Ukrainian Compradors

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Neoliberalism as a New Form of Corporatism Color revolutions NGOs as braintrust of color revolutions Inside "democracy promotion" hypocrisy fair Ukrainian orange revolution Russian Color Revolution
Sharp Theory of Nonviolence Struggle The Technique of Nonviolent Action by Gene Sharp The Politics of Nonviolent Action by Gene Sharp Gene Sharp Recipes and Russian Experience Color revolution playbook The art of manufacturing of prisoners of consciousness
Opposition as a way to get rid of feeling of inferiority Sect of fraudulent election witnesses Human right activists or globalism fifth column Revolutionary Romantics as polit-technology Delegitimization of Ruling Party Inside "democracy promotion" hypocrisy fair
Elite Theory And the Revolt of the Elite Predator state American Exceptionalism Super Imperialism The Iron Law of Oligarchy Russian compradors
Big Uncle is Watching You Corporate Media: Journalism In the Service of the Powerful Few The Real War on Reality Frustrated underachievers IntelliXencia: Corruption of Intelligentsia and it usage in fifth column in Russia Net Hamsters as a part of fifth column
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See also EuroMaidan and Ukrainian orange revolution

Since in the beginning of 90th years, as a result of contact of the young nation with the world market in Ukraine, there are two types of the bourgeoisie, who are not getting along very well...

"And who are you?!"

As we remember, with the elimination of the state monopoly on trade, including foreign, in Ukraine got a flood  of overseas goods. And in the opposite direction came the trains and ships with everything you could dump at the Western market for hard currency to buy goods to import to Ukraine - the main thing that you need to do it  quickly. In this situation, inside the country a new class of comprador bourgeoisie was formed.

This term originated in Spanish-speaking countries and means of intermediary between the national market and Western (now transnational) business. Generally, mediation this gave the comprador quick profits, but has very detrimental effect on the economy of his host country. The fact that comprador business, first of all, based on the import in the state of Western goods (or spare parts, of which the goods are assembled on site using screwdriver technology). Secondly, the comprador earns money to buy goods on transnational market by selling raw  materials often at demping prices.

With the rise of comprador bourgeoisie its political include also had grown. And they tried to reorient the national market and the economy of the state in the direction that reflects the interests of compradors. That is, grow and develop in the first place business selling import good (network of supermarkets, showrooms) and raw materials industries (mining resources, metal smelting and so on). At first glance, seems to be even all is fine: shops full, pipe smoke, people are working. Moreover, the country can even get some foreign investment - but only in the areas that are designated as comprador business.

But all this developments put a stress or even kills another part of the bourgeoisie - national manufacturer. Which tries to fight back and conflicts arise. After all, the comprador interested in ousting (survival) national manufacturer or including it in its chain: either as an assembler of goods from imported components or as a raw materials producer. All other kinds of production only hinder the successful comprador business. In fact, the country is turning into a typical "banana Republic".

As any businessman, the comprador seeks to find wayts to the state machine into work in its interests. And they have support of their oversees partners in this activity.  That includes lobbying for and ensuring passage of appropriate laws and decrees, the distribution of taxes, the state foreign economic strategy, and the foreign policy vector. The comprador depends entirely on those countries with economies in which it is associated, i.e. with the West. Thus, it will contribute to the transformation of the state in political and economic satellite of the West.

National business also tends to use the state to defencd its interestwse. And here they have a face off  with compradors. Almost classic example of such a conflict - the confrontation between the Russian Union of Right Forces, expressing the interests of major raw materials comprador capital, and the Putin team, supported by national manufacturers. It took quite acute form and, it should be noted, after losting the elections, compradore seems to want to take revenge by another "orange revolution".

And they have a chance. Because compradors are a part of society and in their activaties they create subclass of "network hamsters": workers whose well-being depends on the West, Pro-Western forces, those who find comprador system of economy for themselves attractive (mostly by lumpens and denationalize Beau Monde). If they manage to concentrate their energy at the right time in the right place (and they dominate capital) they can do a lot of damage...

In xUSSR space comprador capital had grown quicker then national. It is understandable: to open a wholesale company is simple enough, this is not the chemical plant, and not the aircraft factory, and is not even a poultry farm. So comprador rose to his feet quicker then national business. In addition  they enjoy the full support of the West, especially political support.

Of course, part of compradors, accumulating the initial capital, put it in production development, thus, there was a transformation of compradors to the national bourgeoisie. This process is quite natural, but evolutionary it will last years, and during this time the country national production may simply die from undernurishment.  Therefore, the evolution of the comprador in in this direction can be seen only in those countries in which its industrial and scientific economy was supported by the state - such as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, etc.

The critical mass of compradors also seems to invite color revolution iether in "velvet" form or in Arab spring form.  After it the state typically loses sovereignty and the national economy is put on the brink of collapse and became easy pray of Western companies.

If you remember the famous biblical expression: "you shall know them by their deeds" this raises the question: interests which part of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie is going to defend the new Ukrainian government and where EuroMaidan is leading the Ukraine

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[Dec 15, 2013] Political Turmoil in the Northwestern Black sea Rim by Kimitaka Matsuzato


Kimitaka Matsuzato
Hokkaido University

The new leadership of Ukraine will be committed to continuing and concluding current talks on an association agreement with the EU, including a deal on free trade. Such an agreement would set regulatory and institutional limits on Ukraine's economic integration with Russia. According to past statements by Yanukovych, Ukrainian-Russian economic integration is possible, but on the basis of World Trade Organization principles. Taking into account the uncertainty surrounding Russian membership in the WTO, Ukraine is likely to use this approach to mask its lack of political will to pursue any kind of economic integration with Russia other than free trade.

At the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, Ukraine obtained a promise of future membership. Two years later, the prospect for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration remains uncertain due to a lack of consistency in the country's own policy and the evident hesitation (and even opposition) of some NATO members unwilling to exacerbate tensions with Russia. Ukraine's new leadership is likely to "freeze" any movement in this direction, at least temporarily, and instead pursue a partnership agenda with NATO on the basis of existing arrangements (including the Partnership for Peace and the amended NATO-Ukraine Charter of Distinguished Partnership).

Under its new leadership, Ukraine is not expected to gain a better security environment or greater space to maneuver in international affairs. The United States' foreign policy agenda is likely to focus on its own strategic priorities (Afghanistan, Iran, nonproliferation, the Russian "reset"), and U.S.-Ukraine relations will be built around these major priorities. The Obama administration is choosing to deal with Eastern Europe in terms of what it can do with, not for, the states of the region. For its part, Ukraine's new leadership does not have any constructive Ukraine-U.S. agenda, except for the traditional rhetorical notion of a "mutually beneficial partnership."

The new leadership of Ukraine will be committed to continuing and concluding current talks on an association agreement with the EU, including a deal on free trade. Such an agreement would set regulatory and institutional limits on Ukraine's economic integration with Russia. According to past statements by Yanukovych, Ukrainian-Russian economic integration is possible, but on the basis of World Trade Organization principles. Taking into account the uncertainty surrounding Russian membership in the WTO, Ukraine is likely to use this approach to mask its lack of political will to pursue any kind of economic integration with Russia other than free trade.

At the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, Ukraine obtained a promise of future membership. Two years later, the prospect for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration remains uncertain due to a lack of consistency in the country's own policy and the evident hesitation (and even opposition) of some NATO members unwilling to exacerbate tensions with Russia. Ukraine's new leadership is likely to "freeze" any movement in this direction, at least temporarily, and instead pursue a partnership agenda with NATO on the basis of existing arrangements (including the Partnership for Peace and the amended NATO-Ukraine Charter of Distinguished Partnership).

Under its new leadership, Ukraine is not expected to gain a better security environment or greater space to maneuver in international affairs. The United States' foreign policy agenda is likely to focus on its own strategic priorities (Afghanistan, Iran, nonproliferation, the Russian "reset"), and U.S.-Ukraine relations will be built around these major priorities. The Obama administration is choosing to deal with Eastern Europe in terms of what it can do with, not for, the states of the region. For its part, Ukraine's new leadership does not have any constructive Ukraine-U.S. agenda, except for the traditional rhetorical notion of a "mutually beneficial partnership."

The United States has a chance to lead the bilateral agenda, promoting initiatives in areas it considers important: the strengthening of democratic institutions, anti-corruption, security cooperation (including technical-military cooperation), technology exchange, energy, and stronger people-to-people contacts. It can also cooperate with the EU to promote an integrative, transatlantic, coordinated, and consensus-based approach toward Ukraine, which will be welcomed by any leadership in Kyiv.

The Party of Regions' most noticeable foreign policy message after the elections was that of its deputy chairman, Borys Kolesnikov: "Ukraine with Yanukovych will not ally itself with Russia against the West, and will not ally itself with the West against Russia. Ukraine will be an open country for the whole world." This wording reflects a "soft isolationism" and is reminiscent of the Ukrainian saying "moia hata skraju (my house is on the edge)."

Given Ukraine's current political landscape, we can expect to see a certain temporary revival in government discourse of the concept of Ukraine as a "bridge" between the West and Russia. This concept can provide, above all, a comfortable niche for Ukrainian elites trying to minimize the need to make firm choices on the country's most contentious foreign policy issues. It might also be used as an excuse to avoid painful reforms in various spheres, including energy and the judiciary.

In the longer run, the foreign and security policy of Ukraine will mainly depend on domestic developments: either an erosion of democracy and freedom and, unavoidably, a move toward Russia, or the stabilization and further development of democratic institutions and rule of law, leading to gradual integration with the West.

Color revolution" involvement has made Washington too little friends" by Pat Buchanan,


The future of Ukraine is nebulous: calls to move towards Europe compete with Russia. The U.S. has thrown its weight behind those protesting against the government's refusal to join the EU. Has unnecessary interference become a trademark of Washington? Today we talk with Pat Buchanan – the man, who advised three American presidents.


Sophie Shevardnadze: Our guest today is legendary politician Pat Buchanan, a senior advisor to three American presidents, who was once a candidate for the top job himself. Mr. Buchanan, it's such a pleasure to have you on our show tonight, welcome.

Pat Buchanan: Glad to be here, Sophie.

Read the full transcript

SS: So we are just going to start with the latest news. John McCain promised to support Ukrainians in their political stand against the government. Is that helpful for Ukraine?

PB: I'm feeling that Senator McCain, who has my respect, had no business in the Ukraine, this is the decision by the Ukrainian people, and Ukrainian government as whether they want to orient towards Russia's Customs Union or toward the European economic union, and I don't think that's an issue that the U.S. has any right to be involved in. It's a decision for the Ukrainians as I said and Senator McCain being there is a little bit like President Putin being in Canada during the NAFTA debate and telling the Canadians not to sign. So, I think that Ukrainians should make this decision themselves.

SS: There are talks about sanctions the U.S. could use against the Ukrainian government – what are they? Is that action warranted?

PB: I don't think any action against Ukraine is warranted, no matter what decision it makes. This is a decision, again, for the Ukrainian government, and Ukrainian people, it has nothing to do with vital interests of the U.S., and I would be opposed to my own government, my own country, imposing sanctions on the Ukrainian government and people for the decision which is their sovereign right. So, I don't think the Congress of the U.S. would go along with sanctions, I find that hard to believe.

SS: Like you said, this is a choice that Ukrainian people should make themselves; and there is no one opinion of what path Ukraine should choose. In your opinion – what do you think can help them figure things out at this point?

PB: Well, I think the Ukrainians are to decide what really is in their own best interest. I know a bit about the Ukraine, I was there back way back in the Nixon's administration, before Richard Nixon, in 1971 and I know that Eastern Ukraine, for example, is very much oriented towards Russia, and Western Ukraine is somewhat oriented toward the Old Hapsburg empire, so it's a country that is really a mixture – but again, this is a decision a democratic country ought to make for itself and it is not a business of the U.S. to determine, which way they should orient their economy.

SS: What do you think about the money thrown at promoting democracy around the world, which also includes support and funding of color revolutions – is that money well-spent? Some would argue that democracy actually happened in those countries that revolutions took place in. What do you think?

PB: My view is that many of the national endowment for democracy and its associated agencies – these were Cold War institutions, and they were created in the Reagan administration, I was in the White House and we were trying to orient countries more towards the west as the Soviet Union was trying to orient them towards their camp in the Cold War. But, with the Cold War over, in my judgment, I think these are counter-productive. I mean, interfering in internal affairs of foreign countries to reorient their foreign policy or their government toward the U.S. – I don't think it's justified unless there is some imminent threat to our own country, and I don't see that, and I have argued, basically, for the abolition of these kinds of agencies that interfere in the internal affairs of foreign nations. I think it's counter-productive, I think we create more enemies that we do friends, when we involve ourselves in these so-called "color-coded revolutions". Many of them have been overturned since the U.S. was sub-rosa engaged in them, so again, I would say if the common turn has been shut down then they ought to shutdown some of these agencies in the U.S., but I'm not in office anymore and I'm not advising presidents anymore.

SS: What a pity that you are not advising presidents anymore. Since we started talking about Ukraine, would you classify the U.S. actions in the Ukraine right now as interference in internal affairs of the foreign country, and do you generally find that Washington has a real understanding of places it interferes in.

PB: I don't know that you can say that Washington is interfering per se, but I don't think the U.S. government, the under secretary of state should have gone there and gotten into a rally into the middle of Kiev. I don't think senator McCain should have gone there, and then in a rally in a middle of Kiev and accuse Russia of interfering in the internal affairs in Ukraine, when he himself is doing exactly that. So, I don't think that is helpful. Again, this is an issue that really doesn't involve the U.S., I can understand EU going into Ukraine and arguing for their case, I can understand Mr. Putin inviting the president of Ukraine to Russia to argue his case. I just don't know what America's vital interests or America's interest is in this decision which belongs to the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian government; I'm sure some people welcomed Senator McCain, but I think doing this really enhances and underscores the reputation, unfortunate, of the U.S. for interfering in people's affairs all over the world when there is no necessity or no right to do so.

SS: But at the same time – if people are out on the streets, demanding an end to corruption, war transparency, respect for human rights – I mean, surely the U.S. is helpful to them, no?

PB: Well, I think they ought to do that. I mean, they have a perfect right to demonstrate, they have a perfect right to demonstrate against their government, they have a perfect right to say "We don't want to orient towards Russia, we would like to be part of EU" – that's the right of the Ukrainian people and we would certainly, from the outside support that right, but the question is not whether we support that right, which we do, but whether we are to get into the middle of the argument. And that's what I'm saying is that it isn't our quarrel, it isn't our argument; but would I like people of Ukraine to have a right to have peaceful demonstrations whether they are for or against Russia's Customs Union – that's fine!

SS: But also, you know what a lot of people are thinking – I mean, the U.S. has enough troubles inside its borders, hasn't it – can it really afford at this point to send under-secretaries and senators to foreign countries to support them for whatever reason?

PB: Well, I think the senator went on his own, and he probably paid for his own way, but I agree with you – I don't think the under secretary of State should be in demonstrations or should be vocal inside foreign countries about decisions they make which don't affect our national security, and merely about choice which as I say belongs to Ukraine alone.

SS: Now, you advocate curtailing U.S. invasions around the globe – but aren't' they about security for Washington? Isn't it better to sponsor or fight small-scale wars far-away than let things play on their own and face big problem on your doorstep later?

PB: May view is that now, when the Cold War is over, the U.S. ought not to use its military force unless it's authorized by the Congress of the U.S., unless the vital interest of the U.S. are imperiled in some way or the other, and unless the American people are united over this intervention. As you may know I was against the Iraq war when President George Bush took us to the Iraq war. While I favored the intervention in Afghanistan after the massacre of 9\11, I did not believe the U.S. should stay there and try to reform and remake that country according to our ideas and our ideals. I thought that was a bridge too far for the U.S. I've opposed intervention in Syria, because I'm not an admirer of the regime there, but no vital interests of the U.S. were threatened in that civil war. So, in each of those cases and frankly, since the Cold War ended I have been against most of the American interventions – I didn't see them as directly related to the vital interests of my country: nothing in my country was threatened, our people were not threatened, and so I don't think we ought to be out trying to remake the world in our image. It's an impossibility, as a great scholar once said, the Constitution of the U.S. is not for export.

SS: But you've also said that U.S. and the West will collapse in the same way Rome did –from uncontrolled multiculturalism. Do you not believe in positive effect of globalization?

PB: There's no doubt that the globalization has some tremendously positive aspects to it and consequences from it. I think that the fact that the Chinese people, for example …when I visited China it was Richard Nixon's at his "opening up China", I was part of his delegation - it was a deeply repressed country. Poverty was pandemic; it was as dreary a place I've ever seen. And I think globalization is in large part responsible for the enormous build up of China, the fact that there is widespread wealth in China, there's enormous production, and it is growing 10-12% a year for 20-25 years – that's a great thing. My concern over globalization is that the American economy…America was the most productive nation of the world with a tremendous manufacturing power, when I ran for president in 1992, I said "If we go into these Trade treaties and Free Trade policies the U.S. will lose its manufacturing base, it will disappear. It will be exported" – and that's exactly what has happened. In the first decade of the XXI century 50.000 American factories disappeared and 6 mn manufacturing jobs disappeared - one in every three we had. So I think when you have an economy as advanced as the U.S., put American workers in direct competition with Chinese workers who are making $1-2 dollars an hour was deeply damaging to our country, even if it was beneficial for People's Republic of China.

SS: Where do you see rising civilization, who will take over the superpower role, in your opinion?

PB: I think, clearly, the rising power and the potential superpower of the world is China, given the enormous size of the country, it's extraordinary growth rate, it's population which is 1.4 bln people, it's enormous growing power and its assertiveness – I believe China is the rising superpower of the world.

SS: Let me ask you this – does the world even need someone to fill the superpower shoes at all? Aren't we all about being multi-polar at this point?

PB: I don't think it's the choice of us. Great nations that rise up invariably seek a place under the sun that is unique, different and above all others. It's natural and people take to this, it is part of human nature. I think the Chinese see themselves as the future dominant power of the Western Pacific, then at the Eurasian Subcontinent and then, of the world.

SS: But if we talk about oil-producing countries, not the superpowers – just oil-producing countries and they are obviously very strong politically because of their resources. They had a problem with human rights and America does nothing about it, like in Bahrain or Saudi Arabia – why is the American public okay with this?

PB: It's the old question and the old point is that we are more tolerant of the mistakes and errors of our friends then we are of those of our adversaries, no doubt about. Is there something of a double standard in powers dealing with their friends like the Saudis, and like the Gulf Arabs and like the others and how they treat minorities and how they treat women? And when we are of some other countries, like Russia, for example, with which we have something around adversary relationship? There is no doubt your criticism is justified, it's exactly right, I wouldn't deny it. I mean, in Bahrain, Shia are minority and they rose up peacefully, and they were put down by our friends. What U.S. does in cases like this is usually tries quietly to work with these countries, rather than gets in their face which we tend to do with adversaries.

SS: Yeah, because the second question, of course arises – if the U.S. can find common ground with absolute monarchs, like the Saudis or the Bahrainis, why couldn't they do the same with strong men like Assad? What is the campaign against Assad actually all about, in your opinion?

PB: You might recall some of the, I believe, it was secretary of state Clinton and some others – before the civil war began we were talking him as "reformer" and they were trying to get along with him. But now, when the civil war has broken out and it is an appalling civil war – the atrocities, deaths and killings on both sides – Assad has been completely demonized in the U.S. so that you cannot associate with him, but there is no doubt that some of these rebel groups like Al-Nusra Front and others are engaged in terrible atrocities and their own executions and murders and all the rest, but there's no doubt that what is going on in Syria now is far more serious than what is going on in Bahrain.

SS: How do you see Syrian scenario playing out in the end? What's going to happen?

PB: I don't think it's good. I think the Islamists are growing stronger, the so-called Free Syrian Army and others who are associated with the Americans, those rebels are growing weak, relatively weaker, and I see the Islamist elements setting aside parts of Syria themselves and eliminating all opposition there. It's hard to see how the war ends well, in this sense. I think, Assad could win something of the victory, but it's hard for me to see him driving out the Islamists from where they are really totally encamped. So I think what you could see is what's happening in Iraq after we went there – you see Kurdish parts breaking away, gaining more autonomy and independence and the Islamists setting up their own sanctuaries along the Turkish border in the north and Assad in south-west and over to the coast. You could see sort of de-facto partition again, like we see right now in Iraq, and don't think it's going to be good news for anyone.

SS: What do you think about Obama's handling of Iranian issue? Is he doing the right thing – some people are talking about possible thaw in relationship right now – is he handling it in the right way?

PB: I credit both Secretary of State Kerry whom I've been a critic of, and President Obama whom I have criticized. I think they are doing the right thing. I'm not very hopeful person, but I'm inclined to think a deal can be done with the Iranians, where they not only stop short of the atomic bomb, but stop their program and stop a year or two short of the ability. Even if they are determined to build a bomb, they are stopped a year or two short of that ability. I think it could be done, because when the Ayatollah says we've sworn off nuclear weapons – I think the Iranians must look at that Middle East and say "what do we gain out of building an atom bomb? If we get an atom bomb, then the Israelis will put their nuclear arsenal on a hair trigger. The Saudis will get atom bombs from the Pakistanis. The Turks won't let us be the only nuclear power in this region, they will build a bomb. The Egyptians might have a bomb. The Americans will have all their warships, some of them armed with nuclear weapons in our neighborhood, and if, God forbid, some atomic weapon went off anywhere in the world, everybody would blame us without looking at the evidence and they would attack us. So what does an atom bomb do for us?" Look at North Korea, they may be isolated, they are sanctioned, they are alone, they are despised, and look at China which has come out and engaged the world, look how they have done. So if I were an Iranian I would say "Why don't we go the China road, rather than the North Korea road? We are 85 mln people, we will become the dominant power in the Gulf naturally, from natural growth and with peaceful goals. What nation is going to grow to become dominant nation? The Americans threw out Saddam Hussein and he was our enemy, and now we've got a Shia government in Baghdad!"

SS: Since you've brought up Saddam Hussein in Iraq: Iran is much stronger, internally a lot more unified than Iraq was. In case of a conflict, it will not be a pushover, and everyone understands that. When the U.S. talks about "military option" there – is it really ready for another tough engagement in the region? Is it even in the country's interest?

PB: I don't think the war in Iran would be in the interest of the U.S. at all, and I hope and pray there is no conflict between two countries. But I think you are somewhat mistaken, when you say that Iran is more unified. If you take a look at Iran, the core center of it is Persian. But there is Baluchistan in the south, Sistan and Baluchistan, there are secessionist movements there, there are Arabs in the southwest, there are Kurds up in the northeast and there is Azeri in the north. At the end of WW2 Red Army was in that area and had to be forced out of there. Any war between the U.S. and Iran could be a disaster for the world, a disaster for the world economy, but it would certainly be a disaster for Iran as well. There is no doubt that the country of 80 mn, larger, 3 times as large as Iraq, is not going to be a pushover for anyone, but I don't think anyone would image that the U.S. would send the army up to the Tehran in the event of the conflict. Again, I wouldn't want to see a conflict, but in the event of the conflict it would be all air, naval and missiles.

SS: NSA surveillance is another huge topic and that's not likely to run, we all understand that. But do you think it is necessary, how will people counter it or they will just give up?

PB: What's going to happen is…the court just ruled at the district level that gathering all the information from telephone calls, emails and rest of it all, from everybody, putting it on file – that this was unconstitutional, but there's two more courts to rule and I don't think the Supreme Court will let that stay, but I do think that there's probably going to be some reforms made of the NSA and its bugging and all the rest of it, all the material it gathers, which I think is basically done for the security of the U.S., I don't they are sitting around reading my emails, I don't think why they would waste their time listening to my phone calls, and I do think it's done for national security purposes, but I do think Congress will get in on the act. If you are talking about friendly countries, the idea of listening to the conversations of friendly leaders is a matter of course – I don't think it's a good idea, because, first, we don't get anything out of it and secondly how can you call someone your friend when you are listening to his personal phone calls. Those types of things might be curtailed to a degree, but I think, basically, the program is not going to be – when you got this enormous capacity and enormous ability, people almost always use it.

SS: Mr. Buchanan you yourself thought to become president of the U.S. Do you believe in such a thing as clean politics? Isn't it all controlled by the corporations now anyway?

PB: There's no question about it that the big corporations, giant corporations have tremendous power – they've got lobbying power in Washington DC and they have tremendous amounts of money, but they are not invincible. They have enormous power, but they are not invincible in national politics and I don't think the reason I lost was the corporate power. Mine was, basically, the Republican Party which at that point, in 92 and 96, was hostile to my ideas of economic nationalism, economic patriotism and anti-interventionism. I think some of my ideas are more popular today than they were then, but I don't think it is inevitable that someone, an outsider, can come in and win the presidency of the U.S., I think certainly Barak Obama is an example… clearly, when you get the democratic nomination, you get all of that support in power, the unions and all the rest, but I don't think that's just to say that big corporations are all-powerful – they are enormously powerful, I think half of the biggest economic units in the world are companies, not countries, but I don't think they are united and I don't think they are invincible.

SS: Mr. Buchanan, it's been a delight to talk to you. Thank you very much for this interview, we wish you all the best in the upcoming New Year 2014, and hopefully we'll get to talk to you soon. That's all we have for now, guys, that was Pat Buchanan, former U.S. presidential advisor. See you next time on Sophie&Co.

За вильну Украину!

Прозападная политика украинской власти может привести к тому, что если в Украине произойдет еще одна революция, то она будет...


Як мы волю здобувалы…

Традиционно считается, что национально-освободительное движение в Украине – прерогатива национально-патриотических партий и движений.
Которые в данный момент полностью поддерживают новую власть и более того – всячески выступают за максимальное сближение Украины с Западным миром вплоть до вхождения державы в Евросоюз. Поэтому предположения о возможности национально-освободительной революции вполне могут вызвать недоумение. Однако это только на первый взгляд.

На самом деле такое движение принимает широкий размах и имеет успех только тогда, когда начинает выражать интересы той части общества, которая может сформировать национальное государство или новую власть в этом государстве. Именно поэтому, кстати, украинские национал-патриоты всегда терпели поражение – потому что они не являлись такой силой и представляли собою клубы интеллигентов-романтиков, имеющих поддержку населения только в нескольких регионах Украины.

В отличие от них, украинская советская бюрократия могла сформировать свое государство и сделала это в 1991 году, когда нашла, что это соответствует ее интересам. То, что она подняла на щит национальную независимость именно от России (идею национал-патриотов), поясняется тем, что она реально хотела независимости от московского центра.

Однако национал-патриоты не поняли, что бюрократия будет "основой" государства. Они продолжали попытки встать в ее ряды – отсюда и все эти разговоры о "люстрации". И сейчас, когда им улыбнулось оранжевое солнышко и достались властные портфели, они наивно полагают, что стали "солью земли" всерьез и надолго.

На самом деле сейчас в Украине уже не 1991 год, в котором по инерции все еще живут некоторые политики. И ситуация совершенно изменилась. Самостоятельной бюрократии советского типа как таковой уже не существует – она представляет совершенно новые ведущие силы общества, интересам которых и служит.

Что это за силы, нетрудно догадаться, если знать мировою историю (чьи законы применимы и в отношении Украины) и хотя бы краем уха слушать новости родной страны. Это буржуазия – ведущая часть общества, живущего в условиях капитализма (независимо от степени его развития). Которая представлена во власти различными партиями, политиками, министрами и т.п. (вот только национал-патриоты ее не очень представляют – упустили время в пустых дебатах и теперь лихорадочно ищут под себя хоть каких-то "буржуинов", делая реверансы даже перед рыночными торговцами).

Однако буржуазия буржуазии рознь. Отчего, собственно, рознь уже идет в самой Украине. Дело в том, что в начале 90-х годов в результате соприкосновения молодой державы с мировым рынком в Украине возникли два вида буржуазии, которым ужиться вместе крайне тяжело…

"А ты кто такой?!"

Как мы помним, с ликвидацией государственной монополии на торговлю, в том числе и внешнюю, в Украину хлынули потоки заморских товаров. А в обратном направлении пошли эшелоны и пароходы со всем, что можно было толкнуть Западу по демпингу – главное, чтобы быстро. Вот в этой ситуации сформировалась и поднялась в стране компрадорская буржуазия.

Термин этот возник в испаноязычных странах и означает посредника между национальным рынком и западным (сейчас транснациональным) бизнесом. Как правило, посредничество это давало компрадору быструю и большую прибыль, но зато весьма губительно сказывалось на экономике его страны. Дело в том, что компрадорский бизнес, во-первых, основан на ввозе в государство западных товаров (вариант – запчастей, из которых товары собираются на месте). Во-вторых, компрадор зарабатывает на вывозе товаров на транснациональный рынок – преимущественно это сырье.

Соответственно, начинается процесс переориентации национального рынка и экономики государства под интересы компрадоров. То есть растут и развиваются в первую очередь бизнес по продаже импорта (сети маркетов, салонов, мастерских по сборке и сервису) и сырьевой бизнес (добыча ресурсов, выплавка металла и т.д.). На первый взгляд, вроде бы даже все отлично: магазины полны, трубы дымят, люди работают. Более того, в страну могут даже идти иностранные инвестиции – но только в область компрадорского бизнеса.

Но все это попросту губит другую часть буржуазии – национального производителя, из-за чего между ними и возникают конфликты. Ведь компрадор заинтересован в вытеснении (выживании) национального производителя как такового или во включении его в свою цепочку: либо в качестве сборщика товара из ввезенных комплектующих, либо в качестве производителя сырья. Все остальные виды производства только мешают успешному ведению компрадорского бизнеса. Собственно, страна превращается в типичную "банановую республику".

Как и всякий бизнесмен, компрадор стремится поставить на службу своим интересам и государственную машину. Лоббирование и принятие соответствующих законов и указов, распределение льгот, государственная внешнеэкономическая стратегия, а главное – внешнеполитический вектор. Компрадор целиком зависит от тех стран, с экономикой которых он связан, то есть с Западом. А значит, он будет способствовать превращению государства в политического и экономического сателлита акул глобального мира.

Национальный бизнес тоже стремится поставить государство себе на службу. И в этом процессе происходит его сталкивание с компрадорским на политической арене. Почти классический пример такого столкновения – противостояние между российским Союзом правых сил, выражающим интересы крупного сырьевого компрадорского капитала, и путинской командой, поддерживаемой национальными производителями. Оно приняло довольно острые формы и, нужно заметить, затянулось, поскольку, проиграв выборы, компрадоры, судя по всему, хотят взять реванш путем… еще одной "оранжевой революции".

А почему бы и нет? Ведь за компрадорами тоже стоит некоторая часть общества: зависимые от них работники, прозападники, те, кто находит компрадорскую систему экономики для себя привлекательной (в основном это люмпены и денациональный бомонд). Если их сконцентрировать в нужное время в нужном месте…

К тому же в странах СНГ компрадорский капитал более развит, чем национальный. Оно понятно: открыть оптовую фирму дело нехитрое, это вам не химический комбинат, и не авиазавод, и даже не птицеферма. Поэтому компрадоры поднялись на ноги раньше национального бизнеса, к тому же в отличие от него они пользовались и пользуются полной поддержкой Запада, особенно политической.

Конечно, часть компрадоров, накопив первоначальный капитал, вложила его в развитие производства, таким образом произошла трансформация компрадоров в национальную буржуазию. Такой процесс вполне закономерен, однако эволюционно он растягивается на долгие годы, а за это время в стране может "загнуться" национальное производство. Поэтому эволюция компрадора в нацбуржуазию безболезненно прошла только в тех станах, в которых своей промышленной и научной экономики прежде не было вовсе – таких как Южная Корея, Сингапур, Тайвань и т.п.

Там же, где лбами сталкиваются сильные компрадоры и уже окрепший (или еще неослабленный) национальный бизнес, это происходит весьма бурно, вплоть до революций – либо ожесточенных и кровавых (как, например, китайская революция начала 20 века), либо "бархатных", "оранжевых", "розовых" и им подобных. Потому что ситуация складывается таким образом, что никакого паритета между ними быть уже не может, потому что либо государство стоит на гране потери национальной безопасности, а национальная экономика – на гране краха, либо компрадоры получили внушительную поддержку Запада и серьезно настроились одним ударом смести все препятствия на пути к полному подчинению себе государственной машины.

Кто именно победил в такой схватке, можно определить, если вспомнить известное библейское выражение: "Узнаете их по делам их". В связи с этим возникает вопрос: интересы какой части украинской буржуазии собирается отстаивать новая украинская власть и к чему это приведет?

Пан или пропал

Сколько бы ни критиковали методы работы премьера Виктора Януковича, сколько бы ни ругали записные патриоты ЕЭП, нельзя не согласиться с тем, что в течение 2003 – 2004 годов он сделал несколько важных шагов в интересах именно украинского национального бизнеса. Ведь проект Единого экономического пространства открывал перспективы именно для украинских производителей. По сути, в нем роль рынка сбыта и источника сырья отводилась России. Поэтому вокруг Януковича на последних выборах и начала объединяться большая часть украинской национальной буржуазии.

После явной неудачи она разделилась: многие решили искать мира и согласия с новой властью. Однако первые месяцы ее правления показали, что этого им найти не удастся. Дело в том, что под удары "борьбы с коррупцией" и пресс экономического регулирования рынка в основном попал национальный производитель. Например, предусмотрено лишить льгот украинские автозаводы, что бьет по производству "Таврий", но зато на руку компрадорам, ввозящим в Украину иномарки (в разобранном виде). Или политика правительства в отношении либерализации ввоза импортного мяса. Таким образом, складывается впечатление, что новая власть защищает не те интересы, которые декларирует. И если она таки станет на сторону компрадоров, то национальный производитель будет попросту уничтожен – быстро или медленно, полностью или частично, даже если он будет пытаться жить с новой властью в мире. Ведь противостояние идет не на уровне парламентских партий, а на уровне столкновения интересов ведущих частей общества.

Вообще-то новая власть может и сама не хотела бы вредить национальному бизнесу, пусть он даже поддерживает ее политического оппонента. Однако стремительный бросок в объятия Запада, которому она обязана свой победой на выборах, приводит не только к политической зависимости государства. У Запада в отношении Украины есть свои экономические интересы, и эти интересы заключаются в поддержке именно компрадоров. Во всяком случае, скудные инвестиции Запад вкладывал только в украинский компрадорский бизнес и практически ничего – в национальный.

Поэтому Запад, имея множество рычагов влияния, может попросту заставить новую власть действовать в своих интересах – пусть и противоречащих интересам самой Украины.

В таких условиях для своего элементарного выживания украинский национальный бизнес должен наконец понять, что ему-то Запад ничем не поможет, и перестать строить иллюзии. Напротив, поднятие знамени освобождения страны из-под влияния Запада будет не политическим чудачеством, не шагом на "советскую тропу", а выражением экономических интересов государства. Собственно, это и есть классическая национально-освободительная борьба, которую будет вести одна из передовых сил общества, способная сформировать национальную власть.

Разумеется, что подобные лозунги для все еще центристской оппозиции несколько непривычны. Но только в силу привычки, что они – прерогатива национал-патриотических правых партий и движений. Но в реальности последние давно уже перестали быть таковыми и, будучи крайне лояльными к Западу, скорее поддержат компрадоров, выдавая их своих избирателям за "истинный национальный бизнес". Ну да вопросы просвещения избирателей – дело СМИ, а вот задача оппозиции – сформировать экономические интересы общества в четкую национальную идею. Вопрос архиважный и касается дальнейшей судьбы Украины на ближайшие 50 и более лет: будет ли она "банановой республикой", управляемой компрадорской буржуазией и западными клерками, либо самодостаточным независимым государством с собственной национальной экономикой.

Все может пойти как медленным эволюционным путем, от выборов к выборам, так и ускоренным – революционным. Если власть будет продолжать играть в одни ворота, причем нечестно, и прессовать национальный бизнес далее, у того не останется ничего иного, кроме как либо спустить флаг и порезать свои предприятия на металлолом, либо бороться вплоть до вывода на площади людей. И тогда в Украине может произойти первая в ее истории национально-освободительная революция. И если власть проявит максимум благоразумия – то вполне мирная…

Виктор Дяченко