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Agencies bias in producing oil production and consumption data

Any investigation  into the impartiality of such agencies as EIA, IEA or OPEC will conclude that the data produced by those agencies,  in particular,  production and consumption data and forecasts, are indeed politically biased.


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[May 08, 2021] Does IEA really believe the shit they predict?

May 08, 2021 | peakoilbarrel.com

JEAN-FRANÇOIS FLEURY IGNORED RON PATTERSON IGNORED 05/01/2021 at 8:38 pm

Jean, I cannot get into the heads of the EIA analysis and figure out why they make the predictions they do. That is, do they really believe the shit they predict? Or do they do it as some kind of propaganda campaign to keep the shale Ponzi scheme afloat as long as possible because they think it is their civic duty to do so? I just don't know but I would imagine it is a little of both.

But we must look at the history of all the peak oil predictions. It all started around 2005 when almost everyone thought peak oil had arrived. But it did not happen. Then many thought it had arrived every couple of years since then. But the peak oil prognosticators became fewer and fewer. Now because all the predictions have been wrong in the past, it is just naturally assumed that peak oil will never happen.

So, even though almost every major producer has peak, including the three largest, the US, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, people cannot bring themselves to believe that peak oil has finally arrived, or did arrive a couple of years ago. So all we can do is shake our heads as they continue to predict that oil production will keep going up and almost forever.

But I find it rather fun to watch as finally someone else's predictions are going up in flames. 😉

05/01/2021 at 6:48 pm

There is something I don't understand. How EIA can project that the world oil production will be almost at the level of April 2020 in December 2022? If I am not wrong. KSA has apparently so much difficulties to maintain its production that they decreased their production of 1Mb/d in February to announce after a plan to decrease the domestic oil consumption of 1Mb/d to increase the amount of oil for export. And currently, they are at 8 Mb/d : in March 2020, their production was at 10 Mb/d. Russia is in oil production decline and the goal of increasing the production to the level of March 2020 (11 Mb/d) is and will be a goal for a long time as most the oil produced to compensate the loss of production (1Mb/d) will come from EOR (costly) and fracking (even more costly). For the US, I don't know how the DUC which are currently changed into completed wells and fracked will produce but as the growth of the number of operated rigs is slowing in Permian fields, I don't know how the decline of the current operated rigs will be compensated in the near future (in 6 or 12 months). I am not speaking of Baker, Eagle Ford and Niobara which are in decline. As the lower 48 states conventional oil production is in decline, as the Alaska oil production is in decline and as the GOM oil production is fairly stable, I don't know what will be the increase of US oil production in future. But I have a hunch that it won't be as glorious as the EIA can imagine (predict). Between now and December 2022, there are 6 Mb/d to compensate. If it is not coming the three main oil producers of the world, from where this will come? Iraq : no. They are sparing their oil ressources. Brazil? With pre-salt formations, they will be able to add only a maximum of 500 kb /d. Canada? They are at 5 Mb/d. I am not sure of their possibilities of production growth and even at their production growth rate, they will only add 290 kb/d or so in December 2022. Guyana will produce at most 750 kb/d in 2026. Assuming a constant rate of increase, this will give an additional 120 kb/d in December 2022. The rest of non-opec producer are, at best, only able to maintain their production. Among the rest of OPEC producers ,all are in production decline. There is only Iran which could increase its production but only 1,5 Mb/d at most. With all of this, we are a long way from increasing global oil production by 6 Mb/d until December 2022. HOLE IN HEAD IGNORED 05/02/2021 at 1:35 am

Ron , simple answer . "It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it." . –Upton Sinclair

[Dec 21, 2019] IHS says that modest growth is expected in 2022, but they don't quantify how much growth. I believe this sentence was added because IHS does not want to be accused of implying US oil production has peaked.

Notable quotes:
"... Given decreasing money available to shale oil, declining frac spread counts and falling rig counts, I now guess that US peak oil month is Nov 2019. Permian oil production should continue increasing slowly but it's not enough to offset falling production from other shale basins and other conventional oil basins. ..."
Dec 21, 2019 | peakoilbarrel.com

TonyEriksen x Ignored says: 12/18/2019 at 6:49 pm

EIA weekly supply estimates released, declining from the last two weeks of Nov at 12.9 mbd down to 12.8 mbd for the first two weeks of Dec.
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WCRFPUS2&f=W

HFIR is showing a US peak for 2019 in November of 12.7 mbd.
https://twitter.com/HFI_Research/status/1207413992848674816

IHS stated that "The new IHS Markit outlook for oil market fundamentals for 2019-2021 expects total U.S. production growth to be 440,000 barrels per day in 2020 before essentially flattening out in 2021. Modest growth is expected to resume in 2022."
https://news.ihsmarkit.com/prviewer/release_only/slug/energy-base-decline-rate-oil-and-gas-output-permian-basin-has-increased-dramatically-b

EIA STEO says US oil production in 2019 is 12.25 mbd. That means that IHS is forecasting 12.69 mbd in 2020. This 0.44 mbd growth is assumed to come from the 7 US shale regions on EIA DPR. In 2019, shale region production was 8.60 mbd. 2020 shale region production is forecast to be 9.04 mbd, after 0.44 mbd growth. EIA DPR says that Jan 2020 shale region production is 9.14 mbd which is greater than 9.04 mbd which means that IHS 0.44 mbd 2020 growth implies that a US peak oil is happening about now.

IHS says that modest growth is expected in 2022, but they don't quantify how much growth. I believe this sentence was added because IHS does not want to be accused of implying US oil production has peaked. Dan Yergin, vice chair of IHS, founded CERA in 1982 which is now owned by IHS. Dan Yergin "clearly doesn't care about converting peak oilers. He really wants to influence Washington." In other words, IHS says modest growth in 2022, to please Washington politicians. US shale growth might increase in 2022, even with higher oil prices, but I'm guessing it won't.
http://transitionvoice.com/2011/09/whos-afraid-of-daniel-yergin/

Given decreasing money available to shale oil, declining frac spread counts and falling rig counts, I now guess that US peak oil month is Nov 2019. Permian oil production should continue increasing slowly but it's not enough to offset falling production from other shale basins and other conventional oil basins.

TonyEriksen x Ignored says: 12/20/2019 at 5:05 pm
North American shale is expected to hit an inflection point in 2020. Our expert, Raoul LeBlanc, VP of Unconventionals, shared his insights on what's ahead for North American #shale markets.
https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/video-north-american-shale-hits-an-inflection-point-in-2020.html

[Jun 06, 2019] You notice that the April 19 STEO has the lowest production numbers for Jan. Feb. and April 2019 but the highest numbers as they move into the second half of 2019 and all of 2020. I don't know what to make of this except that I find it rather amusing

May 13, 2019 | peakoilbarrel.com

Ignored says: 05/07/2019 at 5:04 pm Attached are the changing monthly STEO projections for February, March and April for the lower 48 production. Today's projection, April, has added 230 kb/d day by year end 2019 to the March projection and close to 300 kb/d in 2020. The April projection also shows an increase of 960 kb/d from Dec 18 to Dec 19. For Dec 19 to Dec 20, the increase is only 420 kb/d, less than half of the 18 to 19 increase. Any speculation/ideas for the lower increase for 19 to 20. The G of M drops by 70 kb/d from Dec 19 to Dec 20.

Reply

Ron Patterson x Ignored says: 05/07/2019 at 5:37 pm

Thanks, Ovi.

You notice that the April 19 STEO has the lowest production numbers for Jan. Feb. and April 2019 but the highest numbers as they move into the second half of 2019 and all of 2020.

I don't know what to make of this except that I find it rather amusing.

GuyM x Ignored says: 05/07/2019 at 6:27 pm
I found it insulting to my intelligence (not an exceptionally difficult task), but now that you mention it, I can imagine some Lewis Carroll feel to it.

[Apr 27, 2019] EIA us using unlimited, cheap shale oil resources propaganda as a foreign policy tool

Apr 27, 2019 | peakoilbarrel.com

Mike x Ignored says: 04/26/2019 at 2:30 pm

It should, don't you think? Ninety nine out of 100 people in America believe the USGS "discovered" 50 billion more barrels of oil last year in West Texas. Neither it nor the EIA go to near enough lengths to qualify these type of "surveys;" accordingly they are misleading and confusing to an uneducated public, including but not limited to, politicians in charge of implementing America's energy policies.

The USGS mean average EUR in the Delaware Basin does not come close to paying out a $9MM well. How then can operators drill 244K more wells in the Delaware costing nearly $2.4 trillion dollars to recover 46.2 billion more barrels of oil? What earthly good does it do anybody to make an assessment of remaining resources over 8,000 square miles "if economics are not considered?" As stupid as the shale oil industry is, even its smart enough to know better than that.

My comment was directed at using so called unlimited, cheap shale oil resources as a foreign policy tool, not getting in a pissing match about the USGS.

[Apr 11, 2019] EIA's projections can be taken with a grain of salt

Apr 11, 2019 | peakoilbarrel.com

GuyM: 04/11/2019 at 8:44 am

EIA's projections can be taken with a grain of salt. What is happening in the US shale is becoming more apparent. Exxon and Chevron plan to gear up to supply the new additions that they will supply to their new refinery additions that will accept LTO. However, I do not see them in a massive growth campaign that will increase exports.

That leaves the independents who are very much under the gun to fix financials per investors, investments firms, and the press.

I read EOG's fourth quarter discussion with the public, which was cut short due to repetitive questions on whether EOG will increase dividends.

Prices will probably rise, but I don't expect much growth, this year, from the majority of the producers, which are the independents.

At least, for this year. As the years go by, more will be gobbled up by the majors, thus providing more limits in growth.

[Mar 27, 2019] EIA projections are profoundly flawed, being the only question if they are aware of it or if they actually believe their own shit.

Mar 27, 2019 | peakoilbarrel.com

Carlos Diaz x Ignored says: 03/24/2019 at 6:38 am

EIA projections are profoundly flawed, being the only question if they are aware of it or if they actually believe their own shit.

Increased production is driven by relatively high or increasing oil prices that signal increased demand, OR by the need of producers to maintain income at the expense of other producers when prices fall as it happened between mid-2014 to late 2015.

The second case is difficult to take place when oil prices are relatively low, as now, and when there are agreements between producers to limit production to sustain prices, as now. Therefore EIA is projecting an oil price increase amid general economic weakness, a trade war, Chinese ongoing slowdown, and so on. The economy is not signaling any urgency about oil supply after the Iran sanctions have taken place without much effect. Prices are not going to sustain an increase in oil production unless something unforeseen takes place, and such event cannot be included in EIA forecast.

According to Art Berman presentation about the 2018 price collapse the markets are signalling $60/b oil for 2019-2020 with $10 price excursions. If he is correct we will not see an increase in oil production, and might even see a slight decrease as Venezuela continues its fast descent to near zero oil production. Everybody knows that a country that came to depend almost exclusively on oil will implode when its oil production collapses, the only question being how the implosion will look and what will be the final death toll.

[Feb 22, 2019] Volume vs energy content

Feb 22, 2019 | peakoilbarrel.com

dclonghorn x Ignored says: 02/21/2019 at 10:16 pm

Doc,

You need to look at more of the report.

http://ir.eia.gov/wpsr/overview.pdf

Crude imports on line 5 as 7,522 kbpd, crude exports on line 9 are 3,607 kbpd for net crude imports on line 4 of 3,915 kbpd.
Other supply includes products and natural gas liquids. It shows net imports on line 21 of -2,809 kbpd. Total net imports of Crude and Petroleum Products on line 33 are 1,106 kbpd.

likbez x Ignored says: 02/22/2019 at 12:57 am
This is somewhat questionable math as one barrel of oil and one barrel of condensate have different energy content (condensate is around 60% of oil).

So condensate input into the USA energy balance should be multiplied by approximately 0.5 to get a more clear picture.

The USA imports heavy oil and exports condensate. Not the same liter for liter things.

[Dec 27, 2018] EIA prediction about a million bpd increase of shale oil production in 2019 is a scam

Dec 27, 2018 | peakoilbarrel.com

shallow sand x Ignored says: 12/24/2018 at 2:33 pm

WTI $42.58

WTI Midland $34.34

Flint Hills posting ND Light Sweet $16.75.

GuyM x Ignored says: 12/24/2018 at 3:08 pm
Seems the break even is pretty low, as EIA has predicted about a million bpd increase out of shale in 2019 🤡 It doesn't matter whether you provide storage or increase the number of refineries, shale production is relatively dead at these prices. The prices just need to stay ridiculously low for awhile to stop the EIA and IEA from producing more imaginary oil, and face reality. Yeah, that would affect my wells, but I would hope for a better price, later.

Less than $17 a barrel? Bakken is done for awhile. And there is NOBODY in the Permian breaking even at $34. Remember what happened in 2015? Yeah, production dropped by over a million barrels. These prices are as bad as 2015, and we have a bigger drop potential. Those pipeline builders gotta be really worried. But, they should be anyway. How are you going to keep the pipeline flowing if you can't take what's in there out, because there is nowhere to put it? How many mentally challenged people are working in the Permian?

The amazing part is, this time there is no glut, at all. Inventories will drop, but just let it happen. We have to forever eradicate the Permian and shale production will save the world song. It's a thousand times more irritating than listening to Bing Crosby's white Christmas on January1st. There ain't no fritzing Santa Clause, EIA!

Adam B x Ignored says: 12/24/2018 at 5:53 pm
Seems like a lot of year end liquidation of oil futures perhaps. That's the only explanation I've got for how oil is this low. Probably will bounce back to the low 50's WTI by late January. It will be interesting to see December through February US production data to see what effect this price dive has done.
Financier x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 4:24 pm
Hi GuyM,

"Those pipeline builders gotta be really worried. But, they should be anyway."

What do you think the issues are that the pipeline companies are worried about
right now? I would appreciate your thoughts on this.

GuyM x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 4:43 pm
Two thoughts, immediately. The price is such now, that if it stays anywhere close to that for awhile, completions won't be as expected, and there won't be enough oil to fill them. The second is, that if the E&Ps had the right price, and did produce, there is probably not enough shipping until late 2020 or 2021 to handle 2.5 million bpd extra. No place to store it, and refineries can't use high API. Unless, I am missing something. Pipelines can't make much money because a pipeline is filled, it has to be flowing.
Dennis Coyne x Ignored says: 12/24/2018 at 5:47 pm
Its gonna go to zero. Just kidding.
Doubt these prices will be sustained.
GuyM x Ignored says: 12/24/2018 at 6:03 pm
Maybe not zero, but could be a lot more. It's reacting to the stock market, now. Dow down 15% and still going. This is no simple correction, as that stops at around 10%, usually. Been a long, long time since the last bear market, and is past due. Everything dives, until they come to grips that commodities are a different animal. That may take months, or longer depending on how bad it gets. Who knows, each bear market has a different generation, and it's always new to them.
Especially this one, as it has been so long. New ball game.
I think it was EN who posted how rate hikes can cause this on a historical basis. Based on that chart, we could be in a significant bear market. Bubbles are going to pop. Not sure what the derivative markets are looking like, but they can't be healthy. The derivative markets are many times bigger than the regular stock markets. Think Lehman Brothers, and margin call. Lehman didn't fail over bad home loans, they failed over the derivatives of home loans. This time, it won't be housing, but something will give. They made a big effort to control the banks after the last fiasco in 2008, but made NO effort in regulating derivatives. Brilliant. Some of the weaker oil companies may be in trouble. JMO.
Adam B x Ignored says: 12/24/2018 at 9:04 pm
Right on the move from 18,000 to 27,000 in the Dow was just hot air as we are seeing now. Investors realize there isn't a fed put and are freaking out, how far will it sink before Powell and company call off the dogs and say no more rate hikes and stop quantitative tightening..cause it's on "autopilot" according to them. All I want is 4% on an 18 month CD, fat chance now.
GuyM x Ignored says: 12/24/2018 at 10:07 pm
The autopilot is also the monthly selling of Bonds held by the Fed, which also acts as interest rate increases.
Watcher x Ignored says: 12/24/2018 at 7:19 pm
hahahahahahaahahaha

The inventory nazis will be out soon with a surprise discovery that there was more in storage than they ever suspected.

Don't you worry none. In the finest traditions of capitalism and free markets, various govts will be taking action soon. To do something.

GuyM x Ignored says: 12/24/2018 at 7:27 pm
Yeah, they are convening as we speak. Never fear. Trust in your government, not your 401k.🤪

A Minsky moment, day, week, month or year(s). Aka margin call on highly leveraged margin is probably the cause. Hence, duck it's hitting the fan.
https://seekingalpha.com/amp/article/4229895-something-happening

In other words, if you have to sell those paper barrels for margin calls, and there is too few to buy, because they are selling, also; then price goes down, because there are too many paper barrels, and not enough buyers. Probably, the original paper sellers lose their butt, and have to sell something to cover their margins. Everyone now is paying homage to the margin god. Because, there was never any real money to cause the stock market to soar like an eagle.

Which reverses itself later, because when it is time to sell new paper barrels, less are sold, enabling the price to go up (if anyone has any money left). Everyone else is busy ducking Guido, because the value of what they had left in their portfolio was not enough to cover margin. Er, I think 🤡

Anyway, that's Guy's course negative 101, on the current status of oil prices.

TechGuy x Ignored says: 12/24/2018 at 10:20 pm
We come full circle back to the Jan. 2009 Lows! Lowest was Jan 16 at $36.
Folks, I think we hit a recession!
GuyM x Ignored says: 12/24/2018 at 10:35 pm
Recession usually lags 9 months after the market crash, but, yeah. We are basically there.
Dennis Coyne x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 7:30 am
Recession is based on GDP not the stock market or price of oil.

https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product
Q3-2018 was 3.4% GDP growth. Very good for an advanced economy.

GuyM x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 7:47 am
Of course. But traditionally, crashes take from cash/growth after a period of time. Nine months to a year, and growth in GDP precedes bull markets by the same. It's not a fritzing law, but it's logical, and normal. Has been since I started following it in the 60's. Last crash was different, in that the GDP growth declined before the crash, due to housing. But, if the crash persists, my bet would be a lack of cash, eventually, to support growth. There are huge losses, we don't see that are happening now in the derivative market, besides the stock markets. There was something like 384 trillion just in interest rate bets in derivatives,that half are losing right now.
HHH x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 8:04 am
This is no traditional crash. FED can stop hiking interest rates and market might pause an consolidate before going lower but lower they go. Until FED stops allowing it's balance sheet to shrink, down is the direction for markets. Back when QE was full blown stuff like gov. shutdown and trade wars were the very thing that made markets go higher because it meant more QE for longer.

There is nothing organic about the recovery of markets since 2008-2009. All assets and markets are mispriced. Price discovery wasn't allowed to happen after 2008-2009. Truth is true price discovery won't be allowed to happen this time either.

Fed is manufacturing a market crash so they can do the next round of QE. Fact is QE works but you can't end it and you sure as hell can't reverse it. QE creates the illusion that everything is fine. There is a credibility issue if you can't ever end QE though. That's where the Fed finds itself now.

GuyM x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 8:12 am
Your right. Each crash is different. This one is just a slow meltdown. And, since I have been following it, there has never been anything organic about market growth, it's always BS. There was nothing organic about the first big market crash in the early part of last century, it was purely speculative. The tulip crash, before established markets was speculative.
Growth in GDP and markets are two separate animals. Although, as the previous crash proves, GDP decline can affect the market, as well as market crashes affecting GDP.

The stock market, and now especially derivatives, are nothing other than a gigantic Las Vegas casino. Elves in the market strive to maintain that there is a relation, but in the end, it doesn't pan out.

HHH x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 8:46 am
Well the Dow has had its largest monthly loss ever recorded this December unless market recovers some of that between now and the end of the year. Slow meltdown maybe not. It's currently at about -4,200 which tops the largest monthly drop during 2008-2009 by about 1,000 points.
GuyM x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 8:53 am
Just further to drop than the previous ones. Half would be about 10k more points. But, there is nothing magical about half, it could stop well before that.
The analysis of the drop is still being speculated. The ones that make sense, so far, is that there was a lot of market fear (tariffs, ad nauseum). Sell offs happened, snow balling into covering margin calls. If so, that is a normal scenario, but I think the Fed raising interest rates, and continuing to unravel QE is also a major, if not the major reason. There are a bunch of other reasons that don't make a lot of sense. One blaming oil price. I think that is yet to come, but not this time.
HHH x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 9:01 am
Unwinding of FED's balance sheet is also on autopilot. They don't have to have a Fed meeting to vote on it like a rate hike. Much easier to deflect the blame elsewhere for the resulting market decline.
Ron Patterson x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 1:09 pm
-4,200 which tops the largest monthly drop during 2008-2009 by about 1,000 points.

Hey, it it's the precentage drop that counts. What was the largest monthly percentage drop in the 2008-2009 crash? I would wager it was far greater than the percentage drop this December.

This article is about the huge 1,175 one day drop last February, but the point still holds.

Dow Jones Suffers Worst Point Drop Ever, But Percentage Loss Is Not Historic

The Dow's 4.6% loss on Monday was the worst since August 2011. But it didn't even crack the top-20 of all-time losses. It was just the 25th worst loss since 1960.

The Dow's biggest one-day percentage loss was the 22.6% Black Monday crash on Oct. 19, 1987. In point terms, that was "only" 508 points. In second place, the Dow crashed 12.8% on Oct. 28, 1929.

GuyM x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 2:19 pm
Looks like the biggest percentage drop for a month was Feb 2009, at around 21%. Eclipsing this month. But, it had also been going down for a long time. What was this month, around 16%? But, it's just started,
GuyM x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 11:13 am
Merry Christmas from S Padre Island at 75 Degrees F.
Hightrekker x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 12:00 pm
Very white this morning in Bend Oregon.
Watcher x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 2:18 pm
So markets look down 14ish% YTD. Still 4 days to worsen that or better that.

You know, there is no law of the universe that says markets can't be down more than 10% this year, and next year, and the next, and the next for 10 years or so. Never done that before? So what? Never printed 25% of GDP before. Never API 40.6 WTI before. After 10 yrs, scarce oil, scarce life.

GuyM x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 2:22 pm
You have that right. The world is full of surprises.

And, I do not see QE, again. Different folks in the Fed. So, banks will lose big time on easy money, and getting more is not going to be easy like last time. Over the past two years, I have been getting endless calls and letters wanting to loan me money. Bet that slows down.

And, because bear markets have a tendency to stick around for a few years, oil supply may put a blanket on improvement. So it could be possible for continued decline, rather than a rebound. Or, one real big final decline. No end to the possibilities.

One, I really see as a possibility, is another export ban. Think about it. Gasoline prices go up due to a shortage. We could be in a recession with stagflation. The public, and the illiterate congress would not be able to comprehend API. We are just exporting oil, when gas prices are high. In a way, they would be right. Think how that would affect 2.5 million bpd pipeline expansions, and extra shipping improvements.

Or, we could elect another flawed icon for President-Elon. Who would promise a Tesla for every family, or a free trip to Mars.

Ok, this is fun, but pointless.

Watcher x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 7:09 pm
Wrong govts.

Think in terms of the big SWFs. It is they that seek action.

As for quoting indices vs their histories, this sounds like a good thing. Just be sure that you quote an index that has the same companies in it as it did historically. The Dow with Apple will be difficult data to find for 1960. But you can find GE in it for then.

Ever notice they don't add a company that is failing? And never remove one that is doing well? Similarly we should only quote WTI 39.6 API price. Difficult data to find.

GuyM x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 7:21 pm
SWFs? Meaning.
GuyM x Ignored says: 12/25/2018 at 7:11 pm
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/24/whats-a-bear-market-and-how-long-do-they-usually-last-.html

Quick turnaround of the market from this point has no historical precedence. Although, if it does not go down much more, 3 to 5 months is possible.

[Jul 14, 2018] EIA optimism is politically motivated

Notable quotes:
"... If the EIA is intentionally misrepresenting available supply, do they know better and are just trying to postpone some sort of economic panic? ..."
Jul 14, 2018 | peakoilbarrel.com

Tita x Ignored says: 07/11/2018 at 1:21 pm

I did a more thorough analysis of the STEO using their excel tables. Just comparing dec 18 production with dec 19 production. I just corrected some inconsistency with UK data, as dec19 had a drop of 300kb/d.

non-OPEC 2018 increase: 2.8 Mb/d
US increase: 2 Mb/d,
of which 1.4Mb/d of crude, 0.6Mb/d of NGL. Offshore increase of 400kb/d (to 1.89 Mb/d). Onshore increase of 1Mb/d.
Canada increase: 130 kb/d
Brazil increase: 176 kb/d
Russia increase: 211kb/d

So, indeed EIA doesn't forecast any constrains in US production. June to december growth for onshore production is forecasted at 430kb/d. The 1.4Mb/d figure comes probably from the monthly data. They are very optimistic, but there is nothing wrong.

Guym x Ignored says: 07/11/2018 at 2:05 pm
When it says "crude" is that crude plus condensate, or is the condensate included in NGLs? The reason I ask that, is that the monthlies include crude plus condensate. 1.4 million increase does not tie into their summary page. 1 million crude per your spreadsheets does not agree to 600 to the Permian, plus 600 from the rest of the US, including the GOM. The summary analysis has 1.2 million. Adding onshore and GOM from the numbers you pulled is 1.4 million. Adding 2 million from the US plus Canada gives 2.13 million, not 2.3 per the summary. Adding 400 to the ending monthly for the GOM for 2017, gives a lot more than 1.89. Nothing jives. They are supposed to be just "optimistic" when the expect 430k to just magically appear in Cushing or Gulf coast without the aid of pipelines, trains, or trucks? No, wait, 400k of that is supposed to come from the Bakken and Eagle Ford, of which little has happened yet, nor will much. So, most of it has already figured out a way to get teleported. Or, is the optimism politically motivated.
Ron Patterson x Ignored says: 07/11/2018 at 2:51 pm
No, the OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report reports crude only. Their data does not include condensate.

The EIA figures are always Crude+Condensate or Total Liquids. The EIA never reports crude only and OPEC never reports C+C.

George Kaplan x Ignored says: 07/12/2018 at 12:22 am
NEB currently has Canada increase at about 250kbpd (for both yearly average and December exit rate), that may come down as they incorporate the upgrader outage and East Coast turn arounds.

The GoM is not going to add 400 kbpd, it's more likely to be negative on average (December may be up slightly as 2017 had three major unplanned outages then (but at the moment EIA are reporting about 30 kbpd which don't come from any reported wells or leases so they may know something else). GoM has to replace about 20 kbpd per month of decline, which it isn't doing at the moment, plus overcome any planned/unplanned outages, which seem to be getting more frequent.

Brazil is going to struggle to get 180 kbpd increase. They were down 20 kbpd in May from December. They have two FPSOs ramping up but are fighting 30+ kbpd decline per month (and increasing). The are other FPSOs due but seem delayed and the ramp ups are slower than in the past, principally because of lack of drilling capacity. Probably they need two new development wells per month to keep level, given the normal delivery rate and that some are for injection, they only have 8 rigs, not all on new developments, but there may be some predrilled wells available.

Russia has more fields coming on stream, but it depends how much the mature fields decline – there must be a limit some time on how much in-fill drilling can be done.

Guym x Ignored says: 07/12/2018 at 8:12 am
So, replacing the EIA estimates with our own, we get for non-OPEC growth:
650. US (550 from the Permian, 100 Bakken)
Eagle Ford may drop
250. Canada
180. Brazil
300. Russia being generous

1380. Total which is 1.42 short of their 2.8 million, or 2.6 (1.180) if you use their summary page. Even adding another 350 to the US still is close to 1 million short. OPEC contribution seems somewhat "optimistic", and does not factor in any Iranian drop. Yeah, should balance out. 🤡Then, we have 2019, which is damn scary. The only potential partial offset is demand. If part of demand is computed based on funky supply numbers, then it is likely to be less than estimated. But not that much lower. Half a million is an overestimation. This much is politically motivated. The latest monthlies that will be posted before November will be August. Only four months to the end of the year. Going to be tough to keep this up. Four more months of inventory drops before November. OMR out, and indicates OPEC is stretched. I still find it easier to plug in my estimates with the OMR report. I get 2 million a day draws through 2019, at a minimum using their June report, and correcting.
https://www.iea.org/oilmarketreport/omrpublic/currentreport/
Their first page graph pretty much depicts serious draws without adjustment. They have a 2 million a day increase in non-OPEC production for 2018, lowered to 1.97 in this report.

Boomer II x Ignored says: 07/12/2018 at 1:29 pm
If the EIA is intentionally misrepresenting available supply, do they know better and are just trying to postpone some sort of economic panic?
Guym x Ignored says: 07/12/2018 at 1:35 pm
Misrepresenting is too strong a term. That would assume they are reporting the actual numbers wrong, which they do not do. These are projections, and they can be manipulated to serve the best purpose of keeping prices down until the elections. That's pure speculation.
Ron Patterson x Ignored says: 07/12/2018 at 10:44 am
Another Chart.

Guym x Ignored says: 07/12/2018 at 11:07 am
Thanks. Yeah, it's much worse. Looking at that, one could guess 1380- 400 non-OPEC (less US Canada and Russia) for 2018. But, because we were short in 2017, we've gone nowhere.
George Kaplan x Ignored says: 07/12/2018 at 11:16 am
180 for Brazil is a stretch. Fort Hills and Horizon have finished ramping up so 250 for Canada is also probably a stretch. US NGL may be a chunk to include but I wonder what the global decline for NGL on mature gas developments is. North Sea looks not as good as expected. The only place doing better than I thought is Mexico, and I think that could turn the other way any time.
Guym x Ignored says: 07/12/2018 at 11:23 am
EIA reports condensate, so does my estimate. There's about 300k extra in their detail of NGLs that I can't account for.
George Kaplan x Ignored says: 07/12/2018 at 11:47 am
But i think there's a lot of NGPLs (i.e. butane and lighter) in the all liquids numbers, it's not just condensate (C5+).

Are the details of OPEC, IEA and EIA reports getting more and more focussed on short term issues, as if they have no idea how supply can meet demand longer term? Or am I missing something.

Guym x Ignored says: 07/12/2018 at 11:52 am
Unless, EIA is using a double standard in their STEO report for US vs Non-OPEC, I believe it would be crude plus condensate, only. It's crude plus condensate for US, for sure.
Ron Patterson x Ignored says: 07/12/2018 at 12:27 pm
The STEO, table 3b, Non-OPEC, is total liquids. Table 4a, US only, is Crude plus Condensate. Table 3c, OPEC, is crude only.

[Jul 14, 2018] EIA actually acknowledge these constraints, and admit they may be overstimating production, without saying by how much.

Jul 14, 2018 | peakoilbarrel.com

Tita

x Ignored says: 07/13/2018 at 7:37 am Just saw this looking for the release date of the next DPR report, on the EIA website:

"NOTE:
Productivity estimates may overstate actual production which could be limited by logistical constraints."

So, EIA actually acknowledge these constraints, and admit they may be overstimating production, without saying by how much. Reply Guym x Ignored says: 07/13/2018 at 9:35 am

Reliable estimates of takeaway capacity for the Permian. Similar to Genscape, current pipeline capacity is estimated to be about 2.8. Drilling info does not mention total takeaway capacity, but Genscape estimates it at 3.3. Per the article, it was at 3.2 the end of May. The ending production, the end of 2017, was 2.8 from the Permian, making the end of May increase at 400k. I gave the projected increase 550k, because Genscape said 25k of additional trucking, may happen. Note, Drilling info lists some very small additional capacity that should come online this year, and soon, so it will probably wind up to be about 50k higher. Maybe. The gathering terminal gets it from New Mexico and West Texas to the Midland terminal, only, as I understand. The rest of the articles are mostly badly written press, but I think you can rely on Genscape and Drillinginfo.
https://info.drillinginfo.com/permian-oil-and-gas-takeaway-capacity-improvements-on-horizon/

Sometime soon, there will be an odd mixture of increased production and shut ins.

Also, if I estimate Permian production at 600k (generously), it equals the new EIA estimate. The remaining 600k US C&C production will have to come from other shales and the GOM. Good luck with that, it's July, already, and prices are too up and down, to date. Contrary to the EIA's and other analysts thoughts, $65 to $70 oil is pretty ho hum to producers. Also, there is no allowance here for other declines, of which there are some.

Guym x Ignored says: 07/13/2018 at 10:50 am
So, an updated revision to US increases (liquids) would be:
700 c@c US (600 Permian, 100 Bakken and others, GOM 0)
400 US NGLs ? Seems real high for an increase
250 Canada
180 Brazil
300 Russia
Total 1.83 versus a projection of an increase by EIA in the non-OPEC section of the STEO of 2.6, and I think mine is very "optimistic". And, as Ron points out above, it does not include roughly about 300 to 500k in declines that may happen to non-US, Russia and Canada non-OPEC production. The EIA's STEO report can be found in the local library next to Mother Goose.

According to the EIA, we are pretty much finished with inventory declines. 🤡

[Jun 27, 2018] EIA numbers and reality

Jun 27, 2018 | peakoilbarrel.com

GuyM

x Ignored says: 06/25/2018 at 9:16 am https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Gulf-Of-Mexico-Production-Expected-To-Hit-Record-High.html

I think the high is coming from the strange smell from the EIA offices, and they have been sharing their stash with Woods McKenzie:
https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/deepwater-gulf-of-mexico-stages-a-comeback-in-2018/

Four days before the Permian pacifier is removed. EIA monthly for April due out 5/29, Friday. But, then if they are really intent on keeping oil prices down until November, they can post an increase and correct it later. Or, slowly correct it until November. Do I really think the Federal Government would mislead the public? Hell, yes, they have been. They have access to much more information than I do, and they are still singing the Permian song. Reply Guym x Ignored says: 06/25/2018 at 11:16 pm

Second thought, I don't think it is possible for EIA to delay it much further. We crossed the Rubicon. Singing Permian songs when there are reports of service employers cutting back, wells shut in, and overall reports of slowdowns, creates a lot of cognitive dissonance.
George Kaplan x Ignored says: 06/26/2018 at 12:28 am
Must be a slow news day for OilPrice. The headline is misleading – the predicted record is only for deepwater total (oil and gas) production, not total GoM. It is almost certainly going to be wrong – if nothing else the 50 kboepd dropped from the loss of Hadrian South gas and the prolonged Enchilada and Delta house outages are impossible to make up, but even without those there probably wouldn't be enough new, plateau production through this year.

As to the industry having this great revelation and deciding not to go for big, bespoke developments and use standard designs and tie backs – it's the other way round – they ran out of larger developments that were affordable, so didn't need the bigger, on-off designs. Also the standard designs come at a cost – they have less flexibility for future tie-backs or changing reservoir conditions, and probably lower availabilities. Note also the talk of ultra-deep-water and HPHT developments like Anchor, that's a switch back to expensive bespoke design (actually almost research projects).

It also references that crap EIA paper without making any effort to check the facts.

[Jun 21, 2018] IEA monthly oil market report for June is out

Jun 13, 2018 | peakoilbarrel.com

Kolbeinh , 06/13/2018 at 4:02 am

IEA monthly oil market report for June is out.

Selected extracts from the report follows.

About the market in general:
Rapidly rising prices in recent months have raised doubts about the strength of demand growth, and we have modestly downgraded our estimate for 2018. Prices are unlikely to increase as sharply as they did from mid-2017 onwards and thus the dampening effect on demand will be reduced.

About Non-OPEC production growth:
We think that in Texas by end-2019 there will be a net 575 kb/d of additional pipeline capacity beyond our earlier number, albeit with most of it coming on line in the second half of the year. In the meantime, capacity will likely remain tight but production will still be able to grow strongly, by 1.3 mb/d this year and 0.9 mb/d in 2019. Our non-OPEC growth for 2019 includes a modest increase from Russia reflecting a possible contribution to compensating for lost production from Iran and Venezuela.

About OPEC production:
To make up for the losses [from Venezuela and Iran], we estimate that Middle East OPEC countries could increase production in fairly short order by about 1.1 mb/d and there could be more output from Russia on top of the increase already built into our 2019 non-OPEC supply numbers. However, even if the Iran/Venezuela supply gap is plugged, the market will be finely balanced next year, and vulnerable to prices rising higher in the event of further disruption. It is possible that the very small number of countries with spare capacity beyond what can be activated quickly will have to go the extra mile.

As usual I disagree with their views, it seems like they have a stance that the market will be in balance no matter what.

https://www.iea.org/oilmarketreport/omrpublic/

Jeff , 06/13/2018 at 4:10 am
They now have an estimate ("scenario") of market balance in 2019. All assumptions are not available in the public version. Deficit (stock draw or call on Saudi et al.) is between 1-1.6 mbd assuming lower exports from Iran and Venezuela. However, current decline in Venezuela looks worse than I think they assumed and IEA continues to assume N America shale oil on full throttle. 2019 is shaping up to be interesting.

(sorry for cross post)

George Kaplan , 06/13/2018 at 5:20 am
The most likely trend for Venezuela is surely that it hits zero exports (or maybe total production at worst) sometime in 2019, not that it flattens out or, more miraculously, starts increasing again. Brazil is likely to take longer, and therefore have a lower peak, to ramp-up its planned Santos FPSOs. Kazakhstan looks decidedly peaky (or plateau-y, except in the past they've always shown decline after a peak); Tengiz expansion is in 2020 but I think initially it just extends the plant plateau. North Sea will be declining until J. Sverdrup. Nigeria and Angola are definitely showing signs of the big declines you get when deep water FPSOs hit end of life, and not much drilling there showing yet.

It would be interesting to know how they factor in decline rates (which are accelerating); in-fill drilling (which must be running out of the best prospects); and short cycle developments of new discoveries (few to none of those at the moment). If they are using predictions based on 2005 to 2014 experience the models are going to be a long way out, but what data is available to do something better?

[Jun 20, 2018] Pollyanna (sorry EIA) speaks

Jun 20, 2018 | peakoilbarrel.com

Guym, 06/17/2018 at 8:45 am

Pollyanna speaks:
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36493
Permian continues to grow when they have no capacity to move it until late 2019.

Predicated on info from Pollyanna two:
https://www.iea.org/oilmarketreport/omrpublic/currentreport/

Says OPEC 90 day excess capacity is 3.47 million barrels a day. EIA says Sauds part of that is 1.5 to 2. Not sure where IEA is saying the other 1.5 is coming from. Ok, we will soon see the truth in that, over the next year.

The real Pollyanna lunacy, is that the Sauds want to see oil prices in the sixties. Lip service, yes. Actually, why????

Or, come on guys, help us keep the prices down until election time, at least.

The real story:
http://www.petroleumworld.com/story18061505.htm

[Nov 25, 2017] As we moved closer to oil deficit, suddenly, an extra outage will cause meaningful rallies instead of being mostly written off

This May 20, 2016 post was probably two years early ;-) I remember looking back on the IEA's 2005 World Energy Outlook and being perplexed that anyone still takes their price or production forecasts with any seriousness whatsoever. Their 2003 WEO is even more hilarious.
Notable quotes:
"... Eventually market sentiment focused on the recency bias of a 2 year glut is going to shift into the realization that disruptions, depletion, and growing demand have thrown the global balance into a dearth where inventories are being drawn to meet demand – such as the news about Saudi's relying on inventory to meet demand, the "missing" 800,000,000 barrels of OECD inventory from Q1 2016, or next weeks inevitable U.S. inventory draw. ..."
"... Suddenly, an extra outage (like say if anything happens to Venezuela) will cause meaningful rallies instead of being mostly written off. ..."
"... The best, live, interactive charts I am most fond of are here: https://www.dailyfx.com/crude-oil ..."
"... I expect one last fight around $50, a few day consolidation move lower. Then market realities will push WTI past $50, and shorts will have to cover pushing it even higher. ..."
"... Next thing you know were range bound in the mid-$50s at the end of June as everyone questions if shale production will magically skyrocket overnight. Maybe the rig count will go up by 3 or 4, and it'll spark a sell-off back to or below $50 because of the psychological recency bias of a "repeat of 2015". ..."
"... I remember looking back on the IEA's 2005 World Energy Outlook and being perplexed that anyone still takes their price or production forecasts with any seriousness whatsoever. Their 2003 WEO is even more hilarious. ..."
"... Most people are simply incapable of seeing a bigger picture, and they'll simply never understand the relationship between depletion, economic and population growth, and the long-term fact that this equals higher prices (and probably also, in the long run, higher poverty and unemployment). ..."
"... It is for that exact same reason that so many people we know will simply never get it. Physics doesn't have agency, it cannot be avoided, cajoled, or "blamed". It simply is, and that is so unsettling to our psyche that most people have a strong, unconscious drive to negate and ignore that conclusion even if they will acknowledge it is a sound and true explanation of how economics, growth, employment, wealth, energy (physics and thermodynamics), and depletion are woven of the same fabric. ..."
"... Brian – I think you are closer to reality than EIA or USGS, it will be interesting to see how it plays out against your scenario. ..."
"... There doesn't necessarily have to be more social breakdown in Venezuela to have an impact – Haliburton and Schlumberger are pulling out and will have immediate effect as the extra heavy oil production needs continuous attention to the wells. I'm surprised Angola and Algeria haven't seen disruptions yet either. ..."
May 20, 2016 | peakoilbarrel.com

Brian Rose , 05/19/2016 at 11:04 pm

Big news from Canada today:

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-wildfire-idUSKCN0YA0Z1

"The joint-venture Syncrude project told customers to expect no further crude shipments for May, trading sources said on Thursday, extending a force majeure on crude production from earlier in the month."

Eventually market sentiment focused on the recency bias of a 2 year glut is going to shift into the realization that disruptions, depletion, and growing demand have thrown the global balance into a dearth where inventories are being drawn to meet demand – such as the news about Saudi's relying on inventory to meet demand, the "missing" 800,000,000 barrels of OECD inventory from Q1 2016, or next weeks inevitable U.S. inventory draw.

Suddenly, an extra outage (like say if anything happens to Venezuela) will cause meaningful rallies instead of being mostly written off.

In fact, judging by the price action on oil over the last 24 hours, I'd say that sentiment is very close to a shift. From 11 AM forward crude oil marched higher relentlessly, even in opposition to dollar strength. Most every single commodity was down, as we're most every stock market except oil.

The best, live, interactive charts I am most fond of are here: https://www.dailyfx.com/crude-oil

I expect one last fight around $50, a few day consolidation move lower. Then market realities will push WTI past $50, and shorts will have to cover pushing it even higher.

Next thing you know were range bound in the mid-$50s at the end of June as everyone questions if shale production will magically skyrocket overnight. Maybe the rig count will go up by 3 or 4, and it'll spark a sell-off back to or below $50 because of the psychological recency bias of a "repeat of 2015".

That is, until rational minds, or the market itself pushes prices back up as it becomes obvious that a slowdown in U.S. production declines will mean little in the face of mounting production declines around the globe, and "surprisingly" strong demand – because apparently predicting that lower prices will cause stronger than average demand growth is beyond the economic capability of the EIA or IEA, and markets tend to take their word as gospel.

I remember looking back on the IEA's 2005 World Energy Outlook and being perplexed that anyone still takes their price or production forecasts with any seriousness whatsoever. Their 2003 WEO is even more hilarious.

Every step of the way analysts and talking heads will be confused that prices aren't dropping back to $30 just like they were for 5 straight years from 2003 to 2008. They'll predict Saudi's will raise production to 12 mbpd any day now, or that shale will magically take off overnight.

They'll never even realize that they don't understand the history of Saudi production, or the logistical and financial complexities of shale production rising as fast as it did before. Instead they'll blame the banks, or speculators, or Big Oil for artificially making oil prices rise (without questioning why they let them fall for 2 years in the first place)

But then again if gas is cheap, which average people are fond of, their brain says "I like this, so it must be right". If gas is expensive their brain says "I don't like this, it must be wrong, what evil force made this happen?!?"

Most people are simply incapable of seeing a bigger picture, and they'll simply never understand the relationship between depletion, economic and population growth, and the long-term fact that this equals higher prices (and probably also, in the long run, higher poverty and unemployment).

Their lives will have ups and down, growth and recession, but they'll know and feel it is generally getting harder. They'll never be aware that this is the "fault" of nothing but physics and thermodynamics, even if told directly and shown all the rather clear evidence (I know every one of you has experienced this as I have). Instead, they'll blame those dang immigrants, or the Chinese, or the Congress, or regulations.

They'll blame anything that fits their paradigm enough to allow cohesiveness so their fragile lives can at least MAKE SENSE. You can't blame physics, and, frankly, I think that is a large psychological barrier for people comprehending what is happening. We need to have some agent to blame for things, and physics has no agency. Blaming something for a problem is settling because it gives us something to focus on to solve the problem, or, at the very least, avoid it. The evolutionarily beneficial need to assign agents as the cause of events is what pre-disposes us to believing that events we cannot easily assign agency to are, nonetheless, the will of a greater, invisible, omnipresent agent.

It is for that exact same reason that so many people we know will simply never get it. Physics doesn't have agency, it cannot be avoided, cajoled, or "blamed". It simply is, and that is so unsettling to our psyche that most people have a strong, unconscious drive to negate and ignore that conclusion even if they will acknowledge it is a sound and true explanation of how economics, growth, employment, wealth, energy (physics and thermodynamics), and depletion are woven of the same fabric.

George Kaplan , 05/20/2016 at 1:36 am
Brian – I think you are closer to reality than EIA or USGS, it will be interesting to see how it plays out against your scenario.

A couple of other impacts are summer maintenance season in North Sea (Buzzard and, I think, Ekofisk have major turnarounds), Alaska and Canada (maybe Russia as well) and increased demand from driving season in USA and AC use in Middle East.

There doesn't necessarily have to be more social breakdown in Venezuela to have an impact – Haliburton and Schlumberger are pulling out and will have immediate effect as the extra heavy oil production needs continuous attention to the wells. I'm surprised Angola and Algeria haven't seen disruptions yet either.

[Oct 11, 2017] I am absolutely convinced that the commercial inventory number on the EIA weekly report is not real

Oct 11, 2017 | peakoilbarrel.com

Guym

says: 10/10/2017 at 3:58 pm
I am quite sure I am not the only one, but at constantly looking at the commercial inventory number on the EIA weekly report, I am absolutely convinced it is not real. The only time I have seen it adjusted is when they decided to discontinue reporting of lease storage oil. As if they had any idea of what that amount was. In accounting, it is required to take an annual inventory. Only one other company I know of actually attempts to do a physical count of stored oil inventory, and they only do some areas. I've never heard of EIA ever doing a physical inventory of that number.
When I know the production figure is way off each week, it make me keep looking at that funky looking, stagnant number. The rest of the world's inventory is dropping fast, but we still use a decades old funky number. And calculate to its upward or downwards movement with completely false numbers.

[Oct 06, 2017] It really appears to me that US production is closer to 8,900,000 barrels a day versus 9,200,000 a day. EIA data are wrong

Notable quotes:
"... Inventory numbers are not a count of oil. They are a mathematical calculation of what had to be used, based upon baseless numbers. One could base an argument, that because production was really lower, more should be deducted from inventory each week. Some have made that claim. I just think all of the numbers are highly suspect. It is materially in error, and all of the numbers should be questioned. ..."
"... It really appears to me that US production is closer to 8,900,000 barrels a day versus 9,200,000 a day. ..."
"... You would imagine that Customs must know how much oil is traded per month. And that refineries must know how much oil they use. But even looking at the monthly data it's difficult to know what is accurate and what isn't. ..."
Oct 06, 2017 | peakoilbarrel.com

Guym: 10/02/2017 at 11:02 pm

Looked at what EIA posted for "final" numbers for Texas for July. 3474. Now, July 2016 had higher numbers for initial production than July 2017. Much higher with condensate, though I can't find the original condensate number, but they were running over 9 million at the time.

Texas final number for July 2016, at this point, is 3110. EIA has 3161 for July 2016. I don't need to do a lot of mathematical computations by looking backwards.

Just using EIA numbers for 2016, its over by about 313,000. Undoubtedly more.

Substituting, that puts US production at 8,925,000. Even though we had the shutdowns Aug and Sep for Harvey, EIA has production on the latest weekly at 9,547,000.

Does seem a might high, and that doesn't count a questionable increase in the GOM on the EIA July "final" numbers.

If the production is that far off, what else on the weekly report is way off? Total inputs, imports, exports, inventory draws?

Guym: 10/03/2017 at 10:26 am
At first, my thought was, why are they doing this? Then the more I thought of it, there is no nefarious intention. Any organization who uses their calculation to come up with "drilling productivity", can't have both oars in the water. Or, as a popular movie reiterates: "stupid is, as stupid does".
Dennis Coyne: 10/04/2017 at 12:47 pm
Hi Guym,

The EIA estimates (tight oil estimate) about a 510 kb/d increase in US tight oil production from July 2016 to July 2017, about 411 kb/d was from the Permian Basin (Texas and New Mexico). See

https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.php#crude

Click on "Tight Oil Production Estimates".

Energy News: 10/03/2017 at 11:47 am
I was thinking that the EIA's monthly Supply and Disposition numbers are more accurate that the weeklies. But even the monthly figures have an adjustment factor and it spiked up to +558 kb/day in July. So far, it seems that only the inventory figures are reliable.
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRUA_NUS_2&f=M

Guym: 10/03/2017 at 12:20 pm
Inventory numbers are not a count of oil. They are a mathematical calculation of what had to be used, based upon baseless numbers. One could base an argument, that because production was really lower, more should be deducted from inventory each week. Some have made that claim. I just think all of the numbers are highly suspect. It is materially in error, and all of the numbers should be questioned.

It really appears to me that US production is closer to 8,900,000 barrels a day versus 9,200,000 a day.

Energy News says: 10/03/2017 at 12:23 pm
You would imagine that Customs must know how much oil is traded per month. And that refineries must know how much oil they use. But even looking at the monthly data it's difficult to know what is accurate and what isn't.

If you calculate monthly production using the equation but without the adjustment you get the blue line on the chart
Refinery Input = Production + Imports – Exports + Inventory Change + Adjustment
Analysts version on Twitter: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DLIILKvVoAE_dMS.jpg

Energy News says: 10/03/2017 at 1:15 pm
The EIA did make some changes but looking at weekly vs monthly it is still the export/import numbers that show the largest revisions. Although also wondering how accurate the monthly data is.

MarketWatch – Aug 31, 2016 – Oil market cheers EIA changes to weekly statistics

On Wednesday, the EIA's Today in Energy report said the agency is now publishing its weekly petroleum export and consumption estimates based on "near-real-time export data" provided by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It was previously using weekly export estimates based on monthly official export data published by the U.S. Census Bureau about six weeks following the end of each reporting month.

"Exports should be more accurate, and 'net imports' should be better, but still with uncertainty," said Michael Lynch, president of president of Strategic Energy & Economic Research.

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/oil-market-cheers-eia-changes-to-weekly-statistics-2016-08-31

Energy News says: 10/04/2017 at 5:24 am
(I meant to type differences rather than revisions in the post above)

If the monthly data is accurate (?) then compared to the weeklies the USA is exporting more and importing slightly less than reported in the weeklies.

Monthly vs Weekly Trade Volumes, the average difference from Jan-2016 to Jul-2017

Exports: Monthly – Weekly = +124 kb/day (average over 19 months since Jan-2016)
Imports: Monthly – Weekly = -33 kb/day
Net Imports: Monthly – Weekly = -157 kb/day

Energy News says: 10/04/2017 at 6:28 am
The same exercise for refinery input

U.S. Refinery & Blender Net Input
Monthly vs Weekly, the average difference from Jan-2016 to Jul-2017
Monthly – Weekly = -32 kb/day (average over 19 months since Jan-2016)

If you just look at January, for the last 4 years, the January weeklies underestimate the demand drop every year
Monthly – Weekly = -189 kb/day (average over last 4 Januarys)

Monthly vs Weekly, the average difference from Feb-2016 to Jul-2017 (without Jan-2017)
Monthly – Weekly = -7 kb/day (average over 17 months since Feb-2016, without Jan-2017)

[Feb 10, 2017] From IEA figures suggest that while OPEC was pumping flat out in Q4/2016 we still were in a deficit

Notable quotes:
"... OECD stocks fell 800,000 bpd in Q4/2016. This is before any OPEC cuts. ..."
"... Am I the only one who thinks this is worrying? OPEC was pumping flat out at that point and we still were in a deficit? ..."
"... Strange graph though. Where did the oil go? http://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2017/february/omr-the-first-cut-is-the-deepest.html It looks like a stock build up of ~500,000 bpd in Q4/2016 but OECD inventories are down 800,000 bpd in the same period. ..."
"... Some of it is probably China, but where did the rest of the 1.3 mbd go? tankers? ..."
Feb 10, 2017 | peakoilbarrel.com
daniel says: 02/10/2017 at 4:45 am
IEA numbers out today. One jumped out to me:

OECD stocks fell 800,000 bpd in Q4/2016. This is before any OPEC cuts.

Am I the only one who thinks this is worrying? OPEC was pumping flat out at that point and we still were in a deficit?

Jeff says: 02/10/2017 at 5:14 am
Strange graph though. Where did the oil go? http://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2017/february/omr-the-first-cut-is-the-deepest.html
It looks like a stock build up of ~500,000 bpd in Q4/2016 but OECD inventories are down 800,000 bpd in the same period.

Some of it is probably China, but where did the rest of the 1.3 mbd go? tankers?

[Jan 08, 2017] 01/02/2017 at 9:49 pm

Jan 08, 2017 | peakoilbarrel.com
I thought it might be useful/amusing to have a look at a decade old IEA forecast (2006) to see how it panned out
I went back to the Oil Drum
http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/6/20/231220/551
and had a look at Stuart Staniford´s graphs
Third graph down
Eyeballing the numbers for 2016
Total liquids – a smidgeon under 100 million barrels a day (over by about 4%)
OPEC about 38-39 million barrels a day – spot on
Unconvential about 8 million barrels a day (and no one was talking about LTO then)
AlexS says: 01/02/2017 at 11:51 pm
It's not IEA (International Energy Agency).
It's EIA (Energy Information Administration) International Energy Outlook, 2006 edition.

There is no numbers for each year, particularly for 2016. But we can compare the EIA's projections for 2015 made in 2006 with actual numbers for 2015 from the EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, Dec. 2016.

I would say that at least the aggregate numbers from a forecast issued 10 years ago look surprisingly good:

World liquids supply in 2015: EIA IEO-2006 projections vs. actual (mb/d)

AlexS says: 01/03/2017 at 12:16 am
If we take into account supply outages (particularly, in Libya), which were difficult to predict 10 years ago, and the sharp drop in oil prices, which had a negative impact on non-OPEC output, the EIA's projections made in 2006 look extremely good.

I'm sure, projections made by the TOD contributors 10 years ago were much worse.

Especially funny now looks the comment to the last graph in the article:

"Note the bump in historical US production from the late 1970s on is due to the startup of Alaskan production. Apparently, the EIA has found a domestic oil source significantly better than Alaska, and production from it will be starting soon."

We now know that this domestic source was LTO, and actual U.S. total liquids (C+C+NGLs+biofuels) production is even higher than shown in the chart below from
Mr. Staniford's article:

US total oil production: EIA IEO 2006 projections
source: http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/6/20/231220/551

Stoney says: 01/03/2017 at 5:25 am
The EIA forecast from 2006 must also be viewed in light of their price prediction. They assumed oil price would drop again from 60$/b at the time and hover around 50$ until 2030. What would US and world oil production be now if oil price had stayed at 50$?

Also consider the message they were sending the time when there was a supply crunch imminent, seriously threatening the world economy. Move along, nothing to see here, everything will be back to normal.

This was most definitely not competent forecasting.

AlexS says: 01/03/2017 at 6:55 am
What supply crunch was imminent in 2006?
There was a temporary decline in demand during the 2008-09 global recession, and subsequent cut in OPEC supply ( >2 mb/d) in order to support prices. But between 2005 and 2015 global petroleum and other liquids supply increased by 11 mb/d. That's less than projected by the EIA, but 11 mb/d increase is not a crunch

[Dec 20, 2016] How accurate are U.S. DOE/EIA Projections?

Dec 20, 2016 | peakoilbarrel.com
Roger Blanchard says: 12/17/2016 at 3:18 pm
How accurate are U.S. DOE/EIA Projections?

Here are some projections I made in 1999 which are compared to what the EIA projected in 1999.

Author's Projections Peak Prod. Year Peak Prod. (mb/d) 2010 Projected Prod. (mb/d) % Error

Norway           2001     ..3.2            .1.6           +14.4
U.K.             1999     ..2.7            .1.5           -22.0
Sum                 ..      5.9            .3.1           .0.0
U.S. DOE/EIA's Projections
Norway          ..2005     .3.9            .3.7           +97.9
U.K.             ~2006      3.3            .3.0          ..+143.9
Sum                 ..      7.2            .6.7          ..+116.1
Actual Production Values
From U.S. DOE/EIA
Norway          ..2001     .3.226          1.87
U.K.          ..  1999     .2.684          1.23
Sum                 ..      5.91           3.1 

The 2010 values for the US DOE/EIA are based upon an interpolation between the peak projected values and the 2020 projected values

Actual Production data is based upon data from the US DOE/EIA

Mexican Oil Production

In 2003, the U.S. DOE/EIA was projecting that total liquid hydrocarbons production (crude oil + condensate + liquefied petroleum gas + biofuels + refinery gain) for Mexico would rise above 4.2 mb/d by 2010. Specifically, here is what they stated in their International Energy Outlook 2003:

"Mexico is expected to adopt energy policies that will encourage the efficient development of its resource base. Expected production volumes in Mexico exceed 4.2 million barrels per day by the end of the decade and remain near that level through 2025."

It was clear by 2003 that Cantarell complex oil production (crude oil + condensate) would start declining in approximately 2005. Since the Cantarell complex produced about 60% of Mexico's oil production in 2002, it appeared obvious that as Cantarell complex oil production started declining, it would bring down Mexico's oil production as well as its total liquid hydrocarbons production.

Mexico's oil production peaked in 2004 at 3.48 mb/d. By 2010, it was down to 2.62 mb/d, a decline of ~860,000 b/d. In 2010, Mexico's total liquid hydrocarbons production was down to 2.98 mb/d according to US DOE/EIA data. The U.S. DOE/EIA was high by at least 1.22 mb/d for their 2010 Mexican production forecast.

[Dec 11, 2016] These EIA projections are indeed to be taken with a grain of salt especially concerning the USA

Dec 11, 2016 | peakoilbarrel.com
Verwimp says: 12/08/2016 at 5:37 pm
These EIA projections are indeed to be taken with a grain of salt, I think. Especially concerning the USA. Why would the production suddenly stabilise? There has been a -10% decrease over the course of the last 1,5 year. (= a severe decline). And now, miraculously, things will stabilise?
I think, over the course of the next 365 days, the USA will lose another million barrels per day of oil production.
Guy Minton says: 12/08/2016 at 6:53 pm
Wasn't going to be the first one to go that far. Pretty sure we have another half million to go by end of 2017. Including the Gulf. Still, that would be about a million barrels less than EIA is projecting.
Javier says: 12/09/2016 at 6:54 am
Supposedly the increase in oil price should stabilize US production that has been severely affected by low prices. It remains to be seen if OPEC+Russia cuts (no article on this?) in 2017 realize and if US production can increase to compensate for the cuts. Obviously OPEC+Russia think not or they would not be cutting production, unless it is a fake cut in the first place.

[Dec 11, 2016] The EIA oil production forecast for the GOM is a complete fabrication

Dec 11, 2016 | peakoilbarrel.com
Coolreit says: 12/08/2016 at 1:10 am
The EIA oil production forecast for the GOM is a complete fabrication! Here is proof:

Nawar has a list of 2016 new projects that itemize the new GOM projects here:
http://www.investorvillage.com/groups.asp?mb=19176&mn=3794&pt=msg&mid=16582044

The new projects list is derived from the leading independent energy analysts, Energy Aspects!

They include three US projects: all GOM:

Heidelberg 80k b/d
Stones 50kb/d
Julia 34k b/d

Hedelberg forecast directly from the operator forecasts a production rise from ~12k b/d to ~32k b/d by end of 2016:

p6 of their latest presentation:

file:///C:/Users/kopel/Downloads/Anadarko+Jefferies+Presentation.pdf

Stones: From the press release of the startup: " September 6, 2016. Shell announces today that production has started from the Stones development in the Gulf of Mexico. Stones is expected to produce around 50,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day (boe/d) when fully ramped up at the end of 2017

That would suggest a gradual ramp all the way from Sept. 2016 through December 2017. At best a 20% initial flow in September or 10k b/d

Julia: The first well came on line in April and the 2nd one was to start a few weeks later:
ExxonMobil starts up Julia oil field in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico
04/19/2016

Offshore staff

IRVING, Texas – Exxon Mobil Corp. has started oil production at the Julia field in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico under budget and ahead of schedule. The first production well is now online and a second well will start production in the coming weeks.

The Julia development is located about 265 mi (426 km) southwest of New Orleans in water depths of more than 7,000 ft (2,134 m). The initial development phase uses subsea tiebacks to the Chevron-operated Jack/St. Malo production facility.

According to ExxonMobil, the development includes the use of subsea pumps that have one of the deepest applications and highest design pressures in the industry to date.

Neil W. Duffin, president of ExxonMobil Development Co., said: "Successful deepwater developments like Julia, located more than 30,000 ft [9,144 m] below the ocean's surface, benefit from ExxonMobil's disciplined project execution capabilities and commitment to developing quality resources using advanced technology.

"This initial production will provide ExxonMobil with insight into the potential future development of the reservoir."

The Maersk Viking drillship is currently drilling a third well, which is expected to come online in early 2017.

http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/2016/04/exxonmobil-starts-up-julia-oil-field-in-the-deepwater-gulf-of-mexico.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+offshore-latest-news+(OS+-+Latest+News)

So when you consider the start dates and the companies own reports, then there is no evidence of any material GOM oil production growth from the GOM starting October 2016. Furthermore, there is not one 2017 GOM project. So, the EIA forecasting oil production growth of 500k b/d by the end of 2017 is pure fiction. To compound the error, the EIA excludes GOM depletion of what I recall is ~22% depletion in the GOM for 2017 of ~300k b/d (1.5 million b/d of production @20%).

The EIA oil production forecast for the GOM is a complete fabrication!

Guy Minton says: 12/08/2016 at 6:18 am
Thanks, Coolreit! With 15% decline rates, I can't imagine much of an increase, overall.
AlexS says: 12/08/2016 at 3:54 am
Here is the list of projected deepwater GoM field start-ups from February 18, 2016 issue of Today In Energy
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25012

AlexS says: 12/08/2016 at 4:00 am
EIA C+C production projections for the Gulf of Mexico: STEO Dec 2016 vs. STEO January 2016

George Kaplan says: 12/08/2016 at 7:36 am
This shows production from the new leases reported to BOEM since 2015, except Hadrian South which is mainly a gas field, but including Julia which EIA missed. Also missing is Gunflint (nameplate 60 kbpd) which hasn't reported any production although supposed to have started in early 2016. Son of Bluto 2 started early and looks to be watering out quickly. Dantzler also cut a lot of water early and is in decline. Silvertip was tied in as part of Great White (Perdido spar). West Boreas and Deimos South are considered part of Mars B (tied into Olympus spar I think) but I can't tell if they are operating (there are two new leases that appear to have started in 2016). Stones only started operating in September. Heidelberg has a very slow ramp up. Julia has two wells on line but is only at half nameplate (I don't know if it is limited by capacity at the Jack hub. As others I don't see where 300 kbpd of new capacity is supposed to come from, especially given high declines in mature deep water fields.

George Kaplan says: 12/08/2016 at 7:46 am
I noticed I missed off Big Bend – that started up October last year hit an early plateau and looks to be in slight decline at 16 kbpd at the moment. (note the graph is stacked production, oil only – none of the leases reported condensate).
SouthLaGeo says: 12/08/2016 at 7:48 am
Thanks George,

Gunflint is probably identified by BOEM as Freedom/Gunflint – but I don't see any reported production for that either through September.
Julia production is not limited by Jack capacity. Jack capacity is around 170 kbopd, and is currently around 120 (with Jack, St. Malo and Julia).

SouthLaGeo says: 12/08/2016 at 8:14 am
George,
I think what you show as Horn Mountain Deep and Holstein Deep are actually just the base production from those fields. I don't think either Horn Mountain Deep or Holstein Deep are on production yet - I think.
George Kaplan says: 12/08/2016 at 9:29 am
Agreed probably – the numbers are given by lease number only. Sometimes there can be more than one well to a lease (they give the number of completions so sometimes you can see when something starts up then), but additional complications are that BOEM sometimes use different names from the E&P company, and there are often several leases per field. Tie backs, even if given a particular name, are listed against the main filed only. I think there is a way to apportion production to particular wells and from there to a particular tie-back, but it's beyond may attention span at the moment. I was more interested in the overall shape of the curve – which shows a clear flattening. Horn Mountain Depp added two completions in March/April, I need to check further on Holstein, I might have screwed up there as the curve looks suspiciously similar to Horn Mountain Deep. I think there probably is another 150 kbpd ramp up nameplate capacity between Gunflint, Stones, Heidelberg and Julia and maybe 50000 extra tiebacks if they are drilled – but that would only just about cover decline over the next 15 to 18 months.

It's also interesting that, though now in decline, Dantzler and Big Bend initially exceeded expected production capacity, and still do.

Another correction: Son of Bluto 2 didn't cut a lot of water, I looked at the wrong column, so I don't know why it declined so fast. I think it may have capacity for a second well there.

AlexS says: 12/08/2016 at 8:25 am
Interesting, that, in the Annual Energy Outlook 2016, the EIA projects further growth in the U.S. Federal offshore (ex Alaska) oil production to 1.93 mb/d in 2021.

Given high decline rates for deepwater fields, that implies new start-ups or ramp-ups.
One of these projects is BP's Mad Dog Phase 2 . Is there anything else?

Guy M says: 12/08/2016 at 9:58 am
Mad Dog Phase 2 is expected to start drilling in 2021. There is no explanation for why EIA is reporting increased production, as they are.
SouthLaGeo says: 12/08/2016 at 1:10 pm
The additional ones I can think of are Stampede and Big Foot, both in 2018, and Shell's Appomattox, but I don't know when that is slated to come online.
In addition, there will be a fair number of 1-3 well tiebacks to existing facilities. (Maybe 3-4 a year??)
AlexS says: 12/08/2016 at 1:44 pm
Guy M, SouthLaGeo,

Thanks

George Kaplan says: 12/08/2016 at 2:26 pm
There are Thunder Horse South tie backs next year (BP, nameplate maybe 42,000 bpd), Heidelberg Phase II might add another 30,000 in 2021, small tie backs to Delta House (Odd Job next year at 5000, maybe others), Vita (c/w Power Nap) has gone out for FEED but I don't think it could get done before 2022 now, possibly Caesar/Tonga additions next year (20,000 ??), and I think Typhoon (or might be called Tornado now) might have started up recently at 13,000 tie back to Helix producer.
George Kaplan says: 12/08/2016 at 3:07 pm
So I corrected Holstein Deep (I don't think there have been any new tie ins and it is in gradual decline), added Big Bend, Gunflint (though it is zero flow) and Pheonix (no change in the dates shown but Tornado has started up at 20 kbpd this month and will be choked to 13 to 16 kbpd at plateau (this used to be Typhoon I think, but all these names are quite confusing) there are other tie-back options for Phoenix, which is serviced by the Helix producer, in the future, including a second Tornado well and Motormouth.

The plateau through 2016 is maintained but I think there will be a jump in October and then a steady rise at least for a few months. I don't know the issue with Gunflint but if it has a lot of predrilled wells and is just waiting on getting the production facilities operating there could be another big increase then.

Also I had a thought on Julia and Horn Mountain Deep: it's possible that the completions listed by BOEM include producer and injector pairs so at the moment Julia has only one producer, but two wells, and therefore with another producer to come to give full capacity (at up to 35 kbpd).

AlexS says: 12/08/2016 at 5:43 pm
Thanks George,

Do you still think that the EIA's projections for the GoM are unrealistic?

If so, is that because of depleted resource base, or likely project delays, high costs, etc.?

George Kaplan says: 12/08/2016 at 7:26 pm
Alex – I don't think there will be as high a peak as they say – I don't see where the projects ramping up or in late development stages are that could achieve that (I still go for around 1.85 mmbpd sometime in mid 2017 as peak). But equally the decline might be less steep than they show and the tail fatter. Two other projects not yet approved are Shenandoah and Kaskida. I think they would both be about 150 kbpd nameplate, but they are high temperature / high pressure and Kaskida has sand issues I think (maybe they both do), and both might need relatively many wells – so very expensive. There's also Tiber / Gila / Gibson / Guadelupe (I don't know much about that but over 100 kbpd), Anchor (also about 100 kbpd), some fields around Tahiti for tie backs and Constellation (ex-Hopkins) which used to be considered a big find with BP but know looks like a smaller tie back (30 kbpd maybe) for Anadarko. After those only bits and pieces are left, and with not much frontier exploration going on so little prospect of big finds either. Anadarko and BP have a lot of the prospects which would tend to mean they'll get spread out a bit. I've also been surprised at how long the schedules are for Appomatox and Mad Dog II (and also Trion on the Mexican side) they all are around 7 years from FID to plateau rates.

[Oct 28, 2016] The Billion Barrel Oil Swindle 80% Of U.S. Oil Reserves Are Unaccounted

Oct 07, 2016 | oilprice.com
U.S. crude oil storage is filling up with unaccounted-for oil. There is a lot more oil in storage than the amount that can be accounted for by domestic production and imports.

That's a big problem since oil prices move up or down based on the U.S. crude oil storage report . Oil stocks in inventory represent surplus supply. Increasing or decreasing inventory levels generally push prices lower or higher because they indicate trends toward longer term over-supply or under-supply.

Why Inventories Matter

Inventory levels have reached record highs since the oil-price collapse in 2014. This surplus supply is a major factor keeping oil prices low.

Current inventories are 45 million barrels higher than 2015 levels, which were more than 100 million barrels higher than the average from 2010 through 2014 (Figure 1). Until the present surplus is reduced by almost 150 million barrels down to the 2010-2014 average, there is little technical possibility of a sustained oil-price recovery.

(Click to enlarge)

Figure 1. U.S. Crude Inventories Are ~150 Million Barrels Above Average Levels. Source: EIA, Crude Oil Peak and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

U.S. inventories are critical because stock levels are published every week by the U.S. EIA (Energy Information Administration). The IEA (International Energy Agency) publishes OECD inventories, but that data is only published monthly and it measures liquids but not crude oil. It also largely parallels U.S. stock levels that account for almost half of its volume. Inventories for the rest of the world are more speculative.

Understanding U.S. Stock Levels

Understanding U.S. stock levels should be straight-forward. Every Wednesday, EIA publishes the Weekly Petroleum Status Report which includes a table similar to Figure 2.

Figure 2. EIA publishes adjustments and defines them as "Unaccounted-for Oil." Source: EIA U.S. Petroleum Status Weekly (Week Ending September 16, 2016), Crude Oil Peak and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

The calculation to determine the expected weekly stock change is fairly simple:

Stock Change = Domestic Production + Net Imports – Crude Oil Input to Refineries

Domestic production and net imports account for crude oil supply, and refinery inputs account for the volume of oil that is refined into petroleum products. If there is a surplus, it should show up as an addition to inventory and a deficit, as a withdrawal from inventory.

But that's not how it works because EIA uses an adjustment in order to balance the books (Table 1).

Table 1. Calculation of Crude Oil Stock Change. Source: EIA Petroleum Status Weekly, Crude Oil Peak and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

The logic is that estimated stock levels in tank farms and underground storage are relatively dependable and that any imbalance must be from less reliable production, net import or refinery intake data.

Related: Nigerian Oil Anxieties Mount, Even With OPEC Exemption

There is nothing wrong with adjustment factors if they are small in comparison to what is to be balanced. In the Table 1 example from September 2016, however, the adjustment is 60 percent of the stock change–a bit too much.

A one-off perhaps? No, it's a permanent problem that has gotten worse during the last several years.

Figure 3 shows that crude oil supply and refinery intake of oil vary considerably on a weekly basis. The balance is cumulatively negative over time beginning with a zero balance in January 1983. That suggests that crude oil stocks should be falling over time but instead, they have been rising.

(Click to enlarge)

Figure 3. Difference between U.S. crude oil supply and refinery intake. Source: EIA Petroleum Status Weekly.

The vertical bars show the weekly crude supply from production and net imports either exceeding the refinery input requirements (positive, green) or not reaching these requirements (negative, red). The solid red line is the cumulative.

Between 1991 and 2002, the deficit increased to a whopping 1.3 billion barrels.

Looking at only recent history, an additional gap of nearly 200 million barrels developed as refinery intake exceeded crude oil supply for most of 2010 through 2014 (Figure 4).

(Click to enlarge)

Adjustments were introduced in late 2001 so let's look at the period starting January 2002 (Figure 5).

(Click to enlarge)

Figure 5. EIA adjustments to supply to reconcile stock changes. Source: EIA Petroleum Status Weekly, Crude Oil Peak and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

There are both upward (blue) and downward (red) adjustments. Upward adjustments resulted in a 420-million-barrel stock increase over the period January 2002 through September 2016.

All together now

Expected or implied stock changes calculated from weekly crude oil balance indicate falling inventories from May 2009 through the present. Yet, EIA makes adjustments to that balance in order to match observed inventory levels. Rising inventories result after those adjustments are added to the physical balance or implied stock changes (Figure 6).

(Click to enlarge)

Figure 6. Unaccounted-for oil in U.S. storage: the result of adjustments to the supply balance. Source: EIA Petroleum Status Weekly, Crude Oil Peak and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

The green area represents the physical balance (crude production plus net crude imports minus crude refinery intake). The gray area shows the unaccounted-for (adjusted) stocks.

The adjustment for unaccounted-for oil averaged about 15 percent from 2002 through 2010. In 2016, almost 80 percent of reported stocks are from unaccounted-for oil.

When You Have Eliminated The Impossible

There is no obvious solution for the mystery of unaccounted-for oil in U.S. inventories. Possible explanations, however, include:

1. Crude field production is underestimated
2. Net crude oil imports are underestimated
3. Refinery inputs are over-reported
4. Crude oil stocks are over-reported

or any combination of those possibilities.

Production, imports and refinery inputs are taxable transactions. It is likely that reporting errors are largely self-correcting over time because of the financial incentive for government to collect its due.

State regulatory agencies are the source of production data. Their principal objective is to assess production taxes. It is unlikely that states would consistently under-estimate production and forego substantial tax revenue.

Related: Is Russia Diversifying Away From Oil Fast Enough?

Also, producers must state crude oil production in their SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) filings and pay federal income tax on revenues from oil sales. It seems improbable that the SEC and U.S. Treasury would consistently accept under-reported production and associated lower tax payments.

Crude oil imports are subject to both tariffs and excise taxes so it seems unlikely that the U.S. government would consistently fail to identify under-payment of those revenues.

Similarly, taxes are involved when refiners buy crude oil and sell refined products. It seems improbable that they would over-state those transactions and consistently over-pay associated taxes.

The principal components of supply balance-production, imports and refinery intake-are shown in Figure 7. In a general way, increased production and decreased imports tend to cancel each other out. Refinery intake has increased since about 2010.

Those trends determine the physical balance or implied stocks. The inescapable conclusion is that implied stocks (in light blue) are substantially less than reported stocks (in gray).

Adjustments for unaccounted-for oil are unreasonable and out of proportion to the underlying factors that determine crude oil stock levels.

(Click to enlarge)

Figure 7. Components of unaccounted-for oil in U.S. storage. Source: EIA Petroleum Status Weekly, Crude Oil Peak and Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.

It would be speculation to blame anyone for this apparent statistical disaster. Nevertheless, there is a problem that has major implications for oil price and the reliability of reported data.

In several of his Sherlock Holmes mystery stories, Arthur Conan-Doyle wrote, "When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth."

We have not eliminated any impossible explanations. We have, however, eliminated the three most improbable explanations for unaccounted-for oil.

The truth-however improbable-is that inventories are probably much lower than what is reported.

By Art Berman for Oilprice.com Lotanna on October 11 2016 said:

This does not appear good. Those reports have been driving oil price speculations for over a decade. If this is true, then the US has been gradually influencing the oil price dynamics unethically. I hope stock traders read this. The world would not be happy with the US. But then again, I expect them to point the fingers at one individual, jail him and find a new strategy to play the same game [I believe Strategic Petroleum Reserve was the last try].
JACK MA on October 12 2016 said:
In 2015, 800,000 BPD went missing. This was faked oversupply to drive down prices and collapse Russia. The last time this much oil was missing was 22 years ago as a ploy to collapse Russia on low oil prices and back then it worked. This time, Russia simply allied with China.


There is no oversupply of oil and any slight surplus that did exist in now in China's reserves on the cheap. Kerry really goofed when trying a old play-book to collapse Russia by ordering SA to flood the markets. What we will now see in 2 years is a 'absolute price shock up' on real billions in cap x cuts due to the fake oversupply driving down real prices.


This is the oil super cycle driven by the petro-dollar collapse and Dedollarization by Russia and the BRICS. Globalization is failing obviously as is the dollar. Problem is we cannot simply bomb Russia and China so easily like the ME, as these two super powers will actually shoot back and the Western war-hawks are not used to a real enemy that shoots back.

Warmest regards to all, and do your own homework and seek the truth.

Edwards on October 12 2016 said:
Must be the result of common core math, so confusing that even experts can't figure it out. What about the 6.5 TRILLION bucks that is unaccounted for at the pentagon. The last time 2.3 TYRILLION was unaccounted for we had 9/11 the next day. Is this an omen for something big to happen imminently?
Ward on October 13 2016 said:
What a conclusion - the 450MM barrels are not in inventory. Give me a break - ofc the physical inventory is there. Physical inventory is most reliable and verifiable parameter n calculation. You can stick a tank to know how much is in it.

EIA (aka Obama)started underestimating "reported" production around 2011 according to figure 6. That's when the big changes start.

Big assumption in article is that crude production as as estimated from taxes and EIA report are in-sync. Seems like reasonable assumption but there's no evidence in article that is the case. They can still get their taxes and EIA under reports the production because no one sync's up the EIA data with tax data.

James Rose on October 17 2016 said:
Its more plausible to believe the SPR is being sold into the commercial storage than that the EIA is faking reports. The reason is the if the EIA is faking reports, they've got to deputize the API to fake their reports as well. They're different, but not this different.

[Sep 12, 2016] MARCH 16, 2015 AT 5:06 PM

Notable quotes:
"... The EIA and IEA work for banksters trying to destroy the oil industry so they can buy it up cheap ..."
Sep 12, 2016 | peakoilbarrel.com

If, as the IEA believes, oil prices average about $55/bbl in 2015 and not reach $73 until 2020, a lot of assumptions will have to be modified: Because, these prices are clearly well below those needed to justify investment in and exploitation of expensive-oil options like tar sands and Arctic oil.

It seems to me as if a new reality is being signaled by the many recently stalled or cancelled mega-projects. For example, Shell has abandoned plans for a huge petrochemical plant in Qatar; Chevron shelved its plan to drill in the Beaufort; and, Statoil has turned its back on Greenland. If Majors are moving away from expensive future projects it's probably because they doubt their viability, not because they can't raise the cash.

And committing to mega-projects is committing to a predictable future. Could it be that Big Oil has decided the next decade contains too many unknowns: AGW issues, upsurge in renewables, a mega recession, you name it? Or, maybe they've just discovered Ron's Blog?<

Coolreit , 03/16/2015 at 11:58 am
Ron:

The EIA lies. Your posts comparing Texas oil production vs. the EIA's report of Texas oil production highlights the growing lies from the EIA. Each month the EIA adds roughly 50k/b/d for at least the last 12 months. How can that be? Texas has been dropping rigs almost as fast as North Dakota. Their production has surely been dropping now and quite probably since January.

The EIA and IEA work for banksters trying to destroy the oil industry so they can buy it up cheap . Next month, Goldman Sacks is starting a distressed energy bond fund. How convenient that they and the media and the EIA and IEA paint a bearish picture of oil fundamentals now.

Watcher , 03/16/2015 at 12:03 pm

"Next month, Goldman Sacks is starting a distressed energy bond fund. "

Where did you get this?

Coolreit , 03/16/2015 at 12:29 pm
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/25/business/dealbook/goldman-seeks-to-raise-fund-to-buy-energy-sector-debt.html?_r=0
Watcher , 03/16/2015 at 12:46 pm
That's a good find. It looks like it adds up (among Goldman, Blackstone and others) to about $25 Billion and the word is energy, not shale. The Goldman offering is not all junk bonds, either.

This doesn't look like the required bailout, but it's definitely money risked - maybe with people like Transocean.

SRSrocco , 03/16/2015 at 12:07 pm
EVERYONE,

A Bit off topic, but thought I would share the newest interview on the Russia-Ukraine-USA-Europe situation by John Bachelor and Prof. Stephen Cohen. Normally, Prof. Cohen does a weekly interview, but was off for 10 days as he and another U.S. Professor, experts on Russia, spoke to a large group of German Bankers last week on the subject of Russia & the Ukraine.

http://www.tfmetalsreport.com/podcast/6679/batchelor-cohen-return

Petro , 03/16/2015 at 12:41 pm

…indeed Steve,
sadly!

Listen to what a former joint chiefs of staff member, a major general- a true and utter moron, really and actually- said a few days ago:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6Nnn8S1XbE

Sadly, he and people akin to him lead this country now…
That is the real reason I commented (in response to Dennis and Mac) in an earlier post that there will be no market for oil or anything in 2030-2050.
Oil is falling again and when, this time, what was drilled and put on line BEFORE oil reached $50-$60 peaks and starts the 40%-80% per year decline rate shale oil well "army", the morons like the general in the video will gain ground…and then power….and then russians (or chinesse, or anybody) and Putin shall be the "devil" that crushed our economy….and the false flag type of events whe marines are floating drowned in blood killed by the "evil Putin" soldiers are going to make the fat moronic masses "patriotic"…and then, the 99.99% brainwashed, fat moronic herd who think that our soldiers are fighting for our freedom will "volunteer" to go to war and defeat the ennemy.
As alwayz, they shall be blissfully ignorant of the fact that "the ennemy" this time has more nucelarweapons than us and we all shall lose.
It is an unwineable war!
And us few who say otherwise shall be the unpatriotic "spies" who must be eleminated…because "generals" like the one in the video and crowds who dump vodka on the streets (like they did with french wine in 2003 when french refused to join bush-chenney in irak) will take over.
The everlasting historic lesson:
"when all fails, govt takes you to war!"
Even your beloved gold and silver shall not save us this time….pray.

The next few yoars seem to be very "interesting"
Be well and hedge accordingly!

Petro

P.S.: great article Ron! Thank you for updating us.

BC , 03/16/2015 at 7:45 pm
Steve,

US real after-tax income less debt service ("rentier taxes") and "illth" care (a.k.a. as "dis-ease" or "health" care) spending peaked YoY in Q1-Q2 '14 and rapidly decelerated and contracted YoY in Q3-Q4 '14.

Moreover, the oil and gas extraction and energy-related transport sectors have heavily skewed higher capital goods orders, business sales, and industrial production (IP) since 2011-12 to an unsustainable cyclical rate.

It's not surprising, therefore, that retail sales, business sales, orders, nominal real hourly earnings, and IP/IP mfg. have been falling since last summer-fall, the point at which the price of oil began crashing. This is the stuff of cyclical business cycle contractions.

And the point, Mr. BC, one might ask? The powers that be (TPTB) are keenly aware of the foregoing and know that the US economy is decelerating rapidly in response to the deflating of the shale bubble, weather and port and refinery labor strikes notwithstanding, along with the rest of the world economy. The current cyclical trajectory is not unlike that which occurred in summer 2001 (prior to 9/11) and winter-spring 2008, both instances coinciding with the US economy having already rolled over into recession.

Thus, the US is due yet another imperial war cycle in order to goose the goods-producing sector (especially the "defense" sector) in response to recession, which in turn will justify increasing fiscal deficits, maintenance of ZIRP/NIRP, and a resumption of the Fed's QEternity/QEn+1 later in the year.

IOW, economics is politics. Politics is war by other means. The business of empire is war. War is good business for imperialists. Ergo, economics is politics is war is the business of empire, and the owners and financial facilitators, i.e., Wall St. and The City, of Anglo-American-Zionist empire need another regional (or eventual world) war for business, geopolitical (say again imperial business), and domestic social control purposes.

Wall St., DC, the Saudi royals, Bibi and his thugs, and the US-UK war profiteers are maneuvering to release yet again the ravenous hounds of war for profits and power against "Radical Islam", Putin's Russia, and, if history and human nature are a guide, eventually a regional war (or Cold War- or cyberwar) in the Pacific against China.

This begs the question of what kind of "Pearl Harbor-like" event will be required this time to compel the unsuspecting American and western public to support (tacitly acquiesce to) the next phase of the never-ending war for Anglo-American-Zionist, rentier oil empire (in the post-growth, LTG era)?

Same as it ever was . . .

Caelan MacIntyre , 03/17/2015 at 8:11 pm
Parable of The Violent Tribe

This is a 46 second-long video worth watching and/as it seems to put a cherry on top of BC's good comment.

Longtimber , 03/17/2015 at 1:45 pm
Same program from JB podcast 3/10/15
http://johnbatchelorshow.com/podcasts/tues-31015-hr-2-jbs-stephen-f-cohen-nyu-princeton-professor-emeritus-author-soviet-fates
Don't hear about American misinformation or complete loss of confidence of american foreign policy in the MSM. West drives Putin into a corner, extremely dangerous situation.
DuaneX , 03/17/2015 at 6:51 pm
Along these lines, I found these words from Malcolm Fraser Ozzie PM '75-'83 interesting:

here's one paragraph snip:

As painful as a reassessment of relations may be for intellectual and policy elites, there are four principal reasons why one is long overdue. First, despite much blather about a supposed unanimity of national purpose, the truth is that the United States and Australia have substantially different values systems. The idea of American exceptionalism is contrary to Australia's sense of egalitarianism. Second, we have seen the United States act in an arbitrary, imprudent and capricious fashion. It has made a number of ill-advised and ill-informed decisions concerning Eastern Europe, Russia and the Middle East. Third, at the moment, because of U.S. military installations in Australia, if America goes to war in the Pacific, it will take us to war as well-without an independent decision by Australia. Finally, under current circumstances, in any major contest in the Pacific, our relationship with America would make us a strategic target for America's enemies. It is not in Australia's interest to be in that position.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-australias-dangerous-ally-11858

PeakOil NOT , 03/16/2015 at 12:57 pm
EIA production numbers include NGLs, Texas RRC numbers do not. Texas RRC acknowledges as much on their website:

The production data in PDQ doesn't match the data I get from the federal Energy Information Administration. Can you explain the difference?

The Railroad Commission of Texas' crude oil production data reflects only crude oil produced from oil leases as reported by operators. The Commission's data does not include condensate, which are liquid hydrocarbons produced from a gas well. Our data comes directly from production reports filed by operators.

Watcher , 03/16/2015 at 1:05 pm
Who is "our"?
PeakOil NOT , 03/16/2015 at 1:20 pm
Texas RRC.

There are other issues as well. (Producers not reporting, Reporting late, etc.

The website is very helpful.

Marcus , 03/16/2015 at 4:52 pm
PeakOil NOT does this mean you represent or are somehow affiliated to the Texas RRC?
Futilitist , 03/16/2015 at 11:12 pm
Hi PeakOil NOT.

Nice screen name. What made you choose it?

Danlxyz , 03/18/2015 at 5:35 pm
Peak Oil NOT,
I agree that this web site reports only C+C unless otherwise noted. It is Ron's site and that is what he wants to report. I appreciate the effort he puts in especially the graphs.
But total liquids would seem to give a better picture of supply and production changes. After all NGLs, refinery gain, and the other differences are part of mix which make the economy produce.
Dennis Coyne , 03/18/2015 at 6:01 pm
Hi Danlxyz,

One problem with total liquids is that it is not adjusted for energy content. The typical barrel of NGL contains only 65% of the energy of crude, same is true of ethanol. So total liquids adjusted to barrels of oil equivalent is useful, also some NGL is not really used for energy (ethane is used mostly as an industrial input in plastic and cryogenic processes, rather than burned for energy). This is more work than just using C+C data. Also we can use BP data in tonnes of oil to estimate barrels f oil equivalent.

Caelan MacIntyre , 03/16/2015 at 1:19 pm
a carryover thank you
It read as a sort of age-targeted unemployed-wage-slave flyer/ad for the unsustainable North Dakota shale/fracking industry, complete with age, income, corrupted values, etc..
And much more in the crony-capitalist plutarchy global industrial uneconomic monster– which farts in our general direction, Gerd– and that we just can't help feeding… with our children, alive (like those two in question if they are real or part of the monster, or both), as well as with our values, future, and planet.

Pushpush, toolpusher. Make 'er scream. We know abuse when we see it .

toolpush , 03/16/2015 at 6:32 pm
Hey Ron,

Any chance of an ignore button?
That way it would avoid a lot of knee replies one is temped to write.

Throbbing Orville Reddenbudders , 03/16/2015 at 10:27 pm
"I mix with professional people and and I know i have earnt up to double their pay scale…" ~ toolpusher

[Sep 12, 2016] 03/17/2015 at 10:37 am

Notable quotes:
"... "I find it curious that anybody would chose a peak oil blog to tout the merits of shale oil, or shale gas, particularly now, when it has its pants down around its knees, its hands overs its privates , but so be it… ..."
"... The real oil and gas business… is very difficult at the moment; we are all working 24/7, confused about the direction of prices, and having to watch every penny we spend, right down to washing poka dot gloves every evening to wear them again the next day… I have had 50 good men ask me for work the past 3 weeks , all coming out of the stinking shale business, with little hope for the future… As you can clearly (lol) tell, I am not a fan of the stinking shale business … I think [it] …has mismanaged my countries limited hydrocarbon resources in a very bad way. It took advantage of cheap money, little risk, absolutely no regard for conservation practices, and drilled itself into a 9 line bind, in my learned opinion. It lied to the American public, misled its work force , borrowed money it cannot pay back and helped drive the price of both oil and natural gas down to levels that will ultimately hurt, not help Americans. Now its all unraveling… Dickheads in the Bakken and Eagle Ford want to export condensate to stay on their drilling hamster wheels; how does selling American resources, cheap, to buy them back tomorrow, from people that hate our guts and want to kill us, help America? It doesn't. It is stupid… I am reminded of numerous times in the history of oil and gas in the United States where an unregulated industry drilled itself literally into oblivion… More recently, the shale gas industry imploded from over drilling and the corresponding collapse of gas prices. My industry cannot seem to keep from making the same mistakes again, over and over. It gets caught up in it own bullshit far too often… I have to lay off a couple of kids today that have been with me for 5 years, one just got married … Is shale oil extraction a resounding success story in America, a benchmark for free-market enterprise? Bullshit . The debt those guys has accumulated would choke a big horse; its begged, borrowed and essentially stole money from grandma's all around the county that bought their stock based on propaganda. It has not made a dime of profit yet. The wealth of retired people who invested in the shale oil business, even people that didn't, is now being decimated because of the shale oil industry. Every stinking shale well drilled uses sufficient fresh water for 168,000 humans to consume in one day and nearly 400 tons of steel. The crop and ranch land that is lost to shale well pads and roads is heart wrenching. All that for a couple of months of $ 2.00 gasoline? … The shale oil industry shot itself in the foot. Along the way it shot me, and thousands of other operators in America, in the back. It is helping to facilitate a train wreck around the world, actually . I have been to West Africa, the ME, all over S. America, everywhere in the world there is oil production and I am telling you straight away, there are now lots of very, very afraid people out there in the world. Hungry, thirsty, sick people whose countries cannot help them any longer. Why? In part because of stinkin' shale oil industry greed. I am mad at them sumbitches this morning… I gotta go let some good kids go . Damn, I hate that… The shale oil industry will not survive 50 dollar oil …Now oil prices are low, and getting lower, and the money tree is going to fall over. Anybody promoting the shale oil industry at this point must be getting paid to do so. …" ..."
"... ~ Mike @ The POB ..."
"... "So long story short don't believe all the negative people saying you should go home now because there are still plenty of jobs around you can get in the Bakken and be making six figures in no time ." ~ dn_girl ..."
"... "We had a proud young woman post yesterday about her… optimism about… future in the oilfields of North Dakota. It is a powerful message that we should have all embraced … She probably won't be back …" ~ Mike ..."
"... "Things are getting tough out here in the oilfield right now, its time for me to get tougher… But this is going to be my last post for awhile." [January 10, 2015 at 12:41 pm] ~ Mike ..."
"... "Mike, I hope my comments didn't tick you off and that's the reason your going to cut back on posting… If I did say something that ticked you off, I am sorry." ~ TechGuy ..."
"... "It is like attacking the soldiers in Iraq because you don't like the lies that caused them to be there." ~ shallow sand ..."
"... "…all forms of organization, regardless of how democratic they may be at the start, will eventually and inevitably develop oligarchic tendencies, thus making true democracy practically and theoretically impossible, especially in large groups and complex organizations. The relative structural fluidity in a small-scale democracy succumbs to 'social viscosity' in a large-scale organization. [Accordingly] …democracy and large-scale organization are incompatible." ~ Wikipedia ..."
"... "The shale oil industry shot itself in the foot. Along the way it shot me, and thousands of other operators in America, in the back. It is helping to facilitate a train wreck around the world, actually… ..."
"... I gotta go let some good kids go. Damn, I hate that… Anybody promoting the shale oil industry at this point must be getting paid to do so …" ~ Mike @ The POB -- "So long story short don't believe all the negative people saying you should go home now because there are still plenty of jobs around you can get in the Bakken and be making six figures in no time ." ~ dn_girl "We had a proud young woman post yesterday about her… optimism about… future in the oilfields of North Dakota. It is a powerful message that we should have all embraced … She probably won't be back …" ~ Mike ..."
"... "The culture as a whole and most of its members are insane." ~ Derrick Jensen ..."
"... embrace that powerful message ..."
"... female ..."
"... (Another fine on-the-fly comment crafted with the Patterson Press™ Comment Editor) ..."
"... I think we should reflect on this. ..."
"... "By the way, what did you make of my "The Mask of the Red Death" allegory post?" ~ Futilitist ..."
Sep 12, 2016 | peakoilbarrel.com
Ron, Is it possible the EIA is intentionally trying to push oil prices down for political reasons? But has to do some back-peddling in order to try to save face and retain some credibility. EIA must fully understand how oil prices react to what they are saying. They are also a government agency there for can be used for political purposes. Do you notice a trend of misinformation coming from the EIA? Have you ever in the past noticed a trend of misinformation where maybe the incorrect numbers coming from the EIA actually pushed prices up instead of down over any given period of time?
StuckinWalkerWorld , 03/17/2015 at 10:48 am
The effects of the price collapse is beginning to take a serious bite out of Canadian tar sands exploration and extraction activity. Last week's rig count in Canada dropped by 80, according to the most recent Baker Hughes report. Imports from Canada have declined slightly in the last month, though they are still quite high. And there's the news brief (Note link to original article is broken).

http://ieefa.org/1000-layoffs-overnight-by-tar-sands-developer

Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 10:56 am
Pretty sure spring thaw is the seasonally normal time for canadian oil rig decline.
Doug Leighton , 03/17/2015 at 11:16 am
Correct. Spring breakup = mud and road restrictions up here. When Western Canada thaws dirt roads/drill sites become soupy messes, drill rigs stop. Affects truck logging and mining exploration as well.
Ron Patterson , 03/17/2015 at 11:24 am
Nevertheless the Canadian rig count during this same week last year stood at 522. It now stands at 220, a drop of 302 rigs, season point last year to same season point this year.
Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 12:35 pm
Now that's more meaningful.
Ron Patterson , 03/17/2015 at 11:15 am
Sawdust, No, I don't think the EIA is being dishonest for political reasons. Who's politics would that favor? I think they are honest and looking at their algorithm and just reporting the data is spits out. Art Berman puts it this way:

EIA and IEA ultimately get their U.S. production data from the states. State reporting on oil production is lagged by at least 3 months and it takes another month or two for adjustments to be included. IEA and EIA use sampling methods of certain large producers that are then put into algorithms to approximate recent production. So, what we get from these organizations is a pretty good guess that will be revised later.

Their algorithm just gave them some bum production numbers. That's really all I think that happened. But when they saw those numbers from North Dakota they realized they had really screwed up and began to backtrack. They may very well be backtracking further however.

Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 11:43 am
Ya pretty much that. If you've spent time in DC you've spent time on the Metro and it's filled in the morning with guys who got up, looked in the mirror, shaved, and went to work. They don't do that every day to make it their job to lie.

Errors can be systemic. They can be using a source that no longer is valid. The measurement itself may no longer matter - like the newly famous sales by refinery affiliated retail outlets. Those outlets were sold off. The number remaining is few. So retail sales of gasoline appears to have crashed. Doesn't measure the same thing anymore.

This sort of thing is likely underway with Jeffrey's API focus, and there WAS that article I posted here from the WSJ announcing a redefinition of WTI.

Back when night baseball became prominent in the late 1960s (first night game in the 30s, but prominence took time) to generate ticket sales from people who could not take off work, a recognition of pitched balls being harder to see under lights than natural sunlight led to a lowering of the mound. Baseball's org watched as pitchers became more and more dominant (1968 was "the year of the pitcher") and so they made that choice for 1969. All to make the game's historical stats still comparable (and to keep fans happy, who preferred home runs to shutouts).

The redefinition of WTI will specifically make historical stats NOT comparable, but unlike with baseball, that is going to be desirable. As will be an appearance of steady growth, the home run of oil.

Doug Leighton , 03/17/2015 at 11:52 am
Watcher, you're being strangely rational today (or, at the moment). Should we be worried?
Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 12:33 pm
Making peace with our Maker. We'll all be dead soon in the die-off.
Doug Leighton , 03/17/2015 at 12:44 pm
Figured it would pass; I'm breathing MUCH easier now. :)
Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 12:55 pm
Oh don't be too glib. Lowering the mound doesn't kill people.

Claiming you got BTUs you don't got will start wars.

Sam Taylor , 03/17/2015 at 12:26 pm
Ron,

Just how much influence does a single EIA report actually have on the direction of oil markets? I find it difficult to believe that a single report from them which might be slightly over-optimistic, could start the market in London dropping as well as New York.

Ron Patterson , 03/17/2015 at 12:40 pm
Your correct, a single report, that is the Weekly Petroleum Status Report could not have that much influence. However two other EIA monthly reports gave similar bullish assessments. They were thee Short Term Energy Outlook and the Drilling Productivity Report

Then to top those three EIA reports the IEA chimed in with an even more bullish report for oil, (but bearish for prices of course). The IEA Oil Market Report .

Global supply rose by 1.3 mb/d year-on-year to an estimated 94 mb/d in February, led by a 1.4 mb/d gain in non-OPEC. Declines in the US rig count have yet to dent North American output growth. Final December and preliminary 1Q15 data show higher-than-expected US crude supply, raising the 2015 North American outlook.

Got that, non-OPEC up by 1.4 million barrels per day in February and the declining rig count is yet to dent North American output growth. That was enough to drive prices in the dirt.

Dennis Coyne , 03/17/2015 at 3:29 pm
Hi Ron,

Several people, Art Berman, Steve Kopits, and Jeffrey Brown are expecting that oil prices should rebound by years end at minimum. I agree with that assessment.

Impossible to say with any confidence when prices will rise or by how much, but I still like $75/b or more before Sept 30, 2015.

Looks like my guess that oil had reached a bottom in Jan 2015 was not right, it looked good for a month and a half. It will be interesting to see if it breaks through $40/b, I doubt it, but some experts have mentioned $38/b. If we adjust the Dec 2008 bottom for inflation we get $33.65/b for the lowest price since 2003. There would be some serious resistance to oil prices less than $33/b.

In 2008 the bottom was about $30/b in nominal terms and the oil price closed below $35/b for only 4 trading days, by March 2009 the oil price was back to $45/b and by June it was up to $70/b.

Hard to say what will happen this time, but OPEC is predicting that demand will be robust, so we may see prices behave somewhat like 2009. Even without cuts by OPEC, the World economy is in much better shape in 2015, than it was in 2009, so oil demand should be higher.

Jeffrey J. Brown , 03/17/2015 at 3:39 pm
For the current oil price decline, the monthly low (so far) for Brent was $48 in January. I don't think that there's any real chance that March will average below $48, since the average for the first half of March was in the high 50's.

Monthly price data for six month after the $40 monthly Brent low during the 2008/2009 decline:

12/08: $40

1/09: $43
2/09: $43
3/09: $47
4/09: $50
5/09: $57
6/09: $69

toolpush , 03/17/2015 at 9:55 pm
Ron,

On the Permian page, there seems to be an extremely sharp upturn in the Permian's productively, Around about 20% increase in a couple of months. Not sure if it because they are saying all the rigs that have shut down, contributed very little to production, or what? Maybe a little fudge factor to catch up on past errors?
Without that upturn, I believe their minor increase in production would be a negative number.

http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/pdf/dpr-full.pdf

Ron Patterson , 03/17/2015 at 10:29 pm
Toolpush, that has to be an error in their chart. If you go here:

Drilling Productivity Report

Then click on: X Report data (aggregated by region)

That will download the Excel spreadsheet for all regions. Then you can go to the Permian page and get the data through April. Of course the last four months is just their guess as to what the Permian will produce but the data they do show shows a very sharp downturn in the last two months.

The data below is their predicted barrels per day. The chart below is the actual increase in barrels per day they are predicting.
Permian
Dec-14 1,845,634
Jan-15 1,888,536
Feb-15 1,929,450
Mar-15 1,960,259
Apr-15 1,981,512

toolpush , 03/17/2015 at 11:03 pm
Ron,

This was on productivity per well.
The top left chart. Brown line going from around 400 bpd per well to nearly 500 bpd per well?

http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/pdf/permian.pdf

Ron Patterson , 03/18/2015 at 7:19 am
Well there is no data to support that. In fact there is no data at all for April because April and in fact there is no data for March. Why they would make such a wild speculation is beyond me. But this is a prediction that is beyond reason. Productivity per well could not possibly change that fast.
Dennis Coyne , 03/18/2015 at 8:09 am
Hi Ron,

It may be that if a lot fewer vertical wells are completed that productivity per rig will increase. The horizontal wells in the Permian are far more productive (on a per well basis) than the vertical wells.

The EIA may be accounting for the rising percentage of horizontal rigs which will increase the productivity per rig.

I agree that this change is unlikely to happen as quickly as shown in the DPR, which was your main point.

Dennis Coyne , 03/19/2015 at 7:57 am
Hi toolpush,

I think you read the chart wrong, the rig productivity is on the left vertical axis and the rig count is on the right. The increase was from 202 b/d/rig in March to 240 b/d/rig in April.

This could easily be explained by the higher percentage of horizontal rigs now running in the Permian due to a lot of the vertical rigs being stacked there.

toolpush , 03/19/2015 at 8:19 am
Dennis,

I stand corrected, and thanks for checking it out, but the change in slope is the stand out thing. What ever the numbers you are looking at approx 20% increase in productivity in one or two months.
It is either due to a heap of low productive vertical rigs being stacked, or a statistical error.
I believe we will just have to watch out for it next month, to see if there is any change? Though I believe this little uptick conveniently keeps the oil supply estimate in the positive side of the page. smiles

Dennis Coyne , 03/19/2015 at 4:38 pm
Hi Toolpush,

Yes it is a 20% increase either way, in the Bakken it seems that rig efficiency has been increasing and in the Permian the rigs are being stacked faster so the percentage of horizontal to vertical rigs has increased a lot. Currently about 71% of Permian rigs are horizontal rigs, at the rig high point it was about 62% horizontal rigs, so we have fewer vertical rigs which would tend to increase output per rig and in this price environment they may be focusing on sweet spots so that the wells that are fracked have a better chance at positive cash flow.

Futilitist , 03/17/2015 at 11:39 pm
Hi Ron,

"Their algorithm just gave them some bum production numbers."

That is because their algorithms don't work any more. Not since the aggregate cost of oil production overtook our civilization's ability to pay the full cost of that production. This occurred around June of 2014. The EIA seems to be as surprised as everyone else (except me). Here is how they put it:

Steep drops in the US rig count have been a key driver of the price rebound. Yet US supply so far shows precious little sign of slowing down. Quite to the contrary, it continues to defy expectations.

Meaning that production is just not falling fast enough to raise oil prices sufficiently enough to ensure continuing oil production. This is not a temporary condition. There is simply no way to fix the problem. We have experienced a paradigm shift.

The oil industry has begun shutting down .

The cost of production continues to rise. And we don't seem to be getting richer. If the industry needs $100+ oil to maintain current production and bring on future production, then any price lower than $100 will result in the oil industry shrinking.

How could it be otherwise?

Kam , 03/18/2015 at 6:30 am
Coal industry has also started shutting down. And coal is the second source of energy for world economy. It will be fast now. Party's over (Heinberg was 12 years early :) ).
Futilitist , 03/18/2015 at 6:50 am
Hi Kam.

I did some research on the ETP model you pointed me to. It turns out that I haven't been the only person to point out what the giant wedge pattern in the price of oil meant:

"Oil prices are plunging. According to my opinion (and it seems that your theory says so), this is because now we cannot afford a functioning economy at 100 USD per barrel of oil . From now on, any price collapse will lead to the destruction of supply; and a price hike will destroy the demand (And I think that as time passes by, the ceiling at which the demand will be destroyed will only go down). It seems that both factors (supply destruction and demand destruction) have met in the graph and we just hit a collision point …"
~ Observerbrb at peakoil.com

He even made a graph just like mine!

And here is the answer to his question from one of the originators of the ETP model:

"You're right!"
~shortonoil

Wow. So my cute little independently arrived at theory has also occurred to many other people. Well, of course it did! It is so obvious, I think I could explain it to a 6 year old! But for some strange reason, I can't seem to be able to explain it to anyone here, except for a select few.

I wonder why?

Kam , 03/18/2015 at 5:04 pm
I thought that you were familiar with the ETP model, because you sounded like you are. If you figured it out by yourself, then congratulations! :)
Also look at this (link). This chart was first made long time ago (2 years?). This is the updated version. I don't believe that you didn't see this earlier 😛
http://www.economic-undertow.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Triangle-of-Doom-030315-1024×689.png
Futilitist , 03/18/2015 at 8:46 pm
Hi Kam.

I just found that "traingle of doom" chart the other day, when I was looking at the link you gave me to the ETP model, and I wanted to find out more. I looked around and ended up seeing the chart at a discussion at peakoil.com. It looks like charts I was making before 2013.

I have been expecting a collapse for quite a while, so I started watching the wedge form pretty early on. I began to develop the idea that there would be an oil spike when the lines crossed!!! Ha ha. I could probably find where I posted my big prediction for a spike in June 2014!!! Right timing, wrong direction.

I really had had the wrong idea about the cost of production. I thought that would be the impossible line to breach. But that doesn't factor in heavy finance in the oil industry. The affordability line was the real problem. Of course, as soon as oil plummeted, I began to get a clearer idea of the dynamics. I started to get the idea that the price of oil would keep falling. At Thanksgiving at my moms house, I announced that the collapse of industrial civilization began in June of 2014. It was not a welcome topic. It is not welcome here, either.

The ETP model peaks in 2012. Check out this post:

http://peakoilbarrel.com/eia-confusion/comment-page-1/#comment-504805

When seen relative to interest rates, 2012 is the highest price oil ever reached (higher than 2008)! The chart "squeeled" (non-linear dynamics) at the peak. The whole thing fits together.

And that makes this next post really interesting:

http://peakoilbarrel.com/eia-confusion/comment-page-1/#comment-504784

It shows how the FED used QEx and operation twist to extend the wedge by raising the affordability line. Especially twist in 2012. Stick save.

Anyway, thanks for the link, Kam. It really helped me bring the whole thing into sharper focus in my mind. I understand collapse much better now.

I have been debating certain people on the site, and they really don't get it, or they are really pretending hard not to get it. I think I am explaining it pretty well, but…

…Anyway, check out the debate or better yet join it. I could sure use some help.

Boomer II , 03/17/2015 at 3:45 pm
Ron, Is it possible the EIA is intentionally trying to push oil prices down for political reasons?

If there has been any intentional push to be overly optimistic, hasn't it been from the oil industry itself? The whole "energy independence" thing.

So if the net result would also drive down oil prices, wouldn't the industry, rather than government, be the one to blame?

Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 11:25 am
A little bit of data reconciliation here:

the mazamascience.com/oilexport link puts it all on one graph by country/region and is based on BP's data. They also have a button to flip from tonnes to barrels. My personal fave.

This from BP:

Oil production data includes crude oil, tight oil, oil sands and NGLs (the liquid content of natural gas where this is recovered separately). Excludes liquid fuels from other sources such as biomass and derivatives of coal and natural gas.

World oil production tables are in both thousand barrels daily and million tonnes.

There is no mention of condensate in that. It could be called NGL, one supposes. So it's not a pure crude measure. We can't be happy about that, but it IS all on one graph (with consumption). Further, three cheers for BP, they adjust for leap years to get the extra day out for annual quotes.

So their graph for China consumption is pointing at 11+ mbpd. That includes all of the above.

This from China's official org:

China's implied oil demand will grow 3 percent this year versus last year, the country's top energy group forecast, little changed from the pace of growth in 2014 as calculated by Reuters.

State-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) saw the nation's oil demand rising to 10.68 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2015, some 310,000 bpd higher than last year.

The forecast, in an annual report released by CNPC's research institute on Wednesday, also put the country's net crude imports up 5.4 percent at 6.49 million bpd for this year.

China, the world's second-largest oil consumer, raised crude imports by nearly 10 percent last year, or an additional 530,000 bpd, largely to boost government and commercial reserves as oil companies took advantage of the more than 50 percent fall in global benchmark prices from mid-June.

The CNPC forecast was higher than a recent report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) that put China's oil demand growth for 2015 at 2.5 percent, down from 2.7 percent last year.

No sign of reduced Chinese consumption.

SAWDUST , 03/17/2015 at 11:46 am
I'm looking ahead to tomorrows FOMC announcement at 2:00-2:30pm ish. If Fed comes off hawkish i think we will see oil below $40 very soon if their statement is dovish we get a price rebound though it might be a short lived one. I also think if they come out hawkish the dollar will initially strengthen but when stocks roll over and bonds yields start collapsing towards zero they are going to drag the dollar down with it. Which in itself might support oil prices at least in some small manner.
Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 12:31 pm
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/china–carmakers-overcharging–selling-defective-products-175034116.html

This is mostly a vid. The audio content and the text has no value. It's Yahoo talking heads pretending they know something. Turn the audio off.

Rather watch the video. The imagery. LOOK AT THOSE CHINESE TRAFFIC JAMS, on open highways. About the 2:00 mark.

SAWDUST , 03/17/2015 at 12:59 pm
Beyond cars issues. A lot of the stuff manufactured in China eventually will be replaced by 3D printers. Combine that with China's move to De-dollarize. Setting up a alternative to SWIFT and selling US bonds. How will they be able to keep their currency pegged to the dollar? Which is what keeps those Chinese factories humming. In the long run how will they continue to keep hundreds of millions of people working?
Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 2:15 pm
I don't think you embrace the theme of this blog.

If the oil isn't there, people go to war and die. It doesn't matter who prints what piece of paper, you can't print oil and you can't feed 7 billion without oil.

Scarcity begets tanker seizure. Japan can't survive if the tankers going to Tokyo go to Shanghai, and outbidding doesn't matter if China HAS to have that oil.

SAWDUST , 03/17/2015 at 3:11 pm
I totally embrace the theme of this blog. But before scarcity sets in and nations start taking other nations oil supply by force. Some economic tremors will be felt which will lead nations to use force to secure oil supplies. Economic hardship is a prerequisite. We will actual need more than economic tremors. We will need some economic earthquakes. Before bombs and bullets start flying. I don't think nations will attack each other the minute oil starts get scarce. It wont be until their economies can't function properly anymore and respective governments see no other alternative. It will be when growth ceases to exist and economies can do nothing but contract. Chinese tankers can very well be seized themselves. China doesn't own the seas.
Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 3:17 pm
Pretty much.
hermit , 03/18/2015 at 2:37 pm
Watcher if you thought that one was bad. take a look at this one

http://www.bbc.com/autos/story/20150317-how-smart-traffic-signals-may-ease-your-commute

Ronald Walter , 03/17/2015 at 12:17 pm
In 1953 there was one well in the Bakken.

In 1988, there were finally 99 wells.

In 2009, the number of wells in the Bakken Formation then reached 1000 plus wells.

In 2015, there is a Bakken/Three Forks well count of 9052 .

Nine thousand times more wells in a 62 years.

It is entirely possible to shut them all down and forget about the oil, but I wouldn't stand on one leg or hold my breath.

The place where Congress gets the job done.

Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 12:40 pm
Re systemic data issues. ZH just splashed one of their strong points, noticing inconsistency. There may be an explanation for it, but whoever is going to make it better start cracking:

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-03-17/something-strange-going-nonfarm-payrolls

Gist is this morning's Housing Starts number was down sharply for February. But the February Non Farm Payrolls number showed a sharp increase in residential construction employment. Naturally, any time there is bad data this time of year it is attributed to winter. But it's winter for hiring too, and it didn't show there.

My opinion is the NFP measurement is taken the 3rd week of months. I suspect things have been done to take advantage of that knowledge.

Fernando Leanme , 03/17/2015 at 2:45 pm
What's "soon"?
Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 3:18 pm
Best you not know.
clueless , 03/17/2015 at 3:19 pm
Watcher – we had a small back and forth a short time ago, in which I think (do not shoot me if I am wrong) your biggest complaint about today's economics was lack of transparency. This article seems to show what I believe. Do not look for transparency, because you will never find it. People/institutions can put forth as much data and/or reasoning as anyone could possible want, but in the end it is not transparent. You just have to look at the information and decide for yourself if it is reasonable and what it means.
I am big on analogies (in case no one noticed). Everyone watches a football game and sees what they perceive to be a stupid play call. The sportswriters cannot wait to ask the coach about it. He gives some reasoned answer. Pointless. He went brain dead at the time, but he will never give that as the reason.
So, I look at what the Fed does, and try to figure out why I think that they did what they did. I never accept their reasoning at face value. Same with about most things. I read the WSJ every day for 45 years, not necessarily to gain information, but rather trying to figure out if I agreed or not with whatever point someone was trying to make.
With respect to investing, about the only time you can make a lot of money is when almost everyone else is wrong, but you are right. Generally, pretty hard to do.
Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 3:24 pm
With respect to investing, about the only time you can make a lot of money is when almost everyone else is wrong, but you are right.

If oil was the engine of all things (and it was) throughout your investing personal database, then being right was just betting on an index and letting increased BTUs assert themselves and eventually appear in macro economics. This was why "a problem delayed is a problem solved" worked pre 2008. Oil's derived growth would fix everything if you just could buy time.

That's all gone away and it's never coming back.

That sentence cannot be uttered or embraced, so money will be printed to extend and pretend and buy time for the mechanism that no longer works.

learner2 , 03/17/2015 at 1:05 pm
How do you guys think about the current meme that the nuclear deal with Iran (maybe even by month end) is going to result in extra 800k to 1M bpd coming to market soon? That is the reason being given for price declines.
Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 3:19 pm
That stuff hits the rumor mill every time an Iranian deadline approaches.
Longtimber , 03/17/2015 at 2:06 pm
Bit off Topic for Hydrocarbons. but, another reason to be prepared.

Of all our infrastructure, the electrical power grid is the most fragile. In the 2013 Infrastructure Report Card, prepared by the American Society of Civil Engineers, Energy received a grade of D.
http://www.survivopedia.com/the-power-grid-could-collapse/

Competition in Li Pak's are getting interesting.. Capacity and features evolving every few months.
Take any ratings with a grain of salt. There are no test standards. Would love to see reviews.

http://www.amazon.com/600A-Peak-Current-Discharging-Ultra-bright-smartphones-USB-charged/dp/B00QC7EVG4/ref=sr_1_3?s=electronics&ie=UTF8&qid=1426618910&sr=1-3&keywords=LI+jump+starter

sunnnv , 03/17/2015 at 4:07 pm
http://www.manufacturing.net/news/2015/03/when-oil-prices-are-down-worker-deaths-are-up-in-the-bakken

"Low oil prices and subsequent cutbacks in the field by drilling companies could be contributing to a rash of worker fatalities in North Dakota, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal.

The state saw eight oilfield employee deaths since October, a five-month total than exceeded the number for the previous 12-month span. October also coincided with the beginning of a decline in the number of oil rigs operating in the state.
"

For those with access to WSJ:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-deaths-rise-as-bakken-boom-fades-1426187062

And in the same issue of manufacturing.net:
http://www.manufacturing.net/news/2015/03/dow-signs-on-to-develop-massive-wind-farm
"…The wind farm, to be complete in first quarter 2016, will span nearly 35,000 acres, and will supply Dow's Freeport Texas Manufacturing facility with 200 MW of wind power …"

Boomer II , 03/17/2015 at 4:24 pm
Centralized power generation and distribution is going to be replaced as soon as it can be.

You Don't Need An Energy Company When You Can Buy Power From Your Friends

Rune Likvern , 03/17/2015 at 4:52 pm
A couple of articles which will affect the oil price

Iran Can Add Million Barrels a Day of Oil If Sanctions Halt
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-16/iran-can-add-million-barrels-a-day-of-oil-if-sanctions-are-ended

"If sanctions are lifted, we can raise our exports by one million barrels per day within a few months," Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh said Monday in Assaluyeh, Iran. The Persian Gulf nation shipped 1.2 million barrels a day last month, the International Energy Agency said in a March 13 report.

Oil hit by stockpile fears; dollar offsets some loss
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/17/us-markets-oil-idUSKBN0MC1TC20150317

Industry group American Petroleum Institute (API) said after the market's settlement that crude stockpiles rose by 10.5 million barrels in the week to March 13, far ahead of the 3.8 million forecast by analysts polled by Reuters. If correct, the API number would lift total U.S. inventories to 450 million barrels.

Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 5:35 pm
$42.xx following the report, which is post US close pre Asia open. Some futures trading still goes on.

Of more concern, for the 2nd time this week I have seen "22 Trillion in oil derivatives". No idea where that's coming from. That's a lot of HY paper swaps plus options, one supposes. It spells Apocalypse, actually.

Yetanother Mike , 03/17/2015 at 5:03 pm
Found this on chron.com, along with a few other stories about the shale slowdown:

http://fuelfix.com/blog/2015/03/17/oil-production-falling-in-three-big-shale-plays-eia-says/

Boomer II , 03/17/2015 at 6:12 pm
I'm behind on reading the comments on some of the other posts. So I don't know if this has already been posted.

Watch Four Years of Oil Drilling Collapse in Seconds

Longtimber , 03/17/2015 at 11:11 pm
Fantastic, You can filter by play. wish you could filter horizontal and they had one for NG. Hope it's updated for all of 2015.
Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 10:17 pm
Okay. What is the rationale here?

I'm seeing talk that at these price levels some number of wells will get fracked that is a lower number than used to get fracked.

Why? Why are these wells going to get fracked at these price levels and who is going to pay for them post March 31 when revaluation occurs? I thought the plan was allegedly to frack nothing until you got a better price. So . . . who is going to pay for it, and why do it if you're not getting enough price and are oh so very sure you're going to get better price upcoming aka soon? Is this all about paying your people? Are the lenders interested in paying your people, or getting their money back?

Oh, and the big guys buying the small guys theory . . . how does that work at a wellhead price of $25? The for-sale company has $XXXX in revalued assets and $YYYYYYYYYYYYYYY in debt. Who buys that company? Someone should be paying someone to take that company, not the reverse. So . . . maybe the for-sale company says psssssst, maybe I'll just sell you the assets so I can have cash to keep the doors open. Well, didn't the lenders have those assets as collateral? Can we spell fraud?

If the price stays in this ballpark for a while (and note it was around this price for FIVE SOLID YEARS 2000-2005 (which btw was in this century, not last one) all of this is going to disintegrate.

As for who thinks it's going higher, which expert says this or that, let's make this a pure experience. Show me that expert taking out extra mortgages on his house and levering up his 401K to make the bet on higher soon. If he ain't betting, then he's indulging in fantasy.

Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 10:25 pm
hmm never saw that before Ron. "You do not have permission to edit that comment." The edit button is there. That's the message that appears. Plenty of time left.
Ron Patterson , 03/17/2015 at 10:40 pm
Try it now. I have changed the time to 2 hours. Otherwise I don't know what the problem is.
Watcher , 03/17/2015 at 10:58 pm
It's not the time.

I clicked edit just now and a window appeared saying "comment loaded successfully", but it's empty, there's nothing there to edit.

Maybe it will fix itself. Give it overnight.

Futilitist , 03/18/2015 at 12:01 am
It is a glitch that happens every once in a while. Just hit the X, and then hit the edit button again. That works for me.
Caelan MacIntyre , 03/18/2015 at 2:57 am
New and improved! Now an hour+! ^u'
clueless , 03/18/2015 at 10:37 am
Who thinks it is going higher?
Well, just looking at the numbers "somebody" does. To my knowledge, importers of oil do not have long term contracts obligating them to buy oil and import it. So in less than a year, oil inventories are up in the US by 100 million barrels, over 9 million more last week per this mornings EIA report. We have consistently been importing over 1 million bbls/day more than we need and putting it into storage. Imported oil is probably closer to Brent in cost. So let's guess that somebody has put 100 million barrels into storage at an average cost of $55/bbl. That cost somebody $5.5 billion plus monthly storage fees, plus cost of money. I doubt that whoever "somebody" is, is looking for an opportunity to sell it all for $40 and lose close to $2 billion on all in costs. So, if not, then they must think that they will make money at some reasonable time in the future.
This is also somewhat puzzling to me. I know that the majors have access to that kind of money, but after not seeing US oil imports back off one bit since the plunge started, I have concluded that it is above my pay grade to try to figure it out.
Skywalker , 03/19/2015 at 10:46 pm
Current oil future curve is in contango, which means future price is higher than spot price. If the spread between spot and future prices is large enough to cover the storage costs, many people will try to take advantage of that "free" money by buying the oil at spot price, putting them into storage and then shorting the oil future 3 or 6 months out, which enables them to fix the selling price in the future.

Many people are doing this kind of arbitrage right now. Some are even leasing the whole oil tanker as the storage and that is why the tanker rate has been skyrocketing.

Futilitist , 03/19/2015 at 11:21 pm
Desperate measures and a product of the optimism bias in all humans.
Skywalker , 03/20/2015 at 12:54 am
It has nothing to do with biases but everything to do with making risk-free profits. The arbitragers may not have a view as of where the oil price will be in 3 or 6 months time. They simply make money from the spread.

I would do the same if I have the resources.

WeekendPeak , 03/20/2015 at 8:47 am
that's exactly what it is.
rgds
WP
Fernando Leanme , 03/18/2015 at 5:58 pm
Watcher, properties will be purchased by those who have a price forecast high enough to deliver a solid risk weighed return. The evaluation is fairly straightforward. We look at the cash flow from existing wells, perform an estimate for wells being drilled, but consider delaying the completion until prices increase. We also look at undrilled well locations and prepare an estimate for those as well. If it's an outright company purchase we have to look at other topics, for example environental liabilities, pending lawsuits, and labor issues.

I can't go beyond this basic outline. But I assume you do realize there are plenty of players who have very large amounts of cash to buy. If the sales don't go through is because the seller has a really inflated view of what the property is worth. Or is one of those ego driven types who wants to be an oil tycoon and just doesn't want to sell. I ran into one not too long ago. He didn't want to discuss business, was mostly interested in discussing politics, so the sale fell through. I bet right now he's a bit shook up.

Andy Hamilton , 03/17/2015 at 11:07 pm
Investors in US shale oil junk bonds take yet another bath:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/energy-junk-bond-revival-cut-short-as-7-billion-lost-in-10-days
"'Oil prices have fallen more than 15 percent since March 4 to a six-year low of $43.5, wiping out $7 billion of market value of high-yield debt issued by energy companies. Prices on $1.45 billion of notes sold less than two weeks ago by Energy XXI Ltd., an oil producer that was being squeezed by its lenders, have fallen by as much as 10 percent. Comstock Resources Inc.'s $700 million of securities have declined by more than 7 percent since March 6.

The latest slump in crude is rekindling concern that oil companies will struggle to service the $120 billion of high-yield, high-risk debt they took on in the past three years amid the U.S. shale boom. That's a sharp reversal from February when yield-starved bond investors were loading up on the debt again, pushing down borrowing costs to a two-month low. "'

Yalza!

Caelan MacIntyre , 03/18/2015 at 2:15 am
"I find it curious that anybody would chose a peak oil blog to tout the merits of shale oil, or shale gas, particularly now, when it has its pants down around its knees, its hands overs its privates , but so be it…

The real oil and gas business… is very difficult at the moment; we are all working 24/7, confused about the direction of prices, and having to watch every penny we spend, right down to washing poka dot gloves every evening to wear them again the next day… I have had 50 good men ask me for work the past 3 weeks , all coming out of the stinking shale business, with little hope for the future…

As you can clearly (lol) tell, I am not a fan of the stinking shale business … I think [it] …has mismanaged my countries limited hydrocarbon resources in a very bad way. It took advantage of cheap money, little risk, absolutely no regard for conservation practices, and drilled itself into a 9 line bind, in my learned opinion. It lied to the American public, misled its work force , borrowed money it cannot pay back and helped drive the price of both oil and natural gas down to levels that will ultimately hurt, not help Americans. Now its all unraveling…

Dickheads in the Bakken and Eagle Ford want to export condensate to stay on their drilling hamster wheels; how does selling American resources, cheap, to buy them back tomorrow, from people that hate our guts and want to kill us, help America? It doesn't. It is stupid…

I am reminded of numerous times in the history of oil and gas in the United States where an unregulated industry drilled itself literally into oblivion… More recently, the shale gas industry imploded from over drilling and the corresponding collapse of gas prices. My industry cannot seem to keep from making the same mistakes again, over and over. It gets caught up in it own bullshit far too often…

I have to lay off a couple of kids today that have been with me for 5 years, one just got married

Is shale oil extraction a resounding success story in America, a benchmark for free-market enterprise? Bullshit . The debt those guys has accumulated would choke a big horse; its begged, borrowed and essentially stole money from grandma's all around the county that bought their stock based on propaganda. It has not made a dime of profit yet. The wealth of retired people who invested in the shale oil business, even people that didn't, is now being decimated because of the shale oil industry. Every stinking shale well drilled uses sufficient fresh water for 168,000 humans to consume in one day and nearly 400 tons of steel. The crop and ranch land that is lost to shale well pads and roads is heart wrenching. All that for a couple of months of $ 2.00 gasoline?

The shale oil industry shot itself in the foot. Along the way it shot me, and thousands of other operators in America, in the back. It is helping to facilitate a train wreck around the world, actually . I have been to West Africa, the ME, all over S. America, everywhere in the world there is oil production and I am telling you straight away, there are now lots of very, very afraid people out there in the world. Hungry, thirsty, sick people whose countries cannot help them any longer. Why? In part because of stinkin' shale oil industry greed. I am mad at them sumbitches this morning…

I gotta go let some good kids go . Damn, I hate that…

The shale oil industry will not survive 50 dollar oil …Now oil prices are low, and getting lower, and the money tree is going to fall over. Anybody promoting the shale oil industry at this point must be getting paid to do so. …"

~ Mike @ The POB

--

"So long story short don't believe all the negative people saying you should go home now because there are still plenty of jobs around you can get in the Bakken and be making six figures in no time ." ~ dn_girl

"We had a proud young woman post yesterday about her… optimism about… future in the oilfields of North Dakota. It is a powerful message that we should have all embraced She probably won't be back …" ~ Mike

"Things are getting tough out here in the oilfield right now, its time for me to get tougher… But this is going to be my last post for awhile." [January 10, 2015 at 12:41 pm] ~ Mike

"Mike,
I hope my comments didn't tick you off and that's the reason your going to cut back on posting… If I did say something that ticked you off, I am sorry." ~ TechGuy

shallow sand , 03/18/2015 at 6:14 am
I said I wasn't going to post awhile, and am still going to limit my posts because I really need to focus on much more important things than the internet, no offense to Ron's blog, which I appreciate very much.

Assuming the young lady from ND is real, which we know is always an issue on the net, I do not understand attacking her. It is like attacking the soldiers in Iraq because you don't like the lies that caused them to be there.

Living in a place like ND is not easy. Working outdoors in the winter there is not easy. Working in the oilfield is not easy. I do not understand why there would be lack of respect for people who have little to nothing, who move up there to bust their butt to make a living.

While I'm here, I know us small producers are upset with shale overproduction. However, I think the real culprit is our unregulated financial system. No good reason for oil to have hit $147 in 2008, which contributed to crashing the economy and putting millions out of work. Now, no good reason for oil to fall below $40, which means $20-30 at the well. It is so far below the cost of developing new production, its almost a joke. It is also below the cost of most US production too, when you figure in all the costs. Add in the bubble financing, and here we are.

If you are going to attack people, at least try to focus on those who are responsible for this shale mess, not people who are trying to avoid the destruction hitting our middle class by going to work a thousand miles from home in the elements to make a buck.

Futilitist , 03/18/2015 at 6:27 am
Hi shallow sand,

Good to see you again.

Since you dropped by, I would like to ask you a question, if you have time.

How much do you know about the Petroleum Price Curve and the ETP model?

Ronald Walter , 03/18/2015 at 7:24 am
You're getting close on the 'unregulated financial system' part.

At the heart of it all, there is no financial system, it fell down years ago.

What is there is but a vestige of what it really once was, it is now a shriveled carcass. Probably by design and plan, but that will probably never be known and remains to be seen.

Still, somehow, it all trudges on through the dreaded drudgery.

Futilitist , 03/18/2015 at 7:27 am
Not for much longer, I think.
Caelan MacIntyre , 03/18/2015 at 8:01 am
"It is like attacking the soldiers in Iraq because you don't like the lies that caused them to be there." ~ shallow sand

Which is precisely why you need to short circuit those lies bloody fast, shallow sand, and sometimes tell the kids what they don't want to hear. My kid would not be on here like that, singing the praises of ND, etc., nor part of the bombing the tar out of Iraq, that's for sure.

We don't like our children very much, nor ourselves, nor our planet, nor the creatures on it.

If you are in this industry– one of the reprehensible attacks on the aforementioned– your shallow sand seems to be turning to quicksand. I hope so. May your work sink hard and fast along with it.

And this is spot on topic too. If low prices hurt the fracking, etc., industries, you have my 'opinion piece' right here.

Oh, and ironically, as if you hadn't noticed, Mike is, in a sense, with me all the way on this and makes many of my points for me. Have you read it?

And if dn_girl is real, save her and girls and boys like her! Risk pissing them off about their attitudes and choices if you don't agree with them.

If an arm is gangrenous, sometimes you have to hack it off, possibly to the protest of someone you love. I love my planet and some industries need to be hacked off fast.

Caelan MacIntyre , 03/18/2015 at 8:47 am
By the way, Mike may not realize it, may be grappling with it, but he is perched on the precipice of anarchy:
He clearly despises his industry, but it is merely a manifestation of the larger crony-capitalist plutarchy; the violence-based governance structure; the parable of the violent tribe gone large-scale, overcomplex, global, amok.
Push him off!

"…all forms of organization, regardless of how democratic they may be at the start, will eventually and inevitably develop oligarchic tendencies, thus making true democracy practically and theoretically impossible, especially in large groups and complex organizations. The relative structural fluidity in a small-scale democracy succumbs to 'social viscosity' in a large-scale organization. [Accordingly] …democracy and large-scale organization are incompatible." ~ Wikipedia

Paulo , 03/18/2015 at 8:38 am
Nicely said, Shallow. I have always subscribed to the theory that most folks are doing the best that they can with what they have. The villians are the manipulators of finance and people who do so for their own gain, not the workers who have limited opportunities and influence.

regards

John B , 03/19/2015 at 3:34 am
"I do not understand attacking her."

Try thinking in terms of a hopeless misogynistic psychotic.

Then you'll understand.

Caelan MacIntyre , 03/19/2015 at 7:44 am
Way to go, Father John B.
Show us how it's done. Give your 'hopeless misogynistic psychotics' a few pointers. 'u^

"The shale oil industry shot itself in the foot. Along the way it shot me, and thousands of other operators in America, in the back. It is helping to facilitate a train wreck around the world, actually…

I gotta go let some good kids go. Damn, I hate that…

Anybody promoting the shale oil industry at this point must be getting paid to do so …"

~ Mike @ The POB

--

"So long story short don't believe all the negative people saying you should go home now because there are still plenty of jobs around you can get in the Bakken and be making six figures in no time ." ~ dn_girl

"We had a proud young woman post yesterday about her… optimism about… future in the oilfields of North Dakota. It is a powerful message that we should have all embraced She probably won't be back …" ~ Mike

"The culture as a whole and most of its members are insane." ~ Derrick Jensen

People, I call upon you today to embrace that powerful message … Because, well, assuming it is, it is a message that appears like it came from a female … and one must always embrace and never be cheeky or sarcastic with a message that might come from a female . Good god no, because then… then that is just plain attacking … and misogynistic , no if and or buts about it. And will land you in hell. Or you will become blind if you do it too much. ^u^

BTW, John B, I get along very well with women (and men and even those in-between); the willfully-ignorant ones, less so. It's not about gender, but about deliberate stupidity.

(Another fine on-the-fly comment crafted with the Patterson Press™ Comment Editor)

John B , 03/19/2015 at 3:14 pm
Maybe it's about gender identification, and envy?
Futilitist , 03/19/2015 at 3:50 pm
John B,

"Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished."

1) Disagree Strongly
2) Disagree Mostly
3) Disagree Somewhat
4) Agree Somewhat
5) Agree Mostly
6) Agree Strongly

Skywalker , 03/20/2015 at 1:55 am
Very well said. Those working in the oil industry are not the ones to blame. They are just earning their livings by honest work. The biggest culprit, in my view, is the Fed, whose QEs and ZIRP encourage over risk-taking, which helped fuel the frenzy in the shale business.
Futilitist , 03/20/2015 at 3:41 am
If the FED had not done what they did, with ZIRP, NIRP, endless QE's, and operation twist, we would all be dead already.

So, unfortunately, the FED is not the culprit, either. We all are. The FED was just giving us what we wanted.

And since June of 2014, the FED has pretty much lost all of it's effectiveness. They are out of ammo. Physics is in charge now.

Futilitist , 03/18/2015 at 10:36 am
Hey Caelan.

+100

I didn't mean to seem harsh on your style earlier (referencing the chicken and the dn_girl). And I obviously spoke *WAY* too soon. Forgive me. Now I think I understand. I had no idea you were building up to this! Your post above is an absolute work of art. The three posts together now form a kind of tryptic masterpiece.

And I do now think you may have uncovered something profoundly important, in terms of elephants in rooms. Bravo.

By the way, what did you make of my "The Mask of the Red Death" allegory post?

http://peakoilbarrel.com/opec-crude-plus-more-on-eia-estimates/comment-page-1/#comment-504992

Who is Prince Prospero? Who is The Red Death? 😉

Caelan MacIntyre , 03/19/2015 at 10:48 am
It's 'laughable' and kind of curious, the hypocrisy and fairly misplaced self-righteous net-nannyism of some.

I think it had less to do with this dn_girl and more that I stepped on Mike's tail, maybe a few others'; the wish of $110 oil. I mean, what if you lost ~50% of the value of something overnight? Well that's what happened of course. (Many in certain situations might well come to this blog for insights and answers; some in less than the best of moods and frames of mind– and as time goes on. I think we should reflect on this. . This is the time of peak oil; of the decline of global industrial civilization. A New Era. How often do new eras occur? In the middle of single lifetimes?)
I hear many men, especially, more than women, if we want to talk sex, are prone to greater difficulty when it comes to work issues. Like, work is 'everything' to some of them.

The thought did occur that if dn_girl is/was not a 'writeup', then maybe she is related to someone on here, even Mike, himself. In which case she might as well be a writeup.
I mean, aside from the vitriol he laid down about his own industry, he did seem desperate in some of his comments. 'Stabbed me in the back'?…
If your business is literally hemorrhaging, would you want to, somewhat less mindfully even, given your state, attempt to drum up business in any way you can? I would.

In any case, if Mike read some of my comments, he might have got a sense that I am against wage-slavery ('the jobemployee') and against certain forms of industry (like Mike's), against hierarchy ('boss/employee') and my comments with the girl, of course, making fun of company-ownership (Mike has one?). So I think it was less about the girl and simply that, over time, Mike's head was pumped and pumped by his work and my commentary until it exploded.

Everything But The Girl (for Mike)

Caelan MacIntyre , 03/19/2015 at 11:52 am
"By the way, what did you make of my "The Mask of the Red Death" allegory post?" ~ Futilitist

Oh ya, that one. And you think my chicken was over the top?! 'u^
In these Times of Twitter Texts, it is a long read, but I do like Poe who died way to young for my taste.
I am heading out but will grab a nice warm tea and read it over candlelight later tonight. Maybe prop my laptop half on the closed toilet seat and half on the bathtub edge and read it and its original reference in the bath after Russia Today.

до свидания

[Jun 08, 2016] EIA Short Term Energy Outlook

Notable quotes:
"... The longer it takes the EIA to correct this the more dramatic the market reaction will be. I could see a severe price reaction since WTI is now firmly above $50, and the overwhelming sentiment/fear is that frackers will all instantly completing thousands of wells at that price. It would be an incorrect conclusion, but the timing between $50 WTI and revisions that show increased production would match the sentiment perfectly and oil prices would surely experience a significant correction. ..."
peakoilbarrel.com

Peak Oil Barrel

Well hell, if you can cut capex by 62% and continue to produce at record highs, then I say go for it.

...In November 2014 the [rig] count stood at 3,570 rigs. Last month the count was 1,405, a drop of 2,165 rigs or 61%.

...If my prediction of 2015 as the year crude oil peaked is to be proven wrong, it looks like those making that claim will have to wait a few years to make their case. I know, there is nothing about OPEC in this report but OPEC is looking pretty shaky right now.

Brian Rose, 06/07/2016 at 4:38 pm

Dennis,

When would you expect it to become clear to the markets that U.S. production has been higher than forecast for several months?

The EIA's weekly inventory and production data comes out tomorrow morning. Any chance that they will start moderating their weekly production decline estimates tomorrow, or even say production increased to make up the gap?

Anyone here know what the time lag is likely to be?

I mean, the gap has become wide enough that they must be aware that their stated production is too low, right?

The longer it takes the EIA to correct this the more dramatic the market reaction will be. I could see a severe price reaction since WTI is now firmly above $50, and the overwhelming sentiment/fear is that frackers will all instantly completing thousands of wells at that price.

It would be an incorrect conclusion, but the timing between $50 WTI and revisions that show increased production would match the sentiment perfectly and oil prices would surely experience a significant correction.

learner2, 06/07/2016 at 6:01 pm

If the EIA comes out saying production had increased to fill the gap, I would think the market will see that the price went up in real time, meaning supply and demand already balancing, implying that demand must be really high to soak up all the supply. I don't think thats a reason to sell, quite the opposite in fact.

[Jun 07, 2016] Short-Term Energy Outlook June 2016

IEA is probably OK for use as historical data source, but any use of their forecasts is a sign of gross negligence, based on their track record. Their 'waterfall" style forecasts are just propaganda.
My feeling is that 80 dollars bbl are needs to increase shale oil production. Before that it will might be continue to decline. Saudis are a spent bullet. So chances of them coming into play again with more oil to suppress oil price further are close to zero.
If so, the key question we need to answer is when oil will hit this magic price point.
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)

U.S. crude oil production averaged 9.4 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2015. Production is forecast to average 8.6 million b/d in 2016 and 8.2 million b/d in 2017, both unchanged from last month's STEO.

EIA estimates that crude oil production for May 2016 averaged 8.7 million b/d, which is more than 0.2 million b/d below the April 2016 level, and approximately 1 million b/d below the 9.7 million b/d level reached in April 2015.

[Jun 06, 2016] Exported oil from Canada totals 120,000,000 barrels per month, 4,000,000 bpd.

peakoilbarrel.com
R Walter , 06/04/2016 at 7:10 am
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUSCA1&f=M

Exported oil from Canada totals 120,000,000 barrels per month, 4,000,000 bpd.

Imported oil from Canada included in the net import numbers?

11 cars of crude from the Bakken derailed in Oregon today and caught fire. likbez , 06/04/2016 at 12:41 pm

There is another nuance here that was discussed before: It looks like EIA does not subtract imported from the USA dilutant in the total volume of oil exports from Canada overstating the total heavy oil production by this amount (double counting).

Raw bitumen must be blended with around 30% of diluent. At the moment Canada uses for diluent about 200,000 to 250,000 bpd of condensate, most of that imported from the United States. Much of it travels from the U.S. Gulf Coast, where supply is abundant so there are significant transportation costs involved.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-oil-condensate-idUSKBN0EH18420140606

Dennis Coyne , 06/04/2016 at 1:45 pm
Hi likbez

This might effect net exports, but if done properly it does not.

First and barrel of condensate is exported then it is imported, the net is zero.

likbez , 06/05/2016 at 10:58 pm

It overstates the world total production by the amount of condensate used for dilution, is not it?

In this case EIA adds production numbers from all countries, but it do not take into account that part of Canadian oil and Venezuelan oil was "already produced" and accounted in the USA production stats.

So Dennis your world production figures are fudged :=)

Dennis Coyne, 06/06/2016 at 10:25 am
Hi Likbez,

The production statistics include the oil produced, not the oil shipped.

So no the production statistics may not be overstated.

Canadians are pretty smart, I believe they know how much oil they produce and are not counting the condensate imported to ship the bitumen as "produced oil".

My guess is that the secondary sources that estimate Venezuelan output also know they should not count imported condensate as oil production.

The calculation is really quite simple, if one counts production by what flows through the pipeline, just deduct the imported condensate used to create the dilbit.

The World numbers are not that accurate so any number reported is no more than a rough guess (+/- 1 Mb/d).

[Jun 02, 2016] EIA Once Again Contradicts API Reports Crude Draw

Notable quotes:
"... The United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported a draw of 1.366 million barrels of crude oil on Wednesday, falling short of what experts predicted would be a 3.1-million barrel decrease in US crude oil supplies. ..."
"... Last week, crude oil inventories reported by the EIA decreased by 1.4 million barrels, but still represented "historically high levels for this time of year," an official document read. Tuesday's American Petroleum Institute (API) figures said crude inventories increased by 2.35 million barrels, once gain contradicting the EIA's numbers, but also defying its own forecasts. ..."
"... Last week's API report said supplies of the unrefined substance experienced a 5.1 million barrel drop - the largest such event since December. The market responded to the decrease and Brent oil prices almost hit $50 a barrel - a seven month high. ..."
"... many of the U.S.' major energy producing states saw slightly lower production rates during May, including Texas and North Dakota. Offshore drilling sites in the Gulf of Mexico represented a notable exception, which saw a month-over-month increase of 4.1 percent in crude oil production. ..."
finance.yahoo.com

The United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported a draw of 1.366 million barrels of crude oil on Wednesday, falling short of what experts predicted would be a 3.1-million barrel decrease in US crude oil supplies.

Last week, crude oil inventories reported by the EIA decreased by 1.4 million barrels, but still represented "historically high levels for this time of year," an official document read. Tuesday's American Petroleum Institute (API) figures said crude inventories increased by 2.35 million barrels, once gain contradicting the EIA's numbers, but also defying its own forecasts.

The decrease suggests a greater demand for oil in the United States, according to the source's analysis.

Last week's API report said supplies of the unrefined substance experienced a 5.1 million barrel drop - the largest such event since December. The market responded to the decrease and Brent oil prices almost hit $50 a barrel - a seven month high.

On June 2nd, the barrel price of oil reached $50.10 cents as the OPEC meeting commenced in Vienna, according to NASDAQ's estimates.

Gasoline inventories also faced a draw of 1.492 million barrels after enjoying a two million barrel EIA-reported increase during the week ending on May 27th.

The agency's monthly report released earlier this week said many of the U.S.' major energy producing states saw slightly lower production rates during May, including Texas and North Dakota. Offshore drilling sites in the Gulf of Mexico represented a notable exception, which saw a month-over-month increase of 4.1 percent in crude oil production.

[May 19, 2016] EIA has not a clue as to what US oil production will be down the road

Current production will have to continue to fall at current rates all though 2016 to reach current projection and end near 8.2 mbd.
Notable quotes:
"... Basically, the EIA is projecting much higher LTO production from mid-2020s, with continuing rising trend, instead of the peak in 2020 in AEO-2015. ..."
"... [According to EIA forecast] The cumulative tight oil output for the reference case from 2015 to 2040 is 57 Gb. I think that is too optimistic by a factor of 2 at least. My guess, based on the USGS 2013 study of the Bakken/Three Forks and work by David Hughes on other LTO plays in Drilling Deeper is about 30 Gb for US LTO output (2005 to 2050) if prices go to over $100/b and remain close to the AEO reference oil price scenario for 2020 to 2040. Those prices might not even be high enough (in other words 30 Gb is an optimistic estimate, or pessimistic if one believes very high oil prices will be needed for a transition to alternatives). ..."
"... It ain't just what US C+C production will be down the road. See my post further up. Hint, some observers think they are way out of left field on renewables as well. ..."
peakoilbarrel.com
Sorry for posting this down here instead of replying to one or the other AEO 2016 comments but I wanted to get it wide enough.

Just looking at the difference in C+C predictions for each year leaves one to believe that the EIA has not a clue as to what US C+C production will be down the road.

 photo AEO 2016_zpsgx8dxwkn.jpg

AlexS , 05/17/2016 at 1:31 pm
Ron,

Basically, the EIA is projecting much higher LTO production from mid-2020s, with continuing rising trend, instead of the peak in 2020 in AEO-2015.

Projected conventional production is lower than in AEO-2015

LTO was a "black swan" in 2010-14, and it remains one of the biggest uncertainties for future global oil production
-------–
In the early release, the EIA does not explain its assumptions for the LTO output. All they say is:

"Lower prices through 2017 has the greatest impact on tight oil
production, which drops to 4.2 million b/d in 2017 before
increasing to 7.1 million b/d in 2040. The general increase in
tight oil production is largely attributed to the higher oil prices
and the ongoing exploration and development programs that
expand operator knowledge about producing reservoirs."

Dennis Coyne , 05/17/2016 at 2:10 pm
Hi Ron and AlexS,

[According to EIA forecast] The cumulative tight oil output for the reference case from 2015 to 2040 is 57 Gb. I think that is too optimistic by a factor of 2 at least. My guess, based on the USGS 2013 study of the Bakken/Three Forks and work by David Hughes on other LTO plays in Drilling Deeper is about 30 Gb for US LTO output (2005 to 2050) if prices go to over $100/b and remain close to the AEO reference oil price scenario for 2020 to 2040. Those prices might not even be high enough (in other words 30 Gb is an optimistic estimate, or pessimistic if one believes very high oil prices will be needed for a transition to alternatives).

I think we may reach a peak that is 10% to 20% higher than the March 2015 peak in LTO output in 2021 and then output will start to decline rapidly by 2025, the maximum decline rate will be about 12% per year in 2027 and by 2032 decline will become more moderate at about 7%/year (this is US LTO output only).

Stoney , 05/18/2016 at 9:38 am
In addition to the 57 Gb of cumulative LTO production until 2040 they project 7 mb/d production on an upward trend at that point implying at least 50 Gb remains to be produced after that. So it's more like optimistic by a factor of 4 since you and Hughes rightly predict that LTO production will have declined to a low level by 2040-50.
Dennis Coyne , 05/18/2016 at 1:03 pm
Hi Stoney,

If we assume the decline has a similar slope of opposite sign, you would be correct, in the case of LTO I expect a pretty steep decline for 2 or 3 years (maybe a 15% overage decline rate over that period.)

So maybe a factor of 3 too high, but I agree more than a factor of 2 is definitely correct (if my 30 Gb estimate is roughly correct.)

Caelan MacIntyre , 05/17/2016 at 2:49 pm
Ron, your comment and that graph made me chuckle.

islandboy , 05/17/2016 at 3:13 pm

Just looking at the difference in C+C predictions for each year leaves one to believe that the EIA has not a clue as to what US C+C production will be down the road.

It ain't just what US C+C production will be down the road. See my post further up. Hint, some observers think they are way out of left field on renewables as well.

[May 15, 2016] The U.S. Department of Energys EIA projections continue to miss the mark.

Notable quotes:
"... And whatever the arcane arguments made by EIA, the fact remains that even without the impact of new policies, the agency's scenarios remain utterly incongruent to current reality. ..."
peakoilbarrel.com
islandboy , 05/13/2016 at 3:32 pm
The U.S. Department of Energy's EIA projections continue to miss the mark.

Much ink has been spilled over the vast difference between the scenarios put forward by the U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA) and reality. And whatever the arcane arguments made by EIA, the fact remains that even without the impact of new policies, the agency's scenarios remain utterly incongruent to current reality.

Unlike the agency's Annual Energy Outlook (AEO), International Energy Outlook focuses on global trends. But like AEO, the report misses the boat on renewable energy and makes projections about the fossil fuel industry which run counter to facts on the ground.

International Energy Outlook 2016's section on electricity forecasts that total generation from renewable energy sources will rise 2.9% annually under the baseline scenario to reach 29% in 2040, driven by non-hydro renewable energy rising 5.7% annually. By contrast, EIA expects global coal use to rise 0.8% annually, and for coal to still represent 29% of global electricity generation in 2040, the same amount as renewable energy.

[May 13, 2016] EIA completely missed the beginning of the LTO production decline amd continue to overestimate production because they are using mainly economical models for thier forecasts

Notable quotes:
"... We just did some work on the EIA/IHS report on well costs that came out a little while ago. We suspect that these longer peaking wells may be possible due to lower service costs. Operators have switched to natural sand, and lots of it. Not being an engineer, this is only an educated guess, but the general gist I can gather is that natural sand crushes more easily than artificial ceramic proppant, but is significantly cheaper. ..."
"... The decline after peak of new wells appears to be significantly steeper than previous years, so when companies claim 40% IP increase = 40% EUR increase, one should be extremely skeptical. By month 7 of production, the average 2014 well had produced 18% more oil than the average 2010 well at the same stage of its life – but by month 26, that difference was down to 7.6%. In month 3, the average 2014 well had produced nearly 9% more than the average 2013 well – by month 26, that was down to 2%. Those are total cumulative oil produced figures, btw. ..."
peakoilbarrel.com
Enno Peters , 05/13/2016 at 4:58 am

Thanks for the post Ron.

@Alex,

coming back to your comment at the end of last post:

" The chart below shows that both the EIA Drilling Productivity Report and the EIA/DrillingInfo monthly LTO production statistics tend to underestimate the resilience of tight oil production, at least in the case of the Bakken. The EIA estimates for February and March will likely be revised upward. I think that even bigger upward revisions will be done for the Eagle Ford."

The small declines in Feb & March is indeed surprising. Based on the new well count, and on 2015 1H well profiles, I expected declines around 20-25kbo/d. It does appear that the average well that started in the 2nd half of 2015 behaves quite differently, peaking for a few months longer than usual. This is caused for a large part by wells from Burlington, XTO, CLR & QEP. That has messed a bit with my projections, and probably also the EIA. If those wells had behaved more like earlier wells, ND production would be at least 20 kbo/d lower in March.

Questions in my mind now are:

  1. How will these "higher for longer" flow rates behave over the next couple of months?
  2. Will we see the same behavior in all new wells?
  3. Will we see something similar in other basins?

I think you could be right about those upward revisions. To me it shows that there is quite some new uncertainty caused by these changing dynamics.

AlexS says: 05/13/2016 at 5:38 am

Enno,

Thanks very much, that's really surprising. Perhaps they are using some new completion techniques? Will try to find something in companies' presentations.

gwalke says: 05/13/2016 at 5:47 am

Great comment, Enno, as ever. It's important to remember that the EIA's forecasts seem to generally be very "smooth", and their models are mostly done at an economic level, meaning they aren't working from number of wells upwards. This meant they completely missed the beginning of the production decline – their initial forecasts kept on adding ~30kbpd a month to Bakken until April15, for example. Now they are a little to heavy to the downside.

We just did some work on the EIA/IHS report on well costs that came out a little while ago. We suspect that these longer peaking wells may be possible due to lower service costs. Operators have switched to natural sand, and lots of it. Not being an engineer, this is only an educated guess, but the general gist I can gather is that natural sand crushes more easily than artificial ceramic proppant, but is significantly cheaper.

Our assumption on the interests of operators like CLR and WLL is that they currently want to maximise short-term production to boost revenue, and they care significantly less about maximising recovery. Using lots of natural sand fits in with that – though the sand will be crushed more quickly than if artificial proppant will be used, more fractures will be propped open in the short term.

Many of these short term production gains may be given up shortly after any price increase, as the service costs will also rise, and the short term revenue considerations will become less important. That's the theory we're working under currently, anyway…

The decline after peak of new wells appears to be significantly steeper than previous years, so when companies claim 40% IP increase = 40% EUR increase, one should be extremely skeptical. By month 7 of production, the average 2014 well had produced 18% more oil than the average 2010 well at the same stage of its life – but by month 26, that difference was down to 7.6%. In month 3, the average 2014 well had produced nearly 9% more than the average 2013 well – by month 26, that was down to 2%. Those are total cumulative oil produced figures, btw.

[May 12, 2016] The EIAs International Energy Outlook 2016 is out today

peakoilbarrel.com
The EIA's International Energy Outlook 2016 is out today

The new projections imply 1% annual-average growth in global liquids consumption for the period 2012-2040, including virtually zero growth in the OECD countries and 1.9% annual average growth in non-OECD countries.

World liquids consumption by region, Reference case (mb/d)

AlexS , 05/11/2016 at 9:37 am
World total energy consumption by source, Reference case
(Quadrillion Btu)

AlexS , 05/11/2016 at 9:51 am
Share of various sources in total world energy consumption (%)

Ron Patterson , 05/11/2016 at 11:56 am
Thanks for the chart Alex. I fail to see any exponential growth in renewables, (other in this case and that includes hydro and geothermal), or any exponential shrinkage in liquids. I think the EIA would have a strong disagreement with Dennis. :-)
AlexS , 05/11/2016 at 12:17 pm
Ron,
Assuming that growth in hydro is very low, other renewables are likely to increase at a high rate, but from a very low base. So fossil fuels will retain their dominating position in total energy consumption. That's a common view among all key energy forecasting agencies

"I think the EIA would have a strong disagreement with Dennis."

And with many other contributors to this blog :-)

[Apr 23, 2016] 04/21/2016 at 1:39 pm

Notable quotes:
"... In response to continued low oil prices, onshore crude oil production in the Lower 48 states is expected to decline from an average of 7.41 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2015 to 6.46 million b/d in 2016 and to 5.76 million b/d in 2017. ..."
"... EIA's April STEO forecasts Brent crude oil prices averaging $35/b in 2016 and $41/b in 2017, with the December 2017 price averaging $45/b. ..."
"... In contrast to the forecast of declining Lower 48 onshore production through 2017, federal Gulf of Mexico oil production is projected to increase from 1.54 million b/d in 2015 to 1.66 million b/d and to 1.82 million b/d in 2016 and 2017, respectively. Alaska's oil production is projected to slightly decrease from 0.48 million b/d in 2015 to 0.47 million b/d in 2016 and to 0.46 million b/d in 2017. ..."
"... Increased production from the federal Gulf of Mexico (GOM) is not enough to offset those declines, with total projected U.S. production falling from 9.43 million b/d in 2015 to 8.04 million b/d in 2017. ..."
"... Eyeballing the decline of Q1 2015, onshore : it appears to drop from about 7.5 to 5.0 in 1 year time (33%). That's an even higher decline rate than I expected. Looks like not only the production I'm tracking is declining at a rapid rate. ..."
"... In my view we will see actually a massive decline in wells due to plugging of wells. The latest RRC report for March 2016: http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/oil-gas/research-and-statistics/well-information/monthly-drilling-completion-and-plugging-summaries/ shows already a net decline of 1000 wells per month. So, a 33% decline of production is realistic and probably even too conservative. ..."
"... The plugged wells are stripper wells with output of 5 b/d or less. So if 1000 of these wells are plugged each month that's 5 kb/d lower output each month or a 60 kb/d total decrease over 12 months. Not really much of a factor. ..."
"... US production will be declining dramatically over the next months. Even the CEO of Pioneer and the IEA admit the decline. The only difference is that I think the decline will last much farther than Sep 2016 and will last well into 2017. ..."
"... The permits minus plugged is not really very useful. Oil wells completed relative to wells plugged is of greater interest. Every well completed (average of about 250 kb/d for first year) covers about 50 plugged stripper wells (with an average of under 5 b/d). So about 20 completed wells will make up for 1000 plugged wells. ..."
"... Using EIA data, TX decline rate is 9% from March to Jan 2015. Using Dean's data from March 2015 to Dec 2015 the decline is 6.1% (Jan was anomalous so I threw it out, if it is included the decline rate is 4.2%) ..."
"... As regards projections for the rest of this year and 2017, I agree that the EIA's price assumptions are too low. Higher prices may result in higher volumes. That said, I do not expect a quick rebound in drilling/completion activity as most shale companies are in a difficult financial situation and will not rush to increase capex. And even in the shale industry, with its short investment cycle, there is a time lag between a decision to increase capex and first production. ..."
"... The EIA's projections may be too low, but I still do not expect a quick rebound in the US C+C output. ..."
peakoilbarrel.com
EIA's US C+C output projections for 2016-17.
The numbers are from the April STEO, but with some additional details.

Source: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=25892

In response to continued low oil prices, onshore crude oil production in the Lower 48 states is expected to decline from an average of 7.41 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2015 to 6.46 million b/d in 2016 and to 5.76 million b/d in 2017.

The number of active onshore drilling rigs in the Lower 48 states fell 78% (from 1,876 to 412) between the weeks ending on October 31, 2014, and April 15, 2016. The decline in active rigs and well completions is projected to result in month-over-month onshore oil production declines of 120,000 b/d through September 2016.

EIA projects that the number of operating rigs in the Lower 48 states will continue to decrease through mid-2016 before beginning to slowly increase. However, expected Lower 48 production will continue to decline-although at a slowing rate-throughout 2017.

EIA's April STEO forecasts Brent crude oil prices averaging $35/b in 2016 and $41/b in 2017, with the December 2017 price averaging $45/b.

AlexS , 04/21/2016 at 1:45 pm
continued

In contrast to the forecast of declining Lower 48 onshore production through 2017, federal Gulf of Mexico oil production is projected to increase from 1.54 million b/d in 2015 to 1.66 million b/d and to 1.82 million b/d in 2016 and 2017, respectively. Alaska's oil production is projected to slightly decrease from 0.48 million b/d in 2015 to 0.47 million b/d in 2016 and to 0.46 million b/d in 2017.

Increased production from the federal Gulf of Mexico (GOM) is not enough to offset those declines, with total projected U.S. production falling from 9.43 million b/d in 2015 to 8.04 million b/d in 2017.

Enno Peters , 04/21/2016 at 2:09 pm
Great intel Alex, thanks for posting.

Eyeballing the decline of Q1 2015, onshore : it appears to drop from about 7.5 to 5.0 in 1 year time (33%). That's an even higher decline rate than I expected. Looks like not only the production I'm tracking is declining at a rapid rate.

I'm curious to see if we indeed will see the projected pick up in rig count this summer already.

AlexS , 04/21/2016 at 2:26 pm
Enno,

Your charts for the Bakken and some other sources show that LTO output drops by some 35% in 12 months if no new wells are completed.
Given that the EIA chart for Lower 48 onshore includes conventional production and still assumes that new wells are drilled and completed, a 33% decline indeed looks too big.

Apparently, they assume continuing decline in conventional output, primarily due to shut-down of the stripper wells. BTW, according to the EIA, between April 2015 and January 2016, US conventional onshore production was down 300 kb/d (bigger in relative terms than the drop in LTO output).

In addition, the EIA's oil projections are too low, in my view. Therefore, they may assume a small number of well completions

Heinrich Leopold , 04/22/2016 at 12:47 am
AlexS,

In my view we will see actually a massive decline in wells due to plugging of wells. The latest RRC report for March 2016: http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/oil-gas/research-and-statistics/well-information/monthly-drilling-completion-and-plugging-summaries/ shows already a net decline of 1000 wells per month. So, a 33% decline of production is realistic and probably even too conservative.

Dennis Coyne , 04/22/2016 at 9:13 am
Hi Heinrich,

The plugged wells are stripper wells with output of 5 b/d or less. So if 1000 of these wells are plugged each month that's 5 kb/d lower output each month or a 60 kb/d total decrease over 12 months. Not really much of a factor.

Heinrich Leopold , 04/22/2016 at 12:52 pm
Dennis,

It is difficult for me to check how big these wells are. However, the main point here is about a huge sea change (see below chart) in net wells. Add the dramatic decline in use of proppant, the drop in rig counts (natural gas rigs are just at 88 versus 1600 in 2008)….. I can see the writing on the wall.

US production will be declining dramatically over the next months. Even the CEO of Pioneer and the IEA admit the decline. The only difference is that I think the decline will last much farther than Sep 2016 and will last well into 2017.

Dennis Coyne , 04/22/2016 at 2:52 pm
Hi Heinrich,

Everyone agrees there will be some decline. Some estimates are more reasonable than others. So far decline in Texas has been relatively modest at an annual decline rate of 8%. There are still a lot of horizontal oil rigs operating in the Texas Permian Basin (over 100), and the horizontal wells produce much more oil than the vertical wells in that Basin. I am talking about oil only here, I don't follow natural gas as closely, at some point gas output will fall and natural gas prices will rise, no idea when that will happen though.

The permits minus plugged is not really very useful. Oil wells completed relative to wells plugged is of greater interest. Every well completed (average of about 250 kb/d for first year) covers about 50 plugged stripper wells (with an average of under 5 b/d). So about 20 completed wells will make up for 1000 plugged wells.

The first 3 months of 2016 there were 2482 new drill oil completions in Texas and 1453 oil wells plugged. The plugged wells are equivalent to taking away 29 of the new wells drilled, so the net new wells would be 2453 new wells or about 818 new wells per month for the first 3 months of the year. In March about 300 of these wells were in districts 1 and 2 (Eagle Ford most likely) and about 450 wells in Districts 7C, 8 and 8A (Permian Basin).

There has continued to be quite a lot of activity in Texas at least through March 2016.

Dennis Coyne , 04/21/2016 at 2:44 pm
Hi Enno,

Are you accounting for possible incomplete data in Texas? Are you seeing 33% decline rates outside of Texas? I am talking at the field level, rather than individual wells or counties. So for the Niobrara, or New Mexico Permian, the decline is certainly not 33% in the north Dakota Bakken, or not through February at least. Based on Dean's data for Texas and even the EIA data for Texas, the statewide decline rate is not anywhere close to 33% per year.

Using EIA data, TX decline rate is 9% from March to Jan 2015. Using Dean's data from March 2015 to Dec 2015 the decline is 6.1% (Jan was anomalous so I threw it out, if it is included the decline rate is 4.2%)

Dennis Coyne , 04/22/2016 at 9:17 am
Looking at the Bakken, the decline rate from June 2015 to July 2016 will be close to 20% per year if the completed wells fall to 50 new wells per month on average for the rest of 2016, so decline is pretty steep, just not 33%/year. After July 2016 if the completion rate levels off at about 40 completions per month the decline rate moderates to about 10% per year for July 2016 to July 2017.
Dennis Coyne , 04/21/2016 at 2:22 pm
Hi AlexS,

I think the EIA is overestimating the decline because they are underestimating the oil price. With the DUCs available, the decline for the rest of 2016 in the LTO plays could be as little as 350 kb/d. The EIA is estimating almost a 1 Mb/d drop for the rest of 2016, the conventional L48 onshore was about 3300 kb/d in Jan 2016, a 650 kb/d drop in output from L48 onshore conventional would be a 20% drop, if we assume an 8% drop, that would be about 270 kb/d, for a total of 620 Kb. The EIA is also underestimating Texas output, if Dean's estimates are correct. If we assume no acceleration in the decline rate for L48 onshore, we get the following, with 2017 output about 6200 kb/d for L48 onshore.

AlexS , 04/21/2016 at 2:46 pm
Dennis,

The EIA has a long record of underestimating US oil production, not only during the shale boom, but also during the current downturn. In particular, they have been underestimating volumes produced in Texas. But I think that the most recent Dean's estimate for Texas may be too high. TRRC is now receiving production data from operators in electronic form, which may have shortened the reporting time. Hence, the underreported volumes for the most recent months are probably less in relative terms than previously. My conclusion is that historical numbers are somewhere in between Dean's and the EIA's estimates.

As regards projections for the rest of this year and 2017, I agree that the EIA's price assumptions are too low. Higher prices may result in higher volumes. That said, I do not expect a quick rebound in drilling/completion activity as most shale companies are in a difficult financial situation and will not rush to increase capex. And even in the shale industry, with its short investment cycle, there is a time lag between a decision to increase capex and first production.

The EIA's projections may be too low, but I still do not expect a quick rebound in the US C+C output.

shallow sand , 04/21/2016 at 3:51 pm
AlexS. Although maybe not moving the needle much, I think US stripper well production may not decline as much as it has recently because of:

Actually many times both A. & B. apply. We have some wells that must be shut in when the temperature drops below a certain level. Shutting in requires some work, as does resumption of production. When oil prices were high, we would only shut in during the cold weather. This past winter, we just shut in at the first sign of cold weather, and did not start up until winter was over.

I do think, however, US conventional will continue to drop because there are very few vertical oil rigs running, far lower than even in 1998-1999. Also, I do not think a price increase will result in many conventional rigs coming back to the field this year. Balance sheets must be healed first. Conventional producers do not have a shocking decline like the LTO companies, so skipping another year of new wells is not as big of a problem.

AlexS , 04/21/2016 at 3:59 pm
Thank you shallow sand,

I actually wanted to ask you if you expect a return of shut-in stripper wells with higher oil prices

[Apr 17, 2016] A new definition from EIA. market stabilization now means oil price increase.

Notable quotes:
"... The sharp reduction of drilling activity shows already some effect on oil production and there are tentative signs of market stabilization: ..."
"... A new definition. Stabilization now means increase. A $1 drop would be market devastating volatility. ..."
peakoilbarrel.com

Heinrich Leopold , 04/14/2016 at 10:15 am

The sharp reduction of drilling activity shows already some effect on oil production and there are tentative signs of market stabilization:
https://www.iea.org/oilmarketreport/omrpublic/
http://oilpro.com/post/23776/falling-us-production-not-doha-move-oil-markets-to-start-stabiliz
Watcher , 04/15/2016 at 2:54 am
A new definition. Stabilization now means increase. A $1 drop would be market devastating volatility.

[Mar 09, 2016] Exposing The Oil Glut Where Are The 550 Million Missing Barrels!

Notable quotes:
"... "Of the 1 billion barrels reportedly produced but not consumed, roughly 420 million are being stored on land in member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Another 75 million barrels are thought to be stored at sea or in transit by tanker somewhere from the oil fields to the refineries. That leaves 550 million "missing barrels" unaccounted for, apparently produced but not consumed and not visible in the inventory statistics..." ..."
oilprice.com
March 09, 2016 | OilPrice.com

If any of you have seen my early writings on OilPrice.com, you would know I have been steadfast in my criticism of the media exaggerating the extent of the oil glut. Furthermore, I have also documented the pattern of exaggeration from both the EIA/IEA with their statistics.

I realize that no one is perfect, forecasting the future is notoriously difficult, and these entities have their difficulties in obtaining reliable and timely data to make accurate predictions. However, the IEA in particular has a track record of overstating oil supplies – even back in 1999 the agency was questioned for exaggerating a supply glut, and now it seems to have occurred again.

Related: Chevron Protects Dividend, Cuts Another 36 Percent Off Spending

(Click to enlarge)

The chart above shows the "missing barrels," unexplained oil volumes that have shown up in IEA data over time. John Kemp from Reuters, who has done some of the best coverage of the market, put together this data to illustrate the problem with the reported data. He recently wrote this piece, confirming all my suspicions of the past. In it he states the following:

"Of the 1 billion barrels reportedly produced but not consumed, roughly 420 million are being stored on land in member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Another 75 million barrels are thought to be stored at sea or in transit by tanker somewhere from the oil fields to the refineries. That leaves 550 million "missing barrels" unaccounted for, apparently produced but not consumed and not visible in the inventory statistics..."

Related: Six Reasons The Current Oil Short Covering May Have Legs

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So, in other words, OVER HALF of the supposed glut that the IEA has reported is unaccounted for. Not 5 or 10 percent, but greater than a whopping 50 percent. Does anyone believe that half of the glut is just missing?

In the article John explains that it could be in hidden or unaccountable locations. But that doesn't seem credible. It is hard to believe that HALF of the entire world's excess supply cannot be justified with the data? At $40 oil, that is some $22 billion in oil that is squirreled away somewhere that millions of people simply don't know where it is?

Related: How Algorithmic Trading Makes Money On Energy

Yet does anyone care to even question such non-sense? No, of course not, just like every other government statistic that is taken at face value and traded on by headline-driven algorithms. There used to be a time when Wall Street did real research, but that appears to be gone now. Either demand has been understated by the IEA, or supply has been vastly overstated...any rational person would conclude the same.

Please view my video channel for further insight on this topic: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCkA46F9sbOLfDVM0V17sZcw

By Leonard Brecken for Oilprice.com

[Mar 09, 2016] Where has the oil gone? Missing barrels and market rebalancing by John Kemp

Notable quotes:
"... Of the 1 billion barrels reportedly produced but not consumed, roughly 420 million are being stored on land in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Another 75 million barrels are thought to be stored at sea or in transit by tanker somewhere from the oil fields to the refineries. ..."
"... That leaves 550 million "missing barrels" unaccounted for, apparently produced but not consumed and not visible in the inventory statistics ("Oil Market Report", IEA, Feb. 2016). ..."
"... The last time the miscellaneous to balance item was this large and positive (implying an oversupplied market) was in 1997/98 when the issue triggered fierce criticism of the IEA's statistics. Critics accused the IEA of over-estimating supply, under-estimating demand, contributing to perception of a glut, depressing prices, and causing unnecessary hardship to the oil industry ("There Are No Missing Barrels", Simmons, 1999). Senator Pete Domenici, chairman of the U.S. Senate Budget Committee, asked the General Accounting Office to investigate the IEA's statistics and the question of missing barrels. In a report published in May 1999, GAO concluded "missing barrels are not a new condition, and the amount and direction of missing barrels have fluctuated over time". "At any point in time, the historical oil supply and demand as well as the stock data reported by IEA could be overstated or understated by an unknown magnitude." It was not possible to "quantify how much of the missing barrels are due to statistical limitations and how much are the result of physical oil storage in unreported stocks". In 1997/98 episode, the IEA concluded most of the missing barrels went into non-OECD storage and uncounted OECD inventories ("Oil Market Report", IEA, June 1999). ..."
"... The question of what has happened to the missing barrels, and whether some of them exist at all, is critical because it could affect how quickly the oil market rebalances. ..."
Mar 08, 2016 | Reuters.com
Where has the oil gone? Missing barrels and market rebalancing: Kemp Fuel pumps are pictured at a gas station in Sidi Allal El Bahraoui, Morocco, February 7, 2016. REUTERS/Youssef Boudlal Fuel pumps are pictured at a gas station in Sidi Allal El Bahraoui, Morocco, February 7, 2016. Reuters/Youssef Boudlal Where has the oil gone? Missing barrels and market...X By John Kemp LONDON (Reuters) - Global oil production exceeded consumption by just over 1 billion barrels in 2014/15, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

Production exceeded consumption by an average of 0.9 million barrels per day in 2014 and 2.0 million bpd in 2015 (tmsnrt.rs/1pvIEw8).

Of the 1 billion barrels reportedly produced but not consumed, roughly 420 million are being stored on land in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Another 75 million barrels are thought to be stored at sea or in transit by tanker somewhere from the oil fields to the refineries.

That leaves 550 million "missing barrels" unaccounted for, apparently produced but not consumed and not visible in the inventory statistics ("Oil Market Report", IEA, Feb. 2016).

Missing barrels are recorded in the "miscellaneous to balance" line of the IEA's monthly Oil Market Report as the difference between production, consumption and reported stock changes. The miscellaneous item reflects errors in data from OECD countries, errors in the agency's estimates for supply and demand in non-OECD countries, and stockpile changes outside the OECD that go unrecorded. IEA data currently shows a miscellaneous to balance item of 0.5 million barrels per day in 2014 and 1.0 million barrels per day in 2015. Missing barrels have been a feature of IEA statistics since the 1970s ("International Energy Agency: How the Agency Prepares its World Oil Market Statistics", U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999).

Over time, errors have occurred in both directions, and have ranged up to 1 million or even 2 million barrels per day (tmsnrt.rs/1pvIBjQ). Most of the time, the oil market ignores the miscellaneous to balance item, but it tends to become controversial when it becomes very large, either positive or negative.

ERRORS AND OMISSIONS

The last time the miscellaneous to balance item was this large and positive (implying an oversupplied market) was in 1997/98 when the issue triggered fierce criticism of the IEA's statistics. Critics accused the IEA of over-estimating supply, under-estimating demand, contributing to perception of a glut, depressing prices, and causing unnecessary hardship to the oil industry ("There Are No Missing Barrels", Simmons, 1999). Senator Pete Domenici, chairman of the U.S. Senate Budget Committee, asked the General Accounting Office to investigate the IEA's statistics and the question of missing barrels. In a report published in May 1999, GAO concluded "missing barrels are not a new condition, and the amount and direction of missing barrels have fluctuated over time". "At any point in time, the historical oil supply and demand as well as the stock data reported by IEA could be overstated or understated by an unknown magnitude." It was not possible to "quantify how much of the missing barrels are due to statistical limitations and how much are the result of physical oil storage in unreported stocks". In 1997/98 episode, the IEA concluded most of the missing barrels went into non-OECD storage and uncounted OECD inventories ("Oil Market Report", IEA, June 1999).

In the current episode, it is also very likely some of the 550 million barrels unaccounted for in 2014/15 have gone into unreported storage outside the OECD. China's government is known to have been filling its Strategic Petroleum Reserve. More barrels are likely to have gone into commercial storage in China and in other countries outside the OECD. But it is at least possible some of the missing barrels have been caused by the IEA over-estimating oil supplies or under-estimating demand.

CLEARING THE OVERHANG

The question of what has happened to the missing barrels, and whether some of them exist at all, is critical because it could affect how quickly the oil market rebalances. The IEA and most other forecasters predict the oil market will remain oversupplied throughout 2016 and the first half of 2017, ensuring stockpiles continue growing. In its "Medium-Term Oil Market Report", published last month, the IEA predicted consumption would not exceed supply on a full-year basis until 2018. Some analysts argue the market will need to eliminate the excess supply and work down some proportion of the inherited stocks before oil prices can rise sustainably. With the oil market expected to remain in surplus throughout 2016 and "already awash in oil" the IEA has said that "it is very hard to see how oil prices can rise significantly in the short term." To the extent the miscellaneous to balance item reflects oil that has gone into unreported storage, it will take longer to clear the overhang of stocks that built up in 2014/15 and continue to build in 2016. But to the extent the missing barrels are the result of over-estimating supply and under-estimating demand, or have been absorbed into China's strategic stocks, the overhang could clear more quickly.

POSSIBLE PRODUCTION FREEZE

Following the 1997/98 episode, the missing barrels that accumulated in unreported non-OECD storage were drawn down in 1999, according to the IEA ("Oil Market Report", IEA, Dec 1999). In December 1999, the IEA wrote: "The weight of (the) evidence is that the missing barrels did exist and that they have now returned to the market." "The return was triggered by the reversal in the shape of the forward price curve and the need for additional barrels following OPEC's effective production limitation" which began in March 1999. By the end of 1999, the oil market was seeing excess demand and prices were rising. But the rapid recovery depended on very strong economic growth in North America and Asia (after the East Asian financial crisis in 1997/98). It also depended on substantial production cuts by OPEC in conjunction with production restraint from non-OPEC countries.

And it was both heralded and caused by a shift in the forward price curve from contango to a state of backwardation (which made oil less profitable to store). The events of 1999 illustrate the factors needed to clear an inherited glut of oil (strong demand, production restraint and a shift in the shape of the forward price curve). Current circumstances share some similarities with 1998/99 but there are also important differences which should not be overlooked. The current stock build has been caused by oversupply thanks to the shale revolution rather than a slowdown in demand as in the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. The winter of 1997/98 also saw a strong El Nino, which suppressed oil demand as it has this winter.

The current oversupply is not as bad as it was in the earlier episode, and the missing barrels problem is much smaller. The smaller (relative) surplus should make rebalancing faster this time around. In 1997/98, the market was oversupplied by 2.1 million barrels per day compared with total demand of around 74 million barrels per day, according to the IEA. In 2015, the oil market was also oversupplied by 2.0 million barrels per day but consumption was running at more than 94 million barrels per day, around 25 percent higher. At present, oil demand is growing strongly, just as it was in 1999, though there are concerns about the health of the global economy.

The major oil exporting countries have not so far agreed to cut production, unlike 1998/99, but there has been discussion about a possible production freeze. Futures prices remain resolutely in contango, which is both a symptom of excess stockpiles and creates a financial incentive to continue holding them. There is no sign of the market moving into backwardation yet, which would indicate the supply-demand balance was shifting and would also create a financial incentive to release oil from storage. Several key OPEC and non-OPEC producers have announced a provisional production freeze which could speed up the rebalancing, assuming it is implemented. But it might not be enough to eliminate the glut quickly; outright production cuts may be needed to accelerate the process, depending on what happens to demand and production from other countries.

(Editing by David Evans)

[Mar 09, 2016] March 2016 EIA STEP removed another 200 thousand bbl from US 2016 oil production

Notable quotes:
"... U.S. crude oil production is projected to decrease from an average of 9.4 million b/d in 2015 to 8.7 million b/d in 2016 and to 8.2 million b/d in 2017. ..."
"... EIA expects U.S. crude oil production to decline from 9.1 million b/d in the first quarter of 2016 to an average of 8.0 million b/d in the third quarter of 2017. Production of 8.0 million b/d would be 1.7 million b/d below the April 2015 level, which was the highest monthly production since April 1971. Production is expected to begin increasing modestly in the fourth quarter of 2017, as productivity improvements, lower breakeven costs, and anticipated oil price increases are expected to end more than two years of declines in the Lower 48. The forecast remains sensitive to actual wellhead prices and rapidly changing drilling economics that vary across regions and operators. ..."
"... EIA oil price projections are unrealisticly low IMO. Removing 1.5 million bopd from USA, plus world wide demand growth of 1-1.2 in 2016, plus other worldwide declines that Ron has illustrated, add up to more than Iraq and Iran can boost production. KSA appears to be incapable of going past 10.5 million. Russia cannot quickly increase production. ..."
peakoilbarrel.com
AlexS, 03/09/2016 at 9:23 am

The EIA has further reduced its forecast for U.S. oil production in 2016-17 (by 200-300 kb/d for 2017).
Apparently this is related with lower oil price assumptions, which are based on futures prices, and the recent cuts in E&P companies capex guidance.

From the report (STEO, March 2016):

"U.S. crude oil production is projected to decrease from an average of 9.4 million b/d in 2015 to 8.7 million b/d in 2016 and to 8.2 million b/d in 2017. The forecast reflects an extended decline in Lower 48 onshore production driven by persistently low oil prices that is partially offset by growing production in the federal Gulf of Mexico.
EIA estimates total U.S. production has fallen 0.6 million b/d since April 2015, to an average of 9.1 million b/d in February, with the entire production decline coming from Lower 48 onshore. With WTI prices currently below $40/b and projected to remain below that level through the first half of 2017, EIA expects oil production to decline in most Lower 48 onshore oil production regions.

The expectation of reduced cash flows in 2016 and 2017 has prompted many companies to scale back investment programs, deferring major new undertakings until a sustained price recovery occurs. The prospect of higher interest rates and tighter lending conditions will likely limit the availability of capital for many smaller producers, giving rise to distressed asset sales and consolidation of acreage holdings by more financially sound firms.

EIA expects U.S. crude oil production to decline from 9.1 million b/d in the first quarter of 2016 to an average of 8.0 million b/d in the third quarter of 2017. Production of 8.0 million b/d would be 1.7 million b/d below the April 2015 level, which was the highest monthly production since April 1971. Production is expected to begin increasing modestly in the fourth quarter of 2017, as productivity improvements, lower breakeven costs, and anticipated oil price increases are expected to end more than two years of declines in the Lower 48. The forecast remains sensitive to actual wellhead prices and rapidly changing drilling economics that vary across regions and operators.

Projected crude oil production in the Gulf of Mexico rises during the forecast period, and oil production in Alaska falls."

U.S. C+C production: STEO March 2016 vs. Feb. 2016

AlexS, 03/09/2016 at 9:36 am

Projections for Lower 48 states (ex GoM) production in 2017 were revised down by 310 kb/d in 2017,
including a 350 kb/d revision for 4Q17.
EIA now expects Lower 48 output to decline from the peak of 7.73 kb/d in March 2015 to 5.84 kb/d in October 2017 (-1.88 kb/d)

Lower 28 states (excl. GoM) C+C production: STEO March 2016 vs. Feb. 2016

AlexS, 03/09/2016 at 9:40 am

WTI oil price assumptions (based of futures prices)

shallow sand, 03/09/2016 at 10:02 am

ND rigs at 33. Burlington has one to stack. My estimate is rigs will bottom at 26-27.

EIA oil price projections are unrealisticly low IMO. Removing 1.5 million bopd from USA, plus world wide demand growth of 1-1.2 in 2016, plus other worldwide declines that Ron has illustrated, add up to more than Iraq and Iran can boost production. KSA appears to be incapable of going past 10.5 million. Russia cannot quickly increase production.

Things can change fast regarding oil prices, witness the volatility since 1/1/16. We are hearing there could be a real supply squeeze coming and are seeing real evidence of that anticipation based upon some long term offers to hedge well above the current strip, sharply increased local basis and refinery planning chatter. All are anecdotal, but are not signifying worries of tanks topping.

[Mar 08, 2016] EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook for March 2016

EIA tried to play inventory card to talk down oil prices. This is wrong. Inventory matter only during initial priod of "oil glut". One and a half yeay into the oil price crash they are reflecting maily grid of Wall Street operators then anything else.
Notable quotes:
"... With large global oil inventory builds expected to continue in 2016, oil prices are expected to remain near current levels. Forecast Brent prices average $34/b in 2016, $3/b lower than forecast in last month's STEO. ..."
"... Prices reach an average of $45/b in the fourth quarter of 2017, as the oil market becomes relatively balanced at that point, with the potential for inventory draws beyond the forecast period. ..."
"... WTI futures contracts for June 2016 delivery, traded during the five-day period ending March 3, averaged $37/b, while implied volatility averaged 50%. These levels established the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval for the market's expectations of monthly average WTI prices in June 2016 at $24/b and $58/b, respectively. ..."
www.eia.gov
Brent crude oil spot prices increased by $1/b in February to a monthly average of $32/b. Accelerating reductions in the U.S. rig count and market reactions to news of a potential OPEC/non-OPEC supply freeze gave support to oil prices in February that offset the downward price pressure from ongoing growth in global oil inventories and uncertainty over the strength of global oil demand growth.

With large global oil inventory builds expected to continue in 2016, oil prices are expected to remain near current levels. Forecast Brent prices average $34/b in 2016, $3/b lower than forecast in last month's STEO.

Global oil inventories are expected to grow by an average of 1.6 million b/d in 2016 and by 0.6 million b/d in 2017, both higher than in last month's STEO. Inventory builds are higher in this month's STEO as a result of recent updates to historical data showing continued resilience from non-OPEC oil producers in the current low-price environment and as a result of a reduction in forecast global oil demand growth. Higher forecast inventory builds and slower market rebalancing contribute to a more limited price recovery in 2017 than previously forecast, with Brent prices forecast to average $40/b, $10/b lower than in last month's STEO. Prices reach an average of $45/b in the fourth quarter of 2017, as the oil market becomes relatively balanced at that point, with the potential for inventory draws beyond the forecast period.

Forecast West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices average the same as Brent crude oil prices through the forecast period. The price parity of WTI with Brent in the forecast period is based on the assumption of competition between the two crudes in the U.S. Gulf Coast refinery market, as transportation differentials are similar to move the crudes from their respective pricing points to that market.

The expectation of continuing large inventory builds is a major source of uncertainty in the price forecast, as the capacity of global oil storage to absorb builds of the forecast magnitude is unknown. If global storage capacity becomes stressed, the cost of storage will rise to reflect more expensive marginal storage options such as floating inventories on crude oil tankers. The higher storage costs would lower near-month crude oil prices. Additional uncertainty stems from the pace of global economic growth and its contribution to oil demand growth, and also from the responsiveness of oil producers to sustained low oil prices.

The current values of futures and options contracts highlight the heightened volatility and high uncertainty in the price outlook (Market Prices and Uncertainty Report) . WTI futures contracts for June 2016 delivery, traded during the five-day period ending March 3, averaged $37/b, while implied volatility averaged 50%. These levels established the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval for the market's expectations of monthly average WTI prices in June 2016 at $24/b and $58/b, respectively.

The 95% confidence interval for market expectations widens over time, with lower and upper limits of $20/b and $81/b for prices in December 2016. At this time last year, WTI for June 2015 delivery averaged $54/b, and implied volatility averaged 46%. The corresponding lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval were $36/b and $80/b.

[Mar 07, 2016] EIA The Drilling Productivity Report for March 2016

Oil production from major U.S. shale fields is expected to fall by 106,000 barrels a day in April from March to total 4.871 million barrels a day. but this is nothing but an optimistic forecast as EIA usually overestimate production on the down slope. So it can well be closer to 0.2Mb/d drop.
www.eia.gov
The Drilling Productivity Report uses recent data on the total number of drilling rigs in operation along with estimates of drilling productivity and estimated changes in production from existing oil and natural gas wells to provide estimated changes in oil and natural gas production for seven key regions. EIA's approach does not distinguish between oil-directed rigs and gas-directed rigs because once a well is completed it may produce both oil and gas; more than half of the wells produce both.

While shale resources and production are found in many U.S. regions, at this time EIA is focusing on the seven most prolific areas, which are located in the Lower 48 states. These seven regions accounted for 92% of domestic oil production growth and all domestic natural gas production growth during 2011-14.

[Mar 04, 2016] EIA has a tendency to underestimate production in rising conditions, but will overestimate in falling conditions

peakoilbarrel.com

kamakiri , 03/01/2016 at 4:54 am

"The EIA continues to underestimate US oil production in its forecasts."

I think they have a tendency to underestimate in rising conditions, but will overestimate in falling conditions.
http://cdn.oilprice.com/images/tinymce/2016/ThisSC2.jpg
from this article:
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Is-The-EIA-Too-Optimistic-On-US-Oil-Output.html

Their weekly estimates appear to lag actual inflections by 2-3 months.

[Mar 01, 2016] EIA sophisticated form of deception of mathematically challenged public

Notable quotes:
"... In other words EIA operating with four meaningful digit on the data with error margin at or above 1% is just a sophisticated form of deception of (mathematically challenged) public creating an impression of precision were it does not exist. ..."
peakoilbarrel.com

likbez , 03/01/2016 at 9:49 am

If we assume error margin 1% for EIA data that means that EIA data should be rounded to two meaningful digits before making any conclusions.

That makes minimum meaningful difference 100,000 bbl. Everything below that should be considered to be statistical noise.

In other words EIA operating with four meaningful digit on the data with error margin at or above 1% is just a sophisticated form of deception of (mathematically challenged) public creating an impression of precision were it does not exist.

And if the addition is below the error margin it can't be considered statistically meaningful because the value 9,262 is in reality an interval from 9.162 to 9.362 within which the precise value lies.

Jeffrey J. Brown , 03/01/2016 at 9:54 am
I generally try to use two significant figures, e.g., global C+C production increased from 74 million bpd in 2005 to 78 million bpd in 2014.

[Mar 01, 2016] Ive been misunderestimating oil production most of my life and fool me once as EIA pricinples of publishing of oil staitstics

peakoilbarrel.com
likbez , 02/29/2016 at 4:31 pm
Alex,

U.S. oil production in December 2015 was 9,262 kb/d,
65 kb/d higher than the EIA's forecast in the February Short-Term Energy Outlook (9,197 kb/d)

One percent (probably the most charitable estimate of error margin for EIA STEO ) for 9,262 kb/d will be 93 kb/d

From this point of view your statement does not make any sense. Those two values are equal within the margin or error +-93.

AlexS , 02/29/2016 at 6:01 pm
likbez,

The 65 kb/d difference between the most recent estimate for December 2015 published on Feb 29 and previous estimate issued on Feb 12 is a fact
How can a fact make no sense?

My statement is that the EIA has been constantly underestimating US oil production volumes and therefore had to revise upwards its previous forecasts.
Thus, the estimate for September 2015 has been revised by 480 kb/d between September STEO and today's Monthly Production Report (MPR).
Compared to 480 kb/d, 65 kb/d is not much, but there might be further revisions.

EIA's US monthly oil production estimates for 2015: from STEO Sep.15 to MPR Feb.16

likbez , 02/29/2016 at 11:17 pm
Alex,

My statement is that the EIA has been constantly underestimating US oil production

IMHO you are missing possible correlation of "misunderestimation" of US oil production with "cheerleading" of oil price slump. Please note that this is not about some "wild" conspiracy theory :-)

As unforgettable Bush II said "I've been misunderestimated most of my life." North Charleston, South Carolina; February 15, 2016

and

"There's an old saying in Tennessee-I know it's in Texas, probably in Tennessee-that says, 'Fool me once, shame on…shame on you. Fool me - you can't get fooled again.'"[12] - Nashville, Tennessee; September 17, 2002

The same is true about EIA estimates of the USA oil production :-)

[Feb 29, 2016] The EIA data unreliability

peakoilbarrel.com
AlexS says: 02/29/2016 at 2:23 pm EIA's Petroleum Supply Monthly:

U.S. oil production in December 2015 was 9,262 kb/d,
65 kb/d higher than the EIA's forecast in the February Short-Term Energy Outlook (9,197 kb/d)

The EIA continues to underestimate US oil production in its forecasts.

Reply

[Feb 24, 2016] There's no valid data on most of what's going on

Notable quotes:
"... WTI definition was changed to allow more shale output flow into Cushing. Inventory definition similarly changes and loses all valid comparison to history. There's no valid data on most of what's going on. ..."
peakoilbarrel.com

Watcher, 02/24/2016 at 6:39 pm

WTI definition was changed to allow more shale output flow into Cushing. Inventory definition similarly changes and loses all valid comparison to history. There's no valid data on most of what's going on.
clueless, 02/24/2016 at 10:17 pm
Watcher: "There's no valid data on most of what's going on."

One of your best observations.

[Feb 23, 2016] EIA Overestimates US Production, Huge Production Drop in the Works #4 by Richard Grismer

Notable quotes:
"... The conclusion is US shale production is far less robust than the world of oil traders currently believes. ..."
"... My belief is US production is declining at a rate best described by Projection 2. This means the decline is trending in the lower channel and possibly the lower half of the upper channel. The less steep poly trend line also likely describes the situation well. ..."
February 10, 2016 | Griz's Trading Blog

It seems that EIA is doubling down on their faulty model for weekly US oil production estimates. EIA continues to drive monthly production estimates up, at least through February, and in turn this is supporting weekly overestimates of US production. In fact their latest monthly report estimates production in the major US shale basins will exceed their previous January production estimate by 68k bbl/day. This is in direct conflict with dropping rig counts and more importantly falling well completion rates reported by the states of Texas and North Dakota.

... ... ...

The conclusion is US shale production is far less robust than the world of oil traders currently believes. If we have now moved into a mode where Unaccounted for Oil tends to be negative, say -150k bbl/day every week, opposed to the normal +150k bbl/day every week, and this is just week 2 of a much longer streak of back to back negative values for Unaccounted for Oil, US production could already be well under 9MM bbl/day and very rapidly falling toward 8MM bbl/day.

Below I'm including my updated 2016 US production + Unaccounted for Oil projection. I've included a couple of my own linear projections as well as a couple polynomial trend lines. My belief is US production is declining at a rate best described by Projection 2. This means the decline is trending in the lower channel and possibly the lower half of the upper channel. The less steep poly trend line also likely describes the situation well.

Unknown, February 11, 2016 at 5:13 AM<

I think you are correct. When I look at how some of the upstream mlps have now entered panic mode even with good hedging this yr is telling
Kirt

[Feb 23, 2016] EIA shale production projections are extremely optimistic

Notable quotes:
"... So, if oil prices would fall below 20 USD per barrel for a long period I am pretty sure, oil production for Bakken and Eagle Ford would tend to zero within a short time and all above production scenarios would be irrelevant. ..."
peakoilbarrel.com
George Kaplan, 02/23/2016 at 3:14 am
In the discussions here and concerning Bakken LTO has either of these two articles been mentioned? They are by David Hughes and Jean Laherrere.

The David Hughes one in particular looks to have predictions close to what has been happening. They both question EIA estimates of the amount of oil recoverable. For example from Hughes:

"The U.S. Energy Information Administration's (EIA) forecasts regarding tight oil production-published in its Annual Energy Outlook (AEO)-are commonly viewed by industry and government as the best available assessment of what to expect in the longer-term, with the EIA's reference case typically viewed as the most likely scenario for future production. In my Drilling Deeper1 report published last October, I developed alternate production forecasts for two major tight oil plays, the Bakken and Eagle Ford, and reviewed the credibility of EIA AEO20142 forecasts for other major plays based on the fundamental geological characteristics of each play. In most plays the AEO2014 production projections were found to be highly to extremely optimistic when reviewed in the light of play fundamentals. For the Bakken and Eagle Ford plays, AEO2014 overestimated the likely recovery of oil by 2040 by 42% compared to my "Most Likely" drilling rate case found in Drilling Deeper."

http://www.postcarbon.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Hughes_Tight-Oil-Reality-Check.pdf

This is from the Laherrere article (posted at POB) and looks, for something 18 months ago, as prescient as anything I've seen in the light of subsequent events:

"It seems that most oil companies are spending more than their revenues by increasing their debts. Countries can live for a long time with huge debt increase, not companies. They count on the stock market by delivering optimistic reports and keep drilling to avoid the production to decline. With shale oil or shale play, in contrary with conventional where wells are dry or producing, oil can be produced even for a while if not economical.
Such behavior explains why most peak forecasts are wrong. But the main question is about the slope of the decline after the peak. EIA forecast a LTO (light tight oil = shale oil) peak in 2017 it is not too far after my forecast, the big difference is the slow EIA LTO decline."

http://peakoilbarrel.com/bakken-oil-peak-jean-laherrere/

Heinrich Leopold, 02/23/2016 at 5:00 am
George Kaplan

Although these reports are very interesting, they ignore in my opinion financial conditions – mainly the bond market – and oil prices as major drivers for oil production. Jean Laherrere is fully aware of this fact, yet does not provide oil production scenarios at different oil price and bond market conditions.

So, if oil prices would fall below 20 USD per barrel for a long period I am pretty sure, oil production for Bakken and Eagle Ford would tend to zero within a short time and all above production scenarios would be irrelevant.

If oil prices would recover, production will start again.

Yet it is in my view not possible to sustain horrendous losses for a long time. Somebody has to pay the bill. It is already clear now that high US oil production supports the US dollar, yet brings the bond market to its knees. The bond – and equity holders are paying currently the bill, yet for how long?

This comes especially on the background of the US bond market facing a maturity wall of USD 4.1 trn over the next four years. http://www.highyieldbond.com/the-2020-maturity-wall-4-1t-of-bonds-to-mature-and-13-of-that-is-high-yield/.

Companies can roll over the debt, yet at much higher interest rates.

George Kaplan, 02/23/2016 at 5:48 am
Might be so. If the production continues to follow the Hughes predictions though, I'd say that will cast a lot of doubts over how much impact short term price swings have had. Possibly the availability of cheap money through most of 2015 overrode any price signals and they just kept on drilling no matter how much losses they incurred. You talking about a maturity wall now – how would that have impacted production in the past, especially when in the beginning of the price fall producers were expecting prices to recover at any time and later were concentrating solely in staying alive for the next month and couldn't afford to look much further ahead.

With data currently available the main message I've got from this is that there is probably a lot less oil in the Bakken and Eagle Ford than EIA are saying – at any price.

[Feb 23, 2016] The IEA has increased its medium-term global demand projections compared with the 2015 projections

peakoilbarrel.com
AlexS, 02/22/2016 at 12:04 pm
The IEA has actually increased its medium-term global demand projections compared with the previous year's report. This reflects a much higher 2015 base, but also slightly higher growth rates in 2016-2020.
As a result, projected demand in 2020 is now almost 1.5 mb/d higher than in MTOMR-2015 (100.5mb/d vs. 99.05mb/d).

From the new report:

"…our forecast for oil demand to 2021 is for annual average growth of 1.2 mb/d (1.2%) which represents a very solid outlook in historical terms. Oil demand breaks through the 100 mb/d barrier at some point in 2019 or 2020. A major change from the 2015 MTOMR is the higher base from which our forecast begins. In 2015 world oil demand increased by 1.6 mb/d (1.7%), one of the biggest increases in recent years stimulated to a large extent by the rapid fall in oil prices that began in the second half of 2014 and gained momentum in 2015. However, any expectations that the most recent fall in oil prices to USD 30/bbl oil will provide further stimulus to oil demand in the early years of our forecast and send annual rates of growth above 1.2 mb/d are likely to be dashed. In the first part of 2016 we have seen major turmoil in financial markets and clear signs that almost any economy you care to look at could see its GDP growth prospects downgraded.
Since 2014 the non-OECD countries have used more oil than OECD countries and the gap will widen in years to come. However, the rate of demand growth in the non-OECD countries is vulnerable to being pared back as the cost of energy subsidies becomes a major burden and governments take action. This will probably not have an immediate impact on demand in the early part of this forecast, but later on we might see that the reduction in expensive fuel subsidies in many countries, including the fast-growing Middle East, does have a significant effect on growth. Also, rising energy use has brought with it terrible environmental degradation, particularly in the fast-growing Asian economies, and oil's part in this is recognised by measures to limit vehicle registrations and use. Although reducing subsidies and tackling pollution will affect the rate of demand growth, it should be stressed that non-OECD Asia will still remain the major source of oil demand growth with volumes increasing from 23.7 mb/d in 2015 to 28.9 mb/d in 2021."

Global liquids demand (mb/d): IEA Medium-Term Market Reports 2016 vs. 2015

AlexS, 02/22/2016 at 12:44 pm
The IEA's non-OPEC C+C+NGLs production estimate for 2015 in last year's MTOMR proved too pessimistic. They have underestimated the resilience of high cost oil production, particularly that of the US LTO. As a result, actual non-OPEC production was 1.1 mb/d higher than in last year's report.

Still, the agency expects non-OPEC production to decline by 0.6mb/d in 2016 and 0.1mb/d in 2017 before a gradual recovery from 2018. Projected decline in 2016-17 should be mainly driven by LTO. Expected non-OPEC production in 2020 is 0.4mb/d lower than in the MTOMR-2015.

From the new report:

In the year since the 2015 MTOMR was published, the supply side has provided many surprises. By far the most significant has been the resilience of high cost oil production and in particular that of light, tight, oil (LTO) output in the US. As oil prices cascaded down from more than USD 100/bbl it was widely predicted at various milestones that the extraordinary growth in total US crude oil production from 5 mb/d in 2008 to 9.4 mb/d in 2015 would grind to a halt and move rapidly into reverse. Growth certainly ceased in mid-2015 but the intervening period has seen a relatively modest pull-back and total US crude oil production in early February 2016 was still close to 9.0 mb/d, aided by expanding production in the Gulf of Mexico.

In our base case outlook, there is an element of the "straw breaking the camel's back" and we expect US LTO production to fall back by 600 kb/d this year and by a further 200 kb/d in 2017 before a gradual recovery in oil prices, working in step with further improvements in operational efficiencies and cost cutting, allows a gradual recovery. Anybody who believes that we have seen the last of rising LTO production in the United States should think again; by the end of our forecast in 2021, total US liquids production will have increased by a net 1.3 mb/d compared to 2015. Such has been the element of surprise provided by the resilience of US oil production, and the wide divergence of views as to the future, that we have added a High and Low Case to our non-OPEC production analysis and plotted the impact on the global oil market balance of US LTO production falling by more than in our base case or, conversely, less. The eventual outturn is one of the most important factors – if not the most important – in assessing when the oil market will re-balance.

Non-OPEC liquids production (ex biofuels) (mb/d): IEA Medium-Term Market Reports 2016 vs. 2015
(Note: excludes Indonesia)

AlexS, 02/22/2016 at 1:07 pm
The IEA expects the oil market to re-balance in 2017, which is in line with the EIA's and many other forecasts. However the accumulated excess inventories will return to long-term normal levels only by 2021, which should dampen the recovery in oil prices.

From the report:

For some time now analysts have tried to understand when the oil market will return to balance. A year ago it was widely believed that this would happen by the end of 2015 but that view has proved to be very wide of the mark. In 2014 and again in 2015 supply exceeded demand by massive margins, 0.9 mb/d and 2 mb/d respectively, and for 2016 we expect a further build of 1.1 mb/d. Only in 2017 will we finally see oil supply and demand aligned but the enormous stocks being accumulated will act as a dampener on the pace of recovery in oil prices when the market, having balanced, then starts to draw down those stocks. Unless we see an even larger than expected fall in non-OPEC oil production in 2016 and/or a major demand growth spurt it is hard to see oil prices recovering significantly in the short term from the low levels prevailing at the time of publication of this report.

It is very tempting, but also very dangerous, to declare that we are in a new era of lower oil prices. But at the risk of tempting fate, we must say that today's oil market conditions do not suggest that prices can recover sharply in the immediate future – unless, of course, there is a major geopolitical event.

Global balance base case: IEA MTOMR-2016

[Feb 23, 2016] EIA Overestimates US Production, Huge Production Drop in the Works #5

February 18, 2016 | Griz's Trading Blog

The EIA weekly estimate of production is still too high as indicated by Unaccounted for Oil and production estimates based on well completion rates. However, the weekly estimate is starting to move down in a big way. Last week down 30k bbl/day, this week 50k bbl/day. 50k bbl/day is huge, that is 200k bbl/day/month The reality is US production has been falling 20k-30k bbl/day for weeks or even months already, now it is likely falling 30-37k bbl/day/week not 50k bbl/day/week. 50k bbl/day/week would imply almost zero well completions, when around half of each months shale decline is currently being replaced monthly. But EIA is so far behind, with likely production levels already below 9 MM bbl/day compared to the official estimate of 9.135 MM bbl/day, that they are being forced and will continue to be forced to show huge weekly declines for awhile to catch up. Won't be surprised to see 100k bbl/day cut reported next week and potentially the week after as well.

Unaccounted for oil has been running dramatically negative since Dec. 4. We have now just seen 3 back to back weeks with negative unaccounted for oil. This week it was -500k bbl/day or 3.5MM bbl for the week. Imagine what happens when -500k bbl/day in Unaccounted is zeroed out and put in production instead.

[Feb 22, 2016] IEA warns consumers of spike in oil prices

www.bbc.com

The International Energy Agency (IEA) is warning consumers not to let cheap oil lull them into a false sense of security amid forecasts of a price spike by 2021.

In a report, the IEA said it expects prices to start recovering in 2017. But it forecasts that will be followed by a sharp jump in price as supply shrinks following under-investment by struggling producers.

Brent crude touched a 13-year low of $28.88 a barrel in January. It has since recovered somewhat, but is still far below a high of $115 in June 2014.

On Monday the price was up around 4.9% at $34.62.

Fatih Birol, executive director of the IEA, said: "It is easy for consumers to be lulled into complacency by ample stocks and low prices today, but they should heed the writing on the wall: the historic investment cuts we are seeing raise the odds of unpleasant oil-security surprises in the not-too-distant-future."

... ... ...

The policy advisor expects global oil supply will grow by 4.1 million barrels of oil per day between 2015 and 2021, down from an increase of 11 million barrels of oil per day between 2009 and 2015.

It also expects investment in oil exploration and production to fall by 17% in 2016 following a 24% decline last year.

[Feb 22, 2016] EIA as a cheerleader of oil price slump

I especially like "The world of peak oil supply has been turned on its head, due to structural changes in the economies of key developing countries and major efforts to improve energy efficiency everywhere."
Notable quotes:
"... Further, it is becoming even more obvious that the prevailing wisdom of just a few years ago that "peak oil supply" would cause oil prices to rise relentlessly as output struggled to keep pace with ever-rising demand was wrong. Today we are seeing not just an abundance of resources in the ground but also tremendous technical innovation that enables companies to bring oil to the market. ..."
"... The world of peak oil supply has been turned on its head, due to structural changes in the economies of key developing countries and major efforts to improve energy efficiency everywhere. ..."
"... I estimate that Saudi Arabia may have already shipped in the vicinity of half of their post-2005 CNE. Note that annual Saudi net oil exports fell from 9.5 million bpd in 2005 to 8.4 million bpd in 2014 (probably remaining at about 8.7 mililon bpd in 2015, EIA + BP data). In other words, Saudi net exports, after increasing very rapidly from 2002 to 2005, have almost certainly been below their 2005 rate for 10 straight years. But the hidden danger, which almost no one is focused on, is the ongoing–and accelerating–rate of depletion in remaining volume of post-2005 Saudi and Global Cumulative Net Exports of oil. ..."
"... Increasing the extraction rate simply increases the depletion rate. I can't see how anything humans do can change that fact. In other words, nothing can turn peak oil on its head. ..."
"... I believe that high oil prices will be back, but have been convinced by AlexS that it will not be as soon as I have been predicting. Long term projects that will come on line and be ramping up in 2016 and 2017 may keep oil prices under $80/b through mid 2018, we may not see prices rise to $100/b or more (2015$) until 2019, when the current delays in long term oil investment will start to affect oil output in a big way (2 to 3 Mb/d less output than if the projects deferred had been completed). ..."
peakoilbarrel.com
Daniel, 02/22/2016 at 8:00 am
From IEA medium-term oil market report 2016:

Further, it is becoming even more obvious that the prevailing wisdom of just a few years ago that "peak oil supply" would cause oil prices to rise relentlessly as output struggled to keep pace with ever-rising demand was wrong. Today we are seeing not just an abundance of resources in the ground but also tremendous technical innovation that enables companies to bring oil to the market.

Added to this is a remorseless downward pressure on costs and, although we are currently seeing major cutbacks in oil investments, there is no doubt that many projects currently on hold will be re-evaluated and will see the light of day at lower costs than were thought possible just a few years ago. The world of peak oil supply has been turned on its head, due to structural changes in the economies of key developing countries and major efforts to improve energy efficiency everywhere.

I fear that there will be a rude awakening for some in the next few years.

Jeffrey J. Brown, 02/22/2016 at 8:46 am
The WSJ has an article on the IEA outlook, with an interesting chart (do Google Search for access):

WSJ: IEA Sees Global Oil Markets Rebalancing Next Year
IEA says 'supply and demand will gradually rebalance by 2017, with a corresponding recovery in oil prices from around $30 a barrel'

Jeffrey J. Brown, 02/22/2016 at 11:53 am
Copy of an email I sent to some Oil Patch folks:

Attached is an article in today's WSJ about the IEA's most recent outlook, for the balance between global total liquids supply & demand. There is a very interesting chart in the article. Apparently, oil prices were trading up today, because of the report.

However, the IEA outlook does not take into account two critical factors: (1) The composition of the global Crude + Condensate (C+C) inventory oversupply (mostly condensate, in my opinion) and (2) Even as production increases, net exports can fall, because of domestic consumption in net oil exporting countries.

Some of my comments on net oil exports:

Following is a link to a discussion, in three sequential comments, of the Export Land Model (ELM, a simple mathematical model which assumes a 5%/year rate of decline in production and a 2.5%/year rate of increase in consumption, in a net oil exporting country), the Six Country Case History (major net exporters that hit or approached zero net exports from 1980 to 2010, excluding China) and the (2005) Top 33 Net Exporters, with graphics for each item:

http://peakoilbarrel.com/opec-except-iran-has-peaked/#comment-556985

Note that what I define as the ECI Ratio (Export Capacity Index) is the ratio of production to consumption, and CNE = Cumulative Net Exports (for a defined time period).

Based on the mathematical model, which is confirmed by the empirical data (Six Country Case History), a declining ECI Ratio tends to correlate with an accelerating rate of depletion in remaining CNE.

For example, about the only metric that most analysts focus on is the top line production number in a net oil exporting country, and from 1995 to 1999, Six Country production rose by 2%, but in only four years they had already shipped 54% of their post-1995 CNE.

I estimate that Saudi Arabia may have already shipped in the vicinity of half of their post-2005 CNE. Note that annual Saudi net oil exports fell from 9.5 million bpd in 2005 to 8.4 million bpd in 2014 (probably remaining at about 8.7 mililon bpd in 2015, EIA + BP data). In other words, Saudi net exports, after increasing very rapidly from 2002 to 2005, have almost certainly been below their 2005 rate for 10 straight years. But the hidden danger, which almost no one is focused on, is the ongoing–and accelerating–rate of depletion in remaining volume of post-2005 Saudi and Global Cumulative Net Exports of oil.

Regards,

Jeffrey Brown

Frugal, 02/22/2016 at 8:52 am
The world of peak oil supply has been turned on its head, due to structural changes in the economies of key developing countries and major efforts to improve energy efficiency everywhere.

Increasing the extraction rate simply increases the depletion rate. I can't see how anything humans do can change that fact. In other words, nothing can turn peak oil on its head.

Jef, 02/22/2016 at 11:02 am
"… structural changes in the economies…"

Yea, its called tanking.

Dennis Coyne, 02/22/2016 at 11:50 am
Hi Frugal,

Correct. I think what has surprised many, including the IEA is that a few years ago they worried that high oil prices would be a problem as oil supply growth would struggle to keep up oil demand growth.

That has not proven to be the case from late 2014 until today as oil supply growth has outpaced oil demand growth. This is mostly due to a change in strategy by OPEC to focus on market share rather than oil revenue.

I believe that high oil prices will be back, but have been convinced by AlexS that it will not be as soon as I have been predicting. Long term projects that will come on line and be ramping up in 2016 and 2017 may keep oil prices under $80/b through mid 2018, we may not see prices rise to $100/b or more (2015$) until 2019, when the current delays in long term oil investment will start to affect oil output in a big way (2 to 3 Mb/d less output than if the projects deferred had been completed).

To me the undulating plateau scenario looks somewhat plausible, unless there is a financial crisis, in which case demand and price will fall along with output. I have no prediction for when such a crisis might occur, but the scenario below ignores that possibility.

[Feb 21, 2016] Why wouldn't we call the EIA liars in reporting far more Texas oil production than the RRC?

peakoilbarrel.com

Coolreit, 02/21/2016 at 11:23 am

Why wouldn't we call the EIA liars in reporting far more Texas oil production than the RRC?

Critics say they are not lying as their difference with the RRC is initial reporting vs. final estimated reporting. If that critique were valid, then why is the oil production drop by the RRC from peak triple the fall that the EIA reports for Texas?

[Feb 20, 2016] The Oil Drum Oil Watch - World Total Liquids Production

www.theoildrum.com

RockyMtnGuy on November 22, 2012 - 8:49pm Permalink

Well, apparently the EIA and IEA are counting only liquid fuels, but it's not a legitimate accounting technique. They should be doing a mass and/or energy balance. There is quite a lot of mass and energy in the coke a refinery produces, and they don't actually throw it away, they sell it as fuel. Looking at only liquid fuels is really a very simplistic approach which gives a misleading picture. [-] Black_Dog on November 22, 2012 - 10:09am Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Parent subthread | Comments top As you note, "processing gains" aren't something which one can measure directly. The markets deal in volumes and as a result, governmental reports (such as those from the EIA and the IEA) present data in volumes, not energy content or mass. Processing gain only serves to keep the "green eye shade" crowd of corporate and financial types happy, since they are trained to look at various balance sheets in which every thing neatly adds up. In reality, "processing gain" is simply the calculated difference between the volume of product and the volume of input liquids.

The volumes reported on both sides of the calculation have numerous sources of error, not to forget the non-technical situations, such as the Saudis, where production is a state secret and various unauthorized diversions, such often reported in Nigeria. For countries (and companies) with a larger fraction of such gains, the cause might be more efficient refining or differences in the output fraction of each product type. Refiners which have access to natural gas may use that instead of crude to provide the thermal or electrical energy to run the refinery, resulting in more product output. The results might also reflect differences in emissions where a country which has strict standards and enforcement might end up with more product actually making it to market. Then too, it's always going to be difficult to contain these liquid and gaseous materials, especially in countries with warmer climates. There's also the possibility that "processing gains" might turn out to be negative, if losses are extreme.

Ideally, from a scientific or thermodynamic point of view, the accounting should be carried out in energy terms, presenting the information rather like that found in the various markets for natural gas or electricity. With such accounting, there would not be any "processing gain", only the losses during extraction, refining and distribution. The efficiency of each link in the processing and delivery chain would be clearly apparent and the market(s) would be able to include this information in various corporate valuations. Sad to say, our markets don't work that way...

E. Swanson [-] jjhman on November 22, 2012 - 3:30pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Parent subthread | Comments top That's a nice summary of why the 2.5-ish% processing gain should be considered within the noise level of all of this data, and probably best ignored completely. Patrick R on November 21, 2012 - 6:19pm Permalink | Subthread | Parent | Parent subthread | Comments top So the killer for 'American oil independence' is the combination of Dr Patzek's US production chart from yesterday with Westexs' last chart above:

The former tells us that after the Shale bump 'native' production will go back to decline, and the later shows us that replacing it with imported oil is going to get harder, or at least more expensive.

So. Be nice to Canada now, and/or probably better sabotage any attempts by those pesky northerners to build infrastructure that liberates the Alberta resource either east or west and onto the global market.

Related: Is the Alberta product dependent on US inputs to lighten it? If so that is a way that that Bitumen, once it hits the station forecourt, could at least in part accurately be described as a 'North American' product?

[Feb 16, 2016] We are always dealing with rough estimates of oil production

Notable quotes:
"... Lets suppose that one accepts the premise that obtaining accurate figures for total world crude production is going to be problematic at best, and that we are dealing with ballpark figures, to use that term lightly. And this premise is based on the idea that statistics on oil production are undoubtedly politically motivated, and that even if transparency was as good as former American standards, we would still be dealing with rough estimates. ..."
"... Alright, if one accepts this premise, then one must conclude that dealing now with world total liquids will be even more problematic, especially in an era of permanent economic contraction and what will inevitably be defunding of areas thought to be secondary or academic. ..."
"... we should admit is that only country by country production and import/export stats have any meaning now, and even those may be largely tampered with. ..."
www.theoildrum.com
energyblues on November 22, 2012 - 5:44am Permalink
Let's suppose that one accepts the premise that obtaining accurate figures for total world crude production is going to be problematic at best, and that we are dealing with ballpark figures, to use that term lightly. And this premise is based on the idea that statistics on oil production are undoubtedly politically motivated, and that even if transparency was as good as former American standards, we would still be dealing with rough estimates.

Alright, if one accepts this premise, then one must conclude that dealing now with "world total liquids" will be even more problematic, especially in an era of permanent economic contraction and what will inevitably be defunding of areas thought to be secondary or academic.

I suspect this is largely true now. I do enjoy these posts, but what we should admit is that only country by country production and import/export stats have any meaning now, and even those may be largely tampered with.

It is possible and in fact likely that world production could soar while entire countries find themselves out of the market, or that world production could plummet even while a select few are always able to fill their cars and jets.

This was always the danger of peak oil, wasn't it? That the forces it would unleash would in fact undermine any attempts to properly categorize, understand, and deal with it.

[Feb 16, 2016] Some questions about accuracy of EIA statistics

peakoilbarrel.com

likbez, 02/15/2016 at 1:36 pm

Some questions about accuracy of EIA statistics. My impression is that in certain areas they has been playing fast and loose. I might be wrong. Among areas of some concern:

1. Is not the net effect of usage of volume instead of weight result in approximately 6% inflation of gross totals (which include all types f fuels) and thus EIA is distorting the "peak oil" situation? ("Great Condensate Con")

2. Is not the same concern true about accounting of gasoline in those EIA totals which include both oil and refined products ?

3. Is not (1) and (2) make EIA "mixed totals" statistics completely bogus (inflating the data by up to 12%) ?

4. Is EIA accounting of refiner gains just an artifact of usage of volume as the metric?
a. The whole concept might be viewed as a mirage created by usage of volume as a metric (the first law of thermodynamics).
b. How refiner gains on imported oil should be accounted? Should they be classified as domestic production like EIA does?

5. Is EIA usage of volume acceptable in case of ethanol production? A unit of volume of ethanol contains approximately 55% of energy in BTUs in comparison with WTI. Huge difference: 76,000 Btu/gal vs. 138,000 BTU/gal. That affects mileage and all other usage metrics.

6. How dilutants for Canadian tar sands imported to Canada from the USA are accounted by EIA. They are first exported to Canada and then imported as a part of Canadian oil import? So part of the volume of Canada production was already "produced" in the USA.

7. The same question about Venezuela heavy crude.

IMHO Ron's graphs would be definitely twice more convincing if they were constructed in weight metric instead of volume.

Ron Patterson, 02/15/2016 at 2:26 pm
Well, volume is all that I have so my charts are in volume. But I am not really concerned with NGLs, process gain or biofuels. In fact I would never post "total liquids" if I had crude, or C+C for that data.

But all that being said, C+C is a pretty good indicator, even though it is not perfect. It will tell us when the peak occurs, or more correctly, it will tell us when the peak occurred in the past.

[Feb 16, 2016] On the way up EIA greatly underestimate production and on the way down, they are going to greatly overestimate production

peakoilbarrel.com
Javier, 02/13/2016 at 8:11 pm
Hi Ron,

On the issue of EIA's predictions accuracy, I updated this graph from Mason Inman and added actual oil US production.

What this graph shows is a typical very conservative estimate system. This means that on the way up, they greatly underestimate production and on the way down, they are going to greatly overestimate production.

This clearly shows how credible their predictions are. Although the graph is only for the US, clearly they are going to be equally conservative (and thus equally wrong) about world oil production.

AlexS, 02/13/2016 at 9:22 pm
Javier,

The long-term projections of U.S. LTO production are from various issues of the EIA Annual Energy Outlook. They indeed were very conservative, even though none of them (even the AEO-2015) did not assume such a big drop in oil prices.

As regards the actual production data (the black line), it is from the Drilling Productivity Report and include almost 1 mb/d of conventional output, primarily from the Permian basin.
U.S. LTO production had never reached 5.5 mb/d, as the black line shows. According to the most recent EIA presentation, the local peak (In March 2015) was around 4.6 mb/d

Javier, 02/13/2016 at 9:56 pm
OK, thanks. The black curve needs correction.

But the issue continues being that EIA underestimated production so much that it had to raise its predictions by about 100% each year.

Look at the prediction for 2020:
AEO 2012: 1.3 mbpd
AEO 2013: 2.8 mbpd
AEO 2014: 4.7 mbpd
And all this without any significant change in oil price.

So if the question is, as Ron is posting, how much value have EIA predictions? The answer clearly is none. EIA predictions are useless. Evidence indicates that they are going to overestimate production by a large amount for as long as production goes down.

[Feb 16, 2016] It is clear that neither EIA nor IEA are really putting much effort into real data accumulation.

Notable quotes:
"... The big deals against oil prices are, now, the drop in (the increase) in future demand from 1.6 to 1.2%, per IEA, and the massive amount of oil that Iran is getting to lay out with unknown capital input. Supposedly glutting the market with 1.5 million more barrels with magic, I presume. However, I figure it, the drop in demand seems to indicate only about a 300k to 350k difference. ..."
"... I read where Chinas production is expected to drop from 100k to 200k in 2016, base upon the current prices and capex. A recent post by the author indicates that up to 1.5 million barrels may be lost from in field drilling of offshore wells in 2016. All of South America, Africa, and Asia, including Russia, expect drops in 2016, and 2016 is just the tip of the iceberg. ..."
"... Where are all of these figures in the garbage the EIA and IEA put out? Far as I can tell, the magical numbers put out for Iran, roughly match the drop in infield drilling offshore. ..."
"... While what is called a prediction of non-OPEC production seems to meet the definition of the word prediction it seems that the OPEC production prediction is more of what Id call an assumption. The methodology used to predict future OPEC production is basically as follows: world demand minus non-OPEC production equals OPEC production. Thats some pretty weak tea! ..."
"... It seems to me that there is a bunch of strange and interesting things all going on at once here, several of which are as follows; global peak oil production occurring as we speak is significantly probable, the price of oil is low, Cushings is full of condensate but the market calls it crude and it drops the price of crude, imports of crude to USA have recently increased despite the glut, Saudi is likely producing flat out yet production is down month over month for 6 of the last 7 months, upstream investment is down 2 years in a row, demand is up, production is going to decrease. I dont know exactly how its gonna play out but whatever it is the word train wreck is likely an apt description. ..."
"... It seems to me that there is a bunch of strange and interesting things all going on at once here, several of which are as follows; global peak oil production occurring as we speak is significantly probable, the price of oil is low, Cushings is full of condensate but the market calls it crude and it drops the price of crude, imports of crude to USA have recently increased despite the glut, Saudi is likely producing flat out yet production is down month over month for 6 of the last 7 months, upstream investment is down 2 years in a row, demand is up, production is going to decrease. I dont know exactly how its gonna play out but whatever it is the word train wreck is likely an apt description. ..."
"... As well this total liquids thing bugs me. It takes energy to produce biofuels and refinery gains. That seems like double counting to me. Like counting the global beef production once when its on the 1/4 of beef and once again when its cut with pork fat and called Ukrainian Sausage, to use Mr JJ Browns beef analogy. ..."
"... Try listening to what is said by KSA. We are not going to produce oil out of the ground for which we have no orders. ..."
"... Tanks arent filling. No one is placing orders for oil they would put in a tank. That makes no sense. And note, btw, that filling a tank is demand itself and thus would not justify a price decline if youre a supply/demand disciple. ..."
"... The price is low because sellers are willing to sell for that lower price. Period. Even if buyers would pay more, the seller insists on less. ..."
"... In my view the past surge in shale production was based on the favorable conditions of the bond market (search for yield). As long as the bond market has been liquid, production could surge. However, as the recent collapse of the bond market starts affecting production (see below chart) we could see another black swan event on the downside of production. ..."
"... The lesson for investors is to recognize and understand the thinking behind Wall Streets motivation and adjust the investment strategy accordingly. As the bond collapse is far from over, we have not yet seen the bottom of the production decline. The bond market is the major driver of oil and gas production. Any forecast which ignores changes of capital markets is very likely irrelevant. ..."
"... With LTO the production was accelerating y-o-y at a high rate, more in percentage terms than has been seen in fields before, at least since the very early days of the industry. The cut has been from that high rate to a slow decline. If the LTO production had been steady or a growth rate that was more representative of previous new fields then the decline would have been pretty steep by now. That and the different impact, and decoupled timing, of drilling and completions compared to conventional fields is what through off a lot of the predictions in my opinion. ..."
"... Note that the EIA STEO predicts Brent at $46/b in the fourth quarter of 2016. This is the reason that I believe the EIAs oil supply forecast is too high (assuming their price forecast is correct). I would expect at least a 1 Mb/d drop in 2016 average annual World C+C output compared to 2015 average output levels if the EIAs most recent oil price forecast for Brent crude is correct. ..."
"... I didnt say that $45/b is high enough to keep output flat . I said that $40-45/b is enough to cover operating costs and maintenance capex in a vast majority of the worlds currently producing conventional fields (as well as oil sands operations). ..."
peakoilbarrel.com
Guy Minton, 02/13/2016 at 5:47 pm
The big deals against oil prices are, now, the drop in (the increase) in future demand from 1.6 to 1.2%, per IEA, and the massive amount of oil that Iran is getting to lay out with unknown capital input. Supposedly glutting the market with 1.5 million more barrels with magic, I presume. However, I figure it, the drop in demand seems to indicate only about a 300k to 350k difference.

Ah, the magic of OPEC will prevail, then. Even though to fully ramp up more, Saudi has to drill in the offshore area, which I am sure is NOT $10 barrel cost of production. Iraq has to end their internal strife to gain some traction. Venezuela is sucking wind, badly. Ecuador, while not the massive producer of other OPEC members, currently has only one well drilling from 50 something rigs. It is hard to keep up with the news from every country, and it is clear that neither EIA nor IEA are really putting much effort into real data accumulation. I think OPEC is strapped for production for the next two years, with the exception of the magical production from Iran.

On the other hand, I read Canada has some smaller oil sands shut in, while larger ones are scheduling to cut back, or have extended periods of overhaul on production equipment. As rigs for conventional oil have dropped significantly, I fail to see were Canada will not have a decrease in production in 2016. Over a year ago, I said the shale production could drop by over one million, but didn't anticipate the increase before the drop. Still from the high in March of last year, it is still projected to drop by 1.2 million by 2017 by EIA. I still thing they are low in their estimate of the drop, but not as much as they used to be.

I read where China's production is expected to drop from 100k to 200k in 2016, base upon the current prices and capex. A recent post by the author indicates that up to 1.5 million barrels may be lost from in field drilling of offshore wells in 2016. All of South America, Africa, and Asia, including Russia, expect drops in 2016, and 2016 is just the tip of the iceberg.

Where are all of these figures in the garbage the EIA and IEA put out? Far as I can tell, the magical numbers put out for Iran, roughly match the drop in infield drilling offshore. But then I am not an expert, because I am not paid by a highly efficient and omniscient government entity.

Jimmy, 02/13/2016 at 6:37 pm
While what is called a prediction of non-OPEC production seems to meet the definition of the word 'prediction' it seems that the OPEC production prediction is more of what I'd call an assumption. The methodology used to predict future OPEC production is basically as follows: world demand minus non-OPEC production equals OPEC production. That's some pretty weak tea!

It seems to me that there is a bunch of strange and interesting things all going on at once here, several of which are as follows; global peak oil production occurring as we speak is significantly probable, the price of oil is low, Cushings is full of condensate but the market calls it crude and it drops the price of crude, imports of crude to USA have recently increased despite 'the glut', Saudi is likely producing flat out yet production is down month over month for 6 of the last 7 months, upstream investment is down 2 years in a row, demand is up, production is going to decrease. I don't know exactly how it's gonna play out but whatever it is the word 'train wreck' is likely an apt description.

As well this 'total liquids' thing bugs me. It takes energy to produce biofuels and refinery gains. That seems like double counting to me. Like counting the global beef production once when it's on the 1/4 of beef and once again when it's cut with pork fat and called Ukrainian Sausage, to use Mr JJ Browns beef analogy.

I figure in a few short years it'll be pretty clear where all this is going and it'll be a whole new paradigm aka Hobbesian scramble.

Jimmy, 02/13/2016 at 7:49 pm
Intro sentence should have read: "While what is called a prediction of non-OPEC production seems to meet the definition of the word 'prediction' it seems that the OPEC production prediction is more of what I'd call an assumption. "
Jimmy, 02/13/2016 at 6:37 pm
While what is called a prediction of non-OPEC production seems to meet the definition of the word 'prediction' it seems that the non-OPEC production prediction is more of what I'd call an assumption. The methodology used to predict future OPEC production is basically as follows: world demand minus non-OPEC production equals OPEC production. That's some pretty weak tea!

It seems to me that there is a bunch of strange and interesting things all going on at once here, several of which are as follows; global peak oil production occurring as we speak is significantly probable, the price of oil is low, Cushings is full of condensate but the market calls it crude and it drops the price of crude, imports of crude to USA have recently increased despite 'the glut', Saudi is likely producing flat out yet production is down month over month for 6 of the last 7 months, upstream investment is down 2 years in a row, demand is up, production is going to decrease. I don't know exactly how it's gonna play out but whatever it is the word 'train wreck' is likely an apt description.

As well this 'total liquids' thing bugs me. It takes energy to produce biofuels and refinery gains. That seems like double counting to me. Like counting the global beef production once when it's on the 1/4 of beef and once again when it's cut with pork fat and called Ukrainian Sausage, to use Mr JJ Browns beef analogy.

I figure in a few short years it'll be pretty clear where all this is going and it'll be a whole new paradigm aka Hobbesian scramble.

Adam Ash, 02/13/2016 at 6:51 pm
With tank farms, strategic storage, rows of rail tankers and flotillas of super tankers filling up all over the planet, producers will now have to match production to demand much more closely, else they will have to 'spill their seed upon the ground'. And there is not much money to be made doing that.

Some producers with no where to deliver their oil to must be in very difficult positions; going from normal production to zero in a day. From cashflow positive yesterday to being the proud owner of a pile of useless junk and pipes wth zero income today.

Interesting times.

Watcher, 02/14/2016 at 3:29 am
Try this.

Try listening to what is said by KSA. "We are not going to produce oil out of the ground for which we have no orders."

This has been policy all along. Now think about what you just said, and about where you heard it.

Adam Ash, 02/14/2016 at 5:38 am
Yes Watcher. The interesting moment arriving herewith is that we will now discover actual global consumption without the smoke n mirrors of production filling tanks somewhere.

I would imagine that the impacts will be neither selective or nice. Some good paying fields may have to be shut in if the tanks at the end of the pipe are full. Or it could be the final straw that pricks the light tight oil bubble. We shall see.

Watcher, 02/14/2016 at 12:31 pm
Tanks aren't filling. No one is placing orders for oil they would put in a tank. That makes no sense. And note, btw, that filling a tank is demand itself and thus would not justify a price decline if you're a supply/demand disciple.

The price is low because sellers are willing to sell for that lower price. Period. Even if buyers would pay more, the seller insists on less.

Wrap your mind around that and you understand pursuit of victory.

Adam Ash, 02/15/2016 at 1:49 am
Oh! Silly me. A helpful piece re Cushing storage:-

https://rbnenergy.com/just-my-imagination-how-full-is-cushing-crude-oil-storage-capacity-really


'… many storage operators [at Cushing] may be turning prospective customers away. Not because they don't have available capacity but because they don't have enough heavier crude to make WTI lookalike blends with incoming light shale grades.'

Do those full-to-the-brim mega-tankers slow-steaming in circles in the Sargasso Sea and swinging at anchor off Singapore and Malaysia with no where to go waiting for a better time to sell into the market in the face of rising production and exports from Iran make sense?

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-10/oil-traders-look-again-at-floating-storage-as-onshore-tanks-fill

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iran-exports-oil-shipment-europe-nuclear-deal-36929921

Not to me…

Producer-sellers are desperate for cashflow at any price, and the glut in supply means the competition to be the one who gets the sale is intense. Yet at the same time the near capacity storage available to some producers makes the potential for an individual field to be locked in because it has nowhere to send its product to much higher, no matter how hysterical the bean counters get.

The low price of crude is cutting the throat of many producers, who will not easily come back on line even if the price recovers. Its going to be an interesting year

Jeffrey J. Brown, 02/15/2016 at 8:22 am
Interesting article on the RBN Energy website, about Cushing. Note that the author touches on two key issues: (1) Insufficient heavy crude to offset the flood of condensate, thus making it more difficult to create their "Synthetic WTI" blend and (2) Weak demand for the Synthetic WTI blend itself.

The Reuters article from last year discusses the second point:

U.S. refiners turn to tanker trucks to avoid 'dumbbell' crudes (March, 2015)
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-refiners-trucks-analysis-idUSKBN0MJ09520150323

Many executives say that the crude oil blends being created in Cushing are often substandard approximations of West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the longstanding U.S. benchmark familiar to, and favored by, many refiners in the region.

Typical light-sweet WTI crude has an API gravity of about 38 to 40. Condensate, or super-light crude that is abundant in most U.S. shale patches, ranges from 45 to 60 or higher. Western Canadian Select, itself a blend, is about 20.

While the blends of these crudes may technically meet the API gravity ceiling of 42 at Cushing, industry players say the mixes can be inconsistent in makeup and generate less income because the most desirable stuff is often missing.

Link to my Oilpro.com article on crude versus condensate: http://oilpro.com/post/22276/estimates-post-2005-us-opec-global-condensate-production-vs-actua

As I have previously stated, IMO the global total liquids oversupply is a house of cards, built on an unstable foundation of actual global crude oil production* that requires vast amount of capital every year, in order to keep global crude oil production from crashing.

Up the thread, I noted that a plausible estimate is that it may have taken about a trillion dollars in 2014 and 2015 combined to keep global crude oil production around 68 to 69 million bpd, versus my estimate of 69 million bpd in 2005.

*45 API Gravity and lower crude oil

Jimmy, 02/14/2016 at 10:09 pm
Maybe KSA is FOS? Maybe that statement is not true.
Heinrich Leopold, 02/14/2016 at 10:25 am
AlexS,

In my view the past surge in shale production was based on the favorable conditions of the bond market ('search for yield'). As long as the bond market has been liquid, production could surge. However, as the recent collapse of the bond market starts affecting production (see below chart) we could see another 'black swan' event on the downside of production.

Jeffrey J. Brown, 02/14/2016 at 10:31 am
An analyst on CNBC had an interesting quote, which he attributed to John D. Rockefeller, to-wit, there has been more money lost to the ill advised search for yield, than in all of the bank robberies in recorded history.
Heinrich Leopold, 02/15/2016 at 12:56 am
Jeffrey,

All the three bubbles of the last decade – internet bubble, housing bubble and now the shale bubble – reflect deeply the American approach how to respond to challenges in the economy and society: It is better to ask for forgiveness than to ask for permission. Greenspan famously said when the internet bubble burst: You can only recognize a bubble when the bubble has burst. This approach has probably avoided also some damage ( for instance an escalating oil price surge), yet has also done some huge damage to investors.

The lesson for investors is to recognize and understand the thinking behind Wall Street's motivation and adjust the investment strategy accordingly. As the bond collapse is far from over, we have not yet seen the bottom of the production decline. The bond market is the major driver of oil and gas production. Any forecast which ignores changes of capital markets is very likely irrelevant.

AlexS, 02/14/2016 at 11:26 am
Heinrich,

Yes, access to cheap money (not only bonds, but also bank loans) was one of the key factors that contributed to the shale boom.

As regards the 'black swan' event on the downside of production, we will see which financial tricks the shale guys, their bankers and investors will invent to keep shale production afloat.

Ron Patterson, 02/14/2016 at 12:14 pm
we will see which financial tricks the shale guys, their bankers and investors will invent to keep shale production afloat.

I agree if you are talking about the money the bankers and investors already have invested in shale. But the bankers and investors will not likely be looking for ways to lose more money. New investment in shale will be difficult to come by.

TechGuy, 02/15/2016 at 3:27 am
"Nationalize it and this annoying little issue of profit pursuit disappears."

US banks were not "nationalized" during the 2008-2009 crisis. I very much doubt the gov't will nationalize the Oil industry, unless there is a very drastic event that cause the price to skyrocket suddenly (ie above $200). A KSA/Iran hot war would probably do that.

Collapsing Oil prices is just a symptom of a mounting global economic crisis. Even if the US nationalized its Oil industry it still not going to fix problems overseas: The Middle East, China and Europe.

The period of kicking the can with ease has reached its end. Now the World's gov't will need to resort to ever increasing drastic actions to avoid a global depression.

Ves, 02/14/2016 at 12:23 pm
"we will see which financial tricks the shale guys, their bankers and investors will invent to keep shale production afloat."

Maybe they start investor focused campaign "World is running out of oil" meme :-) LOL … similar to "We are running out of land" meme during Housing bubble :-) Just kidding. :-)

likbez, 02/14/2016 at 1:03 pm
Heinrich,

I think we should view "surge in shale production" not as something "based on the favorable conditions of the bond market" but as yet another "boom and bust" cycle which is the hallmark of neoliberal economy. Third in the sequence dot.com-real estate-shale oil, if you wish.

In all three cases it was reckless financing using new instruments which became available after deregulation which initiated the bubble. In this case covenant-light loans -- the crappiest kind of junk.

Like in all previous bubbles the deflation of the shale bubble might take some banks (this time regional) with it and result in a real extinction of shale companies. Technological progress achieved will remain intact and will be picked up by survivors.

The wave of bankruptcies will depress new drilling and might serve as another catalyst of the decline of shale oil production in 2016 and 2017 (despite takeover of properties). The decline that was not accounted for in the current forecasts.

Unlike two previous bubbles, this is a more localized disturbance and the size of CCC and lower junk bond market is just around one and a half trillion, but it will likely spread to the broader economy at least in six affected states due to links to mortgages, commercial real estate, municipal bonds, etc.

And it coincides with the weakening of the US economy.

Heinrich Leopold, 02/15/2016 at 2:56 am
likbez,

CCC and lower is just the canary in the mine. It is a sign of strength or weakness in the sector. It affects also private equity, loans….

The big question now is: How far will this go? Can it escalate? As this is impossible to predict, it is also impossible to make an accurate production forecast – even for the next two years.

It is ironic that even the FED -- having thousands of economists on its payroll -- has been a very bad forecaster. Greenspan did not recognize the internet bubble, Bernanke had to deal with the housing bubble ( the housing crisis is contained) and now Yellen has to face the shale bubble, which she did not foresee (in December there was still talk about escape velocity and inflation).

It is still open how deeply the burst of the shale bubble will affect the US economy. There could be some political events which brings out some oil production worldwide and the shale industry will be saved for a while. However, my gut feeling tells me that this will go very deeply. It looks like the FED has painted itself into a corner again.

Dennis Coyne, 02/14/2016 at 10:39 am
Hi AlexS,

I agree. Also your point about oil prices is important, oil prices are very difficult to predict and eventually they will affect output, though there is a significant time lag (maybe 18 to 36 months) between a change in oil prices and a change in the oil supply. I have not yet figured out what this time lag is, but my current guess is about 24 months on average.

This will vary depending on the oil field (deep water projects have a longer lag and onshore conventional and LTO may be somewhat shorter than the global average).

R Walter, 02/14/2016 at 10:51 am
http://www.theoildrum.com/files/PeakOil1.png

Another forecast that was incorrect.

AlexS, 02/14/2016 at 11:28 am
Who were the authors of those forecasts?
R Walter, 02/14/2016 at 1:44 pm

Edit

Ron Patterson, 02/14/2016 at 2:12 pm
So Ace got it wrong. We have been knowing that for a long time. That's history. What's your point?

Oil production will definitely, one day, peak. The fact that past predictions of peak oil were wrong only means they were too early. People who are predicting peak oil now, or at any time in the future, will be 8 years closer to hitting the date than Ace did.

I am reminded of insider traders in the stock market. That is company executives buying or selling stock in their own companies. The saying is, They are almost always right. But… They are almost always too early.

That is, they see that something is definitely happening so they act. But they just expect it to happen way before it really does. The same can be said about peak oil prognosticators. We saw that peak oil was definitely going to happen. But most of us were way too early with our prognostications, about 8 years too early. :-)

likbez, 02/14/2016 at 7:02 pm
Ron,

I am reminded of insider traders in the stock market. That is company executives buying or selling stock in their own companies. The saying is, They are almost always right. But… They are almost always too early.

An excellent point --

AlexS, 02/14/2016 at 11:44 am
Dennis,

Yes the time lag is different for different type of resource, different type of projects, different producing fields, different countries and different companies.
A big question is how to calculate this time lag.

LTO was expected to be the first to react, and it indeed reacted the most. But I was expecting much bigger declines last year.

Conventional output was almost unaffected last year (low short-term price elasticity). There will be some negative supply-side impact this year, but the biggest cumulative impact from low prices should be felt by 2020.

George Kaplan, 02/14/2016 at 4:26 pm
With LTO the production was accelerating y-o-y at a high rate, more in percentage terms than has been seen in fields before, at least since the very early days of the industry. The cut has been from that high rate to a slow decline. If the LTO production had been steady or a growth rate that was more representative of previous new fields then the decline would have been pretty steep by now. That and the different impact, and decoupled timing, of drilling and completions compared to conventional fields is what through off a lot of the predictions in my opinion.
Dennis Coyne , 02/14/2016 at 7:11 pm
Hi AlexS,

I read your reply on the previous thread and I appreciate your insight. I think I mostly agree with your take.

One place that I may not agree is that you think $45/b is high enough to keep output flat. I think that in the LTO plays $45/b is not enough to make the completion of drilled uncompleted (DUC) wells financially viable so we will see a fairly steep decline in LTO output if the EIA oil price forecast is correct.

In addition there are no doubt fields throughout the World where there are few long term projects in the works, but have continual infill drilling that either maintains a plateau or reduces the overall field decline rate. I would expect that even $45/b may not be enough to justify the continued drilling of new wells in many fields.

Note that the EIA STEO predicts Brent at $46/b in the fourth quarter of 2016. This is the reason that I believe the EIA's oil supply forecast is too high (assuming their price forecast is correct). I would expect at least a 1 Mb/d drop in 2016 average annual World C+C output compared to 2015 average output levels if the EIA's most recent oil price forecast for Brent crude is correct.

AlexS, 02/14/2016 at 8:00 pm
Dennis,

I didn't say that "$45/b is high enough to keep output flat". I said that $40-45/b is enough to cover operating costs and maintenance capex in a vast majority of the world's currently producing conventional fields (as well as oil sands operations).

That doesn't mean keeping production flat. Where production was falling due to natural declines at $90-100, it will continue to decline (probably, at higher rates) at $40-45.

Project delays and lower upstream capex will also have a negative impact on new conventional production. But as project start-ups scheduled for 2015-17 are generally not postponed, the overall impact on global conventional production will be relatively modest this year. However the effects of low prices will gradually increase in the next few years and peak by 2020, even if oil prices recover by that time.

As regards LTO, I agree that $45 is not enough to keep production flat. I guess the required price is closer to $60.

Finally, I certainly do not expect global C+C production to drop by 1 mb/d y-o-y in 2016. Barring unlikely OPEC cuts and unexpected large-scale supply outages, the increase in OPEC output (Iran) should partially offset declines in non-OPEC production.

Dennis Coyne , 02/14/2016 at 8:20 pm
Hi AlexS,

Sorry I misunderstood. Let's assume the EIA STEO oil price predictions are correct.

What would you expect for the average annual C+C output level in 2016, if that assumption were correct?

Note that I also do not expect C+C output will fall by 1 Mb/d, but the reason will be that the EIA's oil price prediction will be too low. I expect an average annual Brent price level for 2016 of about $55/b+/-$5/b and at that price level average annual C+C output will decline by about 500 kb/d in 2016 (about 79 Mb/d for an average output level) relative to the average 2015 output level (about 79.5 Mb/d).

Ron Patterson, 02/14/2016 at 10:27 pm
average annual C+C output will decline by about 500 kb/d in 2016 (about 79 Mb/d for an average output level) relative to the average 2015 output level (about 79.5 Mb/d).

Through the first ten months f 2015, world C+C production has averaged 79.94 Mb/d. If we have the decline that I expect in November and December, I believe the average for 2015 will be around 79.85 to 79.9 Mb/d.

I expect 2016 C+C production to be about 78.9 Mb/d or a decline of about 1 million barrels per day.

Below is the 2015 C+C production, through October, according to the the EIA. The Peak so far, was in July 2015 at 80,525,000 million barrels per day.

Jan-15 Feb-15 Mar-15 Apr-15 May-15 79,379 79,371 80,175 79,988 79,369 Jun-15 Jul-15 Aug-15 Sep-15 Oct-15 80,038 80,525 80,439 80,038 80,071

likbez, 02/14/2016 at 1:07 pm
The time lag probably also depends on when financial spigot that inflates the bubble is shut down.
clueless, 02/14/2016 at 6:44 am
Future accounting problems – There have been many posts here over the past 2 years analyzing the cost incurred by the O & G companies to produce LTO. In my opinion, some of the ability to do that may go away.

Most companies have had to write down the balance sheet value of their LTO reserves (costs incurred) in 2014, 2015 and probably will again in 2016. If the price of oil increases, write ups to reinstate the value back to where it was are not permitted. So the true costs become invisible. So, if in 2017, if the price of oil is back to $50, companies could produce income statements that show a profit. But, some of that will be because much of the cost was written off in previous years due to "one time, extraordinary valuation write offs."

The companies offset the oil being sold with a DD&A [depletion, depreciation and amortization] cost. In general, that means that they ratably deduct their capitalized costs over each barrel of oil produced. But, if they have already written off half of their capitalized cost due to a valuation write off, then future DD&A will be one half of what it would have been without the write off.

And, it will likely be very difficult in 2017 to separate out their 2017 operations.

Enno, 02/14/2016 at 8:18 am
Clueless,

Excellent point. That is why careful investors, like e.g. Warren Buffett, don't accept accounting profit.
They calculate something like "owner earnings", in which you ignore accounting DDA and include your own conservative estimate of the depletion/depreciation of assets.

In my opinion, there is a seriously flaw in the calculation of the accounting profit for LTO companies. The depletion/depreciation amount doesn't fully reflect the actual reduction of the NPV of the assets over a year. In other words, the very fast decline in production of shale wells, and the larger variable costs later in the life of a well, are not fully accounted for. LTO companies are in general getting away with a much smaller DDA amount, and therefore front loading profits. Normally lowering DDA is a bad corporate strategy, because it leads to more corporate taxes, but these companies in general also benefit from major tax deductions to compensate for this. I think this accounting flaw has played a big role in the shale boom.

Most retail investors unfortunately take book profits and book value too seriously. Like Shallow sand, you, and others have shown, there are much better ways to make value estimates.

shallow sand, 02/14/2016 at 11:15 am
Good points, as we have discussed previously. If oil prices don't return to 2011-14 levels, tough to see how loan principal gets paid.

Asset sales to pay principal are self defeating. Due to IDC elections, depletion and depreciation, would seem that shale asset sales would generate a lot of tax liability. A $1 billion sale may generate only $600 million after tax?

Also, assets sales cause company wide production to fall.

Interesting how all of the companies in 2015 are reporting year over year production growth AFTER excluding the effects of asset divestures. So we are selling production to drill more wells to grow production. Our production is falling, but by gosh we have more new wells with 1 million EUR.

The production they are selling tends to have higher OPEX, but lower decline, and therefore, despite the higher OPEX, more PV per BOE.

A prime example would be Whiting, who last summer tried to sell its North Ward Estes CO2 flood.

As I recall, NWE accounted for less than 10% of company wide BOE in 2014, yet almost 20% of PDP PV10. This despite having much higher current OPEX than the Bakken and Nirobrara assets.

I have never understood how long term value is being created by these companies. One thousand 200 BOE average wells will be 40 BOE average in 5 years, for example, yet little to no ability to pay down debt principal.

PV10, 9, 8, or whatever discount value is appropriate does matter. Now that PDP PV10 is greatly less than long term debt, I hope some investors pay attention to it.

clueless, 02/14/2016 at 1:18 pm
SS – I believe that current asset sales generally are unlikely to result in any cash taxes being paid. Especially since prices have fallen so much in the last year and a half. Further information below, for those who might want to delve a little deeper, but not fully into the complexities.

As you know, the companies deduct most of their drilling/fracking costs on their tax returns in the year that the money is spent. But, for their financial presentation books, following the GAAP principle to match expenses with revenue, these expenses are capitalized and included in their Oil & Gas Assets. For the financial statements these costs are rateably amortized as production occurs as DD&A expense.

Generally speaking, the companies create significant net operating losses on their tax returns because of those deductions. However, because in the future they will eventually deduct the costs [DD&A], but they cannot again deduct them for tax purposes, they are required to book deferred taxes payable as a liability.

Looking at PXD. At year end they have a $1.776 billion long term deferred tax liability. Using a 32% tax rate, this can imply a tax net operating loss of up to $5.55 billion. Assume that they have a producing field on the books at $500 million [GAAP using $49/bbl], with future drilling prospects, and a zero tax basis. They sell it for $1 billion, a $500 million book profit. A 32% tax on the book profit is $160 million, which is recorded in the income statement, but, which does not have to be paid. It offsets some of the net operating losses. The tax return shows a gain of $1 billion, an extra $500 million. The 32% tax on that extra $500 million offsets their deferred tax liability of $1.776 billion, reducing their deferred tax liability to $1.616 billion.

shallow sand, 02/14/2016 at 2:44 pm
Clueless. Yes, have to work it through to get a clear picture.
simon oaten, 02/15/2016 at 7:23 am
Enno

one of the "things" that the shale industry has given the oil industry is lower "finding costs" ……at the "expense" of greater variability in outcomes (EUR / IP / PV10). Again – thankyou for your site – outstanding work
rgds
simon

R Walter, 02/14/2016 at 7:59 am
More accurate than this one:

http://www.theoildrum.com/files/ksa1r.gif

Matt Mushalik, 02/14/2016 at 8:08 am
My latest graphs using EIA update to October 2015

15/2/2016
World outside US and Canada doesn't produce more oil than in 2005
http://crudeoilpeak.info/world-outside-us-and-canada-doesnt-produce-more-crude-oil-than-in-2005

clueless, 02/14/2016 at 12:26 pm
Thanks! Much more than an excellent presentation!
Jimmy, 02/14/2016 at 4:34 pm
Awesome article Matt! Thanks for fleshing out the EIA report data!!
Hickory, 02/14/2016 at 5:37 pm
Excellent site Matt!
http://crudeoilpeak.info/

One question- I see that you have US crude imports at about 7Mbpd, where as Jan data from iea have US net liquids import at about 5 Mbpd.
Is this difference because we export things like refined product and condensate?

clueless, 02/14/2016 at 12:12 pm
A big 2 page story in the business section of today's Daily Oklahoman. Oklahoma's oil production is up over 100,000 bbl/day starting in December – over 25%. Well, actual production is not up, but the EIA started doing their surveys last year to get more accurate production numbers. After months of consultation with the Oklahoma Tax Commission, they agreed that the EIA #'s are the correct ones. The OK Tax Comm claims that they have been collecting the right amount of tax.

Apparently, the data is loaded into a 30 year old mainframe system and computer program. Any data that does not match is kicked out of the system. That data is then processed manually but, has never been able to be loaded back into the existing computer system. So, numbers from Oklahoma have been understated for a long time. The Tax Comm says that they have one year left [estimate] on a four year project to put in a new computer system that will fix their problem. Meanwhile, the EIA is going with their survey.

Is this really the 21st century?

Ron Patterson, 02/14/2016 at 12:30 pm
The EIA explains their new methodology here:

Updating Monthly EIA Crude Oil Production Estimates for Oklahoma to Use Survey Data

StuckinWalkerWorld, 02/14/2016 at 2:09 pm
Good afternoon–

At the risk of hijacking of this thread, I have several questions to pose to this group, starting with why are petroleum imports from Canada continuing to increase? (See link to EIA below). Is it caused in part by the anemic Canadian dollar, the need to keep pumping because cash flow generation trumps all other considerations, or something else? Which leads to another question How much further must the price of petroleum decline before petroleum imports from Canada start to dwindle? Until it does–and who knows when that will happen -- I have a hard time believing that oil prices will move higher in the current cycle.

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=W_EPC0_IM0_NUS-NCA_MBBLD&f=W

J

George Kaplan, 02/14/2016 at 3:54 pm

I haven't seen this discussed, but my apologies if it is a duplicate. Paragon Offshore to file Chapter 11 – is this the largest bankruptcy for offshore drillers so far?

http://splash247.com/paragon-offshore-set-declare-chapter-11-bankruptcy/

http://www.paragonoffshore.com/investors-relations/investor-news/investor-news-details/2016/Paragon-Offshore-Announces-Agreement-With-Bondholders-And-Revolver-Banks-To-Restructure-Its-Balance-Sheet/default.aspx

Frugal, 02/14/2016 at 7:12 pm
Oil crisis leaves the East barrelling out of control

"It's sad. These people never thought the day would come where a barrel of oil would be below $30 (U.S.)," he said. "They were just living for the moment and they were making a huge amount of money and just thought it would continue on."

The oil price collapse is also hitting the opposite side of Canada.

likbez, 02/14/2016 at 9:11 pm
A very good article. Thank you!

The fallout from the oil crisis - compounded by potential government job cuts - could hit the province worse than the infamous cod moratorium of the 1990s, said Wade Locke, an economics professor at Memorial University.

"A 30 per cent cut in government expenditures over three years at a time when the economy is weak because of oil prices and less remittance income from people working in the oilfields in Alberta?

"Yes, it's fair to say it could be harder than the moratorium," he said.

Those affects are being felt now. Fewer blue and orange ice-class cargo ships leave the narrow entry to the St. John's harbour, loaded with supplies for the rigs 350-kilometres offshore.

And with declining output from the three producing rigs and two of four exploration rigs temporarily shut down - two more are scheduled for shutdown in July - helicopters are bringing fewer workers back and forth right now.

Still, resilient Newfoundlanders are quick to list off the reasons they believe the downturn could be relatively short-term; that this is the bottom of a typical, albeit particularly painful, commodity cycle.

After all, there's still a great deal of interest in Newfoundland's offshore oil, which is cheaper and cleaner to extract than oilsands crude. A government land sale in the Flemish Pass basin took in a record $1.2 billion of new oil company spending commitments. There are an estimated 12 billion barrels of oil reserves in that area alone. The province believes the number of job openings will increase beginning in 2019, when it anticipates major project expansion will resume.
… … …
….new home construction has dropped by 20 per cent.
…Insolvency filings are up 22 per cent over the last year at accounting and insolvency firm Noseworthy Chapman.
…Two of the seven offshore rigs that the base supplied in 2014 have shut down temporarily. The marine base is taking a revenue hit, but so far there have only been a few layoffs, he said.
…Food banks in the province provide food to nearly five per cent of people in the province, the second highest level in the country.
…8.2% - Percentage of Newfoundland workers projected to lose their jobs in next three years, amounting to 24,000 job losses
… $1.9B - Deficit projection in 2015-2016 fiscal update, nearly twice what was expected in the budget
… $12.4B - Newfoundland's net debt

Looks like everything is connected those days. Or "over connected". A lot of common people suffer consequences of those big boys games. Business bankruptcies lead to personal bankruptcies.

Frugal, 02/14/2016 at 10:27 pm
I wonder where they got the 12 billion barrels of reserves from. Wikipedia gives the following numbers for the estimated oil in place:
Hibernia = 2.1 billion barrels with 700 million already produced by 2010
Terra Nova = 400 million barrels
White Rose = 440 million barrels

As far as I can tell, these are the only major oil fields off Canada's east coast.

Doug Leighton, 02/14/2016 at 11:36 pm
Dead on Frugal,

"A government land sale in the Flemish Pass basin took in a record $1.2 billion of new oil company spending commitments. There are an estimated 12 billion barrels of oil reserves in that area alone."

So what is it, 12 billion barrels or 300 to 600 million barrels? Total production 1977-2005 at Prudhoe Bay = 11 billion barrels with perhaps two billion barrels of recoverable oil remaining. Let's be generous and say 0.5 billion barrels total in the Flemish Pass Basin; 12 billion, no bloody way.

"In late September 2013, Statoil ASA and its 35 per cent joint-venture partner, Husky Energy Inc., announced two back-to-back light crude discoveries in the deepwater Flemish Pass Basin, offshore Newfoundland. The larger of the two discoveries, the Bay du Nord exploration well, confirmed the existence of 300 to 600 million barrels of 34 degree API oil recoverable."

http://www.albertaoilmagazine.com/2014/01/light-crude-discovery-newfoundland/

George Kaplan, 02/15/2016 at 8:42 am
Hebron – comes on line 2017, maybe 700 million barrels or more of heavy oil. BP and Shell each paid about $1 billion for exploration rights offshore Nova Scotia. Shell is drilling at the moment The author might also be considering 'equivalent' oil offshore Labrador which might have a lot of gas (but very difficult to develop). There are a couple of areas on the border with USA which are off limits at the moment. Against this Terra Nova and WhiteRose are well into their run down phases and don't have much left.

http://www.cnlopb.ca/pdfs/off_prod.pdf

Green People's Media , 02/14/2016 at 11:30 pm
Say, Ron, have you looked at the most recent Drilling Productivity Reports? A couple days ago, they showed the major frack-oil fields having a reversal of legacy well declines. Bakken, Eagle Ford, etc. all show an UPWARD move in the legacy graphs (in other words, they're losing less production monthly than they were previous few months).

I thought that looked really odd.

What is your thinking on this?

Bobby G,
at the GPM

Econ, 02/15/2016 at 2:47 am
I think that is due to the decline rate being very high initially for new wells followed by a long period of slower decline and more steady production over the course of a well's life. As new producing wells were only enough in quantity to keep production flat (rather than increase it like previous years), there was less proportionally of this initial production spike and steep decline, and more proportionally of the slower more gradual declining production due – the composition of the wells now being mostly older rather than many new wells.

Also as production had fallen a bit, the decline should naturally be smaller even at the same decline rates. For instance a 10% decline on 1,000,000 mbpd will be higher than the decline at 10% on 900,000 mbpd

AlexS, 02/15/2016 at 3:33 am
New shale wells have much higher decline rates than the old ones.
The less the number of new producing wells, the lower is the average decline rate
Ron Patterson, 02/15/2016 at 8:32 am
It does not look odd at all. That is exactly what you would expect, as Alex and Econ pointed out. Production is declining and therefore you have less oil to decline. And fewer wells are coming on line and older wells have a slower decline rate than new wells.
Oldfarmermac, 02/15/2016 at 9:37 am
I didn't get back to say thanks for the answers to my question about condensate energy content yesterday, or day before but thanks everybody.

Maybe somebody who can still remember their math will calculate the loss of energy per average barrel of so called total liquids as the percentage of condensates increases, with the quantity of conventional crude decreasing.

At first glance it looks as if the rising percentage of condensate is cutting significantly into the energy of an "average" total liquid barrel.

I have not run across any research yet performed with the intent of designing internal combustion engines to run mostly or entirely on condensates, but it would appear at first glance that using straight condensate, or a very high percentage of condensate as ice fuel would be practical and economic, so long as it continues to sell for substantially less than ordinary crude- at least in the case of large stationary engines, or engines powering equipment that mostly stays very close to a home base, such as farm machinery and heavy construction equipment. The condensate could probably be hauled to a big construction job or large farm at no more trouble and expense than LP .

Ron Patterson, 02/15/2016 at 9:49 am
Why blocking Obama's pick to replace Scalia could cost Republicans their Senate majority

Assuming the president picks a Hispanic, African American or Asian American – bonus points if she's a woman – this could be exactly what Democrats need to re-activate the Obama coalition that fueled his victories in 2008 and 2012. Even if he does not go with a minority candidate, the cases on the docket will galvanize voters who are traditionally less likely to turn out.

That is exactly what I have been saying.

Keep in mind that a quarter of Nevada's population is Hispanic. Beyond being a battleground in the presidential race, there is also an open Senate race to succeed Harry Reid. Democrats will nominate a Latina and Republicans will nominate a white guy who is already in Congress.

This will absolutely assure that Harry Reid's seat will stay in Democratic hands.

More broadly, this could also undermine efforts by Senate Republicans to show that they are capable of governing and not just "the party of no."

shallow sand, 02/15/2016 at 11:21 am
Ron, looks like a leading choice is Sri Srinivasan. I know nothing about him, other than what I have just read. 48. Born in India, raised in Kansas, Stanford graduate. Was appointed to DC circuit and confirmed by senate 97-0, in 2012.
Ron Patterson, 02/15/2016 at 11:27 am
Good question shallow. But I don't think he will be shot down. Even if he is the nominee McConnell will not allow it to come up for a vote. He will just sit on it until the next president is elected. And sit on it longer if a Republican is elected. Which is not likely.

That is just what they do. They are the party of NO!

clueless, 02/15/2016 at 4:59 pm
I know that this is useless to point out, but Harry Reid said "no vote" to almost every single proposal passed out of the Republican controlled House.
Fernando Leanme , 02/15/2016 at 1:55 pm
The question is how many of those Hispanic "Nevadans" have the right to vote. I bet less than less than half of that quarter.

And my guess is you'll see republicans very motivated to avoid an imperial presidency ruling by decree backed by an activist court. That reminds me of Venezuela.

shallow sand, 02/15/2016 at 11:32 am
I think a post of mine might have been lost.

In summary, I was comparing PXD (Pioneer) with CLR (Continental).

PXD produced 204K BOEPD in 2015, 53% oil. PV 10 12/31/15 $3.2 billion at $50 WTI, 89% PDP.

CLR produced 222K BOEPD in 2015, 63% oil, PV10 12/31/15 $8 billion at $50 WTI, 43% of proved reserves are PDP.

PXD enterprise value much greater, plans to grow BOEPD in 2016.

CLR enterprise value less, plans to shrink BOEPD in 2016.

Big difference, PXD well hedged, CLR is not.

Why the great disparity in PUD PV10? PXD supposedly has the most core acreage in Permian?

I really would like to see these reserves reports. I don't see how CLR has much in the way of PUD PV10.

shallow sand, 02/15/2016 at 12:40 pm
Note, proved reserves % PDP doesn't necessarily equal % of PV10 that is PDP.

I will wait for 10K. I think we will find at $50 WTI, almost all have less PDP PV10 than long term debt.

Further, I hope we get indication in 10K what PV10 is at $30 WTI.

dclonghorn, 02/15/2016 at 2:57 pm
Something has looked fishy to me with CLR reserves and production every time I looked at it. I just stay away from that one.
shallow sand, 02/15/2016 at 5:58 pm
dclonghorn.

Ironically I used the "fishy" word too discussing CLR today.

Don't know anything they report is not correct, just seems OPEX is always very low compared to peers operating in the same areas.

Seems odd that PUD BOE would be 57% given terrible economics for new wells.

Again, BOE reserve category percentages do not equal PV10 value percentages, but 2/3 of OAS BOE reserves are PDP. Assume PXD is high % PDP reserves, given almost 90% of PV10 is PDP.

Also, never have figured out why all the $10+ million non core wells in places like Divide, Stark, Elm Coulee, etc, haven't caught up with CLR. EOG, WLL, QEP and others seem to have better wells/ locations companywide in Bakken.

Oh well, it's just speculation. Maybe the 10K's will give us more clues.

dclonghorn, 02/15/2016 at 7:16 pm
If you look at Enno's shaleprofile.com, you can get actual production curves for them and compare them with their presentation production. I made that comparison when Enno's site first came up. It is a remarkable difference. I don't know how much NPV they assign to any of their reserves, but I've seen enough to know that I don't trust their reserves for volumes or dollars.
dclonghorn, 02/15/2016 at 3:27 pm
North Dakota should be releasing their December production numbers soon. A lot of people consider North Dakota's reporting as an indicator of the trends for all shale oil. Their reporting is much more timely than waiting 8 months to see what Texas looks like after revisions.

North Dakota surprised with small production gains for October and November. The EIA's November Drilling Productivity Report forecast a 27 kbopd decline from November's estimated 1137 kbopd to December's estimate of 1110 kbopd. North Dakota's report for November was 1119 kbopd. It may be that they trade some accuracy for timeliness as their monthly numbers seem to be very erratic. That said, I think they are due for a decline of over the forecast 27 kbopd.

Oskar DiSilvo, 02/15/2016 at 6:28 pm
Is KSA's strategy succeeding?

http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/saudi-arabia-is-winning-its-war-against-the-u-s-oil-industry/

This article from Quartz is much more in-depth:

http://qz.com/604756/the-us-bet-big-on-american-oil-and-now-the-whole-global-economy-is-paying-the-price/

I have given up any pretense of trying to understand what will happen next, then further down the road. Except to understand, that at some point, depletion becomes unequivocally evident to all…then it will get 'interesting'.

[Feb 15, 2016] EIA greatly underestimates production on the way up and greatly overestimate production on the way down

peakoilbarrel.com
Javier, 02/13/2016 at 8:11 pm
Hi Ron,

On the issue of EIA's predictions accuracy, I updated this graph from Mason Inman and added actual oil US production.

What this graph shows is a typical very conservative estimate system. This means that on the way up, they greatly underestimate production and on the way down, they are going to greatly overestimate production.

This clearly shows how credible their predictions are. Although the graph is only for the US, clearly they are going to be equally conservative (and thus equally wrong) about world oil production.

AlexS, 02/13/2016 at 9:22 pm
Javier,

The long-term projections of U.S. LTO production are from various issues of the EIA Annual Energy Outlook. They indeed were very conservative, even though none of them (even the AEO-2015) did not assume such a big drop in oil prices.

As regards the actual production data (the black line), it is from the Drilling Productivity Report and include almost 1 mb/d of conventional output, primarily from the Permian basin.

U.S. LTO production had never reached 5.5 mb/d, as the black line shows. According to the most recent EIA presentation, the local peak (In March 2015) was around 4.6 mb/d

Javier, 02/13/2016 at 9:56 pm
OK, thanks. The black curve needs correction.

But the issue continues being that EIA underestimated production so much that it had to raise its predictions by about 100% each year.

Look at the prediction for 2020:

AEO 2012: 1.3 mbpd  
AEO 2013: 2.8 mbpd
AEO 2014: 4.7 mbpd

And all this without any significant change in oil price.

So if the question is, as Ron is posting, how much value have EIA predictions? The answer clearly is none. EIA predictions are useless. Evidence indicates that they are going to overestimate production by a large amount for as long as production goes down.

AlexS, 02/13/2016 at 10:27 pm
These are projections for LTO, a new resource type. Its emergence as a new important source of global supply and its rapid growth was a "black swan" event, which nobody could predict.

This is a good example why all such projections are just a snapshot that reflects our current knowledge of geology, technology and other factors affecting energy supply

[Feb 14, 2016] Has EIA been playing fast and loose with the petroleum statistics

Consistent use of energy units such as Barrel of oil equivalent (1 BOE = 1.7 MWh) would be a step in that direction. Using volume is clearly a ploy to improve the numbers, as is the double counting of barrels that are used for production (e.g. a BBL used to extract 2:1 shale oil counts as 3 BBL, to make 1:1 ethanol counts as 2 BBL). This won't fool Mother Nature.
Oil produces 5,800,000 BTUs per 42-gallon barrel or around 138000 per gallon. For comparison ethonol produces only 79000 opf just 55%. Condensate produces around 12% less. That's why it is important to have statistics in metric tons not barrels...
Notable quotes:
"... I think the EIA has been playing fast and loose with the petroleum statistics. ..."
"... Ive previously suggested that assigning all the processing gains to US production is factually incorrect, instead the processing gains resulting from refining imported crude should be added to the total for imports. For a rough guess, using the fraction of crude imported given above, 664 mbbls/d should be subtracted from the US production and added to the import side of the accounting. ..."
"... Of course, the EIA misses the whole discussion about biofuels, especially ethanol, which require a large input of fossil fuels to produce the final product. The EIA ignores this fuel input, showing biofuels as an input to the front end of the refining process. With ethanol production now using about 40% of the US corn crop, it would be more accurate to consider this portion of the US agricultural system to have been added to the energy supply system and the energy used would thus become an internal consumption which would be subtracted from the petroleum energy available to the rest of society. Doing this calculation would increase the fraction of energy imported, which would give a more realistic picture of our situation... ..."
"... And the IEA bought into the EIAs misinformation (call it a lie) with their latest report, which means either that they dont understand the EIAs reporting or they are complicit in the act of overstating US production. Your choice... ..."
November 19, 2012 | The Oil Drum

Black_Dog on November 19, 2012

I think the EIA has been playing fast and loose with the petroleum statistics. As noted last week, the EIA Annual Review for 2010 states that the US produced a total of 9,443 mbbls/d, of which US crude production at 5,512 mbbls/day (which includes lease condensate), NGPL's at 2,001 mbbls/d and processing gain of 1,064 mbbls/d. The difference of 866 mbbls/d appears to be made up by biofuels.

Total product supplied is said to have been 19,148 mbbls/d, with imports minus exports totaling 9,434 mbbls/d of that. The amount of crude imported was 9,163 mbbls/d. From these data, the total crude supplied to the refineries was 14,675 mbbls/d, of which 62% is imported.

I've previously suggested that assigning all the processing gains to US production is factually incorrect, instead the processing gains resulting from refining imported crude should be added to the total for imports. For a rough guess, using the fraction of crude imported given above, 664 mbbls/d should be subtracted from the US production and added to the import side of the accounting. This revision reduces US production to 8,779 mbbls/d and increases imports to 10,098 mbbls/d, increasing the fraction imported from 49% to 53%.

Of course, the EIA misses the whole discussion about biofuels, especially ethanol, which require a large input of fossil fuels to produce the final product. The EIA ignores this fuel input, showing biofuels as an input to the front end of the refining process. With ethanol production now using about 40% of the US corn crop, it would be more accurate to consider this portion of the US agricultural system to have been added to the energy supply system and the energy used would thus become an internal consumption which would be subtracted from the petroleum energy available to the rest of society. Doing this calculation would increase the fraction of energy imported, which would give a more realistic picture of our situation...

E. Swanson

carnot on November 22, 2012

Sorry Guys but you have missed the point on refinery gains. It is a mirage. Remember the 1st law of thermodynamics.

Energy cannot be created or destroyed. US refiners continue to quote their refining capacities and products in barrels - a unit of volume which is meaningless unless a density unit is also quoted. What you should consider is the mass unit. In ALL refineries if you measure in units of mass it should add up to 100% plus the mass of hydrogen and other inputs added which increase the mass. ( methanol for an MTBE unit for instance).

When the crude is distiller in the crude unit it will produce a number of products with different densities and therefore different mass per barrel. Measure the products in barrels and you will have the following barrels per tonne.

Butane. 11
Naphtha 9
Gasoline 8.7
Jet 8
Diesel 7.5
Vacuum gas oil 6.8
Fuel oil 6.5

In a cat cracker, with no hydrogen addition the mass of products is constant but because the volume of LESS dense light products exceed the total volume of HEAVY dense products , hey presto there is a refinery gain - in volume but not in mass.

Some refinery gain is due to the addition of hydrogen but typically this is 2-3% of the overall mass flow. Refiners love to sell in units of volume as they can benefit form the sleight of hand of selling a less dense and lower energy product to unsuspecting drivers. When energy density is compared in mass units there is NO significant difference between gasoline, jet or diesel. It is about 42-44 MJ per Kg but very different in volume units.

That is why diesels appear 30% more fuel efficient on volumetric terms but in reality the difference is much less.

xoddam on November 20, 2012 - 7:21am
A number of people have posted the same argument each time "refinery gains" are mentioned, but it does not universally hold true.

Cracking can be done without addition of hydrogen, either by separately coking the heavier fractions of the crude before cracking (producing large volumes of solid carbon-rich petroleum coke, frequently a desirable byproduct which is further improved for use in metallurgy), or coking by deposition on the catalytic cracker unit itself (usually simply burned off in batches).

In neither case does any non-crude-oil energy input contribute to the increased volume of the light hydrocarbon products. Indeed the liquid products are of considerably less mass and energy than the input crude petroleum.

Indeed to the best of my knowledge hydrogenation in cracking units is not the norm. The main use of hydrogen in petroleum processing is in fact to remove sulfur and nitrogen from the fuel -- in which process it does not add energy to the desulfurised fuel product, but rather to the sulfuric and nitric acid byproducts.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydrodesulfurization

The hydrogen may be generated by steam reformation of natural gas, but coke from crude oil is also used as feedstock for steam reformation.

[-] RockyMtnGuy on November 20, 2012 - 10:22am Permalink

Yes, thank you for clarifying that. I've tried to clarify it for people before, but your explanation is much better. People tend to assume that "refinery gain" comes from adding hydrogen, but that's not generally true - in most cases it comes from removing carbon, ie "coking". Refineries prefer to do it that way because hydrogen is very expensive, and petroleum coke is a valuable product. In either case, the EROEI is much less than unity - in the case of coking, it is less than zero.

mbnewtrain on November 20, 2012 - 10:42am Permalink

From a chemistry standpoint:

If the refinery is breaking H-C bonds in the hydrocarbon chain molecule and producing free C (which you call coke), then the liquids produced have shorter chain molecules (total number of carbons reduced). Fewer H-C bonds mean lower energy. So using catalytic cracker that produces coke removes energy from the resulting liquid.

My claim of lower net energy in the oil product still stands regardless of refining method. In either case refinery gains should not be counted as energy production.

Darwinian on November 20, 2012 - 9:18am Permalink

The US has refinery process gains of over one million barrels per day. That is almost as much as the rest of the world combined. They have to be counting refinery process gains on imported oil.

[-] RockyMtnGuy on November 20, 2012 - 10:32am Permalink

That is correct. The EIA is counting "refinery gain" on imported oil as "US oil production". It is a totally bogus product by any standard, and the only reason I can imagine them doing it is to artificially inflate US oil production statistics. This has to be politically motivated.

Black_Dog on November 20, 2012 - 10:59am Permalink

And the IEA bought into the EIA's misinformation (call it a lie) with their latest report, which means either that they don't understand the EIA's reporting or they are complicit in the act of overstating US production. Your choice...

E. Swanson

RockyMtnGuy on November 20, 2012 - 12:18pm Permalink

There is an addition factor which the EIA is not going to want to make clear. US oil imports are increasingly coming from Canada, and most Canadian oil production is now from the oil sands as Canadian conventional oil production declines and oil sands production increases. Canada now exports more oil to the US than it consumes itself.

The product which is exported is mostly bitumen, which is not "tar" as some people would have you believe, but it is about the heaviest grade of oil you can buy. Midwest oil refineries no longer have sufficient domestic oil to keep running, but there is lots of Canadian bitumen and it is very cheap to buy (although not to produce). They upgrade it using coking, and make a ton of money turning it into gasoline.

Despite the fact that the EROEI of coking is negative (there is an energy loss), there is a huge refinery gain in going from very heavy bitumen to much lighter gasoline. The EIA counts this as "US oil production" despite the fact it comes from the Canadian oil sands and involves a net loss of energy.

That's another factor in the huge "refinery gain" the EIA and therefore the IEA is counting in predicting the US will exceed Saudi oil production. It's not really oil, in physical terms it's some kind of an extreme vacuum, or a form of negative energy.

Black_Dog on November 20, 2012 - 1:08pm Permalink

Furthermore, importing extra heavy oil from Canadian bitumen (aka, tar for those who don't understand that tar is derived from coal) sands requires the addition of some dilutant to the mix to reduce the viscosity enough to allow the mix to flow thru pipelines. Looking quickly at the EIS for the Keystone XL pipeline from the US State Department, one learns that the chemical makeup of those dilutants are company proprietary information. It's likely that these are made up of lighter fractions of crude oil, such as naphtha or even some NGPLs. The fractions with the lowest boiling point temperature would most likely be mixed in during the coldest months of the year when the oil would be most viscous.

The source of those dilutants is unknown, but there have been comments about building a pipeline from the US to Alberta to provide those chemicals. If this is done, the dilutants would be (are?) added to the export column of the EIA data, but would then be returned to the US along with the heavy oil and then recovered at some point during the refining process. The result could be like a loop within which (almost) no change in the total quantity of material occurs, but which appears as a reduction in total imports due to double counting in the EIA volume based data...

E. Swanson

[-] RockyMtnGuy on November 20, 2012 - 2:16pm Permalink

Looking quickly at the EIS for the Keystone XL pipeline from the US State Department, one learns that the chemical makeup of those dilutants are company proprietary information.

Proprietary, shmoprietary, it's only the State Deparment that doesn't know what's in it. If you Google, "Western Canadian Select", you'll find out more than you ever wanted to know about it. They're trying to sell it, after all.

Western Canadian Select

What is Western Canadian Select crude?

Western Canadian Select is a Hardisty based blend of conventional and oilsands production managed by Canadian Natural Resources, Cenovus Energy, Suncor Energy, and Talisman Energy. Argus has launched daily volume-weighted average price indexes for Western Canadian Select (WCS) and will publish this index in the daily Argus Crude and Argus Americas Crude publications.

...followed by a chemical analysis of the most recent sample of it.

What is going down the pipelines is a mixture of oil sands bitumen, conventional heavy oil, synthetic crude oil, condensate, and pentanes plus. The mixture varies from day to day. The buyers don't really care where it came from or how it was mixed, they only care that it meets specs, i.e. the chemical analysis is right.

There are pipelines carrying diluent from the US to Canada, and it is getting to be a big business with the increase in Canadian bitumen and heavy oil production. There are also rail cars full of bitumen going south, and carrying condensate and pentanes plus on the backhaul.

Canada's tar sands unexpected winner from fracking: Kemp

speculawyer on November 20, 2012 - 10:08pm Permalink

"Refinery gain" is definitely a misleading statistic but there is a point there. It is good to do your own refining. Jobs, value-add, refinery gain, etc.

[Feb 14, 2016] The OPEC prediction is more of what I'd call an assumption

peakoilbarrel.com

Guy Minton, 02/13/2016 at 5:47 pm

The big deals against oil prices are, now, the drop in (the increase) in future demand from 1.6 to 1.2%, per IEA, and the massive amount of oil that Iran is getting to lay out with unknown capital input. Supposedly glutting the market with 1.5 million more barrels with magic, I presume. However, I figure it, the drop in demand seems to indicate only about a 300k to 350k difference.
Ah, the magic of OPEC will prevail, then. Even though to fully ramp up more, Saudi has to drill in the offshore area, which I am sure is NOT $10 barrel cost of production. Iraq has to end their internal strife to gain some traction. Venezuela is sucking wind, badly. Ecuador, while not the massive producer of other OPEC members, currently has only one well drilling from 50 something rigs. It is hard to keep up with the news from every country, and it is clear that neither EIA nor IEA are really putting much effort into real data accumulation. I think OPEC is strapped for production for the next two years, with the exception of the magical production from Iran.
On the other hand, I read Canada has some smaller oil sands shut in, while larger ones are scheduling to cut back, or have extended periods of overhaul on production equipment. As rigs for conventional oil have dropped significantly, I fail to see were Canada will not have a decrease in production in 2016. Over a year ago, I said the shale production could drop by over one million, but didn't anticipate the increase before the drop. Still from the high in March of last year, it is still projected to drop by 1.2 million by 2017 by EIA. I still thing they are low in their estimate of the drop, but not as much as they used to be.
I read where China's production is expected to drop from 100k to 200k in 2016, base upon the current prices and capex. A recent post by the author indicates that up to 1.5 million barrels may be lost from in field drilling of offshore wells in 2016. All of South America, Africa, and Asia, including Russia, expect drops in 2016, and 2016 is just the tip of the iceberg.
Where are all of these figures in the garbage the EIA and IEA put out? Far as I can tell, the magical numbers put out for Iran, roughly match the drop in infield drilling offshore. But then I am not an expert, because I am not paid by a highly efficient and omniscient government entity.
Jimmy, 02/13/2016 at 6:37 pm
While what is called a prediction of non-OPEC production seems to meet the definition of the word 'prediction' it seems that the OPEC production prediction is more of what I'd call an assumption. The methodology used to predict future OPEC production is basically as follows: world demand minus non-OPEC production equals OPEC production. That's some pretty weak tea!

It seems to me that there is a bunch of strange and interesting things all going on at once here, several of which are as follows; global peak oil production occurring as we speak is significantly probable, the price of oil is low, Cushings is full of condensate but the market calls it crude and it drops the price of crude, imports of crude to USA have recently increased despite 'the glut', Saudi is likely producing flat out yet production is down month over month for 6 of the last 7 months, upstream investment is down 2 years in a row, demand is up, production is going to decrease. I don't know exactly how it's gonna play out but whatever it is the word 'train wreck' is likely an apt description.

As well this 'total liquids' thing bugs me. It takes energy to produce biofuels and refinery gains. That seems like double counting to me. Like counting the global beef production once when it's on the 1/4 of beef and once again when it's cut with pork fat and called Ukrainian Sausage, to use Mr JJ Browns beef analogy.

I figure in a few short years it'll be pretty clear where all this is going and it'll be a whole new paradigm aka Hobbesian scramble.

Jimmy, 02/13/2016 at 7:49 pm
Intro sentence should have read:

While what is called a prediction of non-OPEC production seems to meet the definition of the word 'prediction' it seems that the OPEC production prediction is more of what I'd call an assumption.

Reply
  • Jimmy says: 02/13/2016 at 6:37 pm While what is called a prediction of non-OPEC production seems to meet the definition of the word 'prediction' it seems that the non-OPEC production prediction is more of what I'd call an assumption. The methodology used to predict future OPEC production is basically as follows: world demand minus non-OPEC production equals OPEC production. That's some pretty weak tea!

    It seems to me that there is a bunch of strange and interesting things all going on at once here, several of which are as follows; global peak oil production occurring as we speak is significantly probable, the price of oil is low, Cushings is full of condensate but the market calls it crude and it drops the price of crude, imports of crude to USA have recently increased despite 'the glut', Saudi is likely producing flat out yet production is down month over month for 6 of the last 7 months, upstream investment is down 2 years in a row, demand is up, production is going to decrease. I don't know exactly how it's gonna play out but whatever it is the word 'train wreck' is likely an apt description.

    As well this 'total liquids' thing bugs me. It takes energy to produce biofuels and refinery gains. That seems like double counting to me. Like counting the global beef production once when it's on the 1/4 of beef and once again when it's cut with pork fat and called Ukrainian Sausage, to use Mr JJ Browns beef analogy.

    I figure in a few short years it'll be pretty clear where all this is going and it'll be a whole new paradigm aka Hobbesian scramble.

    [Feb 12, 2016] Global oversupply is a house of cards which requires massive capital investments to keep crude oil production from crashing

    Notable quotes:
    "... I think there should be is a special place in hell for Goldman commodity traders. ..."
    "... IMO, the global oversupply is a house of cards built on an unstable foundation of actual global crude oil production* that requires massive capital investments to keep crude oil production from crashing. ..."
    "... my buddy (petroleum engineer) who works in Kuwait from time-to-time insists their production rate is maintained by massive infill drilling BUT how long will the party last: a decade? Longer? Shorter? ..."
    "... I would think the second half of 2016 for a price recovery, but I thought we were in a price recovery phase this time last year. As for the duration of a price recovery, I dont have the foggiest. ..."
    "... Incidentally as noted up the thread, an interesting difference between the last oil price decline and the current (much more protracted) decline: Global liquids consumption fell by 2 million bpd from 2007 to 2009, whereas global liquids production reportedly rose by 3 million bpd from 2013 to 2015. ..."
    "... That is what is keeping two thirds of the worlds oil fields from a 5 to 6 percent decline rate. Massive infill drilling is happening in Kuwait, Saudi, the UAE, Russia, the Gulf of Mexico and just about everywhere else in the world. ..."
    "... Normally the production profile of a field would resemble a bell curve with the top of the curve being the 50% depletion point. But with massive infill drilling, the top of the bell just levels out with only a slight decline, if any. But the depletion curve, if you could see it, would be dropping like a rock. ..."
    "... What infill drilling does is delay the decline curve until it too starts dropping like a rock. ..."
    "... My guess is about a decade. Saudi began their infill drilling projects over a decade ago and I believe the fields where this began is already dropping fast. But they have managed to keep production up by bringing on three giant fields, Khurais, Manifa and Shaybah. ..."
    "... But it depends entirely on the size of the field. Giant and super giant fields can maintain infill drilling and keep production up much longer than smaller fields, like those in the GOM. ..."
    "... But Kuwaits production has already started to drop and UAE production is just on the cusp. Russia also has, for almost a decade, had a program of massive infill drilling in their Western Siberia fields where about 60% of their oil is produced. ..."
    peakoilbarrel.com

    Daniel , 02/12/2016 at 7:44 am

    Not sure how reliable this is, but drillinginfo index has the "new US production capacity" (oil and gas) dropping by 24% from January to February; which would be biggest drop since the collapse of the oilprice
    Ron Patterson . 02/12/2016 at 8:44 am
    This headline shocked me: The Oil Industry Got Together and Agreed Things May Never Get Better

    Thousands of industry participants gathered in London for their annual get-together, only to find a world awash in crude and hardly a life jacket in sight.

    The thousands of attendees seeking reasons for optimism didn't find them at the annual International Petroleum Week . Instead they were greeted by a cacophony of voices from some of the largest oil producers, refiners and traders delivering the same message:

    There are few reasons for optimism. The world is awash with oil. The market is overwhelmingly bearish.

    No Hope

    Producers are bracing for a tough year. Prices will stay low for up to a decade as Chinese economic growth slows and the U.S. shale industry acts as a cap on any rally, according to Ian Taylor, chief executive officer of Vitol Group, the world's largest independent oil trader. Even refiners, whose profits have held up better than expected, are seeing a worsening outlook.

    SW , 02/12/2016 at 9:10 am
    Perhaps their only hope is depletion?
    likbez , 02/12/2016 at 1:51 pm
    Is not Bloomberg simply a GS propaganda arm ?

    I especially enjoyed the following statement

    "As the world runs out of places to store oil, "I wouldn't be surprised if this market goes into the teens," said Jeff Currie, head of commodities research at Goldman Sachs Group Inc."

    I think there should be is a special place in hell for Goldman commodity traders.

    Jeffrey J. Brown , 02/12/2016 at 9:41 am
    IMO, the global oversupply is a house of cards built on an unstable foundation of actual global crude oil production* that requires massive capital investments to keep crude oil production from crashing.

    Qatar is basically the poster child for post-2005 production. OPEC 12 data show that Qatar's reported crude oil production, despite billions of dollars spent on enhanced oil recovery, fell from 0.8 million bpd in 2005 to 0.7 million bpd in 2014 (OPEC crude only data), while EIA data show that Qatar's C+C production increased from 1.0 million bpd in 2005 to 1.5 million bpd in 2014.

    Production of condensates rising in Qatar http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/production-condensates-rising-qatar

    *45 API Gravity and lower crude oil

    Doug Leighton , 02/12/2016 at 10:00 am
    "IMO, the global oversupply is a house of cards built on an unstable foundation of actual global crude oil production* that requires massive levels of investments to keep crude oil production from crashing."

    Please provide a scale Jeff. Not that I don't agree with you; my buddy (petroleum engineer) who works in Kuwait from time-to-time insists their production rate is maintained by massive infill drilling BUT how long will the party last: a decade? Longer? Shorter?

    Jeffrey J. Brown , 02/12/2016 at 10:32 am
    I would think the second half of 2016 for a price recovery, but I thought we were in a price recovery phase this time last year. As for the duration of a price recovery, I don't have the foggiest.

    As an example of low probability events, two years ago if someone had asked us what we thought the chances were that Donald Trump, in early 2016, would be the most likely GOP nominee, and that oil prices would be in the 20's to low 30's, I wonder what we would have said.

    Incidentally as noted up the thread, an interesting difference between the last oil price decline and the current (much more protracted) decline: Global liquids consumption fell by 2 million bpd from 2007 to 2009, whereas global liquids production reportedly rose by 3 million bpd from 2013 to 2015.

    Ron Patterson , 02/12/2016 at 11:16 am
    my buddy (petroleum engineer) who works in Kuwait from time-to-time insists their production rate is maintained by massive infill drilling…

    That is what is keeping two thirds of the world's oil fields from a 5 to 6 percent decline rate. Massive infill drilling is happening in Kuwait, Saudi, the UAE, Russia, the Gulf of Mexico and just about everywhere else in the world.

    Normally the production profile of a field would resemble a bell curve with the top of the curve being the 50% depletion point. But with massive infill drilling, the top of the bell just levels out with only a slight decline, if any. But the depletion curve, if you could see it, would be dropping like a rock.

    What infill drilling does is delay the decline curve until it too starts dropping like a rock.

    BUT how long will the party last: a decade? Longer? Shorter?

    My guess is about a decade. Saudi began their infill drilling projects over a decade ago and I believe the fields where this began is already dropping fast. But they have managed to keep production up by bringing on three giant fields, Khurais, Manifa and Shaybah.

    But it depends entirely on the size of the field. Giant and super giant fields can maintain infill drilling and keep production up much longer than smaller fields, like those in the GOM.

    But Kuwait's production has already started to drop and UAE production is just on the cusp. Russia also has, for almost a decade, had a program of massive infill drilling in their Western Siberia fields where about 60% of their oil is produced.

    And folks wonder why I think peak oil is at hand. Geeze, isn't it obvious?

    [Feb 09, 2016] EIA has been underestimating the resilience of the LTO production

    Somewhat strange. On the way down EIA typically overestimating resilience not underestimating it.
    Notable quotes:
    "... By contrast, in the DPR released Monday the EIA predicts the seven major shale plays to produce 5.02 mb/d in February, 185 kb/d higher than in last month's forecast of 4.83 mb/d. The anticipated decline between the March 2015 peak levels and February 2016 is now 453 k/d compared with 638 k/d in January DPR. In general, the comparison between the EIA's DPRs of the past several months shows that the agency has been constantly underestimating the resilience of the LTO production. ..."
    "... The biggest upward revisions were for the Eagle Ford (+77 kb/d for December, +100 kb/d for January, and +127 k/d for February). The EIA's estimates for the Eagle Ford remain lower than those from other sources, in particular, from Bentek Energy. ..."
    peakoilbarrel.com

    AlexS , 02/09/2016 at 6:32 pm

    It is interesting to compare the numbers from the recently released EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO) and Drilling Productivity Report (DPR).

    In today's STEO, the EIA did not change its forecast of C+C production in the Lower 48 states (excl. GoM) for 2016-17, although projected output in the Gulf of Mexico was slightly revised down.

    By contrast, in the DPR released Monday the EIA predicts the seven major shale plays to produce 5.02 mb/d in February, 185 kb/d higher than in last month's forecast of 4.83 mb/d. The anticipated decline between the March 2015 peak levels and February 2016 is now 453 k/d compared with 638 k/d in January DPR. In general, the comparison between the EIA's DPRs of the past several months shows that the agency has been constantly underestimating the resilience of the LTO production.

    The EIA still projects the monthly decline in 7 key shales oil production to accelerate from 73 kb/d in February to 93 kb/d in March.

    Oil production in 7 major U.S. shales: EIA DPR Feb 2016 vs. Jan 2016 vs. Dec 2015

    AlexS , 02/09/2016 at 6:44 pm
    The biggest upward revisions were for the Eagle Ford (+77 kb/d for December, +100 kb/d for January, and +127 k/d for February). The EIA's estimates for the Eagle Ford remain lower than those from other sources, in particular, from Bentek Energy.

    Oil production in the Eagle Ford shale: EIA DPR Feb 2016 vs. Jan 2016 vs. Dec 2015

    Reply

    [Feb 09, 2016] IEA in Davos 2016 warns of higher oil prices in a few years' time

    Notable quotes:
    "... Daniel Yergin: "Just to put a number on that. Our numbers at IHS, 2015-2020 we see a 1.8 trillion dollar decline in upstream oil and gas investment" ..."
    "... To the extent that oversupply of US shale oil (including condensate filling up US inventories) has contributed to currently low oil prices, the drama evolving now is that unconventional oil – which was originally intended to be added to stagnating conventional supplies in the 1 st phase of peaking oil production (2005-2008) – is now endangering this much larger conventional base production, including higher cost offshore fields. ..."
    "... And for those who hope that oil markets will "rebalance" at $60-$70 there is no statistical evidence in the last 10 years that oil prices stayed for very long at these levels. ..."
    crudeoilpeak.info

    This recent forum was about how to transition away from fossil fuels, after the UN conference on climate change in Paris in November 2015. Moderator Yergin – who is a known peak oil denier – started by asking Fatih Birol what low oil and gas prices mean for the development of renewable energies. Fatih responded by first warning about the impact of lower oil prices on investments in the oil and gas sector:

    (video 3:24)
    Fatih Birol: "For the oil markets what worries me the most is that: last year we have seen oil investments in 2015 decline more than 20%, compared to 2014, for the new projects. And this was the largest drop we have ever seen in the history of oil. And, moreover, in 2016, this year, with the $30 price environment, we expect an additional 16% decline in the oil projects, investments. So, we have never seen 2 years in a row oil investments declining. If there was a decline 1 year, which was very rare, the next year there was a rebound"

    Daniel Yergin: "What does that lead you to?"

    Fatih Birol: "this leads me to the very fact that in a few years of time, when the global demand gets a bit stronger, when we see that the high cost areas such as the United States start to decline, we may well see and upward pressure on the prices as a result of market tightness. So my message, my 1st message is: don't be misled that the low oil prices will have an impact on the oil prices in the market in a few years' time"

    Daniel Yergin: "Just to put a number on that. Our numbers at IHS, 2015-2020 we see a 1.8 trillion dollar decline in upstream oil and gas investment"

    ... ... ...

    The graph shows that conventional crude oil production is supposed to be basically flat. This is designed by adjusting the yet-to-be-found wedge. Unconventional tight (shale) oil and heavy oil/bitumen increase only slightly up to 2020. NGLs go up but these don't play a big role for transport fuels (except LPG).

    If 80% of investments are needed just to offset decline, then the additional 2016 drop leads to such a low investment level that yet-to-be-developed projects are in danger, not to mention the assumed production from yet-to-be-found fields. An example of the latter is Shell ending its exploration in the Chukchi sea.

    Conclusion

    Changes in investment projections were already underway before the 2014 oil price drop. To the extent that oversupply of US shale oil (including condensate filling up US inventories) has contributed to currently low oil prices, the drama evolving now is that unconventional oil – which was originally intended to be added to stagnating conventional supplies in the 1st phase of peaking oil production (2005-2008) – is now endangering this much larger conventional base production, including higher cost offshore fields.

    Even if oil prices go up again US shale oil has already destabilized global oil markets by increasing volatility. Is that what we call a swing producer? Yes, swinging oil prices and investments. And for those who hope that oil markets will "rebalance" at $60-$70 there is no statistical evidence in the last 10 years that oil prices stayed for very long at these levels.

    [Feb 09, 2016] Those idiots from BBC predict oil stock building at the rate 300 mm bbp per day

    Total world consumption is around 96 mm bbp per day
    Notable quotes:
    "... The IEA forecast that stock building could continue in the second half of 2016 at a rate of 300 million barrels a day. It said: If these numbers prove to be accurate, and with the market already awash in oil, it is very hard to see how oil prices can rise significantly in the short term. ..."
    "... find how much storage capacity there is, and essentially manufacture that number too, and then derive backwards how much is required to fill it, and then subtract another essentially imaginary number as to how much of the capacity was already filled on some arbitrary date - and you can declare how much oversupply "there must be". ..."
    peakoilbarrel.com

    Doug Leighton , 02/09/2016 at 12:03 pm

    OIL PRICE RECOVERY WILL BE SHORT-LIVED, SAYS IEA

    "A recent rise in oil prices is a "false dawn" and the oversupply of crude is set to worsen, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA)….

    The IEA forecast that stock building could continue in the second half of 2016 at a rate of 300 million barrels a day. It said: If these numbers prove to be accurate, and with the market already awash in oil, it is very hard to see how oil prices can rise significantly in the short term."

    http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35530123

    daniel , 02/09/2016 at 12:41 pm
    300 mm bbp per day – wow :-)
    Watcher, 02/09/2016 at 1:04 pm
    This is what happens when a theory is accepted as fact.

    If there's too much oversupply for storage to exist, well then, the oversupply must have been less than thought. In fact, find how much storage capacity there is, and essentially manufacture that number too, and then derive backwards how much is required to fill it, and then subtract another essentially imaginary number as to how much of the capacity was already filled on some arbitrary date - and you can declare how much oversupply "there must be".

    They would be laughed out of the room at any physics seminar.

    [Feb 09, 2016] February 2016 Short-Term Energy Outlook

    U.S. Energy Information Administration

    [Feb 09, 2016] IEA releases Oil Market Report for February

    Notable quotes:
    "... global oil demand growth is forecast to ease back considerably in 2016, to 1.2 mb/d ..."
    "... Oil Market Report ..."
    "... Global oil supply dropped 0.2 mb/d to 96.5 mb/d in January, ..."
    "... Non-OPEC supplies slipped 0.5 mb/d from a month earlier to stand close to levels of a year ago. For 2016 as a whole, non-OPEC output is expected to decline by 0.6 mb/d, to 57.1 mb/d. ..."
    "... Global refinery runs fell by 1.3 mb/d in January to 79.8 mb/d, as the onset of seasonal maintenance in the United States and weakening refinery margins curbed runs. Global throughputs nevertheless stood more than 1.7 mb/d above a year earlier, with gains particularly strong in the United States and the Middle East. ..."
    "... After growing by an estimated 1.8 million b/d in 2015, global oil inventories are forecast to grow by 1.4 million b/d in the first quarter of 2016. ..."
    "... With global oil inventory builds expected to continue in 2016, upward pressure on crude oil prices will be limited. Forecast Brent prices will average $38/b in 2016, $3/b lower than forecast in last months STEO. The largest inventory builds occur in the first half of 2016, helping keep Brent prices below $40/b through August. ..."
    "... Forecast West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices average the same as Brent crude oil prices through the forecast period, compared with $2/b lower than Brent in 2016 and $3/b lower in 2017 in the prior STEO. The price parity of WTI with Brent in the forecast period is based on the assumption of competition between the two crudes in the U.S. Gulf Coast refinery market, as transportation differentials are similar to move the crudes from their respective pricing points to that market. ..."
    www.iea.org

    Price forecast:


    2014 2015 2016 projected 2017 projected
    WTI Crude Oila (dollars per barrel) 93.17 48.67 37.59 50.00

    Having peaked, at a five-year high of 1.6 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2015, global oil demand growth is forecast to ease back considerably in 2016, to 1.2 mb/d, pulled down by notable slowdowns in Europe, China and the United States, the newly released IEA Oil Market Report (OMR) for February informs subscribers. Early elements of the projected slowdown surfaced in the last quarter of 2015.

    Global oil supply dropped 0.2 mb/d to 96.5 mb/d in January, as higher OPEC output only partly offset lower non-OPEC production. Non-OPEC supplies slipped 0.5 mb/d from a month earlier to stand close to levels of a year ago. For 2016 as a whole, non-OPEC output is expected to decline by 0.6 mb/d, to 57.1 mb/d.

    OPEC crude oil output rose by 280 000 barrels per day in January to 32.63 mb/d as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and a sanctions-free Iran all turned up the taps. Supplies from the group during January stood nearly 1.7 mb/d higher year-on-year.

    OECD commercial stocks built counterseasonally by 7.6 mb in December to stand at 3 012 mb at month end, 350 mb above average. Refined products covered 32.3 days of forward demand, 0.1 day above the level at end-November. Preliminary information indicates that inventories have continued building into January.

    Global refinery runs fell by 1.3 mb/d in January to 79.8 mb/d, as the onset of seasonal maintenance in the United States and weakening refinery margins curbed runs. Global throughputs nevertheless stood more than 1.7 mb/d above a year earlier, with gains particularly strong in the United States and the Middle East.

    Global Crude Oil Prices

    Brent crude oil spot prices decreased by $7/b in January to a monthly average of $31/b, the lowest monthly average price since December 2003. Ongoing growth in global oil inventories and uncertainty over future global demand growth continued to put downward pressure on oil prices during January. After growing by an estimated 1.8 million b/d in 2015, global oil inventories are forecast to grow by 1.4 million b/d in the first quarter of 2016.

    During January, daily changes in crude oil prices were highly correlated with daily changes in global equity indexes. The increased co-movement and higher volatility likely reflect increased uncertainty about future global economic growth. Changes in overall demand for risk assets, such as commodities and equities, by investors and market participants may also be playing a larger role in price discovery across global asset markets compared with previous months.

    With global oil inventory builds expected to continue in 2016, upward pressure on crude oil prices will be limited. Forecast Brent prices will average $38/b in 2016, $3/b lower than forecast in last month's STEO. The largest inventory builds occur in the first half of 2016, helping keep Brent prices below $40/b through August.

    Brent prices are forecast to average $50/b in 2017, with upward price pressure concentrated later in that year. At that point, the market is expected to experience small inventory draws, with the possibility of further draws beyond the forecast period. Brent prices are forecast to average $56/b in the fourth quarter of 2017.

    Forecast West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices average the same as Brent crude oil prices through the forecast period, compared with $2/b lower than Brent in 2016 and $3/b lower in 2017 in the prior STEO. The price parity of WTI with Brent in the forecast period is based on the assumption of competition between the two crudes in the U.S. Gulf Coast refinery market, as transportation differentials are similar to move the crudes from their respective pricing points to that market.

    The current values of futures and options contracts continue to suggest both heightened volatility and high uncertainty in the price outlook (Market Prices and Uncertainty Report). WTI futures contracts for May 2016 delivery, traded during the five-day period ending February 4, averaged $35/b, while implied volatility averaged 57%. These levels established the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval for the market's expectations of monthly average WTI prices in May 2016 at $21/b and $58/b, respectively. The 95% confidence interval for market expectations widens over time, with lower and upper limits of $19/b and $85/b for prices in December 2016. At this time last year, WTI for May 2015 delivery averaged $52/b, and implied volatility averaged 52%. The corresponding lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval were $33/b and $81/b.

    [Feb 05, 2016] The rule of the game for EIA and friends

    peakoilbarrel.com
    Watcher, 02/05/2016 at 2:03 pm
    Useful to remember that accuracy is not the goal of reports reported by . . . almost anyone. If a study says something that suggests a client company is going to be destroyed, do you really think such a study is going to see the light of day? That's like expecting a management consultant to come in and tell management they are incompetent.

    No more contracts for that consultant.

    [Feb 04, 2016] A Saudi-Russian Oil Détente Not Likely

    Notable quotes:
    "... The media puts forth a continuous stream of completely unadulterated crap to its readership. Saudi Arabia is not going to spend $175 billion per year to put out of business producers that produce an entirely different product, and which sells to an entirely different market. LTO is as much like Saudi crude as Shetland Ponies are to an Arabian race horses. The similarities stop at horse. ..."
    "... LTO is a very light hydrocarbon that is used as a diluent, and feed stock. Its API is 45. It is used to thin heavier hydrocarbons like Canadian bitumen to allow it to be transported by pipe. It is used as a feedstock to make hundreds of different products from paint to plastic pipe. ..."
    "... Saudis light sweet crude has an API 45, and the heavier ones, API 40, deliver entirely different products as show in the graph below: ..."
    "... Goldman Sachs is an unscrupulous pack of thieves who have no qualms about lying to their clients, or the public if it serves their purposes. They, and others in the shale financing business will continue to push the Saudi/ US LTO myth for as long as they can find investors that are credulous enough to believe them. ..."
    "... Some see only what they want to see. Others see the whole forest. Bloomberg and Goldman are both habitual liars and thieves. Goldman says it and Bloomberg backs it up, as if either have any credibility left. ..."
    "... Short has it correct. All you see in the US MSM is bullshit in ever higher and smellier piles. As we approach the end, the cries will be louder, shriller and continuous. Wait and see. ..."
    Peak Oil News and Message Boards
    shortonoil on Thu, 4th Feb 2016 4:18 pm

    "A deal is not only "highly unlikely," in the estimation of Goldman Sachs, but "self-defeating" for the Saudis. By cutting production now and boosting prices, Saudi Arabia would effectively bail out U.S. shale producers just as the Saudi strategy of keeping prices low to squeeze them out of the market is beginning to work, Goldman's Jeff Currie argues."

    The media puts forth a continuous stream of completely unadulterated crap to its readership. Saudi Arabia is not going to spend $175 billion per year to put out of business producers that produce an entirely different product, and which sells to an entirely different market. LTO is as much like Saudi crude as Shetland Ponies are to an Arabian race horses. The similarities stop at horse.

    LTO is a very light hydrocarbon that is used as a diluent, and feed stock. Its API is > 45. It is used to thin heavier hydrocarbons like Canadian bitumen to allow it to be transported by pipe. It is used as a feedstock to make hundreds of different products from paint to plastic pipe.

    Saudi's light sweet crude has an API 45, and the heavier ones, API < 40, deliver entirely different products as show in the graph below:

    http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/images/eneene/sources/petpet/images/refraf1-lrgr-eng.png

    Saudi's light sweet crude, and LTO are entirely different products that sell to entirely different markets. Saudi's crude is no competition to LTO and LTO is no competition for Saudi's crude.

    Goldman Sachs is an unscrupulous pack of thieves who have no qualms about lying to their clients, or the public if it serves their purposes. They, and others in the shale financing business will continue to push the Saudi/ US LTO myth for as long as they can find investors that are credulous enough to believe them.

    makati1 on Thu, 4th Feb 2016 7:59 pm

    Some see only what they want to see. Others see the whole forest. Bloomberg and Goldman are both habitual liars and thieves. Goldman says it and Bloomberg backs it up, as if either have any credibility left.

    Short has it correct. All you see in the US MSM is bullshit in ever higher and smellier piles. As we approach the end, the cries will be louder, shriller and continuous. Wait and see.

    [Feb 04, 2016] The IEAs Oil Production Predictions for 2016

    peakoilbarrel.com

    Peak Oil Barrel

    The IEA Oil Market Report, full issue, is now available to the public. Some interesting observations:
    Non-OPEC oil supplies are nevertheless seen sharply lower in December. Overall supplies are estimated to have slipped by more than 0.6 mb/d from the month prior, to 57.4 mb/d. A seasonal decline in biofuel production, largely due to the Brazilian sugar cane harvest, of nearly 0.4 mb/d was the largest contributor to December's drop. Production in Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and the US was also seen easing from both November's level and compared with a year earlier. Persistently low production in Mexico and Yemen were other contributors to the year-on-year decline.

    As such, total non-OPEC liquids output slipped below the year earlier level for the first time since September 2012. A production surge in December 2014 inflates the annual decline rate, but the drop is nevertheless significant should these estimates be confirmed by firm data. Already in November, growth in non-OPEC supply had slipped to 640 kb/d, from as much as 2.9 mb/d at the end of 2014, and 2.4 mb/d for 2014 as a whole. For 2015, supplies look likely to post an increase of 1.4 mb/d for the year, before contracting by nearly 0.6 mb/d in 2016. A prolonged period of oil at sub-$30/bbl puts additional volumes at risk of shut in as realised prices fall close to operating costs for some producers.

    [Feb 04, 2016] EIA as Energy Disinformation Agency

    Notable quotes:
    "... They insist on lumping biofuels with crude oil etc. I would call them the Energy Disinformation Agency. ..."
    "... Alex, they lump everything in the discussions and most tables intended for public distribution. I spend a lot of time explaining to people their graphs and most data tables are covering up what happens to crude oil and condensate. I consider their practices to be deceitful. ..."
    peakoilbarrel.com
    Fernando Leanm, 02/04/2016 at 9:34 am
    They insist on lumping biofuels with crude oil etc. I would call them the Energy Disinformation Agency.
    AlexS, 02/04/2016 at 4:22 pm
    Fernando,

    They include separate numbers for biofuels production and refinery processing gains

    Fernando Leanm, 02/05/2016 at 6:47 am
    Alex, they lump everything in the discussions and most tables intended for public distribution. I spend a lot of time explaining to people their graphs and most data tables are covering up what happens to crude oil and condensate. I consider their practices to be deceitful.

    shortonoil on Thu, 4th Feb 2016 2:27 pm

    Some of this data looks very anomalous. For instance, if one looks at the US rig count vs Us C+C production between June '09 and Sept '11, rig count increased by 800 or 500%.

    During that same period US C+C production stayed flat.

    What were these guys doing, playing poker for 26 months? From spud to IP was no more than 8 months even back in the dark ages (2009) of shale production.

    Assuming 4 wells per year per rig that would have been about 1500 new wells.

    The decline rate of conventional US wells was probably about 5% or 250,000 b/d per year. Without some kind of explanation it is hard to take this data seriously.

    [Feb 03, 2016] Revising the Past - US Oil Production Data

    Notable quotes:
    "... The changes can be very big. Look at the line that comes to a halt in April 2015, these are the numbers from the May 2015 Short Term Energy Outlook, those estimates were about 340,000 bbls per day less than what the EIA now think. About as much as people are estimating Iran might be able to add to the market and which is now causing fear and trepidation amongst oil bulls. On that point I am a tad sceptical , not having been born under a gooseberry tree. ..."
    "... But on the 27th January the EIA published a revision to the numbers (which will be used in the February 2016 STEO) which bucked that trend and started to revise the past downwards. That is the dark blue line on the chart, which tracks the pale blue line for most of the year but includes a 140,000 bbls per day reduction in the estimate of November 2015 production. ..."
    "... We can be confident of one thing the revisions to the past aren't finished, and given the dramatic fall in the oil price from November to January, and the drastic cuts in US operators budgets for 2016 it seems to me that US production will soon decline below 9 million barrels per day, my estimate is that that threshold will be crossed in February and that the US will exit 2016 producing about 8.4 mmbbls/day. ..."
    OilVoice

    The changes can be very big. Look at the line that comes to a halt in April 2015, these are the numbers from the May 2015 Short Term Energy Outlook, those estimates were about 340,000 bbls per day less than what the EIA now think. About as much as people are estimating Iran might be able to add to the market and which is now causing fear and trepidation amongst oil bulls. On that point I am a tad sceptical, not having been born under a gooseberry tree.

    The same then happened on the way down. As the oil price collapsed and rigs were stacked, it seemed in September that the decline was well established and that the US would soon be producing less than 9 million barrels per day. I confidently tweeted that projection, but I was dead wrong. Month after month the previous estimates were raised and the impending collapse was deferred. This continued right up to the last estimate of historic monthly production, published at the end of December, and used in the January 2016 Short Term Energy Outlook, the pale blue line on the graph. At that time, virtually the whole of 2015 was revised upwards by nearly 100,000 bbls per day.

    But on the 27th January the EIA published a revision to the numbers (which will be used in the February 2016 STEO) which bucked that trend and started to revise the past downwards. That is the dark blue line on the chart, which tracks the pale blue line for most of the year but includes a 140,000 bbls per day reduction in the estimate of November 2015 production.

    We can be confident of one thing the revisions to the past aren't finished, and given the dramatic fall in the oil price from November to January, and the drastic cuts in US operators budgets for 2016 it seems to me that US production will soon decline below 9 million barrels per day, my estimate is that that threshold will be crossed in February and that the US will exit 2016 producing about 8.4 mmbbls/day.

    But take that all with a pinch of salt. It is hard enough estimating the past let alone, predicting the future.

    [Feb 01, 2016] On systemic difficulties to estimate actual USA oil production

    Notable quotes:
    "... Bentek: The average oil production from the Eagle Ford in December was 1.5 million barrels per day. On a year-over-year basis, that is down about 7%, or about 110,000 barrels per day, from December 2014. ..."
    "... EIA DPR: The average oil production from the Eagle Ford in December was 1.29 mb/d. That is down 22,4%, or 374 kb/d, from December 2014. ..."
    "... According to Bentek, crude oil production in the North Dakota section of the Bakken shale formation of the Williston Basin dipped by less than 1% month over month in December, or about 9,000 b/d ..."
    "... According to the EIA DPR, the decline in the Bakken was 19 kb/d . ..."
    peakoilbarrel.com
    AlexS , 02/01/2016 at 3:52 pm

    Shale Oil Production in Bakken, Eagle Ford Little Changed in December: Platts Bentek

    Year Over Year, Output from These Two Prolific Shale Plays Fell More Than 6% from December 2014

    Thursday, January 28, 2016
    http://www.oilvoice.com/n/Shale-Oil-Production-in-Bakken-Eagle-Ford-Little-Changed-in-December-Platts-Bentek/459c3fe97203.aspx

    Oil production from key shale formations in North Dakota and Texas dropped slightly in December versus November, according to Platts Bentek, an analytics and forecasting unit of Platts, a leading global provider of energy, petrochemicals, metals and agriculture information.

    Oil production from the Eagle Ford was relatively unchanged in December, increasing about 11,000 barrels per day (b/d), or less than 1%, versus the previous month, the latest analysis showed. This marks the first time since March 2015 that the Eagle Ford shale did not decline. Conversely, crude oil production in the North Dakota section of the Bakken shale formation of the Williston Basin dipped by less than 1% month over month in December, or about 9,000 b/d, continuing the trend of marginal decline that began in the summer.

    The average oil production from the Eagle Ford basin in December was 1.5 million barrels per day. On a year-over-year basis, that is down about 7%, or about 110,000 barrels per day, from December 2014, according to Sami Yahya, Platts Bentek energy analyst. The average crude oil production from the North Dakota section of the Bakken in November was 1.2 million b/d, about 6% lower than year ago levels.

    'The small increase in crude production in the Eagle Ford shale is attributed to a slight resurgence in drilling activity in the region,' said Yahya. 'In December, the number of active rigs in the Eagle Ford reached 80, an increase of five rigs over the previous month. The brief rebound of active rigs is likely due to producers balancing their drilling programs and budgets for the fourth quarter and meeting their goals for wells drilled for the year.'

    Recapping the year-on-year production drop in the Eagle Ford shale, Yahya emphasized the importance of efficiency gains realized in 2015. Back in January of 2015, the Eagle Ford shale utilized over 200 rigs, while now, in January of 2016, the number of active rigs shrunk to under 70 rigs, a drop of over 65%. And yet, production did not meet a similar fate. Producers back in January of 2015 could drill less than two wells per rig per month, compared to nearly three wells per month currently.

    'It is survival of the fittest: the best and most efficient rigs and crews remain standing on the field,' Yahya noted. 'The number of active rigs in the Bakken shale formation of the Williston Basin went from nearly 150 rigs in early 2015 to around 50 rigs currently. At the same time, producers were able to increase their drilling rates from about 1.5 wells per rig per month to about 2.2 wells per rig per month.'

    However, Yahya explained that going forward, crude production would need more than just efficiency gains to grow.

    'Last year, optimization and hedging programs helped production stay largely afloat. But unless the pricing of the oil barrel improve, producers are in for a difficult year ahead. Based on latest Platts Bentek forecast data, both the Eagle Ford and the Bakken shales are expected to continue declining throughout most of the year. Certainly, the availability of wells in backlog inventory where drilling cost is already sunk would be a helpful factor in partially sustaining production volumes in both shales.'

    'If prices remain sub-$40/barrel and producers are unable to further bring down completion costs, then they might defer completions until the pricing market makes a comeback,' said Yahya.

    Platts Bentek analysis shows that from November 2014 to November 2015, total U.S. crude oil production has increased by about 265,000 b/d.
    --------------
    It is interesting to compare Bentek data with the latest EIA Drilling productivity report.
    According to Bentek, oil production from the Eagle Ford increased 11kb/d versus the previous month.
    According to the DPR, it declined 71 kb/d.

    Bentek: "The average oil production from the Eagle Ford in December was 1.5 million barrels per day. On a year-over-year basis, that is down about 7%, or about 110,000 barrels per day, from December 2014.

    EIA DPR: The average oil production from the Eagle Ford in December was 1.29 mb/d. That is down 22,4%, or 374 kb/d, from December 2014.

    According to Bentek, "crude oil production in the North Dakota section of the Bakken shale formation of the Williston Basin dipped by less than 1% month over month in December, or about 9,000 b/d"

    According to the EIA DPR, the decline in the Bakken was 19 kb/d .

    The y-o-y decline, according to bentek was 6% vs. 9.6% in the EIA DPR statistics.

    [Feb 01, 2016] EIA provides two confiting estimates for November 2015 USA production 9.181 or 9,318,000 million bbls per day

    peakoilbarrel.com
    Ron Patterson, 02/01/2016 at 2:30 pm
    Hey, great article on the EIA. Revising the Past – US Oil Production Data

    This article is based on the EIA's Monthly Energy Review which was released on 27th January and which states November 2015 production was 9,181,000 bbls/day. Oddly, the Petroleum & Other Liquids monthly data which was released on 29th January says November 2015 production was 9,318,000 bbls/day. Which one is the one the EIA intend us to use?

    As I have said before the US Energy Information Agency (the EIA) has a thankless task, compiling data from thousands of oilfields and operators to come up with an estimate of how much oil the USA actually produces. Some data is timely and accurate, Alaska is a case in point, some, not so much.

    So every month as well as giving us a new estimate for the month just passed, we get revisions of the historic data. It is instructive to take a look at that data to see how far off the early estimates were. Big revisions are a sign of a dislocation in the system, a sign that the old rules of thumb aren't working any more. The EIA has suffered from this phenomenon on the way up, as US shale output outstripped any reasonable estimates of how it might perform; and now on the way down, as somehow the whole US oil industry did a passable impersonation of Wile E. Coyote, well beyond the edge of the cliff but somehow defying gravity.

     photo EIA Estimates_zpsacmet2gx.jpg

    AlexS, 02/01/2016 at 2:51 pm
    Monthly Energy Review data for November and December is forecast. MER data for the most recent 2 month has never been reliable. By contrast, Petroleum Supply Monthly numbers released on January 29th are more correct, in my view.

    There were some revisions compared with the previous PSM: September 2015 -11 kb/d;
    October 2015 +23 kb/d.

    The data for November was only -2 kb/d compared with the January STEO estimate.
    In general, the EIA has been making mostly upwards revisions for 2015 C+C production

    [Feb 01, 2016] I'm reminded of how often EIA and NoDak's DMR have quoted numbers in conflict with each other of late

    peakoilbarrel.com

    Watcher, 01/31/2016 at 4:43 pm

    Re: Ron's Ronpost . . . anyone have a source for NGL prices?

    Previous Ronpost - Doug noted that in his experience every geologist in China doesn't have their words filtered by Beijing. So there is truth to be found in provincial quotes of things oil related. If the matter became more overtly national security related, of course that would change.

    I'm reminded of how often EIA and NoDak's DMR have quoted numbers in conflict with each other of late. Not that this need be conspiratorial. We somewhat know EIA numbers come from a model that likely is as worthless as most. This would be a case of provincial data having not been . . . filtered, or smoothed, or seasonally adjusted or whatever else is the change mechanism du jour.

    [Jan 30, 2016] Whoever controls the image of the future controls resources now

    peakoilbarrel.com
    Patrick R, 01/30/2016 at 4:29 pm
    Of course the forecasts by WoodMac, IEA, EIA, etc are little more than posturing. Predictions, after all, are claims on the present, not information from the future. Whoever controls the image of the future controls resources now. Conservatives want you only to fear terrorism and not pollution, and Conservationists the reverse [I like those two words; they have the same root of course].

    Here for example are driving predictions from English Department for Transport and Washington State DoT. Like every single Transportation Dept [read; road builders] they constantly predict more driving for ever and ever. No matter how many years they get this wrong, they've got to predict more because these predictions set their budgets for ever more fancy-arsed road projects.

    Are WoodMac really going to say growth in the sector is over? Haha. And the alphabet institutions [EEEEEIIIIAAA] are extrapolationists, they're never going to catch discontinuity.

    Dang, won't accept the attachments again; here's the link:

    http://transportblog.co.nz/2014/02/19/our-insane-traffic-projections/

    likbez, 01/30/2016 at 8:06 pm
    Patrick,

    "Of course the forecasts by WoodMac, IEA, EIA, etc are little more than posturing. Predictions, after all, are claims on the present, not information from the future. Whoever controls the image of the future controls resources now. "

    Well said. Thank you!

    "Whoever controls the image of the future controls resources now. "

    That's what propaganda is about. Agencies such as EIA and IEA are as much propaganda outlets as they are statistics gathering bodies. As we all know there are three types of lies: "Lies, damned lies, and statistics".

    As Watcher observed: "Countries strive for victory over their enemies. They have nothing to gain by providing accurate information."

    Patrick R, 01/30/2016 at 5:44 pm
    Always the argument is between the trend and the status quo. BAUists will insist we look backwards by demanding data which of course can only be historical. This is an important corrective to theory but never shows the whole picture, because it always of course supports no change, or at most an extrapolation of the past. Never fundamental change.

    Why won't oil's future follow where coal is now? I find this at least a highly plausible possibility. It is not unlikely that a combination of electric supply and climate policies will strand a great deal of oil at any price. How, economics of course:

    http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/fossil-fuels-terrible-investment_us_56aa3463e4b05e4e37037321?ir=World&section=us_world&utm_hp_ref=world&utm_content=bufferd6ac7&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

    What is always less clear is how long this takes, if I have learnt anything following global change is that it usually both takes way longer than I first think, and then can also happen very suddenly: Straws do break camels' backs.

    likbez, 01/30/2016 at 8:27 pm
    "Why won't oil's future follow where coal is now?"

    Because predictions are difficult, especially about the future. So far coal was partially replaced in the only role where new technologies are somewhat competitive - electrical power generation - and this happened not only because the rise of wind and solar, but also because the price of natural gas dropped so substantially. Without the last factor the situation might reverse itself. Not everywhere coal is replaced. High quality coal is indispensable in metallurgy.

    Everything depends on technologies available. Actually the initial idea of diesel engine was to run it on coal powder. It failed. But now with the new level of technology achieved I wonder if something along those lines ("nanoparticles") might be feasible at least for large ships.

    At some level of oil prices coal might also be used to produce liquid fuels for transportation like Germany did during the WWII.

    Natural gas is also well positioned to penetrate heavy truck and marine fuel markets if the price remains low.

    [Jan 30, 2016] Questioning the reliability of oil production figures reported by various countries and agencies such as the IEA

    Notable quotes:
    "... These are the most important data points on earth, and they are not known to high confidence. This is what one would expect. Countries strive for victory over their enemies. They have nothing to gain by providing accurate information. ..."
    "... If for instance Saudi Arabia says last years production was ten million barrels per day average, exactly, how far off do you think that might be, one tenth of a percent? two percent? ..."
    "... Some countries are going to be notorious liars of course, and their figures might be off by ten percent or more. ..."
    "... The trend in the reported quantity of oil available on international markets ought to be likewise accurate, even though the actual reported quantity of oil available on world markets might have been off by a percent or even two percent or more. ..."
    "... I would assume that EIA has error margin close or above 100,000 bbls/day. So the accuracy of EIA data is just two significant digits maximum. The fact that they provide more digits is just an attempt to be a better Catholic then Pope, if you wish ;-). ..."
    "... Generally they should have strong institutional bias toward lower oil prices and that bias can influence their oil production and consumption numbers. So it is rational to assume that they tend to overestimate the production and underestimate consumption growth. In other words they are predisposed to "revealing" oil glut even if it does not exists. ..."
    "... Some people like Steve Brown recommend reducing their production numbers by 100,000 bbl/day just in case ..."
    peakoilbarrel.com
    oldfarmermac, 01/30/2016 at 10:05 am
    At times there are numerous comments questioning the reliability of oil production figures reported by various countries and by different outfits sucth as the IEA etc.

    No doubt there are serious errors.

    What I would like to know, is this.

    How big do you guys who crunch a lot of numbers think the errors are ?

    How much higher, or lower might the true total world wide production of C plus C be , if it were possible to know?

    How big might the errors be in the worst case countries?

    AlexS, 01/30/2016 at 10:57 am
    OFM,

    The errors can be very big.
    In the World Energy Outlook 2008, the IEA projected global total liquids demand at 106.4 mb/d by 2030.
    In the latest WEO-2015, they are projecting 103.5 mb/d by 2040.

    The trend in the past 10 years was towards lower medium and long-term supply and demand projections

    clueless, 01/30/2016 at 11:07 am
    Generally speaking, when dealing with massive amounts of data, the "errors" largely offset each other. That is, if almost every figure is subject to being either to high or too low, after adding them all up, the total is surprisingly close to what the "real" total should be. Obviously, if you could posit a situation in which every number is likely to be too high (or too low) that would not be the case.

    So, with an individual country, like say Venezuela, maybe it is off by a significant amount.

    AlexS, 01/30/2016 at 11:19 am
    clueless,

    As regards global oil (liquids) supply and demand projections, there were not just statistical errors, but very significant conceptual errors. All agencies have been significantly overestimating global demand and supply.

    Watcher, 01/30/2016 at 11:38 am
    These are the most important data points on earth, and they are not known to high confidence. This is what one would expect. Countries strive for victory over their enemies. They have nothing to gain by providing accurate information.

    If I were China, I'd make oil production a state secret, too.

    Doug Leighton, 01/30/2016 at 1:16 pm
    Hi Watcher,

    I doubt China is playing games with reported oil production capability. I had an office in Harbin for many years where most of my time was spend assessing reserves for NA oil companies who wanted access to Chinese oil. As such I was in contact with numerous local oilmen who freely gave me access to their reservoir data. The Chinese were duplicitous in one respect, in my opinion, by leading American companies into believing they were entertaining potential JV partners when, in fact, they simply wanted to massage business contacts in general. On China's production I expect the following is accurate:

    "… China's crude oil output has stagnated for the past two years despite intense drilling activity on land and offshore. In late 2014, CNPC essentially threw in the towel on its workhorse field, Daqing, announcing that it would allow the field to essentially enter a phase of managed decline over the next five years. Under this new approach, the field's oil production will fall from 800,000 barrels per day (kbd) in 2014 to 640 kbd by 2020: a 20 percent decrease. To highlight the importance of PetroChina's decision, consider that Daqing currently accounts for approximately one in every five barrels of oil currently pumped in China – on par with the role Alaska's massive Prudhoe Bay field has played in US oil production…"

    http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/china-peak-oil-2015-is-the-year/

    oldfarmermac, 01/30/2016 at 11:42 am
    Thanks guys, but I did not mean to ask about PREDICTED oil production but rather about ACTUAL production, this year, and in past years.

    If for instance Saudi Arabia says last years production was ten million barrels per day average, exactly, how far off do you think that might be, one tenth of a percent? two percent?

    Some countries are going to be notorious liars of course, and their figures might be off by ten percent or more.

    But even though the total reported world production might be wrong by a percent or more, in either direction, up or down, the TREND in reported production still ought to be accurate.

    The trend in the reported quantity of oil available on international markets ought to be likewise accurate, even though the actual reported quantity of oil available on world markets might have been off by a percent or even two percent or more.

    AlexS, 01/30/2016 at 11:58 am
    Historical demand and supply numbers are constantly revised, but in most cases revisions are not too big.

    Revisions of the US oil production numbers were relatively big in 2015.

    likbez , 01/30/2016 at 2:21 pm
    I would assume that EIA has error margin close or above 100,000 bbls/day. So the accuracy of EIA data is just two significant digits maximum. The fact that they provide more digits is just an attempt to be a better Catholic then Pope, if you wish ;-).

    Generally they should have strong institutional bias toward lower oil prices and that bias can influence their oil production and consumption numbers. So it is rational to assume that they tend to overestimate the production and underestimate consumption growth. In other words they are predisposed to "revealing" oil glut even if it does not exists.

    The margin or error is different for different types of oil with those areas that are served by pipelines more precise (offshore is one example here).

    Some people like Steve Brown recommend reducing their production numbers by 100,000 bbl/day just in case :-)

    http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Is-The-EIA-Too-Optimistic-On-US-Oil-Output.html

    [Jan 25, 2016] The problems inherent in counting condensate as crude

    Notable quotes:
    "... Yeah, distillate yield is the big deal. Gasoline doesnt move food. ..."
    "... insofar as condensate is concerned, the biggest problem with too much condensate as a percentage of Crude + Condensate (C+C) refining feedstock is that condensate is deficient in distillate (jet fuel, heating oil, diesel, etc.) plus heavier components. ..."
    "... we have been on an Undulating Plateau in actual global crude oil production (45 API and lower crude oil) since 2005, while global natural gas production and associated liquids, condensate and NGL, have (so far) continued to increase. ..."
    "... I suspect that US (and perhaps global) refiners hit, in late 2014, the upper limit of how much condensate that they could process if they wanted to maintain their output of distillates and heavier products, which plausibly contributed to the 100 million barrel build in US C+C inventories, from late 2014 to late 2015, as US refiners increased their net crude oil imports from December, 2014 to December, 2015. ..."
    "... EIA data indicate that about 40% of US Lower 48 C+C production in 2015 exceeded 42 API Gravity, which is the maximum upper limit for WTI crude oil. ..."
    peakoilbarrel.com

    dmg555, 01/25/2016 at 1:43 pm

    Dear Mr. Jeffrey Brown:

    Of all the contributors on this site, you have highlighted the problems inherent in counting condensates as crude. I am not a petroleum chemist so am not so familiar with the limitations of condensates. Could you briefly tell me what you can and can not use condensates for? I get that one can refine 30-45 WTI into gasoline and other useful fuels like jet fuel, but: Can you drive on condensates? or am I correct in believing the condensates can only be turned into heating fuels.

    Thanks for your answer in advance

    Watcher , 01/25/2016 at 3:40 pm
    Yeah, distillate yield is the big deal. Gasoline doesn't move food.
    likbez , 01/25/2016 at 5:18 pm
    > "Can you drive on condensates?"

    Yes, but it's illegal in most states (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural-gas_condensate)

    It is also harmful to modern engines due to its low octane rating ( about 30 to 50) and possible presence of cancerogenius additives (benzene) and sulfur. Before 1930 it was used as an ICE fuel in low RPM, low compression engines. Both Karl Benz engines, and early Wright brothers aircraft engines used it. It has a distinctive smell when used as a fuel, which allows police to catch people using condensate illegally.

    The white gas sold today as a fuel for stoves is a condensate with the benzene and sulfur removed.

    Adding ethanol improves the octane number (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Octane_rating) and makes it possible to drive regular cars on distillate. You need E85 mix for that.

    My impression is that the drive to blend ethanol with gasoline (most of the gasoline now sold in the United States contains some ethanol) and introduction of E10, E15, and E85 that happened in the USA was at least partially dictated by the desire to blend condensate (as a substitute for gasoline) with ethanol killing two birds with one stone. Moreover denaturized ethanol contains at least 2% of condensate. All gasoline engine vehicles can use E10 so some amount of condensate is present in US gasoline almost by definition.

    E85 (used only in flexible-fuel vehicles (FFV) ) allows blending of considerable amount of reprocessed condensate (probably 40-50%) with ethanol and still getting acceptable octane number. E85 is an abbreviation for an ethanol fuel blend of 85% denatured ethanol fuel and 15% gasoline or other hydrocarbons by volume, although the exact ratio of fuel ethanol to hydrocarbons can vary considerably while still carrying the E85 label. The ethanol content is adjusted according to the local climate to maximize engine performance. ASTM 5798 specifies the allowable fuel ethanol content in E85 as ranging from 51% to 83%.

    Condensate has a very low viscosity and often used to dilute highly viscous heavier oils that cannot otherwise be efficiently transported via pipelines.

    Jeffrey J. Brown , 01/25/2016 at 1:55 pm

    I'm actually not anywhere close to be a refining expert, and I think that Fernando can give you more detailed answers, but insofar as condensate is concerned, the biggest problem with too much condensate as a percentage of Crude + Condensate (C+C) refining feedstock is that condensate is deficient in distillate (jet fuel, heating oil, diesel, etc.) plus heavier components.

    However, the quality issue, in my opinion, is something of a Red Herring.

    My principal point is not that the liquid partial substitutes for crude oil, i.e., condensate, natural gas liquids (NGL) and biofuels, are deficient in quality compared to crude oil; my principal point is that the available data, at least in my opinion, strongly suggest that we have been on an "Undulating Plateau" in actual global crude oil production (45 API and lower crude oil) since 2005, while global natural gas production and associated liquids, condensate and NGL, have (so far) continued to increase.

    The obvious question is that if it took trillions of dollars in post-2005 global upstream capex (spent on oil & gas projects) to keep us on an undulating plateau in actual global crude oil production, what happens to global crude oil production given the large, and ongoing, cutbacks in global upstream capex?

    Jeffrey J. Brown , 01/25/2016 at 2:00 pm
    But in regard to refinery yields, here is a chart of refinery yields by API Gravity. Note that Cat Feed + Distillate Yield drops from about 55% at 39 API gravity (approximately the average API value for Brent & WTI) to about 20% at 42 API Gravity (which is the maximum upper limit for WTI crude oil).

    Here's a link to, and an excerpt from, the source document for the chart:

    http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/crude-petroleum/4561

    The figure below illustrates the product yield for six typical types of crude oil processed in Canada. It includes both light and heavy as well as sweet and sour crude oils. A very light condensate* (42 API) and a synthetic crude oil are also included. The chart compares the different output when each crude type is processed in a simple distillation refinery. The output is broken down into five main product groups: gasoline, propane and butane (C3/C4), Cat feed (a partially processed material that requires further refining to make usable products), distillate (which includes diesel oil and furnace oil) and residual fuel (the heaviest and lowest-valued part of the product output, used to make heavy fuel oil and asphalt).

    As I have previously discussed, I suspect that US (and perhaps global) refiners hit, in late 2014, the upper limit of how much condensate that they could process if they wanted to maintain their output of distillates and heavier products, which plausibly contributed to the 100 million barrel build in US C+C inventories, from late 2014 to late 2015, as US refiners increased their net crude oil imports from December, 2014 to December, 2015.

    *The more common dividing line between crude & condensate is 45 API Gravity, but EIA data indicate that about 40% of US Lower 48 C+C production in 2015 exceeded 42 API Gravity, which is the maximum upper limit for WTI crude oil.

    [Jan 25, 2016] US condensate production increased from 231 mb in the start of shale oil boom in 2011 to 326 mb in 2014

    Notable quotes:
    "... US condensate production increased from 231 mb in 2011 (start of shale oil boom) to 326 mb in 2014 ..."
    "... So IEAs estimate of 36 mb x 0.67 = 24 mb would be 7.4 % of 2014 US condensate production ..."
    "... There are some reporting issues regarding Lease condensate, i.e., I suspect that a good deal of condensate production is reported as crude oil production. And in fact, the EIA refers to Crude + Condensate (C+C) as Crude oil. ..."
    "... Im a little uncertain about the figures because your link takes you to a page, under the heading Natural Gas, titled Natural Gas Liquids Lease Condensate. To me, lease condensate means wellhead condensate and that is not associated with NGLs; condensate also comes out at the NGL-separation stage down the line. ..."
    "... Most of the stored oil is condensate that contains a sulfur compound, which complicates sales because many refineries cant process it, said Victor Shum of IHS Inc. and Robin Mills at Dubai-based Manaar Energy Consulting. To market this large amount of oil within three months - the equivalent of about half a million barrels a day - Iran will have to resort to offering deep discounts, they said. ..."
    "... Iran may need to spur sales of its sulfur-heavy condensate by offering discounts of at least 10 to 15 percent, Shum said. Its main condensate customer, Dragon Aromatics Zhangzhou Co. of China, stopped buying after a fire at its plant in April and an Iranian refinery designed to use it wont be ready until 2017, causing stockpiles to build, he said. ..."
    "... If theyre already having difficulty shifting it, adding another half million barrels will be even more difficult, he said by phone. Theyll manage, but at what discount? ..."
    peakoilbarrel.com
    Jimmy 01/23/2016 at 7:02 pm
    A new post from Aleklett

    https://aleklett.wordpress.com/2016/01/22/what-will-happen-with-the-iranian-stored-40-million-barrels-of-oil/

    likbez , 01/23/2016 at 7:37 pm
    He does not ask himself an important question, what all those tankers contain. Is this crude or condensate? Or some refined products like heating oil too.
    Jeffrey J. Brown , 01/23/2016 at 7:52 pm
    For what it's worth, Iranian sources say it's condensate and fuel oil. I guess we will find out.

    http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-oil-idUSL3N1021Z120150723

    Matt Mushalik , 01/24/2016 at 5:09 am
    For comparison

    US condensate production increased from 231 mb in 2011 (start of shale oil boom) to 326 mb in 2014
    https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rl2r57nus_1a.htm

    So IEA's estimate of 36 mb x 0.67 = 24 mb would be 7.4 % of 2014 US condensate production

    Jeffrey J. Brown , 01/24/2016 at 8:31 am
    There are some reporting issues regarding "Lease condensate," i.e., I suspect that a good deal of condensate production is reported as crude oil production. And in fact, the EIA refers to Crude + Condensate (C+C) as "Crude oil."

    A survey that the EIA did last year estimated that 22%, or about 2 million bpd, of US Lower 48 C+C production consists of condensate (45 API +). And about 40% of US Lower 48 C+C production exceeded the maximum API Gravity for WTI crude oil (42 API Gravity).

    My "Condensate Con" comment:

    http://econbrowser.com/archives/2016/01/world-oil-supply-and-demand#comment-194595

    Synapsid , 01/24/2016 at 7:07 pm
    Matt Mushalik,

    I'm a little uncertain about the figures because your link takes you to a page, under the heading Natural Gas, titled Natural Gas Liquids Lease Condensate. To me, "lease condensate" means wellhead condensate and that is not associated with NGLs; condensate also comes out at the NGL-separation stage down the line. If it is the latter that the chart refers to, then the figure is not total production of condensate but only that recovered from the NGL stream.

    Somebody help?

    AlexS , 01/23/2016 at 8:27 pm
    "At the end of November, roughly 36 mb of oil, of which 67% was condensates, was floating in 18 tankers."
    Source: IEA Oil Market Report, December 2015

    Iranian oil in floating storage
    source: http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/18/investing/iran-sanctions-hoarding-oil-prices/index.html

    AlexS , 01/23/2016 at 8:37 pm
    "With no clear timeline for a restart at petrochemicals producer Dragon Aromatics, one of Tehran's key condensate buyers, after its April fire, Iran hoped new buyers in South Korea, Japan as well as in China would pick up the slack, traders said.

    The CNOOC-Shell petrochemical plant in southeastern Guangdong province could also be a replacement buyer for condensate, they said. The plant was forced to drop a regular supply pact in mid-2012 when the European Union put an embargo on trading Iranian oil."

    http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/12/03/us-china-iran-oil-idUSKBN0TM0CN20151203

    "Iran may roil global oil markets with plans to sell about 45 million barrels of fuel stored in tankers in the Persian Gulf within three months of the removal of sanctions on its economy, according to analysts.

    Most of the stored oil is condensate that contains a sulfur compound, which complicates sales because many refineries can't process it, said Victor Shum of IHS Inc. and Robin Mills at Dubai-based Manaar Energy Consulting. To market this large amount of oil within three months - the equivalent of about half a million barrels a day - Iran will have to resort to offering deep discounts, they said."

    The condensate … is pumped from the offshore South Pars natural gas deposit.

    Iran may need to spur sales of its sulfur-heavy condensate by offering discounts of at least 10 to 15 percent, Shum said. Its main condensate customer, Dragon Aromatics Zhangzhou Co. of China, stopped buying after a fire at its plant in April and an Iranian refinery designed to use it won't be ready until 2017, causing stockpiles to build, he said.

    "There will have to be a major impact on the market of selling that condensate," said Manaar Energy's Mills, who worked for Royal Dutch Shell Plc on projects in Iran from 1998 to 2003. "If they're already having difficulty shifting it, adding another half million barrels will be even more difficult," he said by phone. "They'll manage, but at what discount?"

    http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-29/iran-seen-jolting-oil-market-with-90-day-supply-after-sanctions

    [Jan 25, 2016] There are still significant discrepancies between the EIA monthly and weekly data for the US C+C production

    peakoilbarrel.com

    AlexS, 01/24/2016 at 10:54 am

    There are still significant discrepancies between the EIA monthly and weekly data for U.S. C+C production.
    Weekly numbers show an increase of 139 kb/d from September 25 to January 15, including an uninterrupted growth (of 71 kb/d) over the past 6 weeks from December 4.

    likbez , 01/24/2016 at 3:07 pm

    Alex,

    Thank you --

    This large discrepancy between weekly and monthly data suggests that sources are at least partially different and somewhat incompatible. This also puts a shadow on the accuracy of EIA data in general, especially provided by the monthly short term energy outlook.

    I think similar problems exist in other statistical data that EIA the short term energy outlook provides.

    Previously I asked a similar question about reliability of their world C+C production and consumption data, but I did this from the point of view of accuracy individual country data (which are probably less then 1%):

    http://peakoilbarrel.com/opec-except-iran-has-peaked/#comment-557103

    It is well known that OPEC countries used to cheat on their production data as their quotas depend on the current volume of production.

    Amatoori also provided a link for the following article which is relevant to this discussion: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-prices-kemp-idUSKCN0V0276?feedType=RSS&feedName=GCA-Commodities&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&dlvrit=1391616

    See also response of Watcher to his comment:
    http://peakoilbarrel.com/opec-except-iran-has-peaked/#comment-557074

    AlexS, 01/24/2016 at 7:04 pm
    likbez,

    We have many times discussed the [un]reliability of the EIA U.S. oil production statistics. They have previously relied on the state-level data, which in many cases is uncomplete, with few exceptions (like North Dakota). The EIA was adjusting these numbers according to their old methodology. But their numbers were still inaccurate and had to be revised many times during the next 12 months.

    The EIA now has a new methodology: they get production data directly from the largest companies, which account for about 90% of total output in each state. This survey-based approach now covers 15 individual states and the federal Gulf of Mexico, where the bulk of U.S. C+C is produced. The EIA claims that the new methodology has improved the quality of their estimates. But, as can be seen from the chart below, the numbers still need to be revised, and all of the revisions over the past 4 months were upward (see the chart below).

    In 2015, the EIA has not only underestimated U.S. oil production numbers for the past months, but its predictions for the next several months were also too low. As a result, the most recent numbers for some months are up to 0.5 mb/d higher than earlier estimates.

    The EIA weekly numbers are based on completely different methodology, and they were always seen as very inaccurate. Furthermore, unlike monthly statistics, weekly numbers are never revised.

    What is interesting, weekly statistics from my chart above show a rising trend in U.S. oil production from October to January, while monthly numbers suggest a declining trend. But monthly numbers for October may again be revised upward, while the numbers from November are forecast, rather than estimate. We may not know the more or less exact numbers for end-2015 until mid-2016.

    U.S. C+C production estimates from the last 5 issues of the EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook

    likbez, 01/25/2016 at 10:01 am
    There are several hypothesis that can be advanced based on the data accuracy and a huge lag of EIA and IEA data (as somebody aptly noted: the main purpose of IEA data is to please Americans):

    1. Any talk about world glut below 1 Mb/d should be dismissed as statistical noise as the accuracy of supply/demand data for most countries does not allow to defect such a glut or oil shortage.

    2. EIA is not only statistical outlet but also a propaganda outlet as well providing (sometimes false) signals to Wall street traders and as such having outsize influence on the dynamic of oil prices. They literally can move oil up or down.

    3. "The Great Condensate Con" was probably intentional and essentially is equal to creating an artificial additional pressure on oil prices via manipulated statistics.

    4. The only data that can counterbalance EIA/IEA bias can come from OPEC, but taking into account outsize influence of Saudis within the organization chances are slim.

    5. Rebound of prices, if any, can be pretty abrupt as lack of supplies will be detected only when it becomes acute.

    6. Repeating Watcher "It is indeed astounding that oil numbers, the most important numbers for all civilization, are not reliable."

    [Jan 24, 2016] Oil production and consumption numbers, the most important numbers for the civilization, are not reliable

    peakoilbarrel.com
    Amatoori, 01/22/2016 at 4:54 pm
    Interesting article on the problem with predictions and statistics

    http://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-prices-kemp-idUSKCN0V0276?feedType=RSS&feedName=GCA-Commodities&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&dlvrit=1391616

    Watcher, 01/22/2016 at 6:14 pm
    "The forecasting error for global consumption was much larger, at an average of 400,000 barrels per day, with a standard deviation of as much as 1.1 million barrels per day (tmsnrt.rs/1S9kIZz)."

    Completely meaningless. Can't depend on what is compared to.

    It is indeed astounding that oil numbers, the most important numbers for all civilization, are not reliable.

    [Jan 23, 2016] US (and perhaps global) refiners hit, late in 2014, the upper limit of the volume of condensate that they could process

    Notable quotes:
    "... My premise is that US (and perhaps global) refiners hit, late in 2014, the upper limit of the volume of condensate that they could process, if they wanted to maintain their distillate and heavier output–resulting in a build in condensate inventories, reflected as a year over year build of 100 million barrels in US C+C (Crude + Condensate) inventories. ..."
    "... in my opinion the US and (and perhaps globally) C+C inventory data are fundamentally flawed, when it comes to actual crude oil inventory data. ..."
    "... Note that (in 2015) 22% of US Lower 48 C+C production consists of condensate (45+ API gravity) and note that about 40% of US Lower 48 C+C production exceeds the maximum API gravity for WTI crude oil (42 API). ..."
    "... Crude plus Condensate Inventory build have been higher because mainly of Condensate as EIA is no longer properly distinguishing the difference? ..."
    "... If that 100 Million number is true, we might see $100 oil this year I think. ..."
    "... BTW the last two weeks saw some massive builds in "Blending components for gasoline" while the market went wild because it looked like actual products were building. ..."
    peakoilbarrel.com
    Jeffrey J. Brown, 01/21/2016 at 6:56 am
    http://econbrowser.com/archives/2016/01/world-oil-supply-and-demand#comment-194595

    My premise is that US (and perhaps global) refiners hit, late in 2014, the upper limit of the volume of condensate that they could process, if they wanted to maintain their distillate and heavier output–resulting in a build in condensate inventories, reflected as a year over year build of 100 million barrels in US C+C (Crude + Condensate) inventories.

    Therefore, in my opinion the US and (and perhaps globally) C+C inventory data are fundamentally flawed, when it comes to actual crude oil inventory data. The most common dividing line between actual crude oil and condensate is 45 API gravity, although the distillate yield drops off considerably just going from 39 API to 42 API gravity crude, and the upper limit for WTI crude oil is 42 API. . . .

    Note that (in 2015) 22% of US Lower 48 C+C production consists of condensate (45+ API gravity) and note that about 40% of US Lower 48 C+C production exceeds the maximum API gravity for WTI crude oil (42 API).

    Huckleberry Finn, 01/21/2016 at 1:34 pm
    Mr. Brown,

    Just so I understand what you are saying: Crude plus Condensate Inventory build have been higher because mainly of Condensate as EIA is no longer properly distinguishing the difference?

    If that 100 Million number is true, we might see $100 oil this year I think.

    BTW the last two weeks saw some massive builds in "Blending components for gasoline" while the market went wild because it looked like actual products were building.

    [Jan 23, 2016] The volume of oil, condencate and refined products exports from countries is very difficult to estimate accurately

    So EIA and IEA figures are just educated guesses or propaganda or both
    Notable quotes:
    "... I believe net export capacity if far more important than overall production numbers. ..."
    "... Not only data are very difficult to come by, but the accuracy is low. I think well below 1%. So all talk about glut of less then 1 Mb/d is essentially a talk about statistical noise. In no way glut of less then 1 Mb/d can be reliably detected from those figures as with world production of over 90 Mb/d their accuracy does not allow such a detection. In other words it is equal to balance. Similarly deficit below 1 Mb/d also can not be reliably detected and is equal to a balance of supply and demand. ..."
    "... If you look closely at methods by which EIA collects their information 1% accuracy is a very charitable estimate. Even in the USA, they rely of states data. ..."
    "... So as for foreign countries their last month data are probably not much different in accuracy from their short term forecasts. ..."
    peakoilbarrel.com

    Hickory, 01/20/2016 at 12:02 pm

    Do we have any good data for 'net export' by country? Perhaps I have missed it. I believe net export capacity if far more important than overall production numbers.
    Ves, 01/20/2016 at 12:59 pm
    Yes, export capacity is the most important and that is what everyone is missing. And at the same time if you have the least expensive oil you are suddenly "swing" producer but not in the sense that you control the price but that you can outlast the price downturn.
    likbez, 01/23/2016 at 12:10 am
    Hickory,

    Not only data are very difficult to come by, but the accuracy is low. I think well below 1%. So all talk about "glut" of less then 1 Mb/d is essentially a talk about statistical noise. In no way "glut" of less then 1 Mb/d can be reliably detected from those figures as with world production of over 90 Mb/d their accuracy does not allow such a detection. In other words it is equal to balance. Similarly deficit below 1 Mb/d also can not be reliably detected and is equal to a balance of supply and demand.

    If you look closely at methods by which EIA collects their information 1% accuracy is a very charitable estimate. Even in the USA, they rely of states data.

    That introduces tremendous lag. So only with time their figures about foreign countries probably became close to 1% margin of error, if at all. My impression is that more recent figures are often not more then educated guesses or propaganda (and EIA is partially a propaganda/political organization of the US government; it was created as a reaction to Arab oil embargo with a specific political agenda). So as for foreign countries their "last month" data are probably not much different in accuracy from their short term forecasts.

    [Jan 23, 2016] Notional stocks stir controversy about oil data by John Kemp

    Notable quotes:
    "... Congress held hearings amid a sense the statistics and forecasts prepared by oil and gas producers and the U.S. Department of the Interior had been either inaccurate or deliberately manipulated. ..."
    "... It is all well and good for Exxon and other firms to say well, we have been providing the statistics and the figures. The trouble is there have been no independent statistics, one congressman complained during a hearing in 1974. ..."
    "... The EIA and IEA, statistics twins, have improved the comprehensiveness, quality and availability of data on the oil market significantly ( IEA: The First 20 Years, volume 2, Scott, 1994). ..."
    "... But information on international markets remains much less comprehensive and accurate, mostly as a result of data collection problems in emerging markets and the deliberate secrecy of the oil producers. ..."
    "... And data collection and forecasting can still generate controversy when analysts believe the agencies have made errors affecting market views of the supply/demand/stocks balance and hence prices. ..."
    "... The longer the IEA arrogantly refuses to admit that its supply and demand analysis has some flaws, and the longer the agency holds to a belief that massive amounts of petroleum are still hiding somewhere, the greater the risk becomes that oil markets might crash again on another perception of oversupply. ..."
    "... Even worse, this misguided information could accidentally create a situation where oil supply falls too much and a bona fide physical shortage is created, he grumbled. ..."
    "... Simmons claimed the IEA had over-estimated the amount of oil being exported from OPEC countries; the missing barrels never existed ( There Are No Missing Barrels: Our Oil Markets Are Tightening 1999). ..."
    "... Statistics can be surprisingly political. ..."
    "... A notional 1 billion barrels was added to global inventories over 2014/15 and our latest supply and demand balances suggest builds will persist with up to 285 million barrels expected to be added to stocks over the course of 2016, the IEA wrote in its latest monthly assessment. ..."
    "... The problem is that only part of the stock build is visible. Some analysts, particularly those with a bullish view on oil prices, are once again accusing the IEA of getting its estimates wrong. ..."
    "... This time, the view seems to be the IEA is underestimating demand. Consumption is notoriously difficult to estimate and forecast even in the advanced economies; in most emerging markets it involves a large amount of guesswork because their domestic reporting and statistical systems are so weak. ..."
    "... Based on past performance, it is possible the IEA underestimated oil consumption in 2015, and is forecasting too little oil demand in 2016. ..."
    Jan 22, 2016 | Reuters

    "No other industry begins to offer the data problems that are presented by petroleum," wrote John Blair, a former U.S. government official exactly 40 years ago ("The Control of Oil", Blair, 1976).

    The production of basic statistics and forecasts about oil reserves, production, consumption and stocks ought to be a matter of routine.

    But it has at times sparked fierce debate and even political controversy when statisticians and forecasters have been accused of making significant errors ("The Politics of Mistrust," Wildavsky and Tenenbaum, 1981).

    Doubts about the reliability of energy statistics were a major part of the "energy crisis" that erupted during the 1970s.

    As late as 1968, the United States reportedly had 4 million barrels per day of spare production capacity and thousands of wells across Texas and Louisiana were being operated for fewer than 10 days per month.

    But by March 1972, spare capacity had dropped to zero, every well was at maximum production, domestic output was falling, and politicians began to speak of an energy crisis.

    The oil embargo, announced in October 1973, intensified the sense that something had gone badly wrong, leaving the country unprepared. ("Energy Policy in America since 1945," Vietor, 1984).

    Politicians and the media blamed a conspiracy between domestic producers and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries for engineering the crisis to drive up prices and profits.

    Congress held hearings amid a sense the statistics and forecasts prepared by oil and gas producers and the U.S. Department of the Interior had been either inaccurate or deliberately manipulated.

    One outcome of the crisis was the creation of a new U.S. Department of Energy and within it a new Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 1977 to produce more accurate and independent data.

    Another was the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974 to gather better statistics and bring greater transparency to the international energy markets.

    Prior to the energy crisis, most data and forecasters were confidential and under the control of oil and gas producers themselves.

    "It is all well and good for Exxon and other firms to say 'well, we have been providing the statistics and the figures.' The trouble is there have been no independent statistics," one congressman complained during a hearing in 1974.

    After the energy crisis, data collection and forecasting would be led by impartial civil servants at national and international levels.

    The EIA and IEA, statistics twins, have improved the comprehensiveness, quality and availability of data on the oil market significantly ("IEA: The First 20 Years," volume 2, Scott, 1994).

    Improvements in data collection and forecasting in the United States, led by the EIA, have largely quelled controversy about domestic oil production, consumption and stocks.

    But information on international markets remains much less comprehensive and accurate, mostly as a result of data collection problems in emerging markets and the deliberate secrecy of the oil producers.

    And data collection and forecasting can still generate controversy when analysts believe the agencies have made errors affecting market views of the supply/demand/stocks balance and hence prices.

    MISSING BARRELS IN 1998/1999

    The most notorious controversy in the post-crisis era erupted in the late 1990s when the IEA data showed a large discrepancy between the amount of oil reportedly produced but not reported in the consumption numbers or visible in the recorded stocks.

    "It is just over a year since the saga of the 'missing barrels' began," the IEA wrote in June 1999. "Oil prices tumbled as a result of the Asian financial crisis, a mild winter, increasing production from Iraq and an OPEC quota increase in November 1997."

    The agency went on to wonder: "Millions of barrels of unneeded oil were placed in storage around the world; many of them have yet to reappear ... Did the barrels reported as produced, but that have not shown up in OECD stocks, ever really exist?"

    Fast-forward six months and the agency was confident it had found the answer. Its December 1999 monthly report entitled "an un-fond farewell to the missing barrels" explained:

    "During the first half of 1998 a large amount of the excess supply in the oil market was unaccounted for ... There was strong disagreement at the time as to whether these 'missing barrels' were the result of statistical errors, or whether they represented a large increase in oil stored in non-OECD areas.

    "Almost two years later ... the weight of evidence is that the missing barrels did exist and that they have now returned to the market."

    But the missing barrels in the IEA's statistical system brought a withering response from some analysts, notably Matthew Simmons, who wrote a blistering critique faulting the agency.

    "The longer the IEA arrogantly refuses to admit that its supply and demand analysis has some flaws, and the longer the agency holds to a belief that massive amounts of petroleum are still hiding somewhere, the greater the risk becomes that oil markets might crash again on another perception of oversupply."

    "Even worse, this misguided information could accidentally create a situation where oil supply falls too much and a bona fide physical shortage is created," he grumbled.

    Simmons claimed the IEA had over-estimated the amount of oil being exported from OPEC countries; the missing barrels never existed ("There Are No Missing Barrels: Our Oil Markets Are Tightening" 1999).

    Statistics can be surprisingly political.

    NOTIONAL BARRELS IN 2015/2016

    The missing barrels controversy is now stirring again because of the huge stock builds implied by the IEA's estimates for crude supply and demand between 2014 and 2016.

    "A notional 1 billion barrels was added to global inventories over 2014/15 and our latest supply and demand balances suggest builds will persist with up to 285 million barrels expected to be added to stocks over the course of 2016," the IEA wrote in its latest monthly assessment.

    In the fourth quarter of 2015, global oil stocks swelled by a notional 1.8 million barrels per day, according to the IEA ("Oil Market Report", January 2016).

    The problem is that only part of the stock build is visible. Some analysts, particularly those with a bullish view on oil prices, are once again accusing the IEA of getting its estimates wrong.

    This time, the view seems to be the IEA is underestimating demand. Consumption is notoriously difficult to estimate and forecast even in the advanced economies; in most emerging markets it involves a large amount of guesswork because their domestic reporting and statistical systems are so weak.

    In the statistical framework, non-OPEC production and OECD stocks are generally the easiest to track, while OPEC output, emerging market demand and non-OECD stocks are the source of most of the errors.

    The IEA carefully prepares forecasts for oil consumption and supply for the year ahead, and estimates of actual outturn, which are revised for several years afterward.

    Between 1994 and 2015, the forecasting error between the initial forecast and the final estimate for non-OPEC supply was zero, with a standard deviation of just 90,000 barrels per day ( tmsnrt.rs/1S9kD8l ).

    The implication is that the IEA has been able to predict non-OPEC supply with a high degree of accuracy and with no systematic bias in its forecasts.

    The forecasting error for global consumption was much larger, at an average of 400,000 barrels per day, with a standard deviation of as much as 1.1 million barrels per day ( tmsnrt.rs/1S9kIZz ).

    Oil demand has proved much trickier to forecast and measure accurately, mostly because its large cyclical component and the problems posed by emerging markets, where demand has been growing rapidly but is measured badly.

    The IEA has already raised oil consumption in 2015 from a forecast 93.3 million barrels at the time of the January 2015 Oil Market Report to an estimated 94.5 million barrels in the January 2016 report.

    Two things follow from this analysis, one more bullish for the outlook for oil prices, and one more bearish.

    Based on past performance, it is possible the IEA underestimated oil consumption in 2015, and is forecasting too little oil demand in 2016.

    If that proves to be true, the degree of excess supply, and the build up in stocks, both in 2015 and 2016, might be somewhat smaller than the IEA has estimated and predicted, which would be mildly bullish for prices.

    But if the errors are mostly concentrated on the demand side, then anything which causes economic growth and fuel demand to slow in 2016 would be even more bearish.

    (Editing by David Evans )

    [Jan 20, 2016] Resource Insights The great condensate con Is the oil glut just about oil

    Notable quotes:
    "... My guess is that the surplus of condensate and blended dumbell crudes has been stacking up in storage tanks, especially in the US, cutting the amount of working storage available to purchasers. Lack of storage increases the sensitivity of the market price to supply/demand imbalance magnitude. If a purchaser of oil has plenty of cheap storage, they might purchase oil they cant use today at a slight discount and save it for future use. If they have no storage they wont buy it at all, no matter how low the price. ..."
    "... I never could understand why NGLs are included in oil production in the EIA stats ..."
    "... only 13% of NGLs can be blended with gasoline (the pentane). ..."
    "... the available data strongly suggest that we have been on an Undulating Plateau in actual global crude oil production since 2005, while global natural gas production and associated liquids, condensate natural gas liquids, have so far continued to increase. ..."
    "... Again, what the EIA calls Crude oil is actually Crude + Condensate (C+C), and based on EIA data 22% of Lower 48 C+C production in 2015 exceeded 45 API gravity and about 40% of US Lower 48 C+C production exceeded the maximum API limit for WTI crude (42 API Gravity). ..."
    resourceinsights.blogspot.com
    Joe said...
    My guess is that the surplus of condensate and blended "dumbell crudes" has been stacking up in storage tanks, especially in the US, cutting the amount of working storage available to purchasers. Lack of storage increases the sensitivity of the market price to supply/demand imbalance magnitude. If a purchaser of oil has plenty of cheap storage, they might purchase oil they can't use today at a slight discount and save it for future use. If they have no storage they won't buy it at all, no matter how low the price.
    9:42 AM
    energyskeptic said...
    Kurt, are you saying that the apparent oil glut is mostly NGL's and not oil? Also, are NGL's what make it appear that oil storage is full? I never could understand why NGL's are included in oil production in the EIA stats, since only 13% of NGL's can be blended with gasoline (the pentane).

    The rest is ethane, butane, propane, and isobutane -- mainly useful for petrochemicals, plastics, and heating (propane).

    By the way, I've just written a book for Charlie Hall's Springer Energy Briefs series called "When Trucks stop running: Energy and the Future of Transportation" where I look at all the possible ways trucks, rail, and ships could keep moving as oil declines, including NGL's, CNG, LNG, coal-to-liquids, biofuels, hydrogen, electrification, etc. More info at http://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319263731
    or
    http://energyskeptic.com/2016/when-trucks-stop-running-so-does-civilization/

    I think all the endless electric car nonsense is effective at distracting people from the heavy-duty transportation that really matters. Virtually everything in our homes, everything in our stores, got there on a truck. Prior to that, 90 percent of those items were transported on a ship and/or a train, which all run on finite oil. If trucks, trains, and ships stopped running, our global economy and way of life would stop too.

    5:02 PM
    Kurt Cobb said...
    Alice,

    First, I find myself hitting your site regularly since so many people refer to your work. So, thanks for the great work you are doing.

    As for condensates and NGLs, terminology in this case is the enemy of clarity. For a good treatment of this problem How the changing definition of oil has deceived both policymakers and the public . NGLs generally refer to both natural gas plant liquids and lease condensate which originate from two different sources, i.e. gas wells vs. oil wells. And, yes, part of the storage issue is the storage of lease condensate since it is often, as indicated, mixed with crude oil. Natural gas plant liquids come from natural gas processing plants and so are not typically stored in combination with crude oil (though in gasoline refining, butane is usually mixed in with gasoline).

    Yes, propane and butane, are used for transportation fuels. But their supply is limited by the amount of natural gas demand. No one withdraws natural gas from wells solely for the propane or butane it contains. There are practical limits to how many propane-powered vehicles we can have.

    Now, if we didn't make certain chemicals from natural gas plant liquids, we would be making them from oil, and so in an indirect way this keeps more oil in the liquid fuels market rather than the petrochemical market. But I think the substitution effect here is exaggerated by those saying we should consider all liquids as part of the oil supply. As I said in the piece, the marketplace certainly makes distinctions between these products.

    I think you are right about truck freight being crucial to our current way of living. I remember an exchange with an Italian reader who explained that while European passenger rail is far superior to that of the United States, one reason for this is often not understood. Much of the freight in the United States moves by rail at some point and so our tracks are filled with freight trains that delay passenger travel. In Europe 80 percent of the freight moves by truck. The rails are not so burdened with freight and so passenger trains move with fewer delays and at higher speeds.

    But in both places truck freight remains crucial. Best of luck with your new book.

    5:37 PM
    westexas said...
    Condensate is basically natural gasoline, and it is a byproduct of natural gas production. However, the issue of relative quality, between crude and condensate, is a little bit of a red herring.

    The CC's (Cornucopian Crowd) argue that there is no sign of any kind of peak in sight. I would argue that this assertion is manifestly false when it comes to actual crude oil production (45 API and lower crude oil). In my opinion, the available data strongly suggest that we have been on an "Undulating Plateau" in actual global crude oil production since 2005, while global natural gas production and associated liquids, condensate & natural gas liquids, have so far continued to increase.

    Again, what the EIA calls "Crude oil" is actually Crude + Condensate (C+C), and based on EIA data 22% of Lower 48 C+C production in 2015 exceeded 45 API gravity and about 40% of US Lower 48 C+C production exceeded the maximum API limit for WTI crude (42 API Gravity).

    [Jan 20, 2016] Gasoline and Distillate Inventories Overshadow Crude Oil Market

    See also http://ir.eia.gov/wpsr/wpsrsummary.pdf
    Notable quotes:
    "... The EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration) reported that the US gasoline inventory rose by 8.4 MMbbls to 240.4 MMbbls for the week ending January 8, 2016. This rise was less than the rise of 10.6 MMbbls during the week ending January 1, 2016. Similarly, the US distillate inventory rose by 6.1 MMbbls to 165.6 MMbbls for the week ending January 8, 2016. ..."
    finance.yahoo.com

    Crude Oil Rally Short-Lived: Fundamentals Still Feeding the Bears

    ( Continued from Prior Part )

    EIA's gasoline and distillate inventories

    The EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration) reported that the US gasoline inventory rose by 8.4 MMbbls to 240.4 MMbbls for the week ending January 8, 2016. This rise was less than the rise of 10.6 MMbbls during the week ending January 1, 2016. Similarly, the US distillate inventory rose by 6.1 MMbbls to 165.6 MMbbls for the week ending January 8, 2016.

    EIA's gasoline and distillate inventories by region

    The EIA added that of the five major US storage hubs, the Gulf Coast, the Midwest, and the East Coast recorded the highest gasoline inventories for the week ending January 8, 2016. To learn more about the US storage hubs, read the previous part of this series. Gasoline inventories in these regions came in at 82.6 MMbbls, 57.6 MMbbls, and 62.9 MMbbls, respectively.

    Similarly, distillate inventories were highest in the Gulf Coast, the Midwest, and the East Coast regions. The US distillate inventories were 48.1 MMbbls, 33.3 MMbbls, and 64.9 MMbbls, respectively, in these three regions.

    EIA's gasoline and distillate inventory estimates and impact

    Reuters' surveys estimated that the US gasoline inventory would rise by 2.7 MMbbls and the US distillate inventory would rise by 2 MMbbls for the week ending January 8, 2016. The greater-than-expected rise in refined products inventories weighed on crude oil prices. Lower crude oil prices benefit US refiners like Phillips 66 (PSX), Western Refining (WNR), Alon USA Partners (ALDW), and Northern Tier Energy (NTI). On the other hand, higher refined products inventories put pressure on refiners. The refined products inventories rose due to the fall in retail demand this winter season. Read about refinery demand in the fifth part of this series.

    The fall in retail and refinery demand also affects crude oil prices and oil producers like Chevron (CVX), Whiting Petroleum (WLL), and Continental Resources (CLR). ETFs like the ProShares UltraShort Bloomberg Crude Oil ETF (SCO), the Vanguard Energy ETF (VDE), and the First Trust Energy AlphaDEX Fund (FXN) are also affected by the ups and down in the oil market.

    Read why US crude oil production is crucial for the global crude oil market in the next part of this series.

    Continue to Next Part

    [Jan 19, 2016] The Condensate Con How Real Is The Oil Glut by Kurt Cobb

    Notable quotes:
    "... Lease condensate consists of very light hydrocarbons which condense from gaseous into liquid form when they leave the high pressure of oil reservoirs and exit through the top of an oil well. This condensate is less dense than oil and can interfere with optimal refining if too much is mixed with actual crude oil. ..."
    "... Refiners are already complaining that so-called blended crudes contain too much lease condensate, and they are seeking out better crudes straight from the wellhead. Brown has dubbed all of this the great condensate con. ..."
    "... what the EIA calls crude oil is actually crude plus lease condensate. ..."
    "... the United States isnt producing quite as much actual crude oil as the raw numbers would lead us to believe. This EIA chart breaking down the API gravity of U.S. crude production supports this view. ..."
    "... Exactly how much of Americas and the worlds presumed crude oil production is actually condensate remains a mystery. The data just arent sufficient to separate condensate production from crude oil in most instances. ..."
    "... Here it is worth mentioning that when oil companies talk about the price of oil, they are referring to the price quoted on popular futures exchanges -- prices which reflect only the price of crude oil itself. The exchanges do not allow other products such as condensates to be mixed with the oil that is delivered to holders of exchange contracts. ..."
    "... Which leads to a simple rule coined by Brown: If what youre selling cannot be sold on the world market as crude oil, then its not crude oil. ..."
    "... If Brown is right, we have all been victims of the great condensate con which has lulled the world into a sense of complacency with regard to actual oil supplies--supplies he believes have been barely growing or stagnant since 2005. ..."
    "... Oil traders are acting on fundamentally flawed data, Brown told me by phone. ..."
    "... it took trillions of dollars of investment from 2005 through today just to maintain what he believes is almost flat production in oil. ..."
    Jan 19, 2016 | OilPrice.com
    My favorite Texas oilman is at it again. In a recent email he's pointing out to everyone who will listen that the supposed oversupply of crude oil isn't quite what it seems. Yes, there is a large overhang of excess oil in the market. But how much of that oversupply is honest-to-god oil and how much is so-called lease condensate which gets carelessly lumped in with crude oil? And, why is this important to understanding the true state of world oil supplies?

    In order to answer these questions we need to get some preliminaries out of the way.

    Lease condensate consists of very light hydrocarbons which condense from gaseous into liquid form when they leave the high pressure of oil reservoirs and exit through the top of an oil well. This condensate is less dense than oil and can interfere with optimal refining if too much is mixed with actual crude oil. The oil industry's own engineers classify oil as hydrocarbons having an API gravity of less than 45--the higher the number, the lower the density and the "lighter" the substance. Lease condensate is defined as hydrocarbons having an API gravity between 45 and 70. (For a good discussion about condensates and their place in the marketplace, read "Neither Fish nor Fowl – Condensates Muscle in on NGL and Crude Markets.")

    Refiners are already complaining that so-called "blended crudes" contain too much lease condensate, and they are seeking out better crudes straight from the wellhead. Brown has dubbed all of this the great condensate con.

    Brown points out that U.S. net crude oil imports for December 2015 grew from the previous December, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the statistical arm of the U.S. Department of Energy. U.S. statistics for crude oil imports include condensate, but don't break out condensate separately. Brown believes that with America already awash in condensate, almost all of those imports must have been crude oil proper.

    Brown asks, "Why would refiners continue to import large--and increasing--volumes of actual crude oil, if they didn't have to--even as we saw a huge build in [U.S.] C+C [crude oil plus condensate] inventories?"

    Part of the answer is that U.S. production of crude oil has been declining since mid-2015. But another part of the answer is that what the EIA calls crude oil is actually crude plus lease condensate. With huge new amounts of lease condensate coming from America's condensate-rich tight oil fields -- the ones tapped by hydraulic fracturing or fracking -- the United States isn't producing quite as much actual crude oil as the raw numbers would lead us to believe. This EIA chart breaking down the API gravity of U.S. crude production supports this view.

    Exactly how much of America's and the world's presumed crude oil production is actually condensate remains a mystery. The data just aren't sufficient to separate condensate production from crude oil in most instances.

    Brown explains: "My premise is that U.S. (and probably global) refiners hit in late 2014 the upper limit of the volume of condensate that they could process" and still maintain the product mix they want to produce. That would imply that condensate inventories have been building faster than crude inventories and that the condensate is looking for an outlet.

    That outlet has been in blended crudes, that is heavier crude oil that is blended with condensates to make it lighter and therefore something that fits the definition of light crude. Light crude is generally easier to refine and thus more valuable.

    The trouble is, the blends lack the characteristics of nonblended crudes of comparable density (that is, the same API gravity), and refiners are discovering to their chagrin that the mix of products they can get out of blended crudes isn't what they expect.

    So, now we can try to answer our questions. Brown believes that worldwide production of condensate "accounts for virtually all of the post-2005 increase in C+C [crude plus condensate] production." What this implies is that almost all of the 4 million-barrel-per-day increase in world "oil" production from 2005 through 2014 may actually be lease condensate. And that would mean crude oil production proper has been nearly flat during this period -- a conjecture supported by record and near record average daily prices for crude oil from 2011 through 2014. Only when demand softened in late 2014 did prices begin to drop.

    Here it is worth mentioning that when oil companies talk about the price of oil, they are referring to the price quoted on popular futures exchanges -- prices which reflect only the price of crude oil itself. The exchanges do not allow other products such as condensates to be mixed with the oil that is delivered to holders of exchange contracts.

    But when oil companies (and governments) talk about oil supply, they include all sorts of things that cannot be sold as oil on the world market including biofuels, refinery gains and natural gas plant liquids as well as lease condensate. Which leads to a simple rule coined by Brown: If what you're selling cannot be sold on the world market as crude oil, then it's not crude oil.

    The glut that developed in 2015 may ultimately be tied to some increases in actual, honest-to-god crude oil production. The accepted story from 2005 through 2014 has been that crude oil production has been growing, albeit at a significantly slower rate than the previous nine-year period--15.7 percent from 1996 through 2005 versus 5.4 percent from 2005 through 2014 according to the EIA. If Brown is right, we have all been victims of the great condensate con which has lulled the world into a sense of complacency with regard to actual oil supplies--supplies he believes have been barely growing or stagnant since 2005.

    "Oil traders are acting on fundamentally flawed data," Brown told me by phone. Often a contrarian, Brown added: "The time to invest is when there's blood in the streets. And, there's blood in the streets."

    He explained: "Who of us in January of 2014 believed that prices would be below $30 in January of 2016? If the conventional wisdom was wrong in 2014, maybe it's similarly wrong in 2016" that prices will remain low for a long time.

    Brown points out that it took trillions of dollars of investment from 2005 through today just to maintain what he believes is almost flat production in oil. With oil companies slashing exploration budgets in the face of low oil prices and production declining at an estimated 4.5 and 6.7 percent per year for existing wells worldwide, a recovery in oil demand might push oil prices much higher very quickly.

    That possibility is being obscured by the supposed rise in crude oil production in recent years that may just turn out to be an artifact of the great condensate con.

    By Kurt Cobb

    [Jan 19, 2016] EIA US oil consumption in 2017 forecast

    peakoilbarrel.com
    R Walter, 01/19/2016 at 9:06 am
    http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-114/issue-1b/general-interest/steo-eia-cuts-2016-crude-oil-price-forecasts.html

    For the US:

    [Jan 19, 2016] Do you think the EIA's forecast is correct?

    Notable quotes:
    "... I think the EIA's AEO 2015 reference case oil prices seem reasonable, but their recent short term forecast based on the oil futures market is likely to be incorrect. ..."
    peakoilbarrel.com

    Dennis Coyne, 01/18/2016 at 2:15 pm

    Hi Glenn,

    Do you think the EIA's forecast is correct? The EIA has not posted anything here, but you have, I think the EIA's AEO 2015 reference case oil prices seem reasonable, but their recent short term forecast based on the oil futures market is likely to be incorrect.

    Just double checked AEO 2015 ref scenario, 2016 may be a little high, probably $50/b for an average 2016 price is more reasonable.

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