Here are my (I am far from he specialist in this field, so information should be taken with a grain
of salt):
It would be premature to categorize current China-Russia relations as either a “partnership” or an
“alliance,” but both are fuzzy concept because there are no permanent friends in world politics, only
permanent interests. Somehow France and USA managed to co-exist in NATO, so why not China and Russia.
But here much depends on push of the neocons in the US administration and especially in completely infested
with necons State Department. with enough thrust pigs can fly and they drive those to countries tor
the formal alliance (at least in a form of “nuclear attack on one is an attack on both”):
Both Rozman and Nye are, in fact, looking at different sides of the same coin. However, both have
missed something. The future of a China-Russian relationship depends largely on relations these two
countries have with the West, especially the United States. If Washington pushes too hard on oil
prices, Ukraine, and NATO expansion toward Russia, and if the U.S. rebalances too far against China
in the Pacific, China and Russia may indeed move towards a formal alliance, even if that may not
have been what they originally wanted.
The deal is significant to regional security as well as geopolitics. China’s improved
air defense capabilities will greatly complicate any efforts to conduct aerial operations or missile
attacks against the Chinese mainland, even with stealthy drones, longer-ranged cruise missiles, or
new bombers, all part of the new US “third offset” plan. In wartime, the S-400 could even support
Chinese airstrikes by knocking out enemy fighters flying above their own bases and cities. On the
strategic level, the S-400 sale would facilitate Sino-Russian cooperation, as well as facilitate
other sales and joint projects like submarines and space operations.
Ukrainian coup d’état of February 2014 moved Russia much closer to China and openly hostile to
the USA. That was a dramatic change that US neocons wanted so much. They essentially unleashed
“Cold War II”. That got what they wanted: they blocked EU-Russia cooperation. But it comes with a price.
http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-and-china-are-building-ties-against-the-west-2014-10
According to Missile Threat, a website operated by the George C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes,
it would make sense for Russia to reach out to China for help with an early warning missile system.
China has the technological capability to build a satellite system necessary for Russia’s early-warning
systems, while Russia could provide China with the technology necessary to protect itself against
medium-range ballistic missiles.
… … …
Ultimately, the crisis in Ukraine might benefit China more than any other country.
This trend is confirmed by Russians:
The expert spoke to Sputnik in an interview saying that, “The US solves tactical problems, but
very seriously loses strategically, as a consequence of the placement of US missile defense system
in South Korea, the result would be the rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing, in particular,
in the sphere of missile defense.”
Again, probably not an urgent problem unless some existing Chinese aircraft in service are
on their last legs and urgently must be replaced. In which case they could go with Airbus if
the situation could not wait. China has options. Boeing does not.
The west loves to portray the Chinese as totally without ethics, and if you have a product
they can't make for themselves, they will buy it from you only until they have figured out
how to make it themselves, and then fuck you, Jack. I don't see any reason to believe the
Chinese value alliances less than the west does, or are any more incapable of grasping the
value of a give-and-take trade policy. The west – especially the United States –
favours establishing a monopoly on markets and then using your inability to get the product
anywhere else as leverage to force concessions you don't want to make; is that ethical? China
must surely see the advantages of a mutually-respectful relationship with Russia, considering
that country not only safeguards a significant length of its border from western probing, but
supplies most of its energy. There remain many unexplored avenues for technical, engineering
and technological cooperation. At the same time, Russia is not in a subordinate position
where it has to endure being taken advantage of.
Trade is hard work, and any partner will maneuver for advantage, because everyone in
commerce likes market share and money. But Washington has essentially forgotten how to
negotiate on mutually-respectful terms, and favours maneuvering its 'partners' into
relationships in which the USA has an overwhelmingly dominant position, and then announcing
it is 'leveling the playing field'. Which means putting its thumb on the scale.
Lessons from Dr. Strangelove: The Risks of Deploying Low-Yield Nukes on Submarines
by Natasha E. Bajema
Stanley Kubrik's cult classic, Dr. Strangelove, has a lot to teach us about the practicalities of nuclear deterrence. Using
the film as a frame, we explore how other countries might view the deployment of low-yield nukes on U.S. submarines.
The low-yield nuclear warhead allegedly provides the U.S. with a needed capability for
deterring the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia, a prospect considered more likely under its current
nuclear doctrine. Proponents claim these new weapons are prompt,
useable
,
and capable of circumventing Russia's air defenses.
The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) transits the Hood Canal as it returns to Naval
Base Kitsap-Bangor.
But these claims beg two questions. Does this new weapon lead to enhanced credibility?
If so, at what cost?
Russian Forces Officially Enter the Crimea Region of Ukraine
Whenever U.S. policymakers express their fears of a "capability gap", it's hard not to
think of Stanley Kubrick's 1964 parody of nuclear weapons policies,
Dr. Strangelove
.
While
esteemed
experts have proposed plenty of valid arguments
against deploying low-yield nuclear weapons on submarines, it is
also worth considering what the film might teach us about credibility, capability gaps, the practicalities of deterrence
theory, and the essential role of perception.
I
Getting Into the Minds of our Adversaries is Essential for Achieving Nuclear Deterrence
After consulting with Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling, Kubrick defines deterrence in
his film as "the art of producing in the mind of the enemy... the fear to attack."
Schelling suggests the threat of violence implied by deterrence requires explicit or
implicit collaboration between a "deterrer" and a "deterree" to achieve the common interest of avoiding mutual
destruction. This assumes country leaders are rational, spend time
evaluating
the costs and benefits of multiple courses of action, and communicate clearly about the nature of their deterrent. The
country being deterred will refrain from an action if it proves to be too costly.
If
one party refuses to collaborate or uphold the assumption of rationality, then deterrence fails.
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To determine what might be costly for its adversaries, the U.S. must therefore get
into their heads and see the world from their perspective.
An adversary must
believe
that
the U.S. has the will and capability to follow through with a particular threat. The deterrent must be credible.
II
A Capability Gap is Whatever You Make of It
Since nuclear deterrence does not involve the actual "use" of nuclear weapons, but
rather the threat of their use, it occurs largely in the minds of the "deterrer" and the "deterree".
When President John F. Kennedy first took office in 1961, many people perceived the
credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to suffer from a so-called "missile gap" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union -- a threat
which turned out to be in error. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 and Khrushchev's bluster about the Soviet superiority
generated a widely-held impression that the U.S. trailed far behind the Soviets in ballistic missile technology. But the
gap was actually in United States' favor.
Ham radio operator Dick Oberholtzer and his wife listening to radio signals from Sputnik I.
Francis Miller/The LIFE Picture Collection via Getty Images
To close the gap, the Kennedy administration deployed the "Jupiter" nuclear missiles
to Italy and Turkey with the Soviet Union as their intended target. Meanwhile, Khrushchev decided to place
intermediate-range missiles in Cuba in an effort to restore the perceived imbalance in capabilities.
A Soviet freighter is photographed just after leaving Cuba to return home.
Naval History & Heritage Command
Dr. Strangelove
suggests that a capability gap
exists because we think it exists. Alternatively, it exists because we fear our adversary thinks it exists. The gap does
not have to exist beyond the human imagination. It is the fear evoked by the perceived capability gap that matters.
Therefore, w
hatever U.S. policymakers think
about the supposed "capability gap" will have real world effects. But these effects will not necessarily benefit U.S.
national security in the way they intend. It depends on how their adversaries think about it.
III
Understanding the Discord Between Credibility and the Requirement for Rationality
In the film, plans to enhance credibility of a nuclear deterrent go awry, bringing
about the very nuclear catastrophe such actions were designed to prevent.
A deranged general activates a Top Secret plan designed to ensure prompt retaliation
in the event of a Soviet attack on U.S. leadership by allowing lower-level commanders to give nuclear launch orders. If
a first-strike nuclear attack inevitably leads to an all-out nuclear war, it would never be in the Soviet Union's
interest to start one.
American actor Sterling Hayden as General Jack Ripper in 'Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love
The Bomb' directed by Stanley Kubrick, 1964. In the film, the delusional General Ripper orders a nuclear attack on
the USSR, which triggers a Soviet doomsday device.
Silver Screen Collection/Getty Images
As absurd as it seems, creating a situation in which the loss of central command and
control of nuclear weapons might occur was perceived as an effective strategy for enhancing credibility during the Cold
War.
As absurd as it seems, creating a situation in which the loss of central command and
control of nuclear weapons might occur was perceived as an effective strategy for enhancing credibility during the Cold
War. By exacerbating the risks and uncertainties inherent in nuclear conflict, adversaries were believed to refrain from
taking escalatory actions.
The problem with enhancing credibility of a nuclear deterrent is that such actions
rely on the strict rationality of both parties. Even if leaders are rational in the purest sense, they often lack
necessary information to properly analyze the costs and benefits for all possible courses of action, which can lead to
dangerous miscalculations.
While U.S. policymakers may perceive the new low-yield capability as
enhancing credibility, Putin may still be prepared to call the U.S. bluff on the strength of its will to use nuclear
weapons of any yield.
IV
When Nuclear Deterrence Theory is Translated into Practice, Nuclear War Becomes More Probable
As illustrated in
Dr. Strangelove,
plans grounded
in deterrence theory are prone to nuclear catastrophe when put into practice. Decentralizing command and control
enhances credibility, but it also introduces a significant risk of unauthorized nuclear war.
During the Cold War, the U.S. deployed thousands of tactical nuclear weapons to Europe
to credibly deter an attack from the Soviet Union where it enjoyed significant conventional superiority.
Many tactical nuclear weapons required pre-delegation authority to enhance
credibility. For example, the
Davy
Crockett
light recoilless rifle carried a W54 warhead with a yield of 10 to 20 tons. These weapons were mounted on
jeeps, operated by a three-man crew, and deployed to the front lines in Europe.
A U.S. Army soldier operates a Davy Crockett mounted on a jeep as three fellow soldiers stand by and watch on a
snow-covered road during the Vietnam War. The Davy Crockett was the U.S. Army hand or jeep portable weapons system
capable of firing atomic or conventional warheads.
Hulton Archive/Getty Images
Although the weapon's lethal radius famously exceeded its range, Carl Kaysen, a
prominent nuclear deterrence strategist during the Kennedy administration, expressed greater concern about its implied
pre-delegation authority.
I can't imagine a situation in which it could be safely deployed and used. How are you going to command it? How are
you going to be in control of it? You'll have some sergeant in a jeep firing off nuclear weapons because he's in
danger of being captured.
Carl Kaysen
Nuclear deterrence makes good sense in theory, and holds up in the minds of deterrer
and deterree. As long as nuclear war does not occur, deterrence has succeeded. However, when nuclear deterrence is
implemented as a military strategy, it can translate into absurd situations that actually increase the risk of nuclear
war.
V
Communication is Essential, but Perception is Everything
The conflation of communication with perception was a paramount theme in
Dr.
Strangelove.
In the film, the President goes as far as allowing the Soviet Ambassador into the War Room to clear up
any misunderstandings.
But, clear communication does not guarantee accurate perception.
This
is where the new submarine-launched low-yield nuclear warhead becomes especially problematic. Deploying low-yield
nuclear warheads on a strategic delivery system produces
dangerous
uncertainties
if U.S. policymakers attempt to use them. And they have to at least be willing to use them for the
sake of credibility.
A port quarter aerial view of the nuclear-powered Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Nebraska (SSBN 739)
underway in the Atlantic.
U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 3rd Class Christian Viera
If they're used, will the Russians perceive the attack as limited? If asked this
question, Dr. Strangelove would likely respond: "The whole point of a limited response... is lost...if your adversary
can't tell the difference!"
If under attack from a ballistic missile submarine, the Russians are likely to assume
the worst if they can't determine the exact yield of the warhead on an incoming SLBM. And the worst would lead to
nuclear war with the United States.
In fact, as a result of this risk, U.S. policymakers
might
be self-deterred
and reluctant to use these weapons in the first place. Putin is likely to anticipate this, which
would entirely defeat the purpose of the new capability while increasing the potential for nuclear war.
VI
We Need to Move Beyond Capability Gaps as Drivers of Nuclear Weapons Policy
In his film, Kubrick demonstrates the absurdity of a capability gap in a concluding
discussion about "doomsday gaps" and "mineshaft gaps".
The new low yield nuclear warhead deployed on ballistic missile submarines fails to
enhance credibility. It also increases the risk of nuclear war. As a result, this new weapon does not make us safer, but
rather invites potential misunderstanding with adversaries.
Let's draw on lessons from history and pop culture and avoid repeating past mistakes.
Natasha Bajema is the Founder and CEO of Nuclear Spin Cycle and the host of the Authors
of Mass Destruction Podcast. Follow her on Twitter
@W
MDgirl
.
The rise of China has been a looming threat to the U.S. primacy on the world stage, as
Beijing increasingly seeks to push the United States out of its immediate periphery and
ultimately Asia
. Facing an increasingly powerful China, Obama initiated the strategic rebalancing of U.S.
interests from the Middle East to East Asia. The "
pivot to Asia " aimed to slow down the rise of China as a great power, and also to free the
United States from the shackles of the Middle East wars. In this context, Obama's successor,
Trump, in his 2019 State of the Union address
noted that "great nations do not fight endless wars." For that matter, the Trump
administration has followed its predecessor's overall strategy to pull the United States out of
the Middle East and refocus on its attention on the looming threat of rising China.
Trump, for his turn, has upped the ante by waging a trade war against China and has
increased the U.S. military presence in its vicinity
. In April and May 2020, the U.S. Navy deployed several warships to the South China Sea,
including Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Montgomery to counter Beijing's "
bullying ." Meanwhile, three of the eleven U.S. Navy aircraft
carriers are currently patrolling the Pacific, sending a powerful signal to China.
Washington has also resorted to economic sanctions
to counter Beijing and is considering the
deployment of ballistic missiles to Asia pacific; a move that could shift the balance of
power in favor of the United States.
The recent outbreak of the deadly coronavirus has also enabled the U.S. administration to
increase its diplomatic attacks
against China, blaming Beijing for hiding the truth about the spread of the deadly virus. It is
interesting to note that U.S. officials in reference to China are increasingly using the word "
communist
," a reminiscent of the Cold War great-power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Washington's efforts to slow down and hinder China's rise, as a potential
peer-competitor are in line with the realist predictions that great powers seek to ensure that
no other power can challenge them.
Over the years, the United States has also
increased its defense spending, which is
projected to reach a historic record of $740.5 billion for the year 2021. Meanwhile, some
analysts have even
argued that the U.S. defense budget exceeds $1 trillion. Furthermore, the United States is
investing in new military technologies, including missile defense systems to
counter China's "[development of] missile capabilities intended to deny the United States
the capability and freedom of action to protect U.S. allies and partners in Asia." In the same
context, as China
unveiled its own "game-changer" DF-17 hypersonic missile, the United States is
pressing for its own "super-duper" missiles -- as Trump
calls them -- to take the lead in the emerging arms race for hypersonic missiles. Russia,
for its part, has also deployed Avangard hypersonic missiles, claiming
that it can reach twenty times the speed of sound.
With respect to nuclear weapons, the Trump administration has also called for the expansion
of the role, and capabilities of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) observes the "need" for replacement, sustainment and modernization of
the U.S. nuclear triad. Following the NPR, the United States has deployed
low-yield nuclear warheads, which in turn could lower the threshold of the use of nuclear
weapons. Furthermore, some reports
suggest that the United States, after decades of a moratorium, may conduct its first
nuclear test.
The new changes in the U.S. nuclear policies are reflective of the recent developments in
great power rivalry with Russia and China and are in line with realist
predictions that great powers go into a great length to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence
against other nuclear states. In this vein, Russian president Vladimir Putin recently
signed
Russia's nuclear deterrent policy, announcing that Russia, in response to conventional attacks,
would use nuclear weapons. Ironically, Putin's move echoes President Dwight Eisenhower's "
massive
retaliation " policy, which implicitly threatened nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union
in response to any conventional aggression against America's allies.
Although much smaller in size compared to the United States and Russia, China for its own
part, has embarked on modernizing its nuclear arsenal, fielding a greater number of warheads. A
report by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies indicates that the number of Chinese nuclear
warheads between 2012 and 2019 grew from 240 to 290, suggesting a 21 percent increase. From
Beijing's perspective , however, "rising strategic
threats" emerging from Washington, mandates the country to increase the number of its warheads,
and complete its nuclear triad.
The Trump administration has also set on the path of abandoning international arms control
agreements, unshackling the U.S. military from previous limitations. In the latest case, the
Trump administration, citing Russia's violation of the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), withdrew from
the four-decade arms control agreement in August 2019, allowing the U.S. military to develop
and
test previously banned intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Notwithstanding the official
reasoning however, the decision to abandon the INF treaty has more to do with concerns over
China's
growing intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which is not bound to any restrictions.
As the expiration date for another arms control treaty, the New
START is approaching, the Trump administration is pressing
China to join any future agreement between Washington and Moscow; a demand that seems to be
unlikely given China's own insecurities, and small nuclear arsenal. In the case of INF for
example, reports indicate that China could
lose up to 95 percent of its ballistic missiles capability, should it join an agreement
similar to INF. These developments are consistent with Realist
dictums that states are concerned with their relative gains when joining international
regimes, such as arms control agreements.
After more than three decades of primacy on the world stage, the United States is facing
serious challenges emerging from Asia. To counter them, the United States has sought to
increase its relative power and simultaneously contain its closest competitor, Beijing, which
after two centuries of absence from the world stage, is bent on upending the current ordering
of the international system. In any case, the current U.S. approach to increasing military
spending, nuclear modernization and unilaterally abrogating multilateral agreements are
consistent with realist predictions of great-power rivalry. In this context, under the likely
scenario of a second Trump term, one should expect the United States to continue abrogating
international regimes, and to further increase military expenditure, which in turn could
trigger another arms race, reminiscent of the Cold War era.
Sina Azodi is a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council and a foreign policy advisor
at Gulf State Analytics. He is also a PhD candidate in international relations at the
University of South Florida. Follow him on Twitter @Azodiac83.
Says US would need to come down to China's level for arsenal
China confirmed on Wednesday that they would be happy to join trilateral nuclear arms
limitation talks with the US and Russia, but would only do so if the US drastically cut its
nuclear stockpile to be in line with China's
####
From the CNN link: "I can assure you that if the US says that they are ready to come
down to the Chinese level (of nuclear weapons), China will be happy to participate the next
day. But actually we know that's not going to happen," Fu Cong, head of the Chinese Foreign
Ministry's arms control department, said at a press briefing in Beijing Wednesday
###
LOLZ! That's a pretty good response and I'm surprised they didn't say this much earlier,
but I assume Beijing & Mosocw have it all in hand. Now I would follow this up with If
it helps, we will increase our nuclear capacity to 6,000 plus deployable nuclear weapons and
then negotiate a reduction. Agree?
I LOVE your answer, it is even better than the Chinese response, which I agree was pretty
tongue-in-cheek. Maybe you should be a diplomat – it's not too late.
It also occurred to me that China has a Cuban option if the US insists on ringing it with
missiles and them moves nukes up to the region. Beijing would only have to mention the
possibility and Washington would go apoplectic! Remember that the Cuban missile crisis had
its origins in the USA installing Nike/Jupiter IRBMs in northern Turkey which would have a
very short flight time to target in the Soviet Union. Putting nukes in Cuba was an et tu
Brute move and completely unexpected, coz the enemy is always dumb.
Ringing China was on the cards from the mid-1990s, so of it already implemented such as
'Super Bastions', i.e. building up bases such as Guam & Diego Garcia to take more
bombers, nuke armed submarines etc. The down side of that is that they make very tempting
targets to hit with nukes themselves, both bases being far from any other country.
Just at what point will the US understand that building up its military forces in the
region is massively retarded? Unfortunately the French and the British have signed on. India
still hasn't learned its strategic lessons either as we have seen recently with China where
it tried to change the balance (via J&K new state declaration etc.) and got wedgied. The
US loves its naval exercises with India in the region coz the USN doesn't and will not have
enough (of the right) ships to do so itself ($$$) so being nice is a bit of a freebie.
Backing up India 100% wouldn't be but it does look good in public when soothing words come
from Washington.
Hong Kong has a long history of being the base camp of western intelligence agencies in the
Asia-Pacific. Much has been written about the western intelligence agencies' covert operations out of Hong Kong
before, during and after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests in China.
In the case of Russia, too, western intelligence activities are showing signs of making
another determined push for a post-Putin scenario in the Kremlin. The West's calculation is
that if Putin were to step down in 2024, he would very soon become a "lame duck". Like in Hong
Kong, western intelligence has developed extensive networks within
Russia through which it is feasible to fuel unrest if political uncertainties coalesce with
social and economic grievances. The Russian counter-intelligence is very well aware of this
danger.
Putin has outwitted the western game plan to destabilise Russia. The constitutional
amendment allows him to seek another two six-year terms and he intends to keep everyone
guessing. Keeping the western adversaries guessing is also what the Chinese security law in
Hong Kong hopes to achieve.
The western intelligence operating out of the city henceforth comes under direct scrutiny of Beijing .
Recruitment of local agents, planning and mounting operations inside China, or inciting unrest
in Hong Kong to weaken China -- such covert operations become far more difficult and risky for
the US, British and Australian intelligence. Interestingly, Xi used the expression "external
sabotage and intervention" in his conversation with Putin today.
Beijing and Moscow have voiced strong support for each other's moves to strengthen national
security. On June 2, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said,
"We note that the national referendum on constitutional amendments, a major event in
Russia's political calendar, is going on smoothly. Results released by the Central Elections
Commission reflect the Russian people's choice. As Russia's friendly neighbour and
comprehensive strategic partner of coordination for a new era, China will always respect the
development path independently chosen by the Russian people and support Russia's efforts to
realise lasting stability and promote socioeconomic development.
"We stand ready to work together with the Russian side to act on the consensus reached by
our heads of state, deepen all-round strategic coordination and mutually-beneficial cooperation
in various areas, and bring greater benefits to our two peoples."
On the same day, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said in Moscow, "We
noted the entry into force of the law on ensuring national security in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the PRC on July 1, 2020 by the decision of the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress of China.
"In this context, we would like to reaffirm that Russia's position of principle on the
situation in Hong Kong remains unchanged. We respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the PRC and consider all issues pertaining to Hong Kong to be China's domestic affair. We
are against any attempts by external forces to interfere in relations between the central
government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC."
Cooperation between the Russian and Chinese security agencies in the realm of internal
security can only stem from a high level of mutual understanding at the highest level.
Significantly, on July 4, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov poured cold water on
President Trump's invitation to Putin to attend a G7 summit in the US, calling it a "flawed"
idea.
Moscow has any number of legitimate reasons to distance itself from Trump's
invite, but what Ryabkov chose was very telling. He said, "The idea of the so-called expanded
G7 summit is flawed, because it is unclear to us how the authors of that initiative plan to
consider the Chinese factor. Without China, it is just impossible to discuss certain issues in
the modern world."
In effect, Rybakov thwarted Washington's move to isolate China. Trump's advisors were naive
to estimate that Moscow could be baited to join its containment strategy against China. Ryabkov
publicly administered the
Kremlin's snub.
Enter Russia. Coincidence or not, small fires are being lit lately on the Moscow streets as
well, and they are spreading into significant protests
against President Vladimir Putin. If the extradition law was the pretext for the Hong Kong
turmoil, it is the election to the Moscow Duma (city legislature) that has apparently triggered
the Russian protest.
Protestors in Moscow, August 10, 2019
Just as there is economic and social discontent in Hong Kong, the popularity of Putin has
declined lately which is attributed to the stagnation of the Russian economy.
In both cases, the American agenda is blatantly "regime change". This may seem surprising,
since the Chinese and Russian leaderships appear rock solid. The legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party over which President Xi Jinping presides and the popularity of Putin still at a
level that is the envy of any politician anywhere in the world, but the doctrine of "colour
revolutions" is not built on democratic principles.
Colour revolutions are about upturning an established political order and it has no
co-relation with mass support. The colour revolution is coup by other means. It is not even
about democracy. The recent presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine exposed that
the colour revolution of 2014 was an insurrection that the nation disowns.
Of course, the stakes are very high when it comes to destabilising China and Russia. Nothing
less than the global strategic balance is involved. The US' dual containment strategy against
Russia and China is quintessentially the New American Century project -- US' global hegemony
through the 21st century.
The US wagered that Moscow and Beijing would be hard pressed to cope with the spectre of
colour revolutions and that would isolate them. After all, authoritarian regimes are exclusive
and into the sanctum sanctorum of their internal politics not even their closest friends or
allies are allowed in.
This is where Moscow has sprung a nasty surprise for Washington. The Russian Foreign
Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said in Moscow on Friday that Russia and China should
exchange information on the US interference in their internal affairs. She flagged that Moscow
is aware of the Chinese statements that the US interferes in Hong Kong affairs and treats this
information "with all seriousness."
"Moreover, I think it would be right and useful to exchange such information through
respective services," Zakharova said, adding that the Russian and Chinese sides will discuss
the issue soon. She added that the US intelligence agency is using technology to destabilise
Russia and China.
Earlier on Friday, the
Russian Foreign Ministry had summoned the head of the Political Section in the US embassy
Tim Richardson, and presented him with an official protest against the US encouraging an
unauthorised opposition rally in Moscow on August 3.
Indeed, Moscow is far more experienced than Beijing in neutralising covert operations by the
US intelligence. It is a hallmark of the great skill and expertise as well as the tenacity of
the Russian system that through the entire Cold War era and "post-Soviet" period, there has
never been anything like the turmoil on Tiananmen Square in Beijing (1989) or Hong Kong (2019)
triggered by the US intelligence.
Moscow's message to Beijing is direct and candid -- 'United we stand, divided we fall.' No
doubt, the two countries have been in consultation and wanted the rest of the world to know.
Indeed, the message Zakharova transmitted -- on a joint firewall against US interference -- is
of epochal significance. It elevates the Russia-China alliance to a qualitatively new level,
creating yet another political underpinning of collective security.
Here's What You Need To Remember: Pentagon war plans already included the destruction of
cities as a way to destroy the urban and industrial backbone. "This should result in greater
population casualties in that a larger portion of the urban population may be placed at
risk."
"Bomb them back into the Stone Age," ex-Air Force general Curtis LeMay is reported to have
once urged as a way to defeat North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.
But it turns out that had global nuclear war erupted during the early 1960s, it would have
been the Russians and Chinese who would have reverted to living like the Flintstones.
Related Video: Cold War Escape Tunnel Opens Under Berlin Wall
The document in question pertains to the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP, which
governs the numerous war plans and their associated options that govern how America would fight
a nuclear war. In June 1964, senior military leaders (including Air Force Chief of Staff LeMay)
were sent a staff review of the current SIOP.
The report included questions and answers regarding the various nuclear targeting options.
These ranged from attacks on enemy nuclear and conventional forces while minimizing collateral
damage to enemy cities, to attacking cities as well as military forces on purpose. This latter
option would have been "in order to destroy the will and ability of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to
wage war, remove the enemy from the category of a major industrial power, and assure a post-war
balance of power favorable to the United States."
"Should these options give more stress to population as the main target?" asked one
question.
The answer was that Pentagon war plans already included the destruction of cities as a way
to destroy the urban and industrial backbone. "This should result in greater population
casualties in that a larger portion of the urban population may be placed at risk."
In another Pentagon analysis "on the effect of placing greater emphasis on the attack of
urban/industrial targets in order to destroy the USSR and China as viable societies, it was
indicated that the achievement of a 30 per cent fatality level (i.e., 212.7 million people) in
the total population (709 million people) of China would necessitate an exorbitant weight of
effort."
This was because of China's rural society at the time. "Thus, the attack of a large number
of place names [towns] would destroy only a small fraction of the total population of China.
The rate of return for a [nuclear] weapon expended diminishes after accounting for the 30 top
priority cities."
Note that while annihilating one-third of China's population was deemed uneconomical, the
U.S. military took it for granted that the Soviet Union and China would be destroyed as viable
societies.
14 hours ago Nice. Sounds like a lose lose situation. Carry on! 8 hours ago Whats
more scary is Russia Dead Hand program. it can automatically trigger the launch of the Russian
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by sending a pre-entered highest-authority order
from the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Strategic Missile Force Management to command posts
and individual silos if a nuclear strike is detected by seismic, light, radioactivity, and
pressure sensors even with the commanding elements fully destroyed. So even if we somehow nuked
them and they didnt have time to respond, Dead Hand would do it itself. 16 hours ago This was
before scientist fully understood how the prevailing winds and the jet stream circle the globe
in the northern hemisphere. Had this nuclear war on two fronts actually happened the radiation
fallout would have circled the globe in weeks and killed most of the people living north of the
equator in a matter of months.. Think the old Gregory Peck movie "On the Beach"... And rent it
if you can, it's a great movie.. 14 hours ago If I am not mistaken, was not the same General
Curtis LeMay the running mate of George Wallace in 1968? 14 hours ago Note, all plans of the
USA are always based on assumption of invisibility. The feeling is that the country is
protected by oceans and invisible to any retaliation. My conclusion: Nuclear bomb available to
both sides saved us from MAD. It is good that both Soviet Union and China developed nuclear
response. But look, amepikan plans are made in 1964 - Soviet Union had already launched in 1957
Sputnik and as one of my educated amepikan contacts said "Russians beat a s.....t out us", that
is scared to death.
So amepikan leadership could expect that they would not invite retaliation? May be the US would
win but what would be left from the US would hardly resemble normal society. 15 hours ago By
the late 1980s, the US had so many nuclear weapons that they pretty much ran out of viable
targets. The nuke weaponeers used to talk about "making the rubble bounce" by hitting the same
targets multiple times.
BTW, the highly classified "SIOP" was in effect until 2003: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_Integrated_Operational_Plan
13 hours ago This doctrine imo still exist. An obama aide leaked the same thing. If we go to a
nuclear war with either china or russia we will nuke both because we cant afford to have one
survive if we get destroyed. So, we can assume a nuke war with China or russia will send both
their nukes our way. 13 hours ago This kind of hyperbole article is not productive. National
war strategy should be secret. Freedom of press should have its limit. 9 hours ago I have a
suggestion, Pentagon. In the future, if you have an Endgame scenario & response, DON'T
PUBLISH IT ON YAHOO!
I think you are onto something there. When Putin unveiled the new weapons systems,
Peresvet I took to be a laser and it seemed a bit out of place as lasers are limited by
atmospheric conditions whereas Russian military equipment operates under all conditions.
Putin also spoke of completely new physics principles.
In what is shaping up as the next explosive geopolitical hotspot, one of China's most senior
generals said on Friday that the country will attack Taiwan if there is no other way of
stopping it from becoming independent in the latest rhetorical escalation between China and the
democratically ruled island Beijing claims as its own, Reuters reported.
Speaking at Beijing's Great Hall of the People on the 15th anniversary of the Anti-Secession
Law, Li Zuocheng, chief of the Joint Staff Department and member of the Central Military
Commission, left the door open to using force. The 2005 law gives the country the legal basis
for military action against Taiwan if it secedes or seems about to. Li is one of China's few
senior officers with combat experience, having taken part in China's ill-fated invasion of
Vietnam in 1979.
As Reuters notes the comments "are especially striking amid international opprobrium over
China passing new national security legislation for Chinese-run Hong Kong."
Taiwan's government denounced the comments, saying that threats of war were a violation of
international law and that Taiwan has never been a part of the People's Republic of China.
"Taiwan's people will never choose dictatorship nor bow to violence", Taiwan's Mainland
Affairs Council said. "Force and unilateral decisions are not the way to resolve
problems."
Taiwan is China's most sensitive territorial issue. Beijing says it is a Chinese province,
and has denounced the Trump administration's support for the island. Li Zhanshu, the
third-most-senior leader of China's ruling Communist Party and head of China's Parliament, told
the same event that non-peaceful means were an option of last resort: "As long as there is a
slightest chance of a peaceful resolution, we will put in hundred times the effort," Li Zhanshu
said. However, he added: " We warn Taiwan's pro-independence and separatist forces sternly, the
path of Taiwan independence leads to a dead end; any challenge to this law will be severely
punished".
Taiwan has shown no interest in being run by autocratic China, and has denounced China's
repeated military drills near the island while rejecting China's offer of a "one country, two
systems" model of a high degree of autonomy.
President Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party won presidential and
parliamentary elections by a landslide in January, vowing to stand up to Beijing. At the same
time, China is deeply suspicious of Taiwan's president Tsai, whom it accuses of being a
separatist bent on declaring formal independence. Ms Tsai says Taiwan is already an independent
country called the Republic of China, its official name.
The administration also took off the gloves with China over U.S. listings by mainland
companies that fail to follow U.S. securities laws. This came after the Commerce Department
finally moved to limit access by Huawei Technologies to high-end silicon chips made with U.S.
lithography machines. The trade war with China is heating up, but a conflict was inevitable and
particularly when it comes to technology.
At the bleeding edge of 7 and 5 nanometer feature size, American tech still rules the world
of semiconductors. In 2018, Qualcomm confirmed its next-generation Snapdragon SoC would be
built at 7 nm. Huawei has already officially announced its first 7nm chip -- the Kirin 980. But
now Huawei is effectively shut out of the best in class of custom-made chips, giving Samsung
and Apple a built-in advantage in handsets and network equipment.
It was no secret that Washington allowed Huawei to use loopholes in last year's blacklist
rules to continue to buy U.S. sourced chips. Now the door is closed, however, as the major
Taiwan foundries led by TSMC will be forced to stop custom production for Huawei, which is
basically out of business in about 90 days when its inventory of chips runs out. But even as
Huawei spirals down, the White House is declaring financial war on dozens of other listed
Chinese firms.
President Donald Trump said
in an interview with Fox Business News that forcing Chinese companies to follow U.S.
accounting norms would likely push them to list in non-U.S. exchanges. Chinese companies that
list their shares in the U.S. have long refused to allow American regulators to inspect their
accounting audits, citing direction from their government -- a practice that market authorities
here have been unwilling or unable to stop.
The attack by the Trump Administration on shoddy financial disclosure at Chinese firms is
long overdue, but comes at a time when the political evolution in China is turning decidedly
authoritarian in nature and against any pretense of market-oriented development. The rising
power of state companies in China parallels the accumulation of power in the hands of Xi
Jinping, who is increasingly seen as a threat to western-oriented business leaders. The trade
tensions with Washington provide a perfect foil to crack down on popular unrest in Hong Kong
and discipline wayward oligarchs.
The latest moves by Beijing to take full control in Hong Kong are part of the more general
retrenchment visible in China. "[P]rivate entrepreneurs are increasingly nervous about their
future," writes Henny Sender in the Financial Times . "In many cases, these
entrepreneurs have U.S. passports or green cards and both children and property in America. To
be paid in U.S. dollars outside China for their companies must look more tempting by the day."
A torrent of western oriented Chinese business leaders is exiting before the door is shut
completely.
The fact is that China's position in U.S. trade has retreated as nations like Mexico and
Vietnam have gained. Mexico is now America's largest trading partner and Vietnam has risen to
11th, reports Qian Wang of Bloomberg News . Meanwhile, China has dropped from 21 percent
of U.S. trade in 2018 to just 18 percent last year. A big part of the shift is due to the
U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade pact, which is expected to accelerate a return of production to North
America. Sourcing for everything from autos to semiconductors is expected to rotate away from
China in coming years.
China abandoned its decades-old practice of
setting a target for annual economic growth , claiming that it was prioritizing goals such
as stabilizing employment, alleviating poverty and preventing risks in 2020. Many observers
accept the official communist party line that the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic made it
almost impossible to fix an expansion rate this year, but in fact the lasting effects of the
2008 financial crisis and the aggressive policies of President Trump have rocked China back on
its heels.
As China becomes increasingly focused inward and with an eye on public security, the
economic situation is likely to deteriorate further. While many observers viewed China's "Belt
& Road" initiative as a sign of confidence and strength, in fact it was Beijing's attempt
to deal with an economic realignment that followed the 2008 crisis. The arrival of President
Trump on the scene further weakened China's already unstable mercantilist economic model, where
non-existent internal demand was supposed to make up for falling global trade flows. Or at
least this was the plan until COVID-19.
"Before the Covid-19 outbreak, many economists were expecting China to set a GDP growth
target of 6% to 6.5% to reflect the gradual slowdown in the pace of expansion over the past few
years," reports Caixin Global . "Growth slid to 6.1% in 2019 from 6.7% in 2018. But the
devastation caused by the coronavirus epidemic -- which saw the economy contract 6.8%
year-on-year in the first quarter -- has thrown those forecasts out of the window."
Out of the window indeed. Instead of presiding over a glorious expansion of the Chinese
sphere of influence in Asia, Xi Jinping is instead left to fight a defensive action
economically and financially. The prospective end of the special status of Hong Kong is
unlikely to have any economic benefits and may actually cause China's problems with massive
internal debt and economic malaise to intensify. Beijing's proposed security law would reduce
Hong Kong's separate legal status and likely bring an end to the separate currency and business
environment.
I honestly don't know if this article is or is not correct... But I wonder...
AmConMag publishes a major anti-China article on most days now. What is happening? What is
the mechanics of this... "phenomenon"?
A place where where Americans opposed to U.S. hegemony because it's harm on everyone
without being overwhelmed by the Neocon acolytes where can we go, anyone ever try to get a
word in on foxnews ?
If you try to reach out to twitter on Tom Cotton or Mike Waltz dismisses you as a
'Chinese govt / Iranian / Russian bot'
You know what, God will judge us and we will all be equal in he eyes of Him
Why should I be afraid. Why should I be silent. And thank you TAC for the opportunity to
post.
I too came here for interesting commentary, - and even better comments... five years ago or
so?
I found the original articles mostly okay, often too verbose, meandering for my taste but
the different point of view made them worthwhile. The readers' comments, now that is
priceless. That brings the real value. That's where we learn. That's where I learn, anyway.
:)
It never occurred to me to message to any politician, I think my voice would be lost in the
cacophony.
The target of my curiosity is that when all these articles start to point in one direction
(like belligerence toward China) how does it happen? Is there a chain of command? It seems
coordinated.
It's possible to be anti-neocon, for their being too ideological, and not pacifist. That is
basically my position.
I agree with most here on Russia and Iran. They are not threats, and in specific cases
should be partners instead. Agree on American imperialism being foolish and often evil. I
believe in a multipolar world as a practical matter. I don't take a soft view of China
however. I believe they do intend to replace nefarious American hegemony with their own
relevant, but equally nefarious, flavor of hegemony. There are few countries in the world
with such a pathological distrust of their own people. I truly believe that country is a
threat that needs to be checked at least for a couple of decades by the rest of the
world.
As to the editorial direction, I think it is merely capitalism. China's perception in
the world is extremely bad lately. I would fully expect the always somewhat Russophile
environment here to seize the moment to say 'see! Russia is not a true threat! It's China!'
RT itself soon after Trump's election I recall posted an article complaining about total
disregard for Chinese election meddling.
You can see when the people holding the leash give a tug on the collar. And it's clear that
the GOP is feeling the need for a warlike political environment.
The most blatant presstitution example, of course, was the National Review, going from
'Never Trump' to full time servicing.
This insane situation is only possible because people are sedated by mass media propaganda
and endless diversions from reality, writes Caitlin Johnstone.
T he world's worst Putin puppet is escalating tensions with Russia even further, with the
Trump administration looking at withdrawal from more nuclear treaties in the near future.
Moon of Alabama has
published a solid breakdown of all this, outlining the absence of evidence for the Trump
administration's justifications of its treaty withdrawals and explaining why China has nothing
whatsoever to gain by signing on to a trilateral New START Treaty. I have nothing to add to
this, other than to ask a simple question.
Do you consent to having a bunch of unseen military personnel
rolling the dice every day on the gamble that we won't wipe ourselves off the face of this
Earth in the confusion and chaos of rising hostilities due to miscommunication or technical
malfunction, as nearly happened many times during
the last cold war?
Do you consent to a
slow-motion third world war where an oligarch-led alliance of powerful nations works
tirelessly to absorb new nations into its imperial blob by any means necessary?
Do you consent to a world where weapons of Armageddon are brandished about by imbeciles with
inadequacy issues?
Do you consent to a world ruled by people who are so sociopathic that they are willing to
inflict endless mass military slaughter and risk a nuclear holocaust just to have more control
over the world population?
Do you consent to a world where we risk literally everything because a few overeducated,
under-mothered think tankers were able to market an idea called "unipolarity" at key points of
interest after the fall of the Soviet Union?
Do you consent to a world where powerful governments team up like a bunch of bitchy mean
girls against weaker nations that aren't in their clique?
Do you consent to governments spending lives, resources and treasure on bloodbaths around
the globe and treating terrestrial life itself like some trivial plaything instead of ensuring
the thriving of their own populations?
Does this seem like health to you?
Does this seem like sanity to you?
Is any of this something you want? Something you consent to?
Of course not. These questions are all redundant. Nobody with a healthy mind and a clear
picture of what's going on would consent to this madness, no matter what nation they live
in.
This whole insane model was rolled out without your consent. You were never asked if you
consented, because the answer would have been no.
Nobody gives their conscious and informed consent to this. The new cold war is as consensual
as sex after a Rohypnol-spiked drink, and the illusion of consent is just as nefariously and
artificially manufactured. People are roofied into sedation by mass media propaganda and
endless diversion from reality, and then power has its way with us.
If people were actually given informed consent about what is done in their name, none of
this would be happening. Weapons of war would have been destroyed long ago and we'd all be
working together in healthy collaboration with each other and with our ecosystem to ensure a
healthy, happy world for our children and our grandchildren.
There is no reason we cannot have such a world. We are the many, they are the few. They
manufacture our consent because they absolutely require that consent. A population which will
not be propagandized is a population which cannot be ruled.
All we have to do is inform each other about what's really going on. Then informed consent
can exist. And be withdrawn.
Those who consent include a large fraction of ignorant CIA/MSM-bedazzled young men, mere
punks looking for excuses to destroy something to aggrandize themselves to prove that they
are not teenagers anymore.
Their relatives and friends may not be so sure, but are nearly all cowards who will never
object to the mass media narrative.
They live in fear of, and social and economic dependence upon their tribes of church and
town, led by low-end tyrants who demand power as fake defenders, by posing with flag and
cross, and inventing foreign enemies behind every tree.
This class of the ignorant never sees beyond mass media narrative, so reform requires
eliminating oligarchy mass media.
The gang operation that DC has become, requires rethinking the institutions of democracy,
to preclude corruption.
Also rethinking of the means of action, as we no longer control those tools, and need new
tools to restore democracy.
Nearly all agree that only the most extreme collapse or conquest would permit forcible
restoration of democracy.
In the age of advanced weapons, that would require international embargo and a very deep and
prolonged recession.
Restoration by reason presumes that intellectuals somehow lead when instability and anger
weaken the corrupt.
The core problem is the structure of a democracy that prevents the corruption by money
that has made the tools of democracy serve money power, including all branches of federal
government and mass media. Most educated people have little time to consider the reforms
needed. But it is not difficult to design a democracy not susceptible to corruption by money,
and the tribal cabals of factions.
Moi , May 27, 2020 at 08:43
With trillion dollar "defence" spending (including black) the US needs to learn a simple
thing about "you break it, you own it."
The phrase means if you break it, you pay reparations. It does not mean that you actually
own it.
michael888 , May 27, 2020 at 07:44
As Leroy Fletcher Prouty explains in his book "JFK: The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to
Assassinate Kennedy", war is essential to those at the top for easy profits and to control
global resources. Although not particularly well written and redundant in many sections, the
book is conceptionally sound and sadly thought provoking. There are more forces undermining
than promoting peace, and at higher levels of society in the US and in the world.
Laurence , May 26, 2020 at 23:31
Seems like a mainstream myth you are falling back on–calling Trump the Putin Puppet.
I wonder if you believe in all that rhetoric of Russia-Gate??
Just finished reading a book I highly recommend about history of Russia in our modern era,
and the Russian-American relationship and who is to gain from having one another as enemies.
(the book: Power of Impossible Ideas by Sharon Tennison) We need to be giving each other
respect for all of us to go forward, and not by parroting snipes! Russia and the US and China
stand to gain from cooperation. And we lose by confrontation.
Randal Marlin , May 26, 2020 at 17:50
Of course I agree with Caitlin Johnstone regarding all of her questions. But the one that
raises the most frightening, because realistic, question is: "Do you consent to having a
bunch of unseen military personnel rolling the dice every day on the gamble that we won't
wipe ourselves off the face of this Earth in the confusion and chaos of rising hostilities
due to miscommunication or technical malfunction, as nearly happened many times during the
last cold war?"
Iran shooting down a passenger plane in the wake of verbal escalation by U.S. President
Donald Trump's Administration is an example of the kind thing that can happen. What if the
plane shot down had been a U.S. military plane or warship? The lesson should be that verbal
escalation is not worth the risk. This is not a poker game, or if in some people's minds it
is, they should be not be permitted to get anywhere near decision-making in the matter.
anon4d2 , May 27, 2020 at 11:29
Are you alluding to a potential or actual aircraft shoot-down by Iran?
Perhaps you recall the passenger plane of Iran shot down by the US?
rosemerry , May 26, 2020 at 17:02
We can see by the way we are being treated during this pandemic that people do not seem to
have any idea what terrible decisions their leaders have already made, even just this
century. No regard for facts or truth, constant blaming and paranoia about "national
security" while ignoring evidence of advancing deaths in all our technically advanced
"democracies".
The whole assumption by POTUSTRUMP that Covid-19 is in motion just to stop his re-election
(he really seems to believe this-worse than WMD!) and that Big Pharma making money from a
vaccine is vitally urgent,( not cooperation with China perhaps even making a vaccine which it
would give to the rest of us) shows how far we have descended since the USA "won the Cold
War" but decided that world destruction was worthwhile anyway.
DH Fabian , May 26, 2020 at 16:54
Democrats and their party loyalists spent over three years trying to build support for war
against Russia. As Trump increased US/NATO troops near the Russian border (provocation), and
reinforced economic sanctions against Russia, one would think Democrats would be delighted.
Have you placed your bet yet, on whether Democrats will blame Russia or Chna for a 2020
defeat?
Moi , May 26, 2020 at 16:37
Government of the people, by the people, for the people and the people's name is Koch.
DW Bartoo , May 26, 2020 at 15:52
"No!" To a New Cold War against Russia and China.
"Yes!" To a sane, humane, and sustainable future for all.
Deceit, and the manipulation behind it, and Diversions, and the lack of greater curiosity
and attention paid to the deceits, along with cultural myths of superiority, the inculcation
of which falls to media and academia, all must be understood for what they are, their
purpose, and their consequences. and who, very specifically benefit$ from
things-as-they-are.
How many, however, dare question their culture?
Either the one they were born into or chose to embrace?
How often have those living in and identifying themselves with empire, found the courage
to question, to challenge, aloud, the myths, the unexamined assumptions?
Especially when the cost of doing so risks livelihood, social standing, and relationships,
be they with family, friends, or lovers?
Yet, what alternative have human beings of conscience?
Once one has come to understand those things which you, Caitlin, have fairly presented as
evidence of insanity, greed, and the lust for total control, what honest course is there but
to risk loss, to risk shunning, and even impoverishment?
Specifically, how many toil away at "jobs" which further entrench oligarchy, tyranny, and
authoritarian interests?
How many choose, again and yet again, to participate in rigged "electoral" processes, the
only purpose of which is to legitimize oligarchy, tyranny, and authoritarian power while
furthering the merest pretense of "democracy", that the sham may continue.
In a real and genuine democracy, would not the many actually get to vote on the question
of war? On healthcare for all, as a human right? On housing? On meaningful endeavor?
In other words, should not the many actually get to vote on policy, not on personalities
and cultural dog-whistle rhetorical devices which function simply to set the many against
each other?
To change the culture from militarized empire, profound understanding must be engaged, not
because the issues are especially complex, however convoluted the manipulatory rhetoric might
make things appear, or vicious the fallacious arguments used in favor of war might be;
"You are either with us or against us!", for example which is the classic phrase of "argument
with a stick", meaning an implied threat, but rather that far too many people were never
encouraged to engage in the critical thinking process, at all.
An honest educational system would do that, from the earliest grades.
An honest media, would also present useful information, not slant stories to inculcate the
fear, loathing, and confusion necessary to start wars based on lies, and notions of foreign
monsters all, inevitably, referred to as "the new Hitler", though Putin has been
well-villified and, in the U$, "liberals" and "deplorables", alike, are being told that China
is a land of authoritarian thieves who "stole our jobs", lied about (and "invented or
created") the coronavirus, and intend to rule the world.
An honest media would present actual, useful information and not coerce thought or
understanding in specific ways, telling people what and how to "see" or "not see" things.
The legacy media simply refuses to be anything but a propaganda tool.
Thus, U$ians, in particular, but people in "the west", generally, are fed a steady diet of
untruths, half-truths, unbaked idiocy, and triumphal imperialism.
Frankly, considering, along with the domestic propaganda, all the saber-rattling,
heartless economic sanctions, military bullying, and nuclear weapons buildup of both the
Obama and Trump regimes, the rest of the world, especially Russia and China, the nations of
this planet have been very patient with the U$ and its coalition of whatever, including
Australia, but especially the U.K.
One does wonder how much longer such patience might last as The Empire lashes out,
evermore recklessly, relentlessly, and foolishly?
Yes, a great mutual educational outreach is required.
However, it must entail listening and building bridges of shared interests and common
plight and not much admonition, signaling, or preening.
What common vision may members of the human family, those not caught up in the "Great
Game", develop that will permit our species, indeed, all of terrestrial life, a future worth
having?
Say, even another ten or twenty thousand years, that we, collectively, might gain a wee
bit more understanding and a great deal more compassion.
What would that look like?
How would it feel?
Might that be worth thinking about?
Beyond deceit and diversion
AnneR , May 27, 2020 at 11:44
Yes, D Bartoo.
And if you include NPR and the BBC World Service in your "legacy media" then today there
have been examples a-plenty:
NPR: In a piece on the forthcoming election and the states trying to prepare for managing
polling stations, voters while trying to prevent any potential spread of COVID-19, the
"reporter" raised – guess what? – the need for states to "prevent a repeat of
Russian [i.e. the Kremlin] hacking" and thus, I presume, altering/affecting the results. This
statement provided no evidence, but as declared as if it were unassailable fact. (As I recall
this claim had been debunked within a short time of the Blue Faces and their media supporters
raising it.)
BBC: They broadcast a ten minute "History" piece – repeated at least once within two
hours. The subject of this segment often seems to coincide with some act that the
US/UK/IS/NATO (you name the western grouping) wants the listener to ignore, be ignorant of;
the intention seems, as today, to be to deflect attention from here to there. Or to support
whatever it is that the western world wants to happen. So today's piece was all about the
South Korean protests against the military government, in the late 1980s, and the violence,
largely, according to the broadcast, committed by the government's forces against the
protestors who were demonstrating for: democracy. Hint, Hint.
Both BBC and NPR: They both made much of the Hong Kong police's use, this time, of tear
gas and pepperballs (never have either broadcasters, throughout last year's demos, mentioned
the violence done by the demonstrators: the killing and beating up of those Hong Kong people
who dared to disagree openly with them, the brick throwing, the attacks on buildings and so
on; just as they rarely if ever, and then without ever mentioning the brutal violence of the
French cops, reported the peaceful weekly protests by the Gilets Jaunes) against the
demonstrators.
Even as they basically criticized the HK police their reportage on the completely brutal,
unwarranted murder of George Floyd and the follow up demonstrations, they mentioned the tear
gas used by the police to stop the protests but not any other means that the police may have
used (rubber bullets, possibly stun grenades – these latter caused many serious
injuries among the Gilets Jaunes).
Dave , May 26, 2020 at 15:30
A polemic of sorts, but much needed in these days of rabid running amok by some of the
most despicable and vicious politicians and economic oligarchs in the sad history of the
human species. Let's hope these perverse creatures disappear quietly into the sunset in the
next month or two, or maybe some encouragement is needed to accomplish that much desired
end.
JOHN CHUCKMAN , May 26, 2020 at 15:09
And I'd like to add the thought: when have the people ever consented to any of
Washington's many wars, cold or hot?
From the holocaust in Vietnam to the holocaust in the Middle East?
The power establishment does what it wants and drags you along.
DH Fabian , May 26, 2020 at 16:57
That's the key point. It honestly doesn't matter what the "masses" think. The ruling
duopoly have their own agenda, and one way or another, we must obey.
JOHN CHUCKMAN , May 26, 2020 at 15:01
"New Cold War?"
Given the remarkably hostile words and acts coming from Washington, I'm more concerned
about a hot war.
Withdrawing from treaties is certainly threatening, and the US has done a lot of that
recently, but it has done so much more, too.
The words and acts go beyond anything I recall during the Cold War.
Openly assassinating another country's national hero? Almost bragging about it?
Placing a bounty on the head of a twice-elected national leader?
Declaring the threatening phrase, "full-spectrum dominance," as a national purpose in the
world?
Trying to impose American law on everyone who is not American through a vast network of
illegal sanctions?
Displaying contempt for many important international institutions and organizations?
Quitting some of them? Threatening some? Demanding others serve its own purposes? UN. WHO.
ICC. WTO. UNESCO. OPCW. UNRWA.
Ignoring the rule of law openly throughout the Middle East, on the high seas, and in Latin
America?
Displaying no spirit of international cooperation, even during a medical emergency. At
least in the days of the Cold War, the US always tried to appear cooperative about disasters
and about international organizations. It was often the first to offer some assistance. Now,
it does not bother.
Relentlessly attacking the world's other great power, China, with genuine slander and
lies. Doing so daily with no pretence to science or legality.
Jeff Harrison , May 27, 2020 at 10:42
Unfortunately, we will continue to do everything you describe until other countries of the
world make it clear that the US is no longer welcome there.
I know a bipolar world when I see one. I spent my first 45 years in one: the
world of the Cold War, dominated
by the USA and the USSR
.
That bipolar
world ended twenty-nine years ago. For a while
thereafter the USA stood supreme, economically and militarily.
We still do, actually, on indices like per capita GDP and forces deployed overseas.
Communist China's been coming up fast, though. It's plain they are aiming for parity with us,
regional -- I mean, in Asia -- if not global .
Perhaps they are aiming for global dominance.
Whether they are or not, we are heading into a bipolar world once again. People are waking
up fast to this. The coronavirus
pandemic has us thinking and
talking about
China in a way that we weren't before, not in the public realm at any rate. Some sour-faced
skeptics and grouches on the commentarial fringes, like your acerbically genial
Radio Derb host , were talking that way; now it's well-nigh universal.
As I write this, China's national legislature, the National People's Congress,
has just completed the first day of its 2020 annual session. Here are a couple of
headliners from this first day:
For the first time in thirty years, there will be no
announced target for GDP growth this year -- that's Gross Domestic Product, a key economic
indicator. There will be revisions to the Basic Law that defines the status of Hong Kong. The
point of the revisions will be to "safeguard national security in Hong Kong." [ NPC: China's congress will be
about Hong Kong, the virus and the economy , BBC, May 24, 2020]
What does any of this mean. And why should Americans care?
To take the first part of that question first: What it means is that these are some
of the decisions worked out by the ChiCom Party bosses in secret meetings these past
weeks.
I italicized the words "some of" in that last sentence to emphasize that these are decisions
the Party bosses want to make public. For sure there are many more they don't want made
public.
The NPC is not really a legislature in any dictionary sense. It's Totalitarian Theater.
There is very occasionally -- two or three times per decade -- some muffled resistance to
edicts from the Politburo; but even those have had a staged quality about them, and were
probably just a theatrical way of settling some minor power struggle at the top.
Still, the NPC is not without value for outside observers. The things that are announced,
like the two items I have noted, give clues as to what the Party bosses are thinking. Carefully
scrutinized and sensibly interpreted, they can give us the lie of the land.
China's economic pincer.
From my first point about the NPC announcements -- about there being no GDP growth target
this year–we can deduce that the ChiComs are seriously worried about China's economy.
Like our economy and everyone else's, China's economy has taken a big hit from the pandemic
and the measures taken to slow or contain it. There have been huge employment losses in both
manufacturing and services, in a nation with much less of a social safety net than ours [
A
slump exposes holes in China's welfare state , Economist, May 7 2020].
"There are, in other words, upwards of 78m people who are out of a job and are receiving
no benefits." https://t.co/5sJSMNNCcy
The thought of a couple hundred million hungry, angry, unemployed workers gives ChiCom
bosses the heebie-jeebies.
And this couldn't be happening at a worse time for China's economy, which is looking at a
pincer trap. I'll describe the two arms of the pincer in turn as 1) the Past Arm and 2) the
Future Arm.
The past thirty years have been a sensational boom time for China, with living standards
rising faster, I think, than anywhere else, ever, in modern history. By the end of the 2010s,
though, the low-hanging fruit had all been picked, and the rate of improvement was slowing.
That is one arm of the economic pincer -- call it the Past Arm.
And now there is widespread anger and suspicion towards China among its former trading
partners -- the countries that, by opening their markets and exporting their factories, made
the Chinese economic miracle possible. The developed countries of North America, Western
Europe, and Australasia are waking to the fact that we have sold the Chinese Communist Party a
whole lot of rope
with a gift card attached saying " Please Hang Us ." They are
backing off from China.
There is even talk of boycotts. In a poll done mid-May, forty percent of Americans said they
won't buy products made in China. [
Americans Are Giving Made-in-China the Cold Shoulder, by Brendan Murray, Bloomberg, May
17, 2020 ]
So, looking forward, the era of Western countries blithely helping the ChiComs to
consolidate their power, domestic popularity, and international influence by jacking up their
economy, are over.
That's the other arm of the pincer -- call it the Future Arm.
The Past Arm: no more low-hanging fruit.
The Future Arm: no more illusions about the regime we've been enabling this past thirty
years.
What the status of Hong Kong means
What the ChiComs are proposing for Hong Kong reinforces the Future Arm of the economic
pincer.
Under the agreement with Britain that handed the city back to China 23 years ago, the
ChiComs promised that Hong Kongers would enjoy British levels of social and political freedom,
or at least something closer to them than the mainland dictatorship, until 2047.
Well, that promise will no longer be operative. It was just a convenient lie assented to by
the ChiComs while they pumped up their economy.
I spoke of the NPC giving us clues about the lie of the land behind the closed doors of
ChiCom deliberating. Lie of the land? Politically, China is the
Land of the Lie . Strategic lying is not just an occasional aberration in their diplomacy,
it is all of it.
ORDER IT NOW
The Hong Kong demonstrators this past year have shown feisty spirit
[ Rally against
HK national security law on Sunday , by Jeff Pao, Asia Times, May 22, 2020].
It's not likely that bringing the city back into the warm embrace of the Motherland can be
accomplished without highly visible repression, possibly on the scale of Tiananmen Square in
1989, but much more amply recorded in this age of the cellphone camera. [ Hong Kong
Protest Movement Left Reeling by China's Power Grab , by Vivian Wang and Austin Ramzy,
NYT , May 24, 2020]
That will just further reinforce the ChiComs' image as a thuggish gangster clique,
fortifying the Future Arm of the pincer, shredding any illusions Western populations still have
about the nature of the ChiCom regime.
Did I mention Tiananmen Square? Eh: just a few antisocial troublemakers in need of stern law
enforcement. Tibet, Taiwan, and Eastern
Turkestan ? Integral parts of China since ancient times. Fifty years of autonomy for Hong
Kong? Absolutely! -- where do we sign? If we are admitted to the World Trade Organization,
shall we observe the rules? Of course we shall! COVID-19 originated in China? Certainly not; it
was brought in by visiting U.S. soldiers. [ China
Spins Tale That the U.S. Army Started the Coronavirus Epidemic, by Steven Lee Myers,
NYT, March 13, 2020]
The world is awakening from its dream of China as a trustworthy commercial nation whose
public declarations mean what they say. Communist China is the Land of the Lie.
So this coming new bipolar world is nothing to worry about, right? The ChiComs are going to
get crushed in that economic pincer I've been describing, right? And Uncle Sam will sail on
forward into the middle 21st century as the dominant world power, right?
Well, there are many possible futures, and that is one of them. It's by no means the
most probable one, though. China has advantages, and we have dis -advantages, that could
shape the future in a Chinese direction.
I'd list China's main advantages as three:
Despotism, which makes it easier to get some
things done. A big Smart Fraction. Smart Fraction
Theory argues that "national wealth is determined by the fraction of workers with IQ equal
to or greater than some minimum value." [ The Smart Fraction Theory of IQ and the Wealth of
Nations , La Griffe Du Lion, March 2002] Demographic homogeneity; low levels of ethnic
diversity and ethnomasochism
.
To the first point there, the one about despotism: Look, I really don't want to live
under the ChiComs; and I speak as a person who
did live under them for a year . There is no denying, though, that despotism has its
advantages, especially in technological development. Exhibit A : China's high-speed
rail system . Where is ours?
The second point, about a big Smart Fraction, has a link with the first. The name of the
link is "
eugenics ," both positive and negative.
Positive eugenics means
encouraging people with positive heritable traits to
breed; negative eugenics means dis -couraging -- or actually
forbidding -- people with negative traits to do so. The despotic power of course gets to
decide the definitions of "positive" and "negative" and the degree of coercion.
Are the ChiComs interested in eugenics? Oh yeah. I had things to say about this
in my November Diary last year , to which I refer you.
It's the third point that most powerfully addresses American weakness. China has some ethnic
diversity, but it's mostly out at the territorial fringes, in occupied Tibet, Mongolia, and
Eastern Turkestan. The great
majority of China's population -- and an overwhelming supermajority in metropolitan
China, away from those fringes -- is of a single
ethny . If the Chinese withdrew from those occupied fringes, China would be the world's
most homogenous big nation.
This spares China from all the rancors and disorders that sap so much of our social
and political energy.
China diplomacy is trying to thread very carefully to avoid the fallout. The answer of RIA
Novosti is good example here. Counterattacks are few (see the answer to CC question with the
following money quote: "I respect your right to ask the question, but I'm afraid you're not
framing the question in the right way. One has to have a sense of right and wrong. Without it, a
person cannot be trusted, and a country cannot hold its own in the family of nations. " This is
implicit slap in the face for the USA.
RIA Novosti: How do you assess China-Russia relations in the context of COVID-19? Do you
agree with some people's characterization that China and Russia may join force to challenge US
predominance?
Wang Yi: While closely following the COVID-19 response in Russia, we have done and will
continue to do everything we can to support it. I believe under the leadership of President
Vladimir Putin, the indomitable Russian people will defeat the virus and the great Russian
nation will emerge from the challenge with renewed vigor and vitality.
Since the start of COVID-19, President Xi Jinping and President Putin have had several phone
calls and kept the closest contact between two world leaders. Russia is the first country to
have sent medical experts to China, and China has provided the most anti-epidemic assistance to
Russia. Two-way trade has gone up despite COVID-19. Chinese imports from Russia have grown
faster than imports from China's other major trading partners. The two countries have supported
and defended each other against slanders and attacks coming from certain countries. Together,
China and Russia have forged an impregnable fortress against the "political virus" and
demonstrated the strength of China-Russia strategic coordination.
I have no doubt that the two countries' joint response to the virus will give a strong boost
to China-Russia relations after COVID-19. China is working with Russia to turn the crisis into
an opportunity. We will do so by maintaining stable cooperation in energy and other traditional
fields, holding a China-Russia year of scientific and technological innovation, and
accelerating collaboration in e-commerce, bio-medicine and the cloud economy to make them new
engines of growth in our post-COVID-19 economic recovery. China and Russia will also enhance
strategic coordination. By marking the 75th anniversary of the UN, we stand ready to firmly
protect our victory in WWII, uphold the UN Charter and basic norms of international relations,
and oppose any form of unilateralism and bullying. We will enhance cooperation and coordination
in the UN, SCO, BRICS and G20 to prepare ourselves for a new round of the once-in-a-century
change shaping today's world.
I believe that with China and Russia standing shoulder-to-shoulder and working back-to-back,
the world will be a safer and more stable place where justice and fairness are truly
upheld.
Cable News Network: We've seen an increasingly heated "war of words" between China and the
US. Is "wolf warrior" diplomacy the new norm of China's diplomacy?
Wang Yi: I respect your right to ask the question, but I'm afraid you're not framing the
question in the right way. One has to have a sense of right and wrong. Without it, a person
cannot be trusted, and a country cannot hold its own in the family of nations.
There may be all kinds of interpretations and commentary about Chinese diplomacy. As
China's Foreign Minister, let me state for the record that China always follows an
independent foreign policy of peace. No matter how the international situation may change, we
will always stand for peace, development and mutually beneficial cooperation, stay committed
to upholding world peace and promoting common development, and seek friendship and
cooperation with all countries. We see it as our mission to make new and greater
contributions to humanity.
China's foreign policy tradition is rooted in its 5,000-year civilization. Since ancient
times, China has been widely recognized as a nation of moderation. We Chinese value peace,
harmony, sincerity and integrity. We never pick a fight or bully others, but we have
principles and guts. We will push back against any deliberate insult to resolutely defend our
national honor and dignity. And we will refute all groundless slander with facts to
resolutely uphold fairness, justice and human conscience.
The future of China's diplomacy is premised on our commitment to working with all
countries to build a community with a shared future for mankind. Since we live in the same
global village, countries should get along peacefully and treat each other as equals.
Decisions on global affairs should be made through consultation, not because one or two
countries say so. That's why China advocates for a multi-polar world and greater democracy in
international relations. This position is fully aligned with the direction of human progress
and the shared aspiration of most countries. No matter what stage of development it reaches,
China will never seek hegemony. We will always stand with the common interests of all
countries. And we will always stand on the right side of history. Those who go out of their
way to label China as a hegemon are precisely the ones who refuse to let go of their
hegemonic status.
The world is undergoing changes of a kind unseen in a century and full of instability and
turbulence. Confronted by a growing set of global challenges, we hope all countries will
realize that humanity is a community with a shared future. We must render each other more
support and cooperation, and there should be less finger-pointing and confrontation. We call
on all nations to come together and build a better world for all.
After the Soviet collapse thirty years ago, that order expanded its jurisdiction. Proponents sought to subsume the old Eastern
Bloc, including perhaps Russia itself, into the American sphere. And they wanted to do so firmly on Washington's terms. Even as the
country began to deindustrialize and growth slowed, American leadership developed a taste for fresh crusades in the Middle East;
exotic savagery, went the subtext, had to be brought finally to heel. China was a rising force, but its regime would inevitably crater
or democratize. Besides, Beijing was a peaceful trading partner of the United States.
2008, 2016 and 2020 -- the financial crisis, Trump's election and now the Coronavirus and its reaction -- have been successive
gut punches to this project, a hat trick which may seal its demise. Ask anyone attempting to board an international flight, or open
a new factory in China, or get anything done at the United Nations: the world is de-globalizing at a speed almost as astonishing
as it integrated. Post-Covid, U.S.-China confrontation is not a choice. It's a reality. The liberal international order is not lamentable.
It's already dead.
This was the argument made by Bannon. It had other backers, of course, within both the academy and an emerging foreign policy
counter-establishment loathe to repeat the mistakes of the past thirty years. But coming from the former top political advisor to
the sitting president of the United States, it was provocative stuff. Bannon articulated a perspective which seemed to be on the
tip of the foreign policy world's tongue. And it riled people up. The most fulsome rebuttal to the zeitgeist was perhaps The Jungle
Grows Back , tellingly written by Robert Kagan, an Iraq War architect. The peripheral world was dangerous brush; the United States
was the machete.
Trumpian nationalism has chugged along for nearly three years since -- stripped, some might say, of its Bannonite flair and intelligence.
The most hysterical prophecies of what the president might do -- that he might withdraw from the geriatric North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, for instance -- have not come to pass. Trump has howled and roared, true: but so far, his most disruptive foreign policy
maneuver has been escalation against Iran.
It's very good to hear the right getting a little humility in them now and talking less empire, more multilateralism. Trump has
been way too concerned with his MAGA personality cult to understand the value of humility.
The world's a big place. The reality is, America first will more and more mean working together with other nations for mutual
benefit, and often their gain will indirectly be to our own also.
Working more and more, yes. This is why US is undercutting Germany's competitiveness, by blocking a cheap source of energy via
NS2...
As Bush said, you are either with us or against us. Nothing has changed and nothing will change, but it will become uglier.
If it were to desire multi-polarity, the US would tolerate not only states, like KSA, where the Royals own everything, but also
states, like Iran, or Cuba, where the people (through the government/state) owns assets (land and productive facilities). But
the US does not tolerate such type of multi-polarity, not open to US "investment" and ownership (bought with fiat money).
Cold War II started in 2007, with Putin. Popcorn & beer lads!
It does seem like there's a creeping idea, not just on dissident internet sites now like before, that the Russian rivalry is a
luxury of the past. Even the liberals are going to have to reconcile with liberal hegemony not being workable and settle for something
less. Owing to distance and mutual interest (common rivals Britain and Germany) Russia and America had a long history of friendship
before the Cold war.
I sadly agree about the predatory nature of much of America does. I think it really is a reflection of partially, imperial
arrogance, but even moreso a matter of who runs the country. Oligarchy is poorly checked in modern America. Maybe we can hope
for a humbled oligarchy, at least.
Trump is indeed an empty suit and a demagogue, but he ran on a decent nationalist platform (probably thanks to Bannon, who is
almost certainly a closeted gay. No joke... a deep-in-the-closet, self-hating gay. The navy can change a man, and he's a fraud
in other ways: see Eric Striker's article "International Finance's Anti-China Crusade"). Trump does have an absurd ego, and he
probably figured becoming president would impress Ivanka too.
Also, the Uyghurs are not totally innocent victims... Some of them are US-financed revolutionaries and some of them have committed
terrorism: see Godfree Roberts at Unz Review: "China and the Uyghurs" (January 10, 2019) and Ajit Singh at The Grayzone: "Inside
the World Uyghur Congress: The US-backed right-wing regime change network seeking the 'fall of China'" (March 5, 2020). Some of
our pathetic propagandists make it seem like they're in concentration camps, but there is objective reporting that suggests it's
more like job training programs and anti-jihad classes. Absurd lies have certainly been told about North Korea and many other
countries, so be skeptical.
Yeah, let's get that hate on for China - why they're as bad as Russia, Iran and Venezuela put together and there are so many more
of them. Especially a lot are available right here in the US and have lots of restaurants that can be boycotted. Not that many
Venezuelan restaurants around. Seriously, can Americans get over this childishness? When the US closes down its 800+ overseas
bases and withdraws its fleet to its own shores instead of Iran's and China's, then maybe Americans will be entitled to complain
about someone else's imperialism.
Most of anti-China stuff Hawley, much like Trump, claims always feels empty populism for WWC voters.
1) It is reasonable to be against our Middle East endeavors and not be so anti-China.
2) I still don't understand how it is China fault for stealing manufacturing jobs when it is the US private sector that does it.
(And Vietnam exist, etc.) So without Charles Koch and Tim Cook behind this trade stuff, it feels like empty populism.
3) The most obvious point on China to me is how little they do use military measures for their 'imperialism.'
One problem with all this populism emptiness, is there is a lot issues with China to work on:
1) This virus could have impact economies in Africa and South America a lot where the nations have to renegotiate their loans
to China. I have no idea how this goes but there will be tensions here. Imperialism is tough in the long run.
2) There are nations banding together on China's reaction to the virus and it seems reasonable that US joining them would be more
effective than Trump's taunting.
3) To prove Trump administration incompetence, I have no idea how he is not turning this crisis into more medical equipment and
drugs manufacturing. (My guess is this both takes a lot of work and frankly a lot of manufacturing plants have risks of spreads
so noone wants to invest.)
Hawley is a "fake populist" according to Eric Striker's article "International Finance's Anti-China Crusade" and I just saw fake-patriot
airhead Pete Hegseth claim China wants to destroy our civilization, on fake populist Tucker Carlson's show. It's well-established
that Fox News and the GOP are still neocons and fake patriots... after all, the Trump administration is run by Jared Kushner,
a protégé of Rupert Murdoch and Bibi Netanyahu.
Hawley's speech on the Senate floor yesterday deserves much more criticism than it gets here. This article from Reason
does a good job breaking down the speech and pointing out what's right AND wrong about it:
What if there is reduced wars and civil wars n the world today than ever. (So say anytime before 1991?) I get all the Middle East
& African Wars but look at the rest of the world. When in history have the major West Europe powers not had a major war in 75
years. After issues of post Cold War East Europe is probably more peaceful than ever. Look at South America. In the 1970s the
Civil Wars raged in all those nations. Or the Pacific Rim? Japan, China, and other nations are fighting with Military right now.
This is certainly less than perfect but the number of people (per million) dieing in wars and civil wars are at historic lows.
The fall of Soviet Union and weakening of Russia allowed US and Western Europe to attack Serbia in 1990s. A stronger Russia wouldn't
have allowed that to happen (who's trying to get Crimea from Russia's control now?). But with US aggressiveness and bellicosity
(including nuclear posture) at Russia's borders do not bode well.
But it is true, less important people are dying now...
Chinese imperialism? Uh ... other than shaking trees and drumming up fear can I get like one example of that.
Taiwan, part of China since the 1500's and they are have not issued any new threats since 1949.
Hong Kong - stolen from China and now reluctantly given back with lots of conditions. If they deserve the right of independence
through referendum I'm all for it as long as we apply this standard uniformly including parts of Texas, San Diego, New Mexico,
Arizona, any place that has a large foreign population will do.
Yeah, "Chinese imperialism" is complete nonsense, just like the claim that they definitely originated the coronavirus, caused
Americans to be under house arrest, and caused a depression. In fact, the origin of the virus is far from clear, and it wasn't
China who hyped up and exaggerated the danger and wrecked the economy. It was our superficial corporate media and government that
did that (perhaps deliberately)... the same people who are desperately trying to deflect blame onto the CCP. The same people who
have been mismanaging and ruining America for decades in order to enrich themselves.
"Neoliberal democracy. Instead of citizens, it produces consumers. Instead of communities, it produces shopping malls. The
net result is an atomized society of disengaged individuals who feel demoralized and socially powerless."
Most people would be well served to read Chomsky a first time.
However, it should be noted, Chomsky's critiques of neoliberalism aren't grounded in nationalism, xenophobia, and racism. So a
lot of TAC readers (and especially writers) may be disappointed.
Hawley seems like the natural choice for the potential future of the GOP, that is a post-fusionist or post-liberal GOP. However
the one thing that worries me is his foreign policy. He talks the talk, but I'm having trouble to see if he walks the walk. As
Mills noted he didn't vote to end support for the genocidal war in Yemen, a war that serves purely the interests of Saudi Arabia
and not our own. He has criticized David Petraeus before, but its important not to be fooled by just rhetoric. While accepting
he'll be better than any Tom Cotton or (god forbid) Nikki Haley in 2024, his foreign policy needs to be examined more until then.
Our response to the epidemic was 100% 'made in China'. The entire 'Western World' decided to copy Beijing. If that doesn't establish
a new level of leadership for China, I don't know what would. I'm surprised this is not more widely recognized. You can run down
the many parallels, including the pathetic photo-op attempt by the West to build those emergency hospitals (Nightingale in the
UK, Javits Center, etc. all across the US), which were just to show 'hey we can build hospitals in a few weeks also' ... never
mind they could never, and were never used for anything at all.
At this point, Hawley is all talk. Further, much of his talking amounts to little more than expressing resentment. I agree that
the US needs to follow a more nationalist pathway, which involved making itself less dependent on its chief geopolitical rival.
But accomplishing this is going to require more than bashing China and asserting that cosmopolitan Americans are traitors. At
this point, Hawley has no positive program to offer. Giving paid speeches that vilify coastal elites and China is not a political
plan.
Further, I agree that we're probably moving away from the universalist order that's guided much of our thinking since the 1990s.
But isolationism is not the answer. We need to begin building a multilateral order that takes full account of China's rise as
a worthy rival. This means that we need to develop a series of smaller-scale agreements with strategic partners. The TPP is a
good example of such an agreement. But where is the call to revive it?
Lastly, I find the article's reference to China's treatment of gays and lesbians to be curious. I'd first note that using the
term "homosexual" in reference to people is generally viewed as an offensive slur. Further, China's treatment of gay people isn't
so bad, and tends to be better than what Hawley's evangelical supporters would afford. Moreover, China is a multi-ethnic country.
It's program in Xinjiang has more to do with maintaining political order than a desire to repress non-Han people.
The general chest puffing nature of the American right makes it hard for them to understand that America might need to work with
other countries at a deep level, and not as vassals either.
". We need to begin building a multilateral order that takes full account
of China's rise as a worthy rival. This means that we need to develop a
series of smaller-scale agreements with strategic partners. The TPP is a
good example of such an agreement. But where is the call to revive it?"
The thing is that the post-WWII liberal international order was good for things like that.
Trump and the GOP quite deliberately destroyed it. Before that, the US would have the trust of many other governments; now they
don't trust the US - even if Biden is elected, the next Trump is on the way.
"We benefit if countries that share our opposition to Chinese imperialism -- countries like India and Japan, Vietnam, Australia
and Taiwan -- are economically independent of China, and standing shoulder to shoulder with us,"
OK....then can someone explain why Hawley opposed the TPP, which was designed to accomplish just this. The TPP was supposed
to create trading relationships between these countries and the United States in the context of an agreement that excluded China.
In this instance people like Hawley were advancing China's position and interests (I suspect simply because it was a treaty negotiated
under Obama, which apparently was enough to make it bad).
Probably because Hawley seems more interested in demagoguery than accomplishing anything productive. Never mind that 95% of the
people who voted for him probably couldn't find Japan or Vietnam on a map.
TPP was not geared against China as a blanket thing, as an entire exclusion of China. The perfidy of TPP was that it was against
any economic interactions with State Owned Enterprises (didn't mention the origin, didn't have to). The ultimate goal wasn't to
isolate China but to force privatization of said SOEs, preferably run from Wall Street.
Private property good and = Democracy; State property bad = Authoritarianism, dictatorship, etc. It is a fallacy here somewhere,
cannot really put my finger on it...
Except this is all lies. On each chance to actually do something Hawley has sided with international corporations, as a good conservative
will always do. Fixing globalism will never come form the right, this is all smoke and mirrors for the religious right, aka the
rubes. And they are perpetual suckers and will keep buying into this crap as our nation is hollowed out and raided by the rich.
And that, is TRUE conservatism.
"Now we must recognize that the economic system designed by Western policy makers at the end of the Cold War does not serve
our purposes in this new era," proclaimed Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Missouri. "And it does not meet our needs for this new day." He
continued, perhaps too politely: "And we should admit that multiple of its founding premises were in error."
The "error" in the founding premises of the post-WWII economic system was that it assumed that the US would act in a responsible
manner. Instead we have run huge budget deficits and borrowed the difference from foreigners, randomly invading other countries,
undermined the institutions we set up, bullied smaller countries rather than working with them, and abused our control of the
financial system.
No, that old economic system served our interests very well, as long as we respected the institutions we set up and kept our
own house in order. We haven't been doing any of that for at least 20 years.
Let's bear in mind that the Republican leader of the Senate married into a wealthy Chinese family that makes its money from hauling
Chinese exports to our shores and the shores of other developed nations.
This is all just hollow bravado meant to appeal to the right's nativist base.
I am not into the thinking that everyone whose politics I don't support is acting in bad faith. We are talking about the actions
of literally millions of people. Accusing this or that person of acting in bad faith because of personal interest is just dirty
politics dressed up as perceptiveness. I am not accusing any specific person of acting in bad faith, although some of the people
who pushed opening up to China because more business in China would create a class of people who would eventually push for Democracy
there, were indeed acting in bad faith. They wanted access to cheap labor with no rights.
Yet, no doubt many of them actually believed the propaganda, because it supposedly happened in South Korea, Taiwan and other
places. And especially the ones who switched the line to "globalism" when it was clear that the supposed indigenous pressures
for Democracy did not materialize also acted in bad faith. I only assume that some of were because once I understood the rationale
of the CCCP it was clear to me that China was radically different, and there is no way that so many of those guys who are smarter
and more knowledgeable about political systems than me, did not figure it out. But I am not going to behave as if it the Republicans
alone who were pushing either of these two false messages.
Criticizing China for "imperialism" is the height of hypocrisy on multiple levels. First, the United States has engaged in economic
imperialism, sometimes enforced with military intervention, for a hundred years. Read Smedley Butler's "War is a Racket" if you
doubt that. Second, this is the same guy who voted against our proxy war in Yemen. Third, one could very reasonably argue that
China is simply applying the lessons it learned at the hands of Western imperialists since 1800s..
It's good that SOME Republicans are at least giving lip service to the idea of bringing back manufacturing in this country.
But you have to thank Trump for that, not the GOP establishment. The offshoring of American manufacturing as part of "free trade"
was strongly supported (if not led) by the GOP going back to the 1980s.
And check out John Perkins's books ("Confessions of an Economic Hit Man", etc.) for up-to-date information. It's obviously true
that criticizing China for "imperialism" is ridiculously hypocritical but people like Senator Hawley know they can get away with
it because they understand how propaganda works on the dumbed-down masses.
They understand doublethink, repetition, appeal to patriotism, appeal to racism, appeal to fear, etc. People like Rupert Murdoch
do this every day... poorly, but well enough to be effective on a lot of people.
Incidentally, the Republicans may talk about bringing manufacturing back to the US but they're actually planning on shifting
it to India (see Eric Striker's article "International Finance's Anti-China Crusade").
If Washington lured the Soviet Union into it's demise in Afghanistan, which left that minor
empire in shambles - socially, militarily, economically - it was the nuclear conflagration at
Chernobyl that put the corpse in the ground.....
(Watch the GREAT HBO five-part tragedy on it and you will see that the brutally heroic
response of the Soviets, that saved the Western World at least temporarily, but is the
portrait of self-sacrifice)
What was lost in the Soviets fumbling immediate post-explosion cover-up was the trust of
their Eastern European satellite countries. That doomed that empire. So much military might
was given up in Afghanistan, then on Chernobyl, it was not clear if the Soviets had the
wherewithal to put down the rebellions that spread from Czechoslovakia to East Germany and
beyond.
Covid-19 will do the same to the American Empire.
As its own infrastructure has been laid waste by the COLLASSAL MONEY PIT that is the
Pentagon, its flagrant use of the most valuable energy commodity, oil, to maintain some 4000
bases worldwide, this rickety over-extended upside down version of old Anglo-Dutch trading
empires, will finally collapse.
Loss of trust by the many craven satellites, in America's fractured response, to Covid-19
will put the final nail in its coffin.
A hot-shooting War may come next, but the empire cannot win it.
It would be nice if that were so, but it is very unlikely.
"So tired of reading propaganda."
Is that why you regurgitate it onto forums? Kinda like purging the system, eh?
If you are going to be judging China's economic health by their pollution levels then in
the future you will find yourself convinced that they have never recovered, even when it
becomes inescapably obvious that they have. The fact is that China's pollution levels are
never going back to 2019 levels, but that has nothing to do with their economic
health.
It really never ceases to amaze me how deeply rooted and pervasive the delusions and sense
of exceptionality is in America. It is woven into the thinking, from the lowest levels to the
very top of their thoughts, of even the very most intelligent Americans. It is apparently a
phenomenon that operates at an even deeper level than mass media brainwashing, as it seems it
was just as much a problem in every empire in history. That is, I am sure citizens of the
Roman Empire had the same blinding biases embedded deep below their consciousness. I guess
Marx was entirely correct to say that consciousness arises from material conditions, and
being citizen of an empire must be one of those material conditions that gives rise to this
all-pervasive and unconscious sense of exceptionality.
Go over to EOSDIS Worldview and take a look at satellite photos of China. Simple toggle in
lower left hand corner will take you to photos of same day, earlier years. Or any day in
satellite record.
The skies over China are clear. Chinese industry is not back at work. It may be that China
at 50% or even at 20% is a manufacturing powerhouse compared to a crumbling US. But until
China is back at work the thread so far is about the historical situation six months ago.
Xi used to do elaborately staged state appearances with well planned camera angles,
fabulous lighting, pomp and circumstance. He enjoyed the trappings of power and knew how to
use the trappings of power. Hasn't done that kind of state appearance since January.
China and the US are so different. The citizens of China cannot vote. The population's
movements are micromanaged by the government. This is not the case here (yet). And I hope it
is never the case. I agree with the premise that there are those in our government who are
living in a dream of the past and that is over, unless we want to destroy the world. But
China's government is so repressive. The rules must be obeyed. We seem to be compliant so far
of some of our government officials stepping over the bounds allowed by our Constitution, due
to the fear of C-19 engendered by the deep state (aka the bsmsm). But we will not do that
forever and our government cannot just start shooting big crowds of us as they can and have
done in China. Theirs is all top down rule, which is not the case here. Also, although it is
probably heretical to say this I am glad that the US has many cases of C-19. We will
eventually get herd immunity. IMO, China can lock down as many millions of citizens as they
wish; they cannot stop this virus and as time goes by they will have as many deaths and as
many cases as everybody else. Well, that is off the topic of the article. In the end I agree
that we are fighting weird battles we can never win and we citizens need to keep informing
our government employees that we just want to trade and make money, not threaten companies
and countries and lose money.
There are many influential supporters of nuclear war, and some of these contend that the use
of "low-yield" and/or short-range weapons is practicable without the possibility of escalation
to all-out Armageddon. In a way their argument is comparable to that of the band of starry-eyed
optimists who thought, apparently seriously, that there could be such a beast as a "moderate
rebel."
In October 2013 the Washington Post
reported that "The CIA is expanding a clandestine effort to train opposition fighters in
Syria amid concern that moderate, US-backed militias are rapidly losing ground in the country's
civil war," and the US Congress gave approval
to then President Barack Obama's plan for training and arming moderate Syrian rebels to fight
against Islamic State extremists. The belief that there could be any grouping of insurgents
that could be described as "moderate rebels" is bizarre and it would be fascinating to know how
Washington's planners classify such people. It obviously didn't dawn on them that any person
who uses weapons illegally in a rebellion could not be defined as being moderate. And how
moderate is moderate? Perhaps a moderate rebel could be equipped with US weapons that kill only
extremists? Or are they allowed to kill only five children a month? The entire notion was
absurd, and predictably the scheme collapsed, after expenditure of vast amounts of US
taxpayers' money.
And even vaster amounts of money are being spent on developing and producing what might be
classed as moderate nuclear weapons, in that they don't have the zillion-bang punch of most of
its existing 4,000 plus warheads. It is apparently widely believed in Washington that if a
nuclear weapon is (comparatively) small, then it's less dangerous than a big nuclear
weapon.
In January 2019 the Guardian reported that "the Trump
administration has argued the development of a low-yield weapon would make nuclear war less
likely, by giving the US a more flexible deterrent. It would counter any enemy (particularly
Russian) perception that the US would balk at using its own fearsome arsenal in response to a
limited nuclear attack because its missiles were all in the hundreds of kilotons range and 'too
big to use', because they would cause untold civilian casualties."
In fact, the nuclear war envisaged in that scenario would be a global catastrophe -- as
would all nuclear wars, because there's no way, no means whatever, of limiting escalation. Once
a nuclear weapon has exploded and killed people, the nuclear-armed nation to which these people
belonged is going to take massive action. There is no alternative, because no government is
just going to sit there and try to start talking with an enemy that has taken the ultimate leap
in warfare.
It is widely imagined -- by many nuclear planners in the sub-continent, for example -- that
use of a tactical, a battlefield-deployed, nuclear weapon will in some fashion persuade the
opponent (India or Pakistan) that there is no need to employ higher-capability weapons, or, in
other words, longer range missiles delivering massive warheads. These people think that the
other side will evaluate the situation calmly and dispassionately and come to the conclusion
that at most it should itself reply with a similar weapon. But such a scenario supposes that
there is good intelligence about the effects of the weapon that has exploded, most probably
within the opponent's sovereign territory. This is verging on the impossible.
War is confusing in the extreme, and tactical planning can be extremely complex. But there
is no precedent for nuclear war, and nobody -- nobody -- knows for certain what reactions will
be to such a situation in or near any nation. The US 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stated that
low-yield weapons "help ensure that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantage in
limited nuclear escalation, making nuclear employment less likely." But do the possible
opponents of the United States agree with that? How could they do so?
The reaction by any nuclear-armed state to what is confirmed as a nuclear attack will have
to be swift. It cannot be guaranteed, for example, that the first attack will not represent a
series. It will, by definition, be decisive, because the world will then be a tiny step from
doomsday. The US nuclear review is optimistic that "flexibility" will by some means limit a
nuclear exchange, or even persuade the nuked-nation that there should be no riposte, which is
an intriguing hypothesis.
...the review calls for modification to 'a small number of existing submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads' to provide a low-yield option.
It also calls for further exploration of low-yield options, arguing that expanding these
options will 'help ensure that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantage in
limited nuclear escalation, making nuclear employment less likely.' This is intended to
address the argument that adversaries might think the United States, out of concern for
collateral damage, would hesitate to employ a high-yield nuclear weapon in response to a
'lower level' conflict, in which an adversary used a low-yield nuclear device. The review
argues that expanding low-yield options is 'important for the preservation of credible
deterrence,' especially when it comes to smaller-scale regional conflicts.
"Credible deterrence" is a favourite catch-phrase of the believers in limited
nuclear war, but its credibility is suspect. Former US defence secretary William Perry
said last year that he wasn't so much worried about the vast number of warheads in the
world as he was by open proposals that these weapons are "usable". It's right back to the Cold
War and he emphasises that "The belief that there might be tactical advantage using nuclear
weapons – which I haven't heard being openly discussed in the United States or in Russia
for a good many years – is happening now in those countries which I think is extremely
distressing." But the perturbing thing is that while it is certainly being discussed in Moscow,
it's verging on doctrine in Washington.
In late February US Defence Secretary Esper was
reported as having taken part in a "classified military drill in which Russia and the
United States traded nuclear strikes." The Pentagon stated that "The scenario included a
European contingency where you're conducting a war with Russia and Russia decides to use a
low-yield, limited nuclear weapon against a site on NATO territory." The US response was to
fire back with what was called a "limited response."
First of all, the notion that Russia would take the first step to nuclear war is completely
baseless, and there is no evidence that this could ever be contemplated. But ever if it were to
be so, it cannot be imagined for an instant that Washington would indulge in moderate nuclear
warfare in riposte. These self-justifying wargames are dangerous. And they bring Armageddon
ever closer.
Moscow has transferred more than five hundred aircraft -- large military transports, early warning
aircraft, refueling aircraft, attack jets, and fighter interceptors -- to Beijing since 1990.
Chinese air power these days is something to behold. In the course of just about thirty years, Beijing's
aerial inventory has gone from quite obsolete to cutting edge. It's worth noting, moreover, that Chinese airpower is but
one tool that Beijing can wield in the skies. If its massive missile forces perform as expected, destroying adversary
runways, then there will be few enemy aircraft getting into the air to contest the supremacy of China's fighters and
bombers -- or at least very few of them will be able to gain access to much of the western Pacific.
Russia has closed major border crossings with China across the Far East due to the rapid spread of coronavirus. That constitutes
a significant blow to a trading relationship that had only just begun to fully blossom. The closures come just as new auto and rail
bridges spanning the Amur River are finally
reaching
completion.
The primary line of debate among Russia-China relations analysts is whether the "rapprochement" is robust and tending toward even
a genuine alliance or whether it is weak and has little to show for decades of cooperation other than a few rhetorical flourishes.
After all, the skeptics note, if this bilateral relationship is so robust, then why did it take so long to get those bridges built?
The China-Russia trading relationship does indeed remain underdeveloped and will evidently face additional headwinds in the near
future (along with all of China's trading relationships, so it seems). But
the importance of security ties
can hardly be disputed, especially if one takes the long view. Could China have fought the United States to a stalemate in the Korean
War without Soviet military assistance? Not a chance. More recently, Russia's sale of high-tech air and naval weaponry during the
1990s and 2000s created a solid foundation for today's muscle-bound dragon with both claws (DF-26) and sharp fangs (e.g. YJ-18).
But will it go further?
A tantalizing hint was offered by Russian president Vladimir Putin at the Valdai Conference in early October 2019. During his
remarks, he dropped the following bombshell: "I probably won't open a big secret. It'll become clear anyhow. We are now helping our
Chinese partners to create a missile attack warning system. This is a very serious thing, which will increase the defense capability
of the People's Republic of China in a fundamental way. Because now only the USA and Russia have such a system [Большой тайны, наверно,
не открою. Все равно это станет ясно. Мы сейчас помогаем нашим китайским партнерам создать систему СПРН – систему предупреждения
о ракетном нападении. Это очень серьезная вещь, которая капитальным, кардинальным образом повысит обороноспособность Китайской Народной
Республики. Потому что сейчас такую систему имеют только США и Россия]." This seemingly major step forward in Russia-China military
cooperation demands greater scrutiny. It also provides an interesting opportunity to gauge opinion among Russian strategists regarding
the long-term viability of a close military partnership with the Middle Kingdom.
One impressively comprehensive Russian appraisal begins
by stating that "Russia had to look for various options for answering Washington's actions" to withdraw from the INF Treaty. The
same article notes somewhat ominously that the United States is preparing in case of "accidental nuclear war with Russia." Employing
the Russian acronym "SPRN" literally "warning systems against rocket attack [системы предупреждения о ракетном нападении]" for early
warning system, this assessment also makes the important point that Russia's SPRN has only recently completed a long process of upgrades
meant to fill "gaps [разрывы]" caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, when key facilities for early warning were located in
non-Russian parts of the USSR.
The article quotes one Moscow defense expert, Igor Korotchenko [Игор Коротченко], as offering the following assessment: "This
is really a huge contribution of Russia to strategic stability, since China receives a powerful tool in order not to become a victim
of the first disarming blow from the United States." Another Russian expert, Konstantin Sivkov [Константин Сивков], maintained that
this move would enhance "global stability" but also articulated some concern with respect to Russia's long-term interests. "When
China has at its disposal all the technologies that Russia has at its disposal, or creates similar ones, it will cease to need Russia
as a defender," Sivkov said. "And this could adversely affect Russian-Chinese relations." Korotchenko, however, is more bullish on
the long-term prospects for the defense relationship with Beijing. He underlined the commercial prospects for Russian companies,
and added that the early warning initiative will "contribute to the further rapprochement of Russia and China, building a common
security policy [поспособствует дальнейшему сближению России и Китая, выстраиванию общей политики в области безопасности]."
That's an interesting disagreement among Russian security specialists, for sure, but another rather significant observation regarding
these developments was offered in this same article by the former deputy commander of Russia's air defense command, Alexander Luzan
[Александр Лузан]. He contends that Russia will benefit from the enhanced cooperation with Beijing on an early warning. Luzan explains
that the ground components of Russia's SPRN are comprised of []long range "Voronezh" [Воронеж] radars that can see out four thousand
to six thousand kilometers to detect ICBM launches. Short-range "Sunflower [Подсолнухи]" radars are more suitable for warning of
short-range launches, but also offer ship-detection capabilities. Directly reflecting on operational advantages for the Russian military,
Luzan observes: "Vladivostok and Primorye are protected here, but there is nothing 'in depth.' We once tried to deploy our facilities
in Mongolia, but it didn't work out very well. Therefore, if the Chinese close this 'tongue,' it will be very important for Russia
[Владивосток и Приморье у нас защищены, а 'в глубину' там ничего нет. Мы когда-то в Монголии пытались разместить свои комплексы,
но не очень получилось. Потому если китайцы этот 'язычок' закроют, то для России это будет очень важно]." Again citing this Russian
general, the article states that "a unified information space is created and data is exchanged with Chinese radars, [and therefore]
'the security of our country from the east will be even better.'"
Such interpretations are generally in accord with the analysis
of Vladimir Petrovsky [Владимир Петровский,], a senior fellow and military specialist at Moscow's Institute of the Far East of the
Russian Academy of Sciences. This analyst writes that many believe that Putin's announcement of this strategic cooperation initiative
at Valdai signals that "the military alliance between Russia and China . . . has finally become real." Petrovsky also notes that
other specialists have begun to speculate on the meaning of a "retaliatory strike" under such circumstances, wherein the early warning
is relayed by a third country. He quotes the Russian president (speaking at Valdai) further on the matter of motives for new missile
deployments in the Asia-Pacific region: "we suddenly heard from the American military that the first step in this direction would
be taken just in Asia. But that step also impacts on us, because we need to understand: where in Asia, will Russian territory be
endangered or not? By the way, it's immediately clear what was the root cause of the exit: not Russia and not mythical violations
of the [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty by us. If they are going to put [U.S. missiles] in Asia, then Asia is the primary
reason for withdrawing from this Treaty [вдруг услышали от американских военных, что первый шаг в этом направлении будет сделан как
раз в Азии. Но он и нас затрагивает, потому что надо понять: где в Азии, будет доставать это российскую территорию или нет? Кстати
говоря, сразу понятно, что было первопричиной выхода: не Россия и не мифические нарушения нами Договора. Если они собираются ставить
в Азии, то Азия и является первопричиной выхода из этого Договора]." In other words, Putin's announcement of this initiative to accelerate
military cooperation with China is intended, in part, as a response to the United States' move to exit the INF accord.
Strongly hinting that Beijing might well gain access to Russian early-warning radars based in the Arctic, Petrovsky observes,
"Taking into account geography, it is quite possible to develop protocols for the exchange of data between national SPRN." He further
contends that this early warning cooperation will be "mutually beneficial and not without compensation [эта помощь -- взаимовыгодная
и небезвозмездная]." This military expert explains that China still can learn from Russian radar proficiency, but also implies that
the Russian side may gain some advantages from China's evident prowess in microelectronics, for example. Moreover, he suggests, "a
possible Chinese satellite constellation could be a good addition to Russian orbital facilities." Still, Petrovsky concludes that
Russia and China "are not creating a military-political alliance. It is rather a matter of coordinating the military policies." Playing
down the significance of this new initiative, this specialist also notes that Russia and China have been holding annual ballistic
missile defense command and staff exercises for about a decade already.
The first alteration in the global balance of power enabled by Russia-China cooperation
took place during the 1950s, of course. In that period, the PRC went from being a military
"basket case," with no defense industry to speak of, to possessing a reasonably modern force
within a span of just a decade. That super-energized process was inspired by the hard school
of war against a vastly better-armed opponent in the bloody Korean conflict, as is well
known. But the massive progress in Chinese military capabilities also could not have taken
place without enormous Soviet assistance. With respect to naval-related arms transfers,
Moscow had already given ten torpedo boats and eighty-three aircraft by the beginning of
1953, according to the scholarly journal. The process accelerated during 1953–55 with a
total of eight-one additional vessels transferred (amounting to 27,234 tons) and 148
aircraft. Among these ships were four destroyers, four frigates, and thirteen submarines.
Additionally, the Russians provided the Chinese with more than five hundred torpedoes and
over fifteen hundred sea mines, as well as coastal artillery pieces, radar and communications
equipment. A third batch of naval transfers was comprised of sixty-three vessels and
seventy-eight aircraft. Added to these very substantial allocations, five Chinese shipyards
apparently produced another 116 naval vessels, relying heavily on advisors, designs and
technology purchased from the USSR, during the period up until 1957. Finally, several
transfers agreed to in early 1959 "caused China's Navy to enter into the missile age."
Notably, these transfers included the R-11 , a primitive submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM), and also the P-15 , one of the
earliest anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Yes, these are the earliest progenitors of today's
JL-3 and YJ-12 missiles that now present quite credible threats.
In keeping with the presently jovial mood surrounding current Russia-China relations, very
little is said in this Chinese article regarding the Sino-Soviet conflict that brought the
two Eurasian giants to the brink of war in the late 1960s. The authors imply that the break
was really between the two respective Communist parties, rather than between the two navies,
but it is noted that the Kremlin's stated objective to form a "joint fleet" was viewed in
China as an encroachment on Chinese sovereignty. Nevertheless, this substantial military
cooperation between Moscow and Beijing during the 1950s is evaluated in this Chinese
appraisal to have had "major historical impact
[重要历史作用]." These authors contend that it
"effectively decreased the threat of American imperialism
[有效抵制美帝国主义的军事威胁].
They additionally conclude regarding this period: "The achievements of building up the
Chinese Navy cannot be separated from the assistance of Soviet experts
[中国海军建设的成绩是与苏联专家的帮助分不开的]."
For a long time, "Soviet revisionists" were not given such favorable treatment by Chinese
scholars, but now evidently the "east wind" is blowing once more. If the USSR very
substantially helped boost PRC military prospects during the 1950s, this paper by two Chinese
naval analysts argues cogently that a similarly ambitious and fateful program of Russia-China
military cooperation has had an analogous effect, starting in 1991. When seen in aggregate,
the numbers are indeed quite impressive. Russia has sold China, according to this Chinese
accounting, more than five hundred military aircraft, including Su-27, Su-30, Su-35, and
Il-76 variants. Almost as significant, Russia provided China with more than two hundred
Mi-171 helicopters. Just as these pivotal purchases launched China's air and land forces into
a new era, so the Chinese acquisition of four Sovremeny destroyers, along with twelve
Kilo -class submarines helped to provide the PLA Navy with the technological
wherewithal to enter the twenty-first century on a robust footing. That shortlist here,
moreover, does not even catalog other vital systems transferred, such as advanced air defense
systems, which have formed a bedrock of Chinese purchases from Russia.
Citing a Russian source, these Chinese authors claim that China spent $13 billion on
Russian weapons between 2000–05. That amounts to a decently hefty sum of cash,
especially by rather penurious post-Soviet standards. In fact, this raft of deals was not
only intended to rescue the PLA from obsolescence but simultaneously aimed to "resolve . . .
the survival and development problems [解决 . . .
生存和发展问题]"of the post-Soviet Russian
military-industrial complex too. Just as important as these technical transfers, however,
have been the human capital investments in cooperation. Here, this study points out that two
thousand intermediate and high-level Chinese officers have already graduated from Russian
military academies. The upper ranks of the PLA Navy, in particular, are said to be full of
these graduates, as reported in this study. Perhaps most critically for the future of the
Chinese armed forces, cooperation with Russia has entailed "in particular, promoting the
development of domestic weapons development levels and concepts.
[尤其带动了国内武器研制水平和理念的提升]."
Take, for example, the YJ-18 ASCM, which seems to be superior to any U.S. variants, is a
derivative of the Russian SSN-27 missile and is now becoming pervasive throughout the Chinese
fleet, with both surface and sub-launched variants.
For all the major results on the regional balance of power wrought by these two major
periods of Russian-Chinese security collaboration, however, there are very real reasons to
doubt that such a partnership will truly alter global politics. After all, the Chinese
analysis points out that arms sales from Russia to China have declined substantially from the
peak in 2005. Joint military exercises, moreover, are now quite regular, but they actually do
not seem to exhibit a bellicose trend toward larger and larger demonstrations of military
might. These tendencies may reflect new confidence in Beijing regarding its own abilities to
produce advanced weapons, of course, but also might reflect a certain degree of restraint --
a realization that too close a Russia-China military alignment could provide ample fuel for a
new Cold War that might be in the offing.
Still, American defense analysts must evaluate the possible results of a significantly
closer Russia-China security relationship, whether it is formalized into an actual "alliance"
or not. China and Russia currently have numerous joint development projects underway,
including both a large commercial airliner, as well as a heavy-lift helicopter. In the
future, will cooperative endeavors encompass frigates and VSTOL fighters, or nuclear
submarines and stealth bombers, or even aircraft carriers? Will Moscow and Beijing begin to
launch joint exercises of a large scale that have major strategic implications in highly
sensitive areas? Are third countries, such as Iran, set for "junior associate" status in the
so-called "quasi-alliance? And will China and Russia strive to coordinate strategic
initiatives to bring about common favorable strategic circumstances in the coming
decades?
Such a future is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility. The combination of Russian
weapons design genius with Chinese organizational and production prowess could be formidable,
indeed. That will be another reason for states comprising the West to now exercise restraint,
embrace multi-polarity, and seek to avoid a return to the 1950s "with Chinese
characteristics."
Lyle
J. Goldsteinis Associate Professor at theChina
Maritime Studies Institute(CMSI) at theU.S. Naval War Collegein Newport, RI. The opinions expressed
in this analysis are his own and do not represent the official assessments of the U.S. Navy
or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
In this issue's correspondence section, Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long offer up an
alternative way to code nuclear crises in response to Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald's article in the February
2019 issue of TNSR. Bell and Macdonald, in turn, offer a response to Green and Long's critique.
In their article in the February 2019 issue of the
Texas National Security Review
, Mark S. Bell and
Julia Macdonald make a cogent argument that all nuclear crises are not created equal.
1
We agree with their basic thesis: There really are different sorts of nuclear crises, which have different risk
and signaling profiles. We also concur that the existence of a variety of political and military dynamics
within nuclear crises implies that we should exercise caution when interpreting the results of cross-sectional
statistical analysis. If crises are not in fact all the same, then quantitative estimates of variable effects
have a murkier meaning.
2
We should not be surprised that, to date, multiple studies have produced different results.
Nevertheless, the article also highlights an alternate hypothesis for nuclear scholarship's inconsistent
findings about crisis outcomes and dynamics: Nuclear crises are intrinsically hard to interpret. The balance of
resolve between adversaries -- one of the most important variables in any crisis -- is influenced by many factors
and is basically impossible to code
ex ante
. The two variables identified as critical by Bell and
Macdonald for determining the shape of a crisis -- the nuclear balance and the controllability of escalation --
are only somewhat more tractable to interpretation. The consequence is that nuclear crises are prone to
ambiguity, with coding challenges and case interpretations often resolved in favor of the analyst's
pre-existing models of the world. In short, nuclear crises suffer from an especially pernicious interdependence
between fact and theory.
3
To the extent that this problem can be ameliorated -- although it cannot be resolved entirely -- the solution
is to employ the best possible conceptual and measurement standards for each key variable. Below we provide
best practices for coding the nuclear balance, with particular focus on Bell and Macdonald's interpretation of
the Cuban Missile Crisis. We argue that, following much of the extant literature, Bell and Macdonald make
interpretive choices that unintentionally truncate the history that underlies their coding of the nuclear
balance in this case. In our view, they incorrectly conclude that the United States had no military incentives
to use nuclear weapons first in 1962.
Below, we analyze their interpretation of the Cuba crisis by examining two indicators that might be used to
establish the nuclear balance: the operational capabilities of both sides and the perceptions of key U.S.
policymakers. We conclude by drawing out some broader implications of the crisis for their conceptual
framework, offering a friendly amendment.
What Were the Operational Capabilities on Both Sides in 1962?
Bell and Macdonald's characterization of the nuclear balance in the Cuban Missile Crisis is a central part
of their argument, as it is their sole empirical example of a crisis that "was not characterized by incentives
for deliberate first nuclear use." They base this assertion on a brief overview of the balance of U.S. and
Soviet strategic forces in 1962, followed by a claim that "[t]he U.S. government did not know where all of the
Soviet warheads were located, and there were concerns that U.S. forces were too inaccurate to successfully
target the Soviet arsenal."
4
Yet, any calculation of the incentives for deliberate first use must be based on the full context of the
military balance. This hinges on the operational capabilities of both sides in the crisis, which includes a
concept of operations of a first strike as well as the ability of both sides to execute nuclear operations. The
available evidence on operational capabilities suggests that a U.S. first strike would have been likely to
eliminate much, if not all, of the Soviet nuclear forces capable of striking the United States, as we summarize
briefly below.
Any concept of operations for a U.S. first strike would have been unlikely to rely solely, or even
primarily, on relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles, as Bell and Macdonald imply. In a sketch of such an
attack drafted by National Security Council staffer Carl Kaysen and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Harry
Rowen during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the strike would have been delivered by a U.S. bomber force rather than
with missiles. As Kaysen and Rowen describe, all Soviet nuclear forces of the time were "soft" targets, so U.S.
nuclear bombers would have been more than accurate enough to destroy them. Moreover, a carefully planned bomber
attack could have exploited the limitations of Soviet air defense in detecting low flying aircraft, enabling a
successful surprise attack.
5
Kaysen would retrospectively note that U.S. missiles, which were inaccurate but armed with multi-megaton
warheads, could also have been included in an attack, concluding, "we had a highly confident first strike."
6
Kaysen's confidence was based on his understanding of the relative ability of both sides to conduct nuclear
operations. In terms of targeting intelligence, while the United States may not have known where all Soviet
nuclear warheads were, it had detailed knowledge of the location of Soviet long-range delivery systems. This
intelligence came from a host of sources, including satellite reconnaissance and human sources. U.S.
intelligence also understood the low readiness of Soviet nuclear forces.
7
As Kaysen would later note, "By this time we knew that there were no goddamn missiles to speak of, we knew that
there were only 6 or 7 operational ones and 3 or 4 more in the test sites and so on. As for the Soviet bombers,
they were in a very low state of alert."
8
Of course, Kaysen's assessment of the balance of forces in 1961 might have been overly optimistic or no
longer true a year later during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet, other contemporary analysts concurred. Andrew
Marshall, who had access to the closely held targeting intelligence of this period, subsequently described the
Soviet nuclear force, particularly its bombers, as "sitting ducks."
9
James Schlesinger, writing about four months before the crisis, noted, "During the next four or five years,
because of nuclear dominance, the credibility of an American first-strike remains high."
10
The authors of the comprehensive
History of the Strategic Arms Competition
, drawing on a variety of
highly classified U.S. sources, reach a similar conclusion:
[T]he Soviet strategic situation in 1962 might thus have been judged little short of desperate. A
well-timed U.S. first strike, employing then-available ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBM
[submarine-launched ballistic missile] forces as well as bombers, could have seemed threatening to the
survival of most of the Soviet Union's own intercontinental strategic forces. Furthermore, there was the
distinct, if small, probability that such an attack could have denied the Soviet Union the ability to
inflict any significant retaliatory damage upon the United States.
11
The Soviet nuclear-armed submarines of 1962 were likewise vulnerable to U.S. anti-submarine warfare, as they
would have had to approach within a few hundred miles of the U.S. coast to launch their missiles. As early as
1959, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Nathan Twining testified that while "one or two isolated
submarines" might reach the U.S. coast, in general, the United States had high confidence in its anti-submarine
warfare capabilities.
12
The performance of these capabilities during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when multiple Soviet submarines were
detected and some forced to surface, confirms their efficacy, as Bell and Macdonald acknowledge in their
description of an attack on a Soviet submarine during the crisis.
13
How Was the Nuclear Balance Perceived in 1962?
Bell and Macdonald offer three data points for their argument that U.S. policymakers did not perceive
meaningful American nuclear superiority during the Cuban Missile Crisis. First, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara and other veterans of the Kennedy administration attested retrospectively that nuclear superiority did
not play an important role in the Cuba crisis.
14
Second, President John F. Kennedy received a Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing on the Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SIOP) -- the U.S plan for strategic nuclear weapons employment -- in 1961, which reported that
Soviet retaliation should be expected under all circumstances, even after an American pre-emptive strike.
15
Third, the president expressed ambivalence about the nuclear balance on the first day of the Cuba crisis.
16
But this evidence is a combination of truncated, biased, and weak. The retrospective testimony of Kennedy
administration alumni is highly dubious. McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and others were
all highly motivated political actors, speaking two decades after the fact in the context of fierce nuclear
policy debates on which they had taken highly public positions, as Bell and Macdonald acknowledge in a
footnote.
17
The problems with giving much weight to such statements are especially evident given the fact that, as Bell and
Macdonald acknowledge,
18
these very same advisers made remarks during the Cuba crisis that were much more favorably disposed to the idea
of American nuclear superiority.
19
The Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing to Kennedy on SIOP-62 is evidence, contrary to Bell and Macdonald's
interpretation, of American nuclear superiority in 1962. Bell and Macdonald make much of the briefing's caution
that "Under any circumstances -- even a preemptive attack by the US -- it would be expected that some portion of the
Soviet long-range nuclear force would strike the United States."
20
But interpreting this comment as evidence that the United States did not possess "politically meaningful damage
limitation" capabilities makes sense only if one has already decided that the relevant standard for political
meaning is a perfectly disarming strike.
21
Scott Sagan, in commenting on the briefing, underscores that "although the United States could expect to suffer
some unspecified nuclear damage under any condition of war initiation, the Soviet Union would confront
absolutely massive destruction regardless of whether it struck first or retaliated."
22
Crucially, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for maintaining a U.S. first-strike capability in a memorandum
to McNamara commenting on his plans for strategic nuclear forces for fiscal years 1964–68. This memorandum,
sent shortly after the crisis, argues that the United States could not, in the future, entirely eliminate
Soviet strategic forces. Yet, the memorandum continues: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a first-strike
capability is both feasible and desirable, although the degree or level of attainment is a matter of judgment
and depends upon the US reaction to a changing Soviet capability."
23
In short, not only did the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude the United States had a meaningful first-strike
capability in 1962, they believed such a capability could and should be maintained in the future.
As for Kennedy's personal views, it is important not just to consider isolated quotes during the Cuban
crisis -- after all, he made several comments that point in opposite directions.
24
One has to consider the political context of the Cuban affair writ large: the multi-year contest with the
Soviets over the future of Berlin, and effectively, the NATO alliance. Moreover, Kennedy had deliberately built
Western policy during the Berlin crisis on a foundation of nuclear superiority. NATO planning assumed that
nuclear weapons would ultimately be used, and probably on a massive scale.
25
As Kennedy put it to French President Charles de Gaulle in June of 1961, "the advantage of striking first
with nuclear weapons is so great that if [the] Soviets were to attack even without using such weapons, the U.S.
could not afford to wait to use them." In July, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "he felt the critical
point is to be able to use nuclear weapons at a crucial point before they use them." In January of 1962,
expecting the Berlin Crisis to heat up in the near future, he stressed the importance of operational military
planning, and of thinking "hard about the ways and means of making decisions that might lead to nuclear war."
As he put it at that meeting, "the credibility of our nuclear deterrent is sufficient to hold our present
positions throughout the world" even if American conventional military power "on the ground does not match what
the communists can bring to bear."
26
But the president recognized that this military strength was a wasting asset: The development of Soviet
nuclear forces meant that the window of American nuclear superiority was closing. For this reason, Kennedy
thought it important to bring the Berlin Crisis to a head as soon as possible, while the United States still
possessed an edge. "It might be better to let a confrontation to develop over Berlin now rather than later," he
argued just two weeks before the Cuba crisis. After all, "the military balance was more favorable to us than it
would be later on."
27
Two months after the crisis, his views were little different. Reporting on a presidential trip to Strategic Air
Command during which Kennedy was advised that "the really neat and clean way to get around all these
complexities [about the precise state of the nuclear balance] was to strike first," Bundy "said that of course
the President had not reacted with any such comments, but Bundy's clear implication was that the President felt
that way."
28
Broader Implications
Our argument about the nuclear balance during the Cuban Missile Crisis, if correct, requires some friendly
amendments to Bell and Macdonald's framework for delineating types of nuclear crisis.
Our discussion of the operational capabilities and policymaker perceptions during the Cuba crisis
underscores that Bell and Macdonald's first variable -- "the strength of incentives to use nuclear weapons first
in a crisis"
29
-- probably ought to be unpacked into two separate variables: military incentives for a first strike, and
political bargaining incentives for selective use. After all, whatever the exact nuclear balance was during
1962, the United States was certainly postured for asymmetric escalation. The salience of America's posture is
thrown into especially bold relief once the political context of the crisis is recognized: The Cuban affair was
basically the climax of the superpower confrontation over Berlin, in which American force structure and
planning was built around nuclear escalation. Indeed, this is how policymakers saw the Cuba crisis, where the
fear of Soviet countermoves in Berlin hung as an ever-present cloud over discussions within the Executive
Committee of the National Security Council.
30
According to Bell and Macdonald, either kind of incentive is sufficient to put a case into the "high" risk
category for deliberate use. But in truth, political incentives to use nuclear weapons selectively -- even if
only against military targets -- are ever present. They are just seldom triggered until matters have gone
seriously awry on the battlefield. In short, we believe Bell and Macdonald were right to expend extra effort
looking for military first-strike incentives, which add genuinely different sorts of risk to a crisis. We argue
that operational capabilities and policymaker perceptions in the Cuba crisis show that such incentives are more
common than generally credited.
So, we would build on Bell and Macdonald's central insight that different types of nuclear crisis have
different signaling and risk profiles by modestly amending their framework. We suggest that there are three
types of nuclear crisis: those with political bargaining incentives for selective nuclear use (Type A); those
with risks of both selective use and non-rational uncontrolled escalation (Type B); and those with political
risks, non-rational risks, and military incentives for a nuclear first strike (Type C).
Type A crises essentially collapse Bell and Macdonald's "staircase" and "stability-instability" models, and
are relatively low risk.
31
Any proposed nuclear escalation amounts to a "threat to launch a disastrous war coolly and deliberately in
response to some enemy transgression."
32
Such threats are hard to make credible until military collapse has put a state's entire international position
at stake. Outcomes of Type A crises will be decided solely by the balance of resolve. We disagree with Bell and
Macdonald's argument that the conventional military balance can ever determine the outcome of a nuclear crisis,
since any conventional victory stands only by dint of the losing side's unwillingness to escalate. But the
lower risks of a Type A crisis mean that signals of resolve are harder to send, and must occur through large
and not particularly selective or subtle means -- essentially, larger conventional and nuclear operations.
Type B crises are similar to Bell and Macdonald's "brinksmanship" model.
33
These have a significantly greater risk profile, since they also contain genuine risks of uncontrolled
escalation in addition to political risks. Crisis outcomes remain dependent on the balance of resolve, but
signaling is easier and can be much finer-grained than in Type A crises. The multiple opportunities for
uncontrolled escalation mean that there are simply many more things a state can do at much lower levels of
actual violence to manipulate the level of risk in a crisis. For instance, alerting nuclear forces will often
not mean much in a Type A crisis (at least before the moment of conventional collapse), since there is no way
things can get out of control. But alerting forces in a Type B crisis could set off a chain of events where
states clash due to the interaction between each other's rules of nuclear engagement, incentivize forces
inadvertently threatened by conventional operations to fire, or misperceive each other's actions. Any given
military move will have more political meaning and will also be more dangerous.
Type C crises are similar to Bell and Macdonald's "firestorm" model.
34
These are the riskiest sorts of nuclear crisis, since there are military reasons for escalation as well as
political and non-rational risks. Outcomes will be influenced both by the balance of resolve and the nuclear
balance: either could give states incentives to manipulate risk. Such signals will be the easiest to send, and
the finest-grained of any type of crisis. But because the risk level jumps so much with any given signal, the
time in which states can bargain may be short.
35
In sum, Bell and Macdonald have made an important contribution to the study of nuclear escalation by
delineating different types of crisis with different risk and signaling profiles. We believe they understate
the importance of American nuclear superiority during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and that these coding problems
highlight some conceptual issues with their framework. In the end, though, our amendments appear to us
relatively minor, further underscoring the importance of Bell and Macdonald's research. We hope that they, and
other scholars, will continue to build on these findings.
Brendan R. Green,
Cincinnati, Ohio
Austin Long,
Arlington, Virginia
In Response to a Critique
Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald
We thank Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long for their positive assessment of our work and for
engaging with our argument so constructively.
36
Their contribution represents exactly the sort of productive scholarly debate we were hoping to provoke. As we
stated in our article, we intended our work to be only an initial effort to think through the heterogeneity of
nuclear crises, and we are delighted that Green and Long have taken seriously our suggestion for scholars to
continue to think in more detail about the ways in which nuclear crises differ from one another. Their
arguments are characteristically insightful, offer a range of interesting and important arguments and
suggestions, and have forced us to think harder about a number of aspects of our argument.
In this reply, we briefly lay out the argument we made in our article before responding to Green and Long's
suggestion that we underestimate the incentives to launch a nuclear first-strike during the Cuban Missile
Crisis and their proposal of an alternative typology for understanding nuclear crises.
Our Argument
In our article, we offer a framework for thinking through the heterogeneity of nuclear crises.
37
While the existing literature on such crises assumes that they all follow a certain logic (although there is
disagreement on what that logic is), we identify factors that might lead nuclear crises to differ from one
another in consequential ways. In particular, we argue that two factors -- whether incentives are present for
nuclear first use and the extent to which escalation is controllable by the leaders involved -- lead to
fundamentally different sorts of crises. These two variables generate four possible "ideal type" models of
nuclear crises: "staircase" crises (characterized by high first-use incentives and high controllability),
"brinkmanship" crises (low first-use incentives and low controllability), "stability-instability" crises (low
first-use incentives and high controllability), and "firestorm" crises (high first-use incentives and low
controllability).
Each of these ideal types exhibits distinctive dynamics and offers different answers to important questions,
such as, how likely is nuclear escalation, and how might it occur? How feasible is signaling within a crisis?
What factors determine success? For example, crises exhibiting high incentives for nuclear first use combined
with low crisis controllability -- firestorm crises -- are particularly volatile, and the most dangerous of all
four models in terms of likelihood of nuclear war. These are the crises that statesmen should avoid except
under the direst circumstances or for the highest stakes. By contrast, where incentives for the first use of
nuclear weapons are low and there is high crisis controllability -- the stability-instability model -- the risk
of nuclear use is lowest. When incentives for nuclear first use are low and crisis controllability is also low
-- brinkmanship crises -- or when incentives for first use are high and crisis controllability is also high -- the
staircase model -- there is a moderate risk of nuclear use, although through two quite different processes. For
the brinkmanship model, low levels of crisis controllability combined with few incentives for nuclear first use
mean that escalation to the nuclear level would likely only happen inadvertently and through a process of
uncontrolled, rather than deliberate, escalation. On the other hand, high levels of crisis controllability
combined with high incentives for nuclear first use -- characteristic of the staircase model -- mean that
escalation would more likely occur through a careful, deliberate process.
First-Use Incentives in the Cuban Missile Crisis
First, Green and Long address the extent of incentives for launching a nuclear first strike during the Cuban
Missile Crisis. In short, they argue that there were substantial military incentives for America to strike
first during the crisis and that these were understood and appreciated by American leaders.
38
While space constraints meant that our analysis of the nuclear balance in the Cuban Missile Crisis was
briefer than we would have liked, we certainly agree that the United States possessed nuclear superiority over
the Soviet Union during the crisis.
39
The debate between us and Green and Long is, therefore, primarily over whether the nuclear balance that we
(more or less) agree existed in 1962 was sufficiently lopsided as to offer meaningful incentives for nuclear
first use, and whether it was perceived as such by the leaders involved. In this, we do have somewhat different
interpretations of how much weight to assign to particular pieces of evidence. For example, we believe that the
retrospective assessment of key participants does have evidentiary value, although we acknowledge (as we did in
our article) the biases of such assessments in this case. Given the rapidly shifting nuclear balance, we place
less weight on President John F. Kennedy's statements in years prior to the crisis than on those he made during
the crisis itself,
40
which were more consistently skeptical of the benefits associated with U.S. nuclear superiority at a time when
the stakes were at their highest.
41
We also place somewhat less weight than Green and Long on the 1961 analysis of Carl Kaysen, given doubts about
whether his report had much of an effect on operational planning.
42
And finally, we put less weight on the Joint Chiefs of Staff document from 1962 cited by Green and Long in
support of their argument, given that it acknowledges the U.S. inability to eliminate Soviet strategic nuclear
forces -- thus highlighting the dangers of a U.S. nuclear first strike -- as well as focuses on future force
planning in the aftermath of the crisis.
We would also note that our assessment that U.S. nuclear superiority in the Cuban Missile Crisis did not
obviously translate into politically meaningful incentives for first use is in line with standard
interpretations of this case, including among scholars that Green and Long cite. For Marc Trachtenberg, for
example, "[t]he American ability to 'limit damage' by destroying an enemy's strategic forces did not seem, in
American eyes, to carry much political weight" during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
43
Similarly, the relative lack of incentives for rational first use in the crisis motivated Thomas Schelling's
assessment that only an "unforeseeable and unpredictable" process could have led to nuclear use in the crisis.
44
Regardless of whether participants in the Cuban Missile Crisis understood the advantages (or lack thereof)
associated with nuclear superiority, in some ways, our disagreement with Green and Long is more of a conceptual
one: where to draw the threshold at which a state's level of nuclear superiority (and corresponding ability to
limit retaliatory damage) should be deemed "politically meaningful," i.e., sufficiently lopsided to offer
incentives for first use. This is a topic about which there is certainly room for legitimate disagreement.
"Political relevance" is a tricky concept, which reinforces Green and Long's broader argument that "nuclear
crises are intrinsically hard to interpret" -- a point with which we agree.
45
But Green and Long seem to view
any
ability to limit retaliatory damage as politically meaningful,
since they argue that a nuclear balance that would have likely left a number of American cities destroyed (and
potentially more), even in the aftermath of a U.S. first strike, nonetheless provided strong military
incentives for first use. By contrast, our view is that the threshold should be somewhat higher than this,
though lower than Green and Long's characterization of our position: We do not, in fact, think that the
relevant standard for political meaning "is a perfectly disarming strike."
Part of our motivation in wanting a threshold higher than "any damage limitation capability" is that it
increases the utility of the typology we offer by allowing us to draw the line in such a way that a substantial
number of empirical cases exist on either side of that threshold. Green and Long, by contrast, seem more
satisfied to draw the line in such a way that cases exhibiting very different incentives for first use -- a
crisis with North Korea today compared to the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example -- would both be classified on
the same side of the threshold.
46
Green and Long's approach would ignore the important differences between these cases by treating both crises as
exhibiting strong incentives for nuclear first use. This would be akin to producing a meteorological map that
rarely shows rain because the forecaster judges the relevant threshold to be "catastrophic flooding." There is
nothing fundamentally incorrect about making such a choice, but it is not necessarily the most helpful approach
to shedding light on the empirical variation we observe in the historical record.
An Alternative Typology of Nuclear Crises
Second, Green and Long offer an alternative typology for understanding the heterogeneity of nuclear crises.
Green and Long argue that there are three types of crisis: "those with political bargaining incentives for
selective nuclear use (Type A); those with risks of both selective use and non-rational uncontrolled escalation
(Type B); and those with political risks, non-rational risks, and military incentives for a nuclear first
strike (Type C)." This is an interesting proposal and we have no fundamental objections to their typology.
47
After all, one can categorize the same phenomenon in different ways, and different typologies may be useful for
different purposes. Space constraints inevitably prevent Green and Long from offering a full justification for
their typology, and we would certainly encourage them to offer a more fleshed out articulation of it and its
merits. Their initial discussion of the different types of signals that states can send within different types
of crises is especially productive and goes beyond the relatively simple discussion of the feasibility of
signaling that we included in our article. We offer two critiques that might be helpful as they (and others)
continue to consider the relative merits of these two typologies and build upon them.
First, it is not clear how different their proposed typology is from the one we offer. At times, for
example, Green and Long suggest that their typology simply divides up the same conceptual space we identify
using our two variables, but does so differently. For example, they argue that they are essentially collapsing
two of our quadrants (stability-instability crises and staircase crises) into Type A crises, while Type B
crises are similar to our brinkmanship crises and Type C crises are similar to our firestorm crises. If so,
their typology does not really suggest a fundamentally different understanding of how nuclear crises vary, but
merely of where the most interesting variation occurs within the conceptual space we identify. The key
question, then, in determining the relative merits of the two typologies, is whether there is important
variation between the two categories that Green and Long collapse. We continue to think the distinctions
between stability-instability crises and staircase crises are important. Although both types of crises are
relatively controllable and have limited risk of what Green and Long call "non-rational uncontrolled
escalation," they have very different risks when it comes to nuclear use: lower in stability-instability crises
and higher in staircase crises. The factors that determine success in stability-instability crises -- primarily
the conventional military balance due to the very low risk of nuclear escalation -- do not necessarily determine
success in staircase crises, in which the nuclear balance may matter. As a result, we think that collapsing
these two categories is not necessarily a helpful analytical move.
Second, to the extent that their typology differs from our own, it does so in ways that are not necessarily
helpful in shedding light on the variation across nuclear crises that we observe. In particular, separating
incentives for first use into "political bargaining incentives" and "military incentives" is an intriguing
proposal but we are not yet fully persuaded of its merits. Given that one of Green and Long's goals is to
increase the clarity of the typology we offer, and given that they acknowledge the difficulties of coding the
nuclear balance, demanding even more fine-grained assessments in order to divide incentives for first use into
two separate (but conceptually highly connected) components may be a lot to ask of analysts. Moreover, given
Green and Long's assertion that "political incentives to use nuclear weapons selectively are ever present,"
their argument in fact implies (as mentioned above) that political incentives for first use are
not
a
source of interesting variation within nuclear crises. We disagree with this conclusion substantively, but it
is worth noting that it also has important conceptual implications for Green and Long's typology: It means that
their three types of crises all exhibit political incentives for nuclear first use. If this is the case, then
political incentives for nuclear first use simply fall out of the analysis. In effect, crises without political
incentives for nuclear first use are simply ruled out by definition. This analytic move renders portions of
their argument tautologous. For example, they argue that the conventional balance cannot "ever determine the
outcome of a nuclear crisis," but this is only because they assume that there are always political incentives
to use nuclear weapons first, and thus, "any conventional victory stands only by dint of the losing side's
unwillingness to escalate." More broadly, this approach seems to us at least somewhat epistemologically
problematic. In our view, it is better to be conceptually open to the existence of certain types of crises and
then discover that such crises do not occur empirically, than it is to rule them out by definition and risk
discovering later that such crises have, in fact, taken place.
In sum, while we are not fully persuaded by Green and Long's critiques, we are extremely grateful for their
insightful, thorough, and constructive engagement with our article and look forward to their future work on
these issues. We hope that they, along with other scholars, will continue to explore the ways in which nuclear
crises differ from one another, and the implications of such differences for crisis dynamics.
Mark S. Bell,
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Julia Macdonald,
Denver, Colorado
Endnotes
1
Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises,"
Texas National Security
Review
2, no. 2 (February 2019): 40–64,
http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/1944
.
2
Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 42, 63.
3
For an excellent treatment of this problem in the international relations context, see Robert Jervis,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1976), 154–72.
4
Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
5
See Memorandum for General Maxwell Taylor from Carl Kaysen, "Strategic Air Planning and Berlin," Sept.
5, 1961, from National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC1.pdf
.
7
Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, "Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence,
Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,"
Journal of Strategic Studies
38, no. 1–2 (2015): 44–46,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150
.
9
Quoted in Long and Green, "Stalking the Secure Second Strike," 46.
10
James R. Schlesinger, "Some Notes on Deterrence in Western Europe," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, June 30, 1962), 8.
11
Ernest R. May, John D. Steinbruner, and Thomas M. Wolfe,
History of the Strategic Arms
Competition 1945–1972
, v.1 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), 475.
12
Quoted in Scott Sagan, "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy,"
International Security
12, no. 1 (Summer 1987): 34,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538916
.
13
Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 56. See also, May, Steinbruner, and Wolfe,
History of the Strategic Arms Competition
, 475; and Owen Coté,
The Third Battle: Innovation in
the US Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003),
42.
14
Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55, 59.
15
Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
16
Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
24
For example, consider his remark, just after the peak of the crisis, that "My guess is, well,
everybody sort of figures that, in extremis, everybody would use nuclear weapons," before strongly implying
massive U.S. preemption would be preferable to tactical use. See ExComm Meeting, Oct. 29, 1962, in Ernest R.
May and Philip Zelikow, eds.,
The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 657.
25
For excellent accounts of Kennedy's Berlin policy and his views on nuclear superiority, which we draw
upon heavily, see Marc Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement,
1945-1963
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 8; Francis J. Gavin,
Nuclear
Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012),
chaps. 2–3.
26
Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace
, 292, 293, 294, 295.
28
Legere memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting, Dec. 10, 1962, National
Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group December 1962-January 1963; quoted in
FRUS
1961-1963
, Vol. 8, 436.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d118
.
29
Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 43.
30
See, e.g., Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace
, 353, n. 3.
31
Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 46, 47–49.
32
Thomas C. Schelling,
Arms and Influence
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 97.
33
Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 46, 49.
34
Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 46, 49–50.
36
This work was supported by U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) award FA7000-19-2-0008. The opinions,
findings, views, conclusions or recommendations contained herein are those of the authors and should not be
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied,
of USAFA, DTRA or the U.S. Government.
38
One minor correction to Green and Long's argument: The Cuban Missile Crisis is not the "sole
empirical example" in our article of a crisis characterized by a lack of incentives for first use. In the
article we also argue that the 2017 Doklam Crisis between India and China lacked strong incentives for first
use, and we suspect there are plenty more crises of this sort in the historical record. Bell and Macdonald,
"How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 60–61.
39
Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
40
The quote from the crisis that Green and Long cite does not really support their argument. Green and
Long state: "consider [Kennedy's] remark, just after the peak of the crisis, that 'My guess is, well,
everybody sort of figures that, in extremis, everybody would use nuclear weapons,' before strongly implying
massive U.S. preemption would be preferable to tactical use." In fact, consider the full quote: "My guess
is, well, everybody sort of figures that, in extremis, everybody would use nuclear weapons. The decision to
use any kind of a nuclear weapon, even the tactical ones, presents such a risk of it getting out of control
so quickly." Kennedy then trails off but "appears to agree" with an unidentified participant who states,
"But Cuba's so small compared to the world." This suggests that Kennedy was expressing deep skepticism of
any sort of nuclear use remaining limited, as well as doubts about the merits of taking such risks over
Cuba, rather than making any sort of clear comparison between the merits of tactical use and massive
pre-emption as Green and Long suggest. Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow, eds.,
The Kennedy Tapes: Inside
the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 657.
41
For a recent analysis of Kennedy's behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis that concludes that he
was deeply skeptical of the benefits of nuclear superiority during the crisis, see James Cameron,
The
Double Game: The Demise of America's First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 29–37.
42
For example, see Francis Gavin's assessment that "little was done with" Kaysen's plan, a claim which
echoes Marc Trachtenberg's earlier assessment that "it is hard to tell, however, what effect [Kaysen's
analysis] had, and in particular whether, by the end of the year, the Air Force was prepared in operational
terms to launch an attack of this sort." Francis J. Gavin,
Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in
America's Atomic Age
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 38; Marc Trachtenberg,
History
and Strategy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 225.
43
Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,"
International
Security
10, no. 1 (Summer 1985), 162,
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2538793
.
44
Thomas C. Schelling,
Arms and Influence
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 97.
45
Indeed, at the risk of adding even more complexity, the relevant threshold likely varies with the
stakes of the crisis: Leaders are likely to view lesser damage limitation capabilities as politically
relevant when the stakes are higher than they are when the stakes involved are lower.
46
For discussion of the North Korean case, see Bell and Macdonald, "Toward Deterrence," and Bell and
Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 61–62.
Azita Raji
Former ambassador to Sweden, Azita Raji, proposes a way forward for a renewed and sustainable American
foreign policy. This would require a re-examination of America's interests, institutional reforms, and a
revival of American ideals. To wit: reflection,
Top
Hello
From Texas!
In Response to "How to Think About Nuclear Crises"
Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long
In their article in the February 2019 issue of the
Texas National
Security Review
, Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald make a cogent argument that all nuclear crises are not created equal.
[1]
We agree with their basic thesis: There really are different sorts of nuclear crises, which have different risk and
signaling profiles. We also concur that the existence of a variety of political and military dynamics within nuclear crises
implies that we should exercise caution when interpreting the results of cross-sectional statistical analysis. If crises are
not in fact all the same, then quantitative estimates of variable effects have a murkier meaning.
[2]
We should not be surprised that, to date, multiple studies have produced different results. Nevertheless, the article also
highlights an alternate hypothesis for nuclear scholarship's inconsistent findings about crisis outcomes and dynamics:
Nuclear crises are intrinsically hard to interpret. The balance of resolve between adversaries -- one of the most important
variables in any crisis -- is influenced by many factors and is basically impossible to code
ex ante
. The two
variables identified as critical by Bell and Macdonald for determining the shape of a crisis -- the nuclear balance and the
controllability of escalation -- are only somewhat more tractable to interpretation. The consequence is that nuclear crises
are prone to ambiguity, with coding challenges and case interpretations often resolved in favor of the analyst's
pre-existing models of the world. In short, nuclear crises suffer from an especially pernicious interdependence between fact
and theory.
[3]
To the extent that this problem can be ameliorated -- although it cannot be resolved entirely -- the solution is to employ the
best possible conceptual and measurement standards for each key variable. Below we provide best practices for coding the
nuclear balance, with particular focus on Bell and Macdonald's interpretation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. We argue that,
following much of the extant literature, Bell and Macdonald make interpretive choices that unintentionally truncate the
history that underlies their coding of the nuclear balance in this case. In our view, they incorrectly conclude that the
United States had no military incentives to use nuclear weapons first in 1962. Below, we analyze their interpretation of the
Cuba crisis by examining two indicators that might be used to establish the nuclear balance: the operational capabilities of
both sides and the perceptions of key U.S. policymakers. We conclude by drawing out some broader implications of the crisis
for their conceptual framework, offering a friendly amendment.
What Were the Operational Capabilities on Both Sides
in 1962?
Bell and Macdonald's characterization of the nuclear balance in the Cuban Missile Crisis is a central part
of their argument, as it is their sole empirical example of a crisis that "was not characterized by incentives for
deliberate first nuclear use." They base this assertion on a brief overview of the balance of U.S. and Soviet strategic
forces in 1962, followed by a claim that "[t]he U.S. government did not know where all of the Soviet warheads were located,
and there were concerns that U.S. forces were too inaccurate to successfully target the Soviet arsenal."
[4]
Yet, any calculation of the incentives for deliberate first use must be based on the full context of the military balance.
This hinges on the operational capabilities of both sides in the crisis, which includes a concept of operations of a first
strike as well as the ability of both sides to execute nuclear operations. The available evidence on operational
capabilities suggests that a U.S. first strike would have been likely to eliminate much, if not all, of the Soviet nuclear
forces capable of striking the United States, as we summarize briefly below. Any concept of operations for a U.S. first
strike would have been unlikely to rely solely, or even primarily, on relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles, as Bell and
Macdonald imply. In a sketch of such an attack drafted by National Security Council staffer Carl Kaysen and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Harry Rowen during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the strike would have been delivered by a U.S. bomber
force rather than with missiles. As Kaysen and Rowen describe, all Soviet nuclear forces of the time were "soft" targets, so
U.S. nuclear bombers would have been more than accurate enough to destroy them. Moreover, a carefully planned bomber attack
could have exploited the limitations of Soviet air defense in detecting low flying aircraft, enabling a successful surprise
attack.
[5]
Kaysen would retrospectively note that U.S. missiles, which were inaccurate but armed with multi-megaton warheads, could
also have been included in an attack, concluding, "we had a highly confident first strike."
[6]
Kaysen's confidence was based on his understanding of the relative ability of both sides to conduct nuclear operations. In
terms of targeting intelligence, while the United States may not have known where all Soviet nuclear warheads were, it had
detailed knowledge of the location of Soviet long-range delivery systems. This intelligence came from a host of sources,
including satellite reconnaissance and human sources. U.S. intelligence also understood the low readiness of Soviet nuclear
forces.
[7]
As Kaysen would later note, "By this time we knew that there were no goddamn missiles to speak of, we knew that there were
only 6 or 7 operational ones and 3 or 4 more in the test sites and so on. As for the Soviet bombers, they were in a very low
state of alert."
[8]
Of course, Kaysen's assessment of the balance of forces in 1961 might have been overly optimistic or no longer true a year
later during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet, other contemporary analysts concurred. Andrew Marshall, who had access to the
closely held targeting intelligence of this period, subsequently described the Soviet nuclear force, particularly its
bombers, as "sitting ducks."
[9]
James Schlesinger, writing about four months before the crisis, noted, "During the next four or five years, because of
nuclear dominance, the credibility of an American first-strike remains high."
[10]
The authors of the comprehensive
History of the Strategic Arms Competition
, drawing on a variety of highly
classified U.S. sources, reach a similar conclusion:
[T]he Soviet strategic situation in 1962 might thus have been judged little short of desperate. A well-timed U.S. first
strike, employing then-available ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic
missile] forces as well as bombers, could have seemed threatening to the survival of most of the Soviet Union's own
intercontinental strategic forces. Furthermore, there was the distinct, if small, probability that such an attack could
have denied the Soviet Union the ability to inflict any significant retaliatory damage upon the United States.
[11]
The Soviet nuclear-armed submarines of 1962 were likewise vulnerable to U.S. anti-submarine warfare, as they would have had
to approach within a few hundred miles of the U.S. coast to launch their missiles. As early as 1959, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Gen. Nathan Twining testified that while "one or two isolated submarines" might reach the U.S. coast, in
general, the United States had high confidence in its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
[12]
The performance of these capabilities during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when multiple Soviet submarines were detected and
some forced to surface, confirms their efficacy, as Bell and Macdonald acknowledge in their description of an attack on a
Soviet submarine during the crisis.
[13]
How Was the Nuclear Balance Perceived in 1962?
Bell and Macdonald offer three data points for their
argument that U.S. policymakers did not perceive meaningful American nuclear superiority during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
First, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and other veterans of the Kennedy administration attested retrospectively that
nuclear superiority did not play an important role in the Cuba crisis.
[14]
Second, President John F. Kennedy received a Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing on the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)
-- the U.S plan for strategic nuclear weapons employment -- in 1961, which reported that Soviet retaliation should be expected
under all circumstances, even after an American pre-emptive strike.
[15]
Third, the president expressed ambivalence about the nuclear balance on the first day of the Cuba crisis.
[16]
But this evidence is a combination of truncated, biased, and weak. The retrospective testimony of Kennedy administration
alumni is highly dubious. McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and others were all highly motivated political
actors, speaking two decades after the fact in the context of fierce nuclear policy debates on which they had taken highly
public positions, as Bell and Macdonald acknowledge in a footnote.
[17]
The problems with giving much weight to such statements are especially evident given the fact that, as Bell and Macdonald
acknowledge,
[18]
these very same advisers made remarks during the Cuba crisis that were much more favorably disposed to the idea of American
nuclear superiority.
[19]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing to Kennedy on SIOP-62 is evidence, contrary to Bell and Macdonald's interpretation, of
American nuclear superiority in 1962. Bell and Macdonald make much of the briefing's caution that "Under any
circumstances -- even a preemptive attack by the US -- it would be expected that some portion of the Soviet long-range nuclear
force would strike the United States."
[20]
But interpreting this comment as evidence that the United States did not possess "politically meaningful damage limitation"
capabilities makes sense only if one has already decided that the relevant standard for political meaning is a perfectly
disarming strike.
[21]
Scott Sagan, in commenting on the briefing, underscores that "although the United States could expect to suffer some
unspecified nuclear damage under any condition of war initiation, the Soviet Union would confront absolutely massive
destruction regardless of whether it struck first or retaliated."
[22]
Crucially, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for maintaining a U.S. first-strike capability in a memorandum to McNamara
commenting on his plans for strategic nuclear forces for fiscal years 1964–68. This memorandum, sent shortly after the
crisis, argues that the United States could not, in the future, entirely eliminate Soviet strategic forces. Yet, the
memorandum continues: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a first-strike capability is both feasible and desirable,
although the degree or level of attainment is a matter of judgment and depends upon the US reaction to a changing Soviet
capability."
[23]
In short, not only did the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude the United States had a meaningful first-strike capability in
1962, they believed such a capability could and should be maintained in the future. As for Kennedy's personal views, it is
important not just to consider isolated quotes during the Cuban crisis -- after all, he made several comments that point in
opposite directions.
[24]
One has to consider the political context of the Cuban affair writ large: the multi-year contest with the Soviets over the
future of Berlin, and effectively, the NATO alliance. Moreover, Kennedy had deliberately built Western policy during the
Berlin crisis on a foundation of nuclear superiority. NATO planning assumed that nuclear weapons would ultimately be used,
and probably on a massive scale.
[25]
As Kennedy put it to French President Charles de Gaulle in June of 1961, "the advantage of striking first with nuclear
weapons is so great that if [the] Soviets were to attack even without using such weapons, the U.S. could not afford to wait
to use them." In July, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "he felt the critical point is to be able to use nuclear
weapons at a crucial point before they use them." In January of 1962, expecting the Berlin Crisis to heat up in the near
future, he stressed the importance of operational military planning, and of thinking "hard about the ways and means of
making decisions that might lead to nuclear war." As he put it at that meeting, "the credibility of our nuclear deterrent is
sufficient to hold our present positions throughout the world" even if American conventional military power "on the ground
does not match what the communists can bring to bear."
[26]
But the president recognized that this military strength was a wasting asset: The development of Soviet nuclear forces meant
that the window of American nuclear superiority was closing. For this reason, Kennedy thought it important to bring the
Berlin Crisis to a head as soon as possible, while the United States still possessed an edge. "It might be better to let a
confrontation to develop over Berlin now rather than later," he argued just two weeks before the Cuba crisis. After all,
"the military balance was more favorable to us than it would be later on."
[27]
Two months after the crisis, his views were little different. Reporting on a presidential trip to Strategic Air Command
during which Kennedy was advised that "the really neat and clean way to get around all these complexities [about the precise
state of the nuclear balance] was to strike first," Bundy "said that of course the President had not reacted with any such
comments, but Bundy's clear implication was that the President felt that way."
[28]
Broader Implications
Our argument about the nuclear balance during the Cuban Missile Crisis, if correct,
requires some friendly amendments to Bell and Macdonald's framework for delineating types of nuclear crisis. Our discussion
of the operational capabilities and policymaker perceptions during the Cuba crisis underscores that Bell and Macdonald's
first variable -- "the strength of incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis"
[29]
-- probably ought to be unpacked into two separate variables: military incentives for a first strike, and political
bargaining incentives for selective use. After all, whatever the exact nuclear balance was during 1962, the United States
was certainly postured for asymmetric escalation. The salience of America's posture is thrown into especially bold relief
once the political context of the crisis is recognized: The Cuban affair was basically the climax of the superpower
confrontation over Berlin, in which American force structure and planning was built around nuclear escalation. Indeed, this
is how policymakers saw the Cuba crisis, where the fear of Soviet countermoves in Berlin hung as an ever-present cloud over
discussions within the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.
[30]
According to Bell and Macdonald, either kind of incentive is sufficient to put a case into the "high" risk category for
deliberate use. But in truth, political incentives to use nuclear weapons selectively -- even if only against military
targets -- are ever present. They are just seldom triggered until matters have gone seriously awry on the battlefield. In
short, we believe Bell and Macdonald were right to expend extra effort looking for military first-strike incentives, which
add genuinely different sorts of risk to a crisis. We argue that operational capabilities and policymaker perceptions in the
Cuba crisis show that such incentives are more common than generally credited. So, we would build on Bell and Macdonald's
central insight that different types of nuclear crisis have different signaling and risk profiles by modestly amending their
framework. We suggest that there are three types of nuclear crisis: those with political bargaining incentives for selective
nuclear use (Type A); those with risks of both selective use and non-rational uncontrolled escalation (Type B); and those
with political risks, non-rational risks, and military incentives for a nuclear first strike (Type C). Type A crises
essentially collapse Bell and Macdonald's "staircase" and "stability-instability" models, and are relatively low risk.
[31]
Any proposed nuclear escalation amounts to a "threat to launch a disastrous war coolly and deliberately in response to some
enemy transgression."
[32]
Such threats are hard to make credible until military collapse has put a state's entire international position at stake.
Outcomes of Type A crises will be decided solely by the balance of resolve. We disagree with Bell and Macdonald's argument
that the conventional military balance can ever determine the outcome of a nuclear crisis, since any conventional victory
stands only by dint of the losing side's unwillingness to escalate. But the lower risks of a Type A crisis mean that signals
of resolve are harder to send, and must occur through large and not particularly selective or subtle means -- essentially,
larger conventional and nuclear operations. Type B crises are similar to Bell and Macdonald's "brinksmanship" model.
[33]
These have a significantly greater risk profile, since they also contain genuine risks of uncontrolled escalation in
addition to political risks. Crisis outcomes remain dependent on the balance of resolve, but signaling is easier and can be
much finer-grained than in Type A crises. The multiple opportunities for uncontrolled escalation mean that there are simply
many more things a state can do at much lower levels of actual violence to manipulate the level of risk in a crisis. For
instance, alerting nuclear forces will often not mean much in a Type A crisis (at least before the moment of conventional
collapse), since there is no way things can get out of control. But alerting forces in a Type B crisis could set off a chain
of events where states clash due to the interaction between each other's rules of nuclear engagement, incentivize forces
inadvertently threatened by conventional operations to fire, or misperceive each other's actions. Any given military move
will have more political meaning and will also be more dangerous. Type C crises are similar to Bell and Macdonald's
"firestorm" model.
[34]
These are the riskiest sorts of nuclear crisis, since there are military reasons for escalation as well as political and
non-rational risks. Outcomes will be influenced both by the balance of resolve and the nuclear balance: either could give
states incentives to manipulate risk. Such signals will be the easiest to send, and the finest-grained of any type of
crisis. But because the risk level jumps so much with any given signal, the time in which states can bargain may be short.
[35]
In sum, Bell and Macdonald have made an important contribution to the study of nuclear escalation by delineating different
types of crisis with different risk and signaling profiles. We believe they understate the importance of American nuclear
superiority during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and that these coding problems highlight some conceptual issues with their
framework. In the end, though, our amendments appear to us relatively minor, further underscoring the importance of Bell and
Macdonald's research. We hope that they, and other scholars, will continue to build on these findings. Brendan R. Green,
Cincinnati, Ohio
Austin Long,
Arlington, Virginia
In Response to a Critique
Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald
We thank Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long for their positive assessment
of our work and for engaging with our argument so constructively.
[36]
Their contribution represents exactly the sort of productive scholarly debate we were hoping to provoke. As we stated in our
article, we intended our work to be only an initial effort to think through the heterogeneity of nuclear crises, and we are
delighted that Green and Long have taken seriously our suggestion for scholars to continue to think in more detail about the
ways in which nuclear crises differ from one another. Their arguments are characteristically insightful, offer a range of
interesting and important arguments and suggestions, and have forced us to think harder about a number of aspects of our
argument. In this reply, we briefly lay out the argument we made in our article before responding to Green and Long's
suggestion that we underestimate the incentives to launch a nuclear first-strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and their
proposal of an alternative typology for understanding nuclear crises.
Our Argument
In our article, we offer
a framework for thinking through the heterogeneity of nuclear crises.
[37]
While the existing literature on such crises assumes that they all follow a certain logic (although there is disagreement on
what that logic is), we identify factors that might lead nuclear crises to differ from one another in consequential ways. In
particular, we argue that two factors -- whether incentives are present for nuclear first use and the extent to which
escalation is controllable by the leaders involved -- lead to fundamentally different sorts of crises. These two variables
generate four possible "ideal type" models of nuclear crises: "staircase" crises (characterized by high first-use incentives
and high controllability), "brinkmanship" crises (low first-use incentives and low controllability), "stability-instability"
crises (low first-use incentives and high controllability), and "firestorm" crises (high first-use incentives and low
controllability). Each of these ideal types exhibits distinctive dynamics and offers different answers to important
questions, such as, how likely is nuclear escalation, and how might it occur? How feasible is signaling within a crisis?
What factors determine success? For example, crises exhibiting high incentives for nuclear first use combined with low
crisis controllability -- firestorm crises -- are particularly volatile, and the most dangerous of all four models in terms of
likelihood of nuclear war. These are the crises that statesmen should avoid except under the direst circumstances or for the
highest stakes. By contrast, where incentives for the first use of nuclear weapons are low and there is high crisis
controllability -- the stability-instability model -- the risk of nuclear use is lowest. When incentives for nuclear first use
are low and crisis controllability is also low -- brinkmanship crises -- or when incentives for first use are high and crisis
controllability is also high -- the staircase model -- there is a moderate risk of nuclear use, although through two quite
different processes. For the brinkmanship model, low levels of crisis controllability combined with few incentives for
nuclear first use mean that escalation to the nuclear level would likely only happen inadvertently and through a process of
uncontrolled, rather than deliberate, escalation. On the other hand, high levels of crisis controllability combined with
high incentives for nuclear first use -- characteristic of the staircase model -- mean that escalation would more likely occur
through a careful, deliberate process.
First-Use Incentives in the Cuban Missile Crisis
First, Green and
Long address the extent of incentives for launching a nuclear first strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In short, they
argue that there were substantial military incentives for America to strike first during the crisis and that these were
understood and appreciated by American leaders.
[38]
While space constraints meant that our analysis of the nuclear balance in the Cuban Missile Crisis was briefer than we would
have liked, we certainly agree that the United States possessed nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union during the crisis.
[39]
The debate between us and Green and Long is, therefore, primarily over whether the nuclear balance that we (more or less)
agree existed in 1962 was sufficiently lopsided as to offer meaningful incentives for nuclear first use, and whether it was
perceived as such by the leaders involved. In this, we do have somewhat different interpretations of how much weight to
assign to particular pieces of evidence. For example, we believe that the retrospective assessment of key participants does
have evidentiary value, although we acknowledge (as we did in our article) the biases of such assessments in this case.
Given the rapidly shifting nuclear balance, we place less weight on President John F. Kennedy's statements in years prior to
the crisis than on those he made during the crisis itself,
[40]
which were more consistently skeptical of the benefits associated with U.S. nuclear superiority at a time when the stakes
were at their highest.
[41]
We also place somewhat less weight than Green and Long on the 1961 analysis of Carl Kaysen, given doubts about whether his
report had much of an effect on operational planning.
[42]
And finally, we put less weight on the Joint Chiefs of Staff document from 1962 cited by Green and Long in support of their
argument, given that it acknowledges the U.S. inability to eliminate Soviet strategic nuclear forces -- thus highlighting the
dangers of a U.S. nuclear first strike -- as well as focuses on future force planning in the aftermath of the crisis. We
would also note that our assessment that U.S. nuclear superiority in the Cuban Missile Crisis did not obviously translate
into politically meaningful incentives for first use is in line with standard interpretations of this case, including among
scholars that Green and Long cite. For Marc Trachtenberg, for example, "[t]he American ability to 'limit damage' by
destroying an enemy's strategic forces did not seem, in American eyes, to carry much political weight" during the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
[43]
Similarly, the relative lack of incentives for rational first use in the crisis motivated Thomas Schelling's assessment that
only an "unforeseeable and unpredictable" process could have led to nuclear use in the crisis.
[44]
Regardless of whether participants in the Cuban Missile Crisis understood the advantages (or lack thereof) associated with
nuclear superiority, in some ways, our disagreement with Green and Long is more of a conceptual one: where to draw the
threshold at which a state's level of nuclear superiority (and corresponding ability to limit retaliatory damage) should be
deemed "politically meaningful," i.e., sufficiently lopsided to offer incentives for first use. This is a topic about which
there is certainly room for legitimate disagreement. "Political relevance" is a tricky concept, which reinforces Green and
Long's broader argument that "nuclear crises are intrinsically hard to interpret" -- a point with which we agree.
[45]
But Green and Long seem to view
any
ability to limit retaliatory damage as politically meaningful, since they argue
that a nuclear balance that would have likely left a number of American cities destroyed (and potentially more), even in the
aftermath of a U.S. first strike, nonetheless provided strong military incentives for first use. By contrast, our view is
that the threshold should be somewhat higher than this, though lower than Green and Long's characterization of our position:
We do not, in fact, think that the relevant standard for political meaning "is a perfectly disarming strike." Part of our
motivation in wanting a threshold higher than "any damage limitation capability" is that it increases the utility of the
typology we offer by allowing us to draw the line in such a way that a substantial number of empirical cases exist on either
side of that threshold. Green and Long, by contrast, seem more satisfied to draw the line in such a way that cases
exhibiting very different incentives for first use -- a crisis with North Korea today compared to the Cuban Missile Crisis,
for example -- would both be classified on the same side of the threshold.
[46]
Green and Long's approach would ignore the important differences between these cases by treating both crises as exhibiting
strong incentives for nuclear first use. This would be akin to producing a meteorological map that rarely shows rain because
the forecaster judges the relevant threshold to be "catastrophic flooding." There is nothing fundamentally incorrect about
making such a choice, but it is not necessarily the most helpful approach to shedding light on the empirical variation we
observe in the historical record.
An Alternative Typology of Nuclear Crises
Second, Green and Long offer an
alternative typology for understanding the heterogeneity of nuclear crises. Green and Long argue that there are three types
of crisis: "those with political bargaining incentives for selective nuclear use (Type A); those with risks of both
selective use and non-rational uncontrolled escalation (Type B); and those with political risks, non-rational risks, and
military incentives for a nuclear first strike (Type C)." This is an interesting proposal and we have no fundamental
objections to their typology.
[47]
After all, one can categorize the same phenomenon in different ways, and different typologies may be useful for different
purposes. Space constraints inevitably prevent Green and Long from offering a full justification for their typology, and we
would certainly encourage them to offer a more fleshed out articulation of it and its merits. Their initial discussion of
the different types of signals that states can send within different types of crises is especially productive and goes
beyond the relatively simple discussion of the feasibility of signaling that we included in our article. We offer two
critiques that might be helpful as they (and others) continue to consider the relative merits of these two typologies and
build upon them. First, it is not clear how different their proposed typology is from the one we offer. At times, for
example, Green and Long suggest that their typology simply divides up the same conceptual space we identify using our two
variables, but does so differently. For example, they argue that they are essentially collapsing two of our quadrants
(stability-instability crises and staircase crises) into Type A crises, while Type B crises are similar to our brinkmanship
crises and Type C crises are similar to our firestorm crises. If so, their typology does not really suggest a fundamentally
different understanding of how nuclear crises vary, but merely of where the most interesting variation occurs within the
conceptual space we identify. The key question, then, in determining the relative merits of the two typologies, is whether
there is important variation between the two categories that Green and Long collapse. We continue to think the distinctions
between stability-instability crises and staircase crises are important. Although both types of crises are relatively
controllable and have limited risk of what Green and Long call "non-rational uncontrolled escalation," they have very
different risks when it comes to nuclear use: lower in stability-instability crises and higher in staircase crises. The
factors that determine success in stability-instability crises -- primarily the conventional military balance due to the very
low risk of nuclear escalation -- do not necessarily determine success in staircase crises, in which the nuclear balance may
matter. As a result, we think that collapsing these two categories is not necessarily a helpful analytical move. Second, to
the extent that their typology differs from our own, it does so in ways that are not necessarily helpful in shedding light
on the variation across nuclear crises that we observe. In particular, separating incentives for first use into "political
bargaining incentives" and "military incentives" is an intriguing proposal but we are not yet fully persuaded of its merits.
Given that one of Green and Long's goals is to increase the clarity of the typology we offer, and given that they
acknowledge the difficulties of coding the nuclear balance, demanding even more fine-grained assessments in order to divide
incentives for first use into two separate (but conceptually highly connected) components may be a lot to ask of analysts.
Moreover, given Green and Long's assertion that "political incentives to use nuclear weapons selectively are ever present,"
their argument in fact implies (as mentioned above) that political incentives for first use are
not
a source of
interesting variation within nuclear crises. We disagree with this conclusion substantively, but it is worth noting that it
also has important conceptual implications for Green and Long's typology: It means that their three types of crises all
exhibit political incentives for nuclear first use. If this is the case, then political incentives for nuclear first use
simply fall out of the analysis. In effect, crises without political incentives for nuclear first use are simply ruled out
by definition. This analytic move renders portions of their argument tautologous. For example, they argue that the
conventional balance cannot "ever determine the outcome of a nuclear crisis," but this is only because they assume that
there are always political incentives to use nuclear weapons first, and thus, "any conventional victory stands only by dint
of the losing side's unwillingness to escalate." More broadly, this approach seems to us at least somewhat epistemologically
problematic. In our view, it is better to be conceptually open to the existence of certain types of crises and then discover
that such crises do not occur empirically, than it is to rule them out by definition and risk discovering later that such
crises have, in fact, taken place. In sum, while we are not fully persuaded by Green and Long's critiques, we are extremely
grateful for their insightful, thorough, and constructive engagement with our article and look forward to their future work
on these issues. We hope that they, along with other scholars, will continue to explore the ways in which nuclear crises
differ from one another, and the implications of such differences for crisis dynamics. Mark S. Bell,
Minneapolis,
Minnesota
Julia Macdonald,
Denver, Colorado
[post_title] => Contrasting Views on How to Code a Nuclear
Crisis [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => closed [post_password] =>
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[lead] => In this issue's correspondence section, Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long offer up an alternative way to
code nuclear crises in response to Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald's article in the February 2019 issue of TNSR. Bell and
Macdonald, in turn, offer a response to Green and Long's critique. [pubinfo] => [issue] => Vol 2, Iss 4 [quotes] => [style]
=> framing [type] => Framing [style_label] => The Foundation [download] => Array ( [title] => PDF Download [file] => 2442 )
[authors] => Array ( [0] => 279 [1] => 138 [2] => 258 [3] => 259 ) [endnotes] => Array ( [title] => Endnotes [endnotes] =>
[1]
Mark S.
Bell and Julia Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises,"
Texas National Security Review
2, no. 2 (February
2019): 40–64,
http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/1944
.
[2]
Bell and
Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 42, 63.
[3]
For an
excellent treatment of this problem in the international relations context, see Robert Jervis,
Perception and
Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 154–72.
[4]
Bell and
Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[5]
See
Memorandum for General Maxwell Taylor from Carl Kaysen, "Strategic Air Planning and Berlin," Sept. 5, 1961, from National
Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC1.pdf
.
[6]
Marc
Trachtenberg, David Rosenberg, and Stephen Van Evera, "An Interview with Carl Kaysen," MIT Security Studies Program (1988),
9,
http://web.mit.edu/SSP/publications/working_papers/Kaysen%20working%20paper.pdf
.
[7]
Austin
Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, "Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,"
Journal of Strategic Studies
38, no. 1–2 (2015): 44–46,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150
.
[8]
"An
Interview with Carl Kaysen," 9.
[9]
Quoted
in Long and Green, "Stalking the Secure Second Strike," 46.
[10]
James
R. Schlesinger, "Some Notes on Deterrence in Western Europe," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, June 30, 1962), 8.
[11]
Ernest R. May, John D. Steinbruner, and Thomas M. Wolfe,
History of the Strategic Arms Competition 1945–1972
, v.1
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), 475.
[12]
Quoted in Scott Sagan, "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy,"
International Security
12,
no. 1 (Summer 1987): 34,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538916
.
[13]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 56. See also, May, Steinbruner, and Wolfe,
History of the Strategic
Arms Competition
, 475; and Owen Coté,
The Third Battle: Innovation in the US Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with
Soviet Submarines
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003), 42.
[14]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55, 59.
[15]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[16]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[17]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 59, fn 96. For more on Bundy, see, e.g., McGeorge Bundy et al., "Nuclear
Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,"
Foreign Affairs
60, no. 4 (Spring 1982): 753–68,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1982-03-01/nuclear-weapons-and-atlantic-alliance
.
[18]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[19]
Matthew Kroenig,
The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters
(Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018), 88.
[20]
Sagan, "SIOP-62," 50.
[21]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[22]
Sagan,
"SIOP-62," 36, and esp. n. 49.
[23]
Joint
Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 907-62 to McNamara, Nov. 20, 1962,
in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS),
1961-1963
, Vol. 8, 387–89, quotation on 388,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d109
.
[24]
For
example, consider his remark, just after the peak of the crisis, that "My guess is, well, everybody sort of figures that, in
extremis, everybody would use nuclear weapons," before strongly implying massive U.S. preemption would be preferable to
tactical use. See ExComm Meeting, Oct. 29, 1962, in Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow, eds.,
The Kennedy Tapes: Inside
the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 657.
[25]
For
excellent accounts of Kennedy's Berlin policy and his views on nuclear superiority, which we draw upon heavily, see Marc
Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1999), chap. 8; Francis J. Gavin,
Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), chaps. 2–3.
[26]
Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace
, 292, 293, 294, 295.
[27]
Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace
, 353, 351.
[28]
Legere memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting, Dec. 10, 1962, National Defense University, Taylor
Papers, Chairman's Staff Group December 1962-January 1963; quoted in
FRUS 1961-1963
, Vol. 8, 436.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d118
.
[29]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 43.
[30]
See,
e.g., Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace
, 353, n. 3.
[31]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 46, 47–49.
[32]
Thomas C. Schelling,
Arms and Influence
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 97.
[33]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 46, 49.
[34]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 46, 49–50.
[35]
Schelling,
Arms and Influence
, 102.
[36]
This
work was supported by U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Project on Advanced Systems
and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) award FA7000-19-2-0008. The opinions, findings, views, conclusions or
recommendations contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the
official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of USAFA, DTRA or the U.S. Government.
[37]
Mark
S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises,"
Texas National Security Review
2, no. 2 (February
2019): 40-64,
http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/1944
. For additional
applications of our framework, see Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, "Toward Deterrence: The Upside of the Trump-Kim
Summit,"
War on the Rocks
, June 15, 2018,
https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/toward-deterrence-the-upside-of-the-trump-kim-summit/
; Mark S. Bell and Julia
Macdonald, "How Dangerous Was Kargil? Nuclear Crises in Comparative Perspective,"
Washington Quarterly
42, no. 2
(Summer 2019): 135–48,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1626691
.
[38]
One
minor correction to Green and Long's argument: The Cuban Missile Crisis is not the "sole empirical example" in our article
of a crisis characterized by a lack of incentives for first use. In the article we also argue that the 2017 Doklam Crisis
between India and China lacked strong incentives for first use, and we suspect there are plenty more crises of this sort in
the historical record. Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 60–61.
[39]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[40]
The
quote from the crisis that Green and Long cite does not really support their argument. Green and Long state: "consider
[Kennedy's] remark, just after the peak of the crisis, that 'My guess is, well, everybody sort of figures that, in extremis,
everybody would use nuclear weapons,' before strongly implying massive U.S. preemption would be preferable to tactical use."
In fact, consider the full quote: "My guess is, well, everybody sort of figures that, in extremis, everybody would use
nuclear weapons. The decision to use any kind of a nuclear weapon, even the tactical ones, presents such a risk of it
getting out of control so quickly." Kennedy then trails off but "appears to agree" with an unidentified participant who
states, "But Cuba's so small compared to the world." This suggests that Kennedy was expressing deep skepticism of any sort
of nuclear use remaining limited, as well as doubts about the merits of taking such risks over Cuba, rather than making any
sort of clear comparison between the merits of tactical use and massive pre-emption as Green and Long suggest. Ernest R. May
and Philip Zelikow, eds.,
The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1997), 657.
[41]
For a
recent analysis of Kennedy's behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis that concludes that he was deeply skeptical of the
benefits of nuclear superiority during the crisis, see James Cameron,
The Double Game: The Demise of America's First
Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 29–37.
[42]
For
example, see Francis Gavin's assessment that "little was done with" Kaysen's plan, a claim which echoes Marc Trachtenberg's
earlier assessment that "it is hard to tell, however, what effect [Kaysen's analysis] had, and in particular whether, by the
end of the year, the Air Force was prepared in operational terms to launch an attack of this sort." Francis J. Gavin,
Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 38; Marc
Trachtenberg,
History and Strategy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 225.
[43]
Marc
Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,"
International Security
10, no. 1
(Summer 1985), 162,
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2538793
.
[44]
Thomas C. Schelling,
Arms and Influence
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 97.
[45]
Indeed, at the risk of adding even more complexity, the relevant threshold likely varies with the stakes of the crisis:
Leaders are likely to view lesser damage limitation capabilities as politically relevant when the stakes are higher than
they are when the stakes involved are lower.
[46]
For
discussion of the North Korean case, see Bell and Macdonald, "Toward Deterrence," and Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think
About Nuclear Crises," 61–62.
[47]
We
do, however, suggest that our labels offer somewhat more
joie de vivre
than the alphabetic labels that Green and
Long offer. ) [contents] => Array ( [title] => [contents] => ) ) [queried_object_id] => 1948 [request] => SELECT wp_posts.*
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In Response to "How to Think About Nuclear Crises"
Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long
In their article in the February 2019 issue of the
Texas National
Security Review
, Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald make a cogent argument that all nuclear crises are not created equal.
[1]
We agree with their basic thesis: There really are different sorts of nuclear crises, which have different risk and
signaling profiles. We also concur that the existence of a variety of political and military dynamics within nuclear crises
implies that we should exercise caution when interpreting the results of cross-sectional statistical analysis. If crises are
not in fact all the same, then quantitative estimates of variable effects have a murkier meaning.
[2]
We should not be surprised that, to date, multiple studies have produced different results. Nevertheless, the article also
highlights an alternate hypothesis for nuclear scholarship's inconsistent findings about crisis outcomes and dynamics:
Nuclear crises are intrinsically hard to interpret. The balance of resolve between adversaries -- one of the most important
variables in any crisis -- is influenced by many factors and is basically impossible to code
ex ante
. The two
variables identified as critical by Bell and Macdonald for determining the shape of a crisis -- the nuclear balance and the
controllability of escalation -- are only somewhat more tractable to interpretation. The consequence is that nuclear crises
are prone to ambiguity, with coding challenges and case interpretations often resolved in favor of the analyst's
pre-existing models of the world. In short, nuclear crises suffer from an especially pernicious interdependence between fact
and theory.
[3]
To the extent that this problem can be ameliorated -- although it cannot be resolved entirely -- the solution is to employ the
best possible conceptual and measurement standards for each key variable. Below we provide best practices for coding the
nuclear balance, with particular focus on Bell and Macdonald's interpretation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. We argue that,
following much of the extant literature, Bell and Macdonald make interpretive choices that unintentionally truncate the
history that underlies their coding of the nuclear balance in this case. In our view, they incorrectly conclude that the
United States had no military incentives to use nuclear weapons first in 1962. Below, we analyze their interpretation of the
Cuba crisis by examining two indicators that might be used to establish the nuclear balance: the operational capabilities of
both sides and the perceptions of key U.S. policymakers. We conclude by drawing out some broader implications of the crisis
for their conceptual framework, offering a friendly amendment.
What Were the Operational Capabilities on Both Sides
in 1962?
Bell and Macdonald's characterization of the nuclear balance in the Cuban Missile Crisis is a central part
of their argument, as it is their sole empirical example of a crisis that "was not characterized by incentives for
deliberate first nuclear use." They base this assertion on a brief overview of the balance of U.S. and Soviet strategic
forces in 1962, followed by a claim that "[t]he U.S. government did not know where all of the Soviet warheads were located,
and there were concerns that U.S. forces were too inaccurate to successfully target the Soviet arsenal."
[4]
Yet, any calculation of the incentives for deliberate first use must be based on the full context of the military balance.
This hinges on the operational capabilities of both sides in the crisis, which includes a concept of operations of a first
strike as well as the ability of both sides to execute nuclear operations. The available evidence on operational
capabilities suggests that a U.S. first strike would have been likely to eliminate much, if not all, of the Soviet nuclear
forces capable of striking the United States, as we summarize briefly below. Any concept of operations for a U.S. first
strike would have been unlikely to rely solely, or even primarily, on relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles, as Bell and
Macdonald imply. In a sketch of such an attack drafted by National Security Council staffer Carl Kaysen and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Harry Rowen during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the strike would have been delivered by a U.S. bomber
force rather than with missiles. As Kaysen and Rowen describe, all Soviet nuclear forces of the time were "soft" targets, so
U.S. nuclear bombers would have been more than accurate enough to destroy them. Moreover, a carefully planned bomber attack
could have exploited the limitations of Soviet air defense in detecting low flying aircraft, enabling a successful surprise
attack.
[5]
Kaysen would retrospectively note that U.S. missiles, which were inaccurate but armed with multi-megaton warheads, could
also have been included in an attack, concluding, "we had a highly confident first strike."
[6]
Kaysen's confidence was based on his understanding of the relative ability of both sides to conduct nuclear operations. In
terms of targeting intelligence, while the United States may not have known where all Soviet nuclear warheads were, it had
detailed knowledge of the location of Soviet long-range delivery systems. This intelligence came from a host of sources,
including satellite reconnaissance and human sources. U.S. intelligence also understood the low readiness of Soviet nuclear
forces.
[7]
As Kaysen would later note, "By this time we knew that there were no goddamn missiles to speak of, we knew that there were
only 6 or 7 operational ones and 3 or 4 more in the test sites and so on. As for the Soviet bombers, they were in a very low
state of alert."
[8]
Of course, Kaysen's assessment of the balance of forces in 1961 might have been overly optimistic or no longer true a year
later during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet, other contemporary analysts concurred. Andrew Marshall, who had access to the
closely held targeting intelligence of this period, subsequently described the Soviet nuclear force, particularly its
bombers, as "sitting ducks."
[9]
James Schlesinger, writing about four months before the crisis, noted, "During the next four or five years, because of
nuclear dominance, the credibility of an American first-strike remains high."
[10]
The authors of the comprehensive
History of the Strategic Arms Competition
, drawing on a variety of highly
classified U.S. sources, reach a similar conclusion:
[T]he Soviet strategic situation in 1962 might thus have been judged little short of desperate. A well-timed U.S. first
strike, employing then-available ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic
missile] forces as well as bombers, could have seemed threatening to the survival of most of the Soviet Union's own
intercontinental strategic forces. Furthermore, there was the distinct, if small, probability that such an attack could
have denied the Soviet Union the ability to inflict any significant retaliatory damage upon the United States.
[11]
The Soviet nuclear-armed submarines of 1962 were likewise vulnerable to U.S. anti-submarine warfare, as they would have had
to approach within a few hundred miles of the U.S. coast to launch their missiles. As early as 1959, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Gen. Nathan Twining testified that while "one or two isolated submarines" might reach the U.S. coast, in
general, the United States had high confidence in its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
[12]
The performance of these capabilities during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when multiple Soviet submarines were detected and
some forced to surface, confirms their efficacy, as Bell and Macdonald acknowledge in their description of an attack on a
Soviet submarine during the crisis.
[13]
How Was the Nuclear Balance Perceived in 1962?
Bell and Macdonald offer three data points for their
argument that U.S. policymakers did not perceive meaningful American nuclear superiority during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
First, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and other veterans of the Kennedy administration attested retrospectively that
nuclear superiority did not play an important role in the Cuba crisis.
[14]
Second, President John F. Kennedy received a Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing on the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)
-- the U.S plan for strategic nuclear weapons employment -- in 1961, which reported that Soviet retaliation should be expected
under all circumstances, even after an American pre-emptive strike.
[15]
Third, the president expressed ambivalence about the nuclear balance on the first day of the Cuba crisis.
[16]
But this evidence is a combination of truncated, biased, and weak. The retrospective testimony of Kennedy administration
alumni is highly dubious. McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and others were all highly motivated political
actors, speaking two decades after the fact in the context of fierce nuclear policy debates on which they had taken highly
public positions, as Bell and Macdonald acknowledge in a footnote.
[17]
The problems with giving much weight to such statements are especially evident given the fact that, as Bell and Macdonald
acknowledge,
[18]
these very same advisers made remarks during the Cuba crisis that were much more favorably disposed to the idea of American
nuclear superiority.
[19]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing to Kennedy on SIOP-62 is evidence, contrary to Bell and Macdonald's interpretation, of
American nuclear superiority in 1962. Bell and Macdonald make much of the briefing's caution that "Under any
circumstances -- even a preemptive attack by the US -- it would be expected that some portion of the Soviet long-range nuclear
force would strike the United States."
[20]
But interpreting this comment as evidence that the United States did not possess "politically meaningful damage limitation"
capabilities makes sense only if one has already decided that the relevant standard for political meaning is a perfectly
disarming strike.
[21]
Scott Sagan, in commenting on the briefing, underscores that "although the United States could expect to suffer some
unspecified nuclear damage under any condition of war initiation, the Soviet Union would confront absolutely massive
destruction regardless of whether it struck first or retaliated."
[22]
Crucially, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for maintaining a U.S. first-strike capability in a memorandum to McNamara
commenting on his plans for strategic nuclear forces for fiscal years 1964–68. This memorandum, sent shortly after the
crisis, argues that the United States could not, in the future, entirely eliminate Soviet strategic forces. Yet, the
memorandum continues: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a first-strike capability is both feasible and desirable,
although the degree or level of attainment is a matter of judgment and depends upon the US reaction to a changing Soviet
capability."
[23]
In short, not only did the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude the United States had a meaningful first-strike capability in
1962, they believed such a capability could and should be maintained in the future. As for Kennedy's personal views, it is
important not just to consider isolated quotes during the Cuban crisis -- after all, he made several comments that point in
opposite directions.
[24]
One has to consider the political context of the Cuban affair writ large: the multi-year contest with the Soviets over the
future of Berlin, and effectively, the NATO alliance. Moreover, Kennedy had deliberately built Western policy during the
Berlin crisis on a foundation of nuclear superiority. NATO planning assumed that nuclear weapons would ultimately be used,
and probably on a massive scale.
[25]
As Kennedy put it to French President Charles de Gaulle in June of 1961, "the advantage of striking first with nuclear
weapons is so great that if [the] Soviets were to attack even without using such weapons, the U.S. could not afford to wait
to use them." In July, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "he felt the critical point is to be able to use nuclear
weapons at a crucial point before they use them." In January of 1962, expecting the Berlin Crisis to heat up in the near
future, he stressed the importance of operational military planning, and of thinking "hard about the ways and means of
making decisions that might lead to nuclear war." As he put it at that meeting, "the credibility of our nuclear deterrent is
sufficient to hold our present positions throughout the world" even if American conventional military power "on the ground
does not match what the communists can bring to bear."
[26]
But the president recognized that this military strength was a wasting asset: The development of Soviet nuclear forces meant
that the window of American nuclear superiority was closing. For this reason, Kennedy thought it important to bring the
Berlin Crisis to a head as soon as possible, while the United States still possessed an edge. "It might be better to let a
confrontation to develop over Berlin now rather than later," he argued just two weeks before the Cuba crisis. After all,
"the military balance was more favorable to us than it would be later on."
[27]
Two months after the crisis, his views were little different. Reporting on a presidential trip to Strategic Air Command
during which Kennedy was advised that "the really neat and clean way to get around all these complexities [about the precise
state of the nuclear balance] was to strike first," Bundy "said that of course the President had not reacted with any such
comments, but Bundy's clear implication was that the President felt that way."
[28]
Broader Implications
Our argument about the nuclear balance during the Cuban Missile Crisis, if correct,
requires some friendly amendments to Bell and Macdonald's framework for delineating types of nuclear crisis. Our discussion
of the operational capabilities and policymaker perceptions during the Cuba crisis underscores that Bell and Macdonald's
first variable -- "the strength of incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis"
[29]
-- probably ought to be unpacked into two separate variables: military incentives for a first strike, and political
bargaining incentives for selective use. After all, whatever the exact nuclear balance was during 1962, the United States
was certainly postured for asymmetric escalation. The salience of America's posture is thrown into especially bold relief
once the political context of the crisis is recognized: The Cuban affair was basically the climax of the superpower
confrontation over Berlin, in which American force structure and planning was built around nuclear escalation. Indeed, this
is how policymakers saw the Cuba crisis, where the fear of Soviet countermoves in Berlin hung as an ever-present cloud over
discussions within the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.
[30]
According to Bell and Macdonald, either kind of incentive is sufficient to put a case into the "high" risk category for
deliberate use. But in truth, political incentives to use nuclear weapons selectively -- even if only against military
targets -- are ever present. They are just seldom triggered until matters have gone seriously awry on the battlefield. In
short, we believe Bell and Macdonald were right to expend extra effort looking for military first-strike incentives, which
add genuinely different sorts of risk to a crisis. We argue that operational capabilities and policymaker perceptions in the
Cuba crisis show that such incentives are more common than generally credited. So, we would build on Bell and Macdonald's
central insight that different types of nuclear crisis have different signaling and risk profiles by modestly amending their
framework. We suggest that there are three types of nuclear crisis: those with political bargaining incentives for selective
nuclear use (Type A); those with risks of both selective use and non-rational uncontrolled escalation (Type B); and those
with political risks, non-rational risks, and military incentives for a nuclear first strike (Type C). Type A crises
essentially collapse Bell and Macdonald's "staircase" and "stability-instability" models, and are relatively low risk.
[31]
Any proposed nuclear escalation amounts to a "threat to launch a disastrous war coolly and deliberately in response to some
enemy transgression."
[32]
Such threats are hard to make credible until military collapse has put a state's entire international position at stake.
Outcomes of Type A crises will be decided solely by the balance of resolve. We disagree with Bell and Macdonald's argument
that the conventional military balance can ever determine the outcome of a nuclear crisis, since any conventional victory
stands only by dint of the losing side's unwillingness to escalate. But the lower risks of a Type A crisis mean that signals
of resolve are harder to send, and must occur through large and not particularly selective or subtle means -- essentially,
larger conventional and nuclear operations. Type B crises are similar to Bell and Macdonald's "brinksmanship" model.
[33]
These have a significantly greater risk profile, since they also contain genuine risks of uncontrolled escalation in
addition to political risks. Crisis outcomes remain dependent on the balance of resolve, but signaling is easier and can be
much finer-grained than in Type A crises. The multiple opportunities for uncontrolled escalation mean that there are simply
many more things a state can do at much lower levels of actual violence to manipulate the level of risk in a crisis. For
instance, alerting nuclear forces will often not mean much in a Type A crisis (at least before the moment of conventional
collapse), since there is no way things can get out of control. But alerting forces in a Type B crisis could set off a chain
of events where states clash due to the interaction between each other's rules of nuclear engagement, incentivize forces
inadvertently threatened by conventional operations to fire, or misperceive each other's actions. Any given military move
will have more political meaning and will also be more dangerous. Type C crises are similar to Bell and Macdonald's
"firestorm" model.
[34]
These are the riskiest sorts of nuclear crisis, since there are military reasons for escalation as well as political and
non-rational risks. Outcomes will be influenced both by the balance of resolve and the nuclear balance: either could give
states incentives to manipulate risk. Such signals will be the easiest to send, and the finest-grained of any type of
crisis. But because the risk level jumps so much with any given signal, the time in which states can bargain may be short.
[35]
In sum, Bell and Macdonald have made an important contribution to the study of nuclear escalation by delineating different
types of crisis with different risk and signaling profiles. We believe they understate the importance of American nuclear
superiority during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and that these coding problems highlight some conceptual issues with their
framework. In the end, though, our amendments appear to us relatively minor, further underscoring the importance of Bell and
Macdonald's research. We hope that they, and other scholars, will continue to build on these findings. Brendan R. Green,
Cincinnati, Ohio
Austin Long,
Arlington, Virginia
In Response to a Critique
Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald
We thank Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long for their positive assessment
of our work and for engaging with our argument so constructively.
[36]
Their contribution represents exactly the sort of productive scholarly debate we were hoping to provoke. As we stated in our
article, we intended our work to be only an initial effort to think through the heterogeneity of nuclear crises, and we are
delighted that Green and Long have taken seriously our suggestion for scholars to continue to think in more detail about the
ways in which nuclear crises differ from one another. Their arguments are characteristically insightful, offer a range of
interesting and important arguments and suggestions, and have forced us to think harder about a number of aspects of our
argument. In this reply, we briefly lay out the argument we made in our article before responding to Green and Long's
suggestion that we underestimate the incentives to launch a nuclear first-strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and their
proposal of an alternative typology for understanding nuclear crises.
Our Argument
In our article, we offer
a framework for thinking through the heterogeneity of nuclear crises.
[37]
While the existing literature on such crises assumes that they all follow a certain logic (although there is disagreement on
what that logic is), we identify factors that might lead nuclear crises to differ from one another in consequential ways. In
particular, we argue that two factors -- whether incentives are present for nuclear first use and the extent to which
escalation is controllable by the leaders involved -- lead to fundamentally different sorts of crises. These two variables
generate four possible "ideal type" models of nuclear crises: "staircase" crises (characterized by high first-use incentives
and high controllability), "brinkmanship" crises (low first-use incentives and low controllability), "stability-instability"
crises (low first-use incentives and high controllability), and "firestorm" crises (high first-use incentives and low
controllability). Each of these ideal types exhibits distinctive dynamics and offers different answers to important
questions, such as, how likely is nuclear escalation, and how might it occur? How feasible is signaling within a crisis?
What factors determine success? For example, crises exhibiting high incentives for nuclear first use combined with low
crisis controllability -- firestorm crises -- are particularly volatile, and the most dangerous of all four models in terms of
likelihood of nuclear war. These are the crises that statesmen should avoid except under the direst circumstances or for the
highest stakes. By contrast, where incentives for the first use of nuclear weapons are low and there is high crisis
controllability -- the stability-instability model -- the risk of nuclear use is lowest. When incentives for nuclear first use
are low and crisis controllability is also low -- brinkmanship crises -- or when incentives for first use are high and crisis
controllability is also high -- the staircase model -- there is a moderate risk of nuclear use, although through two quite
different processes. For the brinkmanship model, low levels of crisis controllability combined with few incentives for
nuclear first use mean that escalation to the nuclear level would likely only happen inadvertently and through a process of
uncontrolled, rather than deliberate, escalation. On the other hand, high levels of crisis controllability combined with
high incentives for nuclear first use -- characteristic of the staircase model -- mean that escalation would more likely occur
through a careful, deliberate process.
First-Use Incentives in the Cuban Missile Crisis
First, Green and
Long address the extent of incentives for launching a nuclear first strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In short, they
argue that there were substantial military incentives for America to strike first during the crisis and that these were
understood and appreciated by American leaders.
[38]
While space constraints meant that our analysis of the nuclear balance in the Cuban Missile Crisis was briefer than we would
have liked, we certainly agree that the United States possessed nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union during the crisis.
[39]
The debate between us and Green and Long is, therefore, primarily over whether the nuclear balance that we (more or less)
agree existed in 1962 was sufficiently lopsided as to offer meaningful incentives for nuclear first use, and whether it was
perceived as such by the leaders involved. In this, we do have somewhat different interpretations of how much weight to
assign to particular pieces of evidence. For example, we believe that the retrospective assessment of key participants does
have evidentiary value, although we acknowledge (as we did in our article) the biases of such assessments in this case.
Given the rapidly shifting nuclear balance, we place less weight on President John F. Kennedy's statements in years prior to
the crisis than on those he made during the crisis itself,
[40]
which were more consistently skeptical of the benefits associated with U.S. nuclear superiority at a time when the stakes
were at their highest.
[41]
We also place somewhat less weight than Green and Long on the 1961 analysis of Carl Kaysen, given doubts about whether his
report had much of an effect on operational planning.
[42]
And finally, we put less weight on the Joint Chiefs of Staff document from 1962 cited by Green and Long in support of their
argument, given that it acknowledges the U.S. inability to eliminate Soviet strategic nuclear forces -- thus highlighting the
dangers of a U.S. nuclear first strike -- as well as focuses on future force planning in the aftermath of the crisis. We
would also note that our assessment that U.S. nuclear superiority in the Cuban Missile Crisis did not obviously translate
into politically meaningful incentives for first use is in line with standard interpretations of this case, including among
scholars that Green and Long cite. For Marc Trachtenberg, for example, "[t]he American ability to 'limit damage' by
destroying an enemy's strategic forces did not seem, in American eyes, to carry much political weight" during the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
[43]
Similarly, the relative lack of incentives for rational first use in the crisis motivated Thomas Schelling's assessment that
only an "unforeseeable and unpredictable" process could have led to nuclear use in the crisis.
[44]
Regardless of whether participants in the Cuban Missile Crisis understood the advantages (or lack thereof) associated with
nuclear superiority, in some ways, our disagreement with Green and Long is more of a conceptual one: where to draw the
threshold at which a state's level of nuclear superiority (and corresponding ability to limit retaliatory damage) should be
deemed "politically meaningful," i.e., sufficiently lopsided to offer incentives for first use. This is a topic about which
there is certainly room for legitimate disagreement. "Political relevance" is a tricky concept, which reinforces Green and
Long's broader argument that "nuclear crises are intrinsically hard to interpret" -- a point with which we agree.
[45]
But Green and Long seem to view
any
ability to limit retaliatory damage as politically meaningful, since they argue
that a nuclear balance that would have likely left a number of American cities destroyed (and potentially more), even in the
aftermath of a U.S. first strike, nonetheless provided strong military incentives for first use. By contrast, our view is
that the threshold should be somewhat higher than this, though lower than Green and Long's characterization of our position:
We do not, in fact, think that the relevant standard for political meaning "is a perfectly disarming strike." Part of our
motivation in wanting a threshold higher than "any damage limitation capability" is that it increases the utility of the
typology we offer by allowing us to draw the line in such a way that a substantial number of empirical cases exist on either
side of that threshold. Green and Long, by contrast, seem more satisfied to draw the line in such a way that cases
exhibiting very different incentives for first use -- a crisis with North Korea today compared to the Cuban Missile Crisis,
for example -- would both be classified on the same side of the threshold.
[46]
Green and Long's approach would ignore the important differences between these cases by treating both crises as exhibiting
strong incentives for nuclear first use. This would be akin to producing a meteorological map that rarely shows rain because
the forecaster judges the relevant threshold to be "catastrophic flooding." There is nothing fundamentally incorrect about
making such a choice, but it is not necessarily the most helpful approach to shedding light on the empirical variation we
observe in the historical record.
An Alternative Typology of Nuclear Crises
Second, Green and Long offer an
alternative typology for understanding the heterogeneity of nuclear crises. Green and Long argue that there are three types
of crisis: "those with political bargaining incentives for selective nuclear use (Type A); those with risks of both
selective use and non-rational uncontrolled escalation (Type B); and those with political risks, non-rational risks, and
military incentives for a nuclear first strike (Type C)." This is an interesting proposal and we have no fundamental
objections to their typology.
[47]
After all, one can categorize the same phenomenon in different ways, and different typologies may be useful for different
purposes. Space constraints inevitably prevent Green and Long from offering a full justification for their typology, and we
would certainly encourage them to offer a more fleshed out articulation of it and its merits. Their initial discussion of
the different types of signals that states can send within different types of crises is especially productive and goes
beyond the relatively simple discussion of the feasibility of signaling that we included in our article. We offer two
critiques that might be helpful as they (and others) continue to consider the relative merits of these two typologies and
build upon them. First, it is not clear how different their proposed typology is from the one we offer. At times, for
example, Green and Long suggest that their typology simply divides up the same conceptual space we identify using our two
variables, but does so differently. For example, they argue that they are essentially collapsing two of our quadrants
(stability-instability crises and staircase crises) into Type A crises, while Type B crises are similar to our brinkmanship
crises and Type C crises are similar to our firestorm crises. If so, their typology does not really suggest a fundamentally
different understanding of how nuclear crises vary, but merely of where the most interesting variation occurs within the
conceptual space we identify. The key question, then, in determining the relative merits of the two typologies, is whether
there is important variation between the two categories that Green and Long collapse. We continue to think the distinctions
between stability-instability crises and staircase crises are important. Although both types of crises are relatively
controllable and have limited risk of what Green and Long call "non-rational uncontrolled escalation," they have very
different risks when it comes to nuclear use: lower in stability-instability crises and higher in staircase crises. The
factors that determine success in stability-instability crises -- primarily the conventional military balance due to the very
low risk of nuclear escalation -- do not necessarily determine success in staircase crises, in which the nuclear balance may
matter. As a result, we think that collapsing these two categories is not necessarily a helpful analytical move. Second, to
the extent that their typology differs from our own, it does so in ways that are not necessarily helpful in shedding light
on the variation across nuclear crises that we observe. In particular, separating incentives for first use into "political
bargaining incentives" and "military incentives" is an intriguing proposal but we are not yet fully persuaded of its merits.
Given that one of Green and Long's goals is to increase the clarity of the typology we offer, and given that they
acknowledge the difficulties of coding the nuclear balance, demanding even more fine-grained assessments in order to divide
incentives for first use into two separate (but conceptually highly connected) components may be a lot to ask of analysts.
Moreover, given Green and Long's assertion that "political incentives to use nuclear weapons selectively are ever present,"
their argument in fact implies (as mentioned above) that political incentives for first use are
not
a source of
interesting variation within nuclear crises. We disagree with this conclusion substantively, but it is worth noting that it
also has important conceptual implications for Green and Long's typology: It means that their three types of crises all
exhibit political incentives for nuclear first use. If this is the case, then political incentives for nuclear first use
simply fall out of the analysis. In effect, crises without political incentives for nuclear first use are simply ruled out
by definition. This analytic move renders portions of their argument tautologous. For example, they argue that the
conventional balance cannot "ever determine the outcome of a nuclear crisis," but this is only because they assume that
there are always political incentives to use nuclear weapons first, and thus, "any conventional victory stands only by dint
of the losing side's unwillingness to escalate." More broadly, this approach seems to us at least somewhat epistemologically
problematic. In our view, it is better to be conceptually open to the existence of certain types of crises and then discover
that such crises do not occur empirically, than it is to rule them out by definition and risk discovering later that such
crises have, in fact, taken place. In sum, while we are not fully persuaded by Green and Long's critiques, we are extremely
grateful for their insightful, thorough, and constructive engagement with our article and look forward to their future work
on these issues. We hope that they, along with other scholars, will continue to explore the ways in which nuclear crises
differ from one another, and the implications of such differences for crisis dynamics. Mark S. Bell,
Minneapolis,
Minnesota
Julia Macdonald,
Denver, Colorado
[post_title] => Contrasting Views on How to Code a Nuclear
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[lead] => In this issue's correspondence section, Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long offer up an alternative way to
code nuclear crises in response to Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald's article in the February 2019 issue of TNSR. Bell and
Macdonald, in turn, offer a response to Green and Long's critique. [pubinfo] => [issue] => Vol 2, Iss 4 [quotes] => [style]
=> framing [type] => Framing [style_label] => The Foundation [download] => Array ( [title] => PDF Download [file] => 2442 )
[authors] => Array ( [0] => 279 [1] => 138 [2] => 258 [3] => 259 ) [endnotes] => Array ( [title] => Endnotes [endnotes] =>
[1]
Mark S.
Bell and Julia Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises,"
Texas National Security Review
2, no. 2 (February
2019): 40–64,
http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/1944
.
[2]
Bell and
Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 42, 63.
[3]
For an
excellent treatment of this problem in the international relations context, see Robert Jervis,
Perception and
Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 154–72.
[4]
Bell and
Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[5]
See
Memorandum for General Maxwell Taylor from Carl Kaysen, "Strategic Air Planning and Berlin," Sept. 5, 1961, from National
Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC1.pdf
.
[6]
Marc
Trachtenberg, David Rosenberg, and Stephen Van Evera, "An Interview with Carl Kaysen," MIT Security Studies Program (1988),
9,
http://web.mit.edu/SSP/publications/working_papers/Kaysen%20working%20paper.pdf
.
[7]
Austin
Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, "Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,"
Journal of Strategic Studies
38, no. 1–2 (2015): 44–46,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150
.
[8]
"An
Interview with Carl Kaysen," 9.
[9]
Quoted
in Long and Green, "Stalking the Secure Second Strike," 46.
[10]
James
R. Schlesinger, "Some Notes on Deterrence in Western Europe," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, June 30, 1962), 8.
[11]
Ernest R. May, John D. Steinbruner, and Thomas M. Wolfe,
History of the Strategic Arms Competition 1945–1972
, v.1
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), 475.
[12]
Quoted in Scott Sagan, "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy,"
International Security
12,
no. 1 (Summer 1987): 34,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538916
.
[13]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 56. See also, May, Steinbruner, and Wolfe,
History of the Strategic
Arms Competition
, 475; and Owen Coté,
The Third Battle: Innovation in the US Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with
Soviet Submarines
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2003), 42.
[14]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55, 59.
[15]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[16]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[17]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 59, fn 96. For more on Bundy, see, e.g., McGeorge Bundy et al., "Nuclear
Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,"
Foreign Affairs
60, no. 4 (Spring 1982): 753–68,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1982-03-01/nuclear-weapons-and-atlantic-alliance
.
[18]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[19]
Matthew Kroenig,
The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters
(Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018), 88.
[20]
Sagan, "SIOP-62," 50.
[21]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[22]
Sagan,
"SIOP-62," 36, and esp. n. 49.
[23]
Joint
Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 907-62 to McNamara, Nov. 20, 1962,
in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS),
1961-1963
, Vol. 8, 387–89, quotation on 388,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d109
.
[24]
For
example, consider his remark, just after the peak of the crisis, that "My guess is, well, everybody sort of figures that, in
extremis, everybody would use nuclear weapons," before strongly implying massive U.S. preemption would be preferable to
tactical use. See ExComm Meeting, Oct. 29, 1962, in Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow, eds.,
The Kennedy Tapes: Inside
the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 657.
[25]
For
excellent accounts of Kennedy's Berlin policy and his views on nuclear superiority, which we draw upon heavily, see Marc
Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1999), chap. 8; Francis J. Gavin,
Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), chaps. 2–3.
[26]
Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace
, 292, 293, 294, 295.
[27]
Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace
, 353, 351.
[28]
Legere memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting, Dec. 10, 1962, National Defense University, Taylor
Papers, Chairman's Staff Group December 1962-January 1963; quoted in
FRUS 1961-1963
, Vol. 8, 436.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d118
.
[29]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 43.
[30]
See,
e.g., Trachtenberg,
A Constructed Peace
, 353, n. 3.
[31]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 46, 47–49.
[32]
Thomas C. Schelling,
Arms and Influence
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 97.
[33]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 46, 49.
[34]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 46, 49–50.
[35]
Schelling,
Arms and Influence
, 102.
[36]
This
work was supported by U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Project on Advanced Systems
and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) award FA7000-19-2-0008. The opinions, findings, views, conclusions or
recommendations contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the
official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of USAFA, DTRA or the U.S. Government.
[37]
Mark
S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises,"
Texas National Security Review
2, no. 2 (February
2019): 40-64,
http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/1944
. For additional
applications of our framework, see Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, "Toward Deterrence: The Upside of the Trump-Kim
Summit,"
War on the Rocks
, June 15, 2018,
https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/toward-deterrence-the-upside-of-the-trump-kim-summit/
; Mark S. Bell and Julia
Macdonald, "How Dangerous Was Kargil? Nuclear Crises in Comparative Perspective,"
Washington Quarterly
42, no. 2
(Summer 2019): 135–48,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1626691
.
[38]
One
minor correction to Green and Long's argument: The Cuban Missile Crisis is not the "sole empirical example" in our article
of a crisis characterized by a lack of incentives for first use. In the article we also argue that the 2017 Doklam Crisis
between India and China lacked strong incentives for first use, and we suspect there are plenty more crises of this sort in
the historical record. Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 60–61.
[39]
Bell
and Macdonald, "How to Think About Nuclear Crises," 55.
[40]
The
quote from the crisis that Green and Long cite does not really support their argument. Green and Long state: "consider
[Kennedy's] remark, just after the peak of the crisis, that 'My guess is, well, everybody sort of figures that, in extremis,
everybody would use nuclear weapons,' before strongly implying massive U.S. preemption would be preferable to tactical use."
In fact, consider the full quote: "My guess is, well, everybody sort of figures that, in extremis, everybody would use
nuclear weapons. The decision to use any kind of a nuclear weapon, even the tactical ones, presents such a risk of it
getting out of control so quickly." Kennedy then trails off but "appears to agree" with an unidentified participant who
states, "But Cuba's so small compared to the world." This suggests that Kennedy was expressing deep skepticism of any sort
of nuclear use remaining limited, as well as doubts about the merits of taking such risks over Cuba, rather than making any
sort of clear comparison between the merits of tactical use and massive pre-emption as Green and Long suggest. Ernest R. May
and Philip Zelikow, eds.,
The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1997), 657.
[41]
For a
recent analysis of Kennedy's behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis that concludes that he was deeply skeptical of the
benefits of nuclear superiority during the crisis, see James Cameron,
The Double Game: The Demise of America's First
Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 29–37.
[42]
For
example, see Francis Gavin's assessment that "little was done with" Kaysen's plan, a claim which echoes Marc Trachtenberg's
earlier assessment that "it is hard to tell, however, what effect [Kaysen's analysis] had, and in particular whether, by the
end of the year, the Air Force was prepared in operational terms to launch an attack of this sort." Francis J. Gavin,
Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 38; Marc
Trachtenberg,
History and Strategy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 225.
[43]
Marc
Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,"
International Security
10, no. 1
(Summer 1985), 162,
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2538793
.
[44]
Thomas C. Schelling,
Arms and Influence
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 97.
[45]
Indeed, at the risk of adding even more complexity, the relevant threshold likely varies with the stakes of the crisis:
Leaders are likely to view lesser damage limitation capabilities as politically relevant when the stakes are higher than
they are when the stakes involved are lower.
[46]
For
discussion of the North Korean case, see Bell and Macdonald, "Toward Deterrence," and Bell and Macdonald, "How to Think
About Nuclear Crises," 61–62.
[47]
We
do, however, suggest that our labels offer somewhat more
joie de vivre
than the alphabetic labels that Green and
Long offer. ) [contents] => Array ( [title] => [contents] => ) ) ) [post_count] => 1 [current_post] => -1 [in_the_loop] =>
[post] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 1948 [post_author] => 279 [post_date] => 2019-10-03 05:00:03 [post_date_gmt] =>
2019-10-03 09:00:03 [post_content] =>
In Response to "How to Think About Nuclear Crises"
Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long
In their article in the February 2019 issue of the
Texas National
Security Review
, Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald make a cogent argument that all nuclear crises are not created equal.
[1]
We agree with their basic thesis: There really are different sorts of nuclear crises, which have different risk and
signaling profiles. We also concur that the existence of a variety of political and military dynamics within nuclear crises
implies that we should exercise caution when interpreting the results of cross-sectional statistical analysis. If crises are
not in fact all the same, then quantitative estimates of variable effects have a murkier meaning.
[2]
We should not be surprised that, to date, multiple studies have produced different results. Nevertheless, the article also
highlights an alternate hypothesis for nuclear scholarship's inconsistent findings about crisis outcomes and dynamics:
Nuclear crises are intrinsically hard to interpret. The balance of resolve between adversaries -- one of the most important
variables in any crisis -- is influenced by many factors and is basically impossible to code
ex ante
. The two
variables identified as critical by Bell and Macdonald for determining the shape of a crisis -- the nuclear balance and the
controllability of escalation -- are only somewhat more tractable to interpretation. The consequence is that nuclear crises
are prone to ambiguity, with coding challenges and case interpretations often resolved in favor of the analyst's
pre-existing models of the world. In short, nuclear crises suffer from an especially pernicious interdependence between fact
and theory.
[3]
To the extent that this problem can be ameliorated -- although it cannot be resolved entirely -- the solution is to employ the
best possible conceptual and measurement standards for each key variable. Below we provide best practices for coding the
nuclear balance, with particular focus on Bell and Macdonald's interpretation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. We argue that,
following much of the extant literature, Bell and Macdonald make interpretive choices that unintentionally truncate the
history that underlies their coding of the nuclear balance in this case. In our view, they incorrectly conclude that the
United States had no military incentives to use nuclear weapons first in 1962. Below, we analyze their interpretation of the
Cuba crisis by examining two indicators that might be used to establish the nuclear balance: the operational capabilities of
both sides and the perceptions of key U.S. policymakers. We conclude by drawing out some broader implications of the crisis
for their conceptual framework, offering a friendly amendment.
What Were the Operational Capabilities on Both Sides
in 1962?
Bell and Macdonald's characterization of the nuclear balance in the Cuban Missile Crisis is a central part
of their argument, as it is their sole empirical example of a crisis that "was not characterized by incentives for
deliberate first nuclear use." They base this assertion on a brief overview of the balance of U.S. and Soviet strategic
forces in 1962, followed by a claim that "[t]he U.S. government did not know where all of the Soviet warheads were located,
and there were concerns that U.S. forces were too inaccurate to successfully target the Soviet arsenal."
[4]
Yet, any calculation of the incentives for deliberate first use must be based on the full context of the military balance.
This hinges on the operational capabilities of both sides in the crisis, which includes a concept of operations of a first
strike as well as the ability of both sides to execute nuclear operations. The available evidence on operational
capabilities suggests that a U.S. first strike would have been likely to eliminate much, if not all, of the Soviet nuclear
forces capable of striking the United States, as we summarize briefly below. Any concept of operations for a U.S. first
strike would have been unlikely to rely solely, or even primarily, on relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles, as Bell and
Macdonald imply. In a sketch of such an attack drafted by National Security Council staffer Carl Kaysen and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Harry Rowen during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the strike would have been delivered by a U.S. bomber
force rather than with missiles. As Kaysen and Rowen describe, all Soviet nuclear forces of the time were "soft" targets, so
U.S. nuclear bombers would have been more than accurate enough to destroy them. Moreover, a carefully planned bomber attack
could have exploited the limitations of Soviet air defense in detecting low flying aircraft, enabling a successful surprise
attack.
[5]
Kaysen would retrospectively note that U.S. missiles, which were inaccurate but armed with multi-megaton warheads, could
also have been included in an attack, concluding, "we had a highly confident first strike."
[6]
Kaysen's confidence was based on his understanding of the relative ability of both sides to conduct nuclear operations. In
terms of targeting intelligence, while the United States may not have known where all Soviet nuclear warheads were, it had
detailed knowledge of the location of Soviet long-range delivery systems. This intelligence came from a host of sources,
including satellite reconnaissance and human sources.
U.S. intelligence also understood the low readiness of Soviet nuclear
forces.
[7]
As Kaysen would later note, "By this time we knew that there were no goddamn missiles to speak of, we knew that there were
only 6 or 7 operational ones and 3 or 4 more in the test sites and so on.
As for the Soviet bombers, they were in a very low
state of alert."
[8]
Of course, Kaysen's assessment of the balance of forces in 1961 might have been overly optimistic or no longer true a year
later during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet, other contemporary analysts concurred. Andrew Marshall, who had access to the
closely held targeting intelligence of this period, subsequently described the Soviet nuclear force, particularly its
bombers, as "sitting ducks."
[9]
James Schlesinger, writing about four months before the crisis, noted, "During the next four or five years, because of
nuclear dominance, the credibility of an American first-strike remains high."
[10]
The authors of the comprehensive
History of the Strategic Arms Competition
, drawing on a variety of highly
classified U.S. sources, reach a similar conclusion:
[T]he Soviet strategic situation in 1962 might thus have been judged little short of desperate. A well-timed U.S. first
strike, employing then-available ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] and SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic
missile] forces as well as bombers, could have seemed threatening to the survival of most of the Soviet Union's own
intercontinental strategic forces. Furthermore, there was the distinct, if small, probability that such an attack could
have denied the Soviet Union the ability to inflict any significant retaliatory damage upon the United States.
[11]
The Soviet nuclear-armed submarines of 1962 were likewise vulnerable to U.S. anti-submarine warfare, as they would have had
to approach within a few hundred miles of the U.S. coast to launch their missiles. As early as 1959, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Gen. Nathan Twining testified that while "one or two isolated submarines" might reach the U.S. coast, in
general, the United States had high confidence in its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
[12]
The performance of these capabilities during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when multiple Soviet submarines were detected and
some forced to surface, confirms their efficacy, as Bell and Macdonald acknowledge in their description of an attack on a
Soviet submarine during the crisis.
[13]
How Was the Nuclear Balance Perceived in 1962?
Bell and Macdonald offer three data points for their
argument that U.S. policymakers did not perceive meaningful American nuclear superiority during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
First, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and other veterans of the Kennedy administration attested retrospectively that
nuclear superiority did not play an important role in the Cuba crisis.
[14]
Second, President John F. Kennedy received a Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing on the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)
-- the U.S plan for strategic nuclear weapons employment -- in 1961, which reported that Soviet retaliation should be expected
under all circumstances, even after an American pre-emptive strike.
[15]
Third, the president expressed ambivalence about the nuclear balance on the first day of the Cuba crisis.
[16]
But this evidence is a combination of truncated, biased, and weak. The retrospective testimony of Kennedy administration
alumni is highly dubious. McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and others were all highly motivated political
actors, speaking two decades after the fact in the context of fierce nuclear policy debates on which they had taken highly
public positions, as Bell and Macdonald acknowledge in a footnote.
[17]
The problems with giving much weight to such statements are especially evident given the fact that, as Bell and Macdonald
acknowledge,
[18]
these very same advisers made remarks during the Cuba crisis that were much more favorably disposed to the idea of American
nuclear superiority.
[19]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing to Kennedy on SIOP-62 is evidence, contrary to Bell and Macdonald's interpretation, of
American nuclear superiority in 1962. Bell and Macdonald make much of the briefing's caution that "Under any
circumstances -- even a preemptive attack by the US -- it would be expected that some portion of the Soviet long-range nuclear
force would strike the United States."
[20]
But interpreting this comment as evidence that the United States did not possess "politically meaningful damage limitation"
capabilities makes sense only if one has already decided that the relevant standard for political meaning is a perfectly
disarming strike.
[21]
Scott Sagan, in commenting on the briefing, underscores that "although the United States could expect to suffer some
unspecified nuclear damage under any condition of war initiation, the Soviet Union would confront absolutely massive
destruction regardless of whether it struck first or retaliated."
[22]
Crucially, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for maintaining a U.S. first-strike capability in a memorandum to McNamara
commenting on his plans for strategic nuclear forces for fiscal years 1964–68. This memorandum, sent shortly after the
crisis, argues that the United States could not, in the future, entirely eliminate Soviet strategic forces. Yet, the
memorandum continues: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a first-strike capability is both feasible and desirable,
although the degree or level of attainment is a matter of judgment and depends upon the US reaction to a changing Soviet
capability."
[23]
In short, not only did the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude the United States had a meaningful first-strike capability in
1962, they believed such a capability could and should be maintained in the future. As for Kennedy's personal views, it is
important not just to consider isolated quotes during the Cuban crisis -- after all, he made several comments that point in
opposite directions.
[24]
One has to consider the political context of the Cuban affair writ large: the multi-year contest with the Soviets over the
future of Berlin, and effectively, the NATO alliance. Moreover, Kennedy had deliberately built Western policy during the
Berlin crisis on a foundation of nuclear superiority. NATO planning assumed that nuclear weapons would ultimately be used,
and probably on a massive scale.
[25]
As Kennedy put it to French President Charles de Gaulle in June of 1961, "the advantage of striking first with nuclear
weapons is so great that if [the] Soviets were to attack even without using such weapons, the U.S. could not afford to wait
to use them." In July, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "he felt the critical point is to be able to use nuclear
weapons at a crucial point before they use them." In January of 1962, expecting the Berlin Crisis to heat up in the near
future, he stressed the importance of operational military planning, and of thinking "hard about the ways and means of
making decisions that might lead to nuclear war." As he put it at that meeting, "the credibility of our nuclear deterrent is
sufficient to hold our present positions throughout the world" even if American conventional military power "on the ground
does not match what the communists can bring to bear."
[26]
But the president recognized that this military strength was a wasting asset: The development of Soviet nuclear forces meant
that the window of American nuclear superiority was closing. For this reason, Kennedy thought it important to bring the
Berlin Crisis to a head as soon as possible, while the United States still possessed an edge. "It might be better to let a
confrontation to develop over Berlin now rather than later," he argued just two weeks before the Cuba crisis. After all,
"the military balance was more favorable to us than it would be later on."
[27]
Two months after the crisis, his views were little different. Reporting on a presidential trip to Strategic Air Command
during which Kennedy was advised that "the really neat and clean way to get around all these complexities [about the precise
state of the nuclear balance] was to strike first," Bundy "said that of course the President had not reacted with any such
comments, but Bundy's clear implication was that the President felt that way."
[28]
Broader Implications
Our argument about the nuclear balance during the Cuban Missile Crisis, if correct,
requires some friendly amendments to Bell and Macdonald's framework for delineating types of nuclear crisis. Our discussion
of the operational capabilities and policymaker perceptions during the Cuba crisis underscores that Bell and Macdonald's
first variable -- "the strength of incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis"
[29]
-- probably ought to be unpacked into two separate variables: military incentives for a first strike, and political
bargaining incentives for selective use. After all, whatever the exact nuclear balance was during 1962, the United States
was certainly postured for asymmetric escalation. The salience of America's posture is thrown into especially bold relief
once the political context of the crisis is recognized: The Cuban affair was basically the climax of the superpower
confrontation over Berlin, in which American force structure and planning was built around nuclear escalation. Indeed, this
is how policymakers saw the Cuba crisis, where the fear of Soviet countermoves in Berlin hung as an ever-present cloud over
discussions within the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.
[30]
According to Bell and Macdonald, either kind of incentive is sufficient to put a case into the "high" risk category for
deliberate use. But in truth, political incentives to use nuclear weapons selectively -- even if only against military
targets -- are ever present. They are just seldom triggered until matters have gone seriously awry on the battlefield. In
short, we believe Bell and Macdonald were right to expend extra effort looking for military first-strike incentives, which
add genuinely different sorts of risk to a crisis. We argue that operational capabilities and policymaker perceptions in the
Cuba crisis show that such incentives are more common than generally credited. So, we would build on Bell and Macdonald's
central insight that different types of nuclear crisis have different signaling and risk profiles by modestly amending their
framework. We suggest that there are three types of nuclear crisis: those with political bargaining incentives for selective
nuclear use (Type A); those with risks of both selective use and non-rational uncontrolled escalation (Type B); and those
with political risks, non-rational risks, and military incentives for a nuclear first strike (Type C). Type A crises
essentially collapse Bell and Macdonald's "staircase" and "stability-instability" models, and are relatively low risk.
[31]
Any proposed nuclear escalation amounts to a "threat to launch a disastrous war coolly and deliberately in response to some
enemy transgression."
[32]
Such threats are hard to make credible until military collapse has put a state's entire international position at stake.
Outcomes of Type A crises will be decided solely by the balance of resolve. We disagree with Bell and Macdonald's argument
that the conventional military balance can ever determine the outcome of a nuclear crisis, since any conventional victory
stands only by dint of the losing side's unwillingness to escalate. But the lower risks of a Type A crisis mean that signals
of resolve are harder to send, and must occur through large and not particularly selective or subtle means -- essentially,
larger conventional and nuclear operations. Type B crises are similar to Bell and Macdonald's "brinksmanship" model.
[33]
These have a significantly greater risk profile, since they also contain genuine risks of uncontrolled escalation in
addition to political risks. Crisis outcomes remain dependent on the balance of resolve, but signaling is easier and can be
much finer-grained than in Type A crises. The multiple opportunities for uncontrolled escalation mean that there are simply
many more things a state can do at much lower levels of actual violence to manipulate the level of risk in a crisis. For
instance, alerting nuclear forces will often not mean much in a Type A crisis (at least before the moment of conventional
collapse), since there is no way things can get out of control. But alerting forces in a Type B crisis could set off a chain
of events where states clash due to the interaction between each other's rules of nuclear engagement, incentivize forces
inadvertently threatened by conventional operations to fire, or misperceive each other's actions. Any given military move
will have more political meaning and will also be more dangerous. Type C crises are similar to Bell and Macdonald's
"firestorm" model.
[34]
These are the riskiest sorts of nuclear crisis, since there are military reasons for escalation as well as political and
non-rational risks. Outcomes will be influenced both by the balance of resolve and the nuclear balance: either could give
states incentives to manipulate risk. Such signals will be the easiest to send, and the finest-grained of any type of
crisis. But because the risk level jumps so much with any given signal, the time in which states can bargain may be short.
[35]
In sum, Bell and Macdonald have made an important contribution to the study of nuclear escalation by delineating different
types of crisis with different risk and signaling profiles. We believe they understate the importance of American nuclear
superiority during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and that these coding problems highlight some conceptual issues with their
framework. In the end, though, our amendments appear to us relatively minor, further underscoring the importance of Bell and
Macdonald's research. We hope that they, and other scholars, will continue to build on these findings. Brendan R. Green,
Cincinnati, Ohio
Austin Long,
Arlington, Virginia
In Response to a Critique
Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald
We thank Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long for their positive assessment
of our work and for engaging with our argument so constructively.
[36]
Their contribution represents exactly the sort of productive scholarly debate we were hoping to provoke. As we stated in our
article, we intended our work to be only an initial effort to think through the heterogeneity of nuclear crises, and we are
delighted that Green and Long have taken seriously our suggestion for scholars to continue to think in more detail about the
ways in which nuclear crises differ from one another. Their arguments are characteristically insightful, offer a range of
interesting and important arguments and suggestions, and have forced us to think harder about a number of aspects of our
argument. In this reply, we briefly lay out the argument we made in our article before responding to Green and Long's
suggestion that we underestimate the incentives to launch a nuclear first-strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and their
proposal of an alternative typology for understanding nuclear crises.
Our Argument
In our article, we offer
a framework for thinking through the heterogeneity of nuclear crises.
[37]
While the existing literature on such crises assumes that they all follow a certain logic (although there is disagreement on
what that logic is), we identify factors that might lead nuclear crises to differ from one another in consequential ways. In
particular, we argue that two factors -- whether incentives are present for nuclear first use and the extent to which
escalation is controllable by the leaders involved -- lead to fundamentally different sorts of crises. These two variables
generate four possible "ideal type" models of nuclear crises: "staircase" crises (characterized by high first-use incentives
and high controllability), "brinkmanship" crises (low first-use incentives and low controllability), "stability-instability"
crises (low first-use incentives and high controllability), and "firestorm" crises (high first-use incentives and low
controllability). Each of these ideal types exhibits distinctive dynamics and offers different answers to important
questions, such as, how likely is nuclear escalation, and how might it occur? How feasible is signaling within a crisis?
What factors determine success? For example, crises exhibiting high incentives for nuclear first use combined with low
crisis controllability -- firestorm crises -- are particularly volatile, and the most dangerous of all four models in terms of
likelihood of nuclear war. These are the crises that statesmen should avoid except under the direst circumstances or for the
highest stakes. By contrast, where incentives for the first use of nuclear weapons are low and there is high crisis
controllability -- the stability-instability model -- the risk of nuclear use is lowest. When incentives for nuclear first use
are low and crisis controllability is also low -- brinkmanship crises -- or when incentives for first use are high and crisis
controllability is also high -- the staircase model -- there is a moderate risk of nuclear use, although through two quite
different processes. For the brinkmanship model, low levels of crisis controllability combined with few incentives for
nuclear first use mean that escalation to the nuclear level would likely only happen inadvertently and through a process of
uncontrolled, rather than deliberate, escalation. On the other hand, high levels of crisis controllability combined with
high incentives for nuclear first use -- characteristic of the staircase model -- mean that escalation would more likely occur
through a careful, deliberate process.
First-Use Incentives in the Cuban Missile Crisis
First, Green and
Long address the extent of incentives for launching a nuclear first strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In short, they
argue that there were substantial military incentives for America to strike first during the crisis and that these were
understood and appreciated by American leaders.
[38]
While space constraints meant that our analysis of the nuclear balance in the Cuban Missile Crisis was briefer than we would
have liked, we certainly agree that the United States possessed nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union during the crisis.
[39]
The debate between us and Green and Long is, therefore, primarily over whether the nuclear balance that we (more or less)
agree existed in 1962 was sufficiently lopsided as to offer meaningful incentives for nuclear first use, and whether it was
perceived as such by the leaders involved. In this, we do have somewhat different interpretations of how much weight to
assign to particular pieces of evidence. For example, we believe that the retrospective assessment of key participants does
have evidentiary value, although we acknowledge (as we did in our article) the biases of such assessments in this case.
Given the rapidly shifting nuclear balance, we place less weight on President John F. Kennedy's statements in years prior to
the crisis than on those he made during the crisis itself,
[40]
which were more consistently skeptical of the benefits associated with U.S. nuclear superiority at a time when the stakes
were at their highest.
[41]
We also place somewhat less weight than Green and Long on the 1961 analysis of Carl Kaysen, given doubts about whether his
report had much of an effect on operational planning.
[42]
And finally, we put less weight on the Joint Chiefs of Staff document from 1962 cited by Green and Long in support of their
argument, given that it acknowledges the U.S. inability to eliminate Soviet strategic nuclear forces -- thus highlighting the
dangers of a U.S. nuclear first strike -- as well as focuses on future force planning in the aftermath of the crisis. We
would also note that our assessment that U.S. nuclear superiority in the Cuban Missile Crisis did not obviously translate
into politically meaningful incentives for first use is in line with standard interpretations of this case, including among
scholars that Green and Long cite. For Marc Trachtenberg, for example, "[t]he American ability to 'limit damage' by
destroying an enemy's strategic forces did not seem, in American eyes, to carry much political weight" during the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
[43]
Similarly, the relative lack of incentives for rational first use in the crisis motivated Thomas Schelling's assessment that
only an "unforeseeable and unpredictable" process could have led to nuclear use in the crisis.
[44]
Regardless of whether participants in the Cuban Missile Crisis understood the advantages (or lack thereof) associated with
nuclear superiority, in some ways, our disagreement with Green and Long is more of a conceptual one: where to draw the
threshold at which a state's level of nuclear superiority (and corresponding ability to limit retaliatory damage) should be
deemed "politically meaningful," i.e., sufficiently lopsided to offer incentives for first use. This is a topic about which
there is certainly room for legitimate disagreement. "Political relevance" is a tricky concept, which reinforces Green and
Long's broader argument that "nuclear crises are intrinsically hard to interpret" -- a point with which we agree.
[45]
But Green and Long seem to view
any
ability to limit retaliatory damage as politically meaningful, since they argue
that a nuclear balance that would have likely left a number of American cities destroyed (and potentially more), even in the
aftermath of a U.S. first strike, nonetheless provided strong military incentives for first use. By contrast, our view is
that the threshold should be somewhat higher than this, though lower than Green and Long's characterization of our position:
We do not, in fact, think that the relevant standard for political meaning "is a perfectly disarming strike." Part of our
motivation in wanting a threshold higher than "any damage limitation capability" is that it increases the utility of the
typology we offer by allowing us to draw the line in such a way that a substantial number of empirical cases exist on either
side of that threshold. Green and Long, by contrast, seem more satisfied to draw the line in such a way that cases
exhibiting very different incentives for first use -- a crisis with North Korea today compared to the Cuban Missile Crisis,
for example -- would both be classified on the same side of the threshold.
[46]
Green and Long's approach would ignore the important differences between these cases by treating both crises as exhibiting
strong incentives for nuclear first use. This would be akin to producing a meteorological map that rarely shows rain because
the forecaster judges the relevant threshold to be "catastrophic flooding." There is nothing fundamentally incorrect about
making such a choice, but it is not necessarily the most helpful approach to shedding light on the empirical variation we
observe in the historical record.
An Alternative Typology of Nuclear Crises
Second, Green and Long offer an
alternative typology for understanding the heterogeneity of nuclear crises. Green and Long argue that there are three types
of crisis: "those with political bargaining incentives for selective nuclear use (Type A); those with risks of both
selective use and non-rational uncontrolled escalation (Type B); and those with political risks, non-rational risks, and
military incentives for a nuclear first strike (Type C)." This is an interesting proposal and we have no fundamental
objections to their typology.
[47]
After all, one can categorize the same phenomenon in different ways, and different typologies may be useful for different
purposes. Space constraints inevitably prevent Green and Long from offering a full justification for their typology, and we
would certainly encourage them to offer a more fleshed out articulation of it and its merits. Their initial discussion of
the different types of signals that states can send within different types of crises is especially productive and goes
beyond the relatively simple discussion of the feasibility of signaling that we included in our article. We offer two
critiques that might be helpful as they (and others) continue to consider the relative merits of these two typologies and
build upon them. First, it is not clear how different their proposed typology is from the one we offer. At times, for
example, Green and Long suggest that their typology simply divides up the same conceptual space we identify using our two
variables, but does so differently. For example, they argue that they are essentially collapsing two of our quadrants
(stability-instability crises and staircase crises) into Type A crises, while Type B crises are similar to our brinkmanship
crises and Type C crises are similar to our firestorm crises. If so, their typology does not really suggest a fundamentally
different understanding of how nuclear crises vary, but merely of where the most interesting variation occurs within the
conceptual space we identify. The key question, then, in determining the relative merits of the two typologies, is whether
there is important variation between the two categories that Green and Long collapse. We continue to think the distinctions
between stability-instability crises and staircase crises are important. Although both types of crises are relatively
controllable and have limited risk of what Green and Long call "non-rational uncontrolled escalation," they have very
different risks when it comes to nuclear use: lower in stability-instability crises and higher in staircase crises. The
factors that determine success in stability-instability crises -- primarily the conventional military balance due to the very
low risk of nuclear escalation -- do not necessarily determine success in staircase crises, in which the nuclear balance may
matter. As a result, we think that collapsing these two categories is not necessarily a helpful analytical move. Second, to
the extent that their typology differs from our own, it does so in ways that are not necessarily helpful in shedding light
on the variation across nuclear crises that we observe. In particular, separating incentives for first use into "political
bargaining incentives" and "military incentives" is an intriguing proposal but we are not yet fully persuaded of its merits.
Given that one of Green and Long's goals is to increase the clarity of the typology we offer, and given that they
acknowledge the difficulties of coding the nuclear balance, demanding even more fine-grained assessments in order to divide
incentives for first use into two separate (but conceptually highly connected) components may be a lot to ask of analysts.
Moreover, given Green and Long's assertion that "political incentives to use nuclear weapons selectively are ever present,"
their argument in fact implies (as mentioned above) that political incentives for first use are
not
a source of
interesting variation within nuclear crises. We disagree with this conclusion substantively, but it is worth noting that it
also has important conceptual implications for Green and Long's typology: It means that their three types of crises all
exhibit political incentives for nuclear first use. If this is the case, then political incentives for nuclear first use
simply fall out of the analysis. In effect, crises without political incentives for nuclear first use are simply ruled out
by definition. This analytic move renders portions of their argument tautologous. For example, they argue that the
conventional balance cannot "ever determine the outcome of a nuclear crisis," but this is only because they assume that
there are always political incentives to use nuclear weapons first, and thus, "any conventional victory stands only by dint
of the losing side's unwillingness to escalate." More broadly, this approach seems to us at least somewhat epistemologically
problematic. In our view, it is better to be conceptually open to the existence of certain types of crises and then discover
that such crises do not occur empirically, than it is to rule them out by definition and risk discovering later that such
crises have, in fact, taken place. In sum, while we are not fully persuaded by Green and Long's critiques, we are extremely
grateful for their insightful, thorough, and constructive engagement with our article and look forward to their future work
on these issues. We hope that they, along with other scholars, will continue to explore the ways in which nuclear crises
differ from one another, and the implications of such differences for crisis dynamics.
On January 25, 1995, the Russian military mistook a Black Brant XII missile launched by a
group of scientists from Norway and the United States to study the Northern lights over
Svalbard for a nuclear attack by the US Navy with a Trident ballistic missile. It was the first
case when the Russian leader brought the nuclear suitcase in a state of combat readiness.
The rocket, which was equipped to study the Northern lights, was launched from the island's
Andøya Rocket Range, located off the North-West coast of Norway. It was moving along the
same trajectory that US Intercontinental nuclear missiles could fly towards Moscow. Alarm
sirens sounded in the Russian radar center, where technical specialists recorded the flight of
the missile, and where the message about the us missile attack came from.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin summoned the generals and military advisers, and a "nuclear
suitcase" "Cheget"was delivered to him. He had less than ten minutes to decide whether the
Russian military would strike back. "I really used my" little black box "with a button for the
first time yesterday, which is always with me," Yeltsin told the press the next day, after
narrowly avoiding a nuclear disaster. -- I immediately contacted the Ministry of defense and
all the military commanders I needed, and we tracked the movement of this missile from start to
finish."
A few years later, Spiegel Online noted that Yeltsin left Russian nuclear missiles in his
mines at the time, probably "because relations between Russia and the United States in 1995
were relatively trusting."
The scientists who conducted the study, starting in 1962, launched more than 600 missiles,
but the Black Brant XII rocket was larger than the previous ones and more like an American
ballistic missile. A month before this launch, a team of researchers instructed the Norwegian
foreign Ministry to notify neighboring countries of their experiment. Russian officials
received such a notification from Oslo three weeks before the launch, but it was apparently
ignored by them. The radar crews of the Russian missile warning system (SPRn) were also not
informed and reported that it was a potentially nuclear missile moving towards Russia.
Peter Pry, a former CIA officer, wrote that although there were other false alarms in the
nuclear age, none of them went as far as the Norwegian missile incident, "the single most
dangerous moment of the nuclear missile era."
"... The decision to invade Afghanistan following the events of September 11, 2001, while declaring an "axis of evil" to be confronted that included nuclear-armed North Korea and budding regional hegemon Iran, can be said to be the reason for many of the most significant strategic problems besetting the U.S.. ..."
"... The U.S. often prefers to disguise its medium- to long-term objectives by focusing on supposedly more immediate and short-term threats. Thus, the U.S.'s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and its deployment of the Aegis Combat System (both sea- and land-based) as part of the NATO missile defense system, was explained as being for the purposes of defending European allies from the threat of Iranian ballistic missiles. ..."
"... As was immediately clear to most independent analysts as well as to President Putin , the deployment of such offensive systems are only for the purposes of nullifying the Russian Federation's nuclear-deterrence capability . Obama and Trump faithfully followed in the steps of George W. Bush in placing ABM systems on Russia's borders, including in Romania and Poland. ..."
"... There is no defense against such Russian systems as the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, which serves to restore the deterrence doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which in turn serves to ensure that nuclear weapons can never be employed so long as this "balance of terror" exists. Moscow is thus able to ensure peace through strength by showing that it is capable of inflicting a devastating second strike with regard regard for Washington's vaunted ABM systems. ..."
"... In addition to the continued economic and military pressure placed on Iran, one of the most immediate consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, better known as the Iran nuclear deal) has been Tehran being forced to examine all options. Although the country's leaders and political figures have always claimed that they do not want to develop a nuclear weapon, stating that it is prohibited by Islamic law, I should think that their best course of action would be to follow Pyongyang's example and acquire a nuclear deterrent to protect themselves from U.S. aggression. ..."
"... Once again, Washington has ended up shooting itself in the foot by inadvertently encouraging one of its geopolitical opponents to behave in the opposite manner intended. Instead of stopping nuclear proliferation in the region, the U.S., by scuppering of the JCPOA, has only encouraged the prospect of nuclear proliferation. ..."
"... Trump's short-sightedness in withdrawing from the JCPOA is reminiscent of George W. Bush's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. By triggering necessary responses from Moscow and Tehran, Washington's actions have only ended up leaving it at a disadvantage in certain critical areas relative to its competitors. ..."
Starting from the presidency of George W. Bush to that of Trump, the U.S. has made some
missteps that not only reduce its influence in strategic regions of the world but also its
ability to project power and thus impose its will on those unwilling to genuflect appropriately
.
Some examples from the recent past will suffice to show how a series of strategic errors
have only accelerated the U.S.'s hegemonic decline.
ABM + INF = Hypersonic Supremacy
The decision to invade Afghanistan following the events of September 11, 2001, while
declaring an "axis of evil" to be confronted that included nuclear-armed North Korea and
budding regional hegemon Iran, can be said to be the reason for many of the most significant
strategic problems besetting the U.S..
The U.S. often prefers to disguise its medium- to long-term objectives by focusing on
supposedly more immediate and short-term threats. Thus, the U.S.'s withdrawal from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and its deployment of the Aegis Combat System (both
sea- and land-based) as part of the NATO missile defense system, was explained as being for the
purposes of defending European allies from the threat of Iranian ballistic missiles. This
argument held little water as the Iranians had neither the capability nor intent to launch such
missiles.
As was immediately clear to most independent analysts as well as to President Putin , the deployment of such
offensive systems are only for the purposes of nullifying the
Russian Federation's nuclear-deterrence capability . Obama and Trump faithfully followed in
the steps of George W. Bush in placing ABM systems on Russia's borders, including in Romania
and Poland.
Following from Trump's momentous decision to
withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), it is also likely
that the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) will also be abandoned, creating more
global insecurity with regard to nuclear proliferation.
Moscow was forced to pull out all stops to develop new weapons that would restore the
strategic balance, Putin revealing to the world in a speech in 2018 the introduction of
hypersonic weapons and other technological breakthroughs that would serve to disabuse
Washington of its first-strike fantasies.
Even as Washington's propaganda refuses to acknowledge the tectonic shifts on the global
chessboard occasioned by these technological breakthroughs, sober
military assessments acknowledge that the game has fundamentally changed.
There is no defense against such Russian systems as the Avangard hypersonic glide
vehicle, which serves to restore the deterrence doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD),
which in turn serves to ensure that nuclear weapons can never be employed so long as this
"balance of terror" exists. Moscow is thus able to ensure peace through strength by showing
that it is capable of inflicting a devastating second strike with regard regard for
Washington's vaunted ABM systems.
In addition to ensuring its nuclear second-strike capability, Russia has been forced to
develop the most advanced ABM system in the world to fend off Washington's aggression. This ABM
system is integrated into a defensive network that includes the Pantsir, Tor, Buk, S-400 and
shortly the devastating S-500 and A-235 missile systems. This combined system is designed to
intercept ICBMs as well as any future U.S. hypersonic weapons
The wars of aggression prosecuted by George W. Bush, Obama and Trump have only ended up
leaving the U.S. in a position of nuclear inferiority vis-a-vis Russia and China. Moscow has
obviously shared some of its technological innovations with its strategic partner, allowing
Beijing to also have hypersonic weapons together with ABM systems like the Russian S-400.
No
JCPOA? Here Comes Nuclear Iran
In addition to the continued economic and military pressure placed on Iran, one of the
most immediate consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA, better known as the Iran nuclear deal) has been Tehran being forced to examine all
options. Although the country's leaders and political figures have always claimed that they do
not want to develop a nuclear weapon, stating that it is
prohibited by Islamic law, I should think that their best course of action would be to
follow Pyongyang's example and acquire a nuclear deterrent to protect themselves from U.S.
aggression.
While this suggestion of mine may not correspond with the intentions of leaders of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the protection North Korea enjoys from U.S. aggression as a result of
its deterrence capacity may oblige the Iranian leadership to carefully consider the pros and
cons of following suit, perhaps choosing to adopt the Israeli stance of nuclear ambiguity or
nuclear opacity, where the possession of nuclear weapons is neither confirmed nor denied. While
a world free of nuclear weapons would be ideal, their deterrence value cannot be denied, as
North Korea's experience attests.
While Iran does not want war, any pursuit of a nuclear arsenal may guarantee a conflagration
in the Middle East. But I have long maintained that the risk of a nuclear war (once nuclear
weapons have been acquired)
does not exist , with them having a
stabilizing rather than destabilizing effect, particularly in a multipolar environment.
Once again, Washington has ended up shooting itself in the foot by inadvertently
encouraging one of its geopolitical opponents to behave in the opposite manner intended.
Instead of stopping nuclear proliferation in the region, the U.S., by scuppering of the JCPOA,
has only encouraged the prospect of nuclear proliferation.
Trump's short-sightedness in withdrawing from the JCPOA is reminiscent of George W.
Bush's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. By triggering necessary responses from Moscow and
Tehran, Washington's actions have only ended up leaving it at a disadvantage in certain
critical areas relative to its competitors.
The death of Soleimani punctures the myth
of the U.S. invincibility
I wrote a couple of articles in the wake of General Soleimani's death that
examined the incident and then
considered the profound ramifications of the event in the region.
What seems evident is that Washington appears incapable of appreciating the consequences of
its reckless actions. Killing Soleimani was bound to invite an Iranian response; and even if we
assume that Trump was not looking for war (I
explained why some months ago), it was obvious to any observer that there would be a
response from Iran to the U.S.'s terrorist actions.
The response came a few nights later where, for the first time since the Second World War, a
U.S. military base was subjected to a rain of missiles (22 missiles each with a 700kg payload).
Tehran thereby showed that it possessed the necessary technical, operational and strategic
means to obliterate thousands of U.S. and allied personnel within the space of a few minutes if
it so wished, with the U.S. would be powerless to stop it.
U.S. Patriot air-defense systems yet again failed to do their job, reprising their failure
to defend Saudi oil and gas facilities against a missile attack conducted by Houthis a few
months ago.
We thus have confirmation, within the space of a few months, of the inability of the U.S. to
protect its troops or allies from Houthi, Hezbollah and Iranian missiles. Trump and his
generals would have been reluctant to respond to the Iranian missile attack knowing that any
Iranian response would bring about uncontrollable regional conflagration that would devastate
U.S. bases as well as oil infrastructure and such cities of U.S. allies as Tel Aviv, Haifa and
Dubai.
After demonstrating to the world that U.S. allies in the region are defenseless against
missile attacks from even the likes of the Houthis, Iran drove home the point by conducting
surgical strikes on two U.S. bases that only highlights the disconnect between the perception
of U.S. military invincibility and the reality that would come in the form of a multilayered
missile conflict.
Conclusion
Washington's diplomatic and military decisions in recent years have only brought about a
world world that is more hostile to Washington and less inclined to accept its diktats, often
being driven instead to acquire the military means to counter Washington's bullying. Even as
the U.S. remains the paramount military power, its ineptitude has resulted in Russia and China
surpassing it in some critical areas, such that the U.S. has no chance of defending itself
against a nuclear second strike, with even Iran having the means to successfully retaliate
against the U.S. in the region.
As I continue to say, Washington's power largely rests on perception management helped by
the make-believe world of Hollywood. The recent missile attacks by Houthis on Saudi Arabia's
oil facilities and the Iranian missile attack a few days ago on U.S. military bases in Iraq
(none of which were intercepted) are like Toto drawing back the curtain to reveal Washington's
military vulnerability. No amount of entreaties by Washington to pay no attention to the man
behind the curtain will help.
The more aggressive the U.S. becomes, the more it reveals its tactical, operational and
strategic limits, which in turn only serves to accelerate its loss of hegemony.
If the U.S. could deliver a nuclear first strike without having to worry about a retaliatory
second strike thanks to its ABM systems, then its quest for perpetual unipolarity could
possibly be realistic. But Washington's peer competitors have shown that they have the means to
defend themselves against a nuclear first strike by being able to deliver an unstoppable second
strike, thereby communicating that the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) is here
to stay. With that, Washington's efforts to maintain its status as uncontested global hegemon
are futile.
In a region
vital to U.S. interests , Washington does not have the operational capacity to stand in the
way of Syria's liberation. When it has attempted to directly impose its will militarily, it has
seen as many as 80% of its cruise missiles
knocked down or deflected , once again highlighting the divergence between Washington's
Hollywood propaganda and the harsh military reality.
The actions of George W. Bush, Obama and Trump have only served to inadvertently accelerate
the world's transition away from a unipolar world to a multipolar one. As Trump follows in the
steps of his predecessors by being aggressive towards Iran, he only serves to weaken the U.S.
global position and strengthen that of his opponents.
Up to the election of our current President, I agree that we were bullying for the
personal gain of a few and our military was being used as a mercenary force. The current
administration is working on getting us out of long term conflicts. What do you think "drain
the swamp" means? It is a huge undertaking and need to understand what the "deep state" is
all about and their goals.
The death of Soleimani was needed and made the world a safer place. Dr. Janda / Freedom
Operation has had several very intriguing presentations on this issue. It is my firm belief
that there is a worldwide coalition to make the world a better and safer place. If you want
to know about the "deep state" try watching: www.youtube.com/watch?v=6cYZ8dUgPuU
All mostly true, but the constant drone of this type of article gets old, as the comments
below attest. We really don't need more forensic analysis by the SCF, what we need is an
answer to America's dollar Imperialism problem. But we'll never get it, just as England never
got an answer to it's pound Imperialism problem.
I like Tulsi Gabbard, but she can never truly reveal the magnitude of the dollar
Imperialism behind her "stop these endless wars" sloganism. Besides, she doesn't have the
billions required to mount any real successful campaign. Only billionaires like Bloomberg
need apply these days.
The Truth is that NO ONE will stand up to Wall Street and it's system of global dollar
corporatism (from which Bloomberg acquired his billions, and to which the USG is bound). It's
suicide to speak the truth to the masses. The dollar must die of its own disease.
Trump is America's Chemo. The cure nearly as bad as the cancer, but the makers of it have
a vested interest in its acceptance.
General Bonespur murders a genuine military man from the comfort of his golf course.
America is still dangerous, Pinky might be tired but the (((Brain))) is working feverishly on
solutions for the jaded .
There has been a perception in the last 25 years that the US could win a nuclear war. This
perception is extremely dangerous as it invites the US armed forces to commit atrocities and
think they can get away with it (they are for now). The world opinion has turned, but the
citizens of the United States of America are not listening.
If the US keeps going down the path they are currently on, they are ensuring that war will
eventually reach its coast.
To challenge the US Empire the new Multipolar World is focused on a two-pronged
strategy:
1. Nullifying the US nuclear first strike (at will) as part of the current US military
doctrine - accomplished (for a decade maybe).
2. Outmaneuvering the US petrodollar in trade, the tool to control the global fossil fuel
resources on the planet - in progress.
What makes 2.) decisive is that the petrodollar as reserve currency is the key to recycle
the US federal budget deficit via foreign investment in U.S. Treasury Bonds (IOUs) by the
central banks, thus enabling the global military presence and power projection of the US
military empire.
All their little plots and schemes failed, as corrupt arsehole after corrupt arsehole
stole the funding from those plots and schemes to fill their own pockets. They also put the
most corrupt individuals they could find into power, so as much as possible could be stolen
and voila, everywhere they went, everything collapsed, every single time.
Totally and utterly ludicrous decades, of not punishing failure after failure has resulted
in nothing but more failure, like, surprise, surprise, surprise.
Routine failures have forced other nation to go multipolar or just rush straight to global
economic collapse as a result of out of control US corruption. Russia and China did not
outsmart the USA, the USA did it entirely to itself by not prosecuting corruption at high
levels, even when it failed time and time again, focusing more on how much they could steal,
then on bringing what ever plot or scheme to a successful conclusion.
The use of the terms "Unintended Consequences", shortsightedness, mistakes, stupidity, or
ignorance provides the avenue to transfer or divert the blame. It excuses it away as bad
decisions so that the truth and those responsible are never really exposed and held
accountable. The fact is, these actions were not mistakes or acts of shortsightedness...they
were deliberate and planned and the so-called "unintended consequences" were actually
intended and part of their plan. Looking back and linking the elites favorite process to
drive change (problem, reaction, solution)...one can quickly make the connection to many of
the so-called "unintended consequences" as they are very predictable results their actions.
It becomes very clear that much of what has occurred over the last few decades has been
deliberate with planned/intended outcomes.
I think the biggest advantage USA used to have was that they claimed to stand for Freedom
and Democracy. And for a time, many people believed them. That's partly why the USSR fell
apart, and for a time USA had a lot of goodwill among ordinary Russians.
But US political leaders squandered this goodwill when they used NATO to attack Yugoslavia
against Russia's objections and expanded NATO towards Russia's borders. This has been long
forgotten in USA. But many ordinary Russians still seethe about these events. This was the
turning point for them that motivated them to support Putin and his rebuilding of Russia's
military.
When you have goodwill among your potential competitors, then they don't have much
motivation to increase their capabilities against you. This was the situation USA was in
after the USSR fell apart. But USA squandered all of this goodwill and motivated the Russians
to do what they did.
And now, USA under Trump has done something like this with China. USA used to have a lot
of goodwill among the ordinary Chinese. But now this is gone as a result of US tariffs,
sanctions, and its support for separatism in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Now, the Chinese will be
as motivated as the Russians to do their best at promoting their interests at the expense of
USA. And together with Russia, they have enough people and enough natural resources to do
more than well against USA and its allies.
I think USA could've maintained a lot more influence around the world through goodwill
with ordinary people, than through sanctions, threats, and military attacks. If USA had left
Iraq under Saddam Hussein alone, then Iran wouldn't have had much influence in there. And if
USA had left Iran alone, then the young people there might've already rebelled against their
strict Islamic rule and made their government more friendly with USA.
Doing nothing, except business and trade, would've left USA in a much better position,
than the one USA is in now.
Now USA is bankrupting itself with unsustainable military spending and still falling
behind its competitors. USA might still have the biggest economy in the world in US Dollar
terms. But this doesn't take into account the cost of living and purchasing parity. With
purchasing parity taken into account, China now has a bigger economy than that of USA.
Because internally, they can manufacture and buy a lot more for the same amount of money than
USA can. A lot of US military spending is on salaries, pensions, and healthcare of its
personnel. While such costs in Russia and China are comparatively small. They are spending
most of their money on improving and building their military technology. That's why in the
long run, USA will probably fall behind even more.
The Anglos in the U.S. are not from there and are imposters who are claiming
characteristics and a culture that doesn't belong to them. They're using it as a way
to hide from scrutiny, so you blame "Americans", when its really them. That's why
there's such a huge disconnect between stated values and actions. The values belong to
another group of people, TRUE Americans, while the actions belong to Anglos, who have a
history of aggressive and forced, irrational violence upon innocents.
It's true that ordinary people are often different from their government, including in
Russia, in China, in Iran, in USA, and even in Nazi Germany in the past.
But the people in such a situation are usually powerless and unable to influence their
government. So, their difference is irrelevant in the way their government behaves and
alienates people around the world.
USA is nominally a democracy, where the government is controlled by the people. But in
reality, the people are only a ceremonial figurehead, and the real power is a small minority
of rich companies and individuals, who fund election campaigns of politicians.
That's why for example most Americans want to have universal healthcare, just like all
other developed countries have. But most elected politicians from both major parties won't
even consider this idea, because their financial donors are against it. And if the people are
powerless even within their own country, then outside with foreigners, they have even less
influence.
1. Nation Building? It worked with Germany and Japan, rinse and repeat. So what if it's
comparing apples to antimatter?
2. US won the Cold War? So make the same types of moves made during Reagan adm? The real
reason the Soviet Empire collapsed was because it was a money losing empire while the US was
a money making empire. Just review the money pits they invested in.
3. Corruption? That was your grandfather's time. The US has been restructured. Crime
Syndicate and Feudal templates are the closest. Stagnation and decline economically and
technologically are inevitable.
4. Evaluating the competition is problematic. However perhaps the most backward and
regressive elements in this society are branding themselves as progressive and getting away
with it. That can't work.
That's right. I used to know the guys at Gannet in a major US city. Nice people, but not
technically aware, and politically-philosophically innocent. Naifs. Put on nice parties where
they chatted about their pasts in foreign places entirely unaware of the objective and
obvious exploitation going on right before their eyes.
I might add that the engineering students dread, as a rule, English 1-A, and do,
generally, quite poorly. (My wife used to teach that class)
The result is a nice antipodal bar-bell shaped arrangement whereby neither group sees
reality, but only a simulacrum of one part or another.
In this regard, Yasha Levine > " Weaponizing Fascism for Democracy: The Beginning "
Begins in the DP camps...
I've said before that the plans to nuke USSR were being drawn prior to the Trinity test.
Levine's essay buttresses this quite well, though essentially in background...he says nothing
about the bomb. He doen't have to...
"... What i find truly amazing is that American Zionists still believe crushing Iran is easy enough. Israel, with 8 million jews stuffed in a small country, is nothing more than a carrier battle group marooned on land ..."
The tramp & nutNyahoo machismo show continues to be fun to watch. Both
show off their penis worms as they arrogantly claim they can crush iran. Both the usa and
israel keep banging on the doors and walls of their pissed-off neighbors' houses. That
eventually gets you murdered whether in baltimore or baghdad.
A crushable iran is true if and only if they can mount a full-on nuclear war on Iran.
But such horrendous cheating means all bets are off, and iran's allies will provide the
nukes required to melt down the American homeland too. Nobody, not even Russia and china,
can afford to stay in the sidelines in a nuclear war in the 2020s.
What i find truly amazing is that American Zionists still believe crushing Iran is easy
enough. Israel, with 8 million jews stuffed in a small country, is nothing more than a
carrier battle group marooned on land. Sitting ducks, with nice armor, nukes and all, are
... still sitting ducks. nutNyahoo should ask his technical crew just how few megatons are
needed, or just a few thousand modern missiles are required to transform sitting ducks into
nicely roasted peking ducks.
So a conventional war it is. The usa and israel has exactly zero, zilch and nada chances
of winning a war with iran. The usa keeps forgetting that it is a dying empire with dying
funding value and mental resources. Just like israel which oddly thinks dozens of f-35s
will give it immunity through air superiority. Proof of this fact that iran will win comes
from simply asking american and israeli war experts to go on cnn or the washington post on
how they intend to win a war with iran.
Im sure these expert bloviators will say that it is as easy as winning a naval war
against china, which is capable of launching only 3 new warships in a week. Or an even
easier time against russia, which can launch only a few thousand hypersonic nuke missiles
because its GDP is no bigger than that of texas.
The Pentagon is super slow to adapt and learn. If you understand that
bureaucracy is an ancient organizational structure and that the organizational culture of
the Pentagon is pathologically dysfunctional you could have predicted the moral and
financial bankruptcy of America 15-20 years ago. The "Why?", finally made sense when I
discovered what a sociopath was.
It's about time the US practices what it preachs and start behaving like a normal
country instead of a spoiled narcissistic brat. see more
US military & strategic thought became lazy during the
late days of the Cold War. It mirrored the decline & fall of the foundations of its
opponent, USSR. Post-Cold War, US military & strategic thinking flushed into the sewer.
It was all about maintaining the military as some sort of a social policy jobs program,
operating legacy tech as the mission. And then came the "world-improvers" -- beginning w
the Clinton Admin -- who worked to turn the world into a global "urban renewal" project;
meaning to mirror the success US Big Govt showed in the slums of American cities from sea
to sea. The past 30 yrs of US strategic thinking and related governance truly disgusts me.
see more
Soviet union fall had very different reasons and Soviet military thought was
doing quite well then along with military. Current russian military wonders is completion
of what was started then and not finished earlier because of the disintegration of the
Soviet state. The soviet fall however is extremely regrettable because there was a new way how things can
be done that Soviet union was showing to the world. USA fall long term is a very good thing
because USA is a paragon of how things should be done the old way and basically a huge
parasite. Many negative trends that are afflicting the world were started by USA. Unlimited
individualism and consumerism would be a couple of those. see more
Why does almost every person on Earth feel the need to force others to
bend the knee to their beliefs?
Religious beliefs are what one thinks should be done to promote survival in an
afterlife, political beliefs are what one thinks should be done to promote survival in this
world.
The world would be a far better, more civilized, of world if such beliefs were only
shared on a voluntary basis.
As for individualism, I would rather be free than live in a modern day egalitarian
hunter-gatherer tribe run by modern day psychopathic alpha-males.
That is certainly not a recipe for success. see more
It also mirrors the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. It was Emperor
Augustus that decided the costs to further expand the Empire were too great after losing
one (or two?) legions against the Germanic tribes.
The US has reached its greatest extent. We are living through it. The US didn't go forward
into war with Iran twice. The odds of humanity surviving this immense turn of history is
looking better. see more
Frankly, nothing in common. I read this comparison all the
time.
Yes, Augustus decided not to continue along with expansion into Germany after losing 3
Varus legions due to ambush.
But he famously noted that it does not worth to go fishing with golden hook. Basically
speaking, Germany was not worth fighting for. Poor and remote it had nothing to offer. Just
a drain on resources. As long as conquest was moving smoothly it was ok, but after losses
were inflicted Augustus decided it was not worth it.
Roman expansion under augustus was carried mostly to consolidate previous conquests and
create strategical debth along core and strategical provinces also creating linkage.
When enemy far stronger than germans posed resources which made the whole conquest worthy
no amount of resistance saved Dacians and Parthia also almost died under Trajan attack.
Roman policies were adequate and wise. Treaties were respected, allies supported and
benefited. Empire was build around Mediterranean creating good communication and routes
considering obviously limits of that day technology.
Rome did not behave like crazy and did not deliver threats that she could not follow
through. When war was decided upon thorough preparations were taken. Political goals were
achieved. Wars were won. When Adrian considered that empire was overextended in Parthis, he
simply abandoned all conquered territories. Just like that.
Logical calm thinking USA,is not capable of. Rome truly based upon superior military and
diplomacy dominance lasted many centuries. USA few decades. One hit wonder, lucky fool I
would call it. see more
Yes, this is somewhat puzzling. As I said, let's wait and see where it all
develops to, but as Twisted Genius succinctly observed -- Iran now controls tempo because she
has conventional superiority. Anyone who has precision-guided, stand off weaponry in good
numbers will be on top. see more
The old submarine saying is, "There are two kinds of ships; submarines, and
targets." . The new version for land ops is, "There are two kinds of land-based military assets;
precision-guided missiles, and targets." (And per the photos, those Iranian missiles were
quite precise; bulls-eyes.) . Iran and its missiles demonstrated that the entire strategic foundation for US mil presence
in the Middle East is now obsolete. Everything the US would ever want to do there is now
subject to Iran's version of "steel rain." Every runway, hangar, aircraft parking area;
every supply depot or warehouse; every loading pier, fuel site, naval pier. Everything...
is a target. And really... there's no amount of US "airpower" and "tech" than can mitigate
the Iran missile threat. . Meanwhile, related thinking... Iran's true strategic interest is NOT fighting a near-term
war w/ USA. Iran wants US to exit Middle East; and Iran wants to be able to pursue its
nuclear program. Soleimani or no, Iran appears to have its eyeballs fixed on the long-term
goals. see more
The new version for land ops is, "There are two kinds of land-based military assets;
precision-guided missiles, and targets."
Exactly, and Iran has long-range TLAMs in who knows what numbers, That, in its turn,
brings about the next issue of range for Iranian indigenous anti-ship missiles. Not, of
course, to mention the fact of only select people knowing if Russia transferred P-800 Onyx
to Iran She certainly did it for Syria. If that weapon is there--the Persian Gulf and
Hormuz Strait will be shut completely closed and will push out CBGs far into the Indian
Ocean. see more
It is simply pathetic after decades of talking non stop about developments of
anti missiles and huge amounts wasted and nobody is responsible. This is the way capitalism
works.profits is everything and outcomes secondary. Thankfully russia has got soviet
foundation and things so far are working well. I come to think that in our times no serious
industrial processes should be allowed to stay in private hands. Only services and so.e
other simpler stuff under heavy state control to ensure quality. Otherwise profit
orientation will eventually destroy everything like with Boeing.
I know, i already wrote a full scale war scenario in one of
the comments. Iran can destroy all US bases in 2000 km range. But this does not mean that
it can not be bombed back to the stone age, if the US really wishes so. The problem for the
US is the high cost as well as the high debt levels, but it does have the technical
capability to do that after 2 - 3 years of bombing.
Also low yield tactical nukes are designed to lower the treshold of the use of nukes in
otherwise conventional war, producing less international outrage than the megaton city
buster bombs. Why do you think the US is developing them again? Because they would want to
use them in conventional conflicts.
Here btw is Yurasumy, he also says that the US can technically bomb Iran back to the
stone age, but the cost will be too high.
Again--what's the plan and what's the price? Iran HAS Russia's ISR on her side in case
of such SEAD.
Does the United States want to risk lives of thousands of its personnel (not
to speak of expensive equipment) in Qatar, KSA, Iraq. Does Israel want to "get it"?
There
are numbers which describe such an operation (it was. most likely, already planned as
contingency). Immediate question: when was the last time USAF operated in REAL dense ECM
and ECCM environment? I do not count some brushes with minimal EW in Syria.
Russia there
uses only minimally required option, for now. Iran has a truck load EW systems, including
some funny Russian toys which allowed Iran to take control of US UAVs, as an example. As I
say, this is not Iraq and by a gigantic margin. see more
I already said that debt levels do not allow it and the price
would be too high, but yes, the US does have the military capability to destroy Iran. By
conventional means. It is another question that it is not in good fiscal shape. Anyway, US
ballistic missiles (non nuclear armed) will be hard to stop by EW. Even if Iran gets rid of
50 % of incoming TLAMs, the US will keep sending more and more until most infrastructure,
bridges, oil refineries, power plants, factories, ports etc. are destroyed. This is why i
said it would take 2 - 3 years. see more
but yes, the US does have the military capability to destroy Iran. By conventional
means
That is the whole point: NO, it doesn't. Unless US goes into full mobilization mode and
addresses ALL (plus a million more not listed) requirements for such a war which I listed
in the post. Well, that or nukes. see
more
Yurasumy is a pretty good analist and he thinks that they can. I do not
see it for the US being too hard to produce more TLAMS, ICBMs and IRBMs (conventional) to
sustain the effort for 2 years, by that time most iranian infrastructure will be destroyed.
If the fiscal situation allowes it. see more
I don't know who Yarasumy is and what is his background, but unlike him I
actually write books, including on modern warfare. This is not to show off, but I am sure I
can make basic calculations. This is not to mention the fact that even Sivkov agrees with
my points and Sivkov, unlike Yarsumy, graduated Popov's VVMURE, served at subs, then
graduated Kuznetsov Academy, then Academy of the General Staff and served in Main
Operational Directorate (GOU) until retiring in the rank of Captain 1st Rank from the
billet of Combat Planning group. So, I would rather stick to my opinion.
see more
Why do you think that the US can not destroy Iran with IRBMs? Actually this
is their strategy vs China. If they think its viable vs China, then it should be viable vs
Iran too. see more
Because unlike the US, Russia's Air Defenses have a rather
very impressive history of shifting the balance in wars in favor of those who have them,
when used properly. But then I can quote for you a high ranking intelligence officer:
A friend of mine who has expertise in these matters wrote me:
Any air defense engineer with a securityclearance that isn't lying through his teeth
will admit that Russia'sair defense technology surpassed us in the 1950's and we've never
been able to catch up. The systems thy have in place surrounding Moscow make our Patriot
3's look like fucking nerf guns.
Mathematics is NOT there for the United States for a real combined operations war of
scale with Iran. Unless US political class really wants to see people with pitch-forks.
see more
"Mathematics is not there..." . Neither is the industrial base, including supply lines. Not the mines, mills, factories to
produce any significant levels of warfighting materiel such as we're talking about here.
Not the workforce, either. Meanwhile, where are the basic designs for these weps? The years
of lab work, bench tests, pilot specimens & prototypes, the development pipeline? The
contractors to build them? the Tier 2, 3, 4 suppliers? Where are the universities that
train such people as are needed? Where is the political will? Where is the government
coordination? Where is the money? Indeed, every Democrat and probably half the Republicans
who run for office campaign on controlling military spending; not that USA gets all that
much benefit from the current $800 billion per year. see more
You see, here is the difference--I can calculate approximate required force
for that but I don't want to. It is Friday. You can get some basic intro into operational
theory (and even into Salvo Equations) in my latest book. Granted, my publisher fought me
tooth and nail to remove as much match as possible. But I'll give you a hint--appearance of
S-500 on any theater of operations effectively closes it off effectively for any missile or
aircraft operations when deployed in echeloned (multi-layer) AD. see more
O nce in a blue moon an indispensable book comes out making a clear case for sanity in what
is now a post-MAD world. That's the responsibility carried by " The (Real)
Revolution in Military Affairs ," by Andrei Martyanov (Clarity Press), arguably the most
important book of 2019.
Martyanov is the total package -- and he comes with extra special attributes as a top-flight
Russian military analyst, born in Baku in those Back in the U.S.S.R. days, living and working
in the U.S., and writing and blogging in English.
Right from the start, Martyanov wastes no time destroying not only Fukuyama's and
Huntington's ravings but especially Graham Allison's childish and meaningless Thucydides Trap
argument -- as if the power equation between the U.S. and China in the 21stcentury could be
easily interpreted in parallel to Athens and Sparta slouching towards the Peloponnesian War
over 2,400 years ago. What next? Xi Jinping as the new Genghis Khan?
(By the way, the best current essay on Thucydides is in Italian, by Luciano Canfora ("
Tucidide: La Menzogna, La Colpa, L'Esilio" ). No Trap. Martyanov visibly relishes defining the
Trap as a "figment of the imagination" of people who "have a very vague understanding of real
warfare in the 21st century." No wonder Xi explicitly said the Trap does not exist.)
Martyanov had already detailed in his splendid, previous book, "Losing Military Supremacy:
The Myopia of American Strategic Planning," how "American lack of historic experience with
continental warfare" ended up "planting the seeds of the ultimate destruction of the American
military mythology of the 20thand 21stcenturies which is foundational to the American decline,
due to hubris and detachment of reality." Throughout the book, he unceasingly provides solid
evidence about the kind of lethality waiting for U.S. forces in a possible, future war against
real armies (not the Taliban or Saddam Hussein's), air forces, air defenses and naval
power.
Do the Math
One of the key takeaways is the failure of U.S. mathematical models: and readers of the book
do need to digest quite a few mathematical equations. The key point is that this failure led
the U.S. "on a continuous downward spiral of diminishing military capabilities against the
nation [Russia] she thought she defeated in the Cold War."
In the U.S., Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) was introduced by the late Andrew Marshall, a.k.a. Yoda, the former head of
Net Assessment at the Pentagon and the de facto inventor of the "pivot to Asia" concept. Yet
Martyanov tells us that RMA actually started as MTR (Military-Technological Revolution),
introduced by Soviet military theoreticians back in the 1970s.
One of the staples of RMA concerns nations capable of producing land-attack cruise missiles,
a.k.a. TLAMs. As it stands, only the U.S., Russia, China and France can do it. And there are
only two global systems providing satellite guidance to cruise missiles: the American GPS and
the Russian GLONASS. Neither China's BeiDou nor the European Galileo qualify – yet
– as global GPS systems.
Then there's Net-Centric Warfare (NCW). The term itself was coined by the late Admiral
Arthur Cebrowski in 1998 in an
article he co-wrote with John Garstka's titled, "Network-Centric Warfare – Its Origin and
Future."
Deploying his mathematical equations, Martyanov soon tells us that "the era of subsonic
anti-shipping missiles is over." NATO, that brain-dead organism (copyright Emmanuel Macron)
now has to face the supersonic Russian P-800 Onyx and the Kalibr-class M54 in a "highly hostile
Electronic Warfare environment." Every developed modern military today applies Net-Centric Warfare
(NCW), developed by the Pentagon in the 1990s.
Rendering of a future combat systems network. (soldiersmediacenter/Flickr, CC BY 2.0,
Wikimedia Commons)
Martyanov
mentions in his new book something that I learned on my visit to Donbass in March 2015: how
NCW principles, "based on Russia's C4ISR capabilities made available by the Russian military to
numerically inferior armed forces of the Donbass Republics (LDNR), were used to devastating
effect both at the battles of Ilovaisk and Debaltsevo, when attacking the cumbersome Soviet-era
Ukrainian Armed Forces military."
No Escape From the Kinzhal
Martyanov provides ample information on Russia's latest missile – the hypersonic
Mach-10 aero-ballistic Kinzhal, recently tested in the Arctic.
Crucially, as he explains, "no existing anti-missile defense in the U.S. Navy is capable of
shooting [it] down even in the case of the detection of this missile." Kinzhal has a range of
2,000 km, which leaves its carriers, MiG-31K and TU-22M3M, "invulnerable to the only defense a
U.S. Carrier Battle Group, a main pillar of U.S. naval power, can mount – carrier fighter
aircraft." These fighters simply don't have the range.
The Kinzhal was one of the weapons announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin's
game-changing March
1, 2018 speech at the Federal Assembly. That's the day, Martyanov stresses, when the real
RMA arrived, and "changed completely the face of peer-peer warfare, competition and global
power balance dramatically."
Top Pentagon officials such as General
John Hyten, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, have admitted on the record there are "no
existing countermeasures" against, for instance, the hypersonic, Mach 27 glide vehicle Avangard
(which renders anti-ballistic missile systems useless), telling the U.S. Senate Armed Services
Committee the only way out would be "a nuclear deterrent." There are also no existing
counter-measures against anti-shipping missiles such as the Zircon and Kinzhal.
Any military analyst knows very well how the Kinzhal destroyed a land target the size of a
Toyota Corolla in Syria after being launched 1,000 km away in adverse weather conditions. The
corollary is the stuff of NATO nightmares: NATO's command and control installations in Europe
are de facto indefensible.
Martyanov gets straight to the point: "The introduction of hypersonic weapons surely pours
some serious cold water on the American obsession with securing the North American continent
from retaliatory strikes."
Kh-47M2 Kinzhal; 2018 Moscow Victory Day Parade. (Kremilin via Wikimedia Commons)
Martyanov is thus unforgiving on U.S. policymakers who "lack the necessary tool-kit for
grasping the unfolding geostrategic reality in which the real revolution in military affairs
had dramatically downgraded the always inflated American military capabilities and continues to
redefine U.S. geopolitical status away from its self-declared hegemony."
And it gets worse: "Such weapons ensure a guaranteed retaliation [Martyanov's italics] on
the U.S. proper." Even the existing Russian nuclear deterrents – and to a lesser degree
Chinese, as paraded recently -- "are capable of overcoming the existing U.S. anti-ballistic
systems and destroying the United States," no matter what crude propaganda the Pentagon is
peddling.
In February 2019, Moscow announced the completion of tests of a nuclear-powered engine for
the Petrel cruise missile. This is a subsonic cruise missile with nuclear propulsion that can
remain in air for quite a long time, covering intercontinental distances, and able to attack
from the most unexpected directions. Martyanov mischievously characterizes the Petrel as "a
vengeance weapon in case some among American decision-makers who may help precipitate a new
world war might try to hide from the effects of what they have unleashed in the relative safety
of the Southern Hemisphere."
Hybrid War Gone Berserk
A section of the book expands on China's military progress, and the fruits of the
Russia-China strategic partnership, such as Beijing buying $3 billion-worth of S-400 Triumph
anti-aircraft missiles -- "ideally suited to deal with the exact type of strike assets the
United States would use in case of a conventional conflict with China."
Beijing parade celebrating the 70th anniversary of the People's Republic, October 2019.
(YouTube screenshot)
Because of the timing, the analysis does not even take into consideration the arsenal
presented in early October at the Beijing parade celebrating the 70thanniversary of the
People's Republic.
That includes, among other things, the "carrier-killer" DF-21D, designed to hit warships at
sea at a range of up to 1,500 km; the intermediate range "Guam Killer" DF-26; the DF-17
hypersonic missile; and the long-range submarine-launched and ship-launched YJ-18A anti-ship
cruise missiles. Not to mention the DF-41 ICBM – the backbone of China's nuclear
deterrent, capable of reaching the U.S. mainland carrying multiple warheads.
Martyanov could not escape addressing the RAND Corporation, whose reason to exist is to
relentlessly push for more money for the Pentagon – blaming Russia for "hybrid war" (an
American invention) even as it moans about the U.S.'s incapacity of defeating Russia in each
and every war game. RAND's war games pitting the U.S. and allies against Russia and China
invariably ended in a "catastrophe" for the "finest fighting force in the world."
Martyanov also addresses the S-500s, capable of reaching AWACS planes and possibly even
capable of intercepting hypersonic non-ballistic targets. The S-500 and its latest middle-range
state of the art air-defense system S-350 Vityaz will be operational in 2020.
His key takeway: "There is no parity between Russia and the United States in such fields as
air-defense, hypersonic weapons and, in general, missile development, to name just a few fields
– the United States lags behind in these fields, not just in years but in generations
[italics mine]."
All across the Global South, scores of nations are very much aware that the U.S. economic
"order" – rather disorder – is on the brink of collapse. In contrast, a
cooperative, connected, rule-based, foreign relations between sovereign nations model is being
advanced in Eurasia – symbolized by the merging of the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the NDB (the BRICS bank).
The key guarantors of the new model are Russia and China. And Beijing and Moscow harbor no
illusion whatsoever about the toxic dynamics in Washington. My recent conversations with top
analysts in Kazakhstan last month and in Moscow last week once again stressed the futility of
negotiating with people described – with overlapping shades of sarcasm – as
exceptionalist fanatics. Russia, China and many corners of Eurasia have figured out there are
no possible, meaningful deals with a nation bent on breaking every deal.
Indispensable?
No: Vulnerable
Martyanov cannot but evoke Putin's speech to the Federal Assembly in February 2019, after
the unilateral Washington abandonment of the INF treaty, clearing the way for U.S. deployment
of intermediate and close range missiles stationed in Europe and pointed at Russia:
"Russia will be forced to create and deploy those types of weapons against those regions
from where we will face a direct threat, but also against those regions hosting the centers
where decisions are taken on using those missile systems threatening us."
Translation: American Invulnerability is over – for good.
In the short term, things can always get worse. At his traditional, year-end presser in
Moscow, lasting almost four and a half hours, Putin stated that Russia is more than ready to
"simply renew the existing New START agreement", which is bound to expire in early 2021: "They
[the U.S.] can send us the agreement tomorrow, or we can sign and send it to Washington." And
yet, "so far our proposals have been left unanswered. If the New START ceases to exist, nothing
in the world will hold back an arms race. I believe this is bad."
"Bad" is quite the euphemism. Martyanov prefers to stress how "most of the American elites,
at least for now, still reside in a state of Orwellian cognitive dissonance" even as the real
RMA "blew the myth of American conventional invincibility out of the water."
Martyanov is one of the very few analysts – always from different parts of Eurasia --
who have warned about the danger of the U.S. "accidentally stumbling" into a war against
Russia, China, or both which is impossible to be won conventionally, "let alone through the
nightmare of a global nuclear catastrophe."
Is that enough to instill at least a modicum of sense into those who lord over that massive
cash cow, the industrial-military-security complex? Don't count on it.
* * *
Pepe Escobar, a veteran Brazilian journalist, is the correspondent-at-large for Hong
Kong-based Asia Times . His latest book is
"
2030 ." Follow him on Facebook .
The Congress been on a MIC spending spree for anti ballistic missile defense since Reagan
wanted Star Wars. Today Trump wants Space Force. One and the same. Perhaps MOSGA. Make Outer
Space Great Again? So what is Russia to do? It is the oldest of military equations we have
not been using at all. That equation states that an offensive or defensive weapon system will
ultimately fail if there is a cheaper counter measure that neutralizes it. ABM technology is
hard and expensive. Making missiles faster is cheap and also effective.
But our military has never given a crap about making sense about anything it spends
trillions of dollars on. Most of these massive programs are white elephants and will never
deliver the promises they make. Especially the ABM systems. Russia could have saved the fast
missiles since our systems only are able to shoot down slow ones about 25% of the time under
tightly controlled test parameters that are designed to provide the optimal conditions that
enable a successful intercept.
I really think everyone in the military knows this is a fools errand but we just have to
keep paying it forward to future budgets with bigger allocations for nonsense.
The scariest part is our Congress and President are getting stupider by the day. They
really may actually feel they can rely on this "protection" and remain safe. If that really
takes hold then the likelihood of a first strike grows by leaps and bounds. That is why
Russia has to launch all the new scary weapons. It is because our brain dead government is
not afraid of mere ten megaton thermonuclear bombs any more.
Walter , December 22, 2019 at 19:32
The statement> "One of the staples of RMA concerns nations capable of producing
land-attack cruise missiles, a.k.a. TLAMs. As it stands, only the U.S., Russia, China and
France can do it"
May not be true. Use searchterm "the 5000 dollar cruise missile" or "New Zealand man
'building cruise missile in garage'
Withal, anybody can build a fairly good cruise missile, with a range near 500 miles. The
gizmo to make it effective is another matter. And it is a stupid thing to build. Do it and
get caught – you won't need a retirement plan. It's still easy.
Drew Hunkins , December 22, 2019 at 16:38
Martyanov's "Losing Military Supremacy" was spectacular. I have it on my bookshelf with
vast passages highlighted and underlined.
Cat , December 22, 2019 at 15:58
The world will eventually witness WW3 as Russia, China and U.S. (which is currently
working on at least six different hypersonic programs/projects) are developing hypersonic
weapons and the supremely capable USAF being already fully primed to use dial-a-yield B61
tactical nukes supposedly safe to civilians on the other two (Russia and China).
ttshasta , December 22, 2019 at 15:25
That the US outspends others does not directly connote superiority.
Was it not apx. $200M
in overcharges by Halliburton for meals not delivered and fuel overcharges in Iraq?
How many false test results and double billings are there, we may never know.
And what of the F35, it was designed by Congress to have parts sourced from 50 states
guaranteeing passage. The result; so many bells and whistles it needs constant maintanence,
and its anti radar coating may melt at top speed.
As well in hurricane Michael in Florida 22 of 55 F22s were not flown to safety in Ohio and
endured the hurricane. Apparently the F22 also spends 49% of it's time in maintenance.
Of course we. need defense, but with accountability. Look up Catherine Austin Fitts and
missing money, the Pentagon's black hole of a budget is staggering.
John Drake , December 22, 2019 at 14:21
Very interesting!!!
I look at the Pentagon budget as a warped economic stimulus plan considering how many of
their exotic weapons are lemons: the F-35, the USS Gerald Ford which six years after
launching is still not fully ready to deploy, etc. etc. This organization can't even complete
a complete audit-or is it they don't dare.
They make sure their vendors are in all 50 states so any time a congress critter votes
against a defense budget, he/she votes against jobs in that state.
jo6pac , December 22, 2019 at 11:06
Thanks PE as you are an interesting read for sure. Thanks for the link to Andrei Martyanov
site.
This is capitalism at its best. Selling the world a delusional reality. What if I told you
these weapons are already obsolete? The real issue being who has more highly advanced
technology that's being held from public knowledge and what they're going to use it
towards.
Anna , December 22, 2019 at 19:41
Genuine capitalism demands expertise, technical, scientific, et cet., as well as an
adherence to the unforgiving rules of responsibility. Instead, the US "deciders" are mired in
incompetence and sycophancy.
The stunning story of the Boeing 737 MAX plane tells it all, including the total lack of
responsibility in the highest echelons of the "deciders."
SteveK9 , December 22, 2019 at 08:25
If China and Russia want to fight the American Empire, missiles are not going to be the
way. I suppose they have to keep building up conventional forces, but the idea that there
could be a long-term conventional war between the US and either Russia or China, seems
fanciful nuclear weapons. America's main weapon now is the control of international finance
through the dollar and the use of the dollar in sanctions, arming proxies, paying fifth
columnists. Those are the avenues that Russia and China have to block, if they want to loosen
America's hold on the World. Trump is helping quite a bit.
Rob , December 23, 2019 at 11:13
Nailed it. Both Russia and China have pursued advanced weaponry as a deterrent against
U.S. aggression, not for the sake of fighting a conventional war. The message being sent to
the U.S. and its allies is that there will be a heavy price to pay both at home and abroad
for hostile military threats or actual attacks.
Skip Scott , December 22, 2019 at 08:09
For pennies on the dollar, Russia and China have military superiority over us. It is the
end of Empire, but there is no getting through to our thickheaded emperors. We have no choice
but to quit insisting on our "exceptionalism", and wage peace. All the money and manpower
wasted on our 800+ military bases and bloated weapons programs could feed the world, educate
our children, and transform our infrastructure into a new model of sustainability. Hubris and
entrenched power structures must be overcome if we are to survive as a species.
It is time for the latte sippers to wake up and insist on real change or their last view
of the world will be mushroom clouds out the window from their stools in Starbucks. Corporate
sponsored warmonger from column B will not suffice.
Walter , December 22, 2019 at 07:17
Speaking from History Walter observed that "all war originates from Domestic
interests".
Mikhail Alexandrov (expert) says> " One can break through air defenses only as a result
of a massive attack operation. This can be done by concentrating aviation into massive fire
support." (Pravda)
"As soon as we can see the concentration of American aircraft on airfields in Europe
– they cannot reach us in any other way – we will simply destroy those airfields
by launching our medium-range ballistic missiles at those targets. Afterwards, our troops
will go on offensive in the Baltic direction and take control of the entire Baltic territory
within 48 hours. NATO won't even have time to come to its senses – they will see a very
powerful military buildup on the borders with Poland. Then they will have to think whether
they should continue the war. As a result, all this will end with NATO losing the Baltic
States,"
Not exactly a watered-down view, eh? See also >" According to The National Interest, a
B-52 bomber of the US Air Force practiced an attack on the Kaliningrad region in March of
this year ."
This is an explicit statement by Russia – fire on opposing forces prior in time
– an error Stalin made was to not trust the intel. Russia, it seems, designs to avoid
that mistake the next time the nazis concentrate force.
Donald Duck , December 22, 2019 at 04:51
There was an old song British soldiers used to sing in the trenches of Flanders and France
during WW1.
It went something like this:
'Hush, here comes a whizzbang (German artillery)
Hush, here comes a whizzbang
Come on you solider boys
Get down those stairs
Into your dug out
And say your prayers
Hush here comes a whizzbang
And its headed straight for you
And you'l see all the wonders of no-man's land
When that whizzbang hits you.
Now with my amendments:
Hush here comes a Zircon
Hush here comes a Zircon
Come on you neo-cons
And get down those stairss
Into your fall-out shelters
And say your prayers
Hush here comes a Zircon
And its headed straight for you
And you'll see all the wonders
Of a post nuclear apoclypse
When the Zircon hits you.
A
curious , December 22, 2019 at 00:05
@Jeff
"The Culture of Defeat by Wolfgang Scheivelbusch, posits that in the future wars will be won
when the opposing entity's economy is destroyed or at least seriously damaged"
China has the capability and the will to play the long game in not capitulating to the
demands of the US. The current trade wars initiated and used by the US to threaten China's
independently minded progress is only party due to the trade deficit between the two
countries. The real reason the US is so belligerent is that China successfully developing
socialist based political system which is exposing the deep failures and lack of people
oriented capitalistic system. Once the US population wakes up the this fact it will spell
doom for those wealthy oligarchs ruling the US who want to keep their "gravy" train rolling.
They know their time is running out.
Jeff Harrison , December 22, 2019 at 21:32
Oh, I agree completely that the US is still fighting the socialism vs capitalism wars of
the early 20th century. A form of socialism is the only sensible approach. But, as Nicolas
Van Rijn (see Poul Anderson's Trader to the Stars) puts it: Oh, Governments they come and
they go but greed goes on forever. But as for your thought that everybody will rise up and
hang the oligarchs by the heels from the nearest light pole? Better hope not. We know what
that looks like. It was the great communist wave before and after WWII. The reason it was so
effective in Cuba is that Castro had all the oligarchs still in the country shot.
CitizenOne , December 21, 2019 at 23:55
Cruise missiles deployed by the US do not depend on GPS information to find their targets.
They fly by internal guidance that cannot be blocked or jammed or interfered with in any way.
There is nothing else I can say other than destroying satellites or radars or even
obliterating land targets such that they are unrecognizable will have no (zero) effect on a
US counter strike by nuclear cruise missiles that will be highly lethal to the Russians. The
triad of US defenses is based on an unstoppable and completely independent model based on
unalterable and insurmountable attack strategies. If the Russians or the Chinese try to wage
a preemptive strike they will need to defeat so many invincible technologies that the task
becomes impossible. The US is also playing catch up with intermediate range nukes which the
Russians long ago abandoned the treaty prohibiting these weapons. Intermediate Nukes pose the
greatest danger for the human race since the time from launch to impact is short. That is
what this article announces as an unstoppable threat but it it is not a post MAD World we
live in. We live in a current MAD world where Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is still
healthy and a world where the US can still inflict extinction on any nation that chooses to
launch a preemptive nuclear strike on the US. Just because the Russians chose to abandon the
anti nuclear treaties does not mean they have an edge. The US has followed suit and has
nullified the various treaties banning intermediate nuclear armaments and has begun
testing.
There can be little doubt that the nuclear armaments of the USA arrayed across multiple
weapons platforms that use technology immune to interference by any known or unknown
technology are prepared to launch a counter strike which will effectively annihilate the
nation or nations that choose to use a first strike option no matter what the technology they
employ to use for their advantage.
Hyper sonic nuclear weapons developed by various nations may be a threat but there are
enough missiles left in place to defeat this threat. The US will also develop the same
weapons.
If North Korea were ever to launch nuclear tipped missiles it would be obliterated. If
Russia were ever to do the same it would be obliterated. If China were ever to do the same it
would be obliterated.
So what is the point of the author threatening that the US will be obliterated by new
technology when the defenses the US uses rely on old tech and unstoppable means to retaliate?
Who cares about whether we can survive a first strike?
What matters is that we can mount a credible deterrence by a counter strike that will
obliterate the enemy. That has not changed in the present power balance. The United States
maintains the ability to mount a lethal blow to any nation that tries to attack it with
nuclear weapons. Hyper sonic weapons and Russians loud announcements that they have the upper
hand just amount to nothing. The facts are that even if the US was obliterated we would still
have the means to obliterate Russia.
That will keep the balance of MAD in place and also renders the article useless and devoid
of any useful information.
Nobody wants nuclear war. But if there is nuclear war then we must and will win. That is
the proposition of the US government and it is also a vision that we Americans need to
support.
Lawrence Magnuson , December 23, 2019 at 13:16
"But if there is nuclear war then we must and will win." I thought you, elsewhere in your
panegyric, conceded Mutual Assured Destruction?
Donald Duck , December 23, 2019 at 14:01
"Nobody wants nuclear war. But if there is nuclear war then we must and will win. That is
the proposition of the US government and it is also a vision that we Americans need to
support."
"Nobody wants nuclear war."
Really, so who moved NATO right up to Russia's western frontiers and parked there military
hardware there? Who revoked the INF treaty? Who is using Ukraine and Georgia as battering
rams and forward attack bases – The same goes for Poland and Romania where the US has
stationed or is stationing Intermediate Range Missiles. How would you like the Russians doing
likewise in Mexico and Canada. This is the Cuban crisis in reverse.
Nobody wants nuclear war! You called have fooled me. Your neo-con lunatics seem to be
gagging for one. And BTW you won't win such a war, nobody will. And that my friend is the
cold logic of the age, accept for your demented neo-cons.
TimN , December 23, 2019 at 15:09
So, supporting the destruction of all life is something "we" need to support? A nuclear
war can't be won, sonny, and insisting "we" to support total destruction . There's something
wrong with you.
NoOneYouKnow , December 23, 2019 at 15:51
Sure, except Obama embarked on a $1.5 trillion plan to modernize the US's nuclear arsenal
to make it "more usable." So if anyone is looking to start a nuclear war, it's the US.
LJ , December 23, 2019 at 18:11
@ CitizenOne
It seems to me that what this essay and the Russian advertising their new technology is to
ensure that MAD is still in place, as US has been 'updating' its nuclear arms in an attempt
to promote a nuclear war that is survivable.
You make the classic US mistake of assuming that North Korea, Russia, China etc are
interested in and possibly planning nuclear pre-emptive strikes against the USA. In my
opinion, it is much more likely to be the US that initiates nuclear war, and these weapons
are developed to ensure that US policy makers realise that, as you say, "The facts are that
even if the US was obliterated we would still have the means to obliterate Russia." –
if Russia/China/etc are obliterated, they still have the means to obliterate the USA.
I hope you are right that o one wants nuclear war, because it is doubtful many of us in
any country would survive it!
Dick , December 21, 2019 at 22:39
The problem with the US is the military, Congress, and the President, perhaps even most
Americans, believe their own propaganda. Belief in one's exceptionalism leads to hubris,
which leads to arrogance leading one to overestimate their capabilities and underestimating
the capabilities of one's adversary; this is always fatal.
"The essence of immorality is the tendency to make an exception of myself" – Jane
Addams
Jeff Harrison , December 21, 2019 at 18:44
Ah, Pepe, you are always a fascinating read. The United States has been foolishly chasing
diminishing returns in military hardware that have a cost that is looking asymptotic. The
actual military hardware may well become, like the medieval castle, irrelevant. One of the
more fascinating books I've read recently, The Culture of Defeat by Wolfgang Scheivelbusch,
posits that in the future wars will be won when the opposing entity's economy is destroyed or
at least seriously damaged. The cold war ended when the old SovU had their economy collapse
when they tried to keep up with the US's profligate war spending capability. Actual defense
has, historically and traditionally, been cheaper than offense. Both Russia and China have an
advantage – they are really only interested in defense; they are no longer interested
in conquering the world, unlike the US which still seeks global hegemonic status. Indeed, a
relatively small investment by Russia and China is causing the US to spend huge sums of money
in response.
Of late the US has been using its economic power in the form of the status of our currency
and the need for countries and companies to keep assets on deposit in the US where the US can
readily steal them based on illegitimate legalities. When the petro-dollar finally dies, the
US will be substantially poorer. People have to borrow US $s to trade oil even if the buyer
is India and the seller Iran and the US makes interest on every one of those loans. And it
wasn't even our oil! I predict that this latest cold war will end when enough countries are
buying and selling oil in national currencies and not the US $, when countries start to hold
fewer and fewer US$s for national reserves, and when international businesses shun American
products for fear that they won't be able to export them. Either that or, given our existing
$23T in debt with the rest of our military spending will leave us trying to borrow more money
than the world has.
Moi , December 22, 2019 at 01:46
Conventional warfare seems to depend on which nation has the greatest industrial output.
On that premise the US has already lost to China.
Perhaps that's why the US is taking warfare to space. The new frontier is hi-tech and,
because no one else is really doing it yet, it is asymmetrical not conventional.
Anna , December 22, 2019 at 12:39
The first shoots of global spring: "Russia, China Sign Deal To Settle All Trade In
Respective Currencies And Drop Bilateral Use Of US Dollars" See:
russia-briefing.com/news/russia-china-sign-deal-settle-trade-respective-currencies-drop-bilateral-use-us-dollars.html/
John Drake , December 22, 2019 at 14:05
Good analysis, however the Soviet economy never collapsed though it was weak. Gorbachev
ended it trying to transition to a Scandinavian style socialism. Then he got ousted and
Yeltsin allowed a hundred mostly American neo-liberal economic advisers in to supervise his
selling off of state assets along with "liberalization". It was the neo-liberal reforms and
predatory raiding that wiped out the Russian economy, twice, ushering in the economic and
social malaise of the early '90's.
Who was behind that: Bill Clinton. He can take credit for not only wrecking the US economy
with his banking deregulation, but the Russian economy as well. And his wife is even
worse.
Bob Van Noy , December 23, 2019 at 10:47
(In response to John Drake) Yes, John Drake and Clinton's program is well described in F.
William Engdahl's book "Manifest Destiny".
They poisoned with the USA with Russophobia for decades to come, and that really increases
the risk of nuclear confrontation, which would wipe out all this jerks, but also mass of innocent
people.
Notable quotes:
"... The only way to prevent it, IMHO, is having a Western public shifting just 5 % of their "breads and circuses" paradigm to that issue. Just 5. Not holding my breath I am afraid. ..."
"... Which proves the main point of mine: access to information means shit in the real world of power play. Sheeple didn't care then; they care even less now (better distractions). ..."
Sooner or later you'll have this, IMHO: Reaction time 7 minutes . You know,
decision-making time to say "launch" or not. The decision-maker in the White House, Downing
Street and Elysees Palace either a geriatric or one of this new multiracial breed. Just think
about those people
Add to that the level of overall expertise by the crews manning those systems, its
maintenance etc. Add increased automation of some parts of the launch process with
hardware/software as it's produced now (you know, quality control etc.).
It will take a miracle not to have that launch sooner or later. Not big, say .80 KT. What
happens after that is anybody's guess. Mine, taking the second point from the fourth
paragraph .a big bang.
The only way to prevent it, IMHO, is having a Western public shifting just 5 % of
their "breads and circuses" paradigm to that issue. Just 5.
Not holding my breath I am afraid.
@peterAUS The rational actor false supposition has it that the biologics can't be used
because they don't recognize friend from foe.
Rational actors? Where? Anthrax via the US mail.
One rational actor point of view is that you have to be able to respond to anything.
Anything. In a measured or escalating response. Of course biologics are being actively
pursued to the hilt. Just like you point out about Marburg.
But, the view from above is that general panic in the population cannot be allowed, and so
all biologics have to be down played. "of course we would never do anything like that, it
would be insane to endanger all of humanity". Just like nukes. So professors pontificate
misdirection, and pundits punt.
So don't expect real disclosure, or honest analysis. "We only want the fear that results
in more appropriations. Not the fear that sinks programs." Don't generate new Church
commissions. Hence the fine line. some fear yes, other fears, no.
Well Washington D.C.
Hahahahaha sorry, couldn't resist.
So don't expect real disclosure, or honest analysis.
I don't.
But I also probably forgot more about nuclear war than most of readers here will ever
know. And chemical, when you think about it; had a kit with atropine on me all the time in
all exercises. We didn't practice much that "biologics" stuff, though. We knew why, then.
Same reason for today. Call it a "stoic option" to own inevitable demise.
Now, there is a big difference between the age of those protests I mentioned and today.
The Internet. The access to information people, then, simply didn't have.
Which proves the main point of mine: access to information means shit in the real
world of power play. Sheeple didn't care then; they care even less now (better
distractions).
Well, they will care, I am sure. For about ..say in the USA ..several hours, on
average.
We here where I am typing from will care for "how to survive the aftermath" .. for two
months.Tops.
but if you take away still viable American aerospace, automotive and pharmaceutical
industries among very few others, you will find a wasteland of financial speculations and
selling the snake oil
Lovely takes, Andrei. The people that need to read you see your name and immediately retort,
"Agent for Putin", Washington Post-style. Gets them off the hook from thinking because after
all, college deliberately taught them NOT to think. Most of the kids, they're hopeless. They're
hopeless idiots, they know nothing of the Constitution, they think all is normal. And they were
fleeced by the academics that dumbed them down. Meanwhile, we have in effect, been selling each
other hamburgers (services) for the past 50 years. Also, they've been selling the oil and gas
right out from under our feet overseas and putting THAT in their pockets even as we pay a world
price for gasoline and finished product. Every other country that produces crude gets a
discount. Not us. To steal a quote from a movie I watched once, they struck oil under our
garden and all we get is dead tomatoes. Our society is hollowed out, depraved, the women
becoming more and more hideous, all the institutions that held us together, deliberately
broken. decay everywhere.
As for the military? A reflection of our society. When I went into the Navy in 1975, it was
Stars and Stripes and we served in large part for Mom, Apple Pie and Chevrolet.
Today it is clear that the Stars and Stripes should be dollar signs over a defense
contractor logo. The rest? From where I sit today, for most kids, Mom is a divorced slut, Apple
Pie is a turd in a wax paper wrapper and Chevrolet is a bent shit can from China. This isn't a
society I'd defend as a nation worth defending. The feminists sit on their fat, comfortable
asses, made such on the labors of us White guys and they declare their hatred. Only a moron or
a kid that needs a shot at a job or trade or gets a kick out of airplanes or such joins. Our
women in general aren't worth defending on the streets or the world. Not in the Blue cities,
they are hideous. Take care of your own wman and kids and community and hell with the rest.
There's no draft, the society mostly hates Vets, so it isn't for country most serve. It's to
grab something, from a trade, to a pilot's license. A military based on that has no staying
power. And our corruptions and waste and outright theft in military procurement for shitty
weapons makes us ripe for the taking. And our talent is wasted building shitty weapons and the
second level builds shitty airliners. Can't fly into space? We cannot fly, literally, to
anywhere in the newest build out, the Maxx. And we're depending on the Theranos of Aerospace,
Spacex/Musk to get us to space? Right! Except for the nukes, we're ripe, man.
Andrei, speaking of Musk, how the Hell does he smoke big fat doobies and keep his security
clearance when everyone else in Washington gets fired for getting near the stuff? Queer
privilege? I'm convinced the whole thing with Musk is a shell game. You?
Thanks for your work. Very good stuff, but we can't get those who need it to even look. Our
people are incapable of marching in the streets or even seeing why they should. Kudos to those
who did it to us. They did a fine job. Read More Agree: Andrei Martyanov
Replies:
@Arioch ,
@Andrei Martyanov Reply Agree/Disagree/Etc. More... This Commenter This Thread Hide Thread
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@Frederick V. Reed It has a dangerous set of nukes. The tripwires are and have always
been easy-sinkers like our surface ships. The psychos that run our policy have subs and silos
with missiles with lots of nukes.
It's a dangerous game to consider a dopey thought like that Fred. Bet your ass Russia sees
plenty of military here to defend against. Iran, Iraq, Vietnam, to them it was impossible, we
killed millions. There's enough military here that Israel wants and has harnessed it. In what
universe do you reside Fred? Ah yes, the moon name of Tequila. Fred? Go drink something.
Jesus.
After six years of trials, Russia's 29B6 Konteyner over-the-horizon-radar has
finally become fully operational. According to its chief designer Mikhail Petrov, the radar
is detecting and tracking F-35 jets up to 3000 km away . The radar, located in
Mordovia (receiver) and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (transmitter), is oriented westwards; Russia
plans to build three
more 29B6 Konteyners for the east, north-west, and south directions.
I hardly ever hear any discussion or outrage about nukes and nuclear war on the site/boards
that I see or visit from time to time, and yet it seems to me to be by far the most pressing
existential threat to all humankind, as well as to the planet
I went searching again for one or two of the scientific studies that I'd seen within the
past few years about global effects of a 'small' nuclear war, and came across a new study.
Surprisingly enough, there have been but a handful of studies in the past 30-40 years!! Yes,
it's true. The appetites of sharks and shark attacks on humans are more studied than nuclear
war and the Fate of the Earth.
In this recent case, a mere 100 nukes exchanged between India and Pakistan would bring
devastation
here's a few for everyone's info. And a new one which I just became aware of, from Fox of
all places:
A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would place the entire planet in jeopardy by
unleashing a "climate catastrophe," according to new research published in Science Advances,
a journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science...
"A nuclear war between India and Pakistan -- which share a long history of conflicts --
would not only result in 50 to 125 million direct fatalities but could jeopardize the entire
planet, causing sharp drops in global temperatures and precipitation that could devastate the
world's food supply," writes AAAS...
..."They find that if Pakistan attacks urban targets in 2025 with 150-kiloton nuclear
weapons and if India responds with 100-kiloton nuclear weapons, smoke from burning cities
would release 16 to 36 teragrams of black carbon into the atmosphere, blocking out sunlight
and cooling the global surface by 2 to 5°C (3.6 to 9°F).".....global average
precipitation would drop by 15 percent to 30 percent. Additionally, the rate at which plants
store energy as biomass would decline by 15 percent to 30 percent on land and by 5 percent to
15 percent in oceans, a scenario that would threaten mass starvation.
"Russia and the United States still possess by far the most nuclear warheads, at 6,850 and
6,550, respectively.....
If the birthrate is trending down, it is not a crisis for capitalism, but for the
economy.
Actually, Earth added 83 million people to the planet last year.
We are in massive overshoot, in a collapsing ecosystem.
Not a problem, a predicament.
some of the science about nuclear war is presented here at this link, from a 2008 study.
Computer models are much more advanced now, and it would appear that environmental
consequences of even a small nuclear war would be more severe than previously thought
Environmental consequences of nuclear war - Owen B. Toon, Alan Robock, and Richard P.
Turco
A regional war involving 100 Hiroshima-sized weapons would pose a worldwide threat due to
ozone destruction and climate change. A superpower confrontation with a few thousand weapons
would be catastrophic
More than 25 years ago, three independent research groups made valuable contributions to
elaborating the consequences of nuclear warfare.1 Paul Crutzen and John Birks proposed that
massive fires and smoke emissions in the lower atmosphere after a global nuclear exchange
would create severe short-term environmental aftereffects. Extending their work,two of us
(Toon and Turco) and colleagues discovered "nuclear winter," which posited that worldwide
climatic cooling from stratospheric smoke would cause agricultural collapse that threatened
the majority of the human population with starvation.
.....Neither the US Department of Homeland Security nor any other governmental agency in
the world currently has an unclassified program to evaluate the impact of nuclear
conflict.Neither the US National Academy of Sciences, nor any other scientific body in the
world, has conducted a study of the issue IN THE PART 20 YEARS (my emphasis)...
O
ct.
27, 1962, is the date on which we humans were spared extinction thanks to Soviet Navy submarine Captain Vasili
Alexandrovich Arkhipov.
Arkhipov insisted on
following the book on using nuclear weapons. He overruled his colleagues on Soviet submarine B-59, who were readying
a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo to fire at the USS Randolph task force near Cuba without the required authorization from
Moscow.
Communications links with
naval headquarters were down, and Arkhipov's colleagues were convinced WWIII had already begun. After hours of
battering by depth charges from U.S. warships, the captain of B-59, Valentin Grigorievich Savitsky, screamed, "We're
going to blast them now! We will die, but we will sink them all -- we will not disgrace our Navy!" But Captain
Arkipov's permission was also required. He countermanded Savitsky and B-59 came to the surface.
Much of this account of
what happened on submarine B-59 is drawn from Daniel Ellsberg's masterful book, "The Doomsday Machine" -- one of the
most gripping and important books I have ever read. Dan explains, inter alia, on pages 216-217 the curious
circumstance whereby the approval of Arkhipov, chief of staff of the submarine brigade at the time, was also
required.
Ellsberg adds that had
Arkhipov been stationed on one of the other submarines (for example, B-4, which was never located by the Americans),
there is every reason to believe that the carrier USS Randolph and several, perhaps all, of its accompanying
destroyers would have been destroyed by a nuclear explosion.
Equally chilling, says Dan:
"The source of this
explosion would have been mysterious to other commanders in the Navy and officials on the ExComm, since no
submarines known to be in the region were believed to carry nuclear warheads. The clear implication on the cause
of the nuclear destruction of this antisubmarine hunter-killer group would have been a medium-range missile from
Cuba whose launch had not been detected. That is the event that President Kennedy had announced on October 22
would lead to a full-scale nuclear attack on the Soviet Union."
'The Most Dangerous
Moment in Human History'
Historian Arthur
Schlesinger Jr., a close adviser to President John F. Kennedy, later described Oct. 27, 1962, as Black Saturday,
calling it "the most dangerous moment in human history." On that same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an
all-out invasion of Cuba to destroy the newly emplaced Soviet missile bases there. Kennedy, who insisted that former
U.S. Ambassador to Russia Llewelyn Thompson attend the meetings of the crisis planning group, rejected the advice of
the military and, with the help of his brother Robert, Ambassador Thompson, and other sane minds, was able to work
out a compromise with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
As for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the president had already concluded that the top military were unhinged Russophobes, and that they deserved
the kind of sobriquet used by Under Secretary of State George Ball applied to them -- a "sewer of deceit." As
Ellsberg writes (in his Prologue, p. 3): "The total death toll as calculated by the Joint Chiefs, from a U.S. first
strike aimed at the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact satellites, and China, would be roughly six hundred million dead. A
hundred Holocausts." And yet the fools pressed on, as in trying to cross "The Big Muddy."
Intelligence Not So
Good
The pre-Cuban-missile
crisis performance of the intelligence community, including Pentagon intelligence, turned out to hugely inept. The
U.S. military, for example, was blissfully unaware that the Soviet submarines loitering in the Caribbean were
equipped with nuclear-armed torpedoes. Nor did U.S. intelligence know that the Russians had already mounted nuclear
warheads on some of the missiles installed in Cuba and aimed at the U.S. (The U.S. assumption on Oct. 27 was that the
warheads had not been mounted.)
It was not until 40 years
later, at a Cuban crisis "anniversary" conference in Havana, that former U.S. officials like Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy learned that some of their key assumptions were dead and
dangerously wrong. (Ellsberg p. 215ff)
Today
the Establishment media has inculcated into American brains that it is a calumny to criticize the "intelligence
community." This is despite the relatively recent example of the concocting of outright fraudulent "intelligence" to
"justify" the attack on Iraq in 2003, followed even more recently, sans evidence, falsely accusing Putin himself of
ordering Russian intelligence to "hack" the computers of the Democratic National Committee. True, the U.S.
intelligence performance on Russia and Cuba in 1962 came close to getting us all killed in 1962, but back then in my
view it was more a case of ineptitude and arrogance than outright dishonesty.
As for Cuba, one of the
most consequential CIA failures was the formal Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) of Sept. 19, 1962, which
advised President Kennedy that Russia would not risk trying to put nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba. To a large extent
this judgment was a consequence of one of the cardinal sins of intelligence analysis -- "mirror imaging." That is, we
had warned the Russians strongly against putting missiles in Cuba; they knew the U.S., in those years would not take
that kind of risk; ergo, they would take us at our word and avoid blowing up the world over Cuba. Or so the esteemed
NIE estimators thought.
The Russians, too, were
mirror imaging. Khrushchev and his advisers regarded U.S. nuclear war planners as rational actors acutely aware of
the risks of escalation, who would shy away from ending life immediately for hundreds of millions of human beings.
Their intelligence was not very good on the degree of Russophobia infecting Air Force General Curtis LeMay and others
on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were prepared to countenance hundreds of millions of deaths in order "to end the
Soviet threat." (Ellsberg was there; he provides a first-hand account of the craziness in "The Doomsday Machine.")
Where Did the
Grenade Launchers Go?
I reported for active duty
at Infantry Officers School at Fort Benning, Georgia, on Nov. 3, 1962, six days after the incident. Most of us new
lieutenants had heard about a new weapon, the grenade launcher, and were eager to try it out. There were none to be
found. Lots of other weapons normally used for training were also missing.
After we made numerous
inquiries, the brass admitted that virtually all the grenade launchers and much of the other missing arms and
vehicles had been swept up and carried south by a division coming through Georgia a week or so before. All of it was
still down in the Key West area, we were told. Tangible signs as to how ready the JCS and Army brass were to attack
Cuba, were President Kennedy to have acceded to their wishes.
Had that happened, it is
likely that neither you nor I would be reading this. Yet, down at Benning, there were moans and groans complaining
that we let the Commies off too easy.
Ray McGovern works
with Tell the Word, a publishing arm of the ecumenical Church of the Saviour in inner-city Washington. He was an
Army infantry/intelligence officer from 1962-64 and later served as Chief of CIA's Soviet Foreign Policy Branch and
morning briefer of the President's Daily Brief. He is co-founder of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity
(VIPS).
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"airmen were holding an Air Force nuclear missile crew at gunpoint deep in a top-secret bunker on
Okinawa.
The crew had just been ordered to launch the island's missiles at targets in the Soviet Union and
Asia, just as the Cuban Missile Crisis was reaching a harrowing climax in October 1962. But an Air
Force launch officer was opposing the order.
The officer sent "two men over there with .45's and [they were] told to shoot anybody who tried to
launch until the situation was resolved so those two men kept that whole crew at bay while we made a
decision of what to do," said John Bordne, a nuclear missile mechanic for the Okinawa-based 873rd
Tactical Missile Squadron who was on duty Oct. 28, 1962."
Coleen Rowley
,
October 30, 2019 at 21:44
Arkhipov was not the only Russian to save the world from nuclear Armageddon.
See this article:
vox.com/2018/9/26/17905796/nuclear-war-1983-stanislav-petrov-soviet-union?fbclid=IwAR3XZREPaiekG2ncpUOUGkzppOqs9102z4pityZtIjvi19tWsHD4CLf3h4s
for a few other cases of Russians who kept their cool during mistaken perceptions when the protocol
would have been to launch nuclear war.
Remembering the time and remembering it was like watching children playing chicken. Remember to0 the
country was ingrained with the belief that mankind could be destroyed. Movies like On the Beach and Dr.
Strangelove(that may not have been the title) made America conscious of the real threat of extinction out
there and equally serious that there might be a Doctor Strangelove near the trigger. So as I and others
watched and read we were torn between fear and the sense that it was unreal. The former Lieutenant Ray
McGovern reminds us it was. And yes, a Russian of all things saved our behinds. Back to game seven of the
World Series.
Lone Wolf
,
October 30, 2019 at 09:55
Mr. Ray McGovern, your article is a ray of light, no pun intended, shining brightly on the heart of
darkness we live in. A MAD rule keeps the clock ticking two minutes to midnight, and there is no hope in
sight of moving it backwards. All for what? Greed and possessiveness. What is the winner going to inherit
after a nuclear war? A nuclear winter? How can they market that? Summer in Venus? Retirement on the moon?
Tanning rooms galore? Just FYI, survivors might not have a skin to tan. The empire is reaching sunset,
and it is threatening to take humanity with it into a long nuclear night mare. We can't let them.
Lone Wolf
PS: A new abnormal: It is still two minutes to midnight – See:
thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/
A Tribute to Vasily Arkhipov (Who Saved the World in October of 1962)
(b. 30 January 1926 d. 19 August 1998)
Vice Admiral, Russian Navy
By Dave Evans
Today, as I sense the earth awakening
Under an umbrella of dueling pear trees,
I inhale the sweet esters of spring
Assuaging all my mortal fears.
So much beauty in a simple flower
Cast away those jaded eyes!
To see the art of a higher power
In the tears the racing clouds cry.
The universe has for many eons labored
To produce a blushing plum,
As the mountains were skillfully chiseled
With the rays of the rising sun.
Ours is a blue green gem hanging in the sky
Home to so many great aspirations,
Of generations gone by and by
Rising above our pitiful lamentations.
And what of our tumultuous history
Frozen in amber teardrop,
We are the offspring of a great mystery
Whose outcome we know not.
The world goes round and round
On this the eve of destruction,
As we are oblivion bound
Unknown actors in a tragic production.
Once before in history we were on the brink
Verily, verily, verily!
We have but one man to thank
Vasily, Vasily, Vasily!
Thank you for preserving Sophia's dream
Beyond the Warmongers' guile,
As the angry Generals screamed
With a blood-lust most vile.
Vasily, you have saved all mankind
We owe you a great debt of gratitude,
As we part the mists of time
And pay homage to your infinitude.
Bless the wake of your fair heart
That gave us our world back,
With the rays of a brand new start
Stopping the final attack!
I wish I could thank you to your face
Vasily my dear friend,
For saving the human race
And to our noble destiny defend!
To say the proper words to thank you
They are indeed hard to find,
As we were trapped in annihilation's queue
You saved all mankind!
elmerfudzie
,
October 29, 2019 at 22:49
Ray, thank you for rewriting the old propaganda story that claimed humanity was saved by JFK s diplomatic
negotiations and unique skills during the Cuban missile crisis. Here's a cut n paste reprint of a few
comments I made a few years ago, regarding the heroism of one, Vice Admiral Vasili Arkhipov and it is
paraphrased here. I wish to pause, take a moment to extend the warmest thanks to Soviet Naval officer,
Vasili Alexandrovich Arkhipov and his extended family. He, who single handed-ly prevented WW III during
the crisis by refusing to launch a nuclear tipped torpedo into one of our U.S. battle cruisers.
Vice
Admiral Arkhipov, if you can hear us from the grave, we award you the real "Nobel Peace Prize" not a
piece of paper, not a figurine, not a check for one million dollars but a peace prize from our hearts,
from those of us who truly understand, what is meant by military leadership and just how lonely,
unrewarding, that place of authority and decision was for you! The world will NEVER be so lucky again!
Coleen Rowley
,
October 30, 2019 at 21:31
A FB friend filled me in on the following "rest of the story" re Arkhipov who was also on the the
Soviet submarine K-19:
(From Wikipedia) "In July 1961, Arkhipov was appointed deputy commander and therefore executive
officer of the new Hotel-class ballistic missile submarine K-19.[3] After a few days of conducting
exercises off the south-east coast of Greenland, the submarine developed an extreme leak in its
reactor coolant system. This leak led to failure of the cooling system. Radio communications were also
affected, and the crew was unable to make contact with Moscow. With no backup systems, Commander
Zateyev ordered the seven members of the engineer crew to come up with a solution to avoid nuclear
meltdown. This required the men to work in high radiation levels for extended periods. They eventually
came up with a secondary coolant system and were able to keep the reactor from a meltdown. Although
they were able to save themselves from a nuclear meltdown, the entire crew, including Arkhipov, were
irradiated. All members of the engineer crew and their divisional officer died within a month due to
the high levels of radiation they were exposed to. Over the course of two years, fifteen more sailors
died from the after-effects."
Tony
,
October 31, 2019 at 09:44
Yes, but Kennedy was also a big factor.
He was able to resist pressure to invade Cuba and so the Luna tactical nuclear missiles in Cuba
were not used. We owe both Kennedy and Arkhipov a great deal.
now wth the dumbest is president of the usa
remember the usa is only on of 35 independent countries
i worry more than i did in from 1950 to 1963
but i realise it is hard to open any pressure cooker under full pressure
also the now totally useless un is degraded to an puppy of the usa
all the hope we had with the un is not lost i hope they wake and rise up
Stan W.
,
October 29, 2019 at 15:33
I remember those days well as I was on a temporary assignment in Washington, D.C. Nerve-wracking period
in history!
Tony
,
October 29, 2019 at 12:09
It is truly frightening to think of what would have happened if Lyndon Johnson had been president at the
time.
He bombed Hanoi at around the time that Soviet premier Kosygin was there!
We need to eliminate nuclear
weapons before they eliminate us. That is the very clear message coming from Ellsberg's book.
Incidentally, the Bay of Pigs was deliberately set up by the CIA to fail. It was in order to force JFK
to invade Cuba.
John Drake
,
October 29, 2019 at 18:55
Good point, it is even more frightening to contemplate if Richard Nixon had defeated Kennedy and was
President then.
Let us not forget that Kennedy refused to follow up war in Laos and Cambodia and had ordered the
withdrawal of 1000 US troops(stymied by the Pentagon) from Vietnam; a precursor to complete
withdrawal.
LBJ immediately reversed the order after JFK's death and then sent in combat troops after an election
in which he promised "I'll not send Amurican(sic) boys to do what Asian boys ought to do for
themselves".
jerry olek
,
October 29, 2019 at 10:53
I remember working on National Estimates in the late 1970s when the Pentagon was still pushing the idea
that we could fight and win a nuclear war with the Soviets. Then CIA director, Stansfield Turner strongly
disagreed with the analysis and successfully convinced people in power not to entertain such an idea. I
believe military and civilian leaders, especially after Chernobyl, have come to realize that nuclear war
would be catastrophic for all participants. But, I am concerned that President Trump does not fully
understand the consequences of using nuclear weapons He supposedly asked in a Pentagon briefing why we
had nuclear weapons if we don't use them.
M Le Docteur Ralph
,
October 29, 2019 at 08:40
Words mean everything.
We always call it the Cuban missile crisis, not the Turkish missile crisis and that betrays our
prejudice.
Meaning that it was perfectly okay for the U.S. Air Force to handover nuclear capable Jupiter missiles
that could reach Moscow to the Italian and Turkish air force to be installed at Bari and Izmir, but when
Khrushchev reacted and installed Soviet missiles in Cuba this created the crisis.
The real origins of this crisis lie in the fact that the real enemy of the U.S. Army was never the Red
Army it was always the U.S. Navy and the US Air Force. The U.S. Army developed the Jupiter missile so
that it would possess its own nuclear deterrent but then lost control of it to the U.S. Air Force.
The U.S. Air Force and its preferred contractors were not missile friendly at the time as they wanted to
build as many bombers as possible and had invented the "bomber gap" to enable this. So given the U.S.
Army's Jupiter program was an anathema to the U.S. Air Force as they represented a potential threat to
the bomber budget, the missiles were parked on Italian and Turkish air force bases with the local air
force being responsible for the missiles (to ensure there would be problems with the Army developed
missiles) and the U.S. Air Force controlling the nuclear warheads.
A brilliant plan, sure to win victory in the war of inter-service rivalry but which failed to take into
account the fact that what the Soviet leadership saw were missiles that could reach Moscow being placed
into the hands of the Italians who had participated in Operation Barbarossa and their traditional enemies
the Turks with whom Russia had fought an endless series of wars and who had so recently facilitated the
Nazi invasion of the USSR by allowing access through the Dardanelles.
In April 1959, the Secretary of the Air Force issued instructions to deploy two Jupiter squadrons to
Italy to be operated by Italian Air Force crews with USAF personnel controlling the arming of the nuclear
warheads. In October 1959, a government-to-government agreement was signed with Turkey and resulted in a
third Jupiter squadron being deployed in and around ?zmir, Turkey. In October 1962 a first flight of
three Jupiter missiles was handed over to control of the Turkish Air Force again with USAF personnel
supposedly controlling the arming of the nuclear warheads.
How are the Soviets to know that the USAF personnel were really in control and an Italian or Turkish
equivalent of General Ripper did not have access to the keys? You cannot overfly with a U2 to find that
out.
Real equivalence in the so-called Cuban missile crisis would be if the Soviet Union had installed
medium-range missiles that could hit Los Angeles, Chicago and New York at a base in Sinaloa Mexico, then
handed over the keys to the missiles to the Mexicans while insisting that everything was hunky-dory
because a Soviet officer with known drug problems had the keys to the nuclear warhead.
Todd Pierce
,
October 29, 2019 at 08:24
Great article Ray! And absolutely necessary for the American people, meaning all of us in this
hemisphere, to know how close millions of us came to being incinerated by the criminality of the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff and their allies in government who saw the Cuban Crisis as an "opportunity" to launch our
own "preemptive" nuclear attack on the USSR, and the JCS willingness to accept a reciprocal attack in
retaliation which would predictably kill at least 20 million people in this hemisphere, as a "fair
exchange" for the hundreds of millions of human beings the US nuclear attack would incinerate in the
USSR. That's how "Mad" the US military was then, and is today, if one reads current doctrine. William R.
Polk was there in the White House as McGeorge Bundy's advisor, and has written of this and told me
details in a lengthy oral history. He tells of how angry at Kennedy the JCS were, so much that he feared
a military coup, as did Kennedy, as explained in this video:
`JFK wanted movie "Seven Days in May" made' [youtube.com/watch?v=fRiZtqVPJ9U]
But Americans have this placid confidence, similar to the "What, me worry" attitude of the Holstein
cows I once dealt with in my youth, even as we would be preparing them for a ride to the stockyards, that
the threat or possibility of nuclear war/accident is a thing of the past, even while we, the US, under
three administrations now, has been hard at work to increase the possibility of some sort of nuclear
conflagration in our lifetimes.
Noah Way
,
October 28, 2019 at 20:09
The Soviets also had atomic artillery which could have been used to repel a US invasion, which would also
have started WW3. The bullet was dodged twice – first by JFK NOT invading, then by Arkhipov by not
allowing the launch of a nuclear torpedo.
As Ray has said, now there are no adults in the room.
SteveK9
,
October 28, 2019 at 17:46
Our military is no less crazy today. Subtext of Putin's March 1, 2018 address on new strategic nuclear
weapons 'nuclear war is unthinkable, so kindly stop thinking about it'.
geeyp
,
October 28, 2019 at 16:27
Those moans and groans weren't just happening in Georgia, Ray.
robert e williamson jr
,
October 28, 2019 at 16:02
Hats off again to Mr. McGovern for calling balls and strikes with uncanny precision .
I'm sure of that moaning and groaning at Ft. Benning seeing as how those folks had no clue to what had
really happened and would have moaned and groaned even had they known. After all Ray it was OCS.
Ray I'm recommending that everyone listen to the interview of Edward Snowden by Joe Rogan. In fact get
a hold of Bill Binney, Tom Drake, J. Kurt Wiebe and Ed Loomis and let them know about it. Some
fascinating stuff for me and it could be a major eye opener for those naive individuals who believe cell
phones in their current configuration are great tools. I'm betting 90% of those who would watch this
would want that, "I own my data not ( the cell phone company name goes here), "button" Snowden talked
about.
I'm I wrong here or can everyone who agrees that the "Orange Apocalypse" could shoot someone on 5th
Avenue and be above prosecution be tried on conspiring to give the " fake potus" dictatorial powers and
removed from office?
Thanks again Ray for your great work
Tennegon
,
October 29, 2019 at 17:50
As for Mr. Snowden, I happened to watch the video, 'Citizenfour', last night on Roku. If you're not
aware of it, it's certainly worth trying to view: citizenfourfilm.com
incontinent reader
,
October 28, 2019 at 14:34
Ray- Great article. I hope those in the Administration and Congress read it- and read Ellsberg's book.
Drew Hunkins
,
October 28, 2019 at 14:05
Now the lines of communication between the Kremlin and Washington are all but severed. Any current or
future U.S. president who merely wants to sit down for two minutes and discuss Russian hockey with Lavrov
will be immediately branded a Putin puppet or Moscow stooge. If we experience a Cuban missile crisis type
scenario today we could all be pulverized into dust thanks to Maddow, Clapper, Brennan, Podesta, NPR,
Fred Hiatt and the other establishment Russophobes in our midst.
This madness must stop.
Hank
,
October 28, 2019 at 19:07
I feel that the unspoken consensus among high CIA officials and warmongering US military brass was
that the Bay of Pigs was a win-win for them, regardless of how it played out. The CIA had to know
Castro's immense popularity among the Cuban population, so long impoverished by American corporations
under Batista. To think that a man like Castro would have to face a "Cuban uprising" when a beachhead
was secured by a small contingent of about 1300 anti-Castro mercenaries(trained by the CIA) is
laughable when looking back. JFK was between a rock and a hard place and he NEVER promised any air
support should this small brigade come under attack by Castro small Cuban air force of a few planes!
He even had to deal with a lying Adlai Stevenson at the UN, who stated that the USA was NOT involved
in the Bay of Pigs attack. That ammunition ship off shore that blew up could easily have been a CIA op
expediting what it really wanted- a crushing and embarrassing defeat for the new President(who wasn't
supposed to be President in the first place- sound familiar?) JFK quickly accepted responsibility for
this defeat but was now intent on paying back those in the CIA who had set him up. Much of what we
think we know about wars is just the "smoke" that comes out of the fire, while the fire generally gets
swept under the rug of "history". Kennedy stood up to the Deep State in the early 60's much like Trump
advertised his intention to during his campaign, but it was certainly easier to convince a gullible
public that "Oswald did it" in 1963 than it would be to set someone up for Trump's assassination
nowadays! Hence, we have the CONSTANT media/Deep State CHARACTER assassination of Trump 24/7.
countykerry
,
October 28, 2019 at 19:58
I completely agree with you DH .
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Russia and Ukraine are topics on all Americans' minds only because the Obama Administration made the collossal mistake of trying
to turn Ukraine into a de facto American base. Under Obama, the US sponsored a coup which put Ukraine under the control of anti-Russian
nationalists. The ultimate goal for the US and the Ukrainian nationalists was to turn Ukraine into a NATO member.
Clearly, the Obama Administration attacked Russia on a geopolitical and geostrategic level. Unsurprisingly, Russia fought back
ferociously, just as the Russian have always done when their existential needs and vital national security interests are threatened.
Consequently, the Ukrainian nationalists have been defeated in war and at the polls in Ukraine. America must now make its exit
from Ukraine in as graceful and organized a way as possible. Nobody wants to see US helicopters fleeing the rooftops of Kiev.
Trump has the right idea about pulling America out of Ukraine. The US should never have been in that country in the first place.
Ukraine is part of Russia's zone of influence. Nothing will ever change that.
"when an experimental nuclear-powered cruise missile exploded during testing along the shores of the White Sea."
Except it wasn't. A damaged nuclear reactor with highly enriched uranium for fuel would still be glowing to this day. Also,
while tragic, seven people dead is less than a pipeline explosion, if that's the worst that can happen, it's pretty safe technology.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wi...
Russia reported radioisotopes for power source (radioisotope thermoelectric generators, or RTGs), which makes more sense. RTGs
are used for long term power needs (such as batteries on Voyager spacecraft that are still going strong). That makes them ideal
for robotic sleeper drones (Poseidon/Status 6 types) that will go undetected to the ocean floor and then get activated in the
event of nuclear war.
""The American television channel CNBC recently reported that the test of the Petrel missile near Arkhangelsk was the fifth
in a row, and all five were unsuccessful. Is this an acceptable number of failures for a new project?""
Yes. That's how you learn - by building and testing. Also, I strongly doubt Russian military invites CNBC to every classified
weapons test. Five tests may have been unsuccessful, but there could have been more tests that CNBC doesn't know about.
"but this record illustrates an "emergency situation" and indeed a "failed development process.""
It doesn't. Nuclear powered propulsion is a difficult subject and very few countries can do it successfully. Especially at
small size.
"So, "this missile is only necessary in the circumstance that we and America depart from all arms agreements and beat each
other with missiles until we are blue"
United States is indeed leaving all arms agreements and is preparing for nuclear war.
"The best explanation Gorbachevsky can find for this weapon is "domestic consumption.""
If that's the case, then Gorbachevsky is not well informed.
The reason that Russia will continue to invest in nuclear weapons and their modernization regardless of the cost is that it
is still cheaper than the alternative.
Having a western Army murder and slaughter its way to your capital as it did in 1941 is the one thing you definitely avoid
if you have a viable nuclear deterrance.
For Russia it is the ultimate insurance policy and the threat of a preemptive nuclear strike is the one effective guarantee
against any western power once again launching another invasion against Russia.And is relatively cheap at the price!
They have sufficient numbers of existing nuclear weapons to protect themselves from some imaginary western Army. Where they
need to worry is in their far east that is where the real threat will come from. Spending additional monies on nuclear weapons
is overkill and the money is better spent diversifying the economy.
You overlook that the real issue isn't war or nuclear war, but the stationing of US military assets all along Russia's borders.
If that happens, America will have established coercive influence over Russia. That's because Russia will have to spend untold
billions countering the fleets of American F-35's that are parked only minutes away from the RF's cities and defensive bastions.
That's the kind of stress that the US is trying to impose on Russia. That's why Russia wants the US and NATO out of the former
Soviet Union, and for good reason.
Your remark about Russia's far east comes across as Sinophobia, BTW.
Russian Federation: 146 million, China: 1.4 billion a 10 to 1 advantage in population in a country with little to no natural
resources and little usable open space. Lebensraum has been used many times in the past as a reason to start a war.
As I pointed in another post the irony is that NATO was pretty timid up until 2008 and Putin's first little go at a mini war in
Georgia then invade and annex Crimea followed by fostering war in Donbas. Of course NATO responded to those Russian aggressions
and low and behold we now have Putin pouting about NATO an the US surrounding Russia.
You have missiles in Kaliningrad aimed at Europe same in Sevastopol. The basic problem is that no one trusts Russia and no one
really likes Russia. Putin started this and now he will need to change his tack if he wants the "stress" to start to be relieved.
NATO is a defensive organization and they are deploying in a defensive manner in other NATO countries.
Nuclear propulsion research is by definition diversifying the economy. It is far more high tech than "like" button on Facebook
or whatever passes for "high tech" in Silicon Valley.
Considering the Soviet Union was working on this in the 1970's it really doesn't count as "diversification" in the traditional
economic sense. Why not work with the US, UK, Canada, France on nuclear fusion? That would truly take man kind a lot further than
nuclear powered cruise missiles.
NATO will have to stop expanding into the former USSR before Russia can realistically be expected to work the US, UK, Canada,
and France on nuclear fusion.
Western aggression against Russia must stop. That's step number one towards solving the West vs East problem.
Russia is a part of the ITER project, so it does work with the West in fusion research. As far as Burevestnik goes, i view
it in the same venue as NASA Kilopower type small reactors (or Soviet TOPAZ line). If it is light enough to power a cruise missile,
it is light enough to provide power to spacecraft. This will be very economically important in the near future.
Fair enough regarding the joint study on Fusion. However the nuclear powered cruise missile is for domestic consumption and
to incite the western MSM. It makes little sense to pile more nuclear weapons on top of the existing ones. As the article mentions
there are a lot nuclear reactors that need maintenance in Russia old Soviet era designs that pose a safety risk.
As long as the US is setting up bases in the Baltics and ramping up mililtary aid to Ukraine, and as long as the West is trying
to turn Ukraine into a NATO member, then Russia has no option except to fight back. That means Russia must develop new missiles
and even more destructive WMD's.
American and the Ukrainian nationalists have suffered a humiliating defeat in Donbass. It looks like peace will be made there
on Russian terms, and that the US and its allies will pull out of Ukraine. Upon completion of that retreat, the relationship between
Russia and the West can be reassessed. But not until then.
It is rather ironic that there were no NATO forces in the Baltic states until Putin invaded and annexed Crimea and tried the
same in Donbas. Naturally the countries such as the Baltic states who have experienced Russian/Soviet occupation tend too get
nervous when Putin decides to play war in the neighborhood.
As far as Ukraine the amount of military aid provided by the US, Canada, Poland is relatively small with regard to major arms
systems. The only major arms system is Javelin which is a defensive weapon.
You obviously have little or no knowledge of nuclear weapons and MAD. Russia has plenty of nuclear warheads in fact the most of
any nation on planet Earth.
There are no NATO forces anywhere near the line of contact in Donbas. Any peace accord/deal has nothing to do with the US or NATO
it is between Ukraine and Russia with the pawns being the poor saps called separatists.
The only major arms system is Javelin which is a defensive weapon.
Javelins can be used to support offensive operations. They can serve to neutralize the enemy's ability to use tanks on the
defensive, or to squelch the enemy's counteroffensive.
It's a very thin line that differentiates offense from defense.
True but all weapons have a certain amount of offensive capability. Javelin is designed for infantrymen to take out advancing
armor. Artillery and tanks are offensive.
Artillery and tanks are also used for counter-offensives, so the defender can repulse the aggressor.
There are hawks in the West who are hoping that Ukraine launches one more major military offensive against Donbass. In that
case, the Ukrainians will attack with superior numbers of tanks and troops. If the Ukrainians capture ground (which is unlikely),
they will use their Javelins to try to prevent the Russians and rebels from using tanks to recapture that ground.
That's the real significance of the Javelin missile. That's why American warmongers are sending this weapon to Kiev.
It is rather ironic that there were no NATO forces in the Baltic states until Putin invaded and annexed Crimea...
You are in denial of the facts again. The reality is that the Baltics joined NATO in 2004. That means, since that year, the
US could put any weapons systems it so desires in the Baltics, and there's nothing Russia can do about it short of war.
If that's not a threatening situation for Russia, then I don't know what is.
There was nothing in the Baltic's until after Putin's venture into Crimea and Ukraine proper. He miscalculated as to the push
back regarding both operations and now you are complaining. Those nations are tiny and have almost no defensive capability hence
the deployment of US, UK, Canadian and the NATO troops.
Well, nuclear weapons get obsolete like anything else. ICBMs travel in predictable trajectories and silos are vulnerable to
first strikes. Hence the need for technology evolution.
And sure, old Soviet reactors are getting up there in age. Rosatom is replacing them with modern VVER-1200 designs, not just
in Russia, but all over the world. Rosatom is like the largest and most productive nuclear corporation in the world. in general
though, i would argue that fears of nuclear power are vastly overblown, and it is one of the safest, most reliable forms of power
available.
I'm not anti nuclear power however like everything mechanical it has a safe life time. Weapons of course need modernizing and
that can be done without designing an entirely new weapons system.
MAD is still relevant today as it was during the Cold War. Ultimately I would like to see a reduction in the number of war heads
that the US, Russia have as China, France, UK, India, Pakistan and Israel have far fewer.
I think, US people have enough of their own internal problems. Isn't it better to concentrate on them? Slavics will deal with
their problems themselves. US already piled fantastic bunch of sh@t in Ukraine. As well as in the Middle East.
Current trends of immigration and birthrates in the west mean that by 2070 Russia will be the last homogeneous all white conservative
christian democracy left on earth.
It's possible that there are actually 11,400,000 Moslems in Russia, but nobody knows for certain. Either way, it's rubbish
to claim that there are "25 million Moslems" in the RF.
as famous Russian classics once meticulously observed - Everything was in confusion in the Oblonskys' house [Всё смешалось
в доме Облонских]
Same is this article - first they "scare" you with this "Vergeltungswaffe" of the Soviet designed ca 1970, and, consequently,
abandoned around same time for multiple reasons.
Then they praise the wisdom of not helping Ukraine with real weapons - because Russia was not able achieve much in the current
status quo, so it was wise not to arm Ukraine.
The only thing one can learn from this article (or, more accurately, despite) is that to get a degree in Slavic Studies, ability
to use colloquial phrases in Russian only will not cut it. Even superficially, one should drop Polish or Czech, or, god forbid,
Ukrainian words of wisdom - [Кохайтеся, чорнобриві,. Та не з москалями]
"... Hitler's Third Reich was obliterated by massive military force in 1945. It lasted just 12 years. Stalin's Soviet Union bore the brunt of beating Hitler, but later succumbed to economic sclerosis. It fell apart in 1991, after 68 years. The mystery of the People's Republic of China is that it is still with us. ..."
The 70th anniversary of the People's Republic of China was not a birthday I felt like
celebrating. As Dutch historian Frank Dikötter has shown in his searing three-volume
history of the Mao Zedong era, the Communist regime claimed the lives of tens of millions of
people: 2 million in the revolution between 1949 and 1951, another 3 million by the end of
the 1950s, up to 45 million in the man-made famine known as the "Great Leap Forward," and yet
more in the mayhem of the Cultural Revolution, Mao's campaign against the intelligentsia,
which escalated into a civil war.
Hitler's Third Reich was obliterated by massive military force in 1945. It lasted just
12 years. Stalin's Soviet Union bore the brunt of beating Hitler, but later succumbed to
economic sclerosis. It fell apart in 1991, after 68 years. The mystery of the People's
Republic of China is that it is still with us.
Now, I could give you a rather boring explanation of why I think China's bid to "catch up
and surpass" (ganchao) the United States will fail. But maybe a more interesting answer can
be found in Liu Cixin's astonishing 2008 novel, "The Three-Body Problem," which I read for
the first time last week.
The problem of the title is introduced to the reader -- and to the nanotechnology
scientist Wang Miao, one of the central characters -- as a virtual reality game, set in a
strange, distant world with three suns rather than the familiar one. The mutually perturbing
gravitational attractions of the three suns prevent this planet from ever settling into a
predictable orbit with regular days, nights, and seasons. It has occasional "stable eras,"
during which civilization can advance, but with minimal warning, these give way to "chaotic
eras" of intense heat or cold that render the planet uninhabitable The central conceit of
Liu's novel is that China's history has the same pattern as the three-body problem: periods
of stability always end with periods of chaos -- what the Chinese call dong luan. The other
key character in the book is Ye Wenjie, who sees her father, a professor at Tsinghua
University, beaten to death by a gang of teenage Red Guards during the Cultural
Revolution.
Banished from Beijing to a labor camp in benighted rural backwater, Ye is rescued when she
is given a lowly job in a mysterious observatory known as Red Coast. But nothing can undo the
emotional damage of witnessing her father's murder. Nor can she escape the chaos of
Communism. She watches in horror as the entire area around the observatory is deforested.
Everything -- even astrophysics -- is subordinated to Mao's warped ideology.
Disillusioned completely by the madness of mankind -- a sentiment reinforced by a chance
meeting with an American environmentalist -- Ye stumbles on a way of beaming a message from
Earth deep into space by bouncing it off the sun. When, after years of empty noise, a clear
message is received in reply, she does not hesitate. Even though the message is a warning not
to communicate with Trisolaris -- the name of a real planet with three suns -- Ye sends
another message, ensuring that the Trisolarians can locate Earth, and initiate their
long-planned relocation.
Rehabilitated in the political thaw that follows Mao's death, Ye Wenjie returns to
Beijing, following in her father's footsteps as a physics professor. But she leads a double
life, for she also becomes the Commander of the Earth-Trisolaris Movement, a radically
misanthropic organization dedicated to helping the Trisolarians conquer earth. Acute readers
will notice that this group's ideology is a subtle parody of Maoism.
"Start a global rebellion!" they shout. "Long live the spirit of Trisolaris! We shall
persevere like the stubborn grass that resprouts after every wildfire! ... Eliminate human
tyranny!"
Little do they know that the Trisolarians are even worse than humans. As one of the aliens
points out to their leader, because of their world's utter unpredictability, "Everything is
devoted to survival. To permit the survival of the civilization as a whole, there is almost
no respect for the individual. Someone who can no longer work is put to death. Trisolarian
society exists under a state of extreme authoritarianism." Life for the individual consists
of "monotony and desiccation." That sounds a lot like Mao's China.
There is one scene in "The Three-Body Problem" that sticks in the mind. An adult and a
child stand looking at the grave of a Red Guard killed during the factional battles that
raged during the Cultural Revolution. "Are they heroes?" asks the child. The adult says no.
"Are they enemies?" The adult again says no. "Then who are they?" The adult replies:
"History."
True, the hero of the story is the foul-mouthed, chain-smoking Beijing cop Shi Qiang.
Chinese readers doubtless relish the scene when he lectures a pompous American general about
how best to save the world.
But the deeper meaning of the book is surely that Trisolaris is China. The three bodies in
contention are not suns but classes: rulers, intellectuals, masses. Right now, China is in
one of its stable phases. But, as the contending forces shift, chaos will sooner or later
return. Perhaps it already has, in Hong Kong.
If it spreads, I -- and history -- will win that bet.
The Three-Body Problem is a hard science fiction novel by the Chinese writer Liu Cixin. It is
the first novel of the Remembrance of Earth's Past trilogy, but Chinese readers generally
refer to the whole series by the title of this first novel. The second and third novels in
the trilogy are titled The Dark Forest and Death's End. The title of the first novel refers
to the three-body problem in orbital mechanics. ...
The English translation by Ken Liu was published by Tor Books in 2014. It was the first
Asian novel ever to win a Hugo Award for Best Novel, in 2015 and was nominated for the 2014
Nebula Award for Best Novel.
(An amazing trilogy. Inspired by Arthur Clarke (*). Looks like Niall has read the first
book.)
* 'The Songs of Distant Earth' is a 1986 science fiction novel by British writer Arthur C.
Clarke, based upon his 1958 short story of the same title. He stated that it was his
favourite of all his novels. ... The novel tells of a utopian human colony in the far future
that is visited by travellers from a doomed Earth, as the Sun has gone nova. The Songs of
Distant Earth explores apocalyptic, atheistic, and utopian ideas, as well as the effects of
long-term interstellar travel and extra-terrestrial life. (Wikipedia)
('Songs' is optimistic; 'Remembrance of
Earth's Past is not.)
For China, the three principle points of potential military friction with the U.S. are
Taiwan, South Korea-Japan, and the South China Sea. Apart from South Korea and Japan, where the
U.S. has significant ground and air forces already forward deployed, the main threat to China
is maritime power projected by American aircraft carrier battlegroups and amphibious assault
ships. The Chinese response was to develop a range of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
capabilities designed to target American naval forces before they arrived in any potential
contested waters.
Traditionally, the U.S. Navy has relied on a combination of surface warships armed with
sophisticated air defense systems, submarines, and the aircraft carrier's considerable
contingent of combat aircraft to defend against hostile threats in time of war. China's
response came in the form of the DF-21D medium-range missile , dubbed the
"carrier killer." With a range of between 1,450 and 1,550 kilometers, the DF-21D employs a
maneuverable warhead that can deliver a conventional high-explosive warhead with a circular
error of probability (CEP) of 10 meters -- more than enough to strike a carrier-sized
target.
To compliment the DF-21D, China has also deployed the DF-26 intermediate-range missile , which
it has dubbed the "Guam killer," named after the American territory home to major U.S. military
installations. Like the DF-21, the DF-26 has a conventionally armed variant, which is intended
to be used against ships. Both missiles were featured in the 2015 military parade commemorating
the founding of the PRC.
As capable as they were, however, the DF-21D and DF-26 were not the shashoujian
weapons envisioned by Chinese military planners, representing as they did reciprocal
capability, as opposed to a game-changing technology. The unveiling of the true
shashoujian was reserved for last week's parade, and it came in the form of the DF-100
and DF-17 missiles.
The DF-100 is a vehicle-mounted supersonic cruise missile "characterized by a long range,
high precision and quick responsiveness," according to
the Chinese press . When combined with the DF-21/DF-26 threat, the DF-100 is intended to
overwhelm any existing U.S. missile defense capability, turning the Navy into a virtual sitting
duck. As impressive as the DF-100 is, however, it was overshadowed by the
DF-17 , a long-range cruise missile equipped with a hypersonic glide warhead, which
maneuvers at over seven times the speed of sound -- faster than any of the missiles the U.S.
possesses to intercept it. Nothing in the current U.S. arsenal can defeat the DF-17 -- not the
upgraded anti-missile ships, THAAD, or even the Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) currently
based in Alaska.
In short, in the event of a naval clash between China and the U.S., the likelihood of
America's fleet being sent to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean is very high.
The potential loss of the Pacific Fleet cannot be taken lightly: it could serve as a trigger
for the release of nuclear weapons in response. The threat of an American nuclear attack has
always been the ace in the hole for the U.S. regarding China, given that nation's weak
strategic nuclear capability.
Since the 1980s, China has possessed a small number of obsolete liquid-fuel intercontinental
ballistic missiles as their strategic deterrent. These missiles have a slow response time and
could easily be destroyed by any concerted pre-emptive attack. China sought to upgrade its ICBM
force in the late 1990s with a new road-mobile solid fuel missile, the DF-31 . Over the course of the next
two decades, China has upgraded the DF-31, improving its accuracy and mobility while increasing
the number of warheads it carries from one to three. But even with the improved DF-31, China
remained at a distinct disadvantage with the U.S. when it came to overall strategic nuclear
capability.
While the likelihood that a few DF-31 missiles could be launched and their warheads reach
their targets in the U.S., the DF-31 was not a "nation killing" system. In short, any strategic
nuclear exchange between China and the U.S. would end with America intact and China
annihilated. As such, any escalation of military force by China that could have potentially
ended in an all-out nuclear war was suicidal, in effect nullifying any advantage China had
gained by deploying the DF-100 and DF-17 missiles.
Enter the
DF-41 , China's ultimate shashoujian weapon. A three-stage, road-mobile ICBM
equipped with between six and 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)
warheads, the DF-41 provides China with a nuclear deterrent capable of surviving an American
nuclear first strike and delivering a nation-killing blow to the United States in retaliation.
The DF-41 is a strategic game changer, allowing China to embrace the mutual assured destruction
(MAD) nuclear deterrence posture previously the sole purview of the United States and
Russia.
In doing so, China has gained the strategic advantage over the U.S. when it comes to
competing power projection in the Pacific. Possessing a virtually unstoppable A2/AD capability,
Beijing is well positioned to push back aggressively against U.S. maritime power projection in
the
South China Sea and the
Taiwan Straits .
Most who watched the Chinese military parade on October 1 saw what looked to be some
interesting missiles. For the informed observer, however, they were witnessing the end of an
era. Previously, the United States could count on its strategic nuclear deterrence to serve as
a restraint against any decisive Chinese reaction to aggressive American military maneuvers in
the Pacific. Thanks to the DF-41, this capability no longer exists. Now the U.S. will be
compelled to calculate how much risk it is willing to take when it comes to enforcing its
sacrosanct "freedom of navigation."
While the U.S. commitment to Taiwan's independence remains steadfast, its willingness to go
to war with China over the South China Sea may not be as firm. The bottom line is that China,
with a defense budget of some $250 billion, has successfully combined "Western technology with
Eastern wisdom," for which the U.S. has no response.
Scott Ritter is a former Marine Corps intelligence officer who served in the former
Soviet Union implementing arms control treaties, in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert
Storm, and in Iraq overseeing the disarmament of WMD. He is the author ofseveral books,
most recently,Deal of the Century: How
Iran Blocked the West's Road to War (2018).
This Is How a War With China Could Begin
First, the lights in Taiwan go out.
By Nicholas Kristof
TAIPEI, Taiwan -- If the United States gets embroiled in a war with China, it may begin
with the lights going out here in Taipei.
Tensions are rising across the Taiwan Strait, and there's a growing concern among some
security experts that Chinese President Xi Jinping might act recklessly toward Taiwan in the
next few years, drawing the United States into a conflict....
[ Nuttier and nuttier but there we are, and as Les Gelb explained, the foreign policy
community at such times have become incapable of independent thought. ]
Mission Unaccomplished: Meet the press -- and see why it failed at several crucial points
during the Iraq War
By Leslie H. Gelb with Jeanne-Paloma Zelmati - Council on Foreign Relations
My initial support for the war was symptomatic of unfortunate tendencies within the
foreign policy community, namely the disposition and incentives to support wars to retain
political and professional credibility. We "experts" have a lot to fix about ourselves, even
as we "perfect" the media. We must redouble our commitment to independent thought, and
embrace, rather than cast aside, opinions and facts that blow the common -- often wrong --
wisdom apart. Our democracy requires nothing less.
This Is How a War With China Could Begin
First, the lights in Taiwan go out.
By Nicholas Kristof
[ Though this essay is nutty, the implications are really frightening to me. We have
reached a point where New York Times columnists are imagining the bombing of China. This, to
my imagination, was precisely what was imagined during the height of the supposedly won Cold
War. ]
The atomic scientists should move their clock half the distance to mid night.
A side benefit of the US finding an excuse to terminate Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty of 1987 is to ring China with INF banned weapon systems!
The new, made up, cold war has two major fronts, Europe and the Pac Rim, whereas the
Soviet based [my] cold war only had Russia ringed from Germany Belgium UK and Spain.....
"... Can China then depend on widening internal demand to maintain its global edge? There are two reasons why not. The present authorities worry that a widening middle stratum could jeopardize their political control and seek to limit it.[a] ..."
"... The second reason, more important, is that much of the internal demand is the result of reckless borrowing by regional banks, which are facing an inability to sustain their investments. If they collapse, even partially, this could end the entire economic edge[b] of China. ..."
A structural crisis is chaotic. This means that instead of the normal standard set of
combinations or alliances that were previously used to maintain the stability of the system,
they constantly shift these alliances in search of short-term gains. This only makes the
situation worse. We notice here a paradox – the certainty of the end of the existing
system and the intrinsic uncertainty of what will eventually replace it and create thereby a
new system (or new systems) to stabilize realities .
Now, let us look at China's role in what is going on. In terms of the present system,
China seems to be gaining much advantage. To argue that this means the continuing functioning
of capitalism as a system is basically to (re)assert the invalid point that systems are
eternal and that China is replacing the United States in the same way as the United States
replaced Great Britain as the hegemonic power. Were this true, in another 20-30 years China
(or perhaps northeast Asia) would be able to set its rules for the capitalist
world-system.
But is this really happening? First of all, China's economic edge, while still greater
than that of the North, has been declining significantly. And this decline may well amplify
soon, as political resistance to China's attempts to control neighboring countries and entice
(that is, buy) the support of faraway countries grows, which seems to be occurring.
Can China then depend on widening internal demand to maintain its global edge? There are
two reasons why not. The present authorities worry that a widening middle stratum could
jeopardize their political control and seek to limit it.[a]
The second reason, more important, is that much of the internal demand is the result of
reckless borrowing by regional banks, which are facing an inability to sustain their
investments. If they collapse, even partially, this could end the entire economic edge[b] of
China.
In addition, there have been, and will continue to be, wild swings in geopolitical
alliances. In a sense, the key zones are not in the North, but in areas such as Russia,
India, Iran, Turkey, and southeastern Europe, all of them pursuing their own roles by a game
of swiftly and repeatedly changing sides. The bottom line is that, though China plays a
very big role in the short run, it is not as big a role as China would wish and that some in
the rest of the world-system fear. It is not possible for China to stop the disintegration of
the capitalist system. It can only try to secure its place in a future
world-system.
As far as Wallerstein's bottom line: The proof is in the pudding. That said, there seems to
be a tendency to regard Xi as all-powerful. IMNSHO, that's by no means the case, not only
because of China's middle class, but because of whatever China's equivalent of deplorables is.
The "wild swings in geopolitical alliances" might play a role, too; oil, Africa's minerals.
NOTES [a] I haven't seen this point made elsewhere. [b] Crisis, certainly. "Ending the
entire economic edge"? I'm not so sure.
The US launched a land based Tomahawk nuclear-capable intermediate range cruise missile less
than 3 weeks after the US withdrew from the INF Treaty. Clearly, the missile was under
development for some time prior to the test; the sea-based variant launched by naval vessels
armed with the Aegis systems can carry a W80 variable yield warhead (5-150 kilotons).
The land-based Tomahawk was also launched by the multipurpose Mark 41 launch system, which
is deployed at the Aegis Ashore facility in Romania and soon-to-be-opened Aegis Ashore
facility in Poland. This clearly demonstrates the the Ballistic Missile "Defense" systems
deployed in Romania and Poland by the US/NATO can also be used to launch offensive nuclear
weapons. Because the missiles are deployed in closed cannisters, it is impossible for
observers to verify if the cannisters contain interceptor missiles or cruise missiles.
Putin specifically warned about this possibility in 2016.
Several days ago, Putin told his security
council that the BMD deployments are/were "a direct and material breach of the INF
Treaty." The Russians believe the US was planning all along to use the BMD facilities to
target Russia with both offensive and defensive weapons (defensive in the sense that US/NATO
BMD can be used as a mop-up system to take out remaining Russian nuclear forces after a US
first strike). US Neocons may believe that this will give them leverage in any confrontation
with Russia. I think they are wrong, I think it will simply tempt the Russians to take out
these facilities early on in the event of any direct military conflict with the US/NATO.
Putin is now explicity making the point that Russia will have to consider these BMD
facilities as a direct threat to Russia and will respond symmetrically, with at "tit-for-tat"
response. This may also include Russian missiles in Cuba and Venezuela.
"... The 'hyper-aggressive nuts' don't even have new or original ideas. Even the hyper-aggressiveness isn't exactly new but simply an expression of megalomania. ..."
"... That aside, that land based Tomahawks are an idea from the height of the cold war, iirc in response to the russian SS-20 (which, thanks to the INF, is gone now). ..."
"... In light of that, and the recent US tests, Russian concerns that US land based missile defense in Romania and Poland with Mk.41 & Mk.57 type vertical launchers (or the old trucks) could use to fire US GLCM is exactly rather rational. ..."
"... US cruisers and destroyers with VLS can use the same launcher systems to launch an ESSM, SM-2/3, VL ASROCK or a Tomahawk. Why just from there? ..."
"... It's GLCM again, just vertically launched this time, and with by now more accurate GPS. ..."
"... The problem for the anti-china and neocon nuts IMO is hat China legally allowed has plenty medium range missiles and was not in the INF treaty. Thus the INF treaty was an obstacle for 'hyper-aggressive nuts' when going after China with medium range missiles of which China has plenty. ..."
"... As the by now severely demented Rudy Giuliani put is so clearly (if there is a political interest) the ' reality is now not truth '. ..."
"... Likely Boltonists see any treaty as an unacceptable limitation of the freedom to handle at whits, as an ' indispensable nation ', or to rule by arbitrary tweets or other solo acts like presidential decrees as far as Trump is concerned. ..."
"... The 'hyper-aggressive nuts' are focused but are geographically disoriented. To hit China they kicked Russia. ..."
"The Associated Press ran a brief article asserting that:
"The U.S. military has conducted a flight test of a type of missile banned for more than
30 years by a treaty that both the United
States and Russia abandoned this month, the Pentagon said.
The Trump administration has said it remains interested in useful arms control but
questions Moscow's willingness to adhere to its treaty commitments."
This was stated within the first paragraph. The author failed to mention that it was the
United States that unilaterally abandoned the treaty. Russia only abandoned the treaty after
the U.S. did, despite numerous Russian efforts to keep the treaty alive. Russia only abandoned
the INF treaty when it became the only party to it, and treaties are quite pointless when they
do not actually have more than one party as a signatory. Russia had in fact adhered to the
restrictions imposed by the treaty, vague and unproven Pentagon leveled accusations aside.
Let's be honest, both Russia and the United States have had the technology and the guided
missile systems in service to field the intermediate range land-based missiles prohibited by
the INF treaty. Both field such systems on their naval warships. The only thing that kept them
from fielding such weapons was the INF treaty itself. Now that formal framework of prohibition
is gone.
Now that we can acknowledge the fact that the INF Treaty no longer exists because the United
States unilaterally abandoned it, let's take a look at the missile that the U.S. military
tested." SF
---------------
OK, pilgrims, first we bailed out of the JCPOA, an agreement that was accomplishing what it
was intended to do in impeding Iranian progress toward their supposed goal of a deliverable
nuclear weapon. Our claim, resoundingly approved by Israel, is that the JCPOA nuclear deal did
not restrict Iran to a role as a "hermit kingdom" producer of pistachio nuts and carpets. This
policy of the US is ridiculously servile to the Zionist interest.
Now, WE (the US) have walked away from the INF Treaty, an agreement that had been in place
since the dark days of the Cold War. Its purpose was to prevent the deployment of land based
intermediate range nuclear tipped missiles and it served that purpose well.
But, pilgrims, in the era of the triumph of the Trumpian neocon view of the world, we must
prepare for war. WAR! Any advantage that can be pursued against possible enemies must be
pursued. Pompeo, Bolton and the other hyper-aggressive nuts want total world dominance. Sooo,
we canceled the INF and now have tested a land based version of the navy's Tomahawk which has a
range of over 300 miles.
as for " a land based version of the navy's Tomahawk " ...
The 'hyper-aggressive nuts' don't even have new or original ideas. Even the
hyper-aggressiveness isn't exactly new but simply an expression of megalomania.
That aside, that land based Tomahawks are an idea from the height of the cold war, iirc in
response to the russian SS-20 (which, thanks to the INF, is gone now).
To re-vive that dead old program can use developed technology and is thus rather cheap, as
far as the volume of US military budget goes.
In light of that, and the recent US tests, Russian concerns that US land based missile
defense in Romania and Poland with Mk.41 & Mk.57 type vertical launchers (or the old
trucks) could use to fire US GLCM is exactly rather rational.
US cruisers and destroyers with VLS can use the same launcher systems to launch an ESSM,
SM-2/3, VL ASROCK or a Tomahawk. Why just from there?
It's GLCM again, just vertically launched this time, and with by now more accurate
GPS.
IMO the only reason why the 'hyper-aggressive nuts' killed the INF was not that Russia had
good missiles (which they had also before INF) or missiles violating the INF.
The problem for the anti-china and neocon nuts IMO is hat China legally allowed has plenty
medium range missiles and was not in the INF treaty. Thus the INF treaty was an obstacle for
'hyper-aggressive nuts' when going after China with medium range missiles of which China has
plenty.
Now, thanks to not being in INF the US can have their own.
That the US could perhaps lie here to get that is sadly rather plausible, considering the
BS story about Iraqi WMD used as an excuse to attack the country.
As the by now severely demented Rudy Giuliani put is so clearly (if there is a political
interest) the ' reality is now not truth '.
Indeed! And Trump is a 'stable genius' (and not the opposite) and earned the millions he
had at 8 years by extremely successfully distributing newspapers.
The US, being in the INF, were not allowed to have the desired medium range missiles, thus
... they perhaps arbitrily accused Russia of violating the INF to have an excuse to kill the
treaty and, now legally, get for themselves the medium range missiles they wanted.
Absurdly they did about exactly what they accused Russia of - violate the INF practically
(and not just in spirit). Alas ...
Likely Boltonists see any treaty as an unacceptable limitation of the freedom to handle at
whits, as an ' indispensable nation ', or to rule by arbitrary tweets or other solo
acts like presidential decrees as far as Trump is concerned.
The 'hyper-aggressive nuts' are focused but are geographically disoriented. To hit China
they kicked Russia.
Who knows, maybe in a year the US will have an orange Whitehouse and a president for life
with a crown - or - from folks still living in the cold war - a revived Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), a US Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) and perhaps Pershing
III?
Speaking after talks Wednesday with Finnish President Sauli Niinisto, Putin argued that the quick test
indicated the U.S. had begun work on the missile long before declaring its intention to withdraw from the pact.
"The Americans have tested this missile too quickly after having withdrawn from the treaty," Putin said. "That
gives us strong reason to believe that they had started work to adapt the sea-launched missile long before they
began looking for excuses to opt out of the treaty."
... ... ...
He said that for Russia that means "the emergence of new threats, to which we will react accordingly."
U.S. Ends Cold War Missile Treaty, With Aim of Countering China
Trump administration officials say that the treaty tied their hands on China and that Russia
was not complying with it, but its demise raised fears of a new arms race.
By David E. Sanger and Edward Wong
WASHINGTON -- The United States on Friday terminated a major treaty of the Cold War, the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement, and it is already planning to start testing a new
class of missiles later this summer.
But the new missiles are unlikely to be deployed to counter the treaty's other nuclear
power, Russia, which the United States has said for years was in violation of the accord.
Instead, the first deployments are likely to be intended to counter China, which has amassed
an imposing missile arsenal and is now seen as a much more formidable long-term strategic
rival than Russia....
March 14, 2019 - Following U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty later this year, the U.S. Department of Defense will begin testing new systems
that would previously have been prohibited.
According to comments by U.S. officials to the Associated Press, the United States will
begin testing two weapons -- both armed solely with a conventional payload. The tests are
expected to take place at or after August.
One project was described by the Associated Press, which spoke to Pentagon officials, as a
"low-flying cruise missile with a potential range of about 1,000 kilometers." The second
missile would be a "a ballistic missile with a range of roughly 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers."
...
(First published at Strategic Culture Foundation, I put it here to see what the Committee
thinks about it)
Moscow will not engage in an exhausting arms race, and the country's military spending
will gradually decrease as Russia does not seek a role as the "world gendarme," President
Vladimir Putin said. Moscow is not seeking to get involved in a "pointless" new arms race,
and will stick to "smart decisions" to strengthen its defensive capabilities, Putin said on
Friday during an annual extended meeting of the Defense Ministry board. "Intelligence,
brains, discipline and organization" must be the cornerstones of the country's military
doctrine, the Russian leader said. The last thing that Russia needs is an arms race that
would "drain" its economy, and Moscow sure does not want that "in any scenario," Putin
pointed out.
It's easy to forget it today, but the USSR was, in its time, an "exceptionalist" country. It
was the world's first socialist country – the " bright future "; it set an
example for all to follow, it was destined by History. It had a mission and was required by
History to assist any country that called itself "socialist". The USSR had bases and interests
all over the world. As the 1977 USSR Constitution said :
the Soviet state, a new type of state, the basic instrument for defending the gains of the
revolution and for building socialism and communism. Humanity thereby began the epoch-making
turn from capitalist to socialism.
A novus ordo seclorum indeed.
Russia, however, is just Russia. There is no feeling in Moscow that Russia must take the
lead any place but Russia itself. One of the reasons, indeed, why Putin is always talking about
the primacy of the UN, the independence of nation states, the impermissibility to interfere in
internal activities – the so-called " Westphalian "
position – is that
he remembers the exceptionalist past and knows that it led to a dead end . Moscow has no
interest in going abroad in search of internationalist causes.
Internationalism/exceptionalism and nationalism: the two have completely different
approaches to constructing a military. The first is obsessed with " power
projection ", " full spectrum superiority ", it
imagines that its hypertrophied interests are challenged all over the planet. Its wants are
expensive, indeterminate, unbounded. The other is only concerned with dealing with enemies in
its neighbourhood. Its wants are affordable, exact, finite. The exceptionalist/interventionist
has everything to defend everywhere; the nationalist has one thing to defend in one place. It
is much easier and much cheaper to be a nationalist: the exceptionalist/interventionist
USA spends
much more than anyone else but
always needs more ; nationalist Russia can cut its
expenditure .
The USSR's desire to match or exceed the USA in all military areas was a contributing factor
to the collapse of its alliance system and the USSR itself. Estimates are always a matter for
debate, especially in a command economy that hid its numbers (even when they were calculable),
but a common estimate is a
minimum of 15% of the USSR's production went to the military. But the true effort was
probably higher. The USSR was involved all over the world shoring up socialism's "bright
future" and that cost it at home.
Putin & Co's "bright future" is for Russia only and the world may do as it wants about
any example or counterexample it may imagine there. While Putin may occasionally indulge
himself by offering opinions about liberalism and oped writers gas on about the
Putin/Trump populism threat , Putin & Co are just trying to do what they think best for
Russia with, as their trust ratings suggest (in contrast with those of the rulers of the
"liberal" West), the support and agreement of most Russians.
The military stance of the former exceptionalist country is all gone. As the USSR has faded
away, so have its overseas bases and commitments: the Warsaw Pact is gone together with the
forward deployment of Soviet armies; there are no advisors in Vietnam or Mozambique; Moscow
awaits with bemusement the day next January when the surviving exceptionalist power and its
minions will have been in Afghanistan twice as long as the USSR was. The United States, still
exceptionalist, still imagining it is
spreading freedom and democracy, preventing war and creating stability , has bases
everywhere and thinks that it must protect "freedom of navigation" to and from China in the
South China Sea. It has yet to learn the futility of seeing oneself as The World's Example.
Putin & Co have learned: Russia has no World-Historical purpose and its military is just
for Russia. They understand what this means for Russia's Armed Forces:
Moscow doesn't have to match the US military; it just has to checkmate it.
And it doesn't have to checkmate it everywhere, only at home. The US Air Force can rampage
anywhere but not in Russia's airspace; the US Navy can go anywhere but not in Russia's waters.
It's a much simpler job and it costs much less than what Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev were
attempting; it's much easier to achieve; it's easier to plan and carry out. The
exceptionalist/interventionist has to plan for Everything; the nationalist for One Thing.
Study the enemy, learn what he takes for granted and block it. And the two must haves
of American conventional military power as it affects Russia are 1) air superiority and 2)
assured, reliable communications; counter those and it's checkmated: Russia doesn't have to
equal or surpass the US military across the board, just counter its must haves .
Russia's comprehensive and interlocking air defence weaponry is well known and well
respected: it covers the spectrum from defences against ballistic missiles to small RPVs, from
complex missile/radar sets to MANPADS; all of it coordinated, interlocking with many
redundancies. We hear US generals complaining about
air defence bubbles and studies referring to Russia's " anti-access/area-denial
(A2AD) exclusion zones ". Russian air defence has not been put to the full-scale test but
we have two good indications of its effectiveness. The first was the coordinated RPV attack on
Russian bases in Syria last year in which seven were
shot down and six taken over , three
of them landed intact . Then, in the FUKUS attack of April 2018, the Russians say the
Syrian AD system (most of which is old but has benefited from Russian coordination) shot
down a large number of the cruise missiles. ( FUKUS' claims
are not believable ).
In the past two or three decades US air power has operated with impunity; it has assumed
that all GPS-based systems (and there are many) will operate as planned and that communications
will be free and clear. Not against Russia. With those certainties removed, the American war
fighting doctrine will be left scrabbling.
But AD and EW are not the only Russian counters. When President Bush pulled the USA out of
the ABM Treaty in
2001 , Putin warned that Russia would have to respond. Mutual Assured Destruction may
sound crazy but there's a stability to it: neither side, under any circumstance, can get away
with a first strike; therefore neither will try it. Last year we met
the response : a new ICBM, a hypersonic re-entry vehicle, a nuclear-powered cruise missile
with enormous flight time and a similar underwater cruise missile. No defence will stop them
and so MAD returns. A hypersonic anti-shipping missile will keep the US Navy out of Russian
waters. And, to deal with the US Army's risible ground forces in
Europe , with or without NATO's other feeble forces
, Russia has re-created the
First Guards Tank Army . Checkmate again.
No free pass for US air power, strained and uncertain communications, a defeated ground
attack and no defence against Russian nuclear weapons. That's all and that's enough.
And that is how Moscow does it while spending much less money than Washington. It studies
Washington's strengths and counters them: "smart decisions". Washington is starting to realise
Russia's military power but it is blinded and can only see its reflection in the mirror: the
so-called "
rising threat from Russia " would be no threat to a Washington that stayed at home.
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred
battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also
suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every
battle.
he is of course correct in his over all views. russian missile and EW technology is already,
today, at least a generation ahead of what the pentagon fields for combat. rendering
effective pentagon military power projection neutered against both russia and china as well
as any ally they choose to support (think syria for sure, iran?, venezuela?)
the problem washington faces is they sold out the federal government decades ago to
banking and corporate interest which as time has proven repeatedly are NOT aligned with the
best interests of the american citizenry, and like anyone who sups with the devil a bargain
is a bargain, once taken there is no going back.
the problem for washington is that banking and corporate interests require plunder to
operate properly as currently structured. maximize short term gain for private ownership
while either put off long terms costs (pollution etc) well into the future or like in 2008
socialize the losses across the entire tax payer (a euphemism for serf) base while handily
keeping all those fed vomited bailouts private.
as russia, china, iran, venezuela erect signs backed up by force saying.."this is a
plunder free zone" and, what with unencumbered assets becoming ever harder to locate for
anglo american capitalism a crisis is emerging as forward motion (real growth) slows to a
crawl or goes below zero which renders all the debt entangled corporations, especially
governments and citizens susceptible to gravity once the trigger of ''no confidence''' hits
the public consciousness. increasing debt is directly correlated to decreasing growth need to
sustain the debt load. like unsuccessfully dieting a vicious circle.
all russia and china have to do to prevail over washington and its empire at this point is
WAIT.... while keeping their swords bright and their domestic intentions true (by taking care
of their own).
gravity once widespread public no confidence emerges will do all heavy lifting.
Excellent analysis, Patrick. It shows what can be accomplished when you don't blow your whole
wad on force projection and seeking full spectrum dominance at the same time. Seeking
dominant capability at our borders and territorial waters is doable, but projecting that all
over the world is a losing proposition. The Russian strategy reminds me of the Swiss
defensive model.
BTW, while the Russian bears and our Grizzlies are both brown bears, they are different
species.
I've always been intrigued by Switzerland -- more guns than anywhere but pretty peaceful;
really understands neutrality (which is actually a pretty cold-blooded position). I remember
reading some time ago that Switzerland General Guisan (hah! name just came to me, ultimate
senility is at least a week away!) told the Germans that, if they invaded, the Swiss would
blow the tunnels thereby rendering Switzerland useless to an invader.
Never seen so many measelshafts as there. (You old Cold Warriors might recognise the term
from Germany back in The Day (not entirely sure of the spelling).
But definitely a country that minds its own business but makes sure its more expensive to
conquer than it's worth. Finland is (or was) another example. (Which is why it's so
disappointing to see the current rulers in Helsinki sucking up to NATO.)
Well, many of us will live to see whether that's correct or not. My assumption is that China
is so arrogant (Middle Kingdom means between Heaven and Earth) that they really don't care
what the rest of us do as long as business happens.
Got me there.
The western alliance - since the fall of the USSR - has been pretty useless if not downright
dangerous.
As for China, they may have gone too far in that "inscrutable oriental" act and begun to
believe their own BS.
Throughout its long history China has never tried to dominate foreign countries. It never
tried to conquer Japan, for example, which had some very productive silver and gold mines. On
the other hand, the Mongols tried twice (unsuccessfully) to invade Japan during their short
period of dominance. China did try meddle in Korean politics and use Korea as a buffer zone,
though a few times the Koreans threw them out. China also tried to secure buffer zones in the
west and south. Even now, though, they seem to feel that they are destined to be the world's
middle country, and they don't seem to have a hankering to invade or directly control foreign
areas to gain Lebensraum, even though they have a huge population. And they have no tradition
of global colonialism. It is not in the culture or the economic history.
As for the New Silk Road, it does not seem to be as self-serving and manipulative as the
DoS and Pompeo are constantly claiming. China has an ancient continuous culture, and the
Chinese seem to know full well by now that lasting prosperity only happens when all parties
prosper. Mutual dependence and mutual recognition are a deep part of Chinese and all east
Asian cultures, though the Japanese samurai ethic briefly went berserk and disregarded that
wisdom back in the 1930s! The Chinese spirit of innovation-within-tradition and dynamic
business management (including state management) is also likely to keep them confident in
their own ability to be creative and cutting edge, so they will probably be less likely to
try to suppress other economies the way Trump is trying to do. I imagine Chinese leaders are
hoping that mutual prosperity and interdependence will make ideologies like "full spectrum
dominance" risible relics of the past. Culture is long, turbulence happens.
Moscow will not engage in an exhausting arms race, and the country's military spending will
gradually decrease as Russia does not seek a role as the "world gendarme," President
Vladimir Putin said
While Vladimir Putin is one of the most astute observers of foreign policy in the world
(running circles around Obama and Trump), he is also a politician. I sincerely doubt that
Russia gradually plans on decreasing spending on their military in any meaningful way. That
is for home consumption because about 35-40 percent of Russians live on $300 per month or
less. Putin's popularity is also dropping even though it remains quite high (Paul Goble:
Window on Eurasia -- New Series: Nearly 40 Percent of Russians Subsist on Less than...
https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/02/nearly-40-percent-of-russians-subsist.html?spref=tw):
Thirty-seven percent of Russians life on 19,000 rubles or less a month, Rosstat says, a
figure that works out to a subsistence of ten US dollars or a less a day, 23.2 percent live
on less than 15,000 rubles a month (under seven dollars a day); and 12 percent have incomes
under 10,000 rubles a month (five dollars a day).
I'm coming to think that you are that rare species of a POLITE troll. Russians like VVP, they
trust him and buy the package. And they get it that Russia is under attack (they aren't
living in a news bubble. They see Western stuff.)
Nobody in the West comes anywhere close to his numbers.
PS Paul Goble just prints anti-Putin stuff and is mostly entertainment.
After 8 years of the governance of Boris Yeltsin & the Free Market Reformers, 30% of
Russians were living on $1.50/day or less as their country unstoppably descended into social
catastrophe & strategic irrelevance.
What happened to the USSR and it's empire should serve as a warning to the USA. We have two
huge oceans defending us, yet we spend more to maintain our far flung empire than the USSR
ever did. One day, the taxpayers of this country are no longer going to pay for an empire
that they don't profit from.
thanks for the analysis - a shame the general did not expand on what Russian capabilities iN
EW were eye watering.
Interesting "The first was the coordinated RPV attack on Russian bases in Syria last year
in which seven were shot down and six taken over, three of them landed intact." According to
the article, the drones were controlled from 100 km distant. This really doesnt sound like
jihadi technology. So very interesting that Russia was able to take over the RPVs which were
either US or Israeli...
The US (with those two oceans as its eastern and western boundaries) is a maritime power.
We are also still a sufficiently important maritime power that we have some level of
responsibility for maintaining freedom of the seas (as with the issues with the pirates
operating out of Puntland in southern Somalia in the late 2000s), a situation that has
existed (in some form) since the Roman Republic made the Med "Mare Nostrum."
Russia has always been (mostly) a land power.
Given this, the US (even if it does not "seek to fight monsters" in Nietzsche's terms) has
the Force Projection task thrust upon it in a way Russia doesn't.
Even if we sought to be non-interventionist (as I think we should), we still have more on
our plate than Russia. (The PRC has the same inherent problem.)
Since we have a force projection mission thrust upon us as a maritime power, full spectrum
dominance (in at least the areas where our ships operate) is an implied task.
So, I think the two thoughts I have about this article are:
1) we have broader defense needs than the Russians, based on being a maritime power;
and
2) since our plate is already full, it makes little sense to add to that burden.
Britain is an island. Australia, while designated a continent, is also an island. Please
compare their "maritime power" status to ours, their defense spending as a percentage of gdp
to ours, and their number of foreign bases to ours, and explain.
Please compare those things to similar sized maritime nations and evaluate this in the
context of the former preeminence of the Royal Navy and its adjunct forces.
For extra credit consider the likelihood that the Royal Navy is to some degree an adjunct
of the US Navy,
As, for example, the history of the Western Roman Empire indicates (with the possible
exception of the Five Good Emperors and the early Tetrarchy during and immediately following
the reign of Diocletian), authoritarian states have some problems with succession.
Putin seems to have more of a "read" than any other world leader on the global stage right
now, but the answer to who follows him is likely be: "To the strongest."
Putin has been a smarter, more discerning leader than most presently on the world stage
and that has lent credibility. He has an advantage, as a retired LTC in the old KGB of having
some level of training and experience in both geo-politics and reading people and assessing
strengths and weaknesses.
Even given that, Russia has a decided advantage over many places in terms of natural
resources and in controlling what may be thought of as "global key terrain" (Mackinder's
"Heartland").
They have a kind of lasting Jominian advantage. With BRI/OBOR, they are somewhat in the
position of the guy in the Western who owns the land the Railroad is going to come through
(or, possibly, not).
Given its size, position and history, it is questionable if Russia is ever "finished," but
while it has come back from its dire position 20 years ago, it still is notably weaker than
it was in the 1980s. As Mr. Armstrong's article indicates that may matter less than fact it
appears strong enough to advance its own interests.
"... " China by contrast has historically conducted statecraft based on the concept of a civilization state – under which its strength is not measured by the weakness and subjugation of others but by its internal achievements. " ..."
"... In my view the Usa had an excellent opportunity to enact in a positive way after WW2 but blew it. The main reason was the failure to live up to the above quoted characterisation of the Chinese. To encourage potential achievers in the best sense of the word. ..."
"... Instead the Us oligarchy held back independent and creative thinking and brainwashed the population, in a way that weakened them. Jfk tried to encourage his countrymen but other forces prevailed. ..."
A.B. Abrams: In the introduction to this work I highlight that a fundamental shift in world
order was facilitated by the modernization and industrialization of two Eastern nations –
Japan under the Meiji Restoration and the USSR under the Stalinist industrialization program.
Before these two events the West had retained an effective monopoly on the modern industrial
economy and on modern military force. Russia's image is still affected by the legacy of the
Soviet Union – in particular the way Soviet proliferation of both modern industries and
modern weapons across much of the region was key to containing Western ambitions in the Cold
War. Post-Soviet Russia has a somewhat unique position – with a cultural heritage
influenced by Mongolia and Central Asia as well as by Europe. Politically Russia remains
distinct from the Western Bloc, and perceptions of the country in East Asia have been heavily
influenced by this. Perhaps today one the greatest distinctions is Russia's eschewing of the
principle of sovereignty under international law and its adherence to a non-interventionist
foreign policy. Where for example the U.S., Europe and Canada will attempt to intervene in the
internal affairs of other parties – whether by cutting off parts for
armaments ,
imposing economic sanctions or even launching military interventions under humanitarian
pretexts – Russia lacks a history of such behavior which has made it a welcome presence
even for traditionally Western aligned nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia and South
Korea.
While the Western Bloc attempted to isolate the USSR from East and Southeast Asia by
supporting the spread of anticommunist thought, this pretext for shunning Russia collapsed in
1991. Today the West has had to resort to other means to attempt to contain and demonize the
country – whether labelling it a human rights abuser or threatening its economic and
defense partners with sanctions and other repercussions. The success of these measures in the
Asia-Pacific has varied – but as regional economies have come to rely less on the West
for trade and grown increasingly interdependent Western leverage over them and their foreign
policies has diminished.
Even when considered as a Western nation, the type of conservative Western civilization
which Russia may be seen to represent today differs starkly from that of Western Europe and
North America. Regarding a Russia Pivot to Asia, support for such a plan appears to have
increased from 2014 when relations with the Western Bloc effectively broke down. Indeed, the
Russia's future as a pacific power could be a very bright one – and as part of the up and
coming northeast Asian region it borders many of the economies which appear set to dominate in
the 21 st century – namely China, Japan and the Koreas. Peter the Great is
known to have issued in a new era of Russian prosperity by recognizing the importance of
Europe's rise and redefining Russia as a European power – moving the capital to St
Petersburg. Today a similar though perhaps less extreme pivot Eastwards towards friendlier and
more prosperous nations may be key to Russia's future.
The Saker: We hear many observers speak of an informal but very profound and even
game-changing partnership between Putin's Russia and Xi's China. The Chinese even speak of a "
strategic comprehensive partnership of coordination for the new era ". How would you
characterize the current relationship between these two countries and what prospects do you see
for a future Russian-Chinese partnership?
A.B. Abrams: A Sino-Russian alliance has long been seen in both the U.S. and in Europe as
one of the greatest threats to the West's global primacy and to Western-led world order. As
early as 1951 U.S. negotiators meeting with Chinese delegations to end the Korean War were
instructed to focus on the differences in the positions of Moscow and Beijing in an attempt to
form a rift between the two. Close Sino-Soviet cooperation seriously stifled Western designs
for the Korean Peninsula and the wider region during that period, and it was repeatedly
emphasized that the key to a Western victory was to bring about a Sino-Soviet split. Achieving
this goal by the early 1960s and bringing the two powers very near to a total conflict
significantly increased prospects for a Western victory in the Cold War, with the end of the
previously united front seriously undermining nationalist and leftist movements opposing
Western designs from Africa and the Middle East to Vietnam and Korea. Both states learned the
true consequences of this in the late 1980s and early 1990s when there was a real risk of total
collapse under Western pressure. Attempts to bring an end to China's national revolution
through destabilization failed in 1989, although the USSR was less fortunate and the results
for the Russian population in the following decade were grave indeed.
Today the Sino-Russian partnership has become truly comprehensive, and while Western experts
from Henry Kissinger to the late Zbigniew Brzezinski among others have emphasized the
importance of bringing about a new split in this partnership this strategy remains unlikely to
work a second time. Both Beijing and Moscow learned from the dark period of the post-Cold War
years that the closer they are together the safer they will be, and that any rift between them
will only provide their adversaries with the key to bringing about their downfall. It is
difficult to comprehend the importance of the Sino-Russian partnership for the security of both
states without understanding the enormity of the Western threat – with maximum pressure
being exerted on multiple fronts from finance and information to military and cyberspace. Where
in the early 1950s it was only the Soviet nuclear deterrent which kept both states safe from
very real Western plans for massive nuclear attacks, so too today is the synergy in the
respective strengths of China and Russia key to protecting the sovereignty and security of the
two nations from a very real and imminent threat. A few examples of the nature of this threat
include growing investments in social engineering through social media – the results of
have been seen in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Ukraine, a lowering threshold for nuclear weapons use
by the United States – which it currently trains Western allies outside the NPT to
deploy, and even reports from Russian and Korean sources of investments in biological warfare
– reportedly being tested in
Georgia, Eastern Europe and South Korea .
The partnership between Russia and China has become truly comprehensive, and is perhaps best
exemplified by their military relations. From 2016 joint military exercises have involved the
sharing of extremely
sensitive information on missile and early warning systems – one of the most well
kept defense secrets of any nuclear power which even NATO powers do not share with one another.
Russia's defense sector has played a key role in the modernization of the Chinese People's
Liberation Army, while Chinese investment has been essential to allowing Russia to continue
research and development on next generation systems needed to retain parity with the United
States. There is reportedly cooperation between the two in developing next generation weapons
technologies for systems such as hypersonic cruise and anti aircraft missiles and new strategic
bombers and fighter jets which both states plan to field by the mid-2020s. With the combined
defense spending of both states a small fraction of that of the Western powers, which
themselves cooperate closely in next generation defense projects, it is logical that the two
should pool their resources and research and development efforts to most efficiently advance
their own security.
Cooperation in political affairs has also been considerable, and the two parties have
effectively presented a united front against the designs of the Western Bloc. In 2017 both
issued strong warnings to the United States and its allies that they would not tolerate an
invasion of North Korea – which was followed by the
deployment of advanced air defense systems by both states near the Korean border with
coverage of much of the peninsula's airspace. Following Pyongyang's testing of its
first nuclear delivery system capable of reaching the United States , and renewed American
threats against the East Asian country, China and Russia staged near simultaneous
exercises near the peninsula using naval and marine units in a clear warning to the U.S.
against military intervention. China's Navy has on several occasions deployed to the
Mediterranean for joint drills with Russian forces – each time following a period of high
tension with the Western Bloc over Syria.
In April 2018, a period of particularly high tensions between Russia and the Western Bloc
over Western threats both to take military action against the Syrian government and to
retaliate for an alleged but unproven Russian chemical weapons attack on British soil, the
Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe traveled to Russia and more explicitly stated that the
Sino-Russian partnership was aimed at countering Western designs. Referring to the Sino-Russian
defense partnership as "as stable as Mount Tai" he
stated : "the Chinese side has come to show Americans the close ties between the Armed
Forces of China and Russia, especially in this situation. We have come to support you." A week
later China announced
large-scale live fire naval drills in the Taiwan Strait – which according to several
analysts were scheduled to coincide with a buildup of Western forces near Syria. Presenting a
potential second front was key to deterring the Western powers from taking further action
against Russia or its ally Syria. These are but a few examples Sino-Russian cooperation, which
is set to grow only closer with time.
The Saker: The US remains the most formidable military power in Asia, but this military
power is being eroded as a result of severe miscalculations of the US political leadership. How
serious a crisis do you think the US is now facing in Asia and how do you assess the risks of a
military confrontation between the US and the various Asian powers (China, the Philippines, the
DPRK, etc,).
A.B. Abrams: Firstly I would dispute that the United States is the most formidable military
power in the region, as while it does retain a massive arsenal there are several indicators
that it lost this position to China during the 2010s. Looking at combat readiness levels, the
average age of weapons in their inventories, morale both publicly and in the armed forces, and
most importantly the correlation of their forces, China appears to have an advantage should war
break out in the Asia-Pacific. It is important to remember that the for the Untied States and
its European allies in particular wars aren't fought on a chessboard. Only a small fraction of
their military might can be deployed to the Asia-Pacific within a month of a conflict breaking
out, while over 95% of Chinese forces are already on the region and are trained and armed
almost exclusively for war in the conditions of the Asia-Pacific. In real terms the balance of
military power regionally is in China's favor, and although the U.S. has tried to counter this
with a military 'Pivot to Asia' initiative from 2011 this has ultimately failed due to both the
drag from defense commitments elsewhere and the unexpected and pace at which China has
expanded and
modernized its armed forces.
For the time being the risk of direct military confrontation remains low, and while there
was a risk in 2017 of American and allied action against the DPRK Pyongyang has effectively
taken this option off the table with the development of a viable and growing arsenal of
thermonuclear weapons and associated delivery systems alongside the modernization of its
conventional capabilities. While the U.S. may have attempted to call a Chinese and Russian
bluff by launching a limited strike – which seriously risked spiraling into something
much larger – it is for the benefit of all regional parties including South Korea that
the DPRK now has the ability to deter the United States without relying on external support.
This was a historically unprecedented event, and as military technology has evolved it has
allowed a small power for the first time to deter a superpower without relying on allied
intervention. Changes in military technology such as the proliferation of the nuclear tipped
ICBM make a shooting war less likely, but also alters the nature of warfare to place greater
emphasis on information war, economic war and other new fields which will increasingly decide
the global balance of power. Where America's answer to the resistance of China and North Korea
in the 1950s to douse them with napalm, today winning over their populations through soft
power, promoting internal dissent, placing pressure on their living standards and ensuring
continued Western dominance of key technologies has become the new means of fighting.
That being said, there is a major threat of conflict in the Asia-Pacific of a different
nature. Several organizations including the United Nations and the defense ministries of
Russia, Singapore and Indonesia among others have warned of the dangers posed by Islamic
terrorism to stability in the region. Radical Islamism, as most recently attested to by Saudi Arabia's crown prince , played a key
role in allowing the Western Bloc to cement its dominance over the Middle East and North Africa
– undermining Russian and Soviet aligned governments including Algeria, Libya, Egypt and
Syria – in most cases with direct Western support. CIA Deputy Director Graham Fuller in
this respect referred to the agency's "policy of guiding the evolution of Islam and of helping
them against our adversaries." Several officials, from the higher brass of the Russian, Syrian
and Iranian militaries to the former President of
Afghanistan and the President
of Turkey , have all alleged Western support for radical terror groups including the
Islamic State for the sake of destabilizing their adversaries. As the Asia-Pacific has
increasingly slipped out of the Western sphere of influence, it is likely that this asset will
increasingly be put into play. The consequences of the spread of jihadism from the Middle East
have been relatively limited until now, but growing signs of danger can be seen in Xinjiang,
Myanmar, the Philippines and Indonesia. It is this less direct means of waging war which
arguably poses the greatest threat.
The Saker: Do you think that we will see the day when US forces will have to leave South
Korean, Japan or Taiwan?
A.B. Abrams: Other than a limited contingent of Marines recently deployed to guard
the American Institute , U.S. forces are not currently stationed in Taiwan. The massive
force deployed there in the 1950s was scaled down and American nuclear weapons removed in 1974
in response to China's acceptance of an alliance with the United States against the Soviet
Union. Taiwan's military situation is highly precarious and the disparity in its strength
relative to the Chinese mainland grows considerably by the year. Even a large American military
presence is unlikely to change this – and just 130km from the Chinese mainland they would
be extremely vulnerable and could be quickly isolated from external support in the event of a
cross straits war. We could, however, see a small American contingent deployed as a 'trigger
wire' – which will effectively send a signal to Beijing that the territory is under
American protection and that an attempt to recapture Taiwan will involve the United States.
Given trends in public opinion in Taiwan, and the very considerable pro-Western sentiments
among the younger generations in particular, it is likely that Taipei will look to a greater
rather than a lesser Western military presence on its soil in future.
Japan and particularly South Korea see more nuanced public opinion towards the U.S., and
negative perceptions of an American military presence may well grow in future – though
for different reasons in each country. Elected officials alone, however, are insufficient to
move the American presence – as best demonstrated by the short tenure of Prime Minister
Hatoyama in Japan and the frustration of President Moon's efforts to restrict American
deployments of THAAD missile
systems in his first year. It would take a massive mobilization of public opinion –
backed by business interests and perhaps the military – to force such a change. This
remains possible however, particularly as both economies grow increasingly reliant on China for
trade and as the U.S. is seen to have acted increasingly erratically in response to challenges
from Beijing and Pyongyang which has undermined its credibility. As to a voluntary withdrawal
by the United States, this remains extremely unlikely. President Donald Trump ran as one of the
most non-interventionist candidates in recent history, but even under him and with considerable
public support prospects for a significant reduction in the American presence, much less a
complete withdrawal, have remained slim.
The Saker: Some circles in Russia are trying very hard to frighten the Russian public
opinion against China alleging things like "China want to loot (or even conquer!) Siberia",
"China will built up its military and attack Russia" or "China with its huge economy will
simply absorb small Russia". In your opinion are any of these fears founded and, if yes, which
ones and why?
A.B. Abrams: A growth in Sinophobic sentiment in Russia only serves to weaken the nation and
empower its adversaries by potentially threatening its relations with its most critical
strategic partner. The same is applicable vice-versa regarding Russophobia in China. Given the
somewhat Europhilic nature of the Russian state in a number of periods, including in the 1990s,
and the considerable European soft influences in modern Russia, there are grounds for building
up of such sentiment. Indeed Radio Free Europe, a U.S. government funded nonprofit broadcasting
corporation with the stated purpose of "advancing the goals of U.S. foreign policy," notably
published sinophobic content aimed at depicting the Russian people as
victims of Chinese business interests to coincide with the Putin-XI summit in June 2019.
However, an understanding of the modern Chinese state and its interests indicates that it does
not pose a threat to Russia – and to the contrary is vital to Russia's national security
interests. While Russia historically has cultural ties to the Western nations, the West has
shown Russian considerable hostility throughout its recent history – as perhaps is most
evident in the 1990s when Russia briefly submitted itself and sought to become part of the
Western led order with terrible consequences. China by contrast has historically conducted
statecraft based on the concept of a civilization state – under which its strength is not
measured by the weakness and subjugation of others but by its internal achievements. A powerful
and independent Russia capable of protecting a genuine rules based world order and holding
lawless actors in check is strongly in the Chinese interest. It is clear that in Russia such an
understanding exists on a state level, although there is no doubt that there will be efforts by
external parties to turn public opinion against China to the detriment of the interests of both
states.
The idea that China would seek to economically subjugate Russia, much less invade it, is
ludicrous. It was from Europe were the major invasions of Russian territory came – vast
European coalitions led by France and Germany respectively with a third American led attack
planned and prepared for but stalled by the Soviet acquisition of a nuclear deterrent. More
recently from the West came sanctions, the austerity program of the 1990s, the militarization
of Eastern Europe, and the demonization of the Russian nation – all intended to subjugate
and if possible shatter it. Even at the height of its power, China did not colonize the
Koreans, Vietnamese or Japanese nor did it seek to conquer Central Asia. Assuming China will
have the same goals and interests as a Western state would if they were in a similar position
of strength is to ignore the lessons of history, and the nature of the Chinese national
character and national interest.
The Saker: The Russian military is currently vastly more capable (even if numerically much
smaller) than the Chinese. Does anybody in China see a military threat from Russia?
A.B. Abrams: There may be marginalized extreme nationalists in China who see a national
security from almost everybody, but in mainstream discourse there are no such perceptions. To
the contrary, Russia's immense contribution to Chinese security is widely recognized –
not only in terms of technological transfers but also in terms of the value of the joint front
the two powers have formed. Russia not only lacks a history of annexing East Asian countries or
projecting force against them, but it is also heavily reliant on China in particular both to
keep its defense sector active and to undermine Western attempts to isolate it. Russian
aggression against China is unthinkable for Moscow – even if China did not possess its
current military strength and nuclear deterrence capabilities. This is something widely
understood in China and elsewhere.
I would dispute that Russia's military is vastly more capable than China's own, as other
than nuclear weapons there is a similar level of capabilities in most sectors in both
countries. While Russia has a lead in many key technologies such as hypersonic missiles, air
defenses and submarines to name a few prominent examples, China has been able to purchase and
integrate many of these into its own armed forces alongside the products of its own defense
sector. Russia's most prominent fighter jet for example, the Flanker (in all derivatives from
Su-27 to J-11D), is in fact fielded in larger numbers by China than by Russia itself –
and those in Chinese service have access to both indigenous as well as Russian munitions and
subsystems. Furthermore, there are some less critical but still significant sectors where China
does appear to retain a lead – for example it deployed combat jets equipped with a new
generation of active electronically scanned array radars and air to air missiles from 2017
(J-20 and in
2018 J-10C ) – while Russia has only done so this in July 2019 with the
induction of the MiG-35. Whether this is due to a Chinese technological advantage, or to a
greater availability of funds to deploy its new technologies faster, remains uncertain.
Russia's ability to provide China with its most vital technologies, and China's willingness to
rely so heavily on Russian technology to comprise so much of its inventory, demonstrates the
level of trust between the two countries
The Saker: Do you think that China could become a military threat to other countries in the
region (especially Taiwan, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, etc.)?
A.B. Abrams: I would direct you to a quote by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohamed
from March this year. He stated: "we always say, we have had China as a neighbor for 2,000
years, we were never conquered by them. But the Europeans came in 1509, in two years, they
conquered Malaysia." This coming from a nationalist leader considered one of the most
sinophobic in Southeast Asia, whose country has an ongoing territorial dispute with China in
the South China Sea, bears testament to the nature of claims of a Chinese threat. It is
critical not to make the mistake of imposing Western norms when trying to understand Chinese
statecraft. Unlike the European states, China is not and has never been dependent on conquering
others to enrich itself – but rather was a civilization state which measured its wealth
by what it could its own people could produce. A harmonious relationship with India, Vietnam,
the Philippines and others in which all states' sovereign and territorial integrity is
respected is in the Chinese interest.
A second aspect which must be considered, and which bears testament to China's intentions,
is the orientation of the country's armed forces. While the militaries of the United States and
European powers such as Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and France among others are heavily
skewed to prioritize power projection overseas, China's military has made disproportionately
small investments in power projection and is overwhelmingly tailored to territorial defense.
While the United States has over 300 tanker aircraft deigned to refuel its combat jets midair
and attack faraway lands, China has just three purpose-built tankers – less than
Malaysia, Chile or Pakistan. The ratio of
logistical to combat units further indicates that China's armed forces, in stark contrast
to the Western powers, are heavily oriented towards defense and fighting near their
borders.
This all being said, China does pose an imminent threat to the government in Taipei –
although I would disagree with your categorization of Taiwan as a country. Officially the
Republic of China (ROC- as opposed to the Beijing based People's Republic of China), Taipei has
not declared itself a separate country but rather the rightful government of the entire Chinese
nation. Taipei remains technically at war with the mainland, a conflict would have ended in
1950 if the U.S. had not placed the ROC under its protection. The fast growing strength of the
mainland has shifted the balance of power dramatically should the conflict again break out into
open hostilities. China has only to gain from playing the long game with Taiwan however –
providing scholarships and jobs for its people to live on the mainland and thus undermining the
demonization of the country and hostility towards a peaceful reunification. Taiwan's economic
reliance on the mainland has also grown considerably, and these softer methods of bridging the
gaps between the ROC and the mainland are key to facilitating unification. Meanwhile the
military balance in the Taiwan Strait only grows more favorable for Beijing by the year –
meaning there is no urgency to take military action. While China will insist on unification, it
will seek to avoid doing so violently unless provoked.
The Saker: In conclusion: where in Asia do you see the next major conflict take place and
why?
A.B. Abrams: The conflict in the Asia-Pacific is ongoing, but the nature of conflict has
changed. We see an ongoing and so far highly successful de-radicalization effort in Xinjiang
– which was taken in direct response to Western attempts to turn the province into 'China's Syria or
China's Libya,' in the words of Chinese state media, using similar means. We see a harsh
Western response to
the Made in China 2025 initiative under which the country has sought to compete in key
technological fields formerly monopolized by the Western Bloc and Japan – and the result
of this will have a considerable impact on the balance of economic power in the coming years.
We see direct economic warfare and technological competition between China and the United
States – although the latter has so far refrained from escalating too far due to the
potentially devastating impact reprisals could have. We further see an information war in full
swing, with Sinophobic stories often citing 'anonymous sources' being propagated by Western
media to target not only their own populations – but also to influence public opinion in
Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Influence over third parties remains vital to isolating China and
cementing the Western sphere of influence. Use of social media and social engineering, as the
events of the past decade have demonstrated from the Middle East in 2011 to Hong Kong today,
remains key and will only grow in its potency in the coming years. We also see a major arms
race, with the Western Bloc investing heavily in an all new generation of weapons designed to
leave existing Chinese and allied defenses obsolete – from laser air defenses to
neutralize China's nuclear deterrent to sixth generation stealth fighters, new heavy bombers,
new applications of artificial intelligence technologies and new hypersonic missiles.
All these are fronts of the major conflict currently underway, and the Obama and Trump
administrations have stepped up their offensives to bring about a new 'end of history' much
like that of the 1990s – only this time it is likely to be permanent. To prevail, China
and Russia will need to cooperate at least as closely if not more so as the Western powers do
among themselves.
The Saker: thank you very much for your time and answers!
That being said, there is a major threat of conflict in the Asia-Pacific of a different
nature. Several organizations including the United Nations and the defense ministries of
Russia, Singapore and Indonesia among others have warned of the dangers posed by Islamic
terrorism to stability in the region. Radical Islamism, as most recently attested to by
Saudi Arabia's crown prince, played a key role in allowing the Western Bloc to cement its
dominance over the Middle East and North Africa – undermining Russian and Soviet
aligned governments including Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Syria – in most cases with
direct Western support. CIA Deputy Director Graham Fuller in this respect referred to the
agency's "policy of guiding the evolution of Islam and of helping them against our
adversaries." Several officials, from the higher brass of the Russian, Syrian and Iranian
militaries to the former President of Afghanistan and the President of Turkey, have all
alleged Western support for radical terror groups including the Islamic State for the sake
of destabilizing their adversaries. As the Asia-Pacific has increasingly slipped out of the
Western sphere of influence, it is likely that this asset will increasingly be put into
play. The consequences of the spread of jihadism from the Middle East have been relatively
limited until now, but growing signs of danger can be seen in Xinjiang, Myanmar, the
Philippines and Indonesia. It is this less direct means of waging war which arguably poses
the greatest threat.
There is hardly such a thing called "Islamic Terrorism." In most egregious cases, such as
IS, etc., it can be shown that those lowlifes have been the mercenaries of the evil West and
their accursed implant in the ME (and nowadays the hindutvars too), collectively the avowed
enemies of true monotheism, Islam. I am including the recent Colombo attacks here.
How can any so-called "muslim" who is a tool-of-evil of the enemies of Islam, be a true
muslim? How then can it be termed "Islamic Terror"? Perhaps "Islamic Apostate Terror" would
be more suitable.
Of course, there are many other non-IS muslims who are called "terrorists." The
Palestinians, the Kashmiris, etc. For us muslims, they are simply freedom fighters.
Finally, there are a few muslims who do kill in the name Islam the Charlie Hebdo killers,
Bombay\Dhaka attackers, etc. Some of them are justified (due to intense provocations) and
others not at all. I will leave it for others to judge which falls under which category.
Perhaps the listed order will help decipher that.
It must be conceded, when it comes to setting the narrative of pure deceit, the West (and
its minions, the Jooscum and their lickspittle, the hindutvars), like in all things bad, can
be satanically good. We muslims are being decimated in the propaganda war.
We still got our True Monotheism though. The pagan/godless enemies of the Almighty One are
doomed to fail against it. God willing.
The American system ran on immigration that kept discontent about massive inequality under
control because a substantial proportion of the lowest SES were immigrants just glad to be in
the US. The tAmerican ruling class decided they could make more money by offshoring
everything that could be offshored and mass immigration to keep wags from going up in the non
offshorable parts of the economy.
China and America's venal globalising elite had converging agendas, but could not fool the
common people of America and their tribune . Even the military had began to get alarmed about
the economic growth and technological progress of China, which had been benefiting from
officially sanctioned preferential treatment by the US since Carter.
Free ride is over for China, we will see China's economic and military strength
progressively tested. What America built it can break.
China was made an economic superpower by the US elites. Not because they felt sorry for China
and wanted to speed up conversion to democracy by switching them to capitalist way of doing
business first.
They made them an economic superpower, because the US elites have lost their marbles. They
simply didn't see it coming. They wanted to turn China into one giant cheap sweatshop in
order to exploit their population with a low paying manufacturing jobs, which were never
supposed to make China reach.
But they did, because no matter how much the lost generation of the western elites were
foaming at their mouths about knowledge based economy, value added economy, high tech jobs
and the other crap, it is obvious that manufacturing remains a basis for any strong economy.
That doesn't look like it's going to change even when you add robots to the mixture.
I think that Napoleon was right when he warned the world about waking up the sleeping
dragon. First they made them an economic superpower, and now they want to contain them
militarily. Good luck with that.
There is a reason why China wants to build the silk road. Silk road implies land. The US
military has never been any good at land warfare. Neither where their predecessors –
the British. China, on the other hand, showed in Korea that even then, with a backward army,
equipped with handouts from the Soviet Union, they can pretty much trash the US army.
With the silk road initiative, China will seize the control of the entire Euro-Asian land
mass – the most populous and economically productive region of the world and will be
more than happy to let the US play pirates on the seas.
Abrams is giving the West too much credit for the Sino-Soviet rift of the late 5os and 60s.
That was NOT the doing of the CIA or Western Europe. It was 90% the fault of Mao who tried
to shove Khrushchev aside as the head of world communism. Because Stalin had treated Mao
badly, Krushchev wanted to make amends and treated Mao with respect. But Mao turned out to be
a total a-hole. There are two kinds of people: Those who appreciate friendly gestures and
those who seek kindness as 'weakness'.
It's like Hitler saw Chamberlain's offer as weakness
and pushed ahead. Being kind is nice, but one should never be kind to psychopaths, and
Khrushchev was nice to the wrong person.
Mao only understood power. He sensed Khrushchev as
'weak' and acted as if he wanted to be the new Stalin. He also made international statements
that made the US-USSR relations much worse. He berated Khrushchev for seeking co-existence
with the West and pressed on for more World Revolution.
He also ignored Soviet advice not to
attempt radical economic policies (that were soon to bring China to economic ruin -- at least
Stalin's collectivization led to rise of industry; in contrast, Mao managed to destroy both
agriculture and heavy industry).
When Stalin was alive, he didn't treat Mao with any respect,
and Mao disliked Stalin but still respected him because Mao understood Power. With Stalin
gone, Khrushchev showed Mao some respect, but Mao felt no respect for Khrushchev who was
regarded as a weakling and sucker.
It was all so stupid. China and Russia could have gotten along well if not for Mao's
impetuosity. Of course, Khrushchev could be reckless, contradictory, and erratic, and his
mixed signals to the West also heightened tensions. Also, he was caught between a rock and a
hard place where the Eastern Bloc was concerned. He wanted to de-Stalinize, but this could
lead to events like the Hungarian Uprising.
Anyway, Putin and Xi, perhaps having grown up in less turbulent times, are more stable and
mature in character and temperament than Mao and Khrushchev. They don't see the Russo-China
relations as a zero sum game of ego but a way for which both sides can come to the table
halfway, which is all one can hope for.
@Priss Factor You are probably right about Hitler seeing (Neville) Chamberlain as weak.
But Hitler was a dupe for Britains much smarter and devious elites, who successfully played
him to do their bidding. Hitler, along with the major members of the nazis, had been
significantly influenced by Neville's elder cousin who spurred the nazis towards 'the
ultimate solution'.
Instead of being weak in the manner Hitler may have thought, Neville saved Hitler from his
own generals.
In historical turns , when Britain has appeared weak, it mostly is a deliberate faint.
Be it in Gallipoli, St Petersburg in 1919, Norway or Singapore in WW2.
Commendable contribution by Mr Abrams to enlighten the confused western establishment.
" China by contrast has historically conducted statecraft based on the concept of a
civilization state – under which its strength is not measured by the weakness and
subjugation of others but by its internal achievements. "
In my view the Usa had an excellent opportunity to enact in a positive way after WW2 but
blew it. The main reason was the failure to live up to the above quoted characterisation of
the Chinese. To encourage potential achievers in the best sense of the word.
Instead the Us oligarchy held back independent and creative thinking and brainwashed the
population, in a way that weakened them.
Jfk tried to encourage his countrymen but other forces prevailed.
Americans cannot understand our relations with China by looking at events just the past 75
years. During the century before, European imperial powers and the United States treated
China as a open borders business opportunity backed by foreign military force. China was
infested by mini-colonies to profit from China's riches. The "Opium Wars" shock decent
Americans.
This is just think tank swamp vapor. No real analysis, no real recommendation on adaption of the USA to the collapse of global neoliberal
system (aka the USA empire)
At the heart of the alignment between China and Russia is their shared interest in undermining U.S. influence globally. The two
countries are united in their mutual displeasure with the United States and the U.S.-dominated international order that they feel
disadvantages them. But while Russia and China may have initially banded together in discontent, their repeated engagement on areas
of mutual interest is fostering a deeper and enduring partnership.
It is clear that China will pose the greatest challenge to U.S. interests for the foreseeable future, but Beijing's increasing
collaboration with Moscow will amplify that challenge.
... ... ...
Washington must come to terms with this China-Russia alignment and work to address and manage it. To contain the depth of alignment,
Washington must look for opportunities to strain the seams in the Russia-China relationship. Russia and China may be drawing closer,
but their interests -- and especially their approaches -- are not identical. Russia and China compete in the Middle East, for example,
for military sales and nuclear energy deals. And their very different approaches to Europe could be a source of strain. In communicating
with Beijing, Washington should underscore how Russian interference in these countries could generate instability that threatens
China's growing economic interests.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration is focused on combating China's unfair economic practices, a worthy undertaking. But any trade
war "victory" will be incomplete if Washington does not address Beijing's challenge, in collaboration with Moscow, to the very fabric
of the rules-based order that underpins continued U.S. global leadership and prosperity. Washington will be ineffective if it seeks
to go it alone. Pushing back against the illiberal influence of an aligned Russia and China will require the collective heft of Allies
and partners. The time is ripe to tackle this issue with America's European Allies. Europe has grown more attuned to -- and concerned
about -- the threat that China poses and shares the U.S. imperative to compete with Russia and China.
Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a senior fellow and director of the Center for New American Security's Transatlantic Security Center.
Contents of the article correlate extremely poorly with the title... I don't see even a semblance of a "containment plan" other
than a vague outline that US should ask EU countries something as of yet unspecified...
The evidence that Israel produces nuclear weapons was revealed more than thirty years ago by
Mordechai Vanunu , who had worked in the Dimona plant: published by The Sunday Times on October
5, 1986, after being screened by leading nuclear weapons experts. Vanunu, kidnapped by the
Mossad in Rome and transported to Israel, was sentenced to 18 years of hard jail time and,
after being released in 2004, subject to severe restrictions.
Israel has today (though without admitting it) an arsenal estimated at 100-400 nuclear
weapons, including new generation mini-nukes and neutron bombs, and produces plutonium and
tritium in such quantities as to build hundreds more.
The Israeli nuclear warheads are ready to launch on ballistic missiles, such as the Jericho
3, and on F-15 and F-16 fighter bombers supplied by the USA, to which the F-35 are now
added.
As confirmed by the numerous IAEA inspections, Iran has no nuclear weapons and commits not
to produce them, according to the agreement under strict international control.
However – writes former US Secretary of State Colin Powell on March 3, 2015 in an
email that has come to light –
"the boys in Tehran know Israel has 200 nuclear weapons, all targeted on Tehran, and we
have thousands".
The US European allies, which formally continue to support the agreement with Iran, are
basically aligned with Israel. Germany supplied Israel with six Dolphin submarines, modified so
as to launch nuclear cruise missiles, and approved the supply of three more.
Germany, France, Italy, Greece and Poland participated, with the USA, in the Blue Flag 2017,
the largest international aerial warfare exercise in Israel's history. Italy, linked to Israel
by a military cooperation agreement (Law No. 94, 2005), participated in the exercise with
Tornado fighters of the 6th Wing of Ghedi, assigned to carry US B-61 nuclear bombs (which will
soon be replaced by B61-12). The US participated with F-16 fighters of the 31st Fighter Wing of
Aviano, assigned to the same function.
The Israeli nuclear forces are integrated into the NATO electronic system, within the
framework of the "Individual Cooperation Program" with Israel, a country which, although not a
member of the Alliance, has a permanent mission to NATO headquarters in Brussels.
According to the plan tested in the US-Israel Juniper Cobra 2018 exercise, US and NATO
forces would come from Europe (especially from the bases in Italy) to support Israel in a war
against Iran. It could start with an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, like the one
carried out in 1981 on Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq. In the event of Iranian retaliation,
Israel could use a nuclear weapon by starting a chain reaction with unpredictable outcomes.
https://www.youtube.com/embed/Rh6OBut_bHk
Source: PandoraTV
*
This article was originally published by Il Manifesto.
Manlio Dinucci is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on
Globalization.
The idiots in DC are literally talking about nuclear war with Russia right now in a defense
spending/policy hearing on CSPAN. Sickening. I'm not sure why I even turned on the TV.
The
"premise" is that Russia launches a "tactical" low yield weapon, and the consensus is that
we would not "measure" it and respond in kind, but start an all out nuclear war.
Everyone knows that actual discussions regarding policy are done in closed door
meetings (and several reps have referred to this happening at a later time).
So are we at that point in Idiocracy, where we believe our propaganda has some effect on
our enemy? Is it 1950? FFS
Last year, the nation was confronted with a brief reminder of how Cold War-era nuclear panic
played out, after a state employee in Hawaii mistakenly sent out an emergency alert declaring
that a "ballistic missile threat" was "inbound." The message didn't specify what kind of
missile -- and, in fact, the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command at two sites
in Alaska and California may have some capability to shoot down a few incoming ballistic
missiles -- but panicked Hawaii residents didn't feel protected. They reacted by careening cars
into one another on highways, pushing their children into storm drains for protection and
phoning their loved ones to say goodbye -- until a second message, 38 minutes later,
acknowledged it was an error.
Hypersonics pose a different threat from ballistic missiles, according to those who have
studied and worked on them, because they could be maneuvered in ways that confound existing
methods of defense and detection. Not to mention, unlike most ballistic missiles, they would
arrive in under 15 minutes -- less time than anyone in Hawaii or elsewhere would need to
meaningfully react. How fast is that, really? An object moving through the air produces an
audible shock wave -- a sonic boom -- when it reaches about 760 miles per hour. This speed of
sound is also called Mach 1, after the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach. When a projectile flies
faster than Mach's number, it travels at supersonic speed -- a speed faster than sound. Mach 2
is twice the speed of sound; Mach 3 is three times the speed of sound, and so on. When a
projectile reaches a speed faster than Mach 5, it's said to travel at hypersonic speed.
One of the two main hypersonic prototypes now under development in the United States is
meant to fly at speeds between Mach 15 and Mach 20, or more than 11,400 miles per hour. This
means that when fired by the U.S. submarines or bombers stationed at Guam, they could in theory
hit China's important inland missile bases, like Delingha, in less than 15 minutes. President
Vladimir Putin has likewise claimed that one of Russia's new hypersonic missiles will travel at
Mach 10, while the other will travel at Mach 20. If true, that would mean a Russian aircraft or
ship firing one of them near Bermuda could strike the Pentagon, some 800 miles away, in five
minutes. China, meanwhile, has flight-tested its own hypersonic missiles at speeds fast enough
to reach Guam from the Chinese coastline within minutes.
One concept now being pursued by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency uses a
conventional missile launched from air platforms to loft a smaller, hypersonic glider on its
journey, even before the missile reaches its apex. The glider then flies unpowered toward its
target. The deadly projectile might ricochet downward, nose tilted up, on layers of atmosphere
-- the mesosphere, then the stratosphere and troposphere -- like an oblate stone on water, in
smaller and shallower skips, or it might be directed to pass smoothly through these layers. In
either instance, the friction of the lower atmosphere would finally slow it enough to allow a
steering system to maneuver it precisely toward its target. The weapon, known as Tactical Boost
Glide, is scheduled to be dropped from military planes during testing next year. Under an
alternative approach, a hypersonic missile would fly mostly horizontally under the power of a
"scramjet," a highly advanced, fanless engine that uses shock waves created by its speed to
compress incoming air in a short funnel and ignite it while passing by (in roughly one
two-thousandths of a second, according to some accounts). With its skin heated by friction to
as much as 5,400 degrees, its engine walls would be protected from burning up by routing the
fuel through them, an idea pioneered by the German designers of the V-2 rocket.
The unusual trajectories of these missiles would allow them to approach their targets at
roughly 12 to 50 miles above the earth's surface, in an attacker's sweet spot. That's below the
altitude at which ballistic missile interceptors -- such as the costly American Aegis
ship-based system and the Thaad ground-based system -- are now designed to typically operate,
yet above the altitude that simpler air defense missiles, like the Patriot system, can reach.
They would zoom along in the defensive void, maneuvering unpredictably, and then, in just a few
final seconds of blindingly fast, mile-per-second flight, dive and strike a target such as an
aircraft carrier from an altitude of 100,000 feet.
Officials will have trouble, moreover, predicting exactly where any strike would land.
Although the missiles' launch would probably be picked up by infrared-sensing satellites in its
first few moments of flight, Griffin says they would be roughly 10 to 20 times harder to detect
than incoming ballistic missiles as they near their targets. And during their flight, due to
their maneuverability, the perimeter of their potential landing zone could be about as big as
Rhode Island. Officials might sound a general alarm, but they'd be clueless about exactly where
the missiles were headed. "We don't have any defense that could deny the employment of such a
weapon against us," Gen. John E. Hyten, commander of United States Strategic Command, told the
Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2018. The Pentagon is just now studying what a
hypersonic attack might look like and imagining how a defensive system might be created; it has
no settled architecture for it, and no firm sense of the costs.
Developing these new weapons hasn't been easy. A 2012 test was terminated when the skin
peeled off a hypersonic prototype, and another self-destructed when it lost control. A third
hypersonic test vehicle was deliberately destroyed when its boosting missile failed in 2014.
Officials at Darpa acknowledge they are still struggling with the composite ceramics they need
to protect the missiles' electronics from intense heating; the Pentagon decided last July to
ladle an extra $ 34.5 million into this effort this
year.
The task of conducting realistic flight tests also poses a challenge. The military's
principal land-based site for open-air prototype flights -- a 3,200-acre site stretching across
multiple counties in New Mexico -- isn't big enough to accommodate hypersonic weapons. So fresh
testing corridors are being negotiated in Utah that will require a new regional political
agreement about the noise of trailing sonic booms. Scientists still aren't sure how to
accumulate all the data they need, given the speed of the flights. The open-air flight tests
can cost up to $100 million.
The Air Force's portion of this effort is being managed from its largest base, Eglin,
located in the Florida panhandle, under the direction of the 96 th Test Wing, whose
official slogan is "Make It Happen." But the most recent open-air hypersonic-weapon test was
completed by the Army and the Navy in October 2017, using a 36,000-pound missile to launch a
glider from a rocky beach on the western shores of Kauai, Hawaii, toward Kwajalein Atoll, 2,300
miles to the southwest. The 9 p.m. flight created a trailing sonic boom over the Pacific, which
was expected to top out at an estimated 175 decibels, well above the threshold at which noise
causes physical pain. The effort cost $160 million, comparable to 6 percent of the total
hypersonics budget proposed for 2020.
The RAND Corporation recently published a document entitled
Overextending
and Unbalancing Russia. Assessing the Impact of Cost-Imposing Options
. The study is the
collective effort of experienced diplomats, including former Assistant Secretary of State for
Europe and US Ambassador to the European Union James Dobbins; a professor (Brookings Institution,
American Enterprise Institute, National Defence University) and military intelligence branched
lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, Raphael Cohen; and seven other RAND researchers who
specialise in international relations, the military industry, intelligence, politics, and
technology.
It is a practical recommendation for how the
US can use Russia's weakness and vulnerability to further limit its political and economic
potential.
So what, exactly, are these influential political
analysts suggesting to the American establishment?
Their full spectrum of operations is divided into
four sections – economic, geopolitical, ideological and informational, and military measures. It is
clear that the experts approached the development of their strategy rationally by measuring the
potential costs for the US itself.
The economic section consists of four options that
Russia has already been directly affected by in previous years. The first of these is expanding the
production and export of US energy resources, which would affect global prices and therefore limit
Russia's profits. The second is strengthening sanctions, where the involvement of other countries
in such a process is seen as essential. Next is helping Europe find new gas suppliers, including
for LNG supplies. And, finally, encouraging migration from Russia to other countries, especially
with regard to skilled workers and educated young people. It is assumed that the first three
options would be the most beneficial to the US, although imposing deeper sanctions could bring
certain risks.
In the section on geopolitical measures, the
US experts propose six geopolitical scenarios aimed at weakening Russia.
They don't just
involve the Russian Federation, either, but neighbouring countries as well. Each scenario has
certain risks, costs, and an expected impact.
According to the Americans,
helping
Ukraine by supplying the country with weapons would exploit Russia's greatest vulnerability
.
But any increase in the supply of US weapons and advice to Ukraine would need to be
carefully calibrated in order to increase the costs to Russia of supporting its existing
commitments without provoking a much wider conflict in which Russia, by reason of proximity, would
have significant advantages.
Syrian Democratic Forces trainees, representing an equal number of Arab and Kurdish
volunteers, stand in formation at their graduation ceremony in northern Syria, August 9, 2017.
This is the first option. The RAND experts believe
that this will be the most beneficial, but that its possible realisation will also involve high
risks.
The second option is to increase support
to the Syrian rebels.
This could jeopardise other US policy priorities, however, such
as combating radical Islamic terrorism, and could destabilise the entire region even further. It
might not even be possible, given the radicalisation, fragmentation, and decline of the Syrian
opposition.
The RAND experts obviously understand all the
possible dangers involved in this scenario, but, reading between the lines, it is easy to see that
this option is basically implying the use of terrorist groups in the geopolitical interests of the
US. There is nothing new about this method in and of itself, but it can be rather costly to
implement and comes with considerable risks, and, in the best case scenario, the likelihood of
success is moderate. It could also upset America's traditional allies, as happened during the Iraq
invasion to overthrow Saddam Hussein.
The third option is promoting
liberalisation in Belarus.
The authors admit that this is unlikely to succeed,
however, and could provoke a strong response from Russia, which would lead to a general worsening
of the security situation in Europe and be a setback for US policy. As with the first option, it
comes with high risk, but the benefits could also be considerable. Needless to say that what is
really being referred to here is a colour revolution in the Republic of Belarus. The country's
leadership should pay attention to this recommendation by the RAND Corporation and ask the US
diplomats in Minsk for comment.
Expanding ties in the South Caucasus,
which competes economically with Russia, is the fourth option,
but it would be
difficult to implement because of geography and history.
The fifth scenario is reducing Russia's
influence in Central Asia,
which could also prove difficult and disproportionately
expensive for the US.
And the sixth, and final, scenario is
organising an uprising in Transnistria and expelling Russian troops, which would be a blow to
Russia's prestige.
This could also have the opposite effect, however, since Moscow
would save money, but it could well lead to additional costs for the US and its allies.
Muscovites protesting the war in Ukraine and Russia's support of separatism in the Crimea on
the Circular Boulevards in Moscow on March 15, 2014
It should be noted that all six scenarios are
aimed at Russia's neighbours. They are a kind of re-working of the old Anaconda strategy unleashed
on Russia's borders.
The section on ideological and informational measures
is aimed at the Russian Federation's domestic policies and is essentially interfering in the
country's affairs. There are just four scenarios, but they speak for themselves:
undermining faith in the electoral system; creating the idea that the political elite does not
serve the interests of society; instigating protests and non-violent resistance; and undermining
Russia's image abroad.
Tellingly, the proposed military measures against
Russia have the largest number of options and are separated into three strategic areas – air, sea,
and land.
It states that repositioning bombers to within
striking distance of key Russian strategic targets would have a high likelihood of success and
would undoubtedly attract Moscow's attention and cause unease. The costs and risks associated with
this option would be fairly low, as long as the bombers are based out of range of most of Russia's
ballistic and ground-based cruise missiles.
Marines assigned to the Thunderbolts of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 251 remove a
training AGM-88 HARM from an F/A-18C Hornet on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71).
Reposturing fighter jets so that they are closer to
their targets than bombers. Although the RAND experts believe that such actions could worry Moscow
more than the option with the bombers, the probability of success is low but the risks are high.
Since each aircraft would have to fly several sorties during a conventional conflict because of low
payload, there is a risk that they could be destroyed on the ground and their deployment airfields
could be shut down early on.
Deploying additional tactical nuclear weapons to
parts of Europe and Asia could increase Russia's worry, which could lead to a significant increase
in investment in its air defences. In combination with the 'bomber' option, it has a high
probability of success, but deploying a large number of these weapons could make Moscow react in
ways that go against the interests of the US and its allies.
Repositioning US and allied ballistic missile defence
systems to better deter Russian ballistic missiles would also make Moscow uneasy, but it would
probably be the least effective option since Russia has plenty of missiles that could be used for
any upgrades. US and allied targets would also remain at risk.
A U.S. sailor aboard the guided missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) fires a torpedo at a
simulated target during Valiant Shield 2014 in the Pacific Ocean September 18, 2014.
The report also suggests developing new
low-observable, long-range bombers or significantly increasing the number of those types that are
already causing unease in Moscow. There is also mention of high numbers of autonomous or remotely
piloted strike aircraft.
As the RAND experts point out,
the key risk
of these options is an arms race, which could lead to cost-imposing strategies directed against the
United States.
For example, investing in ballistic missile defence systems and space-based
weapons would alarm Moscow, but Russia could defend itself against such developments by taking
measures that would probably be considerably cheaper than the cost of these systems to the United
States.
With regard to a maritime confrontation, RAND
suggests increasing the presence of US and allied navies in those zones considered potentially
dangerous because of Russia. It is probably safe to assume that this is referring to the Baltic
Sea, the Arctic, and the Black Sea/Mediterranean Basin. The report also mentions increasing
investment in research and developing new types of weapons that could strike Russian nuclear
submarines. At the same time, it would be a good idea for the US itself to increase the fleet of
submarines in its nuclear triad. And, finally, with regard to the Black Sea, the report suggests
using NATO to develop an access denial strategy – probably through the deployment of long-range,
anti-ship missiles – in order to increase Russia's defence spending in Crimea.
On land, the report's authors believe that there
should be an increase in the number of European NATO troops deployed directly on the Russian
border. They also emphasise the importance of increasing the size and scale of NATO exercises in
Europe, which would send a clear signal to Russia. Another option is to develop intermediate-range
missiles but not deploy them, which would force Russia to upgrade its missile programme (an
additional cost). And, finally, the report suggests investing in new technologies (weapons based on
new physical principles such as lasers) aimed at countering Russian air defence systems.
Exercise Artemis Strike was a German-led tactical live-fire exercise with live Patriot and
Stinger missiles at the NATO Missile Firing Installation in Chania, Greece, from October 31 to
November 9, 2017
As can be seen, all four sections are complementary
in their diversity. The Pentagon has already been working on some innovations in the last few years
as part of the
Third Offset Strategy
, while
the current and new budget suggests that, one way or another, the US will continue to build up its
military power.
Together with other advisory documents for
high-level decision makers in the US, this report by RAND experts is evidence of a large-scale
campaign being carried out against Russia.
It is surprising, however, that all of the
recommendations, especially those included in the military section, are virtually pointing to the
preparation of a war with Russia. It calmly talks about what the US can do about existing arms
limitation treaties, how to use NATO, and how to use Ukraine in the war with Russia, especially on
land and in the Black Sea theatre of operations. There is no doubt that the recommendations
themselves were passed on to US decision-making centres a long time before April 2019, when the
monograph was published. All that remains is to monitor the implementation of these scenarios and
take the appropriate countermeasures.
"... Across-the-board rivalry with China is becoming an organising principle of US economic, foreign and security policies. ..."
"... An effort to halt China's economic and technological rise is almost certain to fail. Worse, it will foment deep hostility in the Chinese people. In the long run, the demands of an increasingly prosperous and well-educated people for control over their lives might still win out. But that is far less likely if China's natural rise is threatened. ..."
"... The tragedy in what is now happening is that the administration is simultaneously launching a conflict between the two powers, attacking its allies and destroying the institutions of the postwar US-led order. ..."
The disappearance of the Soviet Union left a big hole. The "war on terror" was an inadequate replacement. But China ticks all boxes.
For the US, it can be the ideological, military and economic enemy many need. Here at last is a worthwhile opponent. That was the
main conclusion I drew from this year's Bilderberg meetings.
Across-the-board
rivalry with China is becoming
an organising principle of US economic, foreign and security policies.
Whether it is Donald Trump's organizing principle is less important. The US president has the gut instincts of a nationalist and
protectionist. Others provide both framework and details. The aim is US domination. The means is control over China, or separation
from China.
Anybody who believes a rules-based multilateral order, our globalised economy, or even harmonious international relations, are
likely to survive this conflict is deluded. The astonishing
white paper on the
trade conflict
, published on Sunday by China, is proof. The -- to me, depressing -- fact is that on many points Chinese positions are right.
The US focus on
bilateral imbalances is economically illiterate. The view that theft of intellectual property has caused huge damage to the US
is
questionable . The proposition that China has grossly violated its commitments under its 2001 accession agreement to the World
Trade Organization is hugely exaggerated.
Accusing China of cheating is hypocritical when almost all trade policy actions taken by the Trump administration are in breach
of WTO rules, a fact implicitly conceded by its determination
to destroy the
dispute settlement system .
A dispute over the terms of market opening or protection of intellectual property might be settled with careful negotiation. Such
a settlement might even help China, since it would lighten the heavy hand of the state and promote market-oriented reform.
But the issues are now too vexed for such a resolution. This is partly because of the bitter breakdown in negotiation. It is still
more because the US debate is increasingly over whether integration with China's state-led economy is desirable. The fear over Huawei
focuses on national security and technological autonomy.
[Neo]liberal commerce is increasingly seen as "trading with the enemy".
A framing of relations with China as one of zero-sum conflict is emerging. Recent remarks by Kiron Skinner, the US state department's
policy planning director (a job once held by cold war strategist George Kennan) are revealing. Rivalry with Beijing,
she suggested at a
forum organised
by New America , is "a fight with a really different civilisation and a different ideology, and the United States hasn't had
that before".
She added that this would be "the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian". The war with Japan
is forgotten.
But the big point is her framing of this as a civilizational and racial war and so as an insoluble conflict. This cannot be accidental.
She is also still in her job. Others present the conflict as one over ideology and power.
Those emphasising the former point to President Xi Jinping's Marxist rhetoric and the reinforced role of the
Communist party . Those emphasising the latter point to China's rising economic might. Both perspectives suggest perpetual conflict.
This is the most important geopolitical development of our era. Not least, it will increasingly force everybody else to take sides
or fight hard for neutrality. But it is not only important. It is dangerous. It risks turning a manageable, albeit vexed, relationship
into all-embracing conflict, for no good reason. China's ideology is not a threat to liberal democracy in the way the Soviet Union's
was. Rightwing demagogues are far more dangerous.
An effort to halt China's economic and technological rise is almost certain to fail. Worse, it will foment deep hostility in the
Chinese people. In the long run, the demands of an increasingly prosperous and well-educated people for control over their lives
might still win out. But that is far less likely if China's natural rise is threatened.
Moreover, the rise of China is not an important cause of western malaise. That reflects far more the indifference and incompetence
of domestic elites. What is seen as theft of intellectual property reflects, in large part, the inevitable attempt of a rising economy
to master the technologies of the day. Above all, an attempt to preserve the domination of 4 per cent of humanity over the rest is
illegitimate.
This certainly does not mean accepting everything China does or says. On the contrary, the best way for the west to deal with
China is to insist on the abiding values of freedom, democracy, rules-based multilateralism and global co-operation. These ideas
made many around the globe supporters of the US in the past.
They still captivate many Chinese people today. It is quite possible to uphold these ideas, indeed insist upon them far more strongly,
while co-operating with a rising China where that is essential, as over protecting the natural environment, commerce and peace.
A blend of competition with co-operation is the right way forward. Such an approach to managing China's rise must include co-operating
closely with like-minded allies and treating China with respect.
The tragedy in what is now happening is that the administration is simultaneously launching a conflict between the two powers,
attacking its allies and destroying the institutions of the postwar US-led order.
Today's attack on China is the wrong war, fought in the wrong way, on the wrong terrain. Alas, this is where we now are.
"... However, nothing in the actual piece talks about security concerns. (I point this out because I perceive a trend towards such misleading summaries and headlines which contradict what the actual reporting says.) ..."
"... These companies do not have security concerns over Huawei. But the casual reader, who does not dive down into the actual piece, is left with a false impression that such concerns are valid and shared. ..."
"... South China Morning Post ..."
"... This move by Google-USG is mostly a propaganda warfare move. Huawei doesn't depend on smartphone sales to survive. It's American market was already small, while China's domestic market is huge. China is not Japan. ..."
"... Trump's heavy handed move against Huawei will backfire. The optic is unsettling; the US looks to be destroying a foreign competitor because it is winning. ..."
"... Until the reserve currency issue favoring the "exceptional" nation changes, the economic terrorism will continue.. ..."
"... What is funny in all these stories, is that there is little to no Huawei equipment (not the end-user smart phone, home router and stuff, but backbone routers, access equipment,..) anywhere in the US -- they are forbidden to compete. Most telcos are quite happy to sell in the US, as the absence of these Chinese competitors allows for healthy margins, which is no longer true in other markets. ..."
"... The US is trying desperately to quash tech success / innovation introduced by others who are not controlled by (or in partnership with) the US, via economic war, for now just politely called a trade war - China no 1 adversary. ..."
"... Attacking / dissing / scotching trade between one Co. (e.g. Huawei) and the world is disruptive of the usual, conventional, accepted, exchange functioning, and throws a pesky spanner in the works of the system. Revanchard motives, petty targetting, random pot-shots, lead to what? ..."
"... The war against Huawei is only one small aspect within the overall Trade War, which is based on the false premise of US economic strength. Most of the world wants to purchase material things, not financial services which is the Outlaw US Empire's forte and most of the world can easily forego. Trump's Trade War isn't going as planned which will cause him to double-down in a move that will destroy his 2020 hopes. ..."
However, nothing in
the actual piece talks about security concerns. (I point this out because I perceive a trend towards such misleading summaries
and headlines which contradict what the actual reporting says.)
The British processor company ARM, which licenses its design to Huawei, cites U.S. export controls as the reason to stop cooperation
with Huawei:
The conflict is putting companies and governments around the world in a tough spot, forcing them to choose between alienating
the United States or China .
Arm Holdings issued its statement after the BBC reported the firm had told staff to suspend dealings with Huawei.
An Arm spokesman said some of the company's intellectual property is designed in the United States and is therefore " subject
to U.S. export controls ."
Additionally two British telecom providers quote U.S. restrictions as reason for no longer buying Huawei smartphones:
BT Group's EE division, which is preparing to launch 5G service in six British cities later this month, said Wednesday it would
no longer offer a new Huawei smartphone as part of that service. Vodafone also said it would drop a Huawei smartphone from
its lineup. Both companies appeared to tie that decision to Google's move to withhold licenses for its Android operating software
from future Huawei phones.
These companies do not have security concerns over Huawei. But the casual reader, who does not dive down into the actual
piece, is left with a false impression that such concerns are valid and shared.
That the Trump administration says it has security reasons for its Huawei ban does not mean that the claim is true. Huawei
equipment is as good or bad as any other telecommunication equipment, be it from Cisco or Apple. The National Security Agency
and other secret services will try to infiltrate all types of such equipment.
After the sudden ban on U.S. entities to export to Huawei, chipmakers like Qualcomm temporarily stopped their relations with
Huawei. Google said that it would no longer allow access to the Google Play store for new Huawei smartphones. That will diminish
their utility for many users.
The public reaction in China to this move was quite negative. There were many calls for counter boycotts of Apple's i-phones
on social media and a general anti-American sentiment.
The founder and CEO of Huawei, Ren Zhengfei, tried to counter that. He gave a
two hour interview (vid, 3 min excerpt with subtitles)
directed at the Chinese public. Ren sounds very conciliatory and relaxed. The Global Times and the South China Morning
Post only have shortexcerpts
of what he said. They empathize that Huawei is well prepared and can master the challenge:
I do not believe this is precisely what will happen. Huawei already has its licenses purchased. In addition they could decide
to disrespect the IP if this was the case.
Huaweis's suppliers in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (ROC), and Britain are examining if they can continue to make business with
Huawei, while some have already declared a suspension in cooperation.
The issue is that these non-American companies nonetheless use some American components of technology, and if they proceed
they will be sanctioned by the US themselves.
It is the same reason why Russia's Sukhoi did not in the end sell its SSJ-100 airliners to Iran -- East Asian tech companies
can hardly be expected to be more gung-ho on defying the US than Russia's leading defense plant......
@p #2 - Huawei surely has their processors *as of now*.
That - if USA would not ban Huawei (HiSilicon) processors, because of using that ARM technology. Thing is, Huawei would be
isolated from next-generation ARM processors. They are locked now in their current generation.
Even Qualcomm today, for what I know, bases their processors on ARM's "default" schemes, instead of doing their development
"from scratch", in a totally independent way. It would push for slow but steady decline as "top" smartphone vendor into "el cheapo"
niche.
Boeing is the counter-part in the contest to destroy Huawei. China has great leverage over Boeing's future. It is the nation with
the biggest market now and downstream for 10-20 years. China need planes, thousands of them.
As for Huawei's chief doubting the prowess of the Chinese students, he only needs to look at the rapidity of the conversion
of his nations' economy to a 98% digital economy. All that conversion was done by local, entrepreneurial innovators in the software
and hardware tech sector. It happened only in China and completely by Chinese young people who had phones and saw the future and
made it happen.
It has been Chinese minds building Chinese AI on Chinese Big Data.
Yes, they need Russian technologists and scientists. Those Russian minds in Russia, in Israel, in South Korea are proven difference
makers.
The need China now has will meet the solution rapidly. For five years, the Double Helix of Russia-China has been coming closer
in education and R&D institutes in both nations. China investors and Chinese sci-tech personnel are in the sci-tech parks of Russia,
and Russians are in similar facilities in China. More will happen now that the Economic War against China threatens.
Huawei will have solutions to replace all US components by the end of the year. It will lose some markets. but it will gain
hugely in the BRI markets yet to be developed.
In the long run, the US makers will rue the day Trump and his gang of Sinophobes and hegemonists took aim at Huawei and China's
tech sector.
This move by Google-USG is mostly a propaganda warfare move. Huawei doesn't depend on smartphone sales to survive. It's American
market was already small, while China's domestic market is huge. China is not Japan.
Besides, it's not like Europe is prospering either. Those post-war days are long gone.
And there's no contradiction between what the CEO said and the Government line: both are approaching the same problem from
different points of view, attacking it from different fronts at the same time. "Patriotism" is needed insofar as the Chinese people
must be prepared to suffer some hardships without giving up long term prosperity. "Nationalism" ("politics") is toxic insofar
as, as a teleological tool, it is a dead end (see Bannon's insane antics): the Chinese, after all, are communists, and communists,
by nature, are internationalists and think beyond the artificial division of humanity in Nation-States.
Talking Digital and security in the same sentence is laughable.... NOTHING Digital is 'secure',,, never has,,, never will.
Digital destroys everything it touches. At present, excepting for now the low wage States, it is destroying economies ever
so slowly one sector at a time. This has nothing to do with security and everything to do with the dying West, especially the
USA which is trying desperately to save what's left of its production whether it be 5G, Steel plants or Nord Stream. The West
created China when it happily allowed and assisted Western corporations to move the production there in order to hide the inflation
that was being created for wars and welfare and now has to deal with the fallout which eventually will be their undoing.
A full-blown trade war was probably inevitable, driven by geopolitical concerns as much or more than economics.
One wonders what each of China and US has been doing to prepare. It seems like the answer is "very little" but since it's USA
that is driving this bus, I would think that USA would've done more to prepare (than China has).
PS It's not just Boeing. China also supplies the vast majority of rare earth minerals.
Her captivity and probable imprisonment in the US explain his attitude. She is a high profile pawn. The US must convict her
in order to justify what they have done to her so far. She may not serve time, in the US prisons, but she will be branded a guilty
person, guilty of violating the Empire's rules (laws).
Imagine Ivanka in the same situation. Her daughter singing in Mandarin would be little help. The Trump Family will be a number
one target for equal treatment long after "45" leaves office.
The US Empire is wild with Power. All of that Power is destructive. And all the globe is the battlefield, except USA. But History
teaches that this in-equilibrium will not last long.
We've seen how Europe caved to US pressure to stop trading with Iran. Now Japan and others are caving to pressure to stop trading
with China. There is already pressure and negotiation to stop Nordstream. And all of the above leads to questions about Erdogan's
resolve.
Trump's heavy handed move against Huawei will backfire. The optic is unsettling; the US looks to be destroying a foreign competitor
because it is winning.
The ramifications of trade war with China (where the supply and manufacturing chain of most consumer electronics is these days)
is disruptive. Trump has created uncertainty for many manufacturers since there is Chinese part content is just about everything
these days. Some manufacturers might relocate production to the US but most will try to simply decouple from the US entirely.
Exposure to the US is really the problem not exposure to China.
The trade war with Iran was also unlikely to persist. But it has persisted, and deepened as European poodles pretended to resist
and then pretended not to notice that they didn't.
A new Bloomberg opinion piece agrees with that view
No, it doesn't b. You say USA trade war will fail because it lacks international support. Bloomberg says USA should get international
support to make it more effective. The difference is that it is highly likely that USA will get international support. It already
has support from Japan.
USA has proven that it can effectively manipulate it's poodle allies. Another example is Venezuela where more than two dozen
countries recognized Guido only because USA wanted them to.
<> <> <> <> <> <> <>
It's not Trump but the US Deep State that causes US allies to fall in line. Any analysis that relies on Trump as President
is bound to fail as his public persona is manipulated to keep Deep State adversaries (including the US public) off-balance.
Like President's before him, Trump will take the blame (and the credit) until another team member is chosen to replace him
in what we call "free and fair elections".
What is funny in all these stories, is that there is little to no Huawei equipment (not the end-user smart phone, home router
and stuff, but backbone routers, access equipment,..) anywhere in the US -- they are forbidden to compete. Most telcos are quite
happy to sell in the US, as the absence of these Chinese competitors allows for healthy margins, which is no longer true in other
markets.
So the Huawei ban hits first and foremost the US' partners.
China can only undo the US-exceptionalsim if and when it can visibly project military power. The only way to achieve
that is tt has to make great haste in building a few fleets of aircraft carriers, fregats and destroyers, etc. It must
build a grand, visibly magnificent Chinese Navy.
Modi wins in India, another victory for the world oligarchs. Exactly mimicking conditions in the U$A. Media and governmental
capture by the uber wealthy...
The US is trying desperately to quash tech success / innovation introduced by others who are not controlled by (or in partnership
with) the US, via economic war, for now just politely called a trade war - China no 1 adversary.
Afaik, the entire smart-phone industry is 'integrated' and 'regulated' by FTAs, the WTO, the patent circuit, the Corps. and
Gvmts. who collaborate amongst themselves.
Corps. can't afford to compete viciously because infrastructure, aka more encompassing systems or networks (sic) are a pre-requisite
for biz, thus, Gvmts. cooperate with the Corps, and sign various 'partnerships,' etc.
sidebar. Not to mention the essential metals / components provenance, other topic. see
Attacking / dissing / scotching trade between one Co. (e.g. Huawei) and the world is disruptive of the usual, conventional,
accepted, exchange functioning, and throws a pesky spanner in the works of the system. Revanchard motives, petty targetting, random
pot-shots, lead to what?
As I wrote in the Venezuela thread, major US corps are already belt tightening by permanently laying off managers, not already
cut-to-the-bone production staff, and another major clothing retailer is closing its 650+ stores. And the full impact of Trump's
Trade War has yet to be felt by consumers. As Wolff, Hudson and other like-minded economists note, there never was a genuine recovery
from 2008, while statistical manipulation hides the real state of the US economy. One thing that cannot be hidden is the waning
of revenues collected via taxes which drives the budget deficit--and the shortfall isn't just due to the GOP Congress's tax cuts.
The war against Huawei is only one small aspect within the overall Trade War, which is based on the false premise of US economic
strength. Most of the world wants to purchase material things, not financial services which is the Outlaw US Empire's forte and
most of the world can easily forego. Trump's Trade War isn't going as planned which will cause him to double-down in a move that
will destroy his 2020 hopes.
Data for 2019 is probably slightly different, but the trends should keep on. That data also does not separate Android-based
phones from non-Android phones. So, segmenting Android into Google and China infrastructures would mean
1) Huawei retains a $152B market - China
2) Huawei retains an unknown share in $87B market - APAC
3) Huawei loses a $163,9B market - all non-China world.
At best Huawei looses 40,7% of world market. That if all APAC population would voluntarily and uniformly drop out of Google
services into Huawei/China services (which they would not). At worst Huawei retains 37,7% of the marker (if APAC population would
uniformly follow Google, which they would not either).
Presumably, RF has been falsely accused in Salisbury. Presumably, RF and Syria have been
falsely accused in Douma. Presumably, Russia and Syria have been falsely accused over Khan
Seikhoun. Presumably, RF has been falsely accused and PUNISHED over the athletes drug doping.
Presumably, RF has been falsely accused over MH17 tragedy. Presumably, the US/EU/NATO/GCC
know all this, and still they carry on?
There can be only ONE reaction from President Putin.
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH!
NO MORE MR NICE GUY.
How this translates into action is up to him and the Russian people. Godspeed to the
mighty Russian Federation, who have become MORE Christian than the US. (I observe this as a
British Indian Hindu).
This reminds me of the moment when the Gita is revealed to Arjuna by Lord Krishna, on the
verge of a war he had done everything to avoid. Lord Krishna revealed how Arjuna had to do
his duty, his dharma, no matter what his attachment. Godspeed President Putin and the RF
military leaders and brave soldiers!
"If President Trump had ever read Mackinder -- and there's no evidence he did -- one might
assume that he's aiming at a new anti-Eurasia integration pivot centered on the Persian Gulf.
And energy would be at the heart of the pivot.
If Washington were able to control everything, including "Big Prize" Iran, it would be
able to dominate all Asian economies, especially China. Trump even said were that to happen,
"decisions on the GNP of China will be made in Washington."...
...Arguably the key (invisible) takeaway of the meetings this week between Foreign
Ministers Sergey Lavrov and Wang Yi, and then between Lavrov and Pompeo, is that Moscow made
it quite clear that Iran will be protected by Russia in the event of an American showdown.
Pompeo's body language showed how rattled he was.
What rattled Pomp: "Any use of nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies, be it
small-scale, medium-scale or any other scale, will be treated as a nuclear attack on our
country. The response will be instant and with all the relevant consequences,"
Trump may not have read Mackinder but Kissinger sure would have.
steven t johnson , Apr 28, 2019 11:37:43 AM |
link
<
Rhisiart Gwilym@30 seems to think that Putin boasting means it's real. This is incorrect.
There is a great deal of historical experience with new weapons. About the only one that was
unanswerable was the chariot and heavy cavalry (with armored rider.) But that was because of
the difficulty in finding large enough horses. The bow spread rapidly. Iron weapons spread
more slowly, although it is easier to transport iron ore than to raise cavalry horses. But
not even iron weapons made the Hittites invincible. They beat the Egyptians, but their empire
still fell, and Egypt's didn't. >
In more recent times, again, the usual experience of new weapons is that they always take
much time to incorporate successfully. And they never make the old armies obsolete. The
modern weapon that came closest to actually winning the war was, as near as I can tell, the
submarine, at least against island nations needing large imports. (Submarine warfare against
Japanese shipping is unsung, but was quite important as I understand it.) The machine gun,
the hydraulic recoil artillery, the flamethrower, the grenade, the barbed wire, the tank, the
plan...none of them compensated for weakness. In the end, however much the new weapons
changed, skilled leadership and determined soldiers who kept their morale could compensate.
And none of these weapons ever compensated for the caste arrogance of incompetent officers or
the demoralization of conscripts used as cannon fodder.
Now that is reality. This reality will crush a Putin press conference.
@steven t johnson #1
I don't know for a fact that the new Russian weapon systems are real, but the technological
breakthroughs behind them are very believable.
Instead of a "magic" stealth capability via ginormous spending as the F-35 is supposed to be
able to do - on top of which it can do via jump jet, carrier based, air superiority, ground
attack, etc etc all at once, the Russian systems are based on a single nuclear engine plus
some civilian grade autonomous guidance capability.
The tidal torpedo is this engine, running underwater, and autonomously guided. The Russian
military has always had very interesting underwater tech including the fastest sub ever
actually built plus the hyperspeed underwater missile/torpedo - which actually creates an
underwater air bubble and travels in it, a tech which the US, I believe, has no idea how to
replicate.
The hyperspeed missile, the same nuclear engine at max power.
The world-spanning cruise missile, the same nuclear engine at long duration plus
autonomous vehicle tech including GLONASS and terrain following - which existing Russian
anti-ship and cruise missile systems must already have.
We do know that Russian tech is very advanced in terms of rocketry; Russian nuclear
systems have also been progressing for decades - unlike in the US where 3 Mile Island stopped
pretty much all nuclear tech development, outside of bombs, for 4 decades.
From my view, it is very possible that this engine exists.
I'd also note that the new systems are primarily deterrence. Yes, a hyperspeed nuclear
missile could be used for first strike, but none of these systems are really useful for
colonialist domination or beating down of "terrorists" with AK47s and sandals.
The new systems aren't for land control - which all of your examples are used for. They're
intended for deterrence/defense.
Land control weapons are different because they require enormous scale.
The theory of air superiority as demonstrated by WW2, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq1, Iraq2,
Afghanistan, Syria, Libya etc is a good example where the theory is that the ability to
destroy the enemy's industry and "will to fight" would be able to replace the need to
actually field soldiers and armies.
American hagiography falsely believes it is the strategic bombing in WW2 that defeated the
Germans; the reality was clearly 20 million dead Russians, millions of live ones in tanks
which eventually took down the Wehrmacht at its peak.
Vietnam was an outright failure - ginormous amounts of bombs, napalm and Agent Orange
failed to break the Vietnamese people's will to fight.
Korea - it worked until it didn't. The US bombed the crap out of the entire country but
ultimately the Chinese manpower turned the tide (note many of these Chinese "volunteers" were
ex-Nationalists sent out to die).
Iraq1 worked - a quick demonstration strike against a 3rd rate military that thought it
was 2nd rate, but Iraq2 showed that just taking down the official military isn't enough to
actually win on the ground.
Afghanistan - ditto. Bombs everywhere for 17+ years, and the Taliban is stronger than ever
before.
Libya - I suspect Gaddafi never thought he'd get stabbed in the back like he did, and was
woefully unprepared, but again US and French/British bombers were used to take down
strongpoints so that the various tribes could roll into town.
Lastly Syria: the presence of Russian military tech stopped the one-sided use of airpower,
and a literal handful of Russian attack jets turned the tide for the entire conflict despite
hundreds of millions of dollars in weaponry poured into Syria by the UAE, Qatar, Turkey and
Saudi Arabia.
It seems the lessons you are trying to teach are simply the wrong ones: Japanese
shipping/American submarines - the reality was that Japan didn't have the manpower or the
oil. Japan had 73 million people in 1940 vs. the US @132M (Germany had 90M). Japan was
significantly behind industrially, economically and technologically. Yes, the US was
participating in Europe - but Japan was also attacking China (population 825M).
For that matter, it is very clear that Japan had significant provocation prior to Pearl
Harbor in the form of an oil embargo imposed by the US US State Dept web site
documenting embargo on Japan (sound familiar? US sanctions aren't anything new)
"... The real test for having an “unprecedentedly high level” relationship would be to coordinate diplomatic campaigns against U.S. policies. Working together they are more likely to split off American allies and friends from unpopular initiatives, such as unilateral sanction campaigns. ..."
"... Lets all mindlessly repeat the platitudes of Thinktankistan entities like CATO... Russian economy is smaller than new York... Russian relies on oil sales and doesn't make anything.... These sock puppets must think we are imbeciles. ..."
"... He's an Atlantacist fool. Senior fellow at the CATO institute, pretty much says it all. His style is to drop the odd truth-bomb (like criticizing the ill-advised NATO expansion and US geopolitical belligerence) but he still sticks to the main planks of Euro-Atlantic narratives. ..."
...Beijing and Moscow share one very big objective: resist U.S. dominance. Washington
expanded NATO up to Russia's borders; America's navy patrols the Asia-Pacific and treats those
waters as an American lake. Elsewhere there is no issue upon which Washington fails to
sanctimoniously pronounce its opinion and piously attempt to enforce its judgment.
Unfortunately, for quite some time Washington has seemed determined to give both China and
Russia good cause for discontent. Instead, in response, Washington should do its best to
eliminate behaviors which bring its two most important competitors together. Then the United
States wouldn't need to worry what Presidents Putin and Xi were saying to one another
.
Thus, Washington has done much to bring its two leading adversaries together. However,
hostility is a limited basis for agreement. There is no military alliance, despite Chinese
participation in a Russian military exercise last fall. Neither government is interested in
going to war with America and certainly not over the other’s grievances. A shared sense
of threat could change that, but extraordinarily sustained and maladroit U.S. policies would be
required to create that atmosphere.
When the two countries otherwise act for similar purposes, it usually is independently, even
competitively, rather than cooperatively. For instance, both are active in Cuba, contra
Washington’s long-failed policy of starving the regime into submission. Beijing and
Moscow also are both supporting Venezuela’s beleaguered Maduro government. However, China
and Russia appear to be focused on advancing their own government’s influence, even
against that of the other.
Both nations have a United Nations Security Council veto, though the PRC traditionally has
preferred to abstain, achieving little, rather than cast a veto. However, working together they
could more effectively reshape allied proposals for UN action. They could do much the same in
other multilateral organizations, though usually without having a veto.
The real test for having an “unprecedentedly high level” relationship would
be to coordinate diplomatic campaigns against U.S. policies. Working together they are more
likely to split off American allies and friends from unpopular initiatives, such as unilateral
sanction campaigns. Europe is more likely to cooperate if the PRC, valued for its economic
connections, joined Russia, still distrusted for its confrontation with Ukraine and
interference in domestic European politics. So far this former communist “axis” has
been mostly an inconvenience for the United States, rather than a significant hindrance,
Still, that could change if the Trump administration makes ever more extraordinary
assertions of unilateral power. Washington officials appear to sense the possibilities, having
periodically whined about cooperation between China and Russia, apparently ill-prepared for any
organized opposition to U.S. policies.
... ... ...
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to
President Ronald Reagan. He is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire
.
"China appears poised to absorb Russia’s sparsely populated east."
Good Lord, but when does this endless BS end? Seriously, no-one really believes this
yet these clowns and fools keep trotting out these absurd canards.
"In a sense, the Putin-Xi meeting was much ado about nothing. The relationship
revolves around what they are against, which mostly is the United States. They would have
little to talk about other than the latest grievance about America to express or American
activity to counter."
Yeah sure... no reason why Putin and Xi wouldn't want to talk about economic links
given that Russia-China trade is now over $100B per year equivalent.... a figure reached
more than 5 years earlier than Western "experts" had predicted, and which is growing very
strongly.
Lets all mindlessly repeat the platitudes of Thinktankistan entities like CATO...
Russian economy is smaller than new York... Russian relies on oil sales and doesn't make
anything.... These sock puppets must think we are imbeciles.
Orwell predicted "It is a warfare of limited aims between
combatants who are unable to destroy one another, have no material cause
for fighting and are not divided by any genuine ideological difference."
He's an Atlantacist fool. Senior fellow at the CATO institute, pretty much says it
all. His style is to drop the odd truth-bomb (like criticizing the ill-advised NATO
expansion and US geopolitical belligerence) but he still sticks to the main planks of
Euro-Atlantic narratives.
"... A lot of money not only in the USA but from the vassal states is and was at stake thus when Trump came along with his anti-imperial rhetoric ..."
"... Whatever Candidate Trump may or may not thought about a militaristic foreign policy, once in office he was properly tutored in the realities of the game. He now realizes that the MIC exists purely through the sufferance of external "enemies"; that "Full-Spectrum Dominance" means what it says; that America Numba One is non-negotiable; that Israel sets ME policy for the US; and that there is no limit to the DoD budget. Any policy changes outside of those parameters is tolerated and here we are plus ça change, etc., etc. ..."
President Bush withdrew the United States unilaterally from the Antiballistic Missile
Treaty, correct? Now, this treaty was related, because it forbid the deployment of so-called
missile defense in a way that either side, American or Russian, could think that it had such
great missile defense, it had a first strike capability. And everybody agreed nobody should
think that. Mutually assured destruction had kept us safe in the nuclear age. But if Russia
or the United States gets a first strike capability, then you don't have assured mutual
destruction, and some crazy person might be tempted to risk it. So how did the Russians react
to that? They began to develop–as I said before, when we began to deploy missile
defense–a new generation of weapons. In other words, you're getting this classic
action, reaction, action, reaction that drove the previous nuclear arms race, and now it's
happening again.
Decisions on whether to go to nuclear war are down to less than 5 minutes. That's the reason
the Doomsday clock is closer to midnight than ever before. And Trump, Pompeo, and Bolton will
be making the decisions.
Since the decline and fall of the Soviet Empire Washington has been worried that its
existence as an imperial capital was in danger due to the rise of the small government right.
A lot of money not only in the USA but from the vassal states is and was at stake thus when
Trump came along with his anti-imperial rhetoric the entire Washington Establishment rose as
one and screamed "off with his head" so Trump had to mollify everyone by more warlike
rhetoric and allying himself with the Saudis and the neo-fascists in Israel and it looks like
he will finish out his term.
Detente will never come no matter who wins next year and no one
wants nuclear war but we could step into it as Cohen warns.
But I believe today that military
leaders have shown how adept they were in avoiding conflict in Syria so I'm more hopeful than
Cohen.
Whatever Candidate Trump may or may not thought about a militaristic foreign policy, once
in office he was properly tutored in the realities of the game. He now realizes that the MIC
exists purely through the sufferance of external "enemies"; that "Full-Spectrum Dominance"
means what it says; that America Numba One is non-negotiable; that Israel sets ME policy for
the US; and that there is no limit to the DoD budget. Any policy changes outside of those
parameters is tolerated and here we are plus ça change, etc., etc.
China has risen explosively, from being clearly a "Third World" country forty years ago to
become a very serious and rapidly advancing competitor to America. Anyone who has seen today's
China (I recently spent two weeks there, traveling muchly) will have been astonished by the
ubiquitous construction, the quality of planning, the roads and airports and high-speed rail,
the sense of confidence and modernity. Compare this with America's rotting and dangerous
cities, swarms of homeless people, deteriorating education, antique rail, deindustrialized
midlands, loony government, and ahe military sucking blood from the economy like some vast
leech, and America will seem yesterday's country. The phrase "national suicide" comes to
mind.
A common response to these observations from thunder-thump patriots is the assertion that
the Chinese can't invent anything, just copy and steal. What one actually sees is a combination
of rapid and successful adoption of foreign technology (see Shanghai maglev below) and,
increasingly, cutting edge science and technology. More attention might be in order.
This year. A couple of decades ago, Chinese students in the US often refused to return to a
backward and repressive country. It now appears that Asia is where the action is and they want
to be part of it.
All those things you mentioned are micro-innovations, not macro ones.
China hasn't come up with a game-changer like the internet.
But we must keep in mind that most of the West hasn't been all that innovative either.
Rather, there have been spurts and sudden explosions followed by little activity.
Look at the Greeks. So creative long long ago but what happened to that fire during
Byzantine yrs? And what are Greeks today? And Italians? And Renaissance was mostly about few
parts of Northern Italy. Italy made some great films in the 20th century but hasn't been a
key player in much of anything.
And most European peoples haven't been all that innovative. It was only pockets of places
in UK, France, and Germany mostly in the modern era. What big thing came out of Poland,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and etc? There are surely exceptions, but they weren't major
players.
Innovations are about sparks. Sparks of inspiration, ingenuity. But for sparks to catch
fire, there has to be dry wood. The problem for East Asia was it tended to suppress
spark-mentality and, besides, the wood was wet with tradition and customs.
But then, a nation that defines itself by genius and innovation alone will fail too. Why?
Because only a tiny number of people are genius or innovative. Most people are 'lame'. If a
nation comes to define itself mainly by wealth, smarts, and genius, then most people will
have no value. Also, the top smarties will identify mainly with smarties in other parts of
the world than with their own 'lame' folks. This is why Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and
Singapore are going the wrong path. They've emphasized excellence so much that only elites
have value, and these elites feel closer to Western elites than with their own 'lame' masses
who are to be replaced like white folks in US and EU.
Certain sectors are doing better than ever. Also, US continues to be the top magnet of
talent around the world.
But in other ways, it is falling apart.
Much of US will end up worse but much of it will get richer.
US will be like a hyper Latin American nation with great riches and great poverty.
A common response to these observations from thunder-thump patriots is the assertion
that the Chinese can't invent anything, just copy and steal.
Well, let's do a thought exercise and simply assume that this is 100% true, that the
Chinese can't invent anything, just copy, steal and maintain what whites invent. Does that
change your opinion that China will overtake the West? It shouldn't.
The West is slowly (at least for now) imploding. We are importing the 3rd world, while we
demonize whites. The West has managed to avoid dramatic decline because whites were still a
large majority of the citizens. That is changing. Whites are less than 50% of births in the
United States. Non-whites account for 1 in 3 births in England. Muslims account for at least
20% of births in France with Sub-Saharan Africans making up between 5% and 10% of the
births.
We'll reach a tipping point at some point where things start to noticeably decline. China
doesn't need to outdo the West. It just has to avoid declining with the West. If China simply
maintains the technology and societal organization of the West while the West falls into
tribal warfare – hot or cold – China will become the dominate power.
@Anon I'd agree with that.
But under that scenario, China will still become the dominant world power. We're on our way
to be a sort-of Brazil of the North. Well, Brazil doesn't do much on the world stage.
We simply won't have the money or talent to maintain a global military and cultural
presence. Then again, we'll probably still be run by Jews, so we'll like remain a presence in
the Middle East.
"... "If that was to happen and no energy source can cover the decline rate, wouldn't the world be pretty fucked economically thereafter? Hence one can assume or take a wild ass guess that the decline after peak would resemble something like Venezuela. So not a smooth short % decline rate." ..."
"... Realistically the global economy is already in a tight spot. It started back in 2000 when Oil prices started climbing from about $10/bbl in 1998 to about $30/bbl in 2000. Then the World Major Central banks dropped interest which ended triggering the Housing Boom\Bust and carried Oil prices to $147/bbl. Since then Interest rates have remained extremely low while World Debt has soared (expected to top $250T in 2019). ..."
"... Probably the biggest concern for me is the risking risks for another World war: The US has been targeting all of the major Oil exporters. The two remaining independent targets are Venezuela & Iran. I suspect Venzuela will be the next US take over since it will be a push over compared to Iran. ..."
"If that was to happen and no energy source can cover the decline rate, wouldn't the world be pretty fucked economically
thereafter? Hence one can assume or take a wild ass guess that the decline after peak would resemble something like Venezuela.
So not a smooth short % decline rate."
Energy is the economy, The economy cannot function without energy. Thus its logical that a decline in energy supply will reduce
the economy. The only way for this not to apply is if there are efficiency gains that offset the decline. But at this point the
majority of cost effective efficiency gains are already in place. At this point gains become increasing expensive with much smaller
gains (law of diminishing returns). Major infrastructure changes like modernizing rail lines take many decades to implement and
also require lots of capital. Real capital needed will be difficult to obtain do to population demographics (ie boomers dependent
on massive unfunded entitlement & pensions).
Realistically the global economy is already in a tight spot. It started back in 2000 when Oil prices started climbing from
about $10/bbl in 1998 to about $30/bbl in 2000. Then the World Major Central banks dropped interest which ended triggering the
Housing Boom\Bust and carried Oil prices to $147/bbl. Since then Interest rates have remained extremely low while World Debt has
soared (expected to top $250T in 2019).
My guess is that global economy will wipe saw in the future as demographics, resource depletion (including Oil) and Debt all
merge into another crisis. Gov't will act with more cheap and easy credit (since there is no alterative TINA) as well as QE\Asset
buying to avoid a global depression. This creating a wipesaw effect that has already been happening since 2000 with Boom Bust
cycles. This current cycle has lasted longer because the Major central banks kept interest rates low, When The Fed started QT
and raising rate it ended up triggering a major stock market correction In Dec 2018. I believe at this point the Fed will no longer
seek any further credit tightening that will trip the economy back into recession. However its likely they the global economy
will fall into another recession as consumers & business even without further credit tighting by CB (Central Banks) Because they've
been loading up on cheap debt, which will eventually run into issues servicing their debt. For instance there are about 7M auto
loans in delinquency in March of 2019. Stock valuations are largely driven by stock buybacks, which is funded by debt. I presume
companies are close to debt limit which is likely going to prevent them from purchase more stock back.
Probably the biggest concern for me is the risking risks for another World war: The US has been targeting all of the major
Oil exporters. The two remaining independent targets are Venezuela & Iran. I suspect Venzuela will be the next US take over since
it will be a push over compared to Iran. I think once all of remaining independent Oil Exports are seized that is when the
major powers start fighting each other. However is possible that some of the proxy nations (Pakastan\India),(Israel\Iran), etc
trigger direct war between the US, China, and Russia at any time.
Notice that the US is now withdrawing from all its major arms treaties, and the US\China\Russia are now locked into a Arms
race. Nuclear powers are now rebuilding their nuclear capacity (more Nukes) and modernizing their deployment systems (Hypersonic,
Very large MIRV ICBMS, Undersea drones, Subs, Bombers, etc.
My guess is that nations like the US & China will duke it out before collapsing into the next Venezuela. If my assessment is
correct, The current state of Venezuela will look like the garden of Eden compared to the aftermath of a full scale nuclear war.
Currently the Doomsday clock (2019) is tied with 1953 at 2 minutes:
1953 was the height of the cold war. I presume soon the Doomsday clock will be reduced to less than 2 Minutes later this
year, due to recent events in the past few weeks.
"the world's nuclear nations proceeded with programs of "nuclear modernization" that are all but indistinguishable from
a worldwide arms race, and the military doctrines of Russia and the United States have increasingly eroded the long-held taboo
against the use of nuclear weapons."
" The current international security situation -- what we call the "new abnormal" -- has extended over two years now.
It's a state as worrisome as the most dangerous times of the Cold War, a state that features an unpredictable and shifting
landscape of simmering disputes that multiply the chances for major military conflict to erupt."
Many people I talk to seem to think American foreign policy has something to do with
democracy, human rights, national security, or maybe terrorism or freedom, or niceness, or
something. It is a curious belief, Washington being interested in all of them. Other people
are simply puzzled, seeing no pattern in America's international behavior. Really, the
explanation is simple.
Ahhh..yes..nothing like the handiwork of the shitstains,morons ,leprechauns, cnts and
cckskkers in the USA State Department over the last few decades that COUL:D have fostered
fundamental sanity in international relations but did not do so:
"A nuclear catastrophe in the making?
No one should underestimate the danger of what would be the first-ever war between
nuclear-armed states. Since the 2001-2002 war crisis, which saw a million Indian troops
deployed on the Pakistan border for nine months, both countries have developed hair-trigger
strategies, with a dynamic impelling rapid escalation. In response to India's Cold Start
strategy, which calls for the rapid mobilization of Indian forces for a multi-front invasion
of Pakistan, Islamabad has deployed tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. India has, in
return, signaled that any use by Pakistan of tactical nuclear weapons will break the
"strategic threshold," freeing India from its "no first use" nuclear-weapon pledge, and be
met with strategic nuclear retaliation.
All this would play out in a relatively small, densely populated area. The center of
Lahore, Pakistan's second largest city with a population in excess of 11 million, lies little
more than 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) from the Indian border. The distance from New Delhi to
Islamabad is significantly less than that between Berlin and Paris or New York and Detroit
and would be travelled by a nuclear-armed missile in a matter of minutes.
A nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would not only kill tens of millions in
South Asia. A 2008 simulation conducted by scientists who in the 1980s alerted the world to
the threat of "nuclear winter" determined that the detonation of a hundred Hiroshima-scale
nuclear weapons in an Indo-Pakistani war would, due to the destruction of large cities,
inject so much smoke and ash into the upper atmosphere as to trigger a global agricultural
collapse. This, they predicted, would lead to a billion deaths in the months that followed
South Asia's "limited" nuclear war."
"... When the Soviet Empire collapsed, America appeared poised to establish the first truly world empire. The developed countries were American vassals in effect if not in name, many of them occupied by American troops: Among others, Europe, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Latin America, Saudi Arabia, and Australia. The US had by far the dominant economy and the biggest military, controlled the IMF, NATO, the dollar, SWIFT, and enjoyed technological superiority.. Russia was in chaos, China a distant smudge on the horizon. ..."
"... Current foreign policy openly focuses on dominating the planet. The astonishing thing is that some people don't notice. ..."
"... A major purpose of the destruction of Iraq was to get control of its oil and put American forces on the border of Iran, another oil power. The current attempt to starve the Iranians aims at installing a American puppet government. The ongoing coup in Venezuela seeks control of another vast oil reserve. It will also serve to intimidate the rest of Latin America by showing what can happen to any country that defies Washington. Why are American troops in Nigeria? Guess what Nigeria has. ..."
"... America cannot compete with China commercially ..."
"... Beijing's advantages are too great: A huge and growing domestic market, a far larger population of very bright people, a for-profit economy that allows heavy investment both internally and abroad, a stable government that can plan well into the future. ..."
"... Increasingly America's commercial power is as a consumer, not a producer. Washington tells other countries, "If you don't do as we say, we won't buy your stuff." ..."
"... As America's competitiveness declines, Washington resorts to strong-arm tactics. It has no choice. A prime example is the 5G internet, a Very Big Deal, in which Huawei holds the lead. Unable to provide a better product at a better price, Washington forbids the vassals to deal with Huawei–on pain of not buying their stuff. In what appears to be desperation, the Exceptional Nation has actually made a servile Canada arrest the daughter of Huawei's founder. ..."
When the Soviet Empire collapsed, America appeared poised to establish the first truly world
empire. The developed countries were American vassals in effect if not in name, many of them
occupied by American troops: Among others, Europe, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Latin America,
Saudi Arabia, and Australia. The US had by far the dominant economy and the biggest military,
controlled the IMF, NATO, the dollar, SWIFT, and enjoyed technological superiority.. Russia was
in chaos, China a distant smudge on the horizon.
Powerful groups in Washington, such as PNAC, began angling towed aggrandizement, but the
real lunge came with the attack on Iraq. Current foreign policy openly focuses on dominating
the planet. The astonishing thing is that some people don't notice.
The world runs on oil. Controlling the supply conveys almost absolute power over those
countries that do not have their own. (For example, the Japanese would soon be eating each
other if their oil were cut off.) Saudi Arabia is an American protectorate,and, having seen
what happened to Iraq, knows that it can be conquered in short order if it gets out of line.
The U. S. Navy could easily block tanker traffic from Hormuz to any or all countries.
A major purpose of the destruction of Iraq was to get control of its oil and put American
forces on the border of Iran, another oil power. The current attempt to starve the Iranians
aims at installing a American puppet government. The ongoing coup in Venezuela seeks control of
another vast oil reserve. It will also serve to intimidate the rest of Latin America by showing
what can happen to any country that defies Washington. Why are American troops in Nigeria?
Guess what Nigeria has.
Note that Iraq and Iran, in addition to their oil, are geostrategically vital to a world
empire. Further, the immensely powerful Jewish presence in the US supports the Mid-East wars
for its own purposes. So, of course, does the arms industry. All God's chillun love the
Empire.
For the Greater Empire to prevail, Russia and China, the latter a surprise contender, must
be neutralized. Thus the campaign to crush Russia by economic sanctions. At the same time
Washington pushes NATO, its sepoy militia, ever eastward, wants to station US forces in Poland,
plans a Space Command whose only purpose is to intimidate or bankrupt Russia, drops out of the
INF Treaty for the same reasons, and seeks to prevent commercial relations between Russia and
the European vassals (e.g., Nordstream II).
China of course is the key obstacle to expanding the Empire. Ergo the trade war. America
has to stop China's economic and technological progress, and stop it now, as it
will not get another chance.
The present moment is an Imperial crunch point. America cannot compete with China
commercially or, increasingly, in technology. Washington knows it. Beijing's advantages are too
great: A huge and growing domestic market, a far larger population of very bright people, a
for-profit economy that allows heavy investment both internally and abroad, a stable government
that can plan well into the future.
America? It's power is more fragile than it may seem. The United States once dominated
economically by making better products at better prices, ran a large trade surplus, and barely
had competitors. Today it has deindustrialized, runs a trade deficit with almost everybody,
carries an astronomical and uncontrolled national debt, and makes few things that the world
can't get elsewhere, often at lower cost.
Increasingly America's commercial power is as a consumer, not a producer. Washington tells
other countries, "If you don't do as we say, we won't buy your stuff." The indispensable
country is an indispensable market. With few and diminishing (though important) exceptions, if
it stopped selling things to China, China would barely notice, but if it stopped buying, the
Chinese economy would wither. Tariffs, note, are just a way of not buying China's stuff.
Since the profligate American market is vital to other countries, they often do as ordered.
But Asian markets grow. So do Asian industries.
As America's competitiveness declines, Washington resorts to strong-arm tactics. It has no
choice. A prime example is the 5G internet, a Very Big Deal, in which Huawei holds the lead.
Unable to provide a better product at a better price, Washington forbids the vassals to deal
with Huawei–on pain of not buying their stuff. In what appears to be desperation, the
Exceptional Nation has actually made a servile Canada arrest the daughter of Huawei's
founder.
The tide runs against the Empire. A couple of decades ago, the idea that China could compete
technologically with America would have seemed preposterous. Today China advances at startling
speed. It is neck and neck with the US in supercomputers, launches moonlanders, leads in 5G
internet, does leading work in genetics, designs world-class chipsets (e.g., the Kirin 980 and
920) and smartphones. Another decade or two of this and America will be at the trailing
edge.
The American decline is largely self-inflicted. The US chooses its government by popularity
contests among provincial lawyers rather than by competence. American education deteriorates
under assault by social-justice faddists. Washington spends on the military instead of
infrastructure and the economy. It is politically chaotic, its policies changing with every new
administration.
The first rule of empire is, "Don't let your enemies unite." Instead, Washington has pushed
Russia, China, and Iran into a coalition against the Empire. It might have been brighter to
have integrated Iran tightly into the Euro-American econosphere, but Israel would not have let
America do this. The same approach would have worked with Russia, racially closer to Europe
than China and acutely aware of having vast empty Siberia bordering an overpopulated China. By
imposing sanctions of adversaries and allies alike, Washington promotes dedollarization and
recognition that America is not an ally but a master.
It is now or never. If America's great but declining power does not subjugate the rest of
the world quickly, the rising powers of Asia will swamp it. Even India grows. Either sanctions
subdue the world, or Washington starts a world war. Or America becomes just another
country.
To paraphrase a great political thinker, "It's the Empire, Stupid."
"Washington has pushed Russia, China, and Iran into a coalition against the Empire."
Turkey may soon join them, then Iraq might revolt. South Korea has tired of the
warmongering and may join too, which is why Washington is giving them the lead in dealing
with North Korea. But a united Korea identifes more with China than the USA, so the USA wants
to block that idea. The Germans are unhappy too, with all the warmongering, immigration, and
American arrogance.
Sorry Fred, but you're too late. It's all over. Just that your maniacal rulers, i.e. Pompeo,
Bolton et al can't see it. Or, Cognitive Dissonance being painful, refuse to.
Warsaw recently was a case in point. The two biggest European countries, Germany and France
refused to even send a senior representative. All people did was listen in an embarrassed
silence while Pompeo tried to make like a latter day Julius Cesear. At the same time, Russia,
Turkey and Iran met in Sochi, and worked out how they were going to take the next solving the
mess in Syria, the way they want it.
Incidentally, you could also go onto YouTube and watch RT's subtitled [also horrible voice
over, but you can't have everything I guess] of President Putin's "Address to Parliament and
the Nation". It runs for close to 1.5 hours. You will hear the problems Russia has, how Putin
addresses the concerns of the people, their complaints re poor access in country areas to
medicine, and his orders on how this is to be fixed.
But you will also hear the moves forward, that Russia now has a trade surplus [remember
those?] and can afford all the programs it needs. It's the world leading exporter of Wheat,
and other commodities are catching up.
Then he will tell you and show videos of the latest 2 defense weapons – and they are
things America cannot defend against. He also in light of the US withdrawing from the INF
treaty made a very clear statement, should the US be so stupid as to think it can use Europe
as it's war ground, and have Europeans get killed instead of Americans. "Put Intermediate
sites in Europe and use just one, and not only will we fire on the European site that sent
it, but we will also take out the "decision making centre", wherever this is".
Ponder that for a while. There is nothing US can do. The dollar is slowly being rejected and
dumped. The heartland is reamed out after billions took the productive facilities and put
them in China [so kind]. The homeless and desperate are growing in numbers.
It's all over, Fred. Time to start planning what to do when the mud really hits the fan.
Can't argue with that! Usually, I read Fred for amusement, but this is all spot on. I
particularly liked:
The American decline is largely self-inflicted. The US chooses its government by
popularity contests among provincial lawyers rather than by competence. American education
deteriorates under assault by social-justice faddists. Washington spends on the military
instead of infrastructure and the economy.
Incredible. US government cooks up lies to invade and wreck Iraq, destroy Libya, and subvert
Syria. It pulled off a coup in Ukraine with Neo-Nazis. US and its allies Saudis and Israel
gave aid, direct and indirect, to ISIS and Al-Qaida to bring down Assad or turn Syria upside
down.
But, scum like Pompeo puts forth hard-line stance against terrorists. What a bunch of vile
phonies and hypocrites.
It might have been brighter to have integrated Iran tightly into the Euro-American
econosphere, but Israel would not have let America do this. The same approach would have
worked with Russia, racially closer to Europe than China and acutely aware of having vast
empty Siberia bordering an overpopulated China.
Russia is more than racially closer, Russia is culturally much closer and by culturally I
don't mean this cesspool of new "culture". But, as you brilliantly noted:
The US chooses its government by popularity contests among provincial lawyers rather
than by competence.
Britain's time of full spectrum dominance (well trade, industry and navy really) did not
emerge fully formed from isolation as did America. England and the UK played balance of power
politics. The US can still do that for a very long time, given some basic diplomatic sense.
India, China & Pakistan present an interesting triangle. Indonesia and Vietnam are no
friends of China. Nigeria is heading for 400m people and will want to exert its own power,
not take instructions from Peking, etc, etc. Balance of power requires more fluidity than the
US has shown to date. Seeing Russia as an hereditary enemy illustrates this failure.
Can the US make the changes necessary to play balance of power politics?
The astonishing thing is that some people don't notice.
.
Not to notice (or rather, not to notice one's own noticing) what the majority doesn't
notice (OK: they don't notice that they notice, actually) is part of humankind's cerebral
package too.
You once called it the law of the pack. It can be given innumerable names -- just it doesn't
change.
The American decline is largely self-inflicted.
.
It's what follows ripe democracy, invariably -- meanjng that it can arguably not be
helped.
@Godfree Roberts
Finally a bright spot in an otherwise depressingly-fairly-truthful article. Less Government
spending is a GOOD thing, I mean, unless you are a flat-out Communist, of course ohhhhh .
And yes, the scale is WAY off. How could those 0.8 to 2.05% numbers seem even close to
reality to anyone who has a clue. I can't vouch for China, but the US number is off by a
factor of 20 to 25 . Come on, Godfree, you're (a tad bit) better than that!
That's not a bad article in general, but, as usual, Mr. Reed doesn't really have that
analytical mind to know what's really been, and is, going on.
1) There were PLENTY of Americans, many of them even politicians who wanted a "peace
dividend" after the Cold War was won. G.H.W Bush and the neocons put the kibosh on that. The
current version of empire-building didn't have to be. The Israeli-influenced neocons are most
of the reason for the post-Cold-War empire building.
2) It's not ALL about oil anymore – it seems to be a diminishing factor, what with
the US producing more oil than it imports, at this point. Mr. Reed could use a dose of
Zerohedge.com, as, along with their gloom-and-doom, they have opened my eyes to the American
meddling around the world to keep support of the Reserve Currency, the US dollar. Lots of the
countries in which the US causes trouble were trying to get out of the dollar world with
their trade.
3) Related to (2) here, China and Russia both want to eliminate the use of the dollar in
trade, including with each other. That bothers a lot of people who understand how bad the
outlook for the US economy really is, and what it would mean for the dollar to no longer be
used around the world for trade.
4) American government has handed China a completely one-sided deal (FOR China) in trade
since the mid-1990's and Bill Clinton. It's time to end that, which is what the trade war is
about. I don't dispute that American could be in a whole lot more pain over it than the
Chinese, but it's like medicine – take it now, or suffer even more later.
America? It's power is more fragile than it may seem. The United States once
dominated economically by making better products at better prices, ran a large trade
surplus, and barely had competitors. Today it has deindustrialized, runs a trade deficit
with almost everybody, carries an astronomical and uncontrolled national debt, and make
