intellectual phase
associated with the Depression. Let's go
back to the basics that economists have
believed in more or less since Adam
Smith-with some modifications,
certainly; we've learned some things
along the line." That's what supply-side
economics was about: It was about
creating capacity.
Now much of my own work over the
years has been about taxes and about the
response of households and businesses to
taxes in various ways. And in particular
if you look at the household response to
marginal tax rates, the typical
professional economist's view and also
that of most tax policy officials is
that people don't seem to respond very
much. If you look at the relationship
between labor force participation and
tax rates, or working hours and tax
rates, there's not much there. There is
for married women, who have more
discretion, but for single women, or men
between 25 and 60, there's virtually no
response of labor force participation.
I've argued that that's really
looking in the wrong place. The measure
of labor supply that matters is not just
hours. The relevant labor supply
includes human capital formation, choice
of occupation, willingness to take risk,
entrepreneurship and so on. All of these
affect income and tax revenue.
What's more, taxes cause a further
distortion that causes a "deadweight
loss," that is, an economic
inefficiency. Taxes change the way
people choose to be compensated. I get
compensated in fringe benefits rather
than taxable cash because I have the
choice between 65 cents of spendable
cash or a dollar of fringe benefits.
That choice of fringe benefits that are
worth less than a dollar for every
dollar that they cost to produce implies
economic waste. It shows up as lower
taxable income. A reduction in taxable
income, whether it occurs because I work
less or because I take my compensation
in this other form, creates the same
kind of inefficiency.
Economic analysis shows that if you
want a single measure of the
inefficiencies created by the tax on
labor income, you can just look at
taxable labor income. You don't have to
distinguish whether a higher tax rate
reduces taxable income because I work
fewer hours or I bring less human
capital to the table or I get
compensated in the form of fringe
benefits and nice working conditions.
Therefore, we should look at the data
on how taxable income relates to
marginal tax rates. I looked at the
experience before and after the 1986 tax
cut, because that was a very big, bold
one. The Treasury provided data that
allowed one to track individual
taxpayers over time. So you could look
at an individual a few years before the
1986 Tax Reform Act and at that same
individual a few years later. And that
comparison suggested quite a large
response: Taxable income responded with
an elasticity of about 1, meaning that a
10 percent increase in the after-tax
share that an individual got to keep,
say, going from 60 percent to 66
percent, would increase their taxable
income by 10 percent. So those are big
numbers.
Think about an across-the-board tax
cut. Let's say you cut all tax rates by
10 percent, so that the 25 percent rate
goes to 22 1/2 percent, 15 percent rate
goes to 13 1/2 percent, and so on. That
raises taxable incomes. The revenue cost
of that tax cut is only about two-thirds
of the so-called static result that
you'd get if you didn't take behavior
into account. So both in terms of
thinking about the economic efficiency,
which is very hard to explain to the lay
public-I've been bending my sword
trying-and also in terms of tax revenue,
these are very large effects.
Of course, cutting the 15 percent
rate to 13 1/2 percent has a much
smaller proportional effect on the
net-of-tax share than doing it at higher
rates. So if this were not a change
across the board but a change in the top
rate of the sort that we had in '86,
that would be an even bigger behavioral
impact.
TAX REFORM PANEL
Region: Last year
the president created a tax reform
advisory panel that held public meetings
around the country, with economists and
others testifying before it. In November
the panel came out with a report and a
series of recommendations. As someone
who has studied tax reform for years,
how do you view the panel's
recommendations, and why do you think
they've gained so little traction?
Feldstein: Their
proposals were pretty sensible. Of
course, they didn't have a single set of
recommendations. They emphasized ways of
reducing the taxes on income on savings,
which I think is a good thing to do. We
didn't talk about that, but that's a
very significant thing. They did not opt
for any sort of radical flat tax
reforms, and I think that's probably the
right thing also. Flat taxes are a
wonderful dream, but not a practical
policy.
So why did it not have more traction?
I don't know the answer to that
question. To say that the White House is
concerned with a wide variety of other
things would be an understatement. Why
didn't the Treasury push it more
independently? I suppose that wasn't
their job. Their job was to receive it
and pass it on to the White House, and
the White House chose for a variety of
reasons not to do more.
THE NBER
Region: You've been
the director of the NBER for 28 years,
nearly one-third of its history. What
have been the Bureau's most significant
accomplishments in that period? And what
is your vision for the NBER over the
next quarter century?
Feldstein: A major
accomplishment has been to encourage
empirical research. Empirical research
is a risky strategy. A researcher
starting to do an empirical project has
to know the data and the institutions.
There's a good chance he gets it wrong.
So after he's done all this work and he
presents it, people will say, "Well, you
didn't know about such and such." Or,
"those data aren't really measuring what
you thought they were measuring." So
economists were reluctant to [engage in]
serious empirical research.
Economics is different from some of
the natural science departments or
medical schools where there may be a
dozen people who work on very similar
things. In an economics department, it's
unusual to have more than one or two
labor economists or public finance
economists. And even then, they probably
do slightly different things. So there's
nobody to talk to in your own department
about the details of empirical research.
In contrast, of course, you can talk
about economic theory and get useful
feedback from colleagues.
I'm not belittling that, but I'm
saying that the profession had moved
very far in that direction and was doing
much less empirically because of this
natural tendency for people to do things
that were safe and reliable.
In addition, the National Bureau
brings people together. Of course, it's
normally smaller groups than this Summer
Institute. The NBER program meetings
bring together researchers from a dozen
or more universities who are expert in
the area you're working on. A researcher
can present his research and get
feedback. You get to know people better
in this subdiscipline. You can e-mail
them and say, "I'm working on this, and
do you think these data are the best?"
So bringing people together and
encouraging empirical research, I think,
have been two of the really important
things we have done. Also, as an
organization, we launch projects on
important economic issues like exchange
rate adjustment or monetary policy in an
open economy. So the Bureau directs
attention on what we think are important
problems. We did a lot of work on debt
crises, for instance, and we were able
to get people who would say, "Well, I'm
really a trade specialist, I don't know
very much about that, but if there's
really a good group of people working on
it and you'd like me to participate,
yes, I'll participate." So I think we're
able to focus resources.
Again, that's something you can't do
in a single department. If I as a
professor at Harvard-forgetting the
Bureau-were to call up economists in six
other departments and say, "How would
you like to work on my study?" They
would say, "I don't understand; I'm a
professor at Yale (or Princeton or
Chicago)." It would be like the Harvard
football team calling some guy from Yale
and saying, "How would you like to play
for us?" Nobody thinks that about the
Bureau. It's perfectly natural to
participate in an NBER study. It's a
neutral ground on which people can come
together and do research.
So I think we're able to add value in
terms of bringing resources to bear on
important questions. We did a lot on
Social Security, for example. We
continue to do various things in the tax
area. We have a Washington conference
called "Tax Policy and the Economy." We
do not advocate policies, so it's quite
different from all of the other [think
tanks]. We work on policy-related
issues, and we can say, "If you do this
policy, that's likely to be the
outcome," but we stop short of saying,
"Therefore, you ought to adopt a
particular policy." Individually, I and
other researchers can advocate policies,
but as an organization we don't. But we
can bring attention to it, and we keep
bringing attention to issues like Social
Security and health care costs and tax
policy.
Region: And your
vision of the Bureau 25 years from now?
Feldstein: Somebody
else will be running it, so I'm not sure
how it will develop. The economic
problems will change. The technology may
change. We may do things like more video
conferencing or offering opportunities
for small groups to get together.
Still, there is something about
holding [in-person] meetings that brings
people from all over the world here to
Cambridge. And it's because of the
coffee breaks and the lunches and
everything else as well as just hearing
the papers. It's not just to know what's
in the paper or even to hear the
discussion. It's to talk to others about
your own work and what they're doing and
get a sense of where the profession is
moving.
Paul Samuelson was here today, which
is really quite unusual, and I was
sitting next to him in the meeting room
next door. After everybody had gone
around the room and introduced
themselves, he said, "This must be what
Copenhagen was like in the 1920s when
Niels Bohr was bringing physicists
together from around the world." I
really thought that was a nice
sentiment.
So I don't know where we will go and
how it will change. You would not have
predicted that it would look like this
25 years ago. In part it's the
technology. I mean, the Internet is an
amazing tool for us in terms of shared
data and collaborative work, and
distribution of the work. We had 21ฺ2
million downloads of NBER working papers
last year.
Region: It's a
little daunting how frequently those
long lists of new papers come out. But I
have to guess that leadership, as much
as technology, will guide the Bureau's
future.
Feldstein: Well,
yes. But you know we're a very
decentralized organization, so there are
these separate programs and program
directors. So the meeting next door on
monetary economics was run by David and
Christine Romer from [the University of
California at] Berkeley. The meeting in
[this room] was the international
finance and macro program, which has had
a series of program directors over the
years, and they've all done a very good
job.
And people have been prepared to do
it. The prestige and the chance to
influence their part of the profession
is what I think draws them to do it. I
mean, I can call somebody up and say, "I
think it would be good to do a project
on X. Would you be willing to do it?
We'll take care of all the logistics. So
you can concentrate on the intellectual
part of the task, picking authors and so
on." I enjoy that aspect of it very much
because I work with the project
directors on both what questions are
going to be asked and who the
researchers are. There are now so many
NBER project meetings that I can't go to
them all. But I go to a lot.
Region: Thank you
very much.
Bruce Webb said...
The Social Security section was
bland. No talk of "crisis", no
suggestion that Social Security as
presently constructed would not be able
to pay its bills. Really just a straight
out assertion that private accounts were
inherently better. Which when boiled
down to policy terms really means "fund
your 401k's and IRAs". Has the Economic
Right just thrown in the towel on Social
Security? Perhaps so.
calmo
Agree with Bruce. And also the bland
(I have other adjectives people) view
that executives, lo and behold, are
managing companies that are n fold
larger, just means their compensation
levels are n fold larger. Niels Bohr,
truly a man with a noodle, was bringing
physicists together because they were
excited --no noodle dysfunction for
them. [Why do people, esp economists,
always resort to comparisons to
physicists when they need noodle
buttressing? Me and Einstein are
suspicious, you?][You and what's his
face the Astrophysicist, got a view on
that?] Ok, the savings rate is going to
bounce back from the current -1.5% as
MEW evaporates according to Marty the
Smarty. [You need to clobber this
reverence for Authority early people.]
And that is because they will be earning
real money (as...physicists owing to the
astounding knowledge they acquired in
the residential market looting) and
investing it in nanotechnology. Yes,
tubes right into Marty's brain so we
won't have to read these tomes.
Bruce Wilder
To me, the subtle thing about economics
is that an economy is a system with feedback
effects. If you push, the economy will push
back. Really thinking in systems terms is a
subtle, but critical thing. Otherwise,
economics just becomes a dead matter of
worldview and whatever platitudes follow
from a particular worldview, instead of
puzzling over an almost living thing.
Feldstein lost his capacity to think about
the economy as a system almost 30 years ago.
He is still a very smart guy, but in a
critically important way, he stopped actual
thinking about economics more than a
generation ago.
On inflation: "I think what the public
wants is price stability. They don't want to
have prices rising. . . . The man on the
street doesn't want to be concerned about
small numbers and/or about "core" inflation
versus "regular" inflation. He wants price
stability; he wants the purchasing power of
the money that he has to stay the same. And
so that's what the Fed's message to him
ought to be."
That's so idiotic that it could well be
the text of a speech by George W. Bush.
Seriously, doesn't it sound like the
President?
Health care: "Of course, everybody wants
to be healthy. We all know that smoking is
bad for your health. We all know that being
overweight is bad for your health. We all
know that exercise is good for your health.
But many people enjoy smoking and they enjoy
eating and they'd rather not exercise. And
they're aware of the consequences. So it's a
trade-off of preferences. And it may well be
that when I go to see the doctor, in
answering questions of how much I want to
spend, I may differ from other people. Not
because I have a higher income, but because
I have different preferences about this."
Right. Thank you, doctor, for suggesting
that we insert a stent to keep open my
cardiac artery, but really, I enjoy a good
heart attack? Don't you?
Executive Compensation: "I guess in the
boards that I've served on I've never felt
that excess compensation was a serious
problem. There was a recent NBER paper
explaining why there's been this n-fold
increase in executive compensation for the
top companies. Well, lo and behold, the top
companies are n-fold larger than they were
20 years ago, and so if you think about the
compensation in proportion to the size of
the business, in part because of mergers, in
part because of just growth and the big ones
growing more than others, that gives you an
explanation of what's going on."
No problem that Marty can see. No problem
at all.
Marty is an idiot, but a useful
idiot, a dependable, reactionary, partisan
whore of an idiot, useful to the worst kinds
of irresponsible, reactionary politicians.
Special note to Bruce Webb: what I note
in what he says about Social Security, is
what he doesn't acknowledge. This is his
standard rhetorical practice. Democrats are
not opposed; they have no leadership. The
1984 Greenspan increase in SS taxes is never
acknowledged. The fiscal deficit is small
and manageable (I guess, because we have a
Republican President).
Reply Wednesday, September 20, 2006 at
08:50 AM calmo said... Nice to be surrounded
by non-whores like these Bruces, yes? Thank
you for your articulate, no nonsense, clear
and concise views Mr Wilder. If I can keep
my prankster mode under control for a moment
and make a contribution following your fine
example: The Region's interviewer/editor
side of this dialogue wherein we learn the
true (current atleast)[possibly decadent]
views of the illustrious [Ok, prankster
control fading here] Herr Doctor Feldstein
(just about pinned by the prankster), do we
get a slanted, possibly even slurred view of
this economist? How would it go with an
interview from Mother Jones? I'm inclined to
think The Region does not do justice to the
man's actual contribution.
Reply Wednesday, September 20, 2006 at
09:48 AM spencer said... When he talk about
the size of corporations the measure he is
using is stock market capitalization not
some measure of output, profits, employment,
etc, etc. We have experienced a massive rise
in the stock market PE because of lower
inflation and interest rates that had
nothing to do with CEO performance. He is
adding crabs and apples to get crapapples.
What I find so interesting is that he can
sound so reasonable and makes broad points
where I say yes, I agree with that. But then
you turn around and look at the details the
Republicans actually propose and the
proposed legislation turns out to be nothing
like the original reasonable proposal.
Finally, note that he talks about the
1985 Reagan tax cuts that were a very
different animal then the original Reagan
tax cuts and what many supply-siders now
propose. Almost accross the board the 1985
tax cuts -- achieved through bipartisan give
and take -- were very good and achieved very
much of their promise.
Reply Wednesday, September 20, 2006 at
09:56 AM Movie Guy said... Bruce Wilder -
Marty [Martin Feldstein] is an idiot, but a
useful idiot, a dependable, reactionary,
partisan whore of an idiot, useful to the
worst kinds of irresponsible, reactionary
politicians.
Wilder, when you're Martin Feldstein's
age (if you live that long), you will
probably be drolling. Worse than you are
now...
Reply Wednesday, September 20, 2006 at
10:49 AM Movie Guy said... Bruce,
There is no excuse for being that ugly
about Martin Feldstein.
Just no excuse, puppy.
Reply Wednesday, September 20, 2006 at
10:54 AM DRR said... So what have you done
with your life so far Mr. Wilder?
Marty Feldstein >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bruce
Wilder
Reply Wednesday, September 20, 2006 at
03:39 PM Bruce Wilder said... MG: There is
no excuse for being that ugly about Martin
Feldstein.
BW: There's Martin Feldstein.
Reply Wednesday, September 20, 2006 at
03:47 PM calmo said... Larson has this
cartoon of God busy with creation --rolling
snakes "This is EASY!!" (And I wish I could
find a link to it). Obviously God has done a
lot of things with his life but snakes here
appear to be a trouble-free delight. Now I'm
not suggesting that Bruce has to come
up/down/over/across to this standard
(Delighted Roller of Snakes) which rings a
certain bell for some of us who can recall
our days with the plastercine, but DRR puts
the plastercine in front of us and who can
resist? Not me. What have you done with your
life, you slab of plastercine? Now that
plastercine has certain properties and if
it's too cold, snakes are NOT easy like God
says. [And it could be that if it's too hot,
the snakes just turn into a gooey mess.] God
just makes it look easy. DDR seems to think
Marty rolled a pretty decent snake (MG too)
and Bruce rolled something less. I'd say The
Region thinks Marty is The Biggest Snake
Ever. And I'd also say that picture is a tad
bloated and hides lots about this pretty
good snake I want to know. Some snakes are
NOT easy as previously reported and refuse
to be rolled just like all the rest. Some
snakes even feel that a list of
accomplishments is way too thin a roll.
Reply Wednesday, September 20, 2006 at
11:31 PM Movie Guy said... calmo,
I believe that communications and
opinions of others in the USA have gone to
hell. And it is a shame. A real shame.
Bruce Wilder is an excellent thinker and
blog poster. He doesn't have to resort to
that type of name calling to make his point.
Now, that is what I really think. And
it's why I posted my response to Bruce. Who
knows better.
Reply Thursday, September 21, 2006 at
08:28 AM calmo said... Good morning Movie, I
confess to irretrievable biases for Bruces.
And that's why I tried to employ Larson
(bring out the Big Guns I say) [yes, the
real snake rollers] to shift the focus from
Martin to The Region. Or was it just to DDR
and not the wider (vs telescopic) view that
was provoked by DDR's question? I appreciate
that desire to be civil and polite. Mostly.
Unless I can see an opportunity for making a
real fuss... It is only one of my failings,
such is stature of this modestly rolled
snake.